{ "id": 4060428, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DONALD COOKSON, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cookson", "decision_date": "2005-05-19", "docket_number": "No. 95491", "first_page": "194", "last_page": "218", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 194" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5796804 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/219/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2535222 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1010" }, { "page": "1010-11" }, { "page": "1008-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5392468 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3625961 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" }, { "page": "385" }, { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130376 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121977 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3134985 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/107/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 N.E.2d 1146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 10948928 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/531/1146-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 Ga. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 1221286 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/259/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.W.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124-25", "parenthetical": "\"the defendant should be permitted to show that the complainant has made false accusations of rape in the past\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "421 Mich. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1967446 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "\"the defendant should be permitted to show that the complainant has made false accusations of rape in the past\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/421/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256443 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5573752 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122017 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160428 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131030 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291891 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910213 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209980 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291537 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" }, { "page": "44" }, { "page": "43" }, { "page": "44", "parenthetical": "requiring a clear showing the trial court abused its discretion to overturn a ruling on the admissibility of evidence" }, { "page": "44", "parenthetical": "requiring a clear showing the trial court abused its discretion to overturn a ruling on the admissibility of evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780290 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" }, { "page": "162", "parenthetical": "rejecting the argument evidence of specific acts of untruthfulness should be admitted to impeach a child witness because the child was too young to have developed a reputation in the community" }, { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637105 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791-92" }, { "page": "791" }, { "page": "792-93" }, { "page": "795-97", "parenthetical": "Cook, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "796", "parenthetical": "Cook, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "797-98", "parenthetical": "Cook, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "796", "parenthetical": "Cook, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0786-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1368, "char_count": 42333, "ocr_confidence": 0.796, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5947442515676554e-07, "percentile": 0.6827220428681363 }, "sha256": "ac1206774890ba1f559ecd5a1c1029042aec3e3991fd0d105f44e5bc9a707a5d", "simhash": "1:a23393665a4ac5f1", "word_count": 6855 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:33:32.210900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DONALD COOKSON, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(a)(1) (West 1998)) and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 16(c)(1)(i) (West 1998)) of A.C. (A.C. or complainant), then seven years old. Before trial, the State moved to introduce several hearsay statements given by A.C. relating to the alleged assaults. 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 1998). Following a hearing held pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Code), the court determined the time, content, and circumstances of the statements provided sufficient safeguards of reliability (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10(b)(1) (West 1998)) and admitted the statements. The court, however, refused to admit evidence A.C. had made allegations of sexual abuse against another person the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) determined on administrative appeal to be unfounded. Defendant was found guilty and sentenced to 25 years\u2019 imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed. 335 Ill. App. 3d 786. We granted defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nAt the time of these events, defendant was married to the minor complainant\u2019s mother, Judy Cookson. In fact, until a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test was performed in 2000, defendant was believed to be the complainant\u2019s father. The DNA test proved, however, another man, Rick Aston, was A.C.\u2019s father. The complainant lived with defendant and Judy Cookson until she was seven years old, when Judy left defendant and moved to Hammond, Indiana, to live with Aston. While in Indiana, Judy worked as a prostitute, and Aston acted as her pimp. The three of them, Judy, Aston, and A.C., lived in cheap motels and on the street.