{ "id": 8450979, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. KEVIN PHELPS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Phelps", "decision_date": "2004-01-23", "docket_number": "No. 93830", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "17", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3560064 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909165 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536114 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98-99" }, { "page": "99" }, { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781334 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351227 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" }, { "page": "532" }, { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5470220 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542613 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" }, { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55998 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483565 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" }, { "page": "390" }, { "page": "390" }, { "page": "390" }, { "page": "390-91" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291993 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83-84" }, { "page": "85" }, { "page": "83-84" }, { "page": "83-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588813 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" }, { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453260 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196", "parenthetical": "assessing \"confinement\" in terms of \"restraint\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602879 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096316 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430-31" }, { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318-19" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "2788-89" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "2789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472345 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 995, "char_count": 26779, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.29131731891135e-07, "percentile": 0.9421763585444557 }, "sha256": "ad25ce9087b630687c1b0f3970e60c3cd07f6fc95f8dabb0c7696feeda4bc9d3", "simhash": "1:fb76bb1eef77d0bc", "word_count": 4497 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:00:11.250886+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. KEVIN PHELPS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THOMAS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Kevin Phelps, was convicted by a jury of heinous battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.1(a) (West 1996)) and aggravated kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 2(a)(3) (West 1996)). The circuit court of Cook County sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of 15 years for the aggravated kidnapping and 30 years for the heinous battery. The appellate court affirmed defendant\u2019s convictions but modified the sentences to run concurrently. 329 Ill. App. 3d 1. We allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).\nBACKGROUND\nEH., a high school student, testified that, in late 1996, she befriended defendant, a paraplegic who she knew also as \u201cSniper.\u201d During the summer of 1997, EH. visited defendant almost every other day at his town house on South St. Lawrence in Chicago. In August 1997, EH. was grounded and told she could not see defendant anymore.\nOn September 4, 1997, as EH. was leaving school, two men she had never seen before called out to her, using her nickname. One of the men said, \u201cFolks said come get your stuff.\u201d EH. knew that the man was referring to defendant, as she had left some things at defendant\u2019s house. She told the men that she would pick it up later and got on a bus to head home. When she exited the bus, the same two men drove up behind her. One of the men grabbed EH.\u2019s jacket and told her to get into the car. The two men drove her to defendant\u2019s house, escorted her inside, and then left her alone with defendant.\nDefendant asked EH. where she had been, what she had been doing, and whom she had been seeing for the past several weeks. Although she explained to defendant that her sister had grounded her, defendant continued to interrogate her for the next hour. During this time, defendant twice asked EH. to get him a glass of water from the kitchen, and EH. agreed. Defendant then told EH. to take off her clothes. When she refused, defendant pulled out a gun, placed it on his lap, and again asked EH. to take off her clothes. This time she complied. Once EH.\u2019s clothes were off, defendant threw a cup of flammable liquid on her and set her on fire. EH. ran to an upstairs bathroom, climbed into the tub, and extinguished the flames with water. Hoping to jump out the window, EH. searched for some clothes. Unable to find any, she had no choice but to return to the room that defendant occupied.\nEH. remained with defendant for approximately an hour, during which time she repeatedly asked for her clothes so that she could leave. EH. explained that she did not leave immediately after the burning both because defendant would not return her clothes and because defendant had a gun. Defendant gave EH. some Vaseline to rub on her wounds and, when that proved ineffective, poured hydrogen peroxide over her burns. Eventually, defendant asked EH. whether anyone knew where she was, to which she replied, \u201cmy family would think that this would be the first place I was because this was the place I was told not to come.\u201d Defendant then asked EH. what she would tell people if he \u201clet [her] go.\u201d EH. assured defendant that she would blame her attack on someone else. Defendant then gave EH. her clothes back, told her to get dressed, and allowed her to leave. On cross-examination, EH. admitted that defendant never actually told her that she could not leave.