{ "id": 8451441, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ERIC L. HART, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hart", "decision_date": "2005-04-07", "docket_number": "No. 97958", "first_page": "490", "last_page": "521", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 490" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "622 F.2d 308", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 479346 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "extending coverage under the rule to statements made to law enforcement agents who have express authority to act for the prosecuting government attorney" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/622/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906704 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 1031", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637142 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1037-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/1031-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 F.3d 1244", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9155932 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"harrowing flight from police - at speeds up to 100 miles per hour - was strong evidence of consciousness of guilt\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/387/1244-01" ] }, { "cite": "805 F.2d 1447", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1111391 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1454" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/805/1447-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 F.3d 1269", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9191473 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1277", "parenthetical": "\" 'evidence of resistance to arrest and flight is admissible to demonstrate consciousness of guilt and thereby guilt' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/392/1269-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279536 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "966" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0961-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307268 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 F.3d 382", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9188455 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/392/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351274 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" }, { "page": "164" }, { "page": "164-65" }, { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55999 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79-80", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259041 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "unnecessary to address merits of argument where error, if any, is harmless" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257215 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "suggesting it is \"possible - even if highly unlikely - that a scenario could arise in which a defendant's tacit admission might be probative\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 3d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rejecting the State's argument that defendant's silence, after she initially waived her Miranda rights, could be used against her unless she expressly reinvoked her right" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Cal. App. 4th 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 40934 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rejecting the State's argument that defendant's silence, after she initially waived her Miranda rights, could be used against her unless she expressly reinvoked her right" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/112/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578235 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474-76", "parenthetical": "defendant responded by saying he \"didn't want to talk,\" and the interview was immediately terminated" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 F.2d 121", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2078468 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/383/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 1067", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6530441, 6530540, 6530637, 6530387, 6530771, 6530837, 6530678, 6530487, 6530940, 6530718, 6531007 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/1067-02", "/us/434/1067-04", "/us/434/1067-05", "/us/434/1067-01", "/us/434/1067-08", "/us/434/1067-09", "/us/434/1067-06", "/us/434/1067-03", "/us/434/1067-10", "/us/434/1067-07", "/us/434/1067-11" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Mass. App. Ct. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass. App. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 1418674 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287", "parenthetical": "defendant's decision not to answer particular question did not constitute an indication that he was invoking previously waived right to remain silent" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass-app-ct/30/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "909 P.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10330224 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108", "parenthetical": "where defendant waived his right to remain silent and participated in the interview, the officer properly testified that defendant refused to answer certain questions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/909/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 So. 2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11761109 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358", "parenthetical": "holding testimony that defendant had no response to question during police interview was not impermissible comment on his constitutional right to remain silent, where defendant had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/726/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.W2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "436 Mich. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 2021787 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/436/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "744 N.E.2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621-22" }, { "page": "621-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "433 Mass. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 343526 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462-64" }, { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/433/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 F. Supp. 2d 582", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9237186 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590", "parenthetical": "defendant's mere refusal to answer or respond to a question, after having waived Miranda rights and answered questions, did not, without more, constitute an assertion or reassertion of the right to silence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/320/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 F.2d 501", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 889102 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503-04", "parenthetical": "defendant's failure to respond to a question in the course of the interrogation was not an assertion of his right to remain silent and evidence thereof was properly admitted" }, { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/563/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "956 F.2d 1388", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10520249 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1398", "parenthetical": "after defendant was read Miranda rights and made two statements, he was told of another's cooperation with the government; testimony was properly admitted that defendant \"dropped his head and said, 'Oh, forget it' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/956/1388-01" ] }, { "cite": "929 F.2d 1169", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10546922 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1174-75", "parenthetical": "similar holding; noncustodial interrogation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/929/1169-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 F.3d 439", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9452486 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/276/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 U.S. 404", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185062 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" }, { "page": "226" }, { "page": "2182" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "226" }, { "page": "2182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/447/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 610", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181032 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909174 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17", "parenthetical": "recognizing that when plain error is lacking, \"the procedural default must be honored\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453255 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3126593 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723", "parenthetical": "defendant's statement to an officer held admissible and not plea related despite defendant's offer to accept a 10-year sentence and his contemporaneous inquiry as to whether the State's Attorney would be willing to plea bargain" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2654475 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436", "parenthetical": "defendant's inquiry as to whether deals could be made was held to be plea related and inadmissible at retrial, despite the appellate panel's acknowledgment that the statement \"was not so clearly a demonstration of defendant's willingness to bargain\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351037 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402-04", "parenthetical": "defendant's hypothetical question - \"if [I] went to court and would plead no contest *** what would happen[?]