{ "id": 3875707, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. WINIFRED MOSS, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Moss", "decision_date": "2005-12-15", "docket_number": "No. 99616", "first_page": "511", "last_page": "534", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 511" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "481 N.W.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10622032, 10622313 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/481/0840-01", "/nw2d/481/0840-02" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599286 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 106", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180104 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975003 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "concerns about officer safety are \"legitimate and weighty\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926980 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 U.S. 132", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6137701 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" }, { "page": "555" }, { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/267/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564623 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" }, { "page": "168" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 L. Ed. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 450611 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609689 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228-29" }, { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243856 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060013 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338811 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "3150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 S. Ct. 484", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 11076359, 11076351 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/0120-01", "/us/525/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 U.S. 113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11076351 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" }, { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 834", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511398 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" }, { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0834-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801357 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" }, { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ill. App. 3d 813", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2837958 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0813-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782797 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Douglas, J., dissenting" }, { "parenthetical": "Douglas, J., dissenting" }, { "parenthetical": "Douglas, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "928 F.2d 894", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1138440 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/928/0894-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 778", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10343 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same guarantee of due process applies to revocation of parole and revocation of probation" }, { "parenthetical": "same guarantee of due process applies to revocation of parole and revocation of probation" }, { "parenthetical": "same guarantee of due process applies to revocation of parole and revocation of probation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 F.3d 700", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9347367 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/323/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974984 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" }, { "page": "261-62" }, { "page": "262", "parenthetical": "search condition required probation officer \"to ask her to consent - or submit - to a particular search prior to conducting it\"" }, { "page": "248" }, { "page": "248" }, { "page": "250-51" }, { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 112", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9108037 ], "weight": 48, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "502" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "114-15" }, { "page": "502-03" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "115-16" }, { "page": "503" }, { "page": "589-90" }, { "page": "117-18" }, { "page": "504" }, { "page": "590-91" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "118-19" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "119-20" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "592" }, { "page": "120-21" }, { "page": "506" }, { "page": "592" }, { "page": "121" }, { "page": "506-07" }, { "page": "593" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "504-05" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "506" }, { "page": "592" }, { "page": "114" }, { "page": "502" }, { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 U.S. 868", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 28251 ], "weight": 21, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870-71" }, { "page": "715-16" }, { "page": "3167" }, { "page": "871" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "3167" }, { "page": "873-74" }, { "page": "717" }, { "page": "3168" }, { "page": "875-76" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "3169-70" }, { "page": "880" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "3172" }, { "page": "873-74" }, { "page": "717" }, { "page": "3168" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/483/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351271 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "433" }, { "page": "433" }, { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 U.S. 366", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12205 ], "weight": 21, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372-73" }, { "page": "344" }, { "page": "2135" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "344" }, { "page": "2136" }, { "page": "378" }, { "page": "347" }, { "page": "2138" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "344" }, { "page": "2136" }, { "page": "379" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "2139" }, { "page": "378" }, { "page": "347" }, { "page": "2138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/508/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" }, { "page": "911" }, { "page": "24" }, { "page": "908" }, { "page": "27" }, { "page": "909" }, { "page": "19-20" }, { "page": "905" }, { "page": "21-22" }, { "page": "906" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 U.S. 