{ "id": 3875396, "name": "In re CHRISTOPHER K., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Christopher K., Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Christopher K.", "decision_date": "2005-12-15", "docket_number": "No. 98597", "first_page": "348", "last_page": "386", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 348" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "321 Ark. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449526 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "157-58", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 So. 2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11861261 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862-67", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/705/0861-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 F.3d 688", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 224154 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697-98", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/120/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 F.3d 965", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9441256 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "971-73", "parenthetical": "applying Danis in prewaiver situation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/287/0965-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156155 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376", "parenthetical": "Simon, J., dissenting, joined by Goldenhersh and Moran, JJ." }, { "page": "376", "parenthetical": "Simon, J., dissenting, joined by Goldenersh and Moran, JJ." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229707 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45-50" }, { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909168 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" }, { "page": "452-53" }, { "page": "451" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 452", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39831 ], "weight": 45, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "2352" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "2353" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "2353" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "369" }, { "page": "2353" }, { "page": "458-59" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "372" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "461" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "2356" }, { "page": "461" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "2356" }, { "page": "461-62" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "2356" }, { "page": "461" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "2356" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "2355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474258 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "311" }, { "page": "311" }, { "page": "311" }, { "page": "312" }, { "page": "312" }, { "page": "311" }, { "page": "311" }, { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 91", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11958689 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" }, { "page": "493-94" }, { "page": "492-93" }, { "page": "99-100" }, { "page": "496-97" }, { "page": "495" }, { "page": "99-100" }, { "page": "496-97" }, { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5554525 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74-75" }, { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S. 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Ct.", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1884-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187603 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477048 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" }, { "page": "706-07" }, { "page": "1612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963649 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451000 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" }, { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451115 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2912891 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5577248 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389-90" }, { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 800", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6224266 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817" }, { "page": "831" }, { "page": "2178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0800-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609700 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2463250 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801353 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444559 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060246 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351282 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926969 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637125 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833539 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13-15", "parenthetical": "holding respondent had no standing to raise vagueness challenge to section 5 -810" }, { "page": "10-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451214 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399", "parenthetical": "noting that where a statute does not affect first amendment rights, it will not be declared unconstitutionally vague unless it is not capable of any valid application" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2999964 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3481676 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 877", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186526 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0877-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5554744 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820340 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468", "parenthetical": "under law-of-the-case doctrine, rule established as controlling in particular case will continue to be law of the case as long as facts remain the same" }, { "page": "468-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578232 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395", "parenthetical": "law-of-the-case doctrine bars relitigation of issue already decided in same case" }, { "page": "395-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295827 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229710 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351247 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609701 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387-88", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3827721 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292", "parenthetical": "no authoritative determination needed because no conflicting case law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243960 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" }, { "page": "365-66", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442049 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" }, { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3155913 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272-73" }, { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448124 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" }, { "page": "45" }, { "page": "46", "parenthetical": "authoritative determination needed because of conflicting case law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 U.S. 186", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166554 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" }, { "page": "678" }, { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/369/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444699 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" }, { "page": "435" }, { "page": "436", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "348 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43" }, { "parenthetical": "348 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43" }, { "parenthetical": "348 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4022770 ], "weight": 16, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "140" }, { "page": "140" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142-43" }, { "page": "143-47" }, { "page": "151-53" }, { "page": "153" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "140" }, { "page": "141-42" }, { "page": "146-47", "parenthetical": "holding the term \"offense,\" as used in section 5-810, is not unconstitutionally vague" }, { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609701 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3827721 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0287-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1745, "char_count": 67386, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.3105334297053653e-07, "percentile": 0.872428083645031 }, "sha256": "0e6d0f447af348d032907a026620a6c04f5d33f8d297ed9881a4693029c84dc3", "simhash": "1:e9abb37e6382dc91", "word_count": 11104 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:57:57.441611+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re CHRISTOPHER K., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Christopher K., Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, respondent, Christopher K., was adjudicated delinquent for the offense of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9\u20141 (West 1998)). The trial court imposed both a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence pursuant to the extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ) statute of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/ 5\u2014810 (West 1998)). The appellate court affirmed respondent\u2019s conviction, but reversed his adult sentence. 348 Ill. App. 3d 130, 154. The main issue before this court is whether the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits the designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after the appellate court affirms the denial of a motion to prosecute a juvenile as an adult under section 5\u2014805(3) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014805(3) (West 1998)). We hold it does not and reverse the appellate court\u2019s modification of respondent\u2019s sentence. We also affirm respondent\u2019s conviction. In doing so, we hold the trial court did not err in determining respondent did not unambiguously invoke his right to counsel.