{ "id": 5735912, "name": "COLLINSVILLE COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 10 et al., Appellants, v. THE REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF ST. CLAIR COUNTY et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees", "decision_date": "2006-01-20", "docket_number": "Nos. 98649, 98668 cons.", "first_page": "175", "last_page": "207", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 175" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4023399 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" }, { "page": "696" }, { "page": "698-99" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450488 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17", "parenthetical": "applying de novo standard where salient facts were undisputed and appeal involved legal issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229699 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "30" }, { "page": "30" }, { "page": "33", "parenthetical": "state's status as a party of record \"could not be more clear\" where the state instituted the proceedings before the agency" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127069 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" }, { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260081 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353", "parenthetical": "\"Since the Administrative Review Law is a departure from common law, the procedures it establishes must be strictly adhered to in order to justify its application\"" }, { "page": "354-55" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974993 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483568 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11-12" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "1" }, { "page": "2" }, { "page": "9-12" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3114487 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313540 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442052 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259070 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229713 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2463250 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462961 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508", "parenthetical": "\"We must construe the statute so that each word, clause, or sentence is given reasonable meaning and not deemed superfluous or void\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780274 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397", "parenthetical": "\"Statutes should be construed, if possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229699 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260081 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483568 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132449 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" }, { "page": "458-59" }, { "page": "460-61" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352886 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750-51" }, { "page": "751-52" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229699 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirming dismissal of administrative review petition based on failure to join the party who instituted the underlying administrative proceeding" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260081 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirming dismissal of complaint for administrative review for failure to name a party of record" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483568 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "in consolidated appeal, dismissing one administrative review action and affirming dismissal of the other, where petitioners served respondents but failed to name those parties in their review petitions" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442052 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963718 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152113 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442056 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2880617 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2880617 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571", "parenthetical": "Review Law \"was not intended to be a trap for the unwary\"" } ], "opinion_index": 3, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0567-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1248, "char_count": 58350, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9632221950922117e-07, "percentile": 0.8497437495390658 }, "sha256": "ab449918542d77d4277df5eba1a6c7a139d218cede8fad725096c77f65473c90", "simhash": "1:ba9893996c6a6ab9", "word_count": 9656 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:47:37.235456+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "COLLINSVILLE COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 10 et al., Appellants, v. THE REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF ST. CLAIR COUNTY et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Freeman, McMorrow, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Garman concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.\nJustice Fitzgerald dissented, with opinion.\nJustice Kilbride also dissented, with opinion.\nOPINION\nThis appeal involves the joinder requirements of the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2000)). At issue is whether the circuit court erred in allowing the plaintiff in an administrative review action additional time to amend its complaint to join, as defendants, the petitioners in the underlying administrative proceeding. The appellate court held that the circuit court erred in allowing amendment of the complaint and dismissed the cause of action. 348 Ill. App. 3d 685. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nBACKGROUND\nOn October 25, 2000, a group of Fairmont City residents filed a \u201cPetition for Detachment and Annexation\u201d with the St. Clair County Regional Board of School Trustees (Board). The petition sought to detach a section of Fairmont City from East St. Louis School District No. 189 (East St. Louis) and annex it to Collins-ville Community Unit School District No. 10 (Collins-ville). The petition was signed by over 400 individuals, representing more than two-thirds of the registered voters in the area proposed to be detached. In accordance with section 7 \u2014 6 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 6 (West 2000)), 10 of the petitioners were designated the \u201cCommittee of Ten\u201d to act as attorney in fact for all of the petitioners. The first page of the petition identified the members of the Committee of Ten by name. The petitioners were also represented by counsel.\nIn January 2001, the Board held a hearing on the petition. Both school districts opposed detachment and annexation. After considering the evidence, the Board granted the petition finding, inter alia, that the educational welfare of the students subject to detachment will be better served in Collinsville rather than East St. Louis. The Board\u2019s order granting the petition did not expressly identify any party as a \u201cparty of record.\u201d The caption on the order referred only to the petition for detachment from East St. Louis and annexation to Collinsville, and did not otherwise identify the parties. The text of the Board\u2019s order referred generally to the \u201cPetitioners,\u201d and noted that a \u201cCommittee of Ten\u201d had been appointed. The order did not, however, identify the committee members by name.