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11339173 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" }, { "page": "585" }, { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/389/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801340 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" }, { "page": "266" }, { "page": "261" }, { "page": "266" }, { "page": "267" }, { "page": "262" }, { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295758 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3151982 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" }, { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 33", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11594631 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451664 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" }, { "page": "512" }, { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3365239 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667-68" }, { "page": "668" }, { "page": "669", "parenthetical": "Kuehn, J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "669", "parenthetical": "Kuehn, J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "671", "parenthetical": "Welch, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "671-72", "parenthetical": "Welch, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "672", "parenthetical": "Welch, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "670-71", "parenthetical": "Kuehn, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0663-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1502, "char_count": 42707, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5766810578606226e-07, "percentile": 0.816750899376759 }, "sha256": "b2cd011dd198c08db4e64e352ae4b3323901a01e40a15f52de47101ef39ae9b1", "simhash": "1:f979d57b5f965699", "word_count": 7108 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:57:57.441611+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. WINIFRED MOSS, Appellee" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was arrested and charged in the circuit court of Saline County with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 720 ILCS 570/ 402(a)(2)(A) (West 2002). The evidence supporting this charge was recovered during a lawful traffic stop. Defendant was a passenger in the vehicle stopped by police and was also its registered owner. He gave consent to a search of the vehicle. While the vehicle search was in progress, an officer performed a pat-down search of defendant to check for weapons. At the time of this incident, defendant was on mandatory supervised release (MSR) from the Illinois Department of Corrections.\nThe circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress cocaine that was seized during the pat-down search. The circuit court ruled that the search was illegal because there was no articulable suspicion to justify it. The appellate court affirmed. 353 Ill. App. 3d 663. We granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) to determine whether defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights were violated when an officer lacking individualized suspicion of illegal activity performed a pat-down search of defendant, a parolee subject to a search condition. We now reverse the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court.\nBACKGROUND\nAccording to testimony given at a suppression hearing, Illinois Secretary of State Police Officer Richard Lowe executed a traffic stop on Route 13 in Saline County between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. on November 8, 2002. The vehicle he stopped, an orange truck, had been speeding. Before Officer Lowe exited his squad car, he notified a dispatcher of his location and the license plate number of the truck. He then approached the truck to ask for identification from the driver, John Sanders, and his two passengers, Shawn McGee and defendant. Defendant called Officer Lowe by his first name. This seemed odd to Lowe, who did not think he had previously met defendant. All three men complied with the officer\u2019s request for identification information, although Sanders produced a driver\u2019s license that was broken in half and defendant orally gave the officer his information instead of producing a license.\nOfficer Lowe returned to his car and relayed the identifications to his dispatcher. The dispatcher informed Officer Lowe that defendant, the registered owner of the truck, was a parolee. The dispatcher also informed Lowe that Sanders had two prior drug-related arrests. This radio exchange was overheard by Illinois State Police Trooper Hobert Boyles, who recognized the names of the three men in the truck. Boyles knew through contact with other officers that all three \u201chad prior arrests for and were known to possess firearms.\u201d He had also been personally involved in a recent arrest of McGee for a gun violation. Boyles contacted Lowe via radio to ask if Lowe would like his assistance, and Lowe accepted. Boyles drove to join Lowe at the site of the traffic stop.\nMeanwhile, Lowe spoke with Sanders about his broken driver\u2019s license, and then returned to his squad car to fill out a speeding citation. Once the citation was complete, he asked Sanders for his permission to search the truck. Although Lowe had no specific information about any illegal activity, he \u201cfelt that there might possibly have been some drugs in the vehicle.\u201d He based this belief on the histories of the men in the truck and the direction they were traveling, theorizing that they may have picked up or dropped off drugs in Marion. Sanders referred Officer Lowe\u2019s request to defendant, who agreed to a search of his truck. At about that time, Boyles pulled up behind Lowe\u2019s squad car.\nDefendant, Sanders, and McGee had exited the truck in response to a request by Lowe. Lowe, speaking with Sanders and McGee, asked if either of the men \u201chad anything.\u201d In response, Sanders stated that he had a knife, which Lowe took from him. Lowe then performed a pat-down search of both men. He did not ask their permission to execute this search. As Officer Lowe began to search the truck, Trooper Boyles performed a pat-down search of defendant. Boyles similarly did not ask defendant\u2019s permission. Boyles testified that it is his practice to perform pat-down searches for officer safety whenever subjects are outside a vehicle at a traffic stop, regardless of whether their behavior arouses any suspicion. He also testified that at no time did the actions of defendant, Sanders, or McGee put him in fear. Nothing he saw during the course of the traffic stop made him feel as if he were in danger, nor did he have any information that defendant and his associates were committing any offense other than speeding.