\nBACKGROUND\nOn January 23, 1999, 16-year-old Willie Lomax was shot and killed. Soon thereafter, respondent, who at the time was 14 years old, was arrested and taken into custody for the shooting. With his mother present, he was questioned by two Chicago Police Department detectives. Ultimately, respondent provided oral and court-reported statements admitting his involvement in the shooting.\nOn February 1, 1999, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship charging respondent with first-degree murder. The State also filed a motion to prosecute respondent as an adult pursuant to section 5\u2014805(3) of the Juvenile Court Act, which gives a juvenile court discretion to permit the prosecution of a minor under the state\u2019s criminal laws (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014805(3) (West 1998)). This procedure is known as a discretionary transfer of jurisdiction (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014805(3) (West 1998)). After a hearing, the trial court denied the State\u2019s discretionary transfer motion, and the State appealed.\nThe appellate court affirmed the trial court\u2019s denial of the State\u2019s motion. In re Christopher K., No. 1\u201499\u20143175 (2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Initially, it rejected the State\u2019s contention that respondent was engaged in \u201cadult activities\u201d to such an extent that his behavior warranted transfer. The appellate court then reasoned that the trial court considered all the appropriate statutory factors in ruling on the State\u2019s motion. According to the appellate court, the trial court correctly gave the seriousness of the alleged crime and respondent\u2019s history of delinquency the most weight. The former factor weighed against respondent, because first degree murder is a serious crime, but the latter factor weighed in his favor, because he had only one prior station adjustment. The remaining six factors enumerated in the discretionary transfer statute were \u201cequally split.\u201d Respondent\u2019s culpability, premeditated actions, and use of a deadly weapon all weighed against him, but his age, his willingness to participate meaningfully in available services, and the adequacy of the punishment or services available in the juvenile system all weighed in respondent\u2019s favor. The appellate court concluded that the record supported the trial court\u2019s findings with respect to each statutory factor. Therefore, the appellate court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State\u2019s motion. In re Christopher K., No. 1\u201499\u20143175.\nAfter the appellate court issued its mandate, respondent moved to quash his arrest for lack of probable cause, and to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of his arrest. Respondent also moved separately to suppress the statements he made to the police while in custody. The trial court denied both motions.\nOn June 20, 2001, the State filed a motion to designate respondent\u2019s case as an EJJ prosecution under section 5\u2014810 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014810 (West 1998)). When a juvenile court designates a case as an EJJ prosecution, the minor subject to the EJJ prosecution is entitled to a jury trial. 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014810(3) (West 1998). If the trial results in a guilty verdict, the trial court must impose a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence, staying the adult sentence on the condition that the minor not violate the provisions of the juvenile sentence. 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014810(4) (West 1998). The trial court granted the State\u2019s EJJ motion, and the case proceeded to a jury tried.\nAt trial, the jury found respondent guilty of first degree murder. Therefore, in accordance with section 5\u2014810, the trial court committed respondent to the Illinois Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, until the age of 21 (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014750(2) (West 1998)) and imposed an adult sentence of 40 years\u2019 imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141 (West 1998)), staying the latter on the condition respondent successfully complete his juvenile sentence.\nRespondent appealed both his conviction and sentence. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 154. With respect to the sentence, the appellate court found the trial court erred in designating respondent\u2019s case as an EJJ prosecution and, accordingly, in imposing a stayed adult sentence. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 154. Specifically, the appellate court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred the application of section 5\u2014810 to respondent\u2019s case. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 140. The court reasoned that the State\u2019s EJJ motion was directed toward the same \u201cultimate issue\u201d as the State\u2019s discretionary transfer motion, which the trial court denied, and which was affirmed on appeal. See 348 Ill. App. 3d at 140. Therefore, the appellate court reversed respondent\u2019s adult sentence. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 154. In addition, based on its interpretation of section 5\u2014805 and section 5\u2014810, the appellate court held the legislature intended discretionary transfer motions and EJJ motions to be filed simultaneously. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 142. The appellate court rejected respondent\u2019s claims that section 5\u2014810 violates the principles of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) (348 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43), and is unconstitutionally vague (348 Ill. App. 3d at 143-47).\nWith respect to respondent\u2019s conviction, the appellate court held the trial court did not err in denying respondent\u2019s motion to suppress his statements to the police. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 151-53. The appellate court also upheld the trial court\u2019s denial of respondent\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress related evidence. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 153. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed respondent\u2019s conviction. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 154.\nThe State filed a petition for leave to appeal with this court. We allowed the State\u2019s petition (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) to address whether the law-of-the-case doctrine bars the designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after the appellate court affirms the denial of a discretionary transfer motion. We also permitted The Juvenile Law Center and a number of other organizations concerned with the welfare of minors to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent (155 Ill. 2d R. 345).\nANALYSIS\nI. Mootness\nPrior to oral argument, the State filed a motion to dismiss certain issues respondent raised on cross-appeal as moot. We ordered the State\u2019s motion to be taken with the case. As a preliminary matter, we address this motion.\nThe issues on cross-appeal fall into three categories. First, respondent claims section 5\u2014810 is unconstitutionally vague. He argues the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it fails to provide adequate notice to a minor as to what acts violate the \u201cconditions\u201d (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014810(6) (West 1998)) of the minor\u2019s juvenile sentence for purposes of lifting the stay on the minor\u2019s adult sentence. He also argues section 5\u2014810 is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it encourages arbitrary and capricious enforcement of a minor\u2019s adult sentence by failing to specify what acts violate the \u201cconditions\u201d of the minor\u2019s juvenile sentence. In addition, respondent argues section 5\u2014810 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because the trial court did not specifically identify the \u201cconditions\u201d attached to his juvenile sentence, thereby failing to provide him with adequate notice as to what acts could trigger his stayed adult sentence. Respondent also argues the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because the trial court did not specifically identify the \u201cconditions\u201d attached to his juvenile sentence, thereby encouraging the arbitrary and capricious imposition of his adult sentence.\nSecond, respondent claims two Apprendi violations. He argues the initial designation of his case as an EJJ prosecution violated Apprendi because it increased his penalty for the alleged offense beyond the statutory maximum absent proof to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the factors necessary to designate a case as an EJJ prosecution. Respondent reasons that the trial court\u2019s denial of the State\u2019s motion to prosecute him as an adult effectively set his maximum sentence at commitment to juvenile detention until the age of 21. The designation of his case as an EJJ prosecution, he concludes, exceeded this maximum. Additionally, respondent argues the procedure in section 5\u2014810 for lifting the stay on a minor\u2019s adult sentence violates Apprendi. Respondent reasons that section 5\u2014810 impermissibly allows a trial judge to extend a minor\u2019s sentence beyond the statutory maximum after finding hy a preponderance of the evidence that the minor committed a new offense or violated the conditions of the juvenile sentence. He reiterates that the applicable maximum sentence is commitment to juvenile detention until the minor\u2019s 21st birthday.\nFinally, respondent raises a fifth amendment claim. He argues that while he was in police custody, he invoked his right to counsel, and this right was not honored. Accordingly, he concludes the trial court should have suppressed the statements he made to the police.