{ "id": 3874716, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOANNE Y. PHILLIPS, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Phillips", "decision_date": "2005-12-01", "docket_number": "No. 99568", "first_page": "270", "last_page": "289", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 270" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "384 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12041092 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "1248" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "1248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 F.3d 1269", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9299441 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/354/1269-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600125 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745", "parenthetical": "appellate court recognized that, as a matter of trial strategy, there was no reason to contest a lab report and distract the jury from defendant's defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 924", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5731714 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926", "parenthetical": "\"counsel's decision to enter into the stipulation in order to focus on other aspects of the case, including challenging the recollection and credibility of the officers, was sound\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0924-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451478 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451309 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" }, { "page": "474", "parenthetical": "where the central issue is whether defendant possessed a controlled substance, defense counsel may reasonably decide to forgo the opportunity to cross-examine a forensic expert in order to focus on other theories of the defense" }, { "page": "461" }, { "page": "474", "parenthetical": "where the central issue is whether defendant possessed a controlled substance, defense counsel may reasonably decide to forgo the opportunity to cross-examine a forensic expert in order focus on other theories of the defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688-95" }, { "page": "693-98" }, { "page": "2064-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 F.3d 59", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11554977 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" }, { "page": "62" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/194/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 745", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6199647 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751", "parenthetical": "appellate counsel must be allowed to present the client's case in accord with counsel's professional judgment by deciding what issues to present" }, { "page": "993", "parenthetical": "appellate counsel must be allowed to present the client's case in accord with counsel's professional judgment by deciding what issues to present" }, { "page": "3313", "parenthetical": "appellate counsel must be allowed to present the client's case in accord with counsel's professional judgment by deciding what issues to present" }, { "page": "751-52" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "3313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 2d 798", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 602206, 11300959 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0400-01", "/us/347/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 602206 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417-18" }, { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576392 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" }, { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974997 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060183 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602986 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173523 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132359 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "729 N.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 867", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5458457 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872" }, { "page": "872" }, { "page": "872" }, { "page": "871" }, { "page": "871" }, { "page": "871" }, { "page": "872" }, { "page": "871" }, { "page": "872" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0867-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "supervisory order" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462898 ], "weight": 14, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" }, { "page": "210" }, { "page": "210" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "212-13" }, { "page": "213-14" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "218" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "218, 221" }, { "page": "217-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281436 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" }, { "page": "160" }, { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229724 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding section 115-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 unconstitutional because it impermissibly required a defendant to take a procedural step to secure his constitutional right of confrontation" }, { "page": "140" }, { "page": "137-38" }, { "page": "137-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0127-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1163, "char_count": 32494, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4066570626985817e-07, "percentile": 0.7995072299581945 }, "sha256": "9e2f714b00d72fbec45dce48f31bf1f8477022f3b7f2b39fcdcd18d664058638", "simhash": "1:9b3bd889c601dce9", "word_count": 5194 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:57:57.441611+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOANNE Y. PHILLIPS, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Joanne Y. Phillips, was charged in the circuit court of Henry County with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1998)), unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1998)), unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West 1998)), and driving while license suspended (625 ILCS 5/6\u2014303 (West 1998)). A jury found defendant guilty of the charged offenses. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to four years\u2019 imprisonment for the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The conviction for possession of a controlled substance was vacated; defendant was sentenced to time served on the cannabis conviction; and a conviction was entered for the offense of driving while license suspended.\nDefendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the admission into evidence of lab reports violated her constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against her, an argument that appears to have been premised, \u201csignificantly,\u201d upon our decision in People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127 (2000) (holding section 115\u201415 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 unconstitutional because it impermissibly required a defendant to take a procedural step to secure his constitutional right of confrontation). The appellate court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the circuit court. People v. Phillips, 326 Ill. App. 3d 157 (2001). The court found defendant\u2019s confrontation contention \u201cunavailing,\u201d noting that \u201cthe lab reports were properly admitted into evidence *** pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.\u201d 326 Ill. App. 3d at 161.\nThis court denied the defendant\u2019s ensuing petition for leave to appeal, but issued a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment and reconsider in light of People v. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d 203 (2003), \u201cto determine if a different result is warranted.\u201d See People v. Phillips, 208 Ill. 2d 550 (2004) (supervisory order).\nIn compliance with this court\u2019s directive, the appellate court reconsidered the confrontation issue and reached a contrary result. 352 Ill. App. 3d 867. We allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now reverse the judgment of the appellate court. The following facts are pertinent to our disposition.\nBACKGROUND\nDefendant was tried before a jury on May 3, 2000. From the outset, in opening statements, it was made clear to the jury that the contested issue, with respect to the controlled substance charge, was whether the defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine discovered in her vehicle. In his opening statement, the prosecutor outlined the evidence the State expected to present in support of the controlled substance charges. Defense counsel, in his initial remarks to the jury, presented defendant\u2019s theory of the case, claiming that defendant had no knowledge of the cocaine found in her car, and that the cocaine belonged to one or both of her passengers. Defense counsel noted that defendant had denied knowledge of the drugs for a considerable time after the drugs were found. He suggested that defendant had only given an inculpatory statement because she was afraid of the male passenger in the car and \u201cbecause of what she felt were promises by Deputy Hampton\u201d that \u201cit would be better for her and easier for her if she just said the stuff was hers.\u201d\nWith respect to the custody and analysis of the drugs, the prosecutor advised the jury in his opening remarks that there was \u201can agreement between the State and *** defense counsel\u201d regarding the testimony of people who handled and tested the drugs found in defendant\u2019s car. On four occasions, the prosecutor referred to stipulations concerning that evidence. Defendant was present when the remarks were made. Defense counsel did not object to those references.\nThe first and only witness called by the State was Henry County sheriffs deputy Glenn Hampton. Hampton testified that he stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle in the early morning hours of November 5, 1999, because defendant\u2019s vehicle had veered off the roadway. Hampton asked the defendant for her license, registration, and proof of insurance. The defendant produced a driver\u2019s license, and Hampton escorted her to his squad car, while the defendant\u2019s two passengers remained in her vehicle. Defendant indicated that she thought her license was suspended, and shortly thereafter Hampton received radio confirmation of the suspension. Hampton then placed the defendant under arrest for driving with a suspended license and returned to the defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nHampton asked the two passengers to step out of the vehicle, and he proceeded to search the vehicle\u2019s interior. Underneath the driver\u2019s seat, near the transmission hump, Hampton found a crumpled paper towel, inside of which were 25 individual plastic bags containing a white substance that appeared to be crack cocaine. In the front ashtray, Hampton found a half-burnt marijuana cigarette.\nHampton walked back to his squad car and confronted the defendant with the substances he had recovered from her vehicle. She asked what it was. After Hampton read the defendant her Miranda rights, he told her \u201cwe have to discuss this[.] I found this cocaine in your car right next to your feet[.] We need to discuss this.