\nCollinsville filed a petition for rehearing, which the Board denied. The Board\u2019s order denying rehearing, like the Board\u2019s earlier order, did not expressly identify the parties of record, nor did it identify the committee members by name.\nWithin the statutory 35-day period (see 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2000)), Collinsville filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of St. Clair County. Collinsville named as defendants the Board, the members of the Board, the St. Clair County regional superintendent of schools, East St. Louis, and the East St. Louis superintendent of schools. East St. Louis and its superintendent immediately joined in Collinsville\u2019s complaint. Collinsville did not name as a defendant the Committee of Ten, any member of the committee, or any of the other numerous individuals who initiated the administrative action that was the subject of Collins-ville\u2019s complaint.\nTwo weeks after Collinsville filed its complaint, two members of the Committee of Ten, Mark Ostendorf and Paul Garcia, filed a motion to intervene, which the circuit court granted. Ostendorf and Garcia also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the committee members and the other signatories to the petition for detachment and annexation were necessary parties who had not been made defendants within the statutory 35-day period. See 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2000).\nPrior to the circuit court\u2019s disposition of the motion to dismiss, Collinsville filed a motion to amend the complaint to add the remaining eight members of the Committee of Ten as party defendants. Collinsville relied on a statutory exception to the 35-day rule that permits amendment of a complaint where the omitted defendant \u201cwas not named by the administrative agency in its final order as a party of record.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000). In April 2002, the circuit court allowed the motion to amend and denied the motion to dismiss. The case proceeded on the merits. The circuit court affirmed the Board\u2019s order granting the petition for detachment and annexation.\nCollinsville and East St. Louis appealed. The individual members of the Committee of Ten, on behalf of the petitioners, filed a cross-appeal, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to dismiss. A majority of the appellate court agreed with the petitioners and vacated the order of the circuit court. 348 Ill. App. 3d 685. The appellate court held that the exception to the 35-day rule, set forth in section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000)), was inapplicable where, as here, the petitioners were referenced in the final administrative order en masse, were present and testified, and were represented by counsel at all the relevant hearings. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 698. The appellate court stated that it \u201cwould be stretching logic to find that because the names of the 10 petitioners were not spelled out in the order, their involvement in the case is any less than as parties of record.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 696. Because the school districts failed to name and serve the petitioners as required by the Review Law, the appellate court concluded that \u201cthe trial judge lacked jurisdiction to allow the school districts\u2019 request to amend their complaints and to thereafter specifically name each of the parties of record. The trial judge should have granted the petitioners\u2019 motion to dismiss.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 698-99. The appellate court thus allowed the Board\u2019s order, granting the petition for detachment and annexation, to stand. 348 111. App. 3d at 699.\nCollinsville and East St. Louis each filed a petition for leave to appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315), which we allowed and have consolidated for review.\nANALYSIS\nThe operative facts in this case are undisputed. Thus, this appeal concerns only the legal issue of whether amendment of the complaint was proper under the joinder requirements of the Review Law. Accordingly, our review proceeds de novo. See Hobbs v. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17 (2005) (applying de novo standard where salient facts were undisputed and appeal involved legal issue); ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26, 29 (2000) (same).\nUnder the Illinois Constitution, final judgments from the circuit courts are appealable as a \u201cmatter of right,\u201d but final administrative decisions are appealable only \u201cas provided by law.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7\u00a7 6, 9. Because review of a final administrative decision may only be obtained as provided by statute, a court is said to exercise \u201cspecial statutory jurisdiction\u201d when it reviews an administration decision. ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 30. Special statutory jurisdiction \u201cis limited to the language of the act conferring it and the court has no powers from any other source.\u201d Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 210 (1985). A party seeking to invoke a court\u2019s special statutory jurisdiction must strictly comply with the procedures prescribed by statute. ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 30; Fredman Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d at 210. See also Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 133 Ill. 2d 349, 353 (1990) (\u201cSince the Administrative Review Law is a departure from common law, the procedures it establishes must be strictly adhered to in order to justify its application\u201d).\nHere, section 7 \u2014 7 of the School Code expressly provides for judicial review of a decision of the Board in accordance with the Review Law. See 105 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 7 (West 2000). The Review Law makes plain that Collins-ville and East St. Louis were required to comply strictly with its provisions: \u201cUnless review is sought of an administrative decision within the time and in the manner herein provided, the parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of such administrative decision.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 102 (West 2000).\nAs to the time and manner of proceeding, the Review Law states that an action to review a final administrative decision \u201cshall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2000). If the complaint is not timely filed, no jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit court and judicial review of the administrative order is barred. Nudell v. Forest Preserve District, 207 Ill. 2d 409, 423 (2003); Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d at 354-55. Here, Collins-ville timely filed its complaint in the circuit court.\nThe Review Law also directs who must be made a defendant within the 35-day period: \u201cthe administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency, shall be made defendants.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 107 (West 2000). Although some panels of the appellate court, including the panel in the present case, have described the joinder requirements of the Review Law as \u201cjurisdictional,\u201d this court has not done so. See McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 165 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (1995). Rather, we have described the joinder requirements as \u201cmandatory.\u201d E.g., Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d at 355; Cox v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 399, 403-04 (1983); Cuny v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 613, 617 (1952). The failure to join necessary parties, however, is no less serious for being nonjurisdictional. Noncompliance with the joinder provisions of the Review Law requires dismissal of the review proceeding. McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 12.