{ "id": 2444442, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. GERALD SCOTT HUDDLESTON, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Huddleston", "decision_date": "2004-06-04", "docket_number": "No. 96367", "first_page": "107", "last_page": "148", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 107" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3777509 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82", "parenthetical": "addressing, inter alia, the differing purposes of the aggravated criminal sexual assault and the female genital mutilation statutes" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926975 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" }, { "page": "475-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5384746 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 Ill. App. 3d 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2520729 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/190/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 347", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "U. Ill. L. Rev.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9251288 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4752702 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "721 So. 2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11806780 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/721/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "861 So. 2d 1261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9309064 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/861/1261-01" ] }, { "cite": "864 So. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9292178 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/864/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 N.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845", "parenthetical": "\"In this case, considering the heinousness of the crime of raping a nine-year-old child, it cannot be said that appellant's sentence was disproportionate or shocking to the moral sense of the community\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ohio App. 3d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1457191 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513", "parenthetical": "\"In this case, considering the heinousness of the crime of raping a nine-year-old child, it cannot be said that appellant's sentence was disproportionate or shocking to the moral sense of the community\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/66/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ohio Rev. Code Ann. \u00a7 2907.02", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ohio Rev. Code Ann.", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(B)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 40", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Tenn. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Or. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 144.642", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Or. Rev. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ohio Rev. Code Ann. \u00a7 2950.031", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ohio Rev. Code Ann.", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "sex offenders prohibited from residing within 1,000 feet of school" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 17.495", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Banks-Baldwin 2000" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ga. Code Ann. \u00a7 42", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ga. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 947.1405", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Fla. Stat. Ann.", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(7)(a)(2)", "parenthetical": "released sex offender with victim under 18 prohibited from living within 1,000 feet of a school, day-care center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Cal. Pen. Code \u00a7 3003", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Cal. Code", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "parolees may not live within 35 miles of victim or witnesses, and certain sex offenders on parole may not live within a quarter mile from a primary school" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ala. Code \u00a7 15", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ala. Code", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 84", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9030411 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" }, { "page": "183-84" }, { "page": "1153", "parenthetical": "\"Alaska could conclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk of recidivism. The legislature's findings are consistent with grave concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a class\"" }, { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208136 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "quoting a legislative declaration referring to \" 'the high recidivism rate of child sex offenders' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609702 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 U.S. 24", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1254852 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" }, { "page": "32-33" }, { "page": "34" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "2025" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/536/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9030296 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" }, { "page": "103" }, { "page": "1163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 A.F. L. Rev. 277", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "A.F. L. Rev.", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 UMKC L. Rev. 629", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "UMKC L. Rev.", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638", "parenthetical": "a large percentage of sexual assault victims never report the crime" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 DePaul L. Rev. 1245", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "DePaul L. Rev.", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1247" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "433 U.S. 584", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180580 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" }, { "page": "992-93" }, { "page": "2869" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "992-93" }, { "page": "2869" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/433/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Fordham Urb. L.J. 439", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Fordham Urb. L.J.", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441", "parenthetical": "arguing that the idea of a \"nonviolent\" rapist is fictional and that \"[\u00a1judges and attorneys must expand their definitions to include injury to the victim's psyche\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Fed. Probation 69", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Fed. Probation", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Am. J. Crim. L. 79", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Am. J. Crim. L.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 843", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ga. St. U. L. Rev.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "858-59, 863-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Duq. L. Rev. 1", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Duq. L. Rev.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35-8" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 UCLA Women's L.J. 255", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "UCLA Women's L.J.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "Spring-Summer 2001" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 295", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Golden Gate U. L. Rev.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ariz. L. Rev. 197", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ariz. L. Rev.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209", "parenthetical": "Spring 2003" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5349330 ], "year": 1882, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/104/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147633 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 535990 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 U.S. 747", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 636693 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757" }, { "page": "1122" }, { "page": "3354" }, { "page": "757" }, { "page": "1123" }, { "page": "3355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/458/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 U.S. 158", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 302055 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/321/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603208 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578268 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" }, { "page": "522" }, { "page": "522" }, { "page": "522" }, { "page": "522" }, { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58947 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" }, { "page": "454" }, { "page": "454" }, { "page": "454" }, { "page": "452" }, { "page": "452" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156128 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" }, { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963706 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442036 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "340" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58954 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402-03" }, { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442053 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" }, { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0151-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2627, "char_count": 74364, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.6500983384537243e-07, "percentile": 0.8900387628776812 }, "sha256": "a4711b0d01f824aad9b53ab9955d1e448c709ddcc6574386ad53912e7646bb90", "simhash": "1:7b9eb57c28e574b4", "word_count": 12137 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:41.185097+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. GERALD SCOTT HUDDLESTON, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RARICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court: Defendant, Gerald Huddleston, was charged by information in the circuit court of Livingston County with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault pursuant to section 12 \u2014 14.1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(a)(1) (West 2002)). Each count pertained to a separate victim. