{ "id": 4060183, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. FLOYD DURR, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Durr", "decision_date": "2005-05-19", "docket_number": "No. 97741", "first_page": "283", "last_page": "308", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 283" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451441 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2990284 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" }, { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5544927 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975008 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461360 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" }, { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475117 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442057 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778581 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569773 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453265 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621", "parenthetical": "before invoking the plain-error exception \" 'it is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at all' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821396 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243886 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2463141 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60-61, 64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121977 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224818 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138", "parenthetical": "\" \u00a3A criminal defendant, whether guilty or innocent, is entitled to a fair, orderly, and impartial trial' conducted according to law. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 214 (1998" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963678 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357", "parenthetical": "\"Under an exception to the waiver rule, Rule 451(c) permits a court to consider substantial defects in instructions despite a defendant's failure to make a timely objection, if the interests of justice require. [Citation.] Under Rule 615(a" }, { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909174 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31-32" }, { "page": "32" }, { "page": "31" }, { "page": "32", "parenthetical": "\"[Plain error would remain an avenue for relief pursuant to Rule 615(a): jury instructions are recognized as implicating substantial rights. [Citation.] Concern for whether fundamental unfairness resulted exists because such rights are implicated; the case is not otherwise close factually\"" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "32" }, { "page": "17", "parenthetical": "recognizing that when plain error is lacking, \"the procedural default must be honored\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209973 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Rule 451(c) offers a remedy for 'grave errors,' which parallels Rule 615(a)'s remedy for plain errors generally, and we construe Rule 451(c) and Rule 615(a) 'identically' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5462052 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8-17" }, { "page": "7-8", "parenthetical": "\"Rule 451(c)'s exception to the waiver rule for substantial defects applies when there is a grave error or when the case is so factually close that fundamental fairness requires that the jury be properly instructed.\" (Emphasis added.) Rule 451(c" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "8" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060336 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450936 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" }, { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477642 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462782 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29943 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "supervisory order" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799391 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799372 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0335-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1202, "char_count": 44678, "ocr_confidence": 0.798, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.145018000098986e-07, "percentile": 0.8622846351273762 }, "sha256": "6da55502d476deb1c72e11baa4bd98c2009e1a8efed1f269d686abbb6a148ad0", "simhash": "1:9fbab34a393a145a", "word_count": 7313 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:33:32.210900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. FLOYD DURR, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Floyd Durr, was convicted of three counts of predatoiy criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to 20-year terms of imprisonment on the former convictions and a 15-year term of imprisonment on the latter. All sentences were ordered to be served consecutively.\nOn appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the trial court had erred in giving a nonpattern jury instruction that \u201ceffectively denied the jury the option of fully acquitting him\u201d of all charges. The appellate court agreed with defendant. The appellate court observed that defendant had not preserved the error for review, but invoked the second prong of our plain error rule, reversing and remanding for a new trial in order to \u201cpreserve the integrity of the judicial process.\u201d People v. Durr, No. 1\u201401\u20141711 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (Durr I). This court denied the State\u2019s ensuing petition for leave to appeal, but issued a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment and reconsider in light of People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335 (2001), and People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003). See People v. Durr, 205 Ill. 2d 603 (2003) (supervisory order).\nIn compliance with this court\u2019s directive, the appellate court reconsidered the instructional issue with references to Crespo and Thurow, and concluded \u201cthat the giving of the altered instruction by the trial court was not error and that defendant was not deprived of a fair trial.\u201d The appellate court went on to consider issues not previously addressed, holding that allegedly improper prosecutorial comments did not deny defendant a fair trial, and vacating one of defendant\u2019s predatory criminal sexual assault convictions as a lesser-included offense of aggravated kidnapping. People v. Durr, No. 1\u201401\u20141711 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (Durr II).