\nIn the present case, the petitioners, who instituted the detachment and annexation proceedings before the Board, were clearly parties of record who should have been joined in the administrative review action. See ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 33 (state\u2019s status as a party of record \u201ccould not be more clear\u201d where the state instituted the proceedings before the agency). Collinsville and East St. Louis do not dispute that the petitioners were parties of record. They argue, however, that under the exception contained in section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000)), their failure to name and serve the petitioners within the 35-day statutory period did not require dismissal. Section 3 \u2014 107(a) states:\n\u201cExcept as provided in subsection (b) [involving review of decisions of a zoning board of appeals], in any action to review any final decision of an administrative agency, the administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made defendants. No action for administrative review shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based upon the failure to name an employee, agent, or member, who acted in his or her official capacity, of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, where the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, has been named as a defendant as provided in this Section. Naming the director or agency head, in his or her official capacity, shall be deemed to include as defendant the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity that the named defendants direct or head. No action for administrative review shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based upon the failure to name an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, where the director or agency head, in his or her official capacity, has been named as a defendant as provided in this Section.\nIf during the course of a review action, the court determines that a party of record to the administrative proceedings was not made a defendant as required by the preceding paragraph, and only if that party was not named by the administrative agency in its final order as a party of record, then the court shall grant the plaintiff 21 days from the date of the determination in which to name and serve the unnamed party as a defendant. The court shall permit the newly served defendant to participate in the proceedings to the extent the interests of justice may require.\u201d\n(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000). Collinsville and East St. Louis argue that, because the Board\u2019s order did not explicitly name the petitioners or Committee of Ten as parties of record, the circuit court was required to allow amendment of the complaint. They contend that the appellate court misconstrued section 3 \u2014 107(a) by focusing on whether the petitioners were parties of record, rather than whether the Board\u2019s final order named the petitioners as parties of record. The petitioners counter that the exception to the 35-day rule applies only in two situations, neither of which is present here. Alternatively, the petitioners argue that, under the facts of this case, the Board\u2019s order sufficiently identified the petitioners as parties of record, thus precluding amendment of the complaint under section 3 \u2014 107(a).\nWe turn our attention first to the petitioners\u2019 argument that the exception to the 35-day rule set forth in section 3 \u2014 107(a) applies in only two situations, neither of which is present here. In support of this argument, the petitioners note that the exception, which is set forth in the second paragraph of section 3 \u2014 107(a), expressly applies only if a party of record is not made a defendant \u201cas required by the preceding paragraph.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000). According to the petitioners, the \u201cpreceding paragraph,\u201d i.e., the first paragraph of section 3 \u2014 107(a), addresses two situations: where a plaintiff fails to name as a defendant the appropriate administrative official, but names the administrative agency, and where a plaintiff fails to name the administrative agency as a defendant, but names the appropriate administrative official. The petitioners argue that under the doctrine of in pari materia, the first and second paragraphs of section 3 \u2014 107(a) must be read with reference to each other and construed harmoniously, giving effect to both paragraphs. The petitioners maintain that the exception to the 35-day rule contained in the second paragraph of section 3 \u2014 107(a) must be construed as limited to the two situations described in the \u201cpreceding paragraph.\u201d Because this is not a case involving the failure to name either the agency or the appropriate administrative official, the petitioners conclude that the exception simply does not come into play.\nUnder the doctrine of in pari materia, two statutes dealing with the same subject will be considered with reference to each other, \u201cso that they may be given harmonious effect.\u201d Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002). This doctrine is also applicable to different sections of the same statute and is consonant with one of our fundamental rules of statutory construction \u2014 \u201cto view all of the provisions of a statute as a whole.\u201d Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422. We agree that under this doctrine, we must construe the second paragraph of section 3 \u2014 107(a) harmoniously with the \u201cpreceding paragraph.\u201d In doing so, however, we are not at liberty to disregard the plain language of the statute. The cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001); In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 331 (2000). The language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indicator of the legislature\u2019s intent. In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 229 (2003). Based on the plain language of section 3 \u2014 107, we conclude that the exception to the 35-day rule may be applied where, as here, a plaintiff fails to name as defendants the petitioners in the underlying administrative proceeding.\nSection 3 \u2014 107 addresses, in broad terms, who must be made defendants in an administrative review action: \u201c[I]n any action to review any final decision of an administrative agency, the administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made defendants.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000). The statute then addresses two frequently recurring scenarios: where the plaintiff names the appropriate administrative official, but fails to name the administrative agency, and where the plaintiff names the administrative agency, but fails to name the appropriate administrative official. The statute prohibits dismissal of the complaint under either circumstance. The fact that the statute addresses two scenarios involving certain defendants in greater detail does not mean that the exception to the 35-day rule cannot apply to other scenarios. The exception itself contains no such limiting language. The exception refers generally to whether a party of record was made a defendant \u201cas required by the preceding paragraph.