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion seeking to have section 12\u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code declared unconstitutional, arguing that it violates state principles of proportionality and due process. Section 12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) mandates a sentence of natural life imprisonment when a person is \u201cconvicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child committed against 2 or more persons regardless of whether the offenses occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) (West 2002). The circuit court deferred ruling on the motion until after it had heard evidence in the case.\nAfter the court found defendant guilty on all three counts, the court entertained arguments on defendant\u2019s motion and ultimately ruled that the statute is not unconstitutional \u201con its face.\u201d The court left open the question of whether the statute might be unconstitutional as applied to defendant until the court considered the evidence adduced at sentencing. Following the presentation of that evidence, the circuit court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to defendant in that it violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 11). The court sentenced defendant to consecutive 10-year sentences of imprisonment. The State appealed directly to this court. See 134 111. 2d R. 603. The sole issue we are asked to consider is whether the circuit court erred in holding section 12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code unconstitutional as applied to defendant. We hold that it did.\nBACKGROUND\nThe information in this case, filed on May 9, 2002, alleged that defendant had committed an act of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, on or about March or April of 2002, in that he had placed his penis in the mouth of C.D., a child \u201cnearly\u201d 10 years old. The other two counts charged that defendant had committed similar acts with 10-year-old K.F. and D.R. on or about May 7, 2002.\nOn September 12, 2002, defendant filed a motion to suppress a statement he had made to the police and a motion challenging the constitutionality of the sentencing provisions of section 12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code on grounds that it violates constitutional principles of proportionality and due process. On October 31, 2002, the circuit court heard testimony and argument on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. The evidence presented indicated that defendant initially denied having engaged in any sexual activity with the children and he continued to do so for \u201ca period of time.\u201d However, he eventually acknowledged that he had engaged in acts of sexual penetration with the children, and he gave a statement to that effect. The court ultimately denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, ruling that defendant\u2019s statement was \u201cboth voluntarily and knowingly given.\u201d The court deferred ruling on defendant\u2019s other motion until it had heard the evidence in the case.\nThe matter was tried before the court on November 12 and 13, 2002. Detective Earl Dutko of the Livingston County sheriffs department testified that he and Detective John Johnson met with defendant on May 8, 2002, at defendant\u2019s home in Fairbury. They arranged for the defendant to meet with them at the Fairbury police department. At the police department, defendant was informed of his rights and apprised of the allegations against him. Defendant initially denied any involvement. At some point in the questioning, defendant was asked about a criminal \u201cconviction\u201d in McLean County in 1996. The presentence report indicates that defendant had pled guilty to public indecency in 1996. After a time, defendant acknowledged improprieties with the children and he agreed to provide a written statement of his activities. He declined to participate in an audio/video statement. Detective Dutko identified defendant\u2019s written statement, which was subsequently admitted into evidence. The statement, with appropriate modification to protect the privacy of the juvenile victims, reads, verbatim, as follows:\n\u201cI Scott Huddleston do hereby attest that while in the course of my teaching duties I had inappropriate sexual contact with three of my students. After school I played a food taste game with them and placed my penis in their mouth [sic]. I placed my penis in [C.D.]\u2019s mouth for a period of about 15 seconds. In [K.F.]\u2019s for about 5 seconds. And in [D.R.]\u2019s for 30 seconds. I used food for them to lick off. Food which I had left-over in my day\u2019s lunch. I stopped at the end of [D.RJ\u2019s time because I became aroused and realized how wrong it was. I never would have physically hurt them. Never!! It was a stupid thing to do and I know that. All of the incidents occurred after the school day was over.\nI used pudding on May 7th with [D.R.] and [K.F.], I cannot recall the food that I used with [C.D.]. I wish that I could tell them how sorry I am for betraying their trust. I need help with this problem. Please let them know that I was wrong and that adults can still be trusted.\nI had only intended to have them help me in cleaning chores in the room. Something snapped inside me and I went too far. I wish I could fix my transgressions. I don\u2019t know why I did what I did. I need help concerning this. My wife and son mean everything to me. I am sorry for disappointing them. I ask for everyones [sic] forgiveness.\nI never fantasized about doing this. It was a stupid thing that happened that I truly regret.\u201d (Emphases in original.)\nDetective Johnson testified, corroborating what Detective Dutko said in his testimony. Johnson stated that defendant \u201ceventually *** confided *** that he had in fact had sexual acts with the children.\u201d Johnson also noted that the officers had questioned defendant about a 1996 incident in his criminal history. The officers asked defendant what had occurred during that incident, and whether the conduct might have involved young victims.\nC.D. testified that she was born on June 19, 1992, and, in the spring of 2002, she was in the fourth grade at Chatsworth Elementary in Livingston County. At that time, defendant was her art teacher. Sometime in March of 2002, defendant asked her to come to the art room. She was alone with defendant in the art room for about 15 minutes after school, and he suggested that they play a food taste-test game. Defendant seated her in a \u201creally tiny\u201d chair, along the same wall as the only door to the room, but at the other end of the room from the door.\nAfter he blindfolded her, defendant gave her foods and she tried to guess what they were. Defendant first placed pickles in her mouth; she recognized the taste. He then gave her chocolate pudding. She testified that she could taste the chocolate, but she could not identify the type of food or the object it was on. Defendant did not place a spoon in her mouth; it was, rather, a cylindrical object. After she guessed incorrectly, defendant told her it was pudding, he took off the blindfold, and she left the room.\nSometime later, she spoke to the other two victims and they came to the consensus that \u201csomething weird\u201d was going on. Subsequently, they mentioned the incidents to the lunchroom teachers.\nK.F. testified that she was born on October 7, 1991, and, in the spring of 2002, she was in the fourth grade at Chatsworth Elementary in Livingston County. At that time, defendant was her art teacher. Pursuant to defendant\u2019s designation, she was the helper in defendant\u2019s art class on May 7, 2002. She stayed after school to help clean up. Defendant told her if she did a good job she would get to play a taste-test game. After she had finished cleaning up, defendant placed her in a small chair back in the corner of the room, where she could not be seen from the door. He blindfolded her and the \u201cgame\u201d began.\nDefendant first gave her marshmallows and then pretzels to taste. She guessed correctly and was given Starburst candy as a reward. Defendant then put either pudding or peanut butter in her mouth. The object he used was not a spoon or a wooden stick or tongue depressor. Defendant was so close to her at the time that she could feel her breath back in her face. She felt \u201ckind of weird.\u201d Defendant told her to open her mouth wider, so he could get the object into her mouth. K.F. said the substance she was given did not taste at all like pudding or peanut butter. She described it as \u201csour and salty and nasty.\u201d\nWhen K.F. told defendant she was going to take off her blindfold, defendant said, \u201cNo, wait,\u201d and ran behind her. She heard defendant get a paper towel out of the towel dispenser and wipe something off. She also heard a sound like pants going together. It took defendant a while, but he finally told her she could take the blindfold off, get her Starburst, and go. K.F. talked about the incident with her friends afterward.\nD.R. testified that she was born on April 17, 1992, and, in the spring of 2002, she was in the fourth grade at Chatsworth Elementary in Livingston County. At that time, defendant was her art teacher. On May 7, 2002, she was in the boys and girls club after school and decided to go to the art room to finish a project. Defendant was there and asked if she wanted to play a game. He took her to the back of the room, along the same wall as the door, and told her to sit down in a small chair. He then placed food in her mouth: first a marshmallow, then a graham cracker, then pudding. The pudding was not on a spoon or a wooden object such as a tongue depressor. It was on something long, straight and circular. The end of the object was round. It was bigger than a marker. D.R. swallowed the pudding from the object and it was then removed from her mouth. At that time, there was a knock at the door. Defendant said she could take off the blindfold and leave.\nD.R. later told her teacher about the incident. In fact, D.R. said she thought something was not right when she went home that night. She thought the pudding did not taste right, and the object used to introduce it into her mouth was a part of a person, and should not have been in her mouth.\nAfter D.R.\u2019s testimony, the State rested. The defense rested without presenting evidence. The court found defendant guilty on all three counts. On January 2, 2003, prior to the commencement of defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing, the circuit court ruled that section 12\u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code is \u201con its face valid.\u201d The court left open the question of \u201cwhether that statute is a constitutional exercise of authority by the legislature as it is applied to this defendant and the facts of this case.\u201d The court reserved ruling on that issue until it heard the evidence at sentencing.\nJust prior to the taking of testimony at defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing, the court acknowledged that it had received and examined the presentence report. The report was compiled from reports of the Livingston County sheriffs department, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, and other sources available to the reporting probation officer. Given the magnitude of the issue before us, we will examine the report, and all other evidence pertinent to sentencing, in depth.