\nAfter several weeks, Aston and A.C. disappeared, prompting Judy to call defendant to Indiana to look for A.C. Later, Aston returned A.C. to Illinois and turned her over to the Springfield police. Based upon statements A.C. made after being returned to Springfield, defendant was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse.\nPursuant to section 115 \u2014 10 of the Criminal Code, the State moved to introduce A.C.\u2019s out-of-court statements concerning defendant\u2019s alleged sexual assaults upon her. At a pretrial hearing, the proposed witnesses testified. Dorothy Rice, the DCFS on-call investigator who took A.C. into protective custody after A.C. was returned to Springfield, testified she took A.C. for a required health screening. After the examination, Rice drove A.C. to the emergency foster home. During the trip, Rice inquired about A.C.\u2019s past based on a reference to prostitution and drugs made by the DCFS hot line operator who notified Rice to pick up A.C. at the police station.\nAccording to Rice, A.C. initially stated she did not want to live with Judy and Donald because they fed her \u201cnasty food like dogs or cats would eat.\u201d A.C. also remarked she wished to live in a clean place. Rice further testified A.C. stated \u201cher Daddy Donald Cookson give [sic] her marijuana, he run [sic] bath water in the tub, put her in the tub and he hump [sic] on her.\u201d Rice indicated A.C. continued by saying \u201che takes his little thingy when [A.C.] is in the tub with him and he put it in her butt.\u201d Initially, when asked if she had made any inquiries of A.C. concerning sexual abuse, Rice responded she had not. Later, when asked to provide the context of A.C.\u2019s statements, Rice explained:\n\u201c[W]e got in the car and I was at the end of the entrance at Doctor\u2019s Hospital when I asked [A.C.], \u2018Have [sic] anyone ever done anything to you,\u2019 and that\u2019s when it came out. I hadn\u2019t even turned out, you know, I was at the end of the entrance, and that\u2019s when the conversation occurred.\u201d\nRice also asked A.C. why her hair was cut so short. A.C. responded \u201cshe had sores in her head, and her father cut her hair off so they would heal fast.\u201d Rice further testified A.C. identified her father as \u201cDonald Cookson.\u201d\nLaverne Landers, A.C.\u2019s foster parent, also testified at the section 115 \u2014 10 hearing. She stated that she and A.C.\u2019s caseworker picked A.C. up at the emergency foster home and drove her to Landers\u2019 home. While A.C. was coloring at the kitchen table, Landers asked a general question concerning A. C.\u2019s condition, and A.C. responded, \u201cI am never going home. I am never going home. I\u2019m not going back to Don and Judy.\u201d She then briefly described in graphic street terms sexual abuse she alleged was committed by \u201cDon\u201d and \u201cJudy.\u201d According to Landers, A.C. continued, \u201cThey are going to jail, and I am going to stay here forever.\u201d\nDetective Richard Wiese of the Springfield police department testified at the section 115 \u2014 10 hearing regarding the interview he and DCFS Investigator Timothy Gonzalez conducted with A.C. in a child-friendly room at the Child Advocacy Center. When the interview began, Wiese asked A.C. if she knew why she was there, and she stated because of something Don and Judy had done to her. According to Wiese, A.C. used slang terms such as \u201cboobs,\u201d \u201cdick,\u201d and \u201cbutt\u201d in describing the alleged abuse. He further stated that, while using an anatomically correct drawing as a reference, A.C. claimed defendant put his penis into her anus. A.C. described two incidents, one occurring in a bathroom and one in a bedroom, stating one of these incidents occurred in a gray house and the other in a pink house. Early in the interview, A.C. claimed these kinds of things happened all the time, but later she recanted and stated those were the only two times.\nInvestigator Gonzalez also testified at the hearing. According to Gonzalez, A.C. indicated she did not want to continue to live with Don and Judy because of what they had done to her. Gonzalez\u2019s testimony regarding how A.C. described the alleged abuse was consistent with Wiese\u2019s testimony. According to Gonzalez, A.C. stated she was six when the abuse occurred. Gonzalez further testified A.C.\u2019s description of the events was remarkable for a child of her age.\nIn response to this testimony, defendant presented a report prepared by Dr. Victoria Nichols-Johnson, an obstetrician-gynecologist at Southern Illinois University. According to the report, A.C. told Dr. Nichols-Johnson that Judy had performed oral sex on A.C. and denied that defendant had anal sex with her. Rather, A.C. stated defendant would touch her groin area and had touched her vaginal area with his penis. A subsequent examination by Dr. Nichols-Johnson showed no evidence of scarring or trauma in any of these areas.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion in limine to bar the admission of the testimony concerning A.C.\u2019s out-of-court statements. While noting both the discrepancy in A.C.\u2019s statement to Dr. Nichols-Johnson and A.C.\u2019s stated wish not to live with defendant or Judy, the court expressed doubt a child of A.C.\u2019s age would be \u201cclever\u201d enough to fabricate a story of sexual assault to achieve a better home environment. The court further noted A.C.\u2019s statements to Landers and Rice were spontaneous and her statements to Wiese and Gonzalez were obtained using professional interrogation techniques. According to the trial court, while A.C.\u2019s use of terminology unexpected of a child her age could be explained by her exposure to street life, the court did not believe a child A.C.\u2019s age would be capable of using those terms to make up a parental abuse accusation if some abuse had not actually occurred. Finally, the court determined that, overall, A.C.\u2019s version of events was consistent.