\nIn its motion to dismiss, the State points out that respondent turned 21 while this appeal was pending, successfully completing his juvenile sentence. The State concedes respondent\u2019s fifth amendment claim may not be moot because it relates to the validity of his conviction, not to his sentence. It argues, however, that this court cannot grant respondent any effectual relief on the other issues raised in his cross-appeal. The State further asserts that the issue of whether the law-of-the-case doctrine bars the designation of respondent\u2019s case as an EJJ prosecution falls within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.\nIn objection, respondent requests that this court dismiss as moot all of the issues related to the designation of his case as an EJJ prosecution, including the law-of-the-case issue. He also asserts his fifth amendment claim is not moot and should not be dismissed. In addition, respondent argues that if this court considers the State\u2019s law-of-the-case issue under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, it should also consider respondent\u2019s vagueness and Apprendi claims.\nThe threshold question before us is whether the issues raised in this appeal are moot. An issue on appeal becomes moot where events occurring after the filing of the appeal render it \u201cimpossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party.\u201d People v. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430, 435 (2004). The mootness doctrine stems from the fear that parties to a resolved dispute lack a stake in its outcome sufficient to ensure \u201cthat concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult *** questions.\u201d Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 678, 82 S. Ct. 691, 703 (1962), quoted in Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d at 435. In general, this court will not consider moot issues. In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 45 (2004).\nRespondent\u2019s fifth amendment claim is not moot. This court has previously acknowledged that the completion of a defendant\u2019s sentence renders a challenge to the sentence moot, but not a challenge to the conviction. People v. Lynn, 102 Ill. 2d 267, 272-73 (1984). Nullification of a conviction may hold important consequences for a defendant. Lynn, 102 Ill. 2d at 273. Respondent\u2019s fifth amendment claim calls into question the validity of his conviction and therefore is not moot.\nOn the contrary, the issues raised by the State and by respondent regarding the designation of respondent\u2019s case as an EJJ prosecution are moot. Under section 5\u2014810, the successful completion of the juvenile sentence imposed on a minor in an EJJ prosecution terminates the minor\u2019s adult sentence. 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014810(7) (West 1998). Respondent successfully completed his juvenile sentence upon turning 21. Therefore, he is no longer subject to the adult sentence imposed by the trial court pursuant to section 5\u2014810. As a result, this court cannot grant any meaningful relief to the State or to respondent by ruling on the validity of the trial court\u2019s EJJ designation.\nWhile this court generally will not consider moot issues, it may choose to review such issues under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 45. Therefore, we must inquire whether the moot issues raised by the State and by respondent fall within the public interest exception. The exception applies when (1) an issue is public in nature, (2) it is likely to recur, and (3) an authoritative determination of the issue is desirable for the future guidance of public officers. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 402 (2002). The exception is construed narrowly, and requires a clear showing of each criterion. In re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365 (1999).\nThe law-of-the-case issue raised by the State is public in nature, because it pertains to the administration of the juvenile justice system. The issue is also likely to recur. It has the potential to arise anytime a minor eligible for discretionary transfer is prosecuted. At oral argument, respondent argued the issue implicates only the facts of this case. We disagree. The appellate court\u2019s law-of-the-case holding effectively precludes the State from ever filing an EJJ motion after the denial of a discretionary transfer motion is affirmed on appeal, regardless of the underlying facts of the case. Finally, an authoritative determination of the law-of-the-case issue is desirable for the future guidance of public officers. In assessing the desirability of an authoritative determination, this court has consistently looked to whether there is conflicting case law on the issue in question. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Peters-Farrell, 216 Ill. 2d 287, 292 (2005) (no authoritative determination needed because no conflicting case law); In re J.B., 204 Ill. 2d 382, 387-88 (2003) (same); Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d at 365-66 (same); Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 46 (authoritative determination needed because of conflicting case law); People v. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430, 436 (2004) (same); Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d at 402; Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27, 33 (2001); In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2000) (same); Lucas v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 170 (1997) (same). While the appellate court\u2019s decision in this case does not directly conflict with prior case law regarding law-of-the-case doctrine, none of the cases cited by the appellate court apply the law-of-the-case doctrine to bar consideration of an issue defined by a different statutory section than the issue determined in the first appeal. Compare 348 Ill. App. 3d at 140, with People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381 (2002); People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414 (1992); People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24 (1988); People v. Rodriguez, 313 Ill. App. 3d 877 (2000); Lake Bluff Heating & Air Conditioning Supply, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 117 Ill. App. 3d 284 (1983); Miscevich v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 110 Ill. App. 3d 400 (1982). Moreover, the appellate court did not clearly explain whether its conclusion that the State must simultaneously file a motion for discretionary transfer and an EJJ motion is dicta, or a necessary implication of its holding that the law-of-the-case doctrine bars the consideration of an EJJ motion after the denial of a discretionary transfer motion is affirmed on appeal. See 348 Ill. App. 3d at 141-42. For these reasons, we find that an authoritative determination of the law-of-the-case issue is desirable to guide juvenile judges in the disposition of motions for discretionary transfer and EJJ motions. Because the law-of-the-case issue meets the three criteria of the public interest exception, we choose to consider it on the merits.\nWe next turn to respondent\u2019s vagueness claims. We acknowledge at the outset that facial and as applied vagueness challenges to section 5\u2014810 have the potential to recur anytime a case is designated as an EJJ prosecution. Moreover, whether section 5\u2014810 is unconstitutionally vague on its face is an issue that is public in nature, because if the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face, it has no valid application. See People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 394, 399 (2005) (noting that where a statute does not affect first amendment rights, it will not be declared unconstitutionally vague unless it is not capable of any valid application). Whether section 5\u2014810 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant, however, is an issue specific to the facts of defendant\u2019s case. Therefore, it is not public in nature. Furthermore, we do not believe an authoritative determination of either of the vagueness claims raised by respondent is necessary at this time. Our research discloses that only one appellate court decision besides the case before us has addressed a vagueness challenge to section 5\u2014810. See In re J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d 1 (2004). The appellate court\u2019s resolution of the vagueness challenge in J.W. is not inconsistent with the appellate court\u2019s discussion of respondent\u2019s vagueness claims in this case. Compare J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d at 13-15 (holding respondent had no standing to raise vagueness challenge to section 5 \u2014810), with 348 Ill. App. 3d at 146-47 (holding the term \u201coffense,\u201d as used in section 5\u2014810, is not unconstitutionally vague). We are aware that neither the instant appellate court decision nor J.W addresses the specific arguments respondent raises before this court in support of his claims. This, however, merely further confirms that, as yet, there is no need for an authoritative pronouncement on vagueness challenges to section 5\u2014810. For these reasons, respondent\u2019s as-applied and facial-vagueness claims do not fall within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.\nFinally, we address whether respondent\u2019s Apprendi claims fall within the public interest exception. These claims are public in nature because, like the law-of-the-case issue, they pertain to the administration of the juvenile justice system. Specifically, they implicate the legislature\u2019s decision to allow judges to make EJJ designations and determine whether to impose stayed adult sentences on minors convicted in EJJ prosecutions. They also are likely to recur, as they may potentially be raised whenever a judge rules on an EJJ motion after the denial of a discretionary transfer motion is affirmed on appeal. However, we conclude that no authoritative determination of these issues is necessary at this time. Our research discloses that the appellate court has thus far uniformly rejected respondent\u2019s claim that the initial designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution violates Apprendi. See 348 Ill. App. 3d at 143; J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d at 10-12; In re Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d 276, 289 (2002). The appellate court has yet to address respondent\u2019s claim that the procedure for lifting a stay on the minor\u2019s adult sentence in an EJJ case violates Apprendi. However, as we noted with respect to respondent\u2019s vagueness claims, this merely confirms that, at this time, there is no need for an authoritative determination of this issue. Thus, respondent\u2019s Apprendi claims do not fall within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.