\" - merely demonstrated that defendant was seeking information, and did not contain the rudiments of the negotiation process" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833569 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186-87", "parenthetical": "where the police apparently offered defendant the opportunity to cooperate in exchange for a reduction in charges, the appellate court (with very limited analysis) affirmed the trial court's ruling that defendant's statements were plea related" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5098872 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146-47", "parenthetical": "court held defendant's offer to cooperate with the police, out of fear of incarceration, was not a plea-related statement and was thus admissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/244/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 829", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79463 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832" }, { "page": "834" }, { "page": "834" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3501", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "525 F.2d 1017", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1094972 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1019-20" }, { "page": "1022" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/525/1017-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 F.2d 1137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1056845 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1138" }, { "page": "1138" }, { "page": "1139" }, { "page": "1140" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/536/1137-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 F.2d 896", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 870265 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900" }, { "page": "901-02" }, { "page": "900" }, { "page": "900" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/578/0896-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 F.2d 855", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1448688 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/602/0855-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 F.2d 1356", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 857789 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1366" }, { "page": "1359-61" }, { "page": "1368" }, { "page": "1370" }, { "page": "1371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/582/1356-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 894", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5678808 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896", "parenthetical": "defendant's statement, \"I want to make a deal,\" was not plea related and therefore not violative of Rule 402(f)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0894-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2691277 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719", "parenthetical": "defendant's statements to the arresting officer that \"he could help out\" and could \"do in someone in Wisconsin\" so long as he were not \"thrown in jail\" could not be characterized as plea negotiations and were therefore admissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2505079 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "546" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5194025 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "487" }, { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070433 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" }, { "page": "351" }, { "page": "351" }, { "page": "351" }, { "page": "351" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "351" }, { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3739324 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825" }, { "page": "825" }, { "page": "826-27" }, { "page": "827" }, { "page": "828" }, { "page": "829", "parenthetical": "Myerscough, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "830", "parenthetical": "Myerscough, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "824-27" }, { "page": "827" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0822-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1876, "char_count": 55965, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.208146327138028e-07, "percentile": 0.5952671371960295 }, "sha256": "586c09890cf85a86332d5d59583216850a8c2fabc4913b177cff12469803fd84", "simhash": "1:daba05d4e601c003", "word_count": 9161 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:17:21.915813+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ERIC L. HART, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Eric Hart, was charged in the circuit court of Macon County with armed robbery and aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, pursuant to section 18 \u2014 2(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a) (West 2000)) and section 11 \u2014 204.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 204.1 (West 2000)). A jury found defendant guilty of both offenses, and defendant was subsequently sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 and 3 years\u2019 imprisonment, with credit for 369 days time served. Defendant appealed, arguing he was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor elicited testimony that he attempted to plea bargain and commented on that attempt in closing argument. With one justice dissenting, the appellate court agreed, reversing defendant\u2019s convictions. 345 Ill. App. 3d 822. We allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now reverse the judgment of the appellate court.\nBACKGROUND\nDefendant was found guilty at the conclusion of a two-day jury trial. We summarize the evidence elicited and the arguments advanced during defendant\u2019s trial to the extent necessary to understand the issues presented.\nBrian Nash testified he was working at a Clark Oil gas station located at Oakland Avenue and Ravina Park Road in Decatur, Illinois, at approximately 5:30 a.m. on May 20, 2001, when a man came in wearing panty hose over his head and robbed Nash at gunpoint. The robber directed Nash to open the cash register and give him the money. Nash complied, handing the man an unspecified amount of money in denominations of $1 and $5 dollar bills. After the man left, Nash called the police. Nash described the robber as a black male in his twenties, approximately 5 feet 11 inches tall, weighing about 160 to 180 pounds, and wearing a black or blue Starter shirt and blue jeans. The police arrived within a minute of his call, and Nash gave them a general description of the robber. Subsequently, Nash was taken to the location where a suspect had been arrested and identified the clothing the suspect was wearing as that worn by the robber. Because of the panty hose the robber wore on his head, Nash had not seen the robber\u2019s face. Nash later gave the police the gas station\u2019s video camera surveillance tape. That tape was subsequently admitted as evidence. Nash identified a handgun found outside the station as the one used by the perpetrator.\nDecatur police officers Toby Williams and Steve Young testified regarding their pursuit and eventual apprehension of defendant. Officer Williams stated that he received a description of the robber over his radio and observed defendant, who matched that description, driving in the opposite direction on Home Park Avenue near Ramsey. The location described is about midway on Home Park between Ravina Park Road and Division Street. Williams turned his car around and followed defendant. At some point, Williams was joined by Officer Young, who had first encountered defendant at the intersection of Home Park and Center Street. When the officers activated their emergency lights, defendant\u2019s car accelerated. In the course of the pursuit, defendant\u2019s vehicle reached estimated speeds of between 50 and 70 miles per hour in an area with a posted speed limit of 30 miles per hour. Ultimately, defendant lost control of his vehicle and ran up into the yard of a residence, coming to rest against a downed tree. Defendant got out of the car and started running, but was quickly caught and, after brief resistance, was taken into custody. Defendant had two $5 bills and six $1 bills on his person.