\nThe report cites various oral statements defendant made that elaborate on the details of the crimes. For example, defendant admitted that he had put chocolate pudding on the end of his penis and K.F. had licked it off. Afterward, he turned around, wiped off the pudding with a paper towel, and then pulled up his pants. Later the same day, he again put pudding on the end of his penis and put his penis in D.R.\u2019s mouth for about \u201cthirty to sixty seconds.\u201d Defendant stated, \u201cI think I got an erection towards the end.\u201d He admitted he told her: \u201copen your mouth big\u201d and \u201cuse your tongue.\u201d Defendant acknowledged he had previously placed his penis in C.D.\u2019s mouth for \u201cabout fifteen or thirty seconds.\u201d Examination of garbage taken from defendant\u2019s classroom shortly after the incident revealed therein two paper towels with a brown substance on them that appeared to be chocolate pudding.\nDefendant expressed sorrow for what he had done. As noted previously, when he gave his written statement, defendant voiced concern for the welfare of the children.\nSchool secretary Stephanie Nagey was interviewed and told of an incident approximately one month before when she had gone to defendant\u2019s classroom to deliver a message to him at the end of the school day. Nagey found the door to the classroom locked. Defendant came to the door and stood in the doorway, seeming to block her entrance. Nagey noticed one of the victims (C.D.) in the room and Nagey wondered why she was still there at that time of day. Nagey noticed that defendant seemed \u201churried,\u201d and she felt she had intruded on something and was not welcome there.\nThe presentence report indicates that defendant sent his wife and pastor to the school on May 29, 2002, to remove some of his personal items, and they were allowed to do so. However, defendant\u2019s pastor was not allowed to open defendant\u2019s locked filing cabinet. Subsequently, with the school principal\u2019s permission, defendant\u2019s filing cabinet was forcibly opened to further the investigation of this matter. Inside the cabinet, officers found female underwear, Playboy magazines, pornographic pictures, pornographic playing cards, a pornographic catalog, a video tape containing, in part, a pornographic movie, and 48 computer discs, 28 of which contained pornography. All the subjects depicted in the pornography were adults.\nOn a written information sheet, completed as part of the presentence investigatory process, defendant stated:\n\u201cYour honor, I feel that a life sentence is too extreme. I would like the chance to prove to you and society that I can be rehabilitated. I have already lost my house, car, and my job. My wife and son mean the world to me. Please give me a chance to prove myself.\u201d\nThe portion of the presentence report dedicated to criminal history contains only one notation relevant to the issue before us. On October 5, 1996, defendant pled guilty to the offense of public indecency and received a sentence of 12 months\u2019 court supervision. The victim\u2019s statement in that case indicated that defendant, on three separate occasions, stood in the doorway of his apartment, which faced hers, and while nude \u201cflopped his penis back and forth.\u201d\nDefendant indicated that his wife and parents had been supportive through the prosecution of this case. He described his relationship with his parents as \u201cgood\u201d and his relationship with his wife as \u201cperfect, wonderful, amazing.\u201d Defendant told the reporting officer that he had an eight-year-old son by Trisha Webb, a previous paramour. Defendant stated he was paying child support as ordered until he was incarcerated on these charges. He denied ownership of any significant assets.\nDefendant denied any past mental health treatment or any current mental health problems. He further denied any problems with alcohol or drugs.\nThe reporting probation officer noted, in conclusion, that defendant seemed remorseful in his statements to police. The officer observed, however, that, with regard to defendant\u2019s written comments to the court on the presentence information sheet, \u201cno concern about the victims is noted.\u201d\nThe first witness to testify at defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing was Dr. Robert Chapman, a psychiatrist called by the defense. Chapman evaluated defendant at defense counsel\u2019s request. He spent two hours with defendant. Chapman testified that defendant suffers from adult attention deficit disorder (ADD) \u2014 characterized by \u201cimpaired attention concentration, impulse control and judgment\u201d \u2014 and an unspecified personality disorder with obsessive-compulsive and dependent features. Chapman believed the clinical evidence was insufficient to make a diagnosis of paraphilia and/or its subcategory, pedophilia. Chapman indicated that a diagnosis of paraphilia would apply to an individual \u201cwho suffers over a period of at least six months intense recurring sexually deviant arousal or behavior\u201d that \u201cimpairs the person\u2019s function in most areas of their life.\u201d\nChapman testified that ADD was more likely relevant to the commission of these offenses than the personality disorder because a person with ADD suffers \u201csome degree of impairment of impulsivity and judgment and difficulty controlling inhibitions.\u201d Chapman noted that ADD is manageable and treatable. Chapman stated his opinion that defendant presented a minimal risk of reoffending so long as he was not in a \u201cposition of authority, power or trust with prepubescent females.\u201d\nUnder cross-examination, Chapman admitted there might be \u201ca lot\u201d of positions of \u201cauthority, power or trust\u201d from which defendant would have to be restricted in order for a minimal risk assessment to apply. The prosecutor asked Chapman if he had taken account of certain behavior that exhibited planning and orchestration in the commission of these offenses. When Chapman said he had, the prosecutor asked, \u201cSo are we talking about some kind of developed opportunism?\u201d Chapman responded affirmatively.\nThe prosecutor then asked Chapman to define \u201cpedophilia.\u201d The definition Chapman supplied tracked that previously given for \u201cparaphilia\u201d with the additional element that the objects of sexual arousal or behavior are \u201cprepubescent children.\u201d Chapman testified there was no \u201cclinical\u201d evidence sufficient to make a diagnosis of pedophilia. He explained:\n\u201c[T]here is no clinical evidence of the intense recurring sexual interest, fantasies and arousal. It may be there. We have no evidence of it. The only objective [evidence] absent him providing that or some indirect evidence such as a history of stalking and/or obsession with child pornography or something would be *** what we call penile polysmograph which would measure the degree, if any, of sexual arousal hy this subject class.\u201d\nChapman indicated there was no indication that defendant had possessed child pornography. Chapman was not asked how the restriction he would place upon defendant\u2019s future interaction with \u201cprepubescent females\u201d might relate to a diagnosis of pedophilia or, more to the point, the failure to reach that diagnosis.\nChapman was asked for recommendations to \u201ceffectuate\u201d compliance with his contingency. Chapman responded, \u201cI presume it would have to be under a mandate of the Court and it would be in the form of a probation status *** with certain restrictions about reporting as living and his work and so forth that would take those things into account.\u201d When the prosecutor suggested that truly effective supervision of defendant might entail someone watching him \u201c24 hours a day,\u201d Chapman responded that global positioning system devices are now available, as are radio frequency ankle bracelets. Chapman acknowledged that a global positioning system would not indicate whether young girls are \u201cin the path\u201d of offenders so monitored. With the conclusion of Chapman\u2019s testimony, the sentencing hearing was continued to February 6, 2003.\nWhen the hearing resumed, the court received victim impact statements. One such statement was read in open court by the mother of K.F., and the other was read on behalf of C.D.\u2019s mother by Alicia Dornan of the Children\u2019s Advocacy Center.\nK.F.\u2019s mother spoke \u201cof the destruction that the defendant\u2019s actions [had] caused\u201d in the lives of her daughter and her family. She described K.F. as independent, confident and curious about the world prior to the sexual assault. K.F. loved going to school, church and social events. She had many friends and \u201calways seemed to keep busy meeting new people.\u201d She did well in school and was excited to go there each day. She enjoyed reading and was talented in art. At the end of her day, K.F. had no difficulty falling asleep.\nAfter the sexual assault, life \u201csignificantly changed and became a struggle for [K.F.] and her family.\u201d K.F. has had to cope with \u201cmany symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder, including feelings of fear, paranoia, anxiety and seclusion.\u201d K.F. would panic when she would see someone with physical features resembling those of the defendant, or hear a voice similar to his. She begged to stay home from normal social events, avoiding crowds because she believed people would stare at her or talk about her. K.F. is no longer independent and obviously suffers from feelings of insecurity. She does not want to be left alone in a room. She wants family members constantly by her side. \u201cShe has lived in terror expressing concern that Mr. Huddleston will come after her and harm her.\u201d\nKF.\u2019s mother described \u201cnumerous nights [when K.F. would] lie awake until the mid-hours of the morning, finally falling asleep only with the comforting thought of protection from her father lying on the floor right next to her bed and her mother at the foot of her bed sleeping in a chair.\u201d As of the date of the sentencing hearing, K.F. was still experiencing interrupted sleep patterns.\nFor K.F., school has changed from \u201ca place of fun and adventure to a dreaded, haunting atmosphere. Almost daily, [K.F.] continues to request to be allowed to stay home from school.\u201d Her mother stated that K.F. \u201cwill beg to stay home and complains of not feeling well. It is devastating to see her trying to gain the strength and courage she needs just to pull the covers back and step a foot to the floor. This is a little girl who used to love school and wake with energy.\u201d K.F. has struggled scholastically. Her mother stated that K.F. now frequently becomes frustrated with assignments and expresses an inability to concentrate. K.F. used to complete her work at school and rarely had to bring work home \u201cbecause school was top priority.