\nBoyles instructed defendant to face the front of Officer Lowe\u2019s car and clasp his hands behind his back. He patted down defendant\u2019s torso, back, legs, ankles, and groin. In doing so, Boyles felt two hard objects in the front of defendant\u2019s pants. He testified that these objects were approximately the size of a nine-volt battery, and that he is aware of weapons that are this size. Boyles also felt a few smaller hard pieces and a powdery substance. All of the items seemed to be contained in a bag. Boyles testified that he maintained contact with the hard object, trying to determine what it was. He asked defendant three times what was in his pants. When defendant did not answer his questions, Boyles ordered him to turn around and open the front of his pants. Instead, defendant removed the object from his pants. The object was a bag of a white, solid substance that field-tested positive for cocaine.\nDefendant was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 720 ILCS 570/ 402(a)(2)(A) (West 2002). The circuit court granted a pretrial motion by defendant to suppress the evidence found in the pat-down search.\nThe court first concluded that individuals on MSR retain constitutional protection against intrusions, despite a condition of MSR which states that they \u201cshall consent\u201d to certain searches. The court determined that by signing the indication he had received notice of the conditions of his MSR, defendant did not prospectively consent to any search by a parole officer or police officer. Observing that failure to comply with the conditions of MSR could result in its revocation, the court concluded that Moss had the option of consenting to the search or losing his MSR.\nThe court next addressed whether the search was permissible without consent. It found that Officer Lowe\u2019s suspicion that drugs might be in the pickup was \u201ca mere hunch.\u201d There was no evidence that the men were engaged in a crime. Trooper Boyles had no reason to believe the men were armed or that they were committing a crime other than the speeding violation. The court concluded there were no articulable facts to justify the search. It later denied the State\u2019s motion to reconsider. The State brought an interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)).\nA divided appellate court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court. The majority concluded that the evidence did not support a reasonable belief that defendant was armed and dangerous or engaged in criminal activity. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 667-68. It agreed with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant\u2019s MSR status may have reduced his expectation of privacy, but did not eliminate it entirely. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 668. A special concurrence opined that the traffic stop became illegal long before the pat-down search of defendant. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 669 (Kuehn, J., specially concurring). The concurring justice wrote that performing a records check on Sanders\u2019 passengers and asking permission to search the vehicle both impermissibly exceeded the scope of the traffic stop. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 669 (Kuehn, J., specially concurring).\nThe dissent concluded that circumstances objectively warranted a pat-down of all three men. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 671 (Welch, J., dissenting). The officers knew the men to have criminal histories, it was late on a November afternoon, and one officer would be in a compromising position while searching the truck. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 671-72 (Welch, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that pat-down searches should be permissible as a matter of routine to guarantee the safety of police officers. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 672 (Welch, J., dissenting). The special concurrence responded to this argument, emphasizing that \u201cthe constitution does not allow pat-down searches of traffic offenders as an unvarying or habitual method of police procedure.\u201d 353 Ill. App. 3d at 670-71 (Kuehn, J., specially concurring).\nWe granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. In reviewing this decision, we examine first whether the terms of the defendant\u2019s MSR established consent to a pat-down search. Second, we determine whether the search was constitutional in the absence of consent.\nAPPLICABLE LAW\nReview of a motion to suppress involves both questions of fact and law. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 512 (2004). A reviewing court will uphold findings of historical fact made by the circuit court unless such findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d at 512. However, we review de novo the ultimate question of whether the evidence must be suppressed, undertaking our own assessment of the facts in relation to the issues presented. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d at 512.\nThe fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the \u201cright of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures\u201d U.S. Const., amend. IV Reasonableness is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 354, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996). Article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution provides the same level of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 243 (1984). For the court to diverge from this \u201clockstep doctrine,\u201d there must be evidence in the language of the state constitution or in the debates and committee reports from its drafting that shows the drafters intended the state constitution to be construed differently. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 245; but see People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 74-76 (1996). The defendant has not pointed to any such evidence. Thus, we look only to the fourth amendment in this case. Although the fourth amendment generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause (People v. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d 257, 262 (1997)), there are \u201ca few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions\u201d to the warrant requirement (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 585, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)). Two of these exceptions are relevant to our analysis.\nThe first is the pat-down search recognized by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Terry held that \u201c \u2018where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make \u2018reasonable inquiries\u2019 aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions.\u201d Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372-73, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 344, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2135 (1993), quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 911, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. Further, when the officer reasonably believes the suspicious person is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a pat-down search for weapons. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 113 S. Ct. at 2136; Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 908, 88 S. Ct. at 1881; People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433 (2001). The reasonableness of the officer\u2019s conduct is determined by whether a reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances would be warranted in the belief that the officer or another person is in danger. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909, 88 S. Ct. at 1883.\nThe second relevant exception involves probationers. In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987), probation officers searched the home of the defendant, Griffin, and found a handgun. Griffin was on probation and thus was forbidden from possessing firearms. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870-71, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 715-16, 107 S. Ct. at 3167. Though warrant-less, the search was conducted under the authority of Wisconsin\u2019s probation regulations. The regulations permitted probation officers to search the homes of probationers without a warrant if the officers had reasonable grounds to suspect the presence of contraband. A defendant who refused to consent to such a search violated the terms of his probation. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 716, 107 S. Ct. at 3167. The Court held that the administration of the state\u2019s probation system presented \u201cspecial needs\u201d beyond normal law enforcement that made the requirements of a warrant and probable cause impracticable. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 717, 107 S. Ct. at 3168. These special needs justified replacing the warrant and probable cause requirements with the lesser standard of \u201creasonable grounds,\u201d as established by the Wisconsin regulation permitting probation searches. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875-76, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 719, 107 S. Ct. at 3169-70. Thus, the search of Griffin\u2019s home was reasonable because it was conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers. The Court left open the question of whether warrantless searches of probationers were otherwise reasonable under the fourth amendment. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 722, 107 S. Ct. at 3172.\nThe Court later addressed the validity of a warrant-less probationer search by a law enforcement officer in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497, 122 S. Ct. 587 (2001). Knights, the defendant, was subject to a probation condition requiring that he submit to a search by a probation or law enforcement officer at any time. Knights, 534 U.S. at 114, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 502, 122 S. Ct. at 589. A detective suspected Knights\u2019 involvement in a string of vandalism incidents and noticed suspicious activity outside his apartment. Knights, 534 U.S. at 114-15, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 502-03, 122 S. Ct. at 589. Based on Knights\u2019 probation condition, the detective searched Knights\u2019 apartment. He found evidence that led to Knights\u2019 indictment on arson charges. Knights, 534 U.S. at 115-16, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 503, 122 S. Ct. at 589-90. The Supreme Court held that the search uncovering this evidence was valid, even though it was conducted for a law enforcement purpose rather than a probationary purpose.\nThe Court noted that Griffin\u2019s \u201cspecial needs\u201d holding made it unnecessary for that case to examine whether warrantless searches of probationers were reasonable for nonprobationary purposes. Knights, 534 U.S. at 117-18, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 504, 122 S. Ct. at 590-91. In the absence of the special need served by administering a probation system, the Knights Court instead applied a general fourth amendment analysis to examine whether the search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505, 122 S. Ct. at 591. The Court determined that Knights\u2019 status as a probationer informed both sides of the balance between his privacy and the legitimate government interests in the search. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505, 122 S. Ct. at 591. The probation search condition significantly diminished Knights\u2019 reasonable expectation of privacy. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505, 122 S. Ct. at 592. Knights\u2019 status as a probationer also increased the government\u2019s interest in searching him, as probationers are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than an ordinary member of the community. Knights, 534 U.S. at 120-21, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 506, 122 S. Ct. at 592. Thus, the Court held that when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer\u2019s significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 506-07, 122 S. Ct. at 593. Although the Knights Court held that reasonable suspicion is sufficient to support a probation search, it did not address whether reasonable suspicion is required for such a search. Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 n.6, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505 n.6, 122 S. Ct. at 592 n.6.\nThe defendants in Knights and Griffin were on probation, while defendant in this case is on MSR, the equivalent of parole. This court has stated generally that probationers and parolees share the same status for fourth amendment purposes. People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 256 n.l (2003), citing United States v. Crawford, 323 F.3d 700, 708 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 & n.3, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 661 & n.3, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1759 & n.3 (1973) (same guarantee of due process applies to revocation of parole and revocation of probation). Probationers and persons on MSR are similarly situated in the broad sense that both enjoy conditional liberty. Crawford, 323 F.3d at 708 n.15, citing United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 n.l (9th Cir. 1991). However, the reasons for the imposition of each status are markedly different. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 496 n.6, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 503 n.6, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2608 n.6 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (probation is imposed in lieu of a prison sentence, while parole is imposed following a prison sentence).