\nOfficers Lonnie Lewellyn and Brian Kaylor testified that they drove Nash to the location where defendant was apprehended and, though Nash could not positively identify the defendant because the robber had worn panty hose over his head, Nash did say that defendant had the same build and clothing as the offender. At trial, Kaylor identified the clothing worn by defendant: a pair of blue jeans, a black long-sleeved T-shirt with a Starter logo on the front, a white T-shirt, and black tennis shoes. The clothing worn by defendant when he was arrested matched that worn by the robber as seen on the station\u2019s surveillance videotape. Officer Lewellyn inventoried the contents of defendant\u2019s vehicle and found, on the driver\u2019s side floorboard, a pellet gun and $132 in loose currency. Officers Lewellyn and Steve Jostes searched the area around the gas station and recovered a pair of nylon stockings and a .22-caliber pistol in a grassy area nearby. No identifiable fingerprints were found on the handgun.\nFormer Decatur police detective Michael Beck testified that he interviewed defendant on May 20, 2001, at the Macon County jail. Beck advised defendant of his rights, and defendant \u201cagreed to make a statement.\u201d Beck said: \u201cHe told me initially that he found out when he was arrested he had a warrant on file that he thought had been taken care of.\u201d Beck then told defendant the reason he was there was to interview defendant about an armed robbery and he knew defendant was involved. Beck stated:\n\u201cHe did not deny being involved but asked me what I could do for him if he cooperated. I advised him at that time I couldn\u2019t make any promises to him if he cooperated; however, I would contact the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office and advise them of his cooperation.\u201d\nNo objection was interposed to the foregoing testimony. Beck testified defendant then asked to make a phone call to his mother. Beck stepped out of the room for a moment so defendant could talk to his mother in private, and, after a short time, reentered the room and spoke to defendant\u2019s mother, explaining defendant\u2019s circumstances. Defendant indicated he wanted to pray with his mother, which he did. Afterward, defendant said he wanted to think about whether he wanted to talk to Beck or not and advised Beck he would notify him if he wished to make a statement. Beck said he never heard from defendant again.\nOn cross-examination, Beck acknowledged that defendant had not admitted to being involved in the robbery. Defense counsel then asked, \u201cHe just said he was thinking about making a statement to you?\u201d Beck reiterated: \u201cWhat he said was, he asked me what I could do for him if he cooperated and I told him and he made no other statement regarding that.\u201d Prior to concluding his cross-examination, counsel sought to further clarify for the jury the extent to which defendant might have implicated himself:\n\u201cQ. He hasn\u2019t made a statement one way or the other concerning his involvement or non-involvement with this robbery. Is that correct?\nA. That is correct.\u201d\nDefendant presented an \u201calibi\u201d defense. Defendant\u2019s girlfriend, Jennifer O\u2019Neil, testified that she lived in Decatur, and defendant often spent the night at her residence. O\u2019Neil stated that defendant stayed at her house on the evening of May 19, 2001, and got up the next morning at 5:30 a.m., \u201cas usual.\u201d However, she did not know when he left her residence that day. Defendant\u2019s mother testified that he \u201cnormally\u201d came to her house \u201cthree or four\u201d mornings a week to feed her dogs.\nDefendant testified that he stayed at O\u2019Neil\u2019s residence the night of May 19, 2001, and got up around 5 or 5:30 a.m. on the day of May 20. At some time unspecified, defendant left O\u2019Neil\u2019s residence in his 1984 Oldsmobile. Defendant stated he was en route to his mother\u2019s house when the police started following him. After about a block, they activated their lights. Defendant admitted he \u201ckept going.\u201d He said he fled because he \u201cdidn\u2019t have [a] license\u201d and \u201chad a warrant.\u201d Defendant also claimed he knew he was going to be arrested, and he was trying to make it to the house of an acquaintance because he \u201cdidn\u2019t want the car to get towed away off the side of the road.\u201d\nAccording to defendant, his vehicle was struck from behind during the police chase, which caused him to lose control of the vehicle. He then hit a mailbox and his vehicle came to rest on a log in someone\u2019s front yard. Defendant said he knew he was going to be arrested, and he was scared, so he jumped out of the car and ran. He was apprehended a short distance away.\nDefendant admitted he owned the \u201cBB gun\u201d found on the floor of his car. He further acknowledged there were numerous bills in $1 and $5 denominations seized upon his arrest, though he stated the money was on his person, not in his car. Defendant addressed the presence of numerous $1 and $5 bills, saying they were the fruits of his employment as a barber. He said he charged $5 for a child\u2019s haircut and $8 for an adult.\nOn cross-examination, defendant insisted he had $148, in small denominations, folded up in his back pocket at the time of his arrest. He maintained that he received that money for cutting hair. The following exchange then ensued between the prosecutor and the defendant.\n\u201cQ. Whose hair did you cut the day before?\nA. That was so long ago. I mean, I can\u2019t tell you exactly, but \u2014 uh\u2014I mean, there\u2019s a lot of people hair [sic] that I cut.- That\u2019s probably from a whole week\u2019s cuts, probably.\nQ. Going back to this \u2014 uh\u2014was the 20th, the 19th, whose hair did you cut?\nA. Cut couple of bunches\u2019 hair. Some kids\u2019 hair.\nQ. How many?\nA. I can\u2019t remember how many I cut that day\nQ. How many kids? How many adults?\nA. I can\u2019t remember how many I cut that day.\u201d\nDefendant was also asked what route he took to his mother\u2019s house on the morning of May 20. Defendant described a circuitous route that actually took him in the opposite direction from his mother\u2019s house for a signifi cant distance. Looking at a map of Decatur that was admitted as an exhibit, it appears the route defendant described would have unnecessarily doubled the distance to his mother\u2019s residence and would have constituted a nonsensical detour. According to defendant, he was headed south when he turned off of Oakland \u2014 which would have taken him directly to his mother\u2019s house\u2014 and traveled several blocks west on Division Street, before turning south on Home Park, intending to go several blocks south, before turning back east and going several blocks back to Oakland. Defendant did not explain why he would have taken such a route. The route he described did, however, supply an explanation why he was on the other side of Decatur, on Home Park Avenue, when he was first spotted by police officers. Home Park Avenue intersects with Ravina Park Road \u2014 where the Clark station was located.\nOn redirect examination, defense counsel asked defendant about the police chase that ended in his apprehension:\n\u201cQ. How fast were you going after the police \u2014 uh\u2014tried to pull you over?\nA. I never did speed from the police officers. I never went over the speed limit.\nQ. Okay.\nA. And they \u2014 I mean, they know that. They made fun about that when they arrested me on the scene. Couple of police officers that was laughing about it; where did he think he was going? He didn\u2019t know I knew somebody. If they had let me go, I would have parked the car in her driveway. Dead end area. She been living back there for over 30-some years.\u201d\nAfter defendant testified, Officer Lewellyn was recalled to identify, on the Decatur street map, the street upon which defendant\u2019s girlfriend lived, and that upon which defendant\u2019s mother lived. With that, the evidentiary portion of the case was concluded. The aforementioned street map was admitted as evidence, as was the gas station\u2019s surveillance videotape, capturing the robbery in progress.\nDuring closing argument, defense counsel noted that defendant did not make an admission to Detective Beck, that the only thing defendant said was that he wanted to pray. The prosecutor subsequently argued:\n\u201cThe defendant, also, mentioned the fact that he wanted to pray [with] his mother is not an indication of guilt, but you remember what Officer Beck told you? He didn\u2019t just want to pray with his mother. He wanted to know what he would get or what kind of compensation or what kind of agreement or whatever he would get if he cooperated. And, [l]adies and [g]entlemen, only guilty men want to know what they get if they cooperate.\u201d\nDefense counsel did not object to the prosecutor\u2019s comments.\nThe jury was instructed in the applicable law, including admonitions that closing arguments are limited to reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence and are not themselves evidence. During deliberations, the jury again viewed the gas station\u2019s security videotape which had captured the robbery in progress. The jury subsequently found defendant guilty of armed robbery and aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. Defense counsel did not raise Beck\u2019s testimony or the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument as issues in a posttrial motion. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 and 3 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nIn the ensuing appeal, defendant argued he was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor \u2014 according to defendant \u2014 elicited testimony that he attempted to \u201cplea bargain\u201d and commented on that attempt in closing argument. The appellate court acknowledged that defendant had not properly preserved the issue, but considered the allegation of error under the plain error rule.\nThe court, with one justice dissenting, held the prosecutor\u2019s comment improper and sufficiently egregious to warrant reversal. The majority recognized that care should be exercised in excluding, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402(f) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(f)), a defendant\u2019s admissions to police investigators, noting that every \u201cguilty person who voluntarily speaks to a detective probably hopes to benefit from the conversation, either by convincing the detective that he did not commit the crime or by obtaining leniency for his cooperation.\u201d 345 Ill. App. 3d at 825. The court agreed that \u201cfactual admissions\u201d should not be excluded \u201con the basis of a mere intention on the part of the accused to help himself by cooperating with the police.\u201d 345 Ill. App. 3d at 825. However, the majority observed this case does not involve a factual admission. Rather, it involves what the majority characterized as the prosecutor\u2019s suggestion to the jury that defendant \u201coffered to enter into plea negotiations and that offer was an indication of guilt.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The appellate majority cited this court\u2019s decision in People v. Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d 341, 352 (1980) for the proposition that \u201c[t]he use of technical objections in an attempt to establish that defendant\u2019s inquiries have not risen to the level of a \u2018plea discussion\u2019 has been rejected by the supreme court.\u201d The appellate court implicitly concluded that defendant had clearly indicated his intent to pursue plea negotiations (345 Ill. App. 3d at 826-27) and stated its belief that the prosecutor\u2019s argument regarding defendant\u2019s willingness to cooperate ran \u201ccounter to the whole idea of Rule 402(f).\u201d 345 Ill. App. 3d at 827. The court noted its \u201cfurther concern\u201d over Detective Beck\u2019s testimony that defendant was silent in the face of Beck\u2019s accusation of guilt; however, the court failed to specify how and if that concern figured into its decision to reverse defendant\u2019s conviction, which was avowedly based upon the appellate majority\u2019s perception of a Rule 402(f) violation.\nIn dissent, Justice Myerscough pointed out that the majority had ignored various appellate court precedents that appeared to dictate a different result, holding similar statements admissible where they were not clearly plea related. 345 Ill. App. 3d at 828 (Myerscough, J., dissenting (citing People v. Rolih, 233 Ill. App. 3d 484 (1992), People v. Ward, 192 Ill. App. 3d 544 (1989), People v. Burns, 188 Ill. App. 3d 716 (1989), and People v. Tennin, 123 Ill. App. 3d 894 (1984)). Justice Myerscough suggested the majority had mischaracterized the prosecutor\u2019s remarks: \u201c[T]he prosecution simply commented that defendant asked what the police officer \u2018could do for him if he cooperated,\u2019 more precisely, what benefits could defendant derive if he cooperated \u2014 not if he pleaded guilty.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) 345 Ill. App. 3d at 829 (Myerscough, J., dissenting). Justice Myerscough believed the prosecutor\u2019s comment constituted permissible rebuttal to defense counsel\u2019s assertion in closing that defendant \u201cdidn\u2019t make an admission to Detective Beck.\u201d Justice Myerscough concluded:\n\u201cDefendant clearly opened the door, and the prosecutor could properly respond to defense counsel\u2019s comments and draw reasonable inferences therefrom. Moreover, it is inconsistent to allow defense counsel to fail to object to Beck\u2019s testimony at trial, to comment on the testimony in his closing argument, and then to argue on appeal that the prosecutor improperly used that testimony in his rebuttal argument.\u201d 345 Ill. App. 3d at 830 (Myerscough, J., dissenting).\nBefore this court, the State argues that the defendant\u2019s statement to Detective Beck was not plea related and was, therefore, admissible at trial. Consequently, the prosecutor\u2019s reference to that statement in closing argument was both proper and invited by defendant\u2019s closing argument. Defendant counters that Rule 402(f) was violated, and his right to a fair trial was compromised, by Detective Beck\u2019s testimonial comment on defendant\u2019s post -Miranda silence and his \u201cattempt to pursue plea negotiations.\u201d Defendant contends the error was magnified when the prosecutor argued in closing, \u201conly guilty men want to know what they get if they cooperate.\u201d\nANALYSIS\nInitially, we note, as did the justices of the appellate court, that defendant neither objected to the evidence or prosecutorial comments in question at the time of trial, nor raised issues relating thereto in a posttrial motion. However, the appellate court excused the default, under the plain error rule, holding that the prosecutor\u2019s violation of Rule 402(f) denied defendant a fair trial. 345 Ill. App. 3d at 824-27. We disagree with the appellate court.\nOur purpose in promulgating Supreme Court Rule 402(f) was to encourage the negotiated disposition of criminal cases by eliminating the risk that juries will hear statements or admissions made by defendants during plea negotiations. Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 351. To that end, Rule 402(f) provides:\n\u201cIf a plea discussion does not result in a plea of guilty, *** neither the plea discussion nor any resulting agreement, plea, or judgment shall be admissible against the defendant in any criminal proceeding.\u201d 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(f).\nOur rule is similar to the previous version of Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provided in pertinent part:\n\u201cExcept as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of *** an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing *** offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the *** offer.\u201d Fed. R. Evid. 410.\nRule 410 has now been changed so as to require \u2014 for purposes of exclusion \u2014 that the statement be made \u201cin the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Fed. R. Evid. 410. But see United States v. Grant, 622 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1980) (extending coverage under the rule to statements made to law enforcement agents who have express authority to act for the prosecuting government attorney). However, when this court rendered its decision in Friedman, we noted the then-existing similarities between the state and federal rules when we recognized the need to establish decisional boundaries \u201cin relation to the reasonable expectations of the accused at the time the statement was made.\u201d Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 351. To that end, this court cited, approvingly, the decision of the federal court in United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978), and adopted the two-part test utilized in that case to determine whether a particular statement is plea related. Pursuant to that test, courts must consider, first, whether the accused exhibited a subjective expectation to negotiate a plea, and, second, whether that expectation was reasonable under the totality of the objective circumstances. Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 351. This court stated: \u201cBecause of the substantial similarity in the purpose of the Federal rules, we find this analysis equally applicable to the determination of when a statement is plea related under our rule.\u201d Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 351.\nThis court further observed: \u201cBefore a discussion can be characterized as plea related, it must contain the rudiments of the negotiation process, i.e., a willingness by defendant to enter a plea of guilty in return for concessions by the State.\u201d Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 353. To illustrate that point, this court invited a comparison of United States v. Pantohan, 602 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1979), United States v. Levy, 578 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1978), and United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1978), with United States v. Brooks, 536 F.2d 1137 (6th Cir. 1976), and United States v. Smith, 525 F.2d 1017 (10th Cir. 1975). Examination of those cases is instructive for present purposes.\nIn both Smith and Brooks, it was held that the rudiments of the negotiation process were present, and exclusion of plea-related statements was thus mandated. In Smith, defendant informed an interrogating officer that he \u201cwanted to talk *** about *** making a deal.