\u201d Defendant again indicated she had no idea what the substance was.\nHampton then returned to defendant\u2019s vehicle and questioned her passengers. Hampton subsequently advised the defendant that her passengers had denied knowledge of the cocaine. He pressed her again to discuss the matter. Hampton said he then noticed the defendant becoming teary-eyed. According to Hampton, defendant told him she needed money to pay bills and feed her children. She said the two passengers in the car did not know anything about the cocaine, which she had picked up in Chicago.\nHampton transported defendant to the county jail and again read her Miranda rights. Defendant signed a written statement which was consistent with the oral admissions she had made to Hampton. Hampton denied that he had made any promises to defendant to obtain her inculpatory statement.\nUnder cross-examination, Hampton acknowledged that the defendant\u2019s passengers had remained in her vehicle, unattended, when Hampton initially spoke with defendant in his squad car prior to the search of defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nAfter Hampton\u2019s testimony, the State introduced the defendant\u2019s written statement, and an Illinois State Police lab report signed by Denise Hanley, a forensic scientist. Hanley\u2019s report was accompanied by an \u201cAffidavit in Lieu of Court Appearance,\u201d \u201cprovided in accordance with *** 725 ILCS 5/115\u201415.\u201d The report revealed that \u201c5.4 grams of off-white chunks from five plastic bags\u201d were tested and were found to contain cocaine. Hanley did not test the 7.1 grams in the remaining bags. The State introduced a second report signed by Robert Streight, an employee of the Henry County sheriffs office, indicating that 0.1 gram of plant material submitted to him contained cannabis. Defense counsel indicated he had no objection to admission of the lab reports. Defendant was present when the reports were admitted, and she voiced no dissent.\nIn her defense, the defendant testified that, in exchange for $100 and gas money, she was transporting the two passengers to Chicago and back to Davenport, Iowa. When Hampton stopped her, she did not know there was cocaine in the car, and she so advised the officer after he found it and confronted her. She said Hampton badgered her into confessing. She indicated that Hampton had informed her if she cooperated the judge would be notified, she would be home with her children the next day, Hampton would not notify the Department of Children and Family Services, and her car would not be towed. In addition, the defendant testified it was only after Hampton threatened to charge her with drug trafficking and possession of a stolen vehicle, and indicated that she would never see her children again, that she admitted knowledge of the drugs. The defendant acknowledged signing the written statement, but testified at trial that the statement was untrue. She maintained that she did not know of any drugs in the car except the marijuana, and she had told the passenger smoking the marijuana to stop.\nThe defendant was convicted of all counts. At sentencing, the defendant adamantly maintained her innocence. The trial judge indicated that he would have placed the defendant on probation, but that the legislature had stripped him of his discretion to do so. The defendant was sentenced to four years\u2019 imprisonment for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. As noted, the court vacated the unlawful possession of a controlled substance count, gave the defendant credit for time served on the cannabis count, and entered judgment on the conviction for driving while license suspended.\nOn appeal, the appellate court characterized defendant\u2019s confrontation argument as follows:\n\u201cRelying significantly on the recent case of People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 729 N.E.2d 470 (2000), the defendant argues that because an element of her alleged drug-related offenses was proven through lab reports, she was denied her sixth amendment right to be confronted by the witnesses against her.\u201d Phillips, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 160.\nWe note, in McClanahan, this court struck down a statute that allowed the State, in drug prosecutions, to use lab reports in lieu of actual testimony as prima facie evidence unless the defendant filed a demand for the testimony of the witness who prepared the report within seven days of the defendant\u2019s receipt of the report. We held that the statute impermissibly required the defendant to take a procedural step to secure his confrontation rights. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 140.\nIn defendant\u2019s first appeal, the appellate court rejected defendant\u2019s argument, noting the holding of People v. Avery, 321 Ill. App. 3d 414 (2001), an appellate decision subsequent to McClanahan. The Avery court held that, absent the defendant\u2019s objection at trial, the trial court could properly consider hearsay lab reports regardless of the existence, or application, of section 115\u201415. Avery, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 418. The court reasoned that \u201c \u2018testimony based on hearsay that is not objected to at trial should be given appropriate consideration.\u2019 \u201d Avery, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 418, quoting People v. Becerril, 307 Ill. App. 3d 518, 526 (1999).\nThe appellate court in this case determined that the record revealed defense counsel had actually \u201cstipulated\u201d to admission of the lab reports. Therefore, the appellate court rejected defendant\u2019s contention \u201cthat she was denied her right to be confronted with the witnesses against her by the application of section 115\u201415 of the Code.