\nProbation is a \u201cmild and ambulatory\u201d punishment, appropriate where an offender does not present a threat to the safety and security of a community. People v. Dowiels, 3 Ill. App. 3d 813, 814 (1972). A court may impose a sentence of probation unless imprisonment is necessary to protect the public or probation would deprecate the seriousness of the offender\u2019s conduct. 730 ILCS 5/5\u20146\u20141(a) (West 2004). Thus, probation is incompatible with a prison term. People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331, 336 (1997); People v. Spera, 303 Ill. App. 3d 834, 838 (1999). In contrast, a term of MSR always accompanies a prison term. Every felony defendant who is sentenced to prison is also sentenced to a term of MSR. 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141(d) (West 2004). During MSR, the Department of Corrections retains custody of the defendant. 730 ILCS 5/3\u201414\u20142(a) (West 2004). Our sentencing scheme thus contemplates that an offender on MSR presents a greater threat to the public than a probationer. This distinction is relevant to the balancing test of Knights.\nANALYSIS\nI. Consent\nThe Knights Court declined to decide whether the defendant\u2019s acceptance of a search condition constituted a complete waiver of his fourth amendment rights. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 504-05, 122 S. Ct. at 591. We are asked in this case to determine whether defendant\u2019s acceptance of a similar condition establishes such a waiver.\nDuring the events of November 8, 2002, defendant was on MSR from the Illinois Department of Corrections. The state legislature has established a set of conditions applicable to every term of parole and MSR. 730 ILCS 5/3\u20143\u20147 (West 2004). These were reflected in the \u201cNotice of Conditions of Parole/Mandatory Supervised Release\u201d that the defendant received. On December 12, 2001, the defendant signed an acknowledgment that he was required to comply with the listed conditions. The document read, in part:\n\u201cEffective January 1, 2002, you are hereby obligated to comply with the following conditions:\nYou shall not violate any criminal statute of any jurisdiction during the parole or release term;\nYou shall refrain from possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon;\nYou shall report to an agent of the Department of Corrections; sfc\nYou shall obtain the permission of an agent of the Department of Corrections before changing your residence or employment;\nYou shall consent to a search of your person, property, or residence under your control;\nYou shall refrain from the use or possession of narcotics or other controlled substances in any form, or both, or any paraphernalia related to those substances and submit to a urinalysis test as instructed by a parole agent or the Department of Corrections.\u201d\nThe notification that Moss signed warned him that \u201cFailure to comply with these terms and conditions, in addition to any additional terms or conditions set by the Prisoner Review Board, may subject you to revocation of parole or mandatory supervised release.\u201d The authorization for this is found in section 3 \u2014 3\u20149 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20149 (West 2004)), which establishes sanctions up to and including revocation of MSR when a defendant violates an MSR condition. Although the Prisoner Review Board is the disciplinary authority, law enforcement officers need not sit idly by when they witness a parole violation:\n\u201cA sheriff or other peace officer may detain an alleged parole or release violator until a warrant for his return to the Department [of Corrections] can be issued.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 14\u20142(c) (West 2004).\nThe State argues that by signing the agreement acknowledging his parole conditions, the defendant expressly consented to being searched. We considered a similar argument in People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231 (2003). The probation condition at issue in Lampitok contained the following language:\n\u201c Tl. That the Defendant shall submit to a search of her person, residence, or automobile at any time as directed by her Probation Officer to verify compliance with the conditions of this Probation Order.\u2019 \u201d Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 236.\nWe determined that this provision did not constitute a waiver of fourth amendment protection or a prospective consent to all probation searches. Instead, we found that \u201cthe plain language of this probation search condition affirmatively required [the probationer\u2019s] probation officer to ask her to consent \u2014 or submit \u2014 to a particular search prior to conducting it.\u201d When asked, she could then decide whether to submit to the search or face the revocation of her probation. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 261-62.\nThe State attempts to distinguish defendant\u2019s MSR condition from the condition at issue in Lampitok. First, the State argues that defendant\u2019s agreement provides for searches by any agent, while the probation condition in Lampitok provided for searches only by the probationer\u2019s probation officer. Further, the State draws a distinction between the use of the phrase \u201cshall submit\u201d in the condition at issue in Lampitok and the use of the phrase \u201cshall consent\u201d in the search condition of defendant\u2019s MSR. Whereas this court found that the phrase \u201cshall submit\u201d requires further action by the probationer, the State argues that the phrase \u201cshall consent\u201d amounts to a prospective waiver of rights. Defendant responds that, in either case, the operative word is \u201cshall.\u201d\nWe agree with defendant. In Lampitok, the word \u201cshall\u201d indicated that by accepting the probation term, the probationer accepted an obligation to submit to a search when directed to do so. Similarly, defendant accepted an obligation to consent to a search when directed to do so. This conclusion is further supported by Lampitok\u2019s use of \u201csubmit\u201d and \u201cconsent\u201d in tandem. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 262 (search condition required probation officer \u201cto ask her to consent \u2014 or submit \u2014 to a particular search prior to conducting it\u201d). The greater breadth of the parole condition in the case at bar is irrelevant. Although defendant\u2019s condition allows for a greater variety of searchers and searches, it still requires that he give his consent to each search before it is conducted.\nOther conditions of defendant\u2019s MSR similarly use the word \u201cshall.