\u201d Defendant indicated he would enter a plea of guilty to federal charges so long as he could spend his period of incarceration in a federal, rather than state, facility. Smith, 525 F.2d at 1019-20. The Smith court concluded that the foregoing statements were indicative of plea bargaining. Smith, 525 F.2d at 1022. In Brooks, defendant telephoned a postal inspector and offered to plead guilty to certain charges if he were given a maximum sentence of two years. Brooks, 536 F.2d at 1138. The Brooks court noted that offers to plead guilty are \u201cgenerally considered a part of plea negotiations and are ordinarily inadmissible.\u201d Brooks, 536 F.2d at 1138. The Brooks court stated that \u201ceven an attempt to open plea bargaining (which is what we have in this case) should be covered under the *** rule of inadmissibility.\u201d Brooks, 536 F.2d at 1139. The court\u2019s opinion suggested a harmless error analysis might have been appropriate, but the court could not \u201csay that admission of appellant\u2019s offer was harmless.\u201d Brooks, 536 F.2d at 1140.\nWhen one compares Brooks and Smith with Pantohan, Levy, and Robertson, it becomes clear that this court never intended Rule 402(f) to exclude as evidence mere offers to cooperate with the police, at least where the offers were not accompanied by \u201cthe rudiments of the negotiation process, i.e., a willingness by defendant to enter a plea of guilty in return for concessions by the State.\u201d See Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 353.\nIn Pantohan, defendant confessed to the crime of which he was accused and cooperated with federal agents to the extent of providing general information regarding the criminal activities of others. He was told that the prosecutor would be told of his cooperation, but the information was never communicated to the prosecutor. Defendant subsequently argued that his statements to the agents should have been suppressed, as they were made during plea bargaining. The court of appeals rejected that contention, stating:\n\u201cPantohan apparently felt that cooperating with the ATF agents was \u2018the only way out.\u2019 However, he knew that he was not under arrest at the time of the statements, there was no \u2018promise\u2019 other than to tell the United States Attorney of the cooperation, and there was no plea offer[,] no plea bargaining. Since the statements were not made during plea negotiations, they do not require suppression.\u201d Pantohan, 602 F.2d at 857.\nIn Robertson, defendant Robertson and his codefendant, Butigan, were arrested on drug charges and, shortly thereafter, offered to cooperate with federal agents in exchange for the release of, or leniency for, their female companions, who had also been arrested. Robertson and Butigan were told only that their cooperation would \u201cprobably help *** out in the long run\u201d and that the agents would \u201cmake it known to the Judicial Authorities.\u201d Pursuant to their offer of cooperation, Robertson and Butigan then admitted their own involvement and stated emphatically that the women were not involved. Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1359-61. Robertson later claimed that his conversations with the agents constituted plea negotiations. The court of appeals rejected that contention. The court observed:\n\u201c [Application of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6) and Fed. R. Evid. 410 to circumstances such as those presented in this case would have a substantial adverse effect on important law enforcement interests. It is reasonable to assume that the cooperation of an arrested person often is prompted by a desire for leniency for himself or others. Statements or confessions made in such circumstances, if they are voluntary and made with full awareness of the person\u2019s rights, are rehable, probative and constitutionally admissible evidence. See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3501. We do not believe that Fed. R. Crim. P 11(e)(6) and Fed. R. Evid. 410 require otherwise.\u201d Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1368.\nThe court determined that Robertson\u2019s conversation with the agents was not a plea negotiation, noting there was \u201cno indication in the record that [defendants] were willing to plead guilty or even offer to plead guilty to exonerate the women.\u201d Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1370. The Robertson court concluded: \u201cStatements such as these should not be rendered inadmissible simply because the individual expresses a desire to be cooperative in return for leniency for another.\u201d Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1371.\nLevy is even more to the point. Following his arrest on narcotics charges, Levy offered to cooperate with federal agents and, in the course of the conversations, volunteered various incriminating statements. He subsequently contended that his offers to cooperate, and the attendant incriminating statements, were inadmissible under the version of Rule 410 then in effect \u2014 the version which this court in Friedman found similar to our own Rule 402(f). The Levy court rejected defendant\u2019s contention. First, the court spoke to the issue of relevance, stating:\n\u201cThere was testimony *** concerning offers by Levy to cooperate in the future. Agents White, DiGravio, and Day each testified that Levy had offered to cooperate with the DEA in future investigations. We think that such an offer evidences a consciousness of guilt and is relevant to prove the charge against Levy.\u201d Levy, 578 F.2d at 900.\nThe court then examined the circumstances surrounding the statements in question and concluded:\n\u201cLevy made his offers of cooperation and attendant admissions without attaching any condition to his admissions. The agents did not initiate the discussion. See ABA, Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty \u00a7 3.4 at 78 (1968), Rather, he volunteered to cooperate in the absence of any request from the agents. His decision to offer his cooperation was spontaneous, apparently based upon a successful prior experience of his own.\nNo fault can be found with allowing in evidence his volunteered desire to cooperate in the future, since it was evidence of his consciousness that he was in serious difficulty with the law and needed to do something to extricate himself. We glean nothing from Levy\u2019s various conversations that is fairly discernible as an offer of a bargain. Nor were the admissions that were made concurrently with the offer immunized from use, since there was no offer to plead guilty on condition that the charges or the possibility of maximum punishment would be reduced.\u201d Levy, 578 F.2d at 901-02.\nIn Friedman, this court utilized Brooks, Smith, Pantohan, Robertson, and Levy to illustrate the difference between cases exhibiting the rudiments of plea bargaining (Brooks and Smith) and those in which the requisites of plea bargaining were lacking (Pantohan, Robertson, and Levy). This court thus placed an implicit imprimatur on the analysis employed in the latter federal decisions which, generally, stand for the proposition that offers to cooperate, without more, do not constitute plea negotiations or offers to enter into plea negotiations. Illinois appellate court panels, confronted with similar facts, have since reached results consistent with the federal decisions cited in Friedman.\nFor example, in People v. Beler, 327 Ill. App. 3d 829 (2002), defendant was arrested for, inter alia, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, and was subsequently approached by a detective seeking defendant\u2019s cooperation in either revealing his supplier or participating in a controlled buy. At trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the detective indicating that defendant had agreed to cooperate. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated, \u201c \u2018[defendant was beginning to attempt to cooperate with the drug investigation *** in this case. Again, it\u2019s overwhelming, obvious evidence of [d]efendant\u2019s knowledge.\u2019 \u201d Beler, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 832. Defendant was convicted and appealed, arguing that the detective\u2019s testimony constituted evidence of plea negotiations inadmissible pursuant to Rule 402(f) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(f)). The appellate court disagreed, noting that defendant \u201cdid not express an interest in confessing, pleading guilty, or seeking concessions from the State in exchange for a plea.\u201d Beler, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 834. In short, \u201c \u2018the rudiments of the negotiation process\u2019 \u201d were not present. Beler, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 834, quoting Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 353. Notably, Beler did not raise the quoted remark of the prosecutor as error or argue that the inference therein was improper.\nSimilarly, in People v. Rolih, 233 Ill. App. 3d 484 (1992), a defendant arrested for possession of narcotics indicated he \u201cwished to cooperate in any way possible for future consideration of the charges that would be pending against him\u201d and he \u201cwould do anything to assist [the police] which would in turn assist him with \u2014 in consideration of the charges.