\nIn sum, the law-of-the-case issue raised by the State and the vagueness and Apprendi claims raised by respondent are moot. However, we shall consider the law-of-the-case issue on the merits because it falls within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. We shall also consider the fifth amendment issue raised by respondent on the merits, because it pertains to the validity of his conviction and is therefore not moot.\nII. Law-of-the-case Doctrine\nThe law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits the reconsideration of issues that have been decided by a reviewing court in a prior appeal. See generally 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review \u00a7\u00a7 605 through 613 (1995). We now consider whether the doctrine prohibits the designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after the appellate court affirms the denial of a discretionary transfer motion. This issue presents a question of law. Therefore, we review it de novo. P.R.S. International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill. 2d 224, 234 (1998). Resolving the issue will necessarily require us to examine the statutory language of section 5\u2014805 and section 5\u2014810. An issue of statutory interpretation likewise presents a question of law, which we review de novo. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001).\nThe plain language of a statute is the best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent (In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364, 372 (2005)), and the primary objective of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to that intent (In re Ryan B., 212 Ill. 2d 226, 232 (2004)). In doing so, this court will examine a statute as a whole, considering all relevant parts. In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 197 (1997). Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will give effect to it without resorting to other aids of construction. In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 229 (2003).\nAt the outset, we note that nothing in the plain language of either statute prohibits the filing of an EJJ motion after the denial of a discretionary transfer motion is affirmed on appeal. To the contrary, section 5\u2014810 permits the State to file an EJJ motion \u201cat any time prior to commencement of the minor\u2019s trial\u201d (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014810(1) (West 1998)). Moreover, section 5\u2014810 specifically provides that \u201c[n]othing in this [sjection precludes the State from filing a motion for transfer under [sjection 5\u2014805\u201d (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014810(8) (West 1998)). We will not read exceptions, conditions, or limitations into a statute that the legislature did not express if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, which it is here. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 62 (2003).\nThis conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry. These statutory provisions alone do not resolve whether, as a matter of judicial discretion, the law-of-the-case doctrine precludes a trial court from considering an EJJ motion after the appellate court affirms the denial of a discretionary transfer motion. In general, the law-of-the-case doctrine \u201cprohibits reconsideration of issues which have been decided in a prior appeal.\u201d 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review \u00a7 605, at 300 (1995). If \u201cthere have been no material changes in the facts since the prior appeal, such issues may not be relitigated in the trial court or reexamined in a second appeal.\u201d 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review \u00a7 605, at 300 (1995); see also Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d at 395 (law-of-the-case doctrine bars relitigation of issue already decided in same case); Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d at 468 (under law-of-the-case doctrine, rule established as controlling in particular case will continue to be law of the case as long as facts remain the same). The underlying purposes of the doctrine are to avoid indefinite relitigation of the same issues, to obtain consistent results in the same litigation, and to ensure that lower courts follow the decisions of appellate courts. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review \u00a7 605, at 301 (1995). While the doctrine is not a jurisdictional limitation on a court\u2019s power to address an issue, it does express the practice of courts generally to decline to reopen what has been decided. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review \u00a7 605, at 300-01 (1995); see also Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d at 468-69, citing Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 100 L. Ed. 2d 811, 831, 108 S. Ct. 2166, 2178 (1988).\nThe State argues the law-of-the-case doctrine does not bar a trial court from designating a case as an EJJ prosecution after the court\u2019s denial of discretionary transfer has been affirmed on appeal. It reasons that the question of whether to prosecute a minor as an adult under section 5\u2014805(3) is different from the question of whether to designate the minor\u2019s case as an EJJ prosecution under section 5\u2014810. It also points out that the statutory factors considered in disposing of each motion are different. Accordingly, the State asserts the appellate court erred in concluding a discretionary transfer motion and an EJJ motion both decide the same \u201cultimate issue.\u201d\nRespondent argues the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits an EJJ designation after a denial of discretionary transfer is affirmed on appeal. He asserts that a discretionary transfer motion and an EJJ motion both decide the issue of whether to subject a minor to an adult sentence, and emphasizes that the statutory factors considered in disposing of each motion are essentially identical.\nTo address whether the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits the designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after the denial of a discretionary transfer is affirmed on appeal, we must determine whether a discretionary transfer motion and an EJJ motion decide the same issue. To do so, we return to the statutory language of section 5 \u2014 805 and section 5 \u2014 810.\nSection 5 \u2014 805 of the Juvenile Court Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201c\u00a7 5 \u2014 805. Transfer of jurisdiction.\nSj\u00ed \u00ed\u00a1\u00ed jfc\n(3) Discretionary transfer.\n(a) If a petition alleges commission by a minor 13 years of age or over of an act that constitutes a crime under the laws of this State and, on motion of the State\u2019s Attorney to permit prosecution of the minor under the criminal laws, a Juvenile Judge assigned by the Chief Judge of the Circuit to hear and determine those motions, after hearing but before commencement of the trial, finds that there is probable cause to believe that the allegations in the motion are true and that it is not in the best interests of the public to proceed under this Act, the court may enter an order permitting prosecution under the criminal laws.\n(b) In making its determination on the motion to permit prosecution under the criminal laws the court shall consider among other matters:\n(i) The seriousness of the alleged offense;\n(ii) The minor\u2019s history of delinquency;\n(iii) The age of the minor;\n(iv) The culpability of the minor in committing the alleged offense;\n(v) Whether the offense was committed in an aggressive or premeditated manner;\n(vi) Whether the minor used or possessed a deadly weapon when committing the alleged offense;\n(vii) The minor\u2019s history of services, including the minor\u2019s willingness to participate meaningfully in available services;\n(viii) The adequacy of the punishment or services available in the juvenile justice system.\nIn considering these factors, the court shall give greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the minor\u2019s prior record of delinquency than to the other factors listed in this subsection.\n(5) If criminal proceedings are instituted, the petition for adjudication of wardship shall be dismissed insofar as the act or acts involved in the criminal proceedings.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805 (West 1998).\nTo summarize, section 5\u2014805(3) gives a juvenile court authority to permit the prosecution of a minor under the state\u2019s criminal laws. For a court to allow a minor to be prosecuted as an adult under the discretionary transfer provision, the minor must be at least 13 years old, the act the minor is alleged to have committed must be a crime, and there must be probable cause to believe the allegations against the minor are true. In addition, the court must determine it is not in the best interests of the public to prosecute the minor in juvenile court. See 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014805(3)(a) (West 1998). In making this determination, the court must consider the eight factors enumerated in the statute, \u201camong other matters\u201d within its discretion. See 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014805(3)(b) (West 1998). If the court determines transfer is appropriate, criminal proceedings are instituted against the minor and the juvenile petition is dismissed. See 705 ILCS 405/ 5\u2014805(5) (West 1998).\nSection 5\u2014810 of the Juvenile Court Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:\n\u201c\u00a7 5 \u2014 810. Extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecutions.\n(1) If the State\u2019s Attorney files a petition, at any time prior to commencement of the minor\u2019s trial, to designate the proceeding as an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution and the petition alleges the commission by a minor 13 years of age or older of any offense which would he a felony if committed by an adult, and, if the juvenile judge assigned to hear and determine petitions to designate the proceeding as an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution determines that there is probable cause to believe that the allegations in the petition and motion are true, there is a rebuttable presumption that the proceeding shall be designated as an extended jurisdiction juvenile proceeding.\n(b) The judge shall enter an order designating the proceeding as an extended jurisdiction juvenile proceeding unless the judge makes a finding based on clear and convincing evidence that sentencing under the Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections would not be appropriate for the minor based on an evaluation of the following factors:\n(i) The seriousness of the alleged offense;\n(ii) The minor\u2019s history of delinquency;\n(iii) The age of the minor;\n(iv) The culpability of the minor in committing the alleged offense;\n(v) Whether the offense was committed in an aggressive or premeditated manner;\n(vi) Whether the minor used or possessed a deadly weapon when committing the alleged offense.\nIn considering these factors, the court shall give greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the minor\u2019s prior record of delinquency than to other factors listed in this subsection.\n* * \u2756\n(4) Sentencing. If an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution under subsection[ ] (1) results in a guilty plea, a verdict of guilty, or a finding of guilt, the court shall impose the following:\n(i) one or more juvenile sentences under Section 5 \u2014 710; and\n(ii) an adult criminal sentence in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections, the execution of which shall be stayed on the condition that the offender not violate the provisions of the juvenile sentence.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 810 (West 1998).\nSection 5\u2014810 thus gives a juvenile court authority to impose an adult sentence on a minor in conjunction with a juvenile sentence, staying the adult sentence pending successful completion of the juvenile sentence. For a court to designate a case as an EJJ prosecution, the minor must be at least 13 years old, the act the minor is alleged to have committed must be a felony if committed by an adult, and there must be probable cause to believe the allegations against the minor are true. See 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014810(1) (West 1998). If these criteria are met, the court must then designate the proceeding as an EJJ prosecution unless clear and convincing evidence demonstrates an adult sentence would be inappropriate. In making this finding, the court must consider the six factors enumerated in the statute. See 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014810(l)(b) (West 1998). If a case designated as an EJJ prosecution results in a finding of guilt, both a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence are imposed, and the latter is stayed. See 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014810(4) (West 1998).\nBased on the language of section 5 \u2014 805(3) and section 5 \u2014 810, it is apparent that a discretionary transfer motion and an EJJ motion decide distinct issues. Section 5 \u2014 805(3) allows the State to prosecute a minor \u201cunder the criminal laws\u201d (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(3) (West 1998)), meaning that the minor is prosecuted in the same manner as an adult offender. Adult prosecution subjects the minor to adult sentencing. For instance, a minor who, like respondent, is convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1 (West 1998)) faces a minimum sentence of 20 years\u2019 imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(a) (West 1998)). The minor convicted and sentenced as an adult has no possibility of avoiding the adult sentence. By contrast, section 5 \u2014 810 subjects a minor to a potential adult sentence that the minor may or may not be required to serve, depending on the minor\u2019s successful completion of a juvenile sentence. By way of example, a minor who, like respondent, is convicted of first degree murder in an EJJ prosecution faces commitment to juvenile detention until the age of 21 (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 750(2) (West 1998)) and the prospect of a minimum adult sentence of 20 years\u2019 imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 1(a)(1)(a) (West 1998)). The minor convicted in an EJJ prosecution remains within the juvenile justice system as long as he does not violate the conditions of his juvenile sentence or commit a new offense (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 810(4), (6) (West 1998)). Thus, section 5 \u2014 810 reflects the legislature\u2019s intent to show minors who qualify for the application of the statute greater leniency than minors who qualify for discretionary transfer, while still providing them with a tangible incentive to avoid flouting their juvenile sentences or reoffending. In this respect, section 5 \u2014 810 differs significantly from section 5 \u2014 805(3). It follows that the issue of whether to designate a case as an EJJ prosecution is not the same as the issue of whether to prosecute a minor as an adult under section 5 \u2014 805(3).\nOur conclusion is further supported by the fact that the inquiry underlying a discretionary transfer motion is distinct from the inquiry underlying an EJJ motion. The initial factors that qualify a minor\u2019s case for discretionary transfer and an EJJ designation are essentially the same. The minor must be at least 13 years old, there must be probable cause to support the allegations against the minor, and the minor must be alleged to have committed a crime (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805 (West 1998)) or an act that is a felony if committed by an adult (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 810 (West 1998)). After these initial factors are met, however, the inquiries underlying a discretionary transfer motion and an EJJ motion diverge. In the case of a discretionary transfer motion, the trial court must consider whether it is in the best interests of the public to prosecute the minor as an adult. 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 805(3)(a) (West 1998). In the case of an EJJ motion, once the initial qualifying factors are met, a rebuttable presumption arises that the case will be designated as an EJJ prosecution (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 810(1) (West 1998)), and the designation will remain unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that an adult sentence would be inappropriate for the minor (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 810(l)(b) (West 1998)). It is true that some of the statutory factors a trial court must consider in determining whether discretionary transfer is in the best interests of the public overlap with the statutory factors a trial court must consider in determining whether an adult sentence would be appropriate for the minor under the EJJ statute. However, these factors are not identical. Under section 5 \u2014 805(3), the trial court must consider \u201c[t]he minor\u2019s history of services, including the minor\u2019s willingness to participate meaningfully in available services,\u201d and \u201c[t]he adequacy of the punishment or services available in the juvenile justice system,\u201d as well as \u201cother matters\u201d within the court\u2019s discretion. 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 805(3)(b), (3)(b)(vii), (3)(b)(viii) (West 1998). These factors are not considered in deciding whether to designate a case as an EJJ prosecution. See 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 810(l)(b) (West 1998). It is entirely conceivable that a trial court could determine on the basis of the eight factors listed in section 5 \u2014 805(3), as well as other matters within its discretion, that it would be inappropriate to try a minor as an adult, but that, on the basis of the six factors listed in section 5 \u2014 810(3), it would be appropriate to designate a minor\u2019s case as an EJJ prosecution.\nPrevious decisions of this court cited by respondent in support of affirming the judgment of the appellate court are distinguishable. In People v. Tenner, this court concluded the law-of-the-case doctrine was inapplicable because the case at issue, which involved the defendant\u2019s second postconviction petition, was not the same case as either that involving his first postconviction petition or his federal habeas corpus petition. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d at 395-96. People v. Williams, 138 Ill. 2d 377 (1990), and People v. Taylor, 50 Ill. 2d 136 (1971), relied on by Williams, both involved the State\u2019s attempt to relitigate fourth amendment suppression issues after the suppression order had become final. In Williams, this court stated the rule in Taylor as follows:\n\u201cTaylor\u2019s procedural rule is simple: A suppression order may be an appealable order ***, and, if it is, the State must either appeal or not. Except for seeking timely reconsideration by the same or a successor judge of the court in which the order was entered [citation], the State \u2018cannot now have [the] order reviewed by another trial judge\u2019 and \u2018cannot [before such a judge] retry the issues therein decided\u2019 [citation].\u201d Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 389-90.\nThe court went on to state that the Taylor rule was not strictly driven by the law-of-the-case doctrine, but was \u201ca discrete rule of Illinois procedure, independent of such related doctrines as collateral estoppel, law of the case, or even res judicata.\u201d Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 392.\nIn light of the foregoing, we hold the law-of-the-case doctrine does not prohibit the designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after the appellate court affirms the denial of a motion for discretionary transfer. Therefore, where a trial court denies a motion for discretionary transfer, the denial is affirmed on appeal, and the State subsequently files an EJJ motion, the trial court must consider the EJJ motion, as the trial court did in this case.