\u201d Now, K.F. gives up on assignments, sobbing. She was forced to drop out of art class due to \u201chaunting\u201d memories associated with that class.\nK.F.\u2019s mother testified that the consequences wrought by defendant\u2019s actions have not been limited to K.F. alone; her entire family has been affected. In particular, K.F.\u2019s older, teenage brother has been withdrawn since the sexual assault of K.F. and has shown a \u201clack of desire to socialize with other high school friends.\u201d He displays a lack of self-esteem that was not evident before the violation of his younger sister. K.F.\u2019s family has gone so far as to relocate so that she can be closer to her best friends in the hope that she will overcome her current tendency to withdraw from social interaction.\nK.F.\u2019s mother stated that parenting has become \u201ca nightmare.\u201d Something as simple as mention of the words \u201cpeanut butter\u201d or \u201cpudding\u201d may trigger a reaction in K.F. Now, both parents worry constantly about their children and it is difficult to let the children out of their sight for fear of something terrible happening. Trusting others with the children has become almost impossible. That tendency often eliminates opportunities for all children in the family. The stress occasioned by the sexual assault has resulted in the physical exhaustion of both parents and a stomach ulcer in the case of K.F.\u2019s mother. On-the-job concentration of both parents has been affected, and both have missed work for counseling, court dates, and for those days when they were called to school because K.F. was having difficulty coping. Although many friends have shown support and offered comfort, KF.\u2019s family \u201chas also experienced the avoidance *** of others who are unsure of what to say or do. Many times, [KF.\u2019s] family has chosen to avoid going places of usual frequency to eliminate undue stares and attention. Public appearance remains extremely uncomfortable.\u201d\nK.F.\u2019s mother stated, \u201cThe pain, worry, anger and fear overwhelms a person.\u201d K.F.\u2019s parents are concerned about KF.\u2019s future, and her mother expressed the hope that defendant \u201cwill never be allowed the future opportunity to inflict pain and suffering to this extent on another child.\u201d\nAlicia Dornan read the victim impact statement written by C.D.\u2019s mother. That statement echoes many of the problems and concerns noted in the impact statement read by K.F.\u2019s mother.\nC.D.\u2019s mother noted that, prior to the sexual assault, C.D. had been a \u201cvery bright, accelerated student. She took advanced classes and brought home excellent grades. She was full of self-confidence and *** humor.\u201d She is a completely different child now. C.D. has become very distant and shy. She cannot look people directly in the face when speaking to them. C.D.\u2019s sense of humor has turned to annoyance. Now, it \u201cseems as though she tries purposely to antagonize to bring on confrontation.\u201d\nAlthough she never slept in her parents\u2019 bed before, she now does frequently. She has constant nightmares and anxiety. C.D.\u2019s mother explained that C.D. \u201csomehow believes that her bed has all the bad dreams in it from what happened to her. And they keep coming out to remind her every night.\u201d\nSince defendant sexually assaulted her, C.D. has had a difficult time speaking to men, especially men who resemble defendant. She instantly retreats into silence when she sees someone with defendant\u2019s features. C.D. had recently had her first music recital. When her mother later asked her how she felt when it was over, C.D. responded, \u201cYou know who was there, don\u2019t you?\u201d C.D. had seen a man who strongly resembled defendant, and she was certain he was there at the school. She noted, as she had looked out over the crowd of assembled parents, she had seen \u201cso many men who looked like Mr. Huddleston.\u201d C.D.\u2019s mother observed, \u201cwhat should have been one of the most wonderful[,] memorable nights of her life was ruined. He was there haunting her.\u201d\nC.D. had related to her mother that she had been having a hard time concentrating on school work and she wanted to be at home more. She complains constantly of stomachaches and throws up at school. Her fears and anxieties magnify in a school setting. Although she never used to cry, now C.D. does often.\nLike KF.\u2019s mother, C.D.\u2019s mother expressed her fears for C.D.\u2019s future:\n\u201cHow will she deal with commitment and relationship issues as she grows older? Scott Huddleston has taken her childhood innocence. How much of her future has he tainted as well?\u201d\nThe two victim impact statements were admitted as evidence.\nThe next witness to testify at defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing was his \u201cspiritual counselor,\u201d Reverend Steven Anderson. Anderson testified that he first met defendant approximately one year prior, when defendant attended church with his parents, who are very active in Anderson\u2019s congregation. Anderson stated he is aware of the offenses of which defendant has been convicted. Anderson had visited defendant in jail on a weekly basis during the period of defendant\u2019s incarceration.\nReverend Anderson worked with defendant in a program designed for \u201csex offenders with Christian beliefs.\u201d Anderson testified that the program is intended to help sex offenders take responsibility for what they have done, and to understand that forgiveness does not mean avoidance of consequences. The program also addresses ways in which the offender can avoid recidivism. Reverend Anderson stated his belief that defendant had responded positively to counseling. He had never tried to blame anyone else, and he was sorry for what he had done to the victims and their families, as well as what he had done to his family. Defendant had asked Anderson to pray for him so that he would change and he would not reoffend. Reverend Anderson was asked whether defendant understood why he did what he did. Anderson responded, \u201cI don\u2019t know that anyone could understand it. But I believe he is extremely sorrowful that he did it. He understands what he did and that it was wrong.\u201d Anderson believed that defendant had been \u201cconsistent in his desire to change.\u201d Reverend Anderson concluded his testimony by stating his opinion that defendant\u2019s words were not simply \u201ca jailhouse conversion for somebody else\u2019s benefit.\u201d\nJoy Mason, defendant\u2019s friend and coworker, also testified for the defense. Mason, a second-grade teacher at Westview Elementary School in Fairbury, Illinois, expressed her sorrow for both the victims and their families, and for defendant and his family. Mason did not, of course, condone defendant\u2019s behavior, and she conveyed her \u201csadness\u201d because defendant \u201chad so much to offer\u201d as a teacher. Defendant had the ability \u201cto help children think positively about themselves, to be creative in their expression of that through art.\u201d Defendant made his class \u201cfun and interesting.\u201d\nMason considered defendant a friend who was always supportive, a very good listener, and a good advisor. She stated, \u201cHe always thinks of others and ways to help them.\u201d She said she hoped he would receive a reasonable amount of time for his crime and he would receive help and counseling to help him with his sickness.\nUnder cross-examination, Mason was asked how she felt about defendant having used his position as a teacher to commit these sexual assaults upon children in his charge. Mason responded, \u201cIt makes me angry and frustrated that anything like that could happen. And also aware as a teacher of *** the things that we should all do in the profession to keep children safe.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s mother, Sidney Huddleston, testified on defendant\u2019s behalf. Much of her testimony focused on the love that family members felt for defendant. She brought numerous letters of support from defendant\u2019s friends, relatives, neighbors and associates. Defendant\u2019s mother spoke of the trauma defendant may have experienced when he was two years old and his father suffered from\u2014 but ultimately overcame \u2014 a \u201clife-threatening disease.\u201d She pointed to a \u201cpretty serious head injury\u201d defendant suffered when he was young and helping his grandfather feed some puppies. She acknowledged that the head injury was not so serious that defendant was admitted to a hospital. Defendant\u2019s mother stated that defendant \u201ccontinued to love his grandfather and love those puppies.\u201d She speculated that the head injury may have \u201ccontributed to the many learning disabilities that came along later in school.\u201d\nMrs. Huddleston testified at length regarding defendant\u2019s difficulties in school. She admitted that diagnostic testing at Illinois State University was \u201cnot conclusive.\u201d Nonetheless, she testified that she continued to receive reports during defendant\u2019s early years in elementary school that he was \u201cslow,\u201d \u201cnot learning at a normal rate,\u201d and not paying attention. She admitted that she had heard evaluations of defendant, subsequent to his arrest, that described him as \u201chighly intelligent.\u201d Defendant\u2019s mother took issue with that description. She stated her belief that defendant is \u201can average person, average intelligence, smothered by learning disabilities.\u201d She testified at length regarding defendant\u2019s academic struggles which culminated in a bachelor of science degree from Illinois State University.\nDefendant\u2019s mother described her son as \u201ca man who touched a lot of lives with a positive influence, especially students who struggled with academics and insecurities.\u201d She stated her belief that defendant could \u201cstill be of use to God\u2019s society if given the opportunity.\u201d\nAfter the attorneys spoke to sentencing issues, defendant was given the opportunity to address the court. He expressed sorrow and remorse for his actions, and for the pain he had caused the victims, their families, his coworkers, and his family. He stated his hope that the victims would \u201cmove forward and heal in a positive way.\u201d Defendant said he was sorry that the victims had to appear before the court for trial; he attributed responsibility to defense counsel who had advised him to proceed in that manner so that he would not waive any of his rights.\nThe trial judge recessed proceedings for a time, and then returned to announce his decision on the constitutional question reserved for ruling, and on defendant\u2019s sentence.\nThe court first spoke to the circumstances of the offense. The court recognized that defendant had violated three children and that his \u201csordid conduct\u201d was \u201cdespicable in the extreme.\u201d However, the court characterized what defendant had done as different from \u201cwhat usually occurs in cases of molestation of children and probably what some of the things [sic] the legislature was concerned about.