\u201d Defendant made other incriminating statements both at the time of his arrest and subsequently at police headquarters. Defendant was later released on the night of his arrest \u201cdue to his offer of cooperation.\u201d Rolih, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 486. After the trial court found defendant guilty, defendant filed a post-trial motion, arguing that the court had erred in considering \u201cplea-related statements.\u201d The court ruled that the statements at issue were not plea related and were properly admitted. Rolih, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 488. We note, in passing, that the prosecutor, at one point in the trial, specifically argued that defendant\u2019s willingness to cooperate \u201cwas evidence of consciousness of guilt.\u201d Rolih, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 487. The appellate court held that the statements were properly admitted, stating:\n\u201cThe rudiments of a negotiated plea are lacking here. Defendant did not explain what he meant hy the terms \u2018cooperation,\u2019 \u2018future consideration of the charges,\u2019 and \u2018in consideration of the charges.\u2019 These words do not manifest that defendant was willing to plead guilty to the charges against him. He did not indicate what the terms were under which he would be willing to bargain. *** Accordingly, we find no error in admission of defendant\u2019s statements.\u201d Rolih, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 489.\nFinally, in People v. Ward, 192 Ill. App. 3d 544 (1989), a defendant arrested for residential burglary told an interrogating officer he knew a lot of narcotics dealers and would like \u201cto work this off.\u201d The officer responded that the police could not make any deals, and the only thing he could do was to tell the State\u2019s Attorney that defendant had cooperated. Defendant later admitted he made the statement because he wanted to go home. Ward, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 546. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated as follows:\n\u201c \u2018And when Detective Strickland, after talking for a while, finally says Karen Gilbert wasn\u2019t asleep, she saw you as you walked by that couch, she identified you, what does [defendant] do? What does he do? He slumps, the head goes down. He says let\u2019s make a deal. Let me work this through. I know drug dealers. Let\u2019s make a deal, ladies and gentlemen. Make a deal for what? His instinctive reaction when he knew he was caught was to try and make a deal.\u2019 \u201d Ward, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 549.\nLater, in rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201c \u2018I submit, ladies and gentlemen, if you didn\u2019t commit the offense, you would not jump at the point where you\u2019ve been told you were identified and say, hey, let\u2019s make a deal. No. You\u2019d say she\u2019s wrong, something along those lines, but not let\u2019s make a deal, let me work this off, I know some drug dealers.\u2019 \u201d Ward, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 546.\nThe appellate court affirmed the resulting conviction after a thorough review of other cases addressing Rule 402(f) issues, concluding that defendant\u2019s statement was not plea related and was properly admitted. Ward, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 553. The court held that defendant\u2019s use of the ambiguous phrase \u201cwork this off\u2019 did not sufficiently demonstrate that defendant was initiating plea discussions. The court observed, \u201c[I]t is just as compelling to conclude from the record that he was attempting to trade information about narcotics dealers for the dropping of the charge against him [citation] or that he just wanted to go home, as defendant himself admitted.\u201d Ward, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 554. Ward apparently did not raise the quoted remarks of the prosecutor as error or argue that the inferences therein were improper.\nThe foregoing cases obviously do not represent an all-inclusive recitation of arguably applicable cases and factual scenarios. However, we believe the relevant circumstances in these cases parallel the critical facts in the case at bar. See also People v. Ramirez, 244 Ill. App. 3d 136, 146-47 (1993) (court held defendant\u2019s offer to cooperate with the police, out of fear of incarceration, was not a plea-related statement and was thus admissible); People v. Burns, 188 Ill. App. 3d 716, 719 (1989) (defendant\u2019s statements to the arresting officer that \u201che could help out\u201d and could \u201cdo in someone in Wisconsin\u201d so long as he were not \u201cthrown in jail\u201d could not be characterized as plea negotiations and were therefore admissible). But see People v. Ragusa, 346 Ill. App. 3d 176, 186-87 (2004) (where the police apparently offered defendant the opportunity to cooperate in exchange for a reduction in charges, the appellate court (with very limited analysis) affirmed the trial court\u2019s ruling that defendant\u2019s statements were plea related).\nWe acknowledge numerous other appellate decisions involving facts differing to a greater or lesser degree from those with which we are confronted in this case. What is apparent from a review of those cases is that a defendant\u2019s reference to \u201cmaking a deal,\u201d or his inquiry as to what would happen if he \u201cpleaded no contest,\u201d can make the analysis more problematic. See generally People v. Taylor, 289 Ill. App. 3d 399, 402-04 (1997) (defendant\u2019s hypothetical question \u2014 \u201cif [I] went to court and would plead no contest *** what would happen[?]\u201d \u2014 merely demonstrated that defendant was seeking information, and did not contain the rudiments of the negotiation process); People v. Connolly, 186 Ill. App. 3d 429, 436 (1989) (defendant\u2019s inquiry as to whether deals could be made was held to be plea related and inadmissible at retrial, despite the appellate panel\u2019s acknowledgment that the statement \u201cwas not so clearly a demonstration of defendant\u2019s willingness to bargain\u201d); People v. Tennin, 123 Ill. App. 3d 894, 896 (1984) (defendant\u2019s statement, \u201cI want to make a deal,\u201d was not plea related and therefore not violative of Rule 402(f)); People v. Victory, 94 Ill. App. 3d 719, 723 (1981) (defendant\u2019s statement to an officer held admissible and not plea related despite defendant\u2019s offer to accept a 10-year sentence and his contemporaneous inquiry as to whether the State\u2019s Attorney would be willing to plea bargain). We express no opinion regarding the outcomes or analyses of these cases, which addressed facts significantly different from those in the case before us.\nIn the instant case, defendant suggested he might be willing to cooperate with Detective Beck, but he wanted to know what Beck could do for him. He did not ask what concessions the prosecutor might offer him. He did not ask Beck to initiate contact with the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office or convey terms to the prosecutor. He did not state what his \u201ccooperation\u201d might entail or specify what, if anything, he would require in exchange for his cooperation. He never intimated that he was willing to plead guilty or discuss pleading guilty. In short, the rudiments of the negotiation process are not present. For all practical purposes, this case is indistinguishable from cases like Levy, and we believe the same result is indicated: the evidence in question does not violate Rule 402(f) and is thus admissible.\nThe fact that defendant did not inquire further after Beck informed defendant he would do nothing more than advise the State\u2019s Attorney of defendant\u2019s cooperation does not, in our opinion, \u201cexhibit[ ] a subjective expectation\u201d (Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 351) that defendant was seeking to negotiate a plea. Moreover, even if we assume, arguendo, that defendant\u2019s subjective expectation was not clear, defendant\u2019s argument would nonetheless fail because that expectation was not reasonable under the totality of the objective circumstances. See Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 351.\nDefendant, however, suggests that the prosecutor\u2019s rebuttal argument \u201ceradicated\u201d any doubt that Beck\u2019s testimony was being used in violation of Rule 402(f). The appellate majority expressed essentially the same view when it characterized the prosecutor\u2019s rebuttal as a suggestion to the jury that defendant \u201cinquired about the possibility of a plea negotiation\u201d and concluded that the prosecutor\u2019s argument regarding defendant\u2019s willingness to cooperate ran \u201ccounter to the whole idea of Rule 402(f).\u201d 345 Ill. App. 3d at 827. We disagree in all respects.\nFirst, the prosecutor never stated or implied that defendant offered to enter into \u201cplea negotiations\u201d or \u201cplead guilty,\u201d which is what Rule 402(f) is intended to prohibit. The prosecutor stated in pertinent part that defendant \u201cwanted to know what he would get or what kind of compensation or what kind of agreement or whatever he would get if he cooperated.