\nP.H. returned home around 8 p.m., screaming, \u201cSniper burnt me.\u201d EH.\u2019s sister called an ambulance, and P.H. was taken to the hospital where she was diagnosed with second and third degree burns over 36 percent of her body. EH. spent two weeks in the intensive care unit and two months in a rehabilitation center. The burns and resulting skin grafts left EH. with permanent and prominent scarring over 80% of her body.\nDefendant, in turn, testified that he did not see EH. on September 4, 1997, and that he was not at the South St. Lawrence town house at all that day. According to defendant, he had lived in the South St. Lawrence town house until June of 1997, at which point he moved onto East 62nd Street with his mother, his brother, and his stepfather. On the day of EH.\u2019s attack, he never left the house on East 62nd Street. Although EH. had been his girlfriend for several months at the time of the attack, defendant had not seen her in several weeks because she was grounded. He first learned of EH.\u2019s injuries at approximately 10:30 p.m. on the night of September 4, 1997, when the police arrived at the house on East 62nd Street to question him.\nDefendant was charged with kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West 1996)), aggravated kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 2(a)(3) (West 1996)), heinous battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.1(a) (West 1996)), and attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4(a), 9 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West 1996)). The jury convicted defendant of aggravated kidnapping and heinous battery, and the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of 15 and 30 years respectively.\nOn appeal, defendant argued that (1) the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the prosecutor misstated the evidence in closing argument; (3) the imposition of consecutive sentences constituted an improper double enhancement; and (4) the use of the same factor to enhance both of the crimes for which he was convicted constituted an improper double enhancement. The appellate court rejected all but the consecutive sentencing argument. Accordingly, it affirmed defendant\u2019s convictions but modified the sentences to run concurrently. 329 Ill. App. 3d at 12.\nBefore this court, the State argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case does not constitute a double enhancement. By way of cross-appeal, defendant renews his arguments with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument, and the use of the same factor to enhance both of the crimes for which he was convicted.\nANALYSIS\n1. Sufficiency of the Evidence\nWe begin with the sufficiency of the evidence. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict on appeal, a reviewing court\u2019s inquiry is \u201cwhether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89 (1979); People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 430-31 (2000). Under this standard, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues of the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d at 431. Indeed, it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to \u201cfairly *** resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.\u201d Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573, 99 S. Ct. at 2789.\nTo obtain a conviction for aggravated kidnapping, the State must prove that the defendant (1) knowingly and secretly confined the victim against her will, and (2) inflicted great bodily harm upon the victim. 720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 1(a)(1), 10 \u2014 2(a)(3) (West 1996). Here, defendant concedes that he inflicted great bodily harm when he doused EH. with a flammable liquid and set her ablaze. Nevertheless, he insists that EH.\u2019s ordeal in the South St. Lawrence town house was neither secret nor against her will. As for the visit not being secret, defendant notes that her presence at the South St. Lawrence town house was known to the two men who forced her into the car and delivered her to defendant. In addition, defendant relies upon the fact that, when defendant asked P.H. whether anyone knew where she was, she replied, \u201cmy family would think that this would be the first place I was because this was the place I was told not to come.\u201d As for the visit not being against her will, defendant relies heavily upon EH.\u2019s admission that defendant never actually told her that she could not leave. In addition, defendant argues that, although EH. could have left during either of her trips to the kitchen for a glass of water, she returned to defendant\u2019s presence both times. Finally, defendant maintains that his paraplegia rendered him physically unable to prevent EH. from leaving.\nFor purposes of the aggravated kidnapping statute, secret confinement may be shown by proof of either the secrecy of the confinement or the secrecy of the place of confinement. People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 187 (1992). In this context, \u201csecret\u201d has been defined as concealed, hidden, or not made public. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d at 187. \u201cConfinement,\u201d in turn, has been defined as \u201c[t]he act of imprisoning or restraining someone.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 294 (7th ed. 1999); see also People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 196 (1988) (assessing \u201cconfinement\u201d in terms of \u201crestraint\u201d). Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence here shows that EH. was forced into a car on her way home from school and delivered to defendant\u2019s apartment against her will. Once EH. was there, defendant brandished a gun, ordered EH. to strip naked, set EH. on fire, withheld the return of EH.\u2019s clothing for more than an hour after the burning, and released P.H. only after she agreed to blame her attack on a stranger. On these facts, a rational jury easily could have concluded that defendant knowingly and secretly confined EH. against her will. Given that defendant concedes the infliction of great bodily harm, his conviction for aggravated kidnapping must be affirmed.