\u201d Phillips, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 161.\nWhen the appellate court subsequently reconsidered this matter at our direction, after our decision in Campbell, the appellate court\u2019s analysis changed significantly. From our decisions in Campbell, McClanahan, and People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41 (1992), the appellate court gleaned a minimal requirement that someone \u2014 defense counsel or the circuit court \u2014 advise defendant of his options with respect to stipulations, of the \u201cimplications\u201d of stipulating, of the \u201clegal impact\u201d of a stipulation, and that the record disclose such advisement. 352 Ill. App. 3d at 872.\nThe appellate court recognized that our decision in Campbell requires admonishments with respect to stipulations in only two instances: \u201c \u2018 [w]here the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant or where the State\u2019s entire case is to be presented by stipulation.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) 352 Ill. App. 3d at 872, quoting Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 221. While the appellate court acknowledged that Campbell does not require admonishments under the facts of this case (352 Ill. App. 3d at 872), it appears the appellate court fashioned its own broader rule out of passages from Ramey and McClanahan that were quoted in Campbell.\nWith regard to the first quoted passage, the appellate court\u2019s added emphasis is telling:\n\u201c \u2018 \u201c[T]rial counsel has the right to make the ultimate decision with respect to matters of tactics and strategy after consulting with his client. Such matters include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike and what trial motions should be made. [Citation.] Such matters also include the defense to be presented at trial.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) 352 Ill. App. 3d at 871, quoting Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 210, quoting Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54.\nImmediately after the quoted passage, the appellate court concluded:\n\u201cConstruing the fundamental constitutional right [of confrontation] in conjunction with the supreme court\u2019s decision in Campbell, we conclude that in order to waive the defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence, there must be some affirmative showing or indication by the defendant in the record that he or she did not object to or dissent from the attorney\u2019s decision to stipulate.\u201d 352 Ill. App. 3d at 871.\nThe appellate court then quoted language this court employed in McClanahan. Referring to stipulations regarding lab reports, this court stated, \u201c \u2018these stipulations properly require a defendant to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision whether he wishes to waive his right to confront the preparer of the report.\u2019 \u201d See 352 Ill. App. 3d at 871, quoting McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 137-38.\nSynthesizing the foregoing quotations from McClanahan and Ramey, the appellate court held that the record must demonstrate that a defendant was advised of the consequences and implications of an evidentiary stipulation (352 Ill. App. 3d at 872) and, absent an \u201caffirmative showing or indication *** in the record that he or she did not object to or dissent from the attorney\u2019s decision to stipulate,\u201d there is no valid waiver of defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right of confrontation (352 Ill. App. 3d at 871). Given its holding, the appellate court found it unnecessary to consider whether the agreement to stipulate was a sound trial tactic or prudent trial strategy. 352 Ill. App. 3d at 872.\nANALYSIS\nAs a preliminary matter, we note that supervisory orders issued by this court are nonprecedential. People v. Durr, 215 Ill. 2d 283, 295 (2005). When, pursuant to our supervisory authority, we remand a case for reconsideration in light of a recent decision, we do not necessarily mean to imply that a different result is warranted. In some instances, that may well be the case; however, in others, reconsideration of the appellate court\u2019s analysis may simply be desirable to account for the recent decision and to ensure a uniform body of law. In any event, we expect the appellate court to exercise its independent judgment in such matters.\nWe begin our analysis with the well-established proposition that, in criminal proceedings, an attorney is authorized to act for his client and determine for him procedural matters and decisions involving trial strategy and tactics. People v. Kaczmarek, 207 Ill. 2d 288, 297 (2003); People v. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d 131, 141 (1990). As this court has noted, this principle of agency is necessary in order for a representative system of litigation to function. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d at 141. Indeed, as the Supreme Court aptly observed in Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798, 816, 108 S. Ct. 646, 657 (1988): \u201cAlthough there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer has \u2014 and must have \u2014 full authority to manage the conduct of the trial. The adversary process could not function effectively if every tactical decision required client approval.\u201d The same principle operates in the appellate arena. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987, 993, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3313 (1983) (appellate counsel must be allowed to present the client\u2019s case in accord with counsel\u2019s professional judgment by deciding what issues to present).