\nThe State filed its own pretrial motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence A.C. had made an allegation of sexual abuse against Aston that DCFS had determined on administrative appeal to be unfounded. In July 2000, six months after being placed into DCFS custody, A.C. alleged Aston stuck his finger into her vagina. Following \u00e1n investigation, DCFS found the report to be \u201cindicated.\u201d Aston filed an administrative appeal, and the indicated finding was subsequently determined to be \u201cunfounded.\u201d Along with this administrative finding, defendant offered a sworn statement by Aston that the alleged abuse had not occurred and that A.C. had made up the abuse to get back at him. The trial court rejected this evidence. According to the trial court, the allegation was not proved false simply because the report was ultimately determined to be \u201cunfounded.\u201d As a result, the trial court refused to admit either the \u201cunfounded\u201d finding on appeal or Aston\u2019s sworn statement.\nAt trial, Rice, Landers, Wiese, Gonzalez, and Dr. Nichols-Johnson reiterated their pretrial testimony. In addition, Wiese admitted he was not aware at the time of the interview that A.C. had recently spent several months in Aston\u2019s care. Wiese also stated he had not investigated whether defendant had ever lived in a gray or pink house as A.C. claimed. Gonzalez noted A.C. continually referred to the perpetrator of the alleged assaults as \u201cDon.\u201d Dr. Nichols-Johnson testified A.C. reported she had been living in Indiana with her mother and a man named \u201cDonald.\u201d Based on their interpretation of A.C.\u2019s statements, the doctors believed \u201cDonald\u201d was either her mother\u2019s boyfriend or husband.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s case, defendant made an offer of proof regarding the allegedly false sexual abuse allegation A.C. had levied against Aston. Defendant\u2019s counsel stated that, if called to testify, Aston would acknowledge the allegation but deny any abuse. Defense counsel further indicated a DCFS worker would testify A.C. had accused Aston of sexual conduct. According to defendant, there were two independent bases for the admission of this evidence. First, defendant repeated his argument the evidence was relevant and admissible to show A.C. had previously made a false accusation of sexual abuse. Second, defendant contended the evidence was relevant to show A.C. had specifically accused Aston, in particular, of sexual abuse.\nFollowing the close of evidence, defendant was convicted. His posttrial motion for a new trial was denied, and he was sentenced to 25 years\u2019 imprisonment for predatory criminal sexual assault. He appealed, and the appellate court affirmed, concluding there were sufficient indicia of reliability to admit the hearsay statements to Rice, Landers, Gonzalez, and Wiese under section 115\u2014 10(a). 335 Ill. App. 3d at 791-92. Both the trial court and the appellate court cited the factors used to determine the reliability of a child\u2019s statement, including: (1) the spontaneity and consistency of the child\u2019s repetition of the incident; (2) the child\u2019s mental state; (3) the use of terminology not expected by a child of that age; and (4) the presence or absence of a motive to fabricate. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 791, citing People v. West, 158 Ill. 2d 155, 164 (1994). The appellate court also rejected defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit evidence concerning the sexual abuse claim A.C. made against Aston. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 792-93.\nJustice Cook disagreed with the majority on both issues. In his dissent, Justice Cook stated he would have found the hearsay statements inadmissible under section 115 \u2014 10. He believed the statements to Wiese and Gonzalez were particularly suspect because they were not spontaneous, but rather were the result of questioning, and they had not been videotaped despite the availability of video equipment. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 795-97 (Cook, J., dissenting). According to Justice Cook, the evidence demonstrated A.C. often confused defendant and Aston and had an independent motive to fabricate, namely, to escape her horrendous past environment. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 796 (Cook, J., dissenting). Justice Cook further believed the trial court erred in failing to admit evidence of A.C.\u2019s allegation against Aston because there was sufficient proof of its falsity. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 797-98 (Cook, J., dissenting).\nDefendant now appeals by leave of this court (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nANALYSIS\nI. The Hearsay Statements In this appeal, defendant challenges the admissibility of several witnesses\u2019 testimony introduced at trial pursuant to the hearsay exception of section 115 \u2014 10 of the Criminal Code. The relevant portions of section 115 \u2014 10 provide:\n\u201c(a) In a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated upon or against a child under the age of 13 ***, the following evidence shall he admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:\n(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by the victim describing any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a sexual or physical act against that victim.\n(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:\n(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and\n(2) The child ***\n(A) testifies at the proceeding[.] *** * * *\n(c) If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section, the court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it shall consider the age and maturity of the child, *** the nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other relevant factor.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 1998).\nIn his supplemental brief, defendant contends the admission of A.C.\u2019s testimony violated the rule announced in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), concerning a defendant\u2019s confrontation clause rights. We disagree. In Crawford, the Court declared the confrontation clause \u201cdoes not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present in court to defend or explain it.