\u201d The court noted:\n\u201cIn this case, the children saw nothing. *** They were told nothing by the defendant that indicated what was happening. There was no torture. There were no threats. There was no intimidation. The children were essentially unaware, in a sense, that this crime was being committed. I think they realized it later. But what we have here is a crime of deceit.\u201d\nThe court questioned whether the State could even have proved that the criminal acts occurred without the oral and written confession of defendant. The court recognized that defendant\u2019s confession \u201cremoved all that.\u201d The court continued: \u201cNone of this, however, changes the fact that the defendant acted atrociously and that his victims were individuals to whom he owed a special responsibility.\u201d\nThe court then turned to the issues of defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential and the constitutionality of section 12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code. The court noted that defendant was 36 years of age. Other than minor traffic offenses, defendant had one criminal misdemeanor of record. On March 3, 1997, defendant had pled guilty to public indecency and had received a sentence of 12 months\u2019 court supervision and a fine of $385. The court observed that defendant\u2019s acts had involved \u201cexposure with no physical contact by the defendant with another individual.\u201d The court did not specify the nature of the acts in rendering its decision.\nThe trial court addressed evidence which the court believed supported an inference that defendant could be rehabilitated. The court observed:\n\u201cTaking into account that it is, of course, to his advantage to be sorry at this time, the evidence before me convinces me that he was and is truly remorseful for his actions. I say that because he did choose to stop what was happening. I think he genuinely recognizes that he has betrayed these children. From the record, he is worried about the loss of faith these children would have in adults.\u201d\nThe court perceived in defendant\u2019s confession \u201ca desire on the part of the defendant to come clean so he could get treatment.\u201d Finally, the court pointed to the testimony of Dr. Chapman that defendant is a \u201cminimal risk\u201d to reoffend. The court did not discuss the conditions Chapman had placed on that assessment.\nThe court then addressed the mandatory natural life sentencing provision of section 12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code:\n\u201cSo what does this boil down to? The legislature saw fit to pass a sentencing statute that was blanket in nature. If there is one victim, the sentence is six to 30. If there is two [sic] or more, the sentence is natural life. The legislature chose in this case to use a blanket approach for all cases regardless of facts, regardless of circumstances, regardless of any rehabilitative potential on the part of a particular defendant.\nThat raises the question of how could the legislature validly pass such a statute if the statute ignores rehabilitative potential entirely. And the answer is that such conduct by a defendant where victims are multiple can be so egregious, that life in prison is permissible without recognition of rehabilitative potential.\u201d\nAlthough the court indicated that it could \u201creadily visualize scenarios where such an argument would be true,\u201d the court concluded it could \u201cnot find such to be the circumstance\u201d in this case. The court, therefore, ruled that section 12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant.\nWe disagree.\nANALYSIS\nStatutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, and this court has a duty to construe statutes in a manner that upholds their validity whenever reasonably possible. Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 157 (2002); People v. Garcia, 199 Ill. 2d 401, 402-03 (2002). The party challenging a statute bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 335 (2002); Garcia, 199 Ill. 2d at 402. We review, de novo, a circuit court\u2019s finding that a statute is unconstitutional. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 335; People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000).\nThis court has repeatedly recognized that the legislature has the power to prescribe penalties for defined offenses, and that power necessarily includes the authority to prescribe mandatory sentences, even if such sentences restrict the judiciary\u2019s discretion in imposing sentences. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 336; People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 208 (1984). However, the power of the legislature is not without limitation; the penalty prescribed must satisfy constitutional requirements. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 336.\nIn the matter before us, the issue is whether section 12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (111. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 11). The proportionate penalties clause provides that \u201c[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 11. As this court observed in Taylor, \u201cthere is no indication [in our constitution] that the possibility of rehabilitating an offender was to be given greater weight and consideration than the seriousness of the offense in determining a proper penalty.\u201d Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 206. Factors to be considered in determining the seriousness of an offense include the degree of harm, the frequency of the crime, and the risk of bodily injury associated with it. People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440, 454 (2002). The legislature may perceive a need to enact a more stringent penalty provision in order to halt an increase in the commission of a particular crime. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d at 454. \u201cAs an institution, the legislature is better equipped than the judiciary to identify and remedy the evils confronting our society and is more capable of gauging the seriousness of an offense.\u201d Hill, 199 Ill. 2d at 454. Consequently, courts will generally defer to the legislature\u2019s judgment that a particular offense is more serious than another. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d at 454.\nThis court has utilized three separate tests to determine whether a proportionate penalties clause violation has occurred. First, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 522 (2003); Hill, 199 Ill. 2d at 452. Second, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause where similar offenses are compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more severely. People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 522 (2003); Hill, 199 Ill. 2d at 452. Finally, the proportionate penalties clause is violated where offenses with identical elements are given different sentences. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 522; Hill, 199 Ill. 2d at 452. In the instant case, defendant contends that the ruling of the trial court can be upheld on the bases that section 12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) fails the first two tests.\nBefore we address the merits, we acknowledge, and reject, the State\u2019s request that we reconsider our holding in People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002). In Miller, a unanimous court held that section 5 \u2014 8\u2014l(a)(l)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 l(a)(l)(c)(ii) (West 1996)) was unconstitutional \u201cas applied\u201d to that defendant. However, the Miller case is readily distinguishable from the present case. In Miller, there was a rare convergence of several factors, including: the defendant was a 15-year-old juvenile who, by statute, was automatically transferred for trial as an adult; the defendant was tried under an accountability theory which, by statute, holds all participants with a common criminal design equally responsible; and the applicable multiple-murder sentencing statute does not allow consideration of the defendant\u2019s age or extent of participation in the crime. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 340. The defendant had served as a lookout during the encounter, and the circuit court described the defendant\u2019s role in the crime as \u201c \u2018passive accountability.\u2019 \u201d Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 331. When affirming the finding that the mandatory life sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied to the defendant, we noted,\n\u201ca mandatory sentence of natural life in prison with no possibility of parole grossly distorts the factual realities of the case and does not accurately represent defendant\u2019s personal culpability such that it shocks the moral sense of the community. This moral sense is particularly true, as in the case before us, where a 15-year-old with one minute to contemplate his decision to participate in the incident and stood as a lookout during the shooting, but never handled a gun, is subject to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole \u2014 the same sentence applicable to the actual shooter.\u201d Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 341.\nA holding that a statute is unconstitutional as applied does not broadly declare a statute unconstitutional but narrowly finds the statute unconstitutional under the specific facts of the case. See Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 158 (2002). The present case does not include the age and level of culpability concerns that we found supported the as-applied unconstitutionality finding in Miller. In addition, while recognizing the convergence of several unusual circumstances in Miller, we in no way weakened the well-established principle that review of a constitutional issue begins with a presumption that the statute is constitutional. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 335. In fact, \u201c[i]t is a court\u2019s duty to construe a statute so as to affirm the statute\u2019s constitutionality and validity, if reasonably possible.\u201d People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 499 (1992). Therefore, we decline to revisit Miller in light of this case.\nNonetheless, we begin by considering whether the sentencing provision in question \u201cis cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community\u201d (Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 522). Because the parties\u2019 briefs were somewhat lacking in this regard, we have conducted independent research on this issue, and what follows is the product of that inquiry. Although it is not suggested that the result is comprehensive or all-inclusive, we believe it is informative and pertinent to our disposition of this case. We address, first, the seriousness of sex offenses against children and, in particular, the degree of harm to the child victims and the frequency of the crimes.\nSixty years ago, the United States Supreme Court enunciated a principle as simple and self-evident as it is critical and compelling: \u201cA democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens ***.