\nWe allowed the defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. On appeal, defendant argues that the appellate court \u201cerred in applying the federal plain-error test to [his] case.\u201d He states that \u201cthe instructional errors raised [in this appeal] are subject to review under Illinois\u2019 long-standing plain-error test, which is set forth in Rule 615(a).\u201d He suggests that application of our plain-error rule would alter the outcome on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nBACKGROUND\nDefendant was tried before a jury on May 9 through 11, 2000. The relevant facts from that proceeding follow.\nM.L. testified that on January 14, 1998, she was 10 years old. At approximately 7 p.m., her mother gave her a dollar with which to purchase candy at a store across the street from her home. When she arrived at the store, she discovered that it was closed, so she walked back to her home. When she reached her front door, a man whom she had never seen before grabbed her by the right shoulder and placed a gun to her side. He ordered her to be quiet and to walk with him or he would kill her. M.L. was able to make a positive in-court identification of defendant because, at the time of the abduction, she looked directly into his face.\nM.L. and defendant began walking toward an abandoned building a block away. As they were walking, defendant held the gun to her side and asked her if she had any money. She lied to him and said that she did not, but he reached into her pocket and removed the dollar bill which her mother had given her. M.L. told defendant that her mother would be worried about her if she did not return home soon and would come looking for her, but defendant told her to be quiet.\nWhen they arrived at the abandoned building, defendant took M.L. to the rear of the building and ordered her to remove her clothes. M.L. complied. Defendant unbuckled his overalls and dropped them to his knees. He ordered M.L. to get down on her knees and he placed his penis into her mouth. Defendant forced her to engage in oral copulation with him for approximately five minutes, during which time he held a gun to her head. He eventually ejaculated into her mouth, and when she jerked her head away, he struck her in the face with the gun.\nAfter that act was completed, defendant ordered M.L. to stand up, and at that time he penetrated her vaginally with his finger for approximately three minutes. M.L. testified that she experienced a great deal of pain, though, according to her testimony, defendant\u2019s finger penetrated her only \u201ca little bit.\u201d M.L. testified that she was crying during the entire time.\nDefendant eventually ordered M.L. to lie down. He then got on top of her and placed his penis into her vagina, which, according to her testimony, again caused her a great deal of pain. She testified that defendant\u2019s penis penetrated her \u201ca little bit\u201d for approximately 10 minutes. During this part of the assault, M.L. was still crying, and defendant told her to be quiet or he would \u201cblow [her] brains out.\u201d While defendant had his penis in M.L.\u2019s vagina, he stuck the gun into her mouth.\nAfter defendant was finished, he stood up, pulled up his overalls, and ordered M.L. to get dressed. While M.L. got dressed, defendant held the gun to his side. He asked M.L. if she had ever had sex before, and she responded she had not. Defendant also asked her how old she was and where she lived. He told her to wait 10 minutes before leaving the building, and defendant then left the premises. M.L. left the building early, and, when she walked outside, she saw defendant standing across the street. She pleaded with defendant not to shoot her and immediately reentered the building and waited approximately five minutes before leaving. She then ran home and told her mother what had happened. M.L. was later transported to the hospital, where she was treated and examined by a doctor and a nurse. Medical personnel took oral and vaginal swabs, drew blood, and confiscated her underwear. M.L. spoke with a police officer and gave him a physical description of her attacker. She described her assailant\u2019s height and weight, and said he was wearing \u201cblack lugg boots,\u201d blue overalls, a white shirt, a white sweater, and a black \u201cfuzz down coat.\u201d She estimated that he was in his late twenties.\nDetective Robert Lenihan of the Chicago police department testified that he was present on August 29, 1998, when M.L. picked defendant out of a lineup. Five men participated in the lineup. M.L. was on the other side of a one-way mirror when she viewed the lineup. The participants were told to walk up to the mirror one at a time and turn left and then right. When the first two men stepped up to the mirror, M.L. stated that neither one of them was the man who had assaulted her. However, when the third man walked up to the mirror, M.L. remained silent. When Detective Lenihan asked her why she did not say anything about \u201cNumber Three,\u201d M.L. cowered behind her mother and said, \u201cThat is because it\u2019s him.\u201d\nAfter defendant was arrested, he signed a consent form to give blood. The sample subsequently taken was later used in a DNA comparison. Greg Didomenic, a forensic scientist for the Forensic Science Center of Chicago, testified that he conducted the DNA analysis in this case. Didomenic concluded that semen stains on M.L.\u2019s panties had a DNA profile matching that of the defendant.\nDefendant did not testify or present witnesses.\nAt the instructions conference, the trial court ruled, with respect to two of the counts charging predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, that defendant was entitled to lesser-included offense instructions on attempted predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Accordingly, during the instructions conference, defense counsel tendered a proposed instruction which, all parties acknowledge, tracked Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 2.01R (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th). The tendered instruction, however, does not appear in the common law record. The trial court, reading from the instruction, stated as follows:\n\u201c[D]efendant is charged with the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (Floyd Durr\u2019s hand to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina and Floyd Durr\u2019s penis to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina). Defendant has pleaded not guilty.