\u201d The universe of parties \u201crequired\u201d to be made defendants \u201cby the preceding paragraph\u201d is not confined to the administrative agency and administrative official \u2014 the only parties involved in the two scenarios on which the petitioners focus. Rather, the \u201cpreceding paragraph\u201d requires that the \u201cadministrative agency and all persons\u201d who were parties of record be made defendants. \u201cAll persons\u201d who were parties of record include the petitioners here. To construe section 3 \u2014 107(a) in the manner the petitioners suggest would ignore the plain language of the statute and render the first sentence of section 3 \u2014 107(a) superfluous. See Quad Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis, 208 Ill. 2d 498, 508 (2004) (\u201cWe must construe the statute so that each word, clause, or sentence is given reasonable meaning and not deemed superfluous or void\u201d); Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994) (\u201cStatutes should be construed, if possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless\u201d).\nJustice Fitzgerald points out that, in reaching this result, \u201cthe majority overlooks the service of summons provisions contained in section 3 \u2014 105\u201d of the Review Law. 218 Ill. 2d at 200 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). Indeed we do, for the simple reason that section 3 \u2014 105 has absolutely nothing to do with this appeal. According to Justice Fitzgerald, \u201csections 3 \u2014 105 and 3 \u2014 107 of the Review Law both involve the joinder requirements for an administrative review action.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 218 Ill. 2d at 201 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). The only difference between the two statutes is that, while section 3 \u2014 107(a) sets forth the \u201cgeneral requirement\u201d that \u201c \u2018the administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made defendants,\u2019 \u201d section 3 \u2014 105 sets forth the more \u201cspecific\u201d requirement that, in school board proceedings involving a committee of 10, \u201c \u2018only the administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 10 shall be served.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added and omitted.) 218 Ill. 2d at 201-02 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting), quoting 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105, 3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000). Justice Fitzgerald then suggests that, as the more specific provision, section 3 \u2014 105 controls. 218 Ill. 2d at 203 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).\nThere are several problems with Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s approach. To begin with, Justice Fitzgerald never quite explains how a statement concerning who must be served can possibly be characterized as a more specific statement of who must be named. Such an explanation would seem incumbent, as service and joinder are wholly distinct legal concepts. Service relates to \u201c[t]he formal delivery of a writ, summons, or other legal process.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1399 (8th ed. 2004). Joinder, by contrast, relates to \u201cthe uniting of parties *** in a single claim.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 853 (8th ed. 2004). Obviously, these are not the same thing. As importantly, this distinction is clearly manifested in the plain language of sections 3 \u2014 105 and 3 \u2014 107. Titled \u201cService of Summons,\u201d section 3 \u2014 105 speaks solely to where, how, and upon whom a \u201c[sjummons issued in any action to review the final administrative decision of any administrative agency shall be served.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000). Section 3 \u2014 105 says absolutely nothing about who must be joined or named as defendants in a complaint for administrative review. Section 3 \u2014 107(a), by contrast, speaks solely to who \u201cshall be made defendants\u201d in a complaint for administrative review and says absolutely nothing about where, how, or upon whom a summons must be served. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000). Simply put, section 3 \u2014 105 is a service statute, and section 3 \u2014 107(a) is a joinder statute. Neither statute speaks to the other. Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s assertion that \u201csections 3 \u2014 105 and 3 \u2014 107 *** both involve the joinder requirements for an administrative review action\u201d is demonstrably false.\nWhich is not to say that section 3 \u2014 105\u2019s \u201ccommittee of 10\u201d clause is not a more specific statement of legislative intent. It undeniably is. The question is, more specific in relation to what? Section 3 \u2014 105 answers this question clearly:\n\u201cSummons issued in any action to review the final administrative decision of any administrative agency shall be served by registered or certified mail on the administrative agency and on each of the other defendants except in the case of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional board of school trustees, regional superintendent of schools, or State Superintendent of Education, as the case may be, when a committee of 10 has been designated as provided in Section 7 \u2014 6 of the School Code, and in such case only the administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 10 shall he served.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000).\nThis statute could not be more clear. The general rule is that summons must be served on \u201cthe administrative agency and on each of the other defendants.\u201d In certain school board cases, however, summons must be served \u201conly [on] the administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 10.\u201d In other words, the \u201ccommittee of 10 clause\u201d is an exception not to the general joinder requirements of section 3 \u2014 107(a), but to the general service requirements of section 3 \u2014 105.\nBe that as it may, there is absolutely nothing in the text of either section 3 \u2014 105 or section 3 \u2014 107(a) to support Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s conclusion that lack of compliance with section 3 \u2014 105 is a bar to invoking section 3 \u2014 107(a)\u2019s exception to the 35-day rule. The second paragraph of section 3 \u2014 107(a) sets forth two, and only two, conditions for application of that exception: (1) a party of record was not made a defendant \u201cas required by the preceding paragraph;\u201d and (2) that same party was not named by the administrative agency in its final order as a party of record. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000). Compliance with section 3 \u2014 105 is mentioned nowhere.\nNevertheless, both Justice Fitzgerald and Justice Garman insist that we should disregard the plain language of the exception because Collinsville was \u201con notice, by virtue of section 3 \u2014 105, that they were required to serve \u2018each of the committee of 10.\u2019 \u201d 218 Ill. 2d at 202 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting), quoting 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000); 218 Ill. 2d at 199 (Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (\u201cSection 3 \u2014 105 precisely informed the district of whom to serve when appealing a decision of the regional school board of trustees\u201d). The obvious problem with this position, aside from a complete lack of support in the statutory text, is the fact that it effectively renders the exception to the 35-day rule a nullity. This is because section 3 \u2014 105 puts every administrative review plaintiff \u201con notice\u201d as to who must be served. In most actions, this will be \u201cthe administrative agency and *** each of the other defendants.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000). In school board proceedings involving a committee of 10, this will be \u201cthe administrative agency and each of the committee of 10.