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9. Our statutory requirement that the child be available to testify at the proceeding (see 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10(b)(2)(A) (West 1998)) comports with this limitation. A.C.\u2019s testimony does not run afoul of Crawford.\nIn addressing the remainder of defendant\u2019s hearsay arguments, we recognize trial courts possess discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence. People v. Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d 37, 44 (1992). A reviewing court may overturn a trial court\u2019s decision only when the record clearly demonstrates the court abused its discretion. Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d at 44. Here, the State, as the proponent of the hearsay evidence, bore the burden of proving the \u201c \u2018time, content, and circumstances\u2019 \u201d of the complainant\u2019s statements provided \u201c \u2018sufficient safeguards of reliability\u2019 \u201d for admission. Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d at 43, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 10. Upon reviewing the record, we conclude the State sufficiently shouldered its burden of proof. While questions about the reliability of the statements may have arisen at trial, the record available at the time of the pretrial section 115 \u2014 10 hearing supports the trial court\u2019s decision to admit the complainant\u2019s hearsay statements.\nWe first examine the language A.C. used to describe the incidents in her out-of-court statements. Standing alone, that language only equivocally supports the statements\u2019 reliability. While the language reflects a knowledge of sexual activity unexpected and unusual for a typical six- or seven-year-old child, the complainant here had anything but a typical upbringing. The record shows for at least a portion of her young life A.C. was subjected to an appalling environment of prostitution and drug use. That environment itself was a likely source of the sexual terms she used to describe the alleged assaults. In admitting her statements, however, the trial court looked not only to the language A.C. used but also to the way she applied those terms to describe the assaults. The trial judge indicated he did not believe \u201cmost children of that age be able [sic] to hear that language and input it to create by fabrication an act perpetrated on them by their father. [The trial judge did not] know that the way she used terminology would be expected of a child of similar age, even under those circumstances, absent the probability that something, in fact, happened.\u201d On this basis, the trial court\u2019s determination that A.C.\u2019s out-of-court statements were sufficiently reliable to be admitted was not an abuse of its discretion.\nDefendant next argues the timing and circumstances surrounding the making of A.C.\u2019s statements fail to provide sufficient safeguards of reliability for admission. Defendant points to several potentially troubling factors that arose during trial. For example, A.C. testified at trial that Aston had told her to say \u201cbad things\u201d about defendant, and the evidence established she had spent a significant amount of time in Aston\u2019s custody. While by itself the substance of this testimony tends to support defendant\u2019s contention that Aston had used his bond with A.C. to influence her to lie, A.C.\u2019s honesty in admitting Aston\u2019s attempt to influence her supports the opposite conclusion. At trial, A.C. readily admitted Aston had prompted her to speak ill of defendant, but she expressly denied Aston ever told her to make a false claim of sexual abuse by defendant. The trial judge had the advantage of observing the testifying witnesses and did not conclude A.C. was acting pursuant to Aston\u2019s direction when she made the allegations against defendant. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by failing to exclude A.C.\u2019s statements based on Aston\u2019s possible influence over the child.\nIn addition, defendant claims A.C. exhibited her own independent motive to fabricate, demonstrated by her desire, expressed either immediately prior to, or contemporaneous with, each of her out-of-court statements, not to be returned to the custody of defendant and Judy, her biological mother. Among other things, A.C. complained defendant and Judy fed her \u201cnasty food like dogs or cats would eat.\u201d She also repeatedly stated her wish to live in a clean place and not with defendant and Judy. The trial court, in turn, found that, while A.C. did not wish to live with defendant again, there was \u201cno evidence presented *** that she would be clever enough to fabricate [the accusations against defendant] in order to achieve that result.\u201d The court then concluded A.C.\u2019s preference to five elsewhere did not motivate her to make up abuse allegations against defendant.\nDefendant suggests a potential weakness in this conclusion, namely, its failure to account for A.C.\u2019s living arrangements during the six months preceding her statements. She had not actually been living with Judy and defendant immediately prior to making the statements, as her concerns would imply. For the previous six months, she had been staying with either Judy and Aston or just Aston. This potential discrepancy is compounded by other evidence suggesting A.C. may have used defendant\u2019s name when she was actually referring to Aston.\nFor example, A.C. testified during trial cross-examination she sometimes \u201cmixed up\u201d defendant and Aston. She also agreed with defense counsel\u2019s statement that \u201cat one time or another [she has] called both of them her father.\u201d In addition, Rice testified at the section 115 \u2014 10 hearing that A.C. said her father had cut her hair very short and, in the same conversation, identified her father as \u201cDonald.\u201d A.C. had not, however, been with Donald for at least six months before making the statements, having been with Aston during that time. Thus, it appears A.C. may have used defendant\u2019s name (\u201cDonald\u201d) to refer to Aston when she related who had recently cut her hair.