\u201d As our previous discussion of relevant cases indicates, a defendant might choose to offer cooperation to a police officer for a variety of reasons; however, without a reasonably specific reference to a defendant\u2019s willingness to either negotiate or enter a guilty plea, neither evidence of a defendant\u2019s willingness to cooperate, nor prosecutorial comments thereon, violate Rule 402(f) as currently constituted. Indeed, in Levy, one of the exemplary cases this court cited in Friedman, the court of appeals specifically stated:\n\u201cWe think that such an offer [of cooperation] evidences a consciousness of guilt and is relevant to prove the charge against Levy.\u201d Levy, 578 F.2d at 900.\nThere is no reason why the prosecutor could not argue an inference properly drawn from relevant and admissible evidence. The law gives a prosecutor wide latitude in argument and he may comment on facts and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom. People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 573 (2000). Neither the testimony elicited, nor the prosecutor\u2019s comment thereon, violated Rule 402(f).\nWe find no error, much less plain error. We therefore hold that the issue is procedurally defaulted and that no basis exists to excuse the default under our case law. See People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995) (recognizing that when plain error is lacking, \u201cthe procedural default must be honored\u201d).\nWe turn now to the post -Miranda silence issue, which the appellate court raised, and which defendant echoes in support of the appellate court\u2019s judgment. In its opinion, the appellate court suggested that Detective Beck\u2019s testimonial comment on defendant\u2019s post -Miranda \u201csilence,\u201d in the face of Beck\u2019s accusation of guilt, violated defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial. There is no suggestion that the prosecutor commented on this aspect of Beck\u2019s testimony.\nAt trial, Beck testified that he advised defendant of his rights prior to interviewing defendant, specifically informing defendant that he did not have to speak with Beck. Beck said defendant agreed to speak with him and \u201cmake a statement,\u201d thus waiving his right to remain silent. After defendant attempted to offer an exculpatory explanation for his flight from pursuing police officers, they discussed the reason for defendant\u2019s arrest, and Beck told defendant he knew defendant was involved in the armed robbery. Defendant immediately responded, but his response was not directed to Beck\u2019s accusation. Defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent. He did not seek to terminate the interview. He did not ask to speak to an attorney. He did not invoke any of these rights, despite having been so recently admonished. Defendant responded evasively by ignoring the accusation and asking Beck what Beck could do for him if he cooperated. In other words, defendant continued speaking with Beck.\nIn a rather abbreviated argument, defendant suggests that Beck\u2019s comment on defendant\u2019s failure to deny his accusation of guilt constituted a violation of principles espoused in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976). We believe this contention is questionable at best, which, perhaps, explains the appellate court\u2019s failure to expand upon its suggestion of error.\nThe Supreme Court has held \u201ca defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent.\u201d Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408, 65 L. Ed. 2d 222, 226, 100 S. Ct. 2180, 2182 (1980). When a defendant waives his Miranda rights, and makes statements to police, \u201c[a]s to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all.\u201d Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 226, 100 S. Ct. at 2182.\nOur research has revealed numerous cases that have sanctioned the admissibility of testimony regarding a defendant\u2019s silence or nonverbal conduct during questioning subsequent to a valid waiver of rights. For example, it has been held in such a situation that a defendant\u2019s failure to respond to some questions during questioning \u2014 while responding to others \u2014 may be the subject of testimony at defendant\u2019s trial, at least where the defendant\u2019s silence cannot be construed as an attempt to reassert his rights and cut off questioning altogether. See generally United States v. Burns, 276 F.3d 439, 441-42 (8th Cir. 2002) (the court of appeals concluded that defendant\u2019s \u201csilent response\u201d to one inquiry during the custodial interrogation, and eventual refusal to respond to further questioning, were \u201cpart of an otherwise admissible conversation\u201d the use of which did not violate defendant\u2019s due process rights); United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1991) (similar holding; noncustodial interrogation); United States v. Robinson, 956 F.2d 1388, 1398 (7th Cir. 1992) (after defendant was read Miranda rights and made two statements, he was told of another\u2019s cooperation with the government; testimony was properly admitted that defendant \u201cdropped his head and said, \u2018Oh, forget it\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 503-04 (1st Cir. 1977) (defendant\u2019s failure to respond to a question in the course of the interrogation was not an assertion of his right to remain silent and evidence thereof was properly admitted); Burton v. Beck, 320 F. Supp. 2d 582, 590 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (defendant\u2019s mere refusal to answer or respond to a question, after having waived Miranda rights and answered questions, did not, without more, constitute an assertion or reassertion of the right to silence); Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 453, 462-64, 744 N.E.2d 614, 621-22 (2001); People v. Reavey, 436 Mich. 197, 218-22, 462 N.W2d 1, 10-12 (1990) (\u201cThe Fifth Amendment does not preclude substantive use of testimony concerning a defendant\u2019s behavior and demeanor during a custodial interrogation after a valid waiver of his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. When a defendant speaks after receiving Miranda warnings, a momentary pause or even a failure to answer a question will not be construed as an affirmative invocation by the defendant of the right to remain silent\u201d); Thomas v. State, 726 So. 2d 357, 358 (Fla. App. 1999) (holding testimony that defendant had no response to question during police interview was not impermissible comment on his constitutional right to remain silent, where defendant had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights); Romano v. State, 909 P.2d 92, 108 (Okla. App. 1995) (where defendant waived his right to remain silent and participated in the interview, the officer properly testified that defendant refused to answer certain questions).\nSome might well find the reasoning of these cases compelling. That reasoning was summed up by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Senior:\n\u201c \u2018[A] defendant has not only the right to remain silent from the beginning but also a continuing right to cut off, at any time, any questioning that does take place.\u2019 [Citation.] The defendant\u2019s failure to answer one specific question \u2018must be interpreted in the context of his willingness to talk both immediately prior to and subsequent to\u2019 this particular question. [Citation.] The fact that the defendant was silent in response to the question concerning where he had been drinking did not constitute an affirmative indication \u2018that he [was] invoking the right he previously waived.\u2019 [Citations.] See Commonwealth v. Pennellatore, supra; Commonwealth v. Ewing, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 285, 287 (1991) (defendant\u2019s decision not to answer particular question did not constitute an indication that he was invoking previously waived right to remain silent). Indeed, for the rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), to apply, \u2018there must be ... an expressed unwillingness to continue,\u2019 which the defendant in this case did not manifest (emphasis added). [Citation.] As the judge found, the defendant could not \u2018pick and choose,\u2019 because \u2018[i]f he talks, what he says or omits is to be judged on its merits or demerits, and not on some artificial standard that only the part that helps him can be later referred to. This was not a case where the government commented upon ... a prior exercise of rights. The government asked the jury to measure what the defendant [did not say] when he had no rights because he had voluntarily waived them.\u2019 United States v. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 503 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978), quoting Vitali v. United States, 383 F.2d 121, 123 (1st Cir. 1967).\u201d Senior, 433 Mass, at 463, 744 N.E.2d at 621-22.\nWe note that the defendant in the case at bar continued speaking with Beck for a time after Beck\u2019s accusation; he did not, at that point, reassert his right to remain silent. Cf. People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 474-76 (2003) (defendant responded by saying he \u201cdidn\u2019t want to talk,\u201d and the interview was immediately terminated).