\nIII. Invocation of Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel\nFinally, we address whether the statements respondent made while in custody were obtained in violation of his fifth amendment right to counsel. This issue requires us to review the trial court\u2019s ruling on respondent\u2019s motion to suppress. Review of a motion to suppress presents both questions of law and fact. People v. Smith, 214 Ill. 2d 338, 347 (2005). A trial court\u2019s credibility determinations and findings of historical fact will be upheld on review unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Watson, 214 Ill. 2d 271, 279 (2005). However, the ultimate legal question of whether the evidence should be suppressed is reviewed de novo. Watson, 214 Ill. 2d at 279.\nThe testimony at the hearing on respondent\u2019s motion to suppress revealed the following facts. On the afternoon of January 31, 1999, respondent turned himself in to the police and was placed under arrest in connection with the shooting of Willie Lomax. One of the arresting officers read respondent his Miranda rights, and respondent stated he understood them. Respondent\u2019s mother, who was present, stated the same. Respondent was then taken to the district police station, accompanied by his mother. The arresting officers did not question respondent about the shooting.\nFrom the district police station, respondent was transferred to the area police headquarters. Detectives Steven Buglio and Edward Winstead met him there in an administrative room. Detective Winstead again advised respondent of his Miranda rights. When asked if he understood those rights, respondent answered \u201cyes.\u201d Respondent\u2019s mother also acknowledged that she understood the Miranda rights.\nIt is undisputed that, at this time, respondent mentioned a lawyer. However, the testimony presented at the suppression hearing varies regarding what respondent actually said. Respondent\u2019s mother recalled respondent saying, \u201cI think I should have a lawyer.\u201d Respondent testified, \u201cI asked them [the detectives] if I would need a lawyer.\u201d Detective Winstead testified that respondent asked him \u201c[D]o I need a lawyer?\u201d and that he answered respondent by saying \u201c[T]hat\u2019s not my call.\u201d\nAfter the exchange between Detective Winstead and respondent, respondent\u2019s mother asked if she could speak with respondent alone. Both detectives left the room and began preparations for a lineup. There is no indication in the record that respondent talked to his mother about a lawyer after the detectives left, or that respondent\u2019s mother took any action to secure a lawyer for respondent.\nDetective Winstead returned once to the room before the lineup to see if respondent and his mother needed anything. He did not ask respondent about the shooting at this time. Shortly thereafter, respondent participated in the lineup.\nWhen the lineup was over, a youth investigator was summoned to the police station. After the youth investigator arrived, Detective Winstead again read respondent his Miranda rights. Respondent and his mother both indicated they understood those rights, and respondent proceeded to speak to the detectives about Lomax\u2019s shooting.\nThe detectives left the room once they finished speaking with respondent and called an assistant State\u2019s Attorney to the police station. When the assistant State\u2019s Attorney arrived, respondent was given further Miranda warnings. He continued to cooperate with the police and ultimately provided a court-reported statement.\nBased on these facts, the trial court found that: Accordingly, the trial court denied respondent\u2019s motion to suppress the statements respondent made while he was in custody.\n\u201c[A]s a matter of fact *** the Minor Respondent asking the question \u2018Do I need a lawyer\u2019 does not suggest his implication *** of a right to remain silent. He was looking for advice. The police were wise *** not to give him advice. They left him alone with his mother and he made his decision.\u201d\nRespondent argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He reasons that when he said either \u201cDo I need a lawyer?\u201d or \u201cI think I should have a lawyer,\u201d his statement was sufficiently clear to invoke his fifth amendment right to counsel. Respondent and amici urge this court to focus on respondent\u2019s youth in determining whether his statement constituted an invocation of his right to counsel. In support of doing so, they claim the United States Supreme Court has historically viewed minors\u2019 constitutional rights differently than those of adults. They also cite numerous psychological and developmental differences between minors and adults, arguing minors are more likely than adults to couch their invocation of the right to counsel in an inquiry about possible counsel, to use indirect language, and to refrain from repeatedly requesting counsel. Respondent\u2019s invocation was, they argue, sufficiently clear for a 14-year-old. Therefore, they conclude, all questioning should have ceased after respondent mentioned a lawyer.\nIn response, the State argues respondent\u2019s statements were properly admitted into evidence. The State asserts that the arguments of respondent and amici ignore the specific facts at issue, which demonstrably prove that, under the circumstances, respondent\u2019s question \u201cDo I need a lawyer?\u201d could not have reasonably been understood as an invocation of counsel. Respondent, the State suggests, was an intelligent and capable minor, who turned himself in to the police on his own volition, understood his Miranda rights, and had his mother present with him throughout the fairly short police detention and interrogation. According to the State, the facts show the detectives responsible for interviewing respondent reasonably understood his question to be a request for their advice, not a request for counsel. The State argues that the relevant inquiry must focus on the facts at hand, not a hypothetical situation involving a hypothetical 14-year-old. Thus, the State concludes respondent\u2019s question was not sufficiently clear to invoke his fifth amendment right to counsel.\nPrior to any interrogation by law enforcement officials, a person in custody must be advised of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. People v. Villalobos, 193 Ill. 2d 229, 233 (2000), citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706-07, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). A suspect who expresses the desire to deal with police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available, unless the suspect initiates further communication with the police. People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 389-90 (1995), citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386, 101 S. Ct. 1800, 1884-85 (1981). To determine whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation may be used against an accused, a court must decide whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel, and if so, whether he then initiated further conversation with the police so as to knowingly and intelligently waive his previously asserted right. People v. Evans, 125 Ill. 2d 50, 74-75 (1988), citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 83 L. Ed. 2d 488, 493-94, 105 S. Ct. 490, 492-93 (1984). This case involves the former inquiry. Accordingly, it requires us to clarify the standard we apply to determine whether a suspect has invoked the right to counsel.\nThis court\u2019s leading discussion of the invocation issue is People v. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d 305 (1980). In Krueger, testimony at the defendant\u2019s suppression hearing revealed that, after the written waiver of his Miranda rights, the defendant answered questions about several burglaries. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d at 308. However, when the questioning turned to the alleged homicide for which the defendant was arrested, the defendant made a remark variously described by the investigators who conducted his questioning as \u201cMaybe I ought to have an attorney,\u201d \u201cMaybe I need a lawyer,\u201d and \u201cMaybe I ought to talk to an attorney.\u201d Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d at 308. When the defendant made the remark, the investigators continued to question him, and shortly thereafter, the defendant gave a written statement admitting his responsibility for the homicide. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d at 308.\nIn Krueger, this court refused to interpret the Miranda decision as requiring \u201cthat every reference to an attorney, no matter how vague, indecisive or ambiguous, should constitute an invocation of the right to counsel.\u201d Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d at 311. The court observed that the record established the defendant was a person of normal intelligence, the defendant fully understood his Miranda rights, the defendant waived those rights, his interrogation lasted only a short while, and there was no indication he was under any coercion or duress other than that inherent in every custodial setting. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d at 311. While the court also acknowledged that, according to the evidence, none of the investigators considered the defendant\u2019s comment to be a request for counsel, it declined to place \u201cundue emphasis or weight\u201d on the investigators\u2019 subjective beliefs. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d at 311. Instead, the court concluded \u201c[ujnder the present facts, we find such belief [the investigators\u2019 belief the defendant did not invoke his right to counsel] to have been reasonable.\u201d Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d at 312. Accordingly, the court held that because, in the instant case, a more positive indication of a desire for an attorney was required, the investigators did not violate the defendant\u2019s fifth amendment right to counsel. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d at 312.