\u201d For example, defendant \u201cshall refrain\u201d from possessing a firearm and \u201cshall report\u201d to the Department of Corrections. These conditions do not foreclose the opposite result. Defendant could choose to obtain a gun, or he could choose not to report to the Department of Corrections. Similarly, he can choose not to consent to a search. But if he makes any of these choices, he risks the revocation of his MSR. We hold that the search condition of defendant\u2019s MSR does not establish prospective consent to all searches.\nWe note that if Boyles had asked for defendant\u2019s consent to a pat-down search, defendant very well may have refused. This refusal would have violated the conditions of defendant\u2019s MSR. Faced with such a violation, Boyles would have been authorized to detain defendant. 730 ILCS 5/3\u201414\u20142(c) (West 2004). This authority gives weight to the search condition. It also gives officers a tool with which to address their safety concerns.\nII. Totality of the Circumstances\nIn the absence of consent, we next address whether the pat-down search of defendant was otherwise appropriate. First, we clarify that the \u201cspecial needs\u201d test of Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 717, 107 S. Ct. at 3168, does not apply here. The special needs of the state\u2019s MSR program are not at issue because the search of defendant was not performed for any supervisory purpose. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505, 122 S. Ct. at 591. Instead, Trooper Boyles and Officer Lowe acted pursuant to their ordinary law enforcement responsibilities when they carried out a traffic stop of a speeding vehicle. Lacking a special need similar to the one found in Griffin, our analysis utilizes the totality of the circumstances test applied in Knights. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505, 122 S. Ct. at 591; see also Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 248.\nIn contrast to Knights, the case before us involves a vehicle stop. Traffic stops are more analogous to a Terry investigative stop than to a formal arrest. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492, 498, 119 S. Ct. 484, 488 (1998), citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 334, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984). Therefore, we analyze such stops under the principles of Terry. People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 270 (2005); People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 518-21 (1999). A Terry analysis involves two steps. We consider, first, whether the officer\u2019s action was justified at its inception and, second, whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879. A vehicle stop based on an officer\u2019s observation of a traffic violation is valid at its inception. People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 228-29 (2003); Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 433. We thus focus on whether the subsequent actions of Officer Lowe and Trooper Boyles were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the initial interference. The totality of the circumstances analysis applied in Knights guides our decision.\nThe officers engaged in two separate actions that have fourth amendment significance. First, Officer Lowe requested and received consent to search defendant\u2019s vehicle. Second, Trooper Boyles performed a pat-down search of defendant\u2019s person. If the search of the vehicle was improper, it may taint the pat-down search that followed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 317 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963). Thus, we consider each step separately to determine whether each action satisfied Terry\u2019s scope requirement.\nIn Gonzalez, a majority of this court established the framework by which we apply the scope requirement to a police question during a traffic stop:\n\u201c[W]e must consider, as an initial matter, whether the question is related to the initial justification for the stop. If the question is reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, no fourth amendment violation occurs. If the question is not reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, we must consider whether the law enforcement officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify the question. If the question is so justified, no fourth amendment violation occurs. In the absence of a reasonable connection to the purpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion, we must consider whether, in light of all the circumstances and common sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop.\u201d Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235.\nDefendant argues that Officer Lowe impermissibly changed the purpose of the stop when, instead of delivering the completed speeding citation to Sanders, he asked permission to search defendant\u2019s truck. The State responds that the search was justified on grounds of officer safety. This response conflates the search of the truck with the search of defendant\u2019s person. Officer Lowe testified that he requested permission to search the truck because he felt there might be drugs in the vehicle, not because he felt his safety was at risk.\nIn light of this testimony, we agree with the defendant that Officer Lowe\u2019s request for consent to search defendant\u2019s vehicle was clearly unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop. However, defendant\u2019s MSR status makes this situation distinct. The conditions of defendant\u2019s MSR put him on notice that law enforcement officials may ask his consent to search his \u201cperson, property, or residence under [his] control,\u201d including his pickup truck, with or without reasonable suspicion. While not reasonably related to the purpose of the traffic stop, the request to search was reasonable because of the defendant\u2019s MSR. Under the conditions of that MSR, Officer Lowe properly asked for defendant\u2019s consent to search his pickup. Defendant gave his consent. Therefore, the search of the truck was proper.\nWe turn next to the pat-down search of defendant. Our case law has established the impropriety of \u201chard and fast\u201d presumptions that authorize police officers to automatically pat down certain types of suspects. People v. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d 153, 173 (1989). In Flowers, this court found an officer\u2019s routine practice to be the \u201c[m]ost problematic\u201d factor when it invalidated a suspicionless pat-down search. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 266. The officer in Flowers testified that he did not have any particular reason to think that the defendant had a weapon, but that he performed a pat-down search anyway, because \u201cI do that as a common thing in my job, to pat people down for my safety as well as theirs.