\nUnder the law, a person charged with predatory sexual assault of a child could be found, one[,] not guilty of predatory sexual assault of a child, and not guilty of attempt predatory sexual assault of a child, and not guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, or guilty of predatory criminal sexual \u2014 guilty of predatory sexual assault of a child or guilty of attempt predatory sexual assault of a child or guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse.\u201d\nThe State objected to the tendered instruction. The prosecutor stated: \u2018T think this is unduly complicated and presents the law to the jury unfavorably. There is just one not guilty.\u201d\nThe trial court agreed the tendered instruction was unduly confusing, stating:\n\u201cIt should read the defendant is charged with the offense of predatory sexual assault to a child, hand to vagina, penis to vagina. Defendant has pleaded not guilty. Under the law a person charged with predatory sexual assault of a child, hand to vagina, penis to vagina, may be found, one, not guilty or two, guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, or guilty of attempt predatory sexual assault of a child or guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse.\u201d\nThe State agreed the instruction should so read. The court continued:\n\u201cAnd then eventually [the jurors] will get the concluding instruction which will tell them regarding two counts of predatory sexual assault involving the hand to the vagina and penis to vagina, that they would get four forms of verdict as to each alternative theory. In essence, they should sign one, either not guilty guilty of predatory sexual assault of a child[,] penis to vagina, hand to vagina, whatever, guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and, or guilty of an attempt predatory sexual assault of a child.\u201d\nThe court noted that the jurors had \u201cfour possibilities, attempt predatory criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, guilty as charged initially or not guilty of anything. And that\u2019s the four choices they get for each of the two charges of predatory sexual assault of a child involving hand to vagina contact and penis to vagina contact.\u201d\nWhen defense counsel expressed concern that the \u201cnot guilty\u201d verdict form would read \u201cnot guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault,\u201d the trial court assured him, \u201cIt will just say not guilty. They have got four verdict forms, they will be told *** to sign only one of those four verdict forms as to each of the two alternative theories, hand to vagina and penis to vagina contact.\u201d The court later reiterated, \u201cThere will just be one verdict form that will say not guilty in relation to those two separate counts, not guilty of anything ***. That\u2019s it, or guilty of one [of] three alternatives ***.\u201d\nLater during the instructions conference, when the matter of verdict forms was specifically addressed, the court directed defense counsel \u201cto make a verdict form which reads in essence not guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, attempt predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse, one verdict form that says not guilty of all three of those things.\u201d The State suggested that the instruction should \u201csay not guilty and then that specific act, not guilty, fingers to vagina, that\u2019s all it will say.\u201d The court agreed:\n\u201cRight. And the other three will be the alternatives, guilty of predatory sexual assault!,] penis to vagina, guilty aggravated criminal sexual abuse, same conduct, and guilty of attempt is based on the same conduct. Four verdict forms. One will say not guilty of any of that kind of conduct\nStill later, the trial court reiterated, \u201cThere is one verdict form which says not guilty regarding that kind of conduct and three alternative forms of guilty referring to conduct of the different charges, predatory criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse or attempt.\u201d At the conclusion of the instructions conference, the trial court again verified, with respect to the predatory criminal sexual assault charges (finger to vagina, and penis to vagina), there would \u201cbe *** plain outright not guilty\u201d verdict forms.\nAfter closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury in the applicable law. The court informed the jury:\n\u201cUnder the law, a person charged with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, (Floyd Durr\u2019s fingers to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina, and Floyd Durr\u2019s penis to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina), may be found not guilty, or two, guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, or three, guilty of attempt predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, or four, guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse.\u201d\nThe court defined the offenses the jury would consider. After specifying the propositions for each lesser-included offense, the court concluded: \u201cIf you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.\u201d\nThe trial court advised the jury:\n\u201cAccordingly, you are provided with four verdict forms pertaining to the charge of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, (Floyd Durr\u2019s fingers to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina), not guilty, guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, (Floyd Durr\u2019s fingers to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina), and guilty of attempt predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, (Floyd Durr\u2019s fingers to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina), and guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, (Floyd Durr\u2019s fingers to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina).\nFrom these four verdict forms, you should select the one verdict form that reflects your verdict and sign it as I have instructed. Do not write at all on the other three verdict forms. Sign only one of these verdict forms.\u201d\nThe court gave an identical instruction with respect to the predatory criminal sexual assault charge based on the allegation of penis-to-vagina contact. The trial court instructed the jurors that they should sign only the guilty verdict for predatory criminal sexual assault if they found defendant guilty of that offense; they should not sign guilty verdicts pertaining to the lesser-included offenses.