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000). Either way, section 3 \u2014 105 leaves no doubt as to who must be served. Consequently, if simply knowing who must be served is a bar to invoking section 3 \u2014 107\u2019s exception to the 35-day rule, then no party will ever be able to avail itself of that exception.\nJustice Fitzgerald goes on to suggest that our reading of sections 3 \u2014 105 and 3 \u2014 107 is \u201cartificially narrow\u201d because \u201c[sjection 3 \u2014 107 is not simply a naming provision.\u201d 218 Ill. 2d at 202 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). According to Justice Fitzgerald, \u201c[sjection 3 \u2014 107 addresses who must be \u2018made\u2019 a defendant,\u201d and \u201ca party is not \u2018made\u2019 a defendant simply by naming that party in the caption of the complaint.\u201d 218 Ill. 2d at 202-03 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). Rather, Justice Fitzgerald maintains, to be \u201cmade\u201d a defendant, \u201ca party must be both named and served within the statutory period.\u201d 218 Ill. 2d at 203 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). Conspicuously absent from Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s analysis on this point is any citation to authority, which is likely attributable to the fact that its conclusion is flatly contradicted by the plain language of the Review Act, this court\u2019s established case law, and the legislative history surrounding the enactment of section 3 \u2014 107\u2019s exception to the 35-day rule.\nAs for the plain language, Justice Fitzgerald asserts that a party is not \u201cmade\u201d a defendant until it is both named in the complaint and served with a summons. 218 Ill. 2d at 203 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). Section 3 \u2014 105 says otherwise. Indeed, that section states that \u201c[t]he plaintiff shall, by affidavit filed with the complaint, designate the last known address of each defendant upon whom service shall be made.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000). Likewise, section 3 \u2014 105 directs the clerk of the court to \u201cmail a copy of the summons to each of the *** defendants, addressed to the last known place of residence or principal place of business of each such defendant.\u201d (Emphases added.) 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 105 (West 2000). This language confirms that, under the Review Law, a \u201cdefendant\u201d exists as such before summons is served. In fact, by requiring the plaintiff to file with the complaint an affidavit setting forth \u201cthe last know address of each defendant,\u201d section 3 \u2014 105 confirms that a \u201cdefendant\u201d is anyone designated as such by the plaintiff. In other words, a party is made a defendant simply by being named in the complaint.\nAs for this court\u2019s case law, McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 165 Ill. 2d 1 (1995), is instructive. The Review Law, of course, governs circuit court review of administrative orders. Not all administrative orders, however, are reviewed in the circuit court. Some are directly reviewed in the appellate court. The procedures governing direct appellate court review of administrative orders are set forth in Supreme Court Rule 335. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 335(a). In McGaughy, this court was asked to consider the consequences of a petitioner\u2019s failure to comply strictly with Supreme Court Rule 335(a), which states:\n\u201cThe petition for review shall he filed in the Appellate Court and shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the respondent and the order or part thereof to be reviewed. The agency and all other parties of record shall be named respondents.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 335(a).\nTwo petitions were at issue in McGaughy. The first \u201cfailed to name the Department of Human Rights ***, joining only the [Human Rights] Commission and the Department of State Police as respondents.\u201d McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 1. As for the second, \u201c[t]he caption *** read only, Tn the Matter of the Request for Review by: Betty L. Barnes,\u2019 and failed to name the Commission, the Department, or [the employer] as respondents.\u201d McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 2. The court began its analysis by thoroughly reviewing Lockett, which held that the failure to comply strictly with section 3 \u2014 107(a)\u2019s joinder requirements mandates dismissal of a complaint for administrative review. McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 9-12. The court then concluded that the same consequence should attach to the failure to comply strictly with the joinder requirements of Rule 335(a). In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized:\n\u201c[T]he joinder requirements of section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Administrative Review Law and of Supreme Court Rule 335(a) are substantively similar. (Compare 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 107(a) (West 1992) (\u2018the administrative agency and all persons *** who were parties of record *** shall be made defendants\u2019) with 134 Ill. 2d R. 335(a) (\u2018The agency and all other parties of record shall be named respondents\u2019).) There is nothing in the plain language of the statute or the rule that would justify the development of two divergent procedural standards for the review of administrative matters, and we do not believe that the meanings of these similar requirements should vary.\u201d (Emphasis added.) McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 12.\nIn other words, McGaughy treated Rule 335(a)\u2019s requirement that \u201c[t]he agency and all other parties of record shall be named respondents\u201d as synonymous and therefore legally indistinguishable from section 3 \u2014 107(a)\u2019s requirement that \u201cthe administrative agency and all *** parties of record *** shall be made defendants.\u201d Once again, contrary to the Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s unsupported assertion, a party is \u201cmade\u201d a defendant simply by being \u201cnamed.\u201d Indeed, the linchpin of McGaughy is that, in this context, the two words mean exactly the same thing.\nAs it turns out, McGaughy\u2019s reading of section 3 \u2014 107(a) perfectly vindicates the General Assembly\u2019s intent, as evinced by the relevant legislative history. The exception to the 35-day rule was enacted on January 1, 1994, as part of Public Act 88 \u2014 1. See Pub. Act 88 \u2014 1, \u00a7 7, eff. January 1, 1994. Speaking on the floor of the Illinois Senate, the bill\u2019s chief sponsor in that body described the purpose of the exception as follows:\n\u201cAs amended in the Senate, [the bill] also deals with who should be named parties in an administrative review\n* * *\nThere have been some difficulties because, on occasion, the final order in the administrative agency does not name all parties who ought to be named. Therefore, this bill, as amended, provides that the petitioner \u2014 the person bringing the action for administrative review \u2014 will name all those parties who are named in the final order of the administrative action, and then if a court subsequently determines that another party ought to be named, the person bringing the action will he granted leave of twenty-one days to add those other parties to the petition for administrative review.\" (Emphases added.) 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, March 12, 1993, at 20 (remarks of Senator Hawkinson).