\nWe are unpersuaded by defendant\u2019s insistence that both the secrecy and the involuntariness of EH.\u2019s confinement \u201cis very much in dispute.\u201d To be sure, EH. admitted that defendant never actually told her that she was not free to leave, and defendant\u2019s paraplegia certainly limits his range of motion. Nevertheless, a rational trier of fact could conclude that, his paraplegia notwithstanding, defendant demonstrated that EH. was not free to go by brandishing a gun, ordering her to strip naked, setting her on fire, and withholding the return of her clothing for more than an hour. Indeed, EH. testified that, after extinguishing her burning torso in the upstairs bathroom, she \u201cwas trying to find something to put on so [she] could jump out the window.\u201d A jury certainly could conclude that jumping out of a second-story window is not the typical exit strategy of a social guest who is free to come and go as she pleases. And while EH. twice returned to defendant\u2019s presence after going to the kitchen for a glass of water, she did so before defendant brandished the gun. Even assuming, then, that EH. was not confined against her will when she returned with the glasses of water, a rational jury could conclude that EH. was confined against her will when defendant brandished a gun and set the ensuing events in motion.\nAs for secrecy, defendant\u2019s case is hardly helped by the fact that EH.\u2019s presence at the South St. Lawrence town house was known to the two men who forced her into a car and delivered her to defendant\u2019s doorstep. These men either knew what defendant was about to do, in which case they were accomplices, or they did not know, in which case EH.\u2019s confinement remained a secret even to them. Either way, a rational jury could conclude that, on the afternoon of September 4, 1997, EH. was secretly confined in the South St. Lawrence town house. Moreover, EH.\u2019s assertion that \u201cmy family would think that this would be the first place I was because this was the place I was told not to come\u201d is just as likely a bluff designed to secure her release as it is an objective statement of fact. When EH. made this assertion, she was naked, suffering from third-degree burns over 36% of her body, attempting to secure the return of her clothing, and responding to her armed captor\u2019s inquiry as to whether anyone knew where she was. We have no trouble affirming defendant\u2019s aggravated kidnapping conviction.\n2. Closing Argument\nDefendant next argues that he was deprived of a fair trial when the assistant State\u2019s Attorney made certain misleading statements during closing arguments. Specifically, defendant notes that (1) although EH. twice testified that defendant never told her that she could not leave, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney told the jury that he did; and (2) although EH. testified that the two men who forced her into the car told her that \u201cFolks\u201d wanted to see her, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney told the jury that EH. was told that \u201cSniper\u201d wanted to see her. According to defendant, these statements \u201cundoubtedly had a prejudicial impact on the jury\u201d and thereby denied him of his right to a fair trial.\nTo preserve an issue for review, a defendant must raise an objection both at trial and in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176 (1988). Here, defendant did neither. Moreover, defendant does not even attempt to argue that the alleged misstatements rise to the level of plain error. See 134 Ill. 2d R 615(a). Accordingly, we find this issue waived. See People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 502-03 (2000).\n3. Double Enhancement: Sentencing Next, the State argues that the appellate court erred in concluding that the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case constituted an improper double enhancement. We agree.\nDefendant was found guilty of aggravated kidnapping and heinous battery. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of 15 years for the aggravated kidnapping and 30 years for the heinous battery. In imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court relied upon section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which provides:\n\u201cThe court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury *** in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1996).\nOn appeal, defendant argued that he was subjected to an improper double enhancement because the factor relied upon to impose consecutive sentences \u2014 the infliction of severe bodily injury \u2014 is already an element of the offenses for which he was convicted. The appellate court agreed and modified defendant\u2019s sentences to run concurrently. 329 Ill. App. 3d at 12.\nGenerally, a factor implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense. People v. Ferguson, 132 Ill. 2d 86, 96 (1989). Stated differently, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing \u201ca harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.\u201d People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 83-84 (1992). Such dual use of a single factor is often referred to as a \u201cdouble enhancement.\u201d Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d at 85. The prohibition against double enhancements is based on the assumption that, in designating the appropriate range of punishment for a criminal offense, the legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense. People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995). The double-enhancement rule is one of statutory construction (Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d at 390), and the standard of review therefore is de novo (People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996)).