\nFinally, the court read from the verdict forms it was providing to the jury. With respect to the not-guilty verdict form pertaining to finger-to-vagina contact, the court recited the language of the given verdict form as follows:\n\u201cRegarding the allegations concerning the fingers to vagina contact. \u2018We, the jury, find the defendant, Floyd Durr, not guilty, (Floyd Durr\u2019s fingers to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina.)\u2019 There is a line for the foreperson\u2019s signature, 11 lines remaining for the 11 jurors.\u201d\nWith respect to the not-guilty verdict form pertaining to penis-to-vagina contact, the court recited the language of the given verdict form as follows:\n\u201c \u2018We, the jury, find the defendant, Floyd Durr, not guilty, (Floyd Durr\u2019s penis, [M.L.\u2019s] vagina).\u2019 \u201d\nThe common law record contains written verdict forms mirroring those read to the jury by the trial court, and alternate written versions, using the language \u201cnot guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child.\u201d The latter versions are marked, \u201cgiven, no objection.\u201d\nUltimately, as to each type of conduct alleged (fingers to vagina, and penis to vagina), the jury returned verdicts of guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. Defendant failed to include an instructional issue in his posttrial motion.\nIn Durr I, the appellate court held that the instructions given the jury denied the jury \u201cthe opportunity to acquit defendant of the lesser-included offenses.\u201d In so holding, the appellate court rejected the State\u2019s contention that the trial court had given the jury \u201ca general \u2018not guilty\u2019 option.\u201d The appellate court stated, \u201cThe actual verdict forms which were provided to the jury were as follows: *** not guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (defendant\u2019s fingers to M.L.\u2019s vagina) *** not guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (defendant\u2019s penis to M.L.\u2019s vagina) ***.\u201d\nIn Durr II, the appellate court initially reiterated its belief that the \u201cactual verdict forms\u201d provided to the jury included \u201cnot guilty\u201d verdict forms that stated, \u201cnot guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child,\u201d and that the jury \u201cwas not given a general \u2018not guilty\u2019 verdict form as to all sex related offenses.\u201d However, the appellate court later concluded that defendant had \u201cfailed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the altered instruction.\u201d The court stated:\n\u201c[Defendant] argues that the trial court\u2019s alternate instruction effectively denied the jury the option of fully acquitting him of both the greater and lesser-included offenses. The first sentence of the instruction clearly states that: \u2018Under the law a person charged with predatory sexual assault of a child (hand to vagina, penis to vagina) may be found (1) not guilty...\u2019 and goes on to list the alternate guilty verdicts for greater and lesser offenses. Moreover, during its charge to the jury, the court defined the lesser offenses and indicated that if they found defendant guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, he wold [sic] then be not guilty of the lesser offenses and likewise that if they found him guilty of either of the lesser offenses, he would not be guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. We find that the general \u2018not guilty\u2019 verdict contained in the instruction gave the jury the option of fully acquitting defendant. We conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by the giving of the altered instruction because the instruction coupled with the trial court\u2019s charge to the jury regarding the lesser-included offenses cured any error. Accordingly, we find that this error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Durr II, No. 1\u201401\u20141711 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nThe court then concluded, \u201cthat the giving of the altered instruction by the trial court was not error and that defendant was not deprived of a fair trial.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Thus, the appellate court expressed ambivalence, at best, as to whether the altered instruction was error at all, but found that any error did not affect the fairness of defendant\u2019s trial.\nAs previously indicated, we allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. Defendant\u2019s sole claim of error on appeal relates to alleged instructional errors at trial. He argues that the appellate court \u201cerred in applying the federal plain-error test to [his] case.\u201d He states that \u201cthe instructional errors raised [in this appeal] are subject to review under Illinois\u2019 longstanding plain-error test, which is set forth in Rule 615(a).\u201d He suggests that application of our plain error rule would alter the outcome on appeal.\nANALYSIS\nAt the outset, we note that supervisory orders issued by this court are \u201cnonprecedential.\u201d First American Bank v. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d 511, 520 (2002). Moreover, we note that the question before us is \u201c \u2018the correctness of the result\u2019 \u201d reached by the appellate court (People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 128 (2003), quoting People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 101 (1994)), not the reasons given therefor. City of Champaign v. Torres, 214 Ill. 2d 234, 241 (2005). We are in no way constrained by the appellate court\u2019s reasoning and may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Torres, 214 Ill. 2d at 241. Finally, we note that the interrelation and consistency of federal and state plain-error standards are matters this court has recently addressed in People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (2005). We need not do so here.\nOur plain-error analysis, as it pertains to instructional error, has developed in a significant and unbroken line of this court\u2019s precedent, in which we have applied the consistent principles of Illinois Supreme Court Rules 451(c) and 615(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 451(c); 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). Recently, in People v. Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d 1, 8-17 (2004), this court undertook plain-error analysis utilizing Rule 451(c). Although we focused on Supreme Court Rule 451(c) in Hopp, because \u2014 unlike the defendant in this case \u2014 Hopp failed to object to the alleged instructional error at trial, we note that the plain-error analyses under Supreme Court Rules 451(c) and 615(a) are construed identically. See People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 151 n.3 (1998) (\u201cRule 451(c) offers a remedy for \u2018grave errors,\u2019 which parallels Rule 615(a)\u2019s remedy for plain errors generally, and we construe Rule 451(c) and Rule 615(a) \u2018identically\u2019 \u201d), quoting People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 31-32 (1995). In Keene, this court noted:\n\u201cRule 451(c) is not expressly addressed to the type of procedural default arising here, the failure to include an issue in a written post-trial motion. The rule is expressly addressed to the failure to make a timely trial objection. But the point is immaterial. Rule 451(c) and Rule 615(a) are construed identically. Even if no chance of excusing the bar could exist under the language of Rule 451(c), plain error would remain an avenue for relief pursuant to Rule 615(a): jury instructions are recognized as implicating substantial rights.\u201d Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 32.\nThus, this defendant, who objected at trial but failed to preserve the instructional issue by including it in a post-trial motion, is subject to the standards we applied in Hopp and other cases applying Rule 451(c), though plain-error review in this case is accomplished under Rule 615(a).\nUnder either Rule 615(a) or Rule 451(c), \u201ca procedural default will not bar review of an error in jury instructions involving a substantial right if to honor the bar would work fundamental unfairness.\u201d Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 31. Although this court has expressed essentially the same proposition of law utilizing slightly different terminology, under either rule this court will invoke the plain-error doctrine to review procedurally defaulted instructional errors \u2014 though the evidence is not closely balanced \u2014 if substantial rights are implicated and the fundamental fairness of the proceeding is in doubt. See Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 32 (\u201c[Plain error would remain an avenue for relief pursuant to Rule 615(a): jury instructions are recognized as implicating substantial rights. [Citation.] Concern for whether fundamental unfairness resulted exists because such rights are implicated; the case is not otherwise close factually\u201d); Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d at 7-8 (\u201cRule 451(c)\u2019s exception to the waiver rule for substantial defects applies when there is a grave error or when the case is so factually close that fundamental fairness requires that the jury be properly instructed.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Rule 451(c) applies when there are \u201cserious errors which severely threaten the fundamental fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial\u201d); People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 357 (2000) (\u201cUnder an exception to the waiver rule, Rule 451(c) permits a court to consider substantial defects in instructions despite a defendant\u2019s failure to make a timely objection, if the interests of justice require. [Citation.] Under Rule 615(a), a procedural default may be excused when the evidence is closely balanced or when the error is of such magnitude that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial\u201d (emphasis added)). See generally People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 138 (2000) (\u201c \u00a3A criminal defendant, whether guilty or innocent, is entitled to a fair, orderly, and impartial trial\u2019 conducted according to law. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 214 (1998). *** [W]hen an error arises at trial that is of such gravity that it threatens the very integrity of the judicial process, the court must act to correct the error, so that the fairness and the reputation of the process may be preserved and protected. Critically, the court will act on plain error regardless of the strength of the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt\u201d (emphasis in original)); accord People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 60-61, 64 (2003).\nThe evidence in this case is not closely balanced, so the question is whether a \u201cgrave error\u201d has been committed or, stated another way, whether an error of such gravity or magnitude has occurred that the fundamental fairness of defendant\u2019s trial has been severely threatened.\nWe have repeatedly held that \u201cwe can review any question not otherwise properly preserved if we believe that plain error affecting a substantial right may have occurred.\u201d (Emphasis added.) People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 326 (1998). We have reviewed alleged instructional errors under the plain-error doctrine, as affecting substantial rights, even though we have ultimately concluded that \u201cany instructional error was [not] so substantial that it reflected on the fairness of the trial.\u201d People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 317-20 (1998). Indeed, \u201cto determine whether a purported error is \u2018plain\u2019 requires a substantive look at it. But if, in the end, the error is found not to rise to the level of a plain error ***, the procedural default must be honored.\u201d Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 17.\nIn Hopp, this court held that Rule 451(a) places the burden of persuasion on the defendant who raises a procedurally defaulted instructional error. As this court explained in Hopp, Rule 451(c) \u201cdoes not require that defendant prove beyond doubt that her trial was unfair because [an instructional error] misled the jury to convict her. It does require that she show that the error caused a severe threat to the fairness of her trial.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d at 12. Logically, and pursuant to this court\u2019s policy of correlative rule construction, defendant must show as much for purposes of Rule 615(a).\nThus, in this context, defendant must show that the alleged instructional error \u201ccreates a serious risk that the jurors incorrectly convicted the defendant because they did not understand the applicable law, so as to severely threaten the fairness of the trial.