\u201d Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168, 88 L. Ed. 645, 653, 64 S. Ct. 438, 443 (1944). In furtherance of that principle, the Court has \u201csustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights.\u201d New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113, 1122, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3354 (1982). In that regard, the Court has proclaimed the \u201cprevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children *** a government objective of surpassing importance.\u201d Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1123, 102 S. Ct. at 3355.\nAs was noted in People v. Woofers, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 509 (1999), this state has traditionally exhibited an \u201cacute interest\u201d in the well-being of minors. Indeed, \u201cthe welfare and protection of minors has always been considered one of the State\u2019s most fundamental interests.\u201d American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 311 (1996). Long ago, this court acknowledged the paramount importance of ensuring the welfare of children, and others, who are least able to protect themselves:\n\u201cIt is the unquestioned right and imperative duty of every enlightened government, in its character of parens patriae, to protect and provide for the comfort and well-being of such of its citizens as, by reason of infancy, defective understanding, or other misfortune or infirmity, are unable to take care of themselves. The performance of this duty is justly regarded as one of the most important of governmental functions, and all constitutional limitations must be so understood and construed as not to interfere with its proper and legitimate exercise.\u201d County of McLean v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378, 383 (1882).\nConcern for the welfare and safety of children is reflected in various criminal statutes and procedural enactments based upon the victim\u2019s age or youth. Our legislature has created offenses on that basis, elevated or differentiated the classification of existing offenses, allowed for sentence enhancement, and relaxed evidentiary rules. See generally 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 9.3 (West 2002) (prohibiting child sex offenders from being present within a school zone); 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 9.4 (West 2002) (prohibiting child sex offenders from approaching, contacting or communicating with a child within a public park); 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(a)(1) (West 2002) (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child); 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(4)(i) (West 2002) (making a defendant eligible for an extended-term sentence based upon the young age of the victim); 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 7.3 (West 2002) (allowing admission of other-crimes evidence in prosecution of sex offenders); 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10(a)(2) (West 2002) (allowing testimony of a child\u2019s out-of-court statement describing a sexual act perpetrated upon the child). The sentencing provision at issue in the instant case was obviously intended to protect this vulnerable segment of our society from sexual predation by deterring would-be offenders and ensuring that those who commit sexual acts with multiple victims will not have the opportunity to reoffend.\nThe vulnerability of children to sexual predation has been a topic of considerable commentary in recent years, as has the psychological damage that results to the developing psyches of these young victims. See M. Meister, Note, Murdering Innocence: The Constitutionality of Capital Child Rape Statutes, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 197, 209 (Spring 2003); N. Yell, Comment, The California Sexually Violent Predator Act and the Failure to Mentally Evaluate Sexually Violent Child Molestors, 33 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 295 (2003); R. Whitcombe, Note, Child Sexual Abuse: Adult Survivors, Repressed Memories, and Stories Finally Told, 11 UCLA Women\u2019s L.J. 255, 259 (Spring-Summer 2001); J. Broughton, Note, \u201cOn Horror\u2019s Head Horrors Accumulate\u201d: A Reflective Comment on Capital Child Rape Legislation, 39 Duq. L. Rev. 1, 35-8 (2000); B. Palmer, Note, Death as a Proportionate Penalty for the Rape of a Child: Considering One State\u2019s Current Law, 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 843, 858-59, 863-66 (1999); S. Ketring & L. Feinauer, Perpetrator-Victim Relationship: Long-term Effects of Sexual Abuse for Men and Women, 27 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 109, 117 (1999); Y. Glazer, Child Rapists Beware! The Death Penalty and Louisiana\u2019s Amended Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 79, 86-88 (1997); A. Lurigio, Child Sexual Abuse: Its Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Probation Practice, 59 Fed. Probation 69, 69-71 (1995); L. Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing, and the Myth of the Nonviolent Rapist, 20 Fordham Urb. L.J. 439, 441 (1993) (arguing that the idea of a \u201cnonviolent\u201d rapist is fictional and that \u201c[\u00a1judges and attorneys must expand their definitions to include injury to the victim\u2019s psyche\u201d); I. Prager, \u201cSexual Psychopathy\u201d and Child Molesters: The Experiment Fails, 6 J. Juv. L. 49, 62-63 (1982); C. Bagley & K. King, Child Sexual Abuse: The Search for Healing 2 (1990); Handbook on Sexual Abuse of Children 6-7 (1988).\nCommentators have recognized that, aside from any physical injury a child may suffer in a sexual assault, children who are sexually assaulted are subject to chronic psychological problems that may be even more pernicious. Sexual assault (rape) has been described as, \u201c[sjhort of homicide, *** the \u2018ultimate violation of self.\u2019 \u201d Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982, 992-93, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2869 (1977), quoting U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Report, Rape and Its Victims: A Report for Citizens, Health Facilities, and Criminal Justice Agencies 1 (1975). Although the aftermath for an adult victim can be devastating and long-term (see 39 Duq. L. Rev. at 35-37; 25 Am. J. Crim. L. at 86-87), the impact on a child can be even more profound. Because of their emotional immaturity, children are exceptionally vulnerable to the effects of sexual assault. 45 Ariz. L. Rev. at 209; 39 Duq. L. Rev. at 38. Long-term follow-up studies with child sexual abuse victims indicate that sexual abuse is \u201c \u2018grossly intrusive in the lives of children and is harmful to their normal psychological, emotional and sexual development in ways which no just or humane society can tolerate.\u2019 \u201d 25 Am. J. Crim. L. at 87, quoting C. Bagley & K. King, Child Sexual Abuse: The Search for Healing 2 (1990). The child\u2019s life may be forever altered by residual problems associated with the event. 45 Ariz. L. Rev. at 209; 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. at 843.\nStudies indicate that as many as 40% of preadolescent sexual assault victims are considered \u201cseriously disturbed.\u201d 59 Fed. Probation at 70. Psychopathology and mental disorders often follow the child into adulthood. 45 Ariz. L. Rev. at 209; 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. at 864; 59 Fed. Probation at 70. Psychological problems associated with sexual assault or abuse include sudden school failure, unprovoked crying, dissociation, depression, insomnia, sleep disturbances, nightmares, feelings of guilt and inferiority, poor self-esteem, and self-destructive behavior, including an increased incidence of attempted suicide. 45 Ariz. L. Rev. at 209; 39 Duq. L. Rev. at 38; 25 Am. J. Crim. L. at 88. Beyond the compassion one must feel for these innocent victims, pragmatism dictates a recognition that the victim\u2019s problems are likely to become society\u2019s problems. Correlations have been noted between child sexual abuse and problems in adulthood such as substance abuse, dangerous sexual behaviors or dysfunction, inability to relate to others on an interpersonal level, and psychiatric illness. 39 Duq. L. Rev. at 38; 25 Am. J. Crim. L. at 89; 59 Fed. Probation at 70-71; C. Bagley & K. King, Child Sexual Abuse: The Search for Healing 53 (1990); Handbook on Sexual Abuse of Children 7 (1988). The harm to the child victim of sexual abuse \u2014 and to society itself \u2014 is well documented. We now consider the prevalence and frequency of the offense.\n\u201cChild sexual abuse is prevalent in America. From 1976 to 1986, the number of reported cases of child sexual abuse grew from 6,000 to 132,000, an increase of 2100%. By 1991, the number of cases totaled 432,000, an increase of another 227% (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 1992).\u201d 59 Fed. Probation at 69. \u201cFrom 1980 to 1994, sex offenders was the fastest-growing category of violent criminal.\u201d J. Smulin, Protecting Life and Liberty: The Constitutionality and Necessity of Civil Commitment of Sexual Predators, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 1245, 1247 (2003), citing U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sex Offenses and Offenders 109 (1997). Most cases never come to the attention of law enforcement or treatment professionals. 59 Fed. Probation at 69; see also J. Peters-Baker, Challenging Traditional Notions of Managing Sex Offenders: Prognosis is Lifetime Management, 66 UMKC L. Rev. 629, 638 (1998) (a large percentage of sexual assault victims never report the crime). Some experts estimate that less than one-third of all sexual abuse or assault cases are actually reported and investigated by child protective authorities. 45 Ariz. L. Rev. at 198, citing 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. at 844, citing J. Treanor, Orchestrating the Successful Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 39 A.F. L. Rev. 277, 278 (1996). Other authorities suggest that the chance of being apprehended for child molestation may be as low as 3%. 52 DePaul L. Rev. at 1248; G. Abel, Self-Reported Sex Crimes of Non-incarcerated Paraphiliacs, 2 J. Interpersonal Violence 3 (1987). Suffice it to say that.the incidence of child molestation is a matter of grave concern in this state and others, as is the rate of recidivism among the offenders.\nAs the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4, 155 L. Ed. 2d 98, 103, 123 S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (2003):\n\u201c \u2018Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation.\u2019 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32 (2002) (plurality opinion). \u2018[T]he victims of sex assault are most often juveniles,\u2019 and \u2018[w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sex assault.\u2019 Id., at 32-33.\u201d\nIn McKune, the Supreme Court described the risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders as \u201cfrightening and high.