\nThese remarks, which describe the focus of section 3 \u2014 107, speak exclusively to who must be named and make no mention whatsoever of service. Moreover, Senator Hawkinson\u2019s statement that the exception grants 21 days \u201cto add those other parties to the petition\u201d flatly refutes Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s assertion that \u201ca party is not \u2018made\u2019 a defendant simply by naming that party in the caption of the complaint.\u201d As Senator Hawkinson\u2019s statement confirms, that\u2019s exactly what it means to be \u201cmade\u201d a defendant.\nFinally, we note that, even if Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s reading of section 3 \u2014 107(a) is correct, the school districts still may invoke the exception to the 35-day rule. Again, the exception states:\n\u201cIf, during the course of a review action, the court determines that a party of record to the administrative proceedings was not made a defendant as required by the preceding paragraph, and only if that party was not named by the administrative agency in its final order as a party of record, then the court shall grant the plaintiff 21 days from the date of the determination in which to name and serve the unnamed party as a defendant.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nAccording to Justice Fitzgerald, to be \u201cmade\u201d a defendant, \u201ca party must be both named and served within the statutory period.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 218 Ill. 2d at 203 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). If this is true, then the school districts\u2019 lack of compliance with section 3 \u2014 105\u2019s service requirement is not a barrier to the invocation of section 3 \u2014 107(a)\u2019s exception. On the contrary, it triggers the exception. Indeed, by Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s own reasoning, as long as the Committee of Ten was unserved, it \u201cwas not made a defendant.\u201d The exception therefore applies.*\nThe only question remaining, then, is whether the Board\u2019s order identified the petitioners as parties of record. Clearly, it did not. As discussed above, the Board\u2019s order granting the petition did not identify any party as a \u201cparty of record.\u201d The caption on the order referred only to the petition for detachment from East St. Louis and annexation to Collinsville, and it did not otherwise identify the parties. And while the text of the Board\u2019s order referred generally to the \u201cPetitioners\u201d and noted that a \u201cCommittee of Ten\u201d had been appointed, the order did not identify any of the petitioners or committee members by name. Even the appellate court conceded this point, noting that \u201c[n] either the school districts involved nor the petitioners seeking detachment and annexation were explicitly labeled as \u2018parties of record\u2019 in the final orders at issue.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 698.\nAccordingly, we hold that the circuit court properly granted the school districts\u2019 motion to amend. The exception set forth in the second paragraph of section 3 \u2014 107(a) sets forth two, and only two, conditions for application of that exception: (1) a party of record was not made a defendant as required by the first paragraph of section 3 \u2014 107(a), and (2) that same party was not named by the administrative agency in its final order as a party of record. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000). Both of those conditions are present in this case, and the school districts therefore were entitled to 21 days in which to name and serve the additional defendants.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed-, cause remanded.\nSection 7 \u2014 6 states in part: \u201cWhen a petition contains more than 10 signatures, the petition shall designate a committee of 10 of the petitioners as attorney in fact for all petitioners, any 7 of whom may make binding stipulations on behalf of all petitioners as to any question with respect to the petition or hearing or joint hearing, and the regional board of school trustees, *** may accept such stipulation in lieu of evidence or proof of the matter stipulated.\u201d 105 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 6(c) (West 2000).\nWe also note that, if Justice Fitzgerald is correct in asserting that a party is not \u201cmade\u201d a defendant until it is both named and served, then the exception set forth in the second paragraph of section 3 \u2014 107(a) is easily the most specific statutory provision at play, as it excuses noncompliance with both section 3 \u2014 105 and section 3 \u2014 107. Indeed, under Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s approach, the exception would apply when a party omitted from the agency\u2019s final order is (1) not named in the petition for administrative review, (2) not served with the petition for administrative review, or (3) neither named in nor served with the petition for administrative review.\nThe appellate court got around this point by insisting that \u201cthe omission of their names, purposefully or by clerical error, from the final order does not convert the petitioners into nonparties.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 694. This is undeniably true. But whether the petitioners were parties of record is not the issue. Rather, the issue is whether the petitioners were named as parties of record in the Board\u2019s final order.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS" }, { "text": "JUSTICE GARMAN,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI agree with Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s conclusion that Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 is barred from obtaining judicial relief because of its failure to strictly comply with section 3 \u2014 105 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000)). However, I also agree with the majority\u2019s determination that section 3 \u2014 105 addresses service, not joinder. Accordingly, it is the school district\u2019s failure to serve the committee of 10 and its members, rather than its failure to join them, that mandates dismissal of this action.\nAs both the majority and Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s dissent note, a party seeking review of an administrative decision must strictly comply with the procedures established by the Review Law. ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26, 30 (2000); Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 133 Ill. 2d 349, 353 (1990). Strict compliance must begin with section 3 \u2014 103 of the Review Law, entitled \u201cCommencement of Action\u201d:\n\u201cEvery action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision[.]\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2000).\nSection 3 \u2014 105 goes on to establish how summons, once issued, must be served:\n\u201cSummons issued in any action to review the final administrative decision of any administrative agency shall be served by registered or certified mail on the administrative agency and on each of the other defendants except in the case of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional board of school trustees, regional superintendent of schools, or State Superintendent of Education, as the case may be, when a committee of 10 has been designated as provided in Section 7 \u2014 6 of the School Code, and in such case only the administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 10 shall be served.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000).