\nMoreover, although Detective Wiese and DCFS Investigator Gonzalez testified to A.C.\u2019s hearsay statements, they initially did not know she had spent the previous six months in Aston\u2019s custody and sometimes mixed up the names of Aston and defendant. Based on the lack of this information, Wiese and Gonzalez could have misinterpreted A.C.\u2019s references to her \u201cfather\u201d and believed she was talking about defendant when, in fact, she was referring to Aston. Indeed, the dissent in the appellate court identified the possibility of identity confusion as \u201c[t]he most troublesome aspect of this case.\u201d 335 Ill. App. 3d at 796 (Cook, J., dissenting).\nOur review of the record, however, reveals the majority of these \u201ctroubling aspect[s]\u201d arose during trial. Therefore, the trial court could not have considered those factors when making its pretrial ruling on the admissibility of the hearsay statements. The trial court also did not have an opportunity to rectify this potential problem during trial. Defendant did not renew his objections to the hearsay testimony when it was presented at trial. At the close of the State\u2019s case, defendant made his offer of proof concerning the admission of A.C.\u2019s sexual abuse allegation against Aston, contending \u201c[g]iven the confusion that has been exhibited with regard to the statements [A.C.] has made to others in the past in the 115 \u2014 10 statements, the jury should be allowed to consider that in connection with whether Rick Aston is, in fact, the one who sexually assaulted her as alleged in the Indictment or Indictments.\u201d Defendant did not, however, apply this contention to argue A.C.\u2019s hearsay statements were inadmissible. Furthermore, defendant never formally requested at trial that the court revisit its pretrial ruling on the admission of the hearsay statements. Based on the record as it existed during the trial and the pretrial hearing on A.C.\u2019s hearsay statements, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting those statements.\nDefendant\u2019s posttrial motion for a new trial focused almost entirely on the trial court\u2019s refusal to admit the evidence relating to A.C.\u2019s abuse allegation against Aston. The motion contained a single contention regarding the hearsay statements, claiming \u201c[t]he Court erred in allowing the State to present hearsay evidence at trial, ostensibly pursuant to Section 115 \u2014 10 of the Criminal Code of Procedure [citation], in that said evidence was unreliable and cumulative.\u201d During oral argument on the motion, defense counsel acknowledged the allegation against Aston was the \u201cmain issue.\u201d Counsel referenced the hearsay ruling only indirectly, by noting \u201cother grounds *** were all argued,\u201d with \u201cauthority presented on both sides of those arguments or most of those points, anyway, at the time of trial.\u201d He then declined to \u201cspeak to those, unless the Court ha[d] any questions.\u201d\nEven after reviewing the admission of the hearsay statements in light of all the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. See Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d at 44 (requiring a clear showing the trial court abused its discretion to overturn a ruling on the admissibility of evidence). While A.C. admitted on cross-examination she sometimes \u201cmixed up\u201d Aston and defendant, her answers to the immediately following questions indicated this confusion was primarily directed at the identity of the man she considered her \u201cfather\u201d or \u201cdad.\u201d The relevant portion of A.C.\u2019s testimony on cross-examination follows:\n\u201cQ. Okay, let me ask you, [A.C.], do you get Rick and Don mixed up sometimes?\nA. Yes.\nQ. All right, and at one time or another you have called both of them your father, right, or your dad?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Okay, and who is your dad? Who [sic] do you think of as your dad today, if anybody?\nA. Rick.\nQ. Rick, okay. You think of Rick as your dad?\nA. Yes.\nQ. All right. And since you went to live with the Landers, you know now, or you have been told anyway, that Don is not your dad, right?\nA. He is.\nQ. He is your dad?\nA. Yes.\nQ. He is your dad?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Okay, because he raised you, didn\u2019t he?\nA. Yeah.\nQ. I mean from when you were little, right?\nA. Yes.\nQ. You lived with him from back when you were just a baby growing up until you moved out with your mother and starting living with Rick; isn\u2019t that right?\nA. Yes.\u201d\nThis series of questions indicates defendant was attempting to establish that A.C. sometimes called both men her \u201cdad,\u201d thus creating confusion about who she was referring to in her hearsay statements. Defendant also attempted to elicit testimony from Wiese and Gonzalez that A.C. told them during her interview she had been abused by her \u201cfather\u201d or \u201cdad,\u201d but both witnesses testified she consistently called her abuser \u201cDon\u201d or referred to him as \u201che.\u201d At no point did she mistakenly say Aston or \u201cRick\u201d had committed the abuse alleged in this case. Rice also testified that \u201cthe majority of the time [A.C.] would say Donald\u201d rather than \u201cDaddy\u201d or \u201cFather\u201d when describing the incidents. A.C.\u2019s repeated use of the name \u201cDon\u201d rather than \u201cdad\u201d to identify her abuser does not support defendant\u2019s contention that her hearsay statements were too unreliable to be admitted because she may have also expressed some understandable confusion about the identity of her father.\nFinally, A.C.