\nThis court noted in Campbell that criminal defendants possess two types of constitutional rights, and a different waiver standard applies to each. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 210; see also United States v. Plitman, 194 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1999). The first category includes five decisions that ultimately belong to the defendant in a criminal case after consultation with his attorney: (1) what plea to enter; (2) whether to waive a jury trial; (3) whether to testify in his own behalf; (4) whether to tender a lesser-included-offense instruction; and (5) whether to appeal. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 210. Beyond those decisions, however, \u201c \u2018trial counsel has the right to make the ultimate decision with respect to matters of tactics and strategy after consulting with his client. Such matters include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike and what trial motions should be made. [Citation.] Such matters also include the defense to be presented at trial.\u2019 \u201d Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 210, quoting Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54.\nIn Campbell, the defendant seized upon a single sentence in McClanahan to support his contention that \u201cany waiver of the right to confrontation must be a knowing waiver made by the defendant personally.\u201d Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 212. As noted, the appellate court in this case utilized the same sentence in its analysis. That sentence, which refers to stipulations to lab reports, reads as follows: \u201cUnlike section 115\u201415, these stipulations properly require a defendant to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision whether he wishes to waive his right to confront the preparer of the report.\u201d McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 137-38. In Campbell, this court flatly rejected defendant\u2019s contention that the foregoing language required \u201ca knowing waiver by the defendant personally.\u201d This court stated:\n\u201cWe decline to read McClanahan so broadly. Contrary to defendant\u2019s interpretation of McClanahan, this court has never held that only a defendant can waive his sixth amendment right of confrontation. In fact, this court has never directly addressed the issue of whether defense counsel may waive a defendant\u2019s right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence. We note, however, that a majority of the courts that have addressed the issue have held that counsel in a criminal case may waive his client\u2019s sixth amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence.\u201d Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 212-13.\nThis court in Campbell reviewed federal and state decisions on point, focusing, in particular, on the federal court of appeals\u2019 opinion in Plitman. See Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 213-14.\nIn Plitman, defendant claimed that his attorney\u2019s stipulation to certain testimony was invalid because: (1) Plitman had not waived his sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against him; (2) his attorney never said that Plitman had waived his right of confrontation and/or knew the risks involved in doing so; and (3) defense counsel\u2019s actions were not justified as matters of trial strategy. See Plitman, 194 F.3d at 62. The court of appeals rejected Plitman\u2019s argument that a defendant must in every instance personally waive the right to confront the witnesses against him. The court held that the defendant\u2019s waiver of his right of confrontation, through counsel, was valid because the defendant achieved several tactical advantages as a result of the stipulation, and defendant did not object during the discussion concerning the stipulation or when his attorney made the decision to stipulate. Plitman, 194 F.3d at 64. As the court noted in Plitman, \u201cPlitman himself was present\u201d when his attorney waived his right of confrontation, \u201cand did not object to his lawyer\u2019s decisions.\u201d Plitman, 194 F.3d at 64. Moreover, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-95, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693-98, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064-68 (1984), the court observed: \u201cA well developed body of case law protects defendants from constitutionally defective actions of their attorneys.\u201d Plitman, 194 F.3d at 64.\nAfter discussing Plitman, and the holdings of other courts, this court stated in Campbell: \u201cWe agree that defense counsel may waive a defendant\u2019s right of confrontation as long as the defendant does not object and the decision to stipulate is a matter of trial tactics and strategy.\u201d Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 217. However, we held that a defendant must personally waive the right of confrontation \u201cwhen the State\u2019s entire case is to be presented by stipulation and the defendant does not present or preserve a defense ***, or where the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant.\u201d Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 218. We attached no other restrictions to defense counsel\u2019s authority to stipulate to the admission of evidence, and, except in those specified instances where the stipulation is tantamount to a guilty plea, we imposed no obligations on the trial court or counsel to admonish the defendant and ensure that the advisement is made a part of the record. Insofar as the appellate court held otherwise, the court erred.\nThe appellate court\u2019s holding is premised upon a single sentence from our opinion in McClanahan and the significance the appellate court attributed to the words \u201cafter consulting with his client\u201d from our quotation of Ramey in Campbell. The appellate court has, in effect, adopted the defendant\u2019s position in Campbell, a construction we clearly rejected when we \u201cdecline[d] to read McClanahan so broadly.