\nThus, sections 3 \u2014 103 and 3 \u2014 105 require summons to be issued within 35 days for the administrative agency and each of the other defendants, except in cases where a committee of 10 has been appointed. Where there is a committee of 10, the Review Law requires issuance of summons for the administrative agency and each member of the committee of 10. As the majority correctly notes, this provision says nothing about whether the committee and its members should be joined as defendants. 218 Ill. 2d at 188. However, it does require that they be served with summons properly issued within 35 days, regardless of whether they are joined.\nSection 3 \u2014 107, in contrast, speaks solely to joinder. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107 (West 2000). In addition to establishing who must be joined, it allows petitioners a second chance to join defendants who were not named as parties of record in the final administrative order. 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 107 (West 2000). However, the district\u2019s failure to join the committee of 10 was not the district\u2019s critical shortcoming. Rather, the district failed to strictly comply with the Review Law when it failed to obtain issuance of summons for the committee of 10 and its members within the 35 days mandated by section 3 \u2014 103 (735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 103 (West 2000)). Although the application of section 3 \u2014 107 allows the belated joinder of certain parties, it cannot excuse the district\u2019s failure to timely serve the committee of 10 and its members in accordance with the requirement of sections 3 \u2014 103 and 3 \u2014 105. The consequence for this failure to comply is dismissal of the review proceeding. McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 165 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1995).\nMost petitioners for administrative review will not find themselves in the school district\u2019s position. The section 3 \u2014 105 requirements for service are unique and specific only in their treatment of cases involving a committee of 10 under the School Code. Other petitioners are merely required to serve \u201cthe administrative agency and *** each of the other defendants.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 105 (West 2000). As the majority notes, a party is made a defendant by being named in the complaint. 218 Ill. 2d at 191. Thus, in most cases section 3 \u2014 105 does not require service until a defendant is named. When petitioners fail to name a party of record who was not named in the agency\u2019s final order, most will be able to fall back on the section 3 \u2014 107 exception that allows extra time to join and then to serve that defendant. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107 (West 2000). However, when a committee of 10 is involved, the Review Law requires issuance of summons within the 35-day limit of section 3 \u2014 103 no matter whether or when the committee is named as a defendant. 218 Ill. 2d at 203 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).\nIn cases where the appellate court has properly applied the language at issue in the section 3 \u2014 107 exception, the facts suggest legitimate confusion about the appropriate defendants to join. In United Methodist Village Retirement Communities, Inc. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 321 Ill. App. 3d 456 (2001), the petitioner taxpayer appealed a notice of assessment change to the county board of review. United Methodist, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 458. He then appealed the board of review decision to the Property Tax Appeal Board, which did not name the board of review as a party in its final order. United Methodist, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 458-59. On appeal of the Appeal Board\u2019s decision, the petitioner joined only the Appeal Board. The appellate court applied section 3 \u2014 113(b) of the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 113(b) (West 1998)), which contains language identical to the section 3 \u2014 107 exception, and allowed amendment of the petition for review to add the board of review as a defendant. United Methodist, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 460-61. In an earlier property tax case, the petitioner appealed directly to the Appeal Board, bypassing the board of review entirely. Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 302 Ill. App. 3d 745, 750-51 (1999). Holding that the board of review was nevertheless a party of record, the appellate court determined that the petitioner was entitled to amend its complaint to add the board of review as a defendant. Villa Retirement, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 751-52.\nIn each of these cases, it was unclear whether the Board of Review was an appropriate party to join and serve. But no confusion as to service exists in the instant case. Section 3 \u2014 105 precisely informed the district of whom to serve when appealing a decision of the regional school board of trustees. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000). In contravention of this explicit language, the district did not obtain issuance of summons for the committee of 10 and its members within 35 days.\nThe section 3 \u2014 107 exception allowing belated joinder cannot excuse this failure to comply with the Review Law\u2019s service requirements. In this regard, I join Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s dissent.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE GARMAN," }, { "text": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD,\ndissenting:\nI agree with the majority that one of our fundamental rules of statutory construction is \u201c \u2018to view all of the provisions of a statute as a whole.\u2019 \u201d 218 Ill. 2d at 185-86, quoting Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002). Under this rule, each provision of a statute must be construed in connection with every other section (Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 466 (2000)), and not as isolated provisions {Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000)). The majority, however, fails to follow this rule by overlooking other provisions of the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2000)), relevant to the issue before us. In particular, the majority overlooks the service of summons provisions contained in section 3 \u2014 105 (735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 105 (West 2000)). Consideration of section 3 \u2014 105, in conjunction with section 3 \u2014 107 (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107 (West 2000)), leads to the conclusion that the appellate court judgment, dismissing the complaint for administrative review, should be affirmed. Accordingly, I dissent.\nSection 3 \u2014 105 of the Review Law states, in relevant part:\n\u201cSummons issued in any action to review the final administrative decision of any administrative agency shall be served by registered or certified mail on the administrative agency and on each of the other defendants except in the case of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional board of school trustees, regional superintendent of schools, or State Superintendent of Education, as the case may be, when a committee of 10 has been designated as provided by Section 7 \u2014 6 of the School Code, and in such case only the administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 10 shall be served.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000).\nThe relevance of section 3 \u2014 105 to this appeal is evident. Collinsville challenged a \u201cfinal administrative decision of the regional board of school trustees\u201d and a \u201ccommittee of 10\u201d was designated in accordance with the School Code. See 105 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 6 (West 2000). Pursuant to section 3 \u2014 105, \u201ceach of the committee of 10 shall be served.