\nAfter Krueger was decided, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994). In Davis, the United States Supreme Court considered how police should respond when a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is insufficiently clear to invoke the right to counsel. Davis, 512 U.S. at 454, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 368, 114 S. Ct. at 2352. The petitioner in Davis waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel both orally and in writing, but stated \u201cMaybe I should talk to a lawyer\u201d an hour and a half into his interview with investigators. Davis, 512 U.S. at 455, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 368, 114 S. Ct. at 2353. At that point, the investigators attempted to clarify whether the petitioner wanted an attorney, to which the petitioner responded \u201cNo, I\u2019m not asking for a lawyer\u201d and \u201cNo, I don\u2019t want a lawyer.\u201d Davis, 512 U.S. at 455, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 368, 114 S. Ct. at 2353. After a short break, the investigators reminded the petitioner once again of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, and continued on with the interview. Davis, 512 U.S. at 455, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 369, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.\nIn finding against the petitioner, the Court emphasized that determining whether a suspect actually invoked his right to counsel is an \u201cobjective inquiry.\u201d Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 371, 114 S. Ct. at 2355. According to the Court, \u201cif a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel,\u201d the officer is not required to cease questioning the suspect. (Emphasis in original.) Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 371, 114 S. Ct. at 2355. The Court went on to state that a suspect \u201cmust articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.\u201d Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 371, 114 S. Ct. at 2355. It then rejected the petitioner\u2019s argument that law enforcement officers should be required to stop questioning a suspect immediately upon the suspect\u2019s ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 372, 114 S. Ct. at 2355. Specifically, the Court held that \u201cafter a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.\u201d Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 373, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. In so holding, the Court also noted that, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney, it often will be good police practice to clarify whether the suspect actually wants counsel, as the investigators did in Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 373, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. Such clarification, however, is not required. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461-62, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 373, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.\nThis court applied the Davis holding in People v. Oaks. People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409 (1996), rev\u2019d on other grounds, In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 45-50 (2000). In Oaks, the defendant inquired \u201cShould I see a lawyer?\u201d in response to an investigator\u2019s question about whether the defendant had any problem with memorializing the oral statement he had just given. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d at 452. The investigator initially responded \u201c[T]hat\u2019s up to you,\u201d but also made further comments urging the defendant to give a written statement. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d at 452-53. After summarily concluding that the defendant\u2019s remark \u201cShould I see a lawyer?\u201d was ambiguous (Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d at 451), this court applied Davis and held that, absent an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the investigators had no obligation to stop questioning the defendant (Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d at 453). As in Davis, this court noted that it would have been good police practice for the investigators to clarify whether the defendant actually wanted an attorney. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d at 453. However, they were not required to do so. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d at 453.\nWhile this court\u2019s adherence to the holding in Davis has been clear since Oaks, this court has yet to express any opinion on the Davis objective test. At this time, we note that the objective test is consistent with the approach we set forth in Krueger. There, we emphasized that while \u201can assertion of the right to counsel need not be explicit, unequivocal, or made with unmistakable clarity,\u201d not \u201cevery reference to an attorney, no matter how vague, indecisive or ambiguous, should constitute an invocation of the right to counsel.\u201d Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d at 311. After setting forth this threshold standard, we proceeded to examine the circumstances surrounding the defendant\u2019s purported invocation of the right to counsel. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d at 311. Ultimately, we concluded that, in light of the circumstances, the investigators reasonably believed the defendant\u2019s comment was not a request for counsel. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d at 312; see also People v. Smith, 102 Ill. 2d 365, 376 (1984) (Simon, J., dissenting, joined by Goldenhersh and Moran, JJ.) (\u201cThe focus of a reviewing court should be on whether the defendant\u2019s alleged assertion of his right to counsel, standing alone or in conjunction with his earlier statements or actions insofar as they shed light on his desires, were sufficient to be understood as such an invocation by a reasonable man in the interrogating officer\u2019s position\u201d (emphasis omitted)), rev\u2019d on other grounds, Smith, 469 U.S. at 99-100, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 496-97, 105 S. Ct. at 495. This approach is essentially the same as that endorsed by Davis. Thus, for the sake of clarity, we now formally recognize our adherence to the Davis objective test.\nEespondent correctly points out that the holding in Davis is limited to the situation where the alleged invocation of the right to counsel comes after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the suspect\u2019s Miranda rights. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 373, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. By implication, this suggests the United States Supreme Court has left open the issue of whether the objective test applies in a prewaiver setting. We believe the objective test set forth in Davis can be applied to situations where, as here, the suspect makes a reference to counsel immediately after he has been advised of his Miranda rights. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 287 F.3d 965, 971-73 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying Danis in prewaiver situation); United States v. Muhammad, 120 F.3d 688, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); Ex parte Cothren, 705 So. 2d 861, 862-67 (Ala. 1997) (same); Moore v. State, 321 Ark. 249, 257, 903 S.W.2d 154, 157-58 (1995) (same). In such a case, the relevant inquiry should remain whether a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel (Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 371, 114 S. Ct. at 2355), or stated alternatively, whether the suspect\u2019s articulation of the desire to have counsel present was sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have understood the statement to be a request for an attorney (Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 371, 114 S. Ct. at 2355). The fact waiver has not yet occurred can simply be subsumed into the objective test. That is, a trial court may consider the proximity between the Miranda warnings and the purported invocation of the right to counsel in determining how a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have understood the suspect\u2019s statement. The primary focus of the inquiry, however, should remain on the nature of the actual statement at issue. See, e.g., Evans, 125 Ill. 2d at 75 (holding that defendant never invoked right to counsel \u201cequivocally, ambiguously or otherwise\u201d where questions of \u201cYou mean, I can have a PD here, or do you mean I have to wait?\u201d and \u201cWe can take time for you to get a PD, right?\u201d asked during Miranda warnings merely constituted inquiries into the availability of a public defender); People v. Smith, 102 Ill. 2d 365, 376 (1984) (Simon, J., dissenting, joined by Goldenersh and Moran, JJ.) (\u201c[T]his court has required *** that a statement invoking the right [to counsel] be at least sufficiently free of indecision or double meaning to reasonably inform the authorities that [the defendant] wishes to speak to counsel\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, Smith, 469 U.S. at 99-100, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 496-97, 105 S. Ct. at 495.\nThis brings us to the contention of respondent and amici that respondent\u2019s age should be the determinative factor in our analysis of whether respondent invoked his right to counsel. We decline to adopt this approach. Doing so would shift the focus of the invocation analysis away from what is actually said to a single characteristic of the person saying it. In this case, regardless of what a hypothetical 14-year-old would possibly have meant when making the statement respondent made, the relevant inquiry must focus on what the police reasonably believed the statement to mean, under the particular circumstances, with regard to this respondent. Respondent\u2019s age is not wholly irrelevant to this inquiry, but it is merely one of multiple factors the trial court could permissibly have considered in reaching its conclusion. Cf. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 55 (holding with respect to voluntariness inquiry that a juvenile\u2019s confession should not be considered involuntary simply because the juvenile is denied the opportunity to confer with a parent or other concerned adult before or during interrogation, but noting that this factor may be relevant in determining whether a juvenile\u2019s confession was voluntary). We note that respondent and amici have not cited any authority in which this court or the United States Supreme Court has held that, when assessing an alleged invocation of the right to counsel by a minor, a court must factor the minor\u2019s youth into the analysis.\nApplying the foregoing principles to this case, we find the trial court did not err in denying respondent\u2019s motion to suppress. At the outset, we note the trial court determined as a matter of fact that, after being advised of his Miranda rights, respondent asked, \u201cDo I need a lawyer?\u201d This characterization of respondent\u2019s statement is consistent with respondent\u2019s own testimony and with Detective Winstead\u2019s testimony. Therefore, the trial court\u2019s finding that respondent asked the question \u201cDo I need a lawyer?\u201d is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It is this statement we must examine.\nIn light of the circumstances, respondent\u2019s query \u201cDo I need a lawyer?\u201d was not sufficiently clear that a reasonable police officer would have understood it to be a request for an attorney. While respondent\u2019s inquiry came immediately after Detective Winstead finished reading the Miranda warnings, it was phrased as a request for advice, not as an assertion of a desire to obtain counsel. We note that the actual content of the statement is virtually identical to that of the statement we found to be ambiguous in Oaks, \u201cShould I see a lawyer?\u201d Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d at 451 (defendant\u2019s fifth amendment right to counsel not violated by the continuation of questioning after his ambiguous remark \u201cShould I see a lawyer?\u201d). In addition, despite the fact respondent was only 14 years old at the time of his exchange with Detective Winstead, the evidence in the record establishes he was articulate and above average in intelligence. There is no indication respondent was incapable of simply saying \u201cI want a lawyer.\u201d When respondent made his ambiguous reference to a lawyer, Detectives Winstead and Buglio acted appropriately by allowing respondent\u2019s mother, who intervened on respondent\u2019s behalf, to confer with her son in private. Although they were not obligated to cease questioning at that point, the detectives\u2019 decision to do so gave respondent the opportunity to ask his mother for advice regarding counsel. The trial court did not err in concluding respondent\u2019s statement was not sufficiently clear to invoke his right to counsel.\nCONCLUSION\nWe hold that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not bar the designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after a motion for discretionary transfer has been affirmed on appeal. Therefore, we reverse that part of the appellate court\u2019s judgment which modified respondent\u2019s sentence. We also hold the trial court did not err in determining respondent did not unambiguously invoke his right to counsel. Accordingly, we affirm that part of the appellate court\u2019s judgment which affirmed respondent\u2019s conviction.\nAppellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.\nWe set forth the facts surrounding respondent\u2019s custodial interrogation in more detail during our discussion of whether respondent invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel.\nWe are aware the trial court referred to the invocation of respondent\u2019s \u201cright to remain silent,\u201d not the invocation of respondent\u2019s right to counsel, in finding that respondent asked, \u201cDo I need a lawyer?\u201d This, however, has no bearing on the trial court\u2019s factual finding that respondent asked, \u201cDo I need a lawyer?\u201d In any event, it is clear to us from the context of the court\u2019s statement that the court was referring to respondent\u2019s right to counsel.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN,\nspecially concurring:\nI agree with the majority\u2019s disposition of those issues it chooses to reach. There was no fifth amendment violation in allowing defendant\u2019s confession into evidence, and defendant\u2019s extended juvenile justice (EJJ) prosecution does not run afoul of the \u201claw of the case\u201d doctrine. However, unlike the majority, I believe it would be proper to address defendant\u2019s Apprendi challenge, and I would do so. Accordingly, I write separately to explain why I do not join the majority\u2019s mootness analysis.\nBecause defendant has turned 21, all issues save his fifth amendment challenge are moot. Accordingly, we normally would not consider them. 217 Ill. 2d at 358. However, we can transcend mootness considerations when we conclude that it would be in the public interest to do so. As the majority notes, there are three factors we consider when determining whether to apply the public interest exception: the issue must be public in nature, it must be likely to recur, and an authoritative determination of the issue must be desirable for the future guidance of public officers. 217 Ill. 2d at 359-60. I agree with the majority that the first two factors are satisfied with respect to both the \u201claw of the case\u201d issue and defendant\u2019s Apprendi challenge. The majority chooses to reach the former, but not the latter based solely on the third factor of the public interest test: that an \u201cauthoritative determination of the issue is desirable for the future guidance of public officers.\u201d 217 Ill. 2d at 360. The majority concludes that this factor is satisfied for the \u201claw of the case\u201d issue (217 Ill. 2d at 361), but not for Apprendi (217 Ill. 2d at 363).\nThe majority seems to intimate that this distinction is warranted because there is conflicting authority on \u201claw of the case,\u201d but not on Apprendi. Compare 217 Ill. 2d at 360-61 with 217 Ill. 2d at 362-63. This is not accurate, however. The appellate court\u2019s \u201claw of the case\u201d holding is not in conflict with any other authority. All the majority actually says on this point is that there is no prior authority applying the \u201claw of the case\u201d issue in this context. That means nothing more than that the appellate court\u2019s opinion is a case of first impression. This is not \u201cconflicting\u201d case law. Accordingly, the \u201claw of the case\u201d issue and the Apprendi issue are not differentiable on this basis.\nIn addition, the majority\u2019s decision to reach one issue but not the other seems to me to run counter to the spirit of the public interest exception. Other than the fifth amendment issue, none of our analysis can have any effect on the parties to this appeal. Any issue we reach and resolve other than the fifth amendment issue, we are reaching and resolving for the sole purpose of giving guidance to lower courts. As the majority notes, our decision answers the question whether the law of the case doctrine prevents the State from \u201cever filing an EJJ motion after the denial of a discretionary transfer motion is affirmed on appeal.\u201d 217 Ill. 2d at 360. But what sort of \u201cguidance\u201d is this? By looking only at the \u201claw of the case\u201d issue, we leave unresolved whether the EJJ system is itself wholly unconstitutional \u2014 an issue which the majority admits to be public in nature and likely to recur, and the importance of which can hardly be denied. If we are going to decide the first issue because we desire to provide guidance to lower courts, why deny them any guidance on the arguably more important second issue?\nBecause the majority and I part ways on the threshold question of whether defendant\u2019s Apprendi argument should be addressed, it would serve no purpose for me to engage in a solitary discourse on its merits. Accordingly, I express no opinion on the issue other than my belief that this court ought to address it.\nIt concerns me somewhat that this court seems to be drifting towards using the existence of \u201cconflicting authority\u201d as a surrogate for the actual third factor of the public interest exception test. See 217 Ill. 2d at 360-61 (and authority cited therein, specifically In re Marriage of Peters-Farrell, 216 Ill. 2d 287 (2005); In re J.B., 204 Ill. 2d 382 (2003)). The existence of conflicting authority is not the test. The test is whether this court\u2019s resolution of the issue is \u201cdesirable for the future guidance of public officers.\u201d Although I do agree that the existence of conflicting authority on a particular issue does make it more likely that it is desirable for this court to resolve that issue, conflicting authority is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the third factor of the public interest test.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, Susan Schierl Sullivan, Annette Collins, Ashley Romito, Veronica Calderon Malavia and Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Cathryn S. Crawford, and Thomas F. Geraghty, of Chicago, and Richard Lindstrom, Haley Stein, Jennifer Lupfer, Jennifer Bruni, Tiffany Fobes, Alejandro Ponce de Leon, Christopher Stanton, Guy Temple, Alfred Wang and Andrew Whitcup, law students, for appellee.", "Marsha L. Levick and Nina W. Chernoff, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for amici curiae Juvenile Law Center et al." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 98597.\nIn re CHRISTOPHER K., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Christopher K., Appellee).\nOpinion filed December 15, 2005.\nFREEMAN, J., specially concurring.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, Susan Schierl Sullivan, Annette Collins, Ashley Romito, Veronica Calderon Malavia and Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nCathryn S. Crawford, and Thomas F. Geraghty, of Chicago, and Richard Lindstrom, Haley Stein, Jennifer Lupfer, Jennifer Bruni, Tiffany Fobes, Alejandro Ponce de Leon, Christopher Stanton, Guy Temple, Alfred Wang and Andrew Whitcup, law students, for appellee.\nMarsha L. Levick and Nina W. Chernoff, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for amici curiae Juvenile Law Center et al." }, "file_name": "0348-01", "first_page_order": 362, "last_page_order": 400 }