\u201d Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d at 8. Given the argument defendant advances in this case, defendant must show there was a serious risk that the jurors convicted him because they did not understand they had the option of signing a general \u201cnot guilty\u201d verdict pertaining to both greater and lesser-included offenses. This, defendant cannot do.\nWe first consider whether any error occurred at all. See People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 621 (2000) (before invoking the plain-error exception \u201c \u2018it is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at all\u2019 \u201d), quoting People v. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370, 376 (1989). As the State concedes, \u201cdefense counsel submitted a jury instruction, dealing with greater and lesser-included offenses, which tracked the language set forth in Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 2.01R.\u201d That instruction apparently would have informed the jury that it could find defendant \u201cnot guilty of predatory sexual assault of a child, and not guilty of attempt predatory sexual assault of a child, and not guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, or *** guilty of predatory sexual assault of a child or guilty of attempt predatory sexual assault of a child or guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse.\u201d Thus, the instruction would have informed the jury that it could acquit defendant of all offenses after giving independent consideration to the elements of each or find defendant guilty of the greater offense (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child) or one of the two lesser-included offenses (either attempted predatory sexual assault of a child or aggravated criminal sexual abuse).\nDefendant\u2019s tendered instruction did indeed adopt the structure, and track the pertinent parts, of IPI Criminal 4th No. 2.01R. That instruction states in relevant part as follows: \u201cUnder the law, a person charged with_[greater offense] may be found (1) not guilty of_[greater offense] and not guilty of_ [lesser offense]; or (2) guilty of _[greater offense]; or (3) guilty of_ [lesser offense].\u201d IPI Criminal 4th No. 2.01R. Pursuant to directions in the committee note to this instruction, defense counsel added an additional \u201cnot guilty\u201d clause to account for an additional lesser-included offense.\nThe trial court erred when it refused defendant\u2019s tendered instruction, which conformed to the pertinent provisions of the applicable IPI instruction. That IPI instruction, along with a corresponding concluding instruction and verdict forms, would have encouraged the jury to examine the elements of each offense separately, and would have emphasized the need for independent consideration of each offense.\nWhen an IPI criminal instruction does not accurately state the law with respect to a particular subject, the trial court may, in its discretion, give a non-IPI instruction on the subject. People v. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d 248, 253 (1993). However, as we recently reiterated in Hopp: \u201cSupreme Court Rule 451(a) requires that in a criminal case, if the court determines the jury should be instructed on a subject, and the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI), Criminal, contains an applicable instruction, then the IPI instruction \u2018shall\u2019 be given unless the court determines it does not accurately state the law. 177 Ill. 2d R. 451(a).\u201d Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d at 7. As this court noted in People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 212 (2002), Illinois pattern instructions have been \u201c \u2018painstakingly drafted *** so as to clearly and concisely state the law.\u2019 \u201d Quoting People v. Haywood, 82 Ill. 2d 540, 545 (1980). Trial judges should not take it upon themselves to second-guess the drafting committee where the instruction in question clearly applies.\nIn this case, the prosecutor objected to the tendered instruction, arguing that it was \u201cunduly complicated\u201d and presented the law to the jury \u201cunfavorably.\u201d The trial judge agreed insofar as he found the instruction unduly \u201cconfusing.\u201d Further, he expressed concern that the tendered instruction would require an excessive number of verdict forms. However, the trial court did not find that the instruction failed to state the law accurately.\nThe tendered instruction applied in this context and, taken in conjunction with other applicable instructions, would have stated the law clearly and accurately with respect to the issues under consideration. The tendered instruction reflected the appropriate IPI structure, specifically advising jurors that they could find defendant not guilty of the greater offense and not guilty of each of the lesser-included offenses. Therefore, the trial court erred when it gave non-IPI instructions on this point.\nNotwithstanding, there is no doubt that the error is de minimis and did not result in \u201cfundamental unfairness\u201d or cause a \u201csevere threat\u201d to the fairness of defendant\u2019s trial. See Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 32; Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d at 12. Consequently, defendant cannot establish plain error. See also Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 64 (\u201cAbsent reversible error, there can be no plain error\u201d); Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at 348 (same).\nIf the instructions given the jury had denied the jury the option of returning a general \u201cnot guilty\u201d verdict, as defendant contends, a significant structural error would have occurred for purposes of our rules, substantial rights would in fact have been violated, and the fairness and integrity of the trial process would have been compromised. However, that is not what happened in this case.\nThe record is replete with references to a general \u201cnot guilty\u201d option, both in the instructions conference and in the instructions and verdict forms given by the trial court and read to the jury. Though the recitation of facts we have previously provided amply demonstrates that to be true, we will reiterate the bases for our conclusion.\nIn rejecting defendant\u2019s tendered instruction, the trial court stated the instruction \u201cshould read *** a person charged with predatory sexual assault of a child, hand to vagina, penis to vagina, may be found, one, not guilty, or two, guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, or guilty of attempt predatory sexual assault of a child or guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse.\u201d The court continued, noting that the jurors would get four forms of verdict as to each alternative theory: \u201cIn essence, they should sign one, either not guilty, guilty of predatory sexual assault of a child[,] penis to vagina, hand to vagina, whatever, guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and, or guilty of an attempt predatory sexual assault of a child.\u201d The court observed that the jury would have \u201cfour possibilities, attempt predatory criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, guilty as charged initially or not guilty of anything.\u201d\nWhen defense counsel expressed concern that the \u201cnot guilty\u201d verdict form would read \u201cnot guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault,\u201d the trial court assured him, \u201cIt will just say not guilty.\u201d The court later reiterated, \u201cThere will just be one verdict form that will say not guilty in relation to those two separate counts, not guilty of anything ***.\u201d Still later during the instruction conference, when the matter of verdict forms was specifically addressed, the court directed defense counsel \u201cto make a verdict form which reads in essence not guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, attempt predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse, one verdict form that says not guilty of all three of those things. *** One will say not guilty of any of that kind of conduct.\u201d Subsequently, the trial court again stated, \u201cThere is one verdict form which says not guilty regarding that kind of conduct and three alternative forms of guilty referring to conduct of the different charges, predatory criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse or attempt.\u201d Finally, at the conclusion of the instruction conference, the court again verified, with respect to the predatory criminal sexual assault charges (finger to vagina, and penis to vagina), there would \u201cbe *** plain outright not guilty\u201d verdict forms.\nCertainly, there can be no doubt that the trial court intended to give the jury the option of a general acquittal as to each of the two kinds of conduct charged (finger to vagina, and penis to vagina) and, to that end, saw to it that instructions and verdicts forms were drafted to make that option available to the jury. That intent was evident throughout the instruction conference. That objective came to fruition when the court instructed the jury on the applicable law and read from the verdict forms it gave the jury.\nConsistent with the discussion during the instructions conference, after closing arguments, the court informed the jury that \u201ca person charged with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, (Floyd Durr\u2019s fingers to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina, and Floyd Durr\u2019s penis to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina), may be found not guilty, or two, guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, or three, guilty of attempt predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, or four, guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse.\u201d (Emphasis added.) After advising the jury of the propositions the State was required to prove to convict defendant of the lesser-included offenses, the court informed the jury, \u201cIf you find from your consideration of all the evidence any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt you should find the defendant not guilty.\u201d The court told the jury:\n\u201c[Y]ou are provided with four verdict forms pertaining to the charge of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, (Floyd Durr\u2019s fingers to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina), not guilty, guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, (Floyd Durr\u2019s fingers to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina), guilty of attempt predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, (Floyd Durr\u2019s fingers to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina), and guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, (Floyd Durr\u2019s fingers to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina).\nFrom these four verdict forms, you should select the one verdict form that reflects your verdict and sign it as I have instructed. Do not write at all on the other three verdict forms. Sign only one of these verdict forms.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe court gave an identical instruction with respect to the predatory criminal sexual assault charge based on the allegation of penis-to-vagina contact. The trial court explained to the jurors that they should sign only the guilty verdict for predatory criminal sexual assault if they found defendant guilty of that offense; in that event, they should not sign guilty verdicts pertaining to the lesser-included offenses.\nFinally, the court read from the verdict forms it was providing to the jury. With respect to the \u201cnot guilty\u201d verdict form pertaining to finger-to-vagina contact, the court recited the language of the given verdict form as follows:\n\u201c \u2018We the jury, find the defendant, Floyd Durr, not guilty, (Floyd Durr\u2019s fingers to [M.L.\u2019s] vagina).\u2019 \u201d\nWith respect to the \u201cnot guilty\u201d verdict form pertaining to penis-to-vagina contact, the court recited the language of the given verdict form as follows:\n\u201c \u2018We, the jury, find the defendant, Floyd Durr, not guilty, (Floyd Durr\u2019s penis, [M.L.\u2019s] vagina).\u2019 \u201d\nAs previously indicated, the common law record contains written verdict forms mirroring those read to the jury by the trial court, and alternate written versions, using the language \u201cnot guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child.\u201d The latter versions are marked, \u201cgiven, no objection.\u201d\nIn support of his argument that the jury was not given a general \u201cnot guilty\u201d option, defendant points to the latter versions in the common law record. He contends that the verdict forms given the jury allowed the jury to find defendant \u201cnot guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault,\u201d but did not allow the jury to find defendant \u201cnot guilty\u201d of all offenses under consideration. He chides the State for suggesting, for the first time before this court, that the verdict forms marked \u201cgiven\u201d in the common law record were not the verdict forms the jury actually received.