\nWhile there are certainly cases reaching a result contrary to those we have cited (see People v. Jennings, 112 Cal. App. 4th 459, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243 (2003) (rejecting the State\u2019s argument that defendant\u2019s silence, after she initially waived her Miranda rights, could be used against her unless she expressly reinvoked her right)), a strong argument could certainly be made that this is the \u201cscenario\u201d to which the appellate court referred in People v. Powell, 301 Ill. App. 3d 272, 277 (1998) (suggesting it is \u201cpossible \u2014 even if highly unlikely \u2014 that a scenario could arise in which a defendant\u2019s tacit admission might be probative\u201d). Moreover, we note in passing that it is arguable defendant was not silent at all. He in fact responded to Detective Beck\u2019s accusation \u2014 albeit an evasive response \u2014 with a statement that we have already observed indicates consciousness of guilt, standing alone.\nIn any event, we need not decide whether defendant\u2019s failure to deny Beck\u2019s accusation is admissible against him, because the error, if any, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 442 (2001) (unnecessary to address merits of argument where error, if any, is harmless); People v. Hooper, 172 Ill. 2d 64, 79-80 (1996) (same).\nDoyle violations \u2014 assuming, arguendo, this was one, as defendant claims \u2014 are subject to a harmless error analysis. People v. Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d 156, 164 (2001). This court has recognized at least five factors for a court to consider in determining whether a Doyle violation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the party who elicited the testimony about defendant\u2019s silence; (2) the intensity and frequency of the references to the defendant\u2019s silence; (3) the use that the prosecution made of defendant\u2019s silence; (4) the trial court\u2019s opportunity to grant a mistrial motion or to give a curative jury instruction; and (5) the quantum of other evidence proving the defendant\u2019s guilt. Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d at 164.\nIn this case, the prosecution did elicit the testimony in question; however, that would appear to be the only factor that weighs against the State. As in the cases discussed in Dameron, the reference in question was brief and isolated, and the prosecutor never revisited that aspect of the testimony. See Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d at 164-65. Defense counsel did not object to the reference, so the reference was not highlighted. While this may have been a matter of trial strategy, or an acknowledgment that the testimony was proper, or mere ineptitude, depending upon one\u2019s evaluation of the issue, it was defense counsel\u2019s failure to object that deprived the court of the opportunity to consider whether error had occurred and take remedial action, if necessary. Finally, as to the last factor, the State presented a formidable case against defendant, albeit one based on circumstantial evidence.\nAccording to the State\u2019s evidence, defendant was observed not far from the scene of the robbery, driving in the opposite direction, in the early morning, within minutes of the robbery. The clothing he wore was identified as that worn by the robber. When the police followed him, and activated their lights, defendant accelerated and fled, leading them on a high-speed chase, at speeds between 50 and 70 miles per hour, through residential areas where the posted speed limit was 30 miles per hour. When defendant eventually lost control of his vehicle, and ran up into a yard, he got out of the car and tried to flee on foot. Moreover, he resisted when the officers caught him. Although there are some logical inferences that must be drawn to connect flight with guilt of the crime charged (United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 395 (9th Cir. 2004)), and defendant attempted to offer an exculpatory explanation as to one of them (suggesting that he did not flee from officers because of the robbery), we believe defendant\u2019s flight and resistance upon apprehension constitute circumstances from which the trier of fact could infer consciousness of guilt. People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 448 (1995); People v. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d 961, 966 (2001); United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 2004) (\u201c \u2018evidence of resistance to arrest and flight is admissible to demonstrate consciousness of guilt and thereby guilt\u2019 \u201d), quoting United States v. Deparias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1454 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1266 n.20 (11th Cir. 2004) (\u201charrowing flight from police \u2014 at speeds up to 100 miles per hour \u2014 was strong evidence of consciousness of guilt\u201d).\nWhen questioned by Beck, defendant suggested he might be willing to cooperate with Beck under appropriate circumstances, also evincing consciousness of guilt. See Levy, 578 F.2d at 900.\nAdditionally, a significant amount of cash, in small bills, was found on the floorboard of defendant\u2019s car, along with a pellet gun. A few bills were recovered from defendant\u2019s person.\nMoreover, defendant chose to testify and submit his version of events as evidence for the jury\u2019s consideration. Defendant testified that, at 5:30 a.m. on the day of the robbery, he was en route to his mother\u2019s residence to feed her dogs. Having examined the city map that was admitted at trial, we can only say it seriously taxes reason for defendant to suggest that he took the circuitous route he did in order to get to his mother\u2019s house. The nonsensical route he claims he drove actually took him away from his mother\u2019s residence at one point, for no apparent reason, and doubled the distance otherwise required to get there. Defendant offered no explanation for the circuitous route he took. The route he testified to did, however, serve to place him in the vicinity where the officers first encountered him.\nDefendant testified that he fled from police because he did not have a license, and he thought there might have been a warrant for his arrest with respect to some unspecified matter. He claimed he fled from two pursuing police cars because he wanted to reach an acquaintance\u2019s house \u2014 so his car would not be towed when he was arrested. This explanation is highly implausible. Moreover, we would add that \u201cfled\u201d is probably the wrong word to use in describing defendant\u2019s version of the police chase, as defendant testified that he (and by correlation the pursuing officers) never exceeded the speed limit, which the uncontradicted testimony indicated was 30 miles per hour. We need not expand upon the ludicrous imagery this calls to mind.\nFinally, defendant suggested that the money recovered after his arrest represented the proceeds of his work cutting people\u2019s hair. However, when pressed by the prosecutor on cross-examination, defendant could not recall the name of a single person whose hair he had cut.\nThe story defendant told the jury was simply unbelievable. If a defendant chooses to give an explanation for his incriminating situation, he should provide a reasonable story or be judged by its improbabilities. People v. Shevock, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1037-38 (2003); People v. Nyberg, 275 Ill. App. 3d 570, 579 (1995).\nAs in Dameron, the testimony in question was brief and isolated, the State never returned to that aspect of the testimony, and there was strong evidence of guilt. See Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d at 166. Assuming, arguendo, there was a Doyle violation, we find it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nWe conclude there was no violation of Rule 402(f) or infringement of defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial, and any Doyle violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand this matter to the appellate court for consideration of sentencing issues previously raised, but not addressed, in the appellate court.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Scott Rueter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin and Colleen M. Griffin, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman and David E. Mannchen, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.", "Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Keleigh L. Biggins, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 97958.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ERIC L. HART, Appellee.\nOpinion filed April 7, 2005.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Scott Rueter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin and Colleen M. Griffin, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman and David E. Mannchen, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.\nDaniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Keleigh L. Biggins, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0490-01", "first_page_order": 502, "last_page_order": 533 }