\u2019s testimony at trial did not vacillate concerning the identity of her abuser. Indeed, A.C. indicated Aston and defendant did not look alike, stating Aston was tall and defendant was short. She also pointed to defendant when asked to identify the person who had committed the abuse she had just described at trial and indicated the color of his clothing and his position in the courtroom. While defendant could, and in fact did, argue to the jury that A.C. had mistakenly identified defendant as the perpetrator, we cannot say the hearsay statements were so unreliable as to demonstrate clearly that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting them. See Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d at 44 (requiring a clear showing the trial court abused its discretion to overturn a ruling on the admissibility of evidence). The jury was able to consider properly defendant\u2019s mistaken identity contentions in their evaluation of the weight to be given to both those statements and A.C.\u2019s testimony itself.\nOn a related subject, we take this opportunity to address the troubling absence of a videotape of A.C.\u2019s interview by Detective Wiese and DCFS Investigator Gonzalez, despite the availability of video equipment. This court has previously recognized the value of taping an interview of a child sex offense complainant. As we reasoned,\n\u201cThe probative value of corroborating complaints in these cases, especially in videotaped form, has been widely recognized. Children may be subject to memory loss in the often prolonged period between the abuse and trial, and videotaping the child\u2019s account of abuse at the earliest opportunity preserves the account while it is still fresh in the child\u2019s memory; in addition, it allows for the examination of the conditions prevalent at the time of the child\u2019s initial complaint. [Citation.] A recording close in time to the first outcry, prior to any charges being filed, where feasible, also makes the statement less likely to be the product of suggestion or even manipulation by overzealous prosecutors, parents or caseworkers.\u201d People v. Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d 103, 115-16 (1998).\nIndeed, on at least one occasion our appellate court has stated the failure to record a child\u2019s statement when recording equipment is available may be considered a negative factor in determining the statement\u2019s reliability. People v. Simpkins, 297 Ill. App. 3d 668, 677-78 (1998). While we believe the lack of a contemporaneous video recording does not render the interview unreliable (see People v. Wittenmyer, 151 Ill. 2d 175, 187 (1992)), we once again strongly admonish law enforcement personnel and social workers to record those interviews whenever possible.\nII. Abuse Allegations Against a Third Party\nNext, we address the issue of whether the trial court properly excluded evidence of a sexual abuse allegation A.C. made against Aston. At trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to bar: (1) the admission of A.C.\u2019s subsequent allegation against Aston; (2) the administrative reversal of DCFS\u2019s \u201cindicated\u201d finding of abuse by Aston; and (3) Aston\u2019s denial and alternative explanation of A.C.\u2019s accusation. The State based its motion on two grounds: (1) the material could not properly be used to impeach A.C.\u2019s credibility because the accusations were not \u201cdemonstrably false\u201d and (2) the accusation against Aston was not relevant to the charges facing defendant and would only tend to confuse the jury. In response to the State\u2019s motion, defendant argued, inter alia, the evidence was admissible to impeach A.C.\u2019s credibility because the accusations were demonstrably false based on both the administrative reversal of the indicated finding and Aston\u2019s denial.\nThe trial court rejected defendant\u2019s arguments, finding first \u201cunder this factual scenario, an appellate reversal of a finding of indicated does not rise to the legal standard of demonstrably false\u201d because mere disagreement on appeal with DCFS\u2019s application of the credible evidence standard is \u201cnot the affirmative type of finding *** necessary for a finding of demonstrably false.\u201d The court next concluded A.C.\u2019s allegation against Aston was not sufficiently similar to the type of abuse she alleged against defendant to be relevant. During defendant\u2019s offer of proof at the close of the State\u2019s case, defense counsel added the argument that the evidence was admissible because it related to A.C.\u2019s alleged \u201cconfusion\u201d of defendant and Aston. Defendant did not, however, formally request the trial court to reconsider its prior ruling on the State\u2019s pretrial motion in limine.\nBefore this court, despite defendant\u2019s prior adoption of a \u201cdemonstrably false\u201d standard for determining the admissibility of A.C.\u2019s accusation against Aston, he now advocates the application of a preponderance of the evidence standard. Indeed, the only argument defendant now raises on this issue is that the evidence should have been admitted to impeach A.C.\u2019s credibility because a preponderance of the evidence establishes her accusation against Aston was false. The State, in turn, contends the proffered evidence was properly excluded because a witness may not be impeached with specific collateral instances of untruthfulness. The State also adheres to the demonstrably false standard and maintains defendant\u2019s proof did not rise to that level.\nThis issue does not invoke hearsay concerns because A.C.\u2019s out-of-court statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 65 (1999). Indeed, the only argument on appeal concerns the admissibility of the evidence to impeach A.C.\u2019s credibility. Since hearsay is not at issue, we address only the parties\u2019 arguments on the impeachment issue. On questions of the admissibility of evidence, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court unless the record clearly shows the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455-56 (1984). We find no clear abuse of discretion in this case.\nWe have consistently held the proper procedure for impeaching a witness\u2019 reputation for truthfulness is through the use of reputation evidence and not through opinion evidence or evidence of specific past instances of untruthfulness. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 173 (1998); People v. West, 158 Ill. 2d 155, 162 (1994) (rejecting the argument evidence of specific acts of untruthfulness should be admitted to impeach a child witness because the child was too young to have developed a reputation in the community). This rule applies with equal force to all witnesses, regardless of age. People v. Williams, 139 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (1990). This case has not presented us with any compelling basis for altering this rule in cases involving sexual abuse allegations, and we take this opportunity to reaffirm that principle.\nAs we have previously recognized, however, some jurisdictions provide an exception to this rule, permitting defendants accused of sexual assault to introduce evidence their accuser has previously made false accusations of sexual assault. See People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159, 185 (1990), quoting People v. Hackett, 421 Mich. 338, 348, 365 N.W.2d 120, 124-25 (1984) (\u201cthe defendant should be permitted to show that the complainant has made false accusations of rape in the past\u201d); Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 187 (citing Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989), and Stewart v. State, 531 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 1988)). Although this court has suggested that type of evidence may be admissible, it has not addressed the requisite conditions for its admission. See People v. Gorney, 107 Ill. 2d 53, 60-61 (1985) (\u201cin the absence of the compelling evidence here it well might have been error to reject the proposed testimony. Evidence of prior false accusations of rape by the victim may be admissible, and though here no false charge actually was brought, a trial judge might have considered the testimony relevant and probative\u201d). This case presents us with an opportunity to examine the rationale and parameters for admitting evidence relating to other allegations of sexual assault as a means of impeaching a complainant\u2019s general credibility rather than as a specific attack on the complainant\u2019s reputation for truthfulness.\nWe have long applied the rule that a witness may be impeached by a showing of bias, interest, or motive to testify falsely. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 206 (1998). In Bull, the defendant sought to admit the disciplinary record of the prosecution\u2019s expert witness, arguing it gave him a \u201cmotive to testify falsely or to embellish his testimony to please his employers.\u201d Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 206. After acknowledging that \u201cevidence of arrests or other charges\u201d is generally not admissible to impeach a witness\u2019 credibility, this court explained that evidence may nonetheless be admitted to show the witness\u2019 interest, bias, or motive to lie. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 206. We cautioned that the evidence \u201cmust give rise to the inference that the witness has something to gain or lose by his or her testimony. Therefore, the evidence used must not be remote or uncertain.\u201d Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 206, citing People v. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d 463, 475-76 (1985).\nSimilarly, in People v. Howard, 113 Ill. App. 3d 380, 385 (1983), our appellate court applied the same rationale when a defendant accused of sexual abuse by his teenage stepdaughter sought to admit evidence she had previously made sexual abuse allegations against him. The court noted criminal defendants should be given wide latitude to establish bias, prejudice, or a motive to testify falsely. Howard, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 385, citing People v. Barr, 51 Ill. 2d 50, 51-52 (1972). This wide latitude, the court explained, \u201cis particularly important where *** the State\u2019s case rests almost entirely on the credibility of its witnesses.\u201d Howard, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 385.\nHere, as in many if not most child sexual abuse cases, there was no testimony from third-party eyewitnesses. There was also no physical evidence hnking defendant to the alleged abuse. In addition, defendant\u2019s objection to the State\u2019s motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence relating to A.C.\u2019s accusation against Aston was based, in part, on needing the evidence to impeach A.C.\u2019s credibility because the allegation was determined to be \u201cunfounded\u201d on administrative appeal. Under these circumstances, A.C.\u2019s credibility was undeniably at issue in the case. Defendant was entitled to present evidence of A.C.\u2019s potential interest, bias, and motive to lie to impeach her credibility. See Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 206.\nDefendant\u2019s proposed impeachment evidence consisted of: (1) a DCFS worker\u2019s testimony that A.C. alleged she was sexually abused by Aston; (2) the reversal on administrative review of DCFS\u2019s original finding that the claimed abuse was \u201cindicated\u201d; and (3) Aston\u2019s proposed testimony that he did not abuse A.C. and that he believed she made up the allegation because she was upset with him. We must determine whether any of this evidence supports the inference A.C. possessed an improper interest, bias; or motive to lie. We note that to be admissible, \u201cthe evidence used must not be remote or uncertain.\u201d See Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 206.\nFirst, we conclude evidence relating to abuse allegedly committed by Aston does not establish A.C.\u2019s bias against this defendant. The two men were not linked in any way to create the rational inference that the irritation Aston claimed motivated her \u201cfalse\u201d allegation against him would carry over to defendant, particularly since the accusation at issue here was made six months before A.C. reported being abused by Aston. The speculative nature of this evidence makes it inadmissible to show A.C.