\nInsofar as defendant suggests the State has waived this facet of its argument (defendant cites no supporting cases to that effect), we note that waiver is a limitation on the parties, not on this court. Zaabel v. Konetski, 209 Ill. 2d 127, 136 (2004). In the interest of justice, this court may consider an issue that a party has waived. Zaabel, 209 Ill. 2d at 136. Moreover, as a prevailing party in the court below, the State may raise any arguments in support of that court\u2019s judgment. See generally People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 563 (2003). In any event, we will consider the State\u2019s contention, which we believe is valid.\nIt is obvious to us, from our review of the report of proceedings, that the verdict forms which the trial court actually read to the jury were the only \u201cnot guilty\u201d verdict forms the jury was given in this respect. The trial court mentions no others. Although the common law record imports verity and is presumed correct, where the common law record is contradicted by matters in the report of proceedings, a reviewing court must look at the record as a whole to resolve the inconsistencies. People v. Fike, 117 Ill. 2d 49, 56 (1987). In this case, everything the trial judge said during the instruction conference indicated he would give the jury general \u201cnot guilty\u201d verdict forms with respect to finger-to-vagina and penis-to-vagina conduct, respectively. At one point, defense counsel expressed concern that the \u201cnot guilty\u201d verdict form would read \u201cnot guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault,\u201d and the trial court assured him, \u201cIt will just say not guilty.\u201d The verdict forms the court read to the jury were consistent with that assurance, stating simply \u201cnot guilty\u201d of the type of conduct which formed the basis for both greater and lesser-included offenses. It is evident that the verdict forms reading \u201cnot guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault\u201d were mistakenly marked \u201cgiven\u201d during the instructions conference and were not read or submitted to the jury. The clean copies that the jury received stated, simply, \u201cnot guilty.\u201d\nBecause the jury in this case did not receive the verdict forms mistakenly marked \u201cgiven,\u201d and was unequivocally instructed that it could find defendant not guilty of all offenses under consideration, defendant\u2019s reliance upon People v. James, 255 Ill. App. 3d 516 (1993), is misplaced and unavailing. In James, the trial court agreed to give the jury the following three verdict forms: \u201cguilty of aggravated arson,\u201d \u201cguilty of arson,\u201d and \u201cnot guilty of any arson related offense.\u201d However, during its admonishment to the jury, the trial court told the jury that the three verdict forms it would receive would read \u201cguilty of aggravated arson,\u201d \u201cguilty of arson,\u201d and \u201cnot guilty of aggravated arson.\u201d The latter instruction had been previously withdrawn by the State. The court did not mention a verdict form stating \u201cnot guilty of any arson related offense.\u201d In the common law record, all four of the above mentioned verdict forms had the notation \u201cgiven\u201d in the bottom margin. The jury returned a verdict of \u201cguilty of aggravated arson.\u201d James, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 523.\nOn appeal, defendant advanced the same argument that defendant makes in this case, i.e., that the jurors did not realize they had the option of acquitting him of all offenses under consideration. Noting that the State had not even argued \u201cthat the certified reading of the instructions was inaccurate,\u201d the appellate court in James reversed and remanded for a new trial, stating:\n\u201cIn this case, the State does not offer any evidence to prove nor, for that matter, does it even argue, that the certified record of the reading of the instructions was inaccurate. As is shown by the above-cited cases, the mere fact that correct instructions are found in the court file is insufficient to prove that the jury was so instructed. Therefore, we are bound by the certified report of proceedings and must proceed under the assumption that the jury received the incorrect instructions which provided for verdicts of \u2018not guilty of aggravated arson,\u2019 \u2018guilty of aggravated arson,\u2019 and \u2018guilty of arson.\u2019 \u201d James, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 528.\nIn this case, adequate verdict forms were read to the jury. Moreover, unlike the record in James, the record in this case reveals repeated statements by the trial court indicating that it would give the jury a general \u201cnot guilty\u201d verdict form as to the type of conduct under consideration. With respect to the alleged conduct underlying the two predatory criminal sexual assault charges in question (finger to vagina, and penis to vagina), the jurors were adequately apprized that there were three offenses under consideration and that they could find defendant not guilty of all three. Finally, unlike James, the State \u2014 albeit belatedly \u2014 makes the appropriate argument, pointing out what should have been obvious heretofore.\nIn sum, defendant cannot show that the de minimis instructional error in this case resulted in fundamental unfairness or caused a \u201csevere threat\u201d to the fairness of his trial. Therefore, applying our long-standing principles of plain-error analysis in this instructional context, we find that defendant has suffered no injustice, and we thus hold that the procedural default must be honored. See People v. Hart, 214 Ill. 2d 490, 513 (2005), citing Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 17 (recognizing that when plain error is lacking, \u201cthe procedural default must be honored\u201d).\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Steven W. Becker, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, Annette Collins, Susan Schierl Sullivan, Veronica Calderon Malavia and John E. Nowak, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 97741.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. FLOYD DURR, Appellant.\nOpinion filed May 19, 2005.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Steven W. Becker, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, Annette Collins, Susan Schierl Sullivan, Veronica Calderon Malavia and John E. Nowak, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0283-01", "first_page_order": 305, "last_page_order": 330 }