\u201d Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 212. The appellate court has taken our limited holding in Camp bell \u2014 applicable only \u201cwhen the State\u2019s entire case is to be presented by stipulation and the defendant does not present or preserve a defense ***, or where the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant\u201d \u2014 and has rendered a decision which would require, in every conceivable situation, that a defendant be advised of the implications and consequences of stipulation and that he approve on the record. Indeed, if we were to interpret the quoted passage from Ramey as the appellate court did, decisions regarding \u201cwhat witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike and what trial motions should be made\u201d (see Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54) would all, logically, require consultation with defendant, and his tacit approval, on the record. Since an evidentiary stipulation is, in effect, nothing more than an acknowledgment of what a witness would testify to if called, and a concomitant decision not to challenge the testimony the witness would give, a stipulation is not much different from a decision not to cross-examine. The notion that a defendant would have to approve every aspect of defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination \u2014 including \u201cwhether and how to conduct cross-examination\u201d\u2014 highlights the impracticality of the procedure espoused by the appellate court. A representative system of litigation cannot function with those restrictions. We decline to impose them, and we hold that they are not constitutionally required.\nAs recently as our decision in People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 468 (2005), we reiterated that \u201ccourts look with favor upon stipulations\u201d insofar as \u201c \u2018 \u201cthey tend to promote disposition of cases, simplification of issues, and the saving of expense to litigants.\u201d \u2019 \u201d As a matter of trial strategy, defense counsel might choose to stipulate to evidence in an effort to minimize the adverse impact it will have at trial. For example, counsel might, in certain circumstances, decide to stipulate to a defendant\u2019s prior felony conviction in order to avoid disclosure of the name and nature of the prior felony conviction. See People v. Walker, 211 Ill. 2d 317, 341 (2004). In this instance, to contest the results of chemical testing, without a basis for doing so, would have simply highlighted testimony regarding the nature of the drug and would have unduly magnified its importance, when defendant was better served by focusing the jury\u2019s attention on the critical issue of whether defendant knowingly possessed the controlled substance. See Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 474 (where the central issue is whether defendant possessed a controlled substance, defense counsel may reasonably decide to forgo the opportunity to cross-examine a forensic expert in order to focus on other theories of the defense); People v. Banks, 358 Ill. App. 3d 924, 926 (2005) (\u201ccounsel\u2019s decision to enter into the stipulation in order to focus on other aspects of the case, including challenging the recollection and credibility of the officers, was sound\u201d); People v. Scott, 355 Ill. App. 3d 741, 745 (2005) (appellate court recognized that, as a matter of trial strategy, there was no reason to contest a lab report and distract the jury from defendant\u2019s defense); United States v. Aptt, 354 F.3d 1269, 1283 (10th Cir. 2004) (\u201cit may be that defense counsel determined that the likelihood of successfully excluding the stipulated exhibits was small enough that it would be more advantageous for his client to bolster his credibility by expressing, in the presence of the jury, a willingness to let them see all of the evidence\u201d).\nWe note, in passing, that the stipulation in Woods would not pass muster under this appellate panel\u2019s holding, since there was no indication in the record that the defendant had been advised of the consequences of the stipulation. See Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 461. As we stated in Campbell, \u201cdefense counsel may waive a defendant\u2019s right of confrontation as long as the defendant does not object and the decision to stipulate is a matter of trial tactics and strategy.\u201d Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 217. Other than the limitations noted, where the stipulation is tantamount to a guilty plea, we did not qualify the foregoing principle in Campbell, and we see no need to do so now. As this court suggested in Campbell, it is only when counsel\u2019s stipulations render defendant\u2019s trial the \u201c \u2018practical equivalent of a plea of guilty\u2019 \u201d that a defendant must be \u201cpersonally admonished about the stipulation and must personally agree to the stipulation.\u201d Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 218, 221, quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7, 16 L. Ed. 2d 314, 319, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 1248 (1966).\nDefense counsel in this case appears to have chosen, as a matter of trial strategy, to focus the jury\u2019s attention upon the critical issue of whether defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine found in her car. Without contradiction, Officer Hampton testified that he searched defendant\u2019s car and recovered 25 plastic bags, each containing a white substance that appeared to be cocaine. When confronted with that evidence, even the defendant acknowledged, \u201cIt looks like drugs.