\u201d McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47, 57, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2025 (2002).\nAs we recently acknowledged in People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 174 (2003), our legislature has responded again and again to the propensity of sex offenders to repeat their crimes and to increases in the incidence of sexual assault and abuse cases. See also People v. Stork, 305 Ill. App. 3d 714, 721 (1999) (quoting a legislative declaration referring to \u201c \u2018the high recidivism rate of child sex offenders\u2019 \u201d), quoting 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 157, 1997 Sess. Similar declarations can be found in the statutes of numerous other states. See C. Champagne, Case Note, Sex Offender and Notification Statutes & The Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s Decision in People v. Malchow, 22 QLS 301, 308 n.64 (2003) (compilation of statutory declarations).\nAlthough there is considerable debate over the degree to which treatment of sex offenders may be effective, it is clear that state legislatures may respond to what they reasonably perceive as a \u201csubstantial risk of recidivism.\u201d See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164, 183-84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1153 (2003) (\u201cAlaska could conclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk of recidivism. The legislature\u2019s findings are consistent with grave concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a class\u201d). State legislatures have addressed this substantial risk of child sex offender recidivism in many different ways. Some statutes seek to protect children once an offender is released from state custody by monitoring or restricting his or her movement and access to children. Other enactments call for longer sentences of imprisonment, so that the offender\u2019s opportunity to reoffend is foreclosed during the period of incarceration.\nFor example, every state in the nation has enacted a version of \u201cMegan\u2019s Law,\u201d requiring, inter alia, registration and monitoring of sex offenders who are released into the community. Smith, 538 U.S. at 90, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 175, 123 S. Ct. at 1145. At least 12 states have enacted some form of residency restriction applicable to sex offenders. See Ala. Code \u00a7 15 \u2014 20\u201426 (Supp. 2000) (restricts sex offenders from residing or accepting employment within 2,000 feet of school or child care facility); Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5 \u2014 14\u2014128 (Lexis Supp. 2003) (unlawful for level three or four sex offenders to reside within 2,000 feet of school or day-care center); Cal. Pen. Code \u00a7 3003 (Deering Supp. 2004) (parolees may not live within 35 miles of victim or witnesses, and certain sex offenders on parole may not live within a quarter mile from a primary school); Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (West 2001) (released sex offender with victim under 18 prohibited from living within 1,000 feet of a school, day-care center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate); Ga. Code Ann. \u00a7 42 \u2014 1\u201413 (Supp. 2003) (sex offenders required to register shall not reside within 1,000 feet of any child care facility, school, or area where minors congregate); 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 9.3(b\u20145) (West 2002) (child sex offenders prohibited from knowingly residing within 500 feet of schools); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 17.495 (Banks-Baldwin 2000) (registered sex offenders on supervised release shall not reside within 1,000 feet of school or child care facility); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 14:91.1 (West Supp. 2004) (sexually violent predators shall not reside within 1,000 feet of schools unless permission is given by school superintendent); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. \u00a7 2950.031 (Lexis 2003) (sex offenders prohibited from residing within 1,000 feet of school); 57 Okla. Stat. \u00a7 590 (2003) (prohibits sex offenders from residing within 2,000 feet of schools or educational institutions); Or. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 144.642, 144.643 (1999) (incorporates general prohibition on supervised sex offenders living near places where children reside); Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 40 \u2014 39\u2014111 (2003) (sex offenders prohibited from establishing residence within 1,000 feet of school, child care facility, or victim). Many jurisdictions restrict the offender\u2019s movements in other ways, similar to the Illinois statutes we have previously mentioned. See 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 9.3 (West 2002); 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 9.4 (West 2002). Perhaps the most common means of protecting children are statutes providing for enhanced classification of sex offenses and/or sentences, based upon the age of the victim. The rationale for these statutes is undoubtedly specific and general deterrence: the chances of the offender violating other children while incarcerated is nonexistent; and others might be deterred by the lengthy sentences of those incarcerated. In this regard, we are aware of many states that impose mandatory life sentences upon repeat sex offenders. Illinois, of course, has such statutes. See 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(d)(2) (West 2002) (natural life imprisonment for a second or subsequent offense); 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(b)(2) (West 2002) (same).\nWhile several state statutes authorize a life sentence \u2014 with or without parole \u2014 for a perpetrator\u2019s first sexual assault of a child, at least five states, including Illinois, would require a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment, under certain circumstances. Ohio requires the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment where the offender compels a victim less than 13 years of age to submit to felonious sexual penetration \u201cby force or threat of force.\u201d Ohio Rev. Code Ann. \u00a7 2907.02(B) (Lexis 2003). An earlier version of the statute was upheld against a proportionality challenge in State v. Gladding, 66 Ohio App. 3d 502, 513, 585 N.E.2d 838, 845 (1990) (\u201cIn this case, considering the heinousness of the crime of raping a nine-year-old child, it cannot be said that appellant\u2019s sentence was disproportionate or shocking to the moral sense of the community\u201d). Florida and North Carolina have statutes that mandate the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment for \u201ccapital sexual battery\u201d and \u201cfirst-degree sexual offense,\u201d respectively, neither of which requires the use of force or threat of force. These provisions have survived repeated proportionality challenges. See Adaway v. State, 864 So. 2d 36, 37-38 (Fla. 2003); Jones v. State, 861 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 2003); Gibson v. State, 721 So. 2d 363, 369-70 (Fla. 1998); State v. Higginbottom, 312 N.C. 760, 763-64, 324 S.E.2d 834, 837 (1985); State v. Bartlett, 153 N.C. App. 680, 688-89, 571 S.E.2d 28, 33-34 (2002). Louisiana authorizes the death penalty for the offense of aggravated rape, which includes the rape of a child under 12 years old. A defendant who does not receive the death penalty is subject to a mandatory life sentence. La. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 14:42 (West Supp. 2004). Although the constitutionality of state statutes that impose the death penalty for non-homicide crimes is the subject of debate (see 45 Ariz. L. Rev. at 210-12; D. Schaaf, What If the Victim Is a Child? Examining the Constitutionality of Louisiana\u2019s Challenge to Coker v. Georgia, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 347, 365-67), the Louisiana Supreme Court has upheld Louisiana\u2019s sentencing scheme.\nWe return to the first question posed at the outset of our discussion: Is a sentence of natural life imprisonment, as applied to this defendant, cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community? Having applied the appropriate criteria for review of this question, having taken account of the pertinent considerations relevant to this type of offense and enactments in other jurisdictions, and having considered the facts of defendant\u2019s case, we cannot say that it is. We now speak to the circumstances attending the commission of these offenses.\nDefendant committed sexual assaults against three victims, one more than the minimum section 12\u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) requires for imposition of a natural life sentence. We note that the first assault occurred at least one month prior to the subsequent assaults; thus, there was a period of time during which defendant could have reflected upon the gross impropriety of his actions and refrained from further violations of children under his supervision. Unfortunately for the latter two victims, he did not.\nAlthough defendant did not have a prior felony conviction when he committed these offenses, he had previously committed an offense characterized as a \u201csex offense\u201d in the Criminal Code. See 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 9 (West 1996) (public indecency included among article 11 sex offenses). The presentence report refers to the victim\u2019s statement in that case, indicating that defendant, on three separate occasions, stood in the doorway of his apartment, which faced hers, and while nude, \u201cflopped his penis back and forth.\u201d The commission of these offenses is obviously a marked escalation of defendant\u2019s preexisting deviant tendencies. Defendant\u2019s previous encounter with the legal system did nothing to deter him.\nDefendant\u2019s sexual fixation is further evinced by the discovery of pornographic materials in his file cabinet at the school. It would be reasonable to assume that defendant looked at these materials during the course of the school day. While these materials \u2014 including female underwear, Playboy magazines, pornographic pictures, pornographic playing cards, a pornographic catalog, a video tape containing, in part, a pornographic movie, and 48 computer discs, 28 of which contained pornography\u2014 portrayed only adults, it is impossible for us to believe defendant\u2019s assertion that he never fantasized about sexual activity with children prior to the commission of these offenses. In his written statement, defendant admits he was sexually aroused during the assault of the third victim. Whence came defendant\u2019s desire to place his penis in the mouth of a 10-year-old girl? Having done it once, whence came the urge to do it to additional children? Defendant\u2019s acts do not strike us as impulsive; rather, the commission of these offenses appears to have been the result of planning and well-orchestrated execution, on two separate dates, a month apart.