\u2019s bias against defendant. See Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 206.\nNext, we do not believe the evidence properly shows A.C. has an improper interest in this matter or a motive to lie about being abused by this defendant. Neither the fact A.C. reported abuse by Aston nor Aston\u2019s self-serving denial of those accusations establishes any improper interest or permissible motive for A.C. to lie about defendant as well. Indeed, the trial court specifically rejected the suggestion a young child such as A.C. could have fabricated the accusations against defendant to obtain a better home, and, without the advantage of observing the witnesses, we defer to its conclusion regarding A.C.\u2019s maturity and strategic abilities. Thus, the only relevant inference a jury could draw from the evidence of the abuse allegation against Aston and his explanatory denial would be that A.C. lied about being abused by defendant, but this court has already specifically rejected the use of evidence of specific past instances of untruthfulness to impeach a witness\u2019 truthfulness. See Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 173; West, 158 Ill. 2d at 162.\nFinally, we note the parties make much of the admissibility of evidence showing the original DCFS finding of \u201cindicated\u201d was reversed on administrative appeal. Their arguments focus primarily on the appellate decisions in People v. Nicholl, 210 Ill. App. 3d 1001 (1991), and People v. Mason, 219 Ill. App. 3d 76 (1991). Defendant urges us to adopt the reasoning in Nicholl and reject Mason. The State counters that Mason accurately reflects the law of impeachment in Illinois and Nicholl is distinguishable. We believe the results in both cases are consistent with our rationale in the instant appeal.\nIn People v. Nicholl, 210 Ill. App. 3d 1001 (1991), the defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and he appealed, arguing, in relevant part, the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence of the victim\u2019s subsequent false accusation against him. As in this case, the proffered evidence involved a DCFS worker\u2019s conclusion the allegation was unfounded. Nicholl, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 1010. The appellate court held the trial court should have admitted the evidence, including testimony from the alleged victim\u2019s father stating the child was not in the defendant\u2019s presence on the day in question, making it impossible for the uncharged abuse to have occurred. Nicholl, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 1010-11. There was also evidence the child\u2019s mother had repeatedly threatened to \u201cget\u201d defendant and the child had \u201cno independent recollection\u201d of the subsequent incident of alleged abuse. Nicholl, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 1008-09. Taken together, this evidence suggests the five-year-old victim may have, albeit unwittingly, had some bias or motive not to tell the truth about the charged incident due to his custodial mother\u2019s hostile influence.\nIn Mason, the defendant was convicted of a sex offense against a seven-year-old child. The defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, the court erred by barring evidence of a prior sexual assault accusation made by the alleged victim that had been determined to be unfounded. That allegation had been made against the defendant two years earlier. The Mason court held evidence concerning the \u201cunfounded\u201d status of the accusation was properly excluded. That evidence included the defendant\u2019s admission, made during the investigation of the child\u2019s previous allegation, that he actually had improperly touched the child. Mason, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 82. Thus pursuant to our reasoning in the instant case, the proffered evidence would have had no bearing on the child\u2019s interest, bias, or motive to be untruthful regarding the later, charged, allegation of abuse.\nHere, the situation is more similar to that in Mason because even if evidence of the reversal of the indicated finding is admitted, it fails to establish A.C. had any interest, bias, or motive to lie about this defendant. Accordingly,, in the absence of a demonstration of A.C.\u2019s improper interest, bias against defendant, or motive to fabricate abuse claims against him, evidence relating to A.C.\u2019s sexual abuse accusation against Aston was properly excluded by the trial court.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor these reasons, we hold that, given the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the hearsay statements of A.C. concerning the alleged sexual assault by defendant in this case. We further hold the trial court did not err by refusing to admit evidence concerning the allegation of sexual abuse A.C. made against a third party, Rick Aston. The appellate court judgment, affirming the defendant\u2019s conviction, is affirmed.\nAppellate court judgment affirmed.\nJUSTICE KARMEIER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAt trial, Rice testified A.C. told her \u201cDonald cut [her hair] so [the sores] would go away faster.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Robert N. Markfield, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, and John E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, both of Springfield (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Lisa Anne Hoffman and Jay Paul Hoffmann, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 95491.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DONALD COOKSON, Appellant.\nOpinion filed May 19, 2005.\nKARMEIER, J., took no part.\nDaniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Robert N. Markfield, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, and John E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, both of Springfield (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Lisa Anne Hoffman and Jay Paul Hoffmann, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0194-01", "first_page_order": 216, "last_page_order": 240 }