\u201d Under the circumstances, we fail to see any tactical advantage defendant might have obtained from extended forensic testimony about the analysis and nature of \u201coff-white chunks\u201d found individually packaged in 25 plastic bags. To the contrary, we believe such testimony would have been an unnecessary distraction for the jury.\nMoreover, we note that defendant was present when the prosecutor, in his opening statement, mentioned \u201can agreement between the State and the defense counsel\u201d regarding the testimony of people who handled and tested the drugs found in defendant\u2019s car. On four occasions, the prosecutor referred to stipulations concerning that evidence. Defendant did not voice any dissent or objection when those remarks were made. Defendant was also present when defense counsel announced he had no objection to admission of the lab reports. Again, defendant did not object.\n\u201c[Djefense counsel may waive a defendant\u2019s right of confrontation as long as the defendant does not object and the decision to stipulate is a matter of trial tactics and strategy.\u201d Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 217. The criteria of Campbell are met in this case. Since counsel\u2019s stipulations did not render defendant\u2019s trial the \u201c \u2018practical equivalent of a plea of guilty,\u2019 \u201d there was no need for defendant to be \u201cpersonally admonished about the stipulation\u201d and \u201cpersonally agree to the stipulation.\u201d See Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 218, 221, quoting Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 7, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 319, 86 S. Ct. at 1248. The critical issue of knowing possession remained, and indeed, that was the focus of trial. It was, therefore, unnecessary for either the court or counsel to admonish defendant about the implications and consequences of the stipulation; defendant\u2019s personal agreement to the stipulation on the record was not required.\nDefendant obviously recognizes that the analysis of Campbell does not support the appellate court\u2019s result, as she repeatedly calls upon us to \u201coverrule\u201d Campbell. Defendant submits that Campbell is \u201cconstitutionally infirm because it fails to recognize that the right of confrontation is personal to a defendant\u201d in every situation. Defendant offers a hypothetical which she apparently believes shows the error in Campbell\u2019s analysis. Defendant suggests, under the holding in Campbell, \u201cin a murder prosecution, twenty prosecution witnesses\u2019 statements could be presented via affidavit upon stipulation by the defense attorney, but as long as a sole witness testified in person, such a trial would not offend the accused\u2019s confrontation-clause right.\u201d Defendant\u2019s hypothetical suffers from an erroneous assumption that runs throughout her brief, i.e., that form matters more than substance, and that the consistent exercise of the right of confrontation, via cross-examination, is more important than the effective exercise of the right. Thus, in defendant\u2019s improbable hypothetical, if 20 witnesses have nothing to say about the critical issues in the case, or if what they have to say does not concern a controverted matter, there would be no point in cross-examining each witness, thereby diminishing the significance of the single witness whose testimony may be crucial.\n\u201cExperienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments *** and focusing *** at most on a few key issues.\u201d Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-52, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 994, 103 S. Ct. at 3313. That observation, made in reference to appellate advocacy, applies to trial practice as well, as we noted in Woods. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 474 (where the central issue is whether defendant possessed a controlled substance, defense counsel may reasonably decide to forgo the opportunity to cross-examine a forensic expert in order focus on other theories of the defense).\nIn sum, it is not necessary for either the court or counsel to admonish a defendant about the implications and consequences of a stipulation, and defendant\u2019s explicit agreement to the stipulation on the record is not required where, as here, (1) defense counsel\u2019s decision to stipulate appears to have been a matter of trial tactics and strategy and defendant does not object to counsel\u2019s decision, and (2) the State\u2019s entire case is not presented by stipulation, the defendant does present or preserve a defense, and the stipulation does not include a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict. See Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 217-18.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Terence M. Patton, State\u2019s Attorney, of Cambridge (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin and Leah C. Myers, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.", "Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Donna Kelly and Thomas A. Karalis, Assistant Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 99568.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOANNE Y. PHILLIPS, Appellee.\nOpinion filed December 1, 2005.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Terence M. Patton, State\u2019s Attorney, of Cambridge (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin and Leah C. Myers, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Donna Kelly and Thomas A. Karalis, Assistant Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0270-01", "first_page_order": 284, "last_page_order": 303 }