\nA textbook example of double enhancement is found in People v. White, 114 Ill. 2d 61 (1986). In White, this court held that, although it is a statutory aggravating factor, the victim\u2019s age cannot form the basis for an extended-term sentence where the defendant is convicted of aggravated battery of a child. White, 114 Ill. 2d at 66. As White explained, in establishing aggravated battery of a child as a statutory offense separate from aggravated battery, the legislature included the victim\u2019s age as an element of the offense. As importantly, the legislature attached a higher penalty to aggravated battery of a child (then a Class 2 felony) than it did to mere aggravated battery (a Class 3 felony). Thus, the victim\u2019s age formed not only an element of the offense but also the basis for an enhanced penalty. By then using the victim\u2019s age yet again as the basis of an extended-term sentence, the trial court did exactly what the double enhancement rule is designed to prevent \u2014 subjected the defendant to a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed. White, 114 Ill. 2d at 66.\nDouble enhancement also occurs when the same factor is used twice to elevate the severity of the offense itself. For example, in People v. Haron, 85 Ill. 2d 261 (1981), the defendant committed a battery, which ordinarily is a Class A misdemeanor. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 3(b). However, because the defendant used a deadly weapon in the course of committing that battery, the State elevated the charge to aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 4(e). The State then used the deadly weapon again to elevate the aggravated battery charge to armed violence, a Class X felony that occurs when a person commits a felony while armed with a dangerous weapon. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 33A \u2014 2, 33A \u2014 3(a). In reviewing the propriety of these charges, this court explained that \u201cthe General Assembly did not intend that the presence of a weapon serve to enhance an offense from misdemeanor to felony and also to serve as the basis for a charge of armed violence.\u201d Haron, 85 Ill. 2d at 278. Accordingly, the dismissal of the armed violence charge was affirmed. Haron, 85 Ill. 2d at 280.\nApplying these principles to the present case, we conclude that defendant\u2019s consecutive sentences do not constitute a double enhancement. Defendant\u2019s heinous battery charge alleged that, in the course of committing a battery, defendant knowingly caused P.H. to suffer severe and permanent disability by means of a flammable substance. Thus, the infliction of severe and permanent disability was used once to enhance battery, a Class A misdemeanor punishable by less than a year in prison, to heinous battery, a Class X felony punishable by 6 to 45 years in prison. Once defendant was convicted of heinous battery, however, no further enhancements occurred. Defendant stood convicted of a Class X felony punishable by 6 to 45 years in prison, and he was sentenced to a nonextended term of 30 years in prison. Likewise, defendant\u2019s aggravated kidnapping charge alleged that, in the course of kidnapping EH., defendant inflicted great bodily harm upon her. Thus, the infliction of great bodily harm was used once to enhance kidnapping, a Class 2 felony punishable by 3 to 7 years in prison, to aggravated kidnapping, a Class X felony punishable by 6 to 30 years in prison. Once defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, however, no further enhancements occurred. Defendant stood convicted of a Class X felony punishable by 6 to 30 years in prison, and he was sentenced to a nonextended term of 15 years in prison. Thus, the severity of each offense was enhanced only once.\nThe fact that the trial court ordered defendant to serve his sentences consecutively does not change this outcome. To be sure, the consecutive sentencing order was premised on the fact that defendant \u201cinflicted severe bodily injury\u201d (see 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1996)), an element of both aggravated kidnapping and heinous battery. Nevertheless, no double enhancement occurred because consecutive sentencing is not a sentencing enhancement. Again, a double enhancement occurs when a single factor is used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing \u201ca harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.\u201d Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d at 83-84. In People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518 (2001), this court specifically held that a defendant subject to consecutive sentencing \u201cis not exposed to punishment beyond that authorized by the jury\u2019s verdict, provided that the sentence for each separate offense does not exceed the maximum permitted by statute for that offense.\u201d Carney, 196 Ill. 2d at 532. This is because consecutive sentencing \u201cdetermines only the manner in which a defendant will serve his sentences for multiple offenses.\u201d Carney, 196 Ill. 2d at 532. Thus, even when subject to consecutive sentencing, \u201c[e]ach conviction results in a discrete sentence that must be treated individually.\u201d (Emphases added.) Carney, 196 Ill. 2d at 530. In the preceding paragraph, we treated defendant\u2019s discrete sentences individually and concluded that no double enhancements occurred. Under Carney, no further inquiry is warranted.\nWe note that, even if defendant\u2019s consecutive sentences did constitute a double enhancement, the appellate court still erred in modifying those sentences to run concurrently. The general prohibition against double enhancements is \u201cmerely a rule of statutory construction,\u201d premised on the assumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in fashioning the appropriate range of punishment for that offense. People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995). Consequently, where the legislature clearly intends to enhance the penalty based upon some aspect of the crime, and such an intention is clearly expressed, there is no prohibition. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d at 390. In determining whether the legislature intended a double enhancement, we look to the statute itself as the best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d at 390-91. The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994).\nUnder section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a), consecutive sentencing is mandated where \u201cone of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 8 \u2014 4(a) (West 1996). In People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91 (1999), this court was asked to construe this provision and decide whether, in order to qualify for consecutive sentencing, the defendant must inflict great bodily harm in the course of committing the actual Class X or Class 1 felony. This court held that he must. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d at 98-99. Significantly, the next question was not whether consecutive sentencing applied even to those Class X and Class 1 felonies for which severe bodily harm is an element. Rather, the question was whether consecutive sentencing applied only to those Class X and Class 1 felonies for which severe bodily harm is an element. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d at 99. In holding that the statute was not so narrowly drafted, this court explained that \u201cany Class X or Class 1 felony that results in severe bodily injury being inflicted on the victim of that felony triggers consecutive sentences.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d at 99. Thus, in Whitney, this court took it as a given that consecutive sentencing was intended to apply to Class X and Class 1 felonies for which severe bodily harm is an element. The only question was what additional Class X and Class 1 felonies are subject to consecutive sentencing.\nAgain, where the legislature clearly intends to enhance the penalty based upon some aspect of the crime, and such an intention is clearly expressed, there is no prohibition. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d at 390. As Whitney teaches, the legislature clearly intended to make consecutive sentencing applicable to Class X and Class 1 felonies for which severe bodily harm is an element. Even assuming, then, that defendant\u2019s consecutive sentences did constitute a double enhancement, they constituted a perfectly lawful double enhancement.\nAccordingly, we reverse that portion of the appellate court\u2019s opinion modifying defendant\u2019s sentences to run concurrently.\n4. Double Enhancement: Offenses\nFinally, defendant raises another double-enhancement argument. This time, defendant argues that one of his convictions must be vacated because a single factor \u2014 the infliction of great bodily harm \u2014 was used to enhance both of the offenses for which he was convicted. In support, defendant notes that the single fact that he inflicted great bodily harm upon EH. was used against him twice, once to elevate kidnapping to aggravated kidnapping and again to elevate battery to heinous battery. According to defendant, this constitutes an unlawful double enhancement.\nWe disagree. As explained above, the double-enhancement rule prohibits a single factor from being used twice with respect to the same offense. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d at 83-84; Ferguson, 132 Ill. 2d at 96. Defendant does not cite, and we cannot find, any principle that prohibits the use of a single factor with respect to separate and distinct offenses. In fact, this court has specifically held that \u201c \u2018[a] person can be guilty of two offenses when a common act is part of both offenses.\u2019 \u201d People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 188 (1996), quoting People v. Lobdell, 121 Ill. App. 3d 248, 252 (1983). Such is the case here. Defendant committed a heinous battery not only by causing bodily harm to EH. but by also inflicting severe and permanent disfigurement by means of a flammable substance. See 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.1(a) (West 1996). In addition, he committed an aggravated kidnapping not only by kidnapping EH. but also by inflicting great bodily harm upon her in the process. See 720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 2(a)(3) (West 1996). As defined by the legislature, these are entirely distinct offenses, and the State proved each of their elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing prohibits such an outcome, and defendant\u2019s heinous battery and aggravated kidnapping convictions therefore will stand.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse that portion of the appellate court\u2019s judgment modifying defendant\u2019s sentences to run concurrently. The balance of the judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THOMAS" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan and Lisa Madigan, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers and Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Renee G.", "Goldfarb and Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Timothy J. Rooney, Raymond W Mitchell, Karen L. Sugden and Jerome H. Sturhahn, of Winston & Strawn, of Chicago, and Kevin Phelps, pro se, for appellee and cross-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 93830.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. KEVIN PHELPS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.\nOpinion filed January 23, 2004.\nRehearing denied May 24, 2004.\nJames E. Ryan and Lisa Madigan, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers and Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Renee G.\nGoldfarb and Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nTimothy J. Rooney, Raymond W Mitchell, Karen L. Sugden and Jerome H. Sturhahn, of Winston & Strawn, of Chicago, and Kevin Phelps, pro se, for appellee and cross-appellant." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 13, "last_page_order": 29 }