\nThese observations bring us to Dr. Chapman\u2019s testimony. Chapman testified that the \u201cclinical\u201d evidence was not sufficient to make a diagnosis of \u201cparaphilia and/or its subcategory, pedophilia.\u201d He conceded, \u201cIt may be there.\u201d In that regard, we find Chapman\u2019s risk assessment of defendant more than a little perplexing. Chapman testified that defendant is a \u201cminimal risk\u201d to reoffend so long as he is restricted from a \u201cposition of authority, power or trust with prepubescent females.\u201d If defendant is not attracted to prepubescent females, and is not a danger to them, why is there a need to, essentially, restrict his access to them? According to this reasoning, a man thrice convicted of raping women might be a \u201cminimal risk\u201d to reoffend so long as he is not given access to women. It seems to us, this kind of recommendation perverts the very purpose of risk assessment. Chapman acknowledged that defendant should not be a teacher, a baby-sitter, or in any situation where he is in a position of authority. We take this to mean that defendant should never be alone with children, because he could then seek to exercise the inherent authority that an adult can exert over a child. We recognize, of course, that defendant did utilize his position of authority and supervision over the children to commit these offenses \u2014 an aggravating factor in defendant\u2019s case. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(a)(14) (West 2002).\nWe accord significant weight to the seriousness of defendant\u2019s conduct. We are not convinced that any rehabilitative potential he may have outweighs what he has done to the victims. The circuit court made much of the fact that the victims were blindfolded when the sexual acts were committed, referring to the admittedly \u201csordid\u201d and \u201cdespicable\u201d acts as \u201ccrimes of deceit,\u201d as if this were somehow mitigating. We think otherwise. The children are well aware of what happened to them. From the victim impact statements it is clear that they exhibit many classic symptoms of sexual abuse. We fail to see how their prognosis is any better than other sexual assault victims. The circuit court also stated that defendant had taken responsibility for his actions and had shown remorse:\n\u201cTaking into account that it is, of course, to his advantage to be sorry at this time, the evidence before me convinces me that he was and is truly remorseful for his actions. I say that because he did choose to stop what was happening. I think he genuinely recognizes that he has betrayed these children. From the record, he is worried about the loss of faith these children would have in adults.\u201d\nThe court is correct: it is to the defendant\u2019s advantage to express remorse. He perhaps recognized that at the time he gave his statement to police and in allocution at sentencing. He appears to have overlooked it in his presentence report statement. We are at a loss to explain what the circuit court meant when it commented that defendant chose \u201cto stop what was happening.\u201d Defendant did not turn himself in to authorities after the third sexual assault. He did not seek counseling or treatment. When the investigators of these matters came to him, defendant initially denied the allegations. His concern for the children was first expressed some time after the authorities confronted him with the allegations. Defendant \u201cstopped what was happening\u201d with the third victim \u2014 in a physical sense \u2014 the same way he \u201cstopped\u201d with his first two victims: he withdrew his penis from the victim\u2019s mouth. In the third incident, a knock on the door of the classroom may have had something to do with it as well. However, to suggest, as defendant did, that he realized \u201chow wrong\u201d his conduct was only after he became \u201caroused\u201d during the third sexual assault, strains credulity beyond the breaking point. Moreover, defendant really had no opportunity to commit further sexual assaults. Soon after the third sexual assault, school personnel became suspicious and the matter was turned over to law enforcement authorities for investigation.\nEven if defendant is truly remorseful, that is hardly a determinative factor with respect to the prospect of rehabilitation. A court may well find that the seriousness of the offense outweighs any expression of sorrow. See People v. Fyke, 190 Ill. App. 3d 713, 721 (1989). Moreover, remorse may be part of a cycle in which the sex offender ultimately returns to his deviant behavior. See People v. Lintz, 245 Ill. App. 3d 658, 668 (1993). If the circuit court really believed that the 36-year-old defendant possessed significant rehabilitative potential, sentences that would permit his earliest release from prison at age 61 would seem to be an odd way of showing it. As this court observed in Taylor, \u201cthere is no indication [in our constitution] that the possibility of rehabilitating an offender was to be given greater weight and consideration than the seriousness of the offense in determining a proper penalty.\u201d Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 206. Having considered all relevant factors for purposes of the first test of proportionality, we cannot say that the legislature\u2019s mandated sentence is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant. Given that determination, it obviously follows that the statute is constitutional on its face. \u201c[S]o long as there exists a situation in which a statute could be validly applied, a facial challenge must fail.\u201d Hill, 202 111. 2d at 157.\nWe now turn to the contention that the statute violates the second proportionality test. For purposes of the second test, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause where similar offenses are compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more severely. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 522. The cross-comparison analysis of the second test involves a potential two-step inquiry, depending on the answer to the first question: (1) whether the offenses being compared share a common statutory purpose (People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 476 (1998); Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 522); and (2) if the purposes are related, whether the less serious offense is punished more harshly than the more serious offense (Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 475-76). The defendant offers for comparison the offense of aggravated battery of a child. We reject defendant\u2019s argument because we do not believe the offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, and aggravated battery of a child, share a common statutory purpose.\nDefendant argues that aggravated battery of a child is a more serious offense because it requires conduct resulting in \u201cgreat bodily harm\u201d or \u201cpermanent disability or disfigurement\u201d (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.3(a) (West 2002)) whereas predatory criminal sexual assault of a child \u201cdoes not require or contemplate\u201d such harm to the victim. In addition, defendant suggests that the legislature must have considered the conduct proscribed by section 12 \u2014 4.3 of the Code more prevalent because \u201caggravated battery of a child has been a crime since 1981, and predatory criminal sexual assault was not a crime until 1996.\u201d The latter disingenuous assertion, of course, ignores the fact that the pertinent elements of the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault were previously criminalized in the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute.\nIn any event, we believe our previous lengthy discussion of the problems associated with sexual assaults upon children adequately refutes defendant\u2019s contentions regarding the comparative seriousness of these two offenses. Defendant would minimize what happened to the victims. Defendant states that his acts \u201cwere not even immediately recognized by the children as unlawful\u201d and did not cause them \u201cany physical harm.\u201d Defendant would have us accept the \u201cfiction\u201d of the \u201cnonviolent\u201d rapist (see Fordham Urb. L.J. at 441) and ignore the devastating injury inflicted upon a child\u2019s developing psyche. We reiterate the words of the Supreme Court from Coker, describing rape as \u201c[sjhort of homicide, *** the \u2018ultimate violation of self.\u2019 \u201d Coker, 433 U.S. at 597, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 992-93, 97 S. Ct. at 2869, quoting U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Report, Rape and Its Victims: A Report for Citizens, Health Facilities, and Criminal Justice Agencies 1 (1975).\nThe psychological injury suffered by a child victim of sexual assault is different in kind from injuries sustained by a battered child. Moreover, it appears from our research that sexual assaults upon children are occurring with increasing frequency and have justifiably become a matter of nationwide concern. Unlike the offender who batters a child, a sexual predator is more likely to seek out multiple victims and more likely to reoffend. The purpose of statutes like the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute, and the predatory criminal sexual assault statute, is to \u201cprotect victims from, and punish perpetrators for, sexually harmful and offensive conduct.\u201d People v. Sanchez, 344 Ill. App. 3d 74, 82 (2003) (addressing, inter alia, the differing purposes of the aggravated criminal sexual assault and the female genital mutilation statutes). The purpose of the aggravated battery of a child statute is obviously to protect children from bodily harm associated with a battery. Because the purposes of the predatory criminal sexual assault statute and the statute proscribing aggravated battery of a child are different, comparison for purposes of proportionality review is inappropriate.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we conclude that section 12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code is constitutional as applied to this defendant. We reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the cause for resentencing.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RARICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Thomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Linda D. Woloshin and Domenica A. Osterberger, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.", "Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Nancy L. Vincent, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 96367.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. GERALD SCOTT HUDDLESTON, Appellee.\nOpinion filed June 4, 2004.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied October 4, 2004.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Thomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Linda D. Woloshin and Domenica A. Osterberger, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.\nDaniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Nancy L. Vincent, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0107-01", "first_page_order": 117, "last_page_order": 158 }