\u201d Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 261. The court noted that this practice misapprehends the scope of the Terry exception. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 266. It held that \u201c[t]he limited exception recognized in Terry *** clearly does not permit police officers to engage in a practice of routinely frisking individuals, without concern for whether a particular person poses a danger.\u201d Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 267. Instead, we have said that an officer may frisk a defendant for weapons only if the officer reasonably believes that the person is armed and dangerous. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 433, citing Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 262.\nThus, Trooper Boyles\u2019 routine practice of patting down every person who is outside a vehicle at a traffic stop would be unlikely to withstand the scrutiny of Terry in the abstract. However, we judge the reasonableness of the search before us only by its particular facts and circumstances. See Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 173. An officer\u2019s subjective feelings may not dictate whether a pat-down search is valid or invalid. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 168. Rather, the test is objective: Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the search \u201c \u2018warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?\u201d Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 69 L. Ed. 543, 555, 45 S. Ct. 280, 288 (1925); Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 167 (test must be objective rather than subjective, or else \u201can officer who subjectively feels no fear in a situation where a reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances would fear for his or her own safety would never be justified in conducting a pat-down search of a suspect temporarily stopped pursuant to a valid Terry stop\u201d)- Again, this question must be answered with reference to the totality of the circumstances analysis employed in Knights.\nFirst, Trooper Boyles had a strong interest in ensuring defendant was not armed. He and his fellow officer were beside a rural road. The two officers were outnumbered by three men well known to law enforcement. Their identities alone suggested enough of a safety concern that Boyles offered his assistance to Officer Lowe as soon as he heard their names over the radio. He was aware through law enforcement circles that all three men were associated with weapons, and he had recently been involved in a weapons-related arrest of McGee. He was also aware that defendant was a parolee.\nNotably, the circumstances surrounding the pat-down search involved not just a traffic stop, but a consensual automobile search. This circumstance, which requires passengers to leave the vehicle and an officer to place himself in a compromising position, increases the government\u2019s interest in ensuring those passengers are not armed. This court has recognized that the public has a strong interest in officer safety. People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 418 (1998); People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515, 531 n.4 (2003) (concerns about officer safety are \u201clegitimate and weighty\u201d), citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 336, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 (1977). The risk to an officer is increased by the presence of passengers (Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 437), particularly when those passengers are outside the vehicle. Although Trooper Boyles was not the sole officer at the scene, he and Officer Lowe were outnumbered, and Lowe was occupied with the vehicle search. Boyles was not just outnumbered \u2014 he was outnumbered by three men he believed to have histories involving weapons and drugs, three men with whom he and his fellow law enforcement officers were quite familiar.\nThese officer safety circumstances contributed to the government\u2019s interest in performing a pat-down search of defendant. The defendant\u2019s MSR status also contributed to that interest. The state is justified in focusing greater attention on probationers because of their higher likelihood of recidivism. Knights, 534 U.S. at 120, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 506, 122 S. Ct. at 592; Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 248. Persons on MSR, even more than probationers, present a risk to the public. See 730 ILCS 5/5\u20146\u20141(a) (West 2004); People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331, 336 (1997); People v. Spera, 303 Ill. App. 3d 834, 838 (1999). The objective officer safety concerns, combined with the defendant\u2019s MSR status, established a significant governmental interest in performing a pat-down search to ensure that defendant was not armed.\nThe defendant\u2019s MSR status also impacts the other side of the balance. A parolee has a reduced expectation of privacy compared to ordinary citizens because he or she is a criminal offender. See Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 250-51, citing People v. Adams, 149 Ill. 2d 331, 348 (1992). The search condition of defendant\u2019s MSR further diminishes that already reduced expectation. We noted in Lampitok that the breadth of a search condition affects a probationer\u2019s expectation of privacy. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 251. The probationer in that case was subject to a search condition that required her to submit to searches as directed by her probation officer for the purpose of determining her compliance with probation. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 236. In contrast, the search condition in Knights required the probationer to submit to searches by any probation officer or law enforcement officer. Knights, 534 U.S. at 114, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 502, 122 S. Ct. at 589. The condition of defendant\u2019s MSR is similarly broad. It requires that he consent to a search of his person, residence, or property under his control, with no limitation on what government agent may perform that search or what purpose they may have. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s expectation of privacy is much more limited than that of the probationer in Lampitok. We note also that, in keeping with the differing purposes of MSR and probation, the statutory conditions attached to each status differ in type. The conditions of probation are fewer in number and include rehabilitative provisions such as community service and substance abuse treatment. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20143 (West 2004). In contrast, the conditions of MSR more extensively curtail the liberty of parolees, limiting where they may live, with whom they may associate, and what places they may frequent. 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20147 (West 2004). These differences support the conclusion that a person subject to MSR has a lesser expectation of freedom from government intrusion than a probationer does.\nBalancing the defendant\u2019s limited privacy interest with the government\u2019s interest in performing a pat-down search to ensure officer safety, we hold that the pat-down search of defendant did not violate his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The vulnerable position of the officers, the trooper\u2019s concerns about the histories of the men who were pulled over, the defendant\u2019s MSR status, and his significantly reduced expectation of privacy make the pat-down search reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. The limited scope of a pat-down search for weapons, as opposed to a full-fledged search for evidence, was appropriate where no individualized suspicion of illegal activity existed.\nIn this particular case, objective concerns about officer safety, combined with the defendant\u2019s status as a parolee subject to a search condition, shift the balance in favor of the reasonableness of a pat-down search. We emphasize that our holding is limited to circumstances in which MSR is a factor and does not address the appropriateness of pat-down searches in other situations.\nIII. Scope\nDefendant argues that even if a pat-down search was reasonable at its inception, the extent of the pat-down exceeded the permissible scope of a search. He argues, first, that Trooper Boyles\u2019 purpose was to search for contraband instead of weapons and, second, that the trooper impermissibly extended his search after determining the object in defendant\u2019s pants was not a weapon. In support, defendant cites Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993), in which the Supreme Court invalidated a pat-down search when the officer discovered a lump of cocaine by \u201c \u2018squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant\u2019s pocket.\u2019 \u201d Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 347, 113 S. Ct. at 2138, quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992). The State responds that Trooper Boyles was properly within the scope of a pat-down search because he was attempting to determine whether the hard object in defendant\u2019s pants was a weapon.\nThe purpose of a pat-down search is to protect the officer and others in the vicinity, not to gather evidence. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 263, citing Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 113 S. Ct. at 2136. The scope of the search must be limited to actions which are reasonably likely to discover weapons that could be used to harm the officer. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 911, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. A search that exceeds this scope is constitutionally invalid. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 379, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 348, 113 S. Ct. at 2139.\nAs we have held above, Trooper Boyles was entitled to perform a pat-down search to learn whether defendant was armed. The record contains no evidence that his purpose was to search for drugs, rather than weapons. Boyles testified that his purpose was officer safety. The record similarly contains no indication that Boyles continued the search after he had assured himself that defendant was unarmed. Unlike the officer in Dickerson, who continued to manipulate the defendant\u2019s pocket even after he determined it did not contain a weapon (Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 347, 113 S. Ct. at 2138), Boyles testified that he could not identify the hard object he felt in defendant\u2019s pants, but was aware of weapons that are a similar size. In light of this testimony, we hold that the search of defendant did not exceed the proper scope under Terry when Trooper Boyles continued his contact with defendant\u2019s pants as he attempted to determine whether the object he felt was a weapon.\nCONCLUSION\nThe circuit court erroneously suppressed the evidence found in the pat-down search of defendant because the search was constitutionally reasonable in light of objective officer safety concerns and the defendant\u2019s status as a parolee subject to a search condition.\nThe judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are reversed and this cause remanded to the circuit court for proceedings in accordance with this disposition.\nJudgments reversed; cause remanded.\nWhat was known in Illinois law as \u201cparole\u201d prior to February 1, 1978, is now termed \u201cmandatory supervised release\u201d (MSR). 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141(d) (West 2004). For purposes of fourth amendment analysis, there is no difference between a parolee and a defendant on MSR.\nOne fact that was not available to Trooper Boyles was defendant\u2019s unexpected familiarity with Officer Lowe\u2019s first name. The State points to this as an illustration of the officer safety risk defendant presented. However, nothing in the record indicates that Boyles was aware of this earlier exchange between defendant and Lowe. Thus, it cannot serve as justification for Boyles\u2019 search of defendant.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Rod Wolf, State\u2019s Attorney, of Harrisburg (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Linda D. Woloshin and Russell K. Benton, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris and Sharon Shanahan, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Mt. Vernon, of counsel), for the People.", "Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, and Elaine M. Belcher, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee, and Winifred Moss, pro se." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 99616.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. WINIFRED MOSS, Appellee\nOpinion filed December 15, 2005.\nRehearing denied January 23, 2006.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Rod Wolf, State\u2019s Attorney, of Harrisburg (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Linda D. Woloshin and Russell K. Benton, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris and Sharon Shanahan, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Mt. Vernon, of counsel), for the People.\nDaniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, and Elaine M. Belcher, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee, and Winifred Moss, pro se." }, "file_name": "0511-01", "first_page_order": 525, "last_page_order": 548 }