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000). The focus of this appeal, therefore, is not solely section 3 \u2014 107. Rather, we must consider the interplay between sections 3 \u2014 107 and 3 \u2014 105.\n\u201c[Sjettled principles of statutory construction call for the specific to control over the general.\u201d People v. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 345 (1984). Accordingly, where a statute contains two provisions relating to the same subject, one specific and one general, the specific provision controls and should be applied. Knolls Condominium Ass\u2019n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 459 (2002). Here, sections 3 \u2014 105 and 3 \u2014 107 of the Review Law both involve the joinder requirements for an administrative review action. Section 3 \u2014 107 sets out the general requirement: \u201cthe administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made defendants.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000). Section 3 \u2014 107(a) also contains an exception to this general rule, allowing amendment of the complaint where the omitted defendant was \u201cnot named by the administrative agency in its final order as a party of record.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 107(a) (West 2000).\nSection 3 \u2014 105, on the other hand, addresses a specific cas\u00e9: \u201cthe case of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional board of school trustees,\u201d where a \u201ccommittee of 10 has been designated.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000). \u201c[I]n such case only the administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 10 shall be served.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 105 (West 2000). Section 3 \u2014 105 specifically addresses the present situation and controls over the more general provisions of section 3 \u2014 107(a). Accordingly, the school districts\u2019 argument that the petitioners or the Committee of Ten were not \u201cnamed\u201d in the Board\u2019s final order as \u201cparties of record\u201d is irrelevant. The school districts were on notice, by virtue of section 3 \u2014 105, that they were required to serve \u201ceach of the committee of 10.\u201d Under the statute, and our case law, Collinsville\u2019s failure to comply strictly with the Review Law is fatal to its complaint. See 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 102 (West 2000) (barring review unless sought within the time and manner provided by the Review Law); ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26 (2000) (affirming dismissal of administrative review petition based on failure to join the party who instituted the underlying administrative proceeding); McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 165 Ill. 2d 1 (1995) (in consolidated appeal, dismissing one administrative review action and affirming dismissal of the other, where petitioners served respondents but failed to name those parties in their review petitions); Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 133 Ill. 2d 349 (1990) (affirming dismissal of complaint for administrative review for failure to name a party of record).\nThe majority maintains that because section 3 \u2014 105 addresses service of process, and section 3 \u2014 107 addresses who must be named as a defendant, section 3 \u2014 105 cannot be deemed the more specific and controlling of the two statutory provisions. 218 Ill. 2d at 188. The majority\u2019s reading of these statutory sections is artificially narrow. Section 3 \u2014 107 is not simply a naming provision. Section 3 \u2014 107 addresses who must be \u201cmade\u201d a defendant in an administrative review proceeding. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107 (West 2000). A party is not \u201cmade\u201d a defendant simply by naming that party in the caption of the complaint for administrative review. A party must be both named and served within the statutory period. Thus, section 3 \u2014 107 allows additional time to \u201cname and serve\u201d an unnamed party. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107 (West 2000). Similarly, section 3 \u2014 105 is not simply a service statute as the majority contends. To be sure, section 3 \u2014 105 addresses how service shall be made on defendants in a review action \u2014 by registered or certified mail. Section 3 \u2014 105, however, also addresses who must be served as defendants in a case such as the present one: \u201cthe administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 10.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000). Thus, sections 3 \u2014 107 and 3 \u2014 105 both speak, in some fashion, as to who must be joined or \u201cmade\u201d a defendant in a case such as the present one, but section 3 \u2014 105 is the more specific.\nEven if the majority\u2019s characterization of section 3 \u2014 107 as a naming provision and section 3 \u2014 105 as a service provision is correct, I disagree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that section 3 \u2014 105 is irrelevant to this case. Lockett and its progeny firmly establish that administrative review is barred unless the complaining party is in compliance with the procedures set forth in the Review Law. As the majority states, \u201cA party seeking to invoke a court\u2019s special statutory jurisdiction must strictly comply with the procedures prescribed by statute.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 218 Ill. 2d at 182. Section 3 \u2014 105 expressly required Collinsville to serve \u201ceach of the committee of 10.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2000). That obligation was not made dependent on any obligation to name the committee, its members, or the underlying petitioners as defendants. Collinsville failed to serve the committee members and thus failed to \u201cstrictly comply with the procedures prescribed by statute.\u201d\nI recognize that the Review Law \u201cwas not intended to be a trap for the unwary to establish a bar to relief.\u201d Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Ill. 2d 567, 571 (1966). In this case, however, no trap was set. Section 3 \u2014 105 of the Review Law set forth in explicit terms how a case of this type must proceed. Accordingly, Collinsville\u2019s failure to serve the members of the Committee of Ten cannot be overlooked. I would hold that because review was not sought in the manner provided in the Review Law, the school districts are \u201cbarred\u201d from obtaining judicial review. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 102 (West 2000).", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD," }, { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE,\nalso dissenting:\nI agree with Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s dissent that section 3 \u2014 105 controls in this appeal. I write separately to explain that, even if the exception in section 3 \u2014 107 were applicable, the conditions for application of that exception have not been met in this case. The appellate court\u2019s dismissal of the complaint for administrative review should be affirmed in either case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.\nThe majority concludes that the exception contained in section 3 \u2014 107 of the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) allows the school districts an opportunity to name and serve the members of the Committee of Ten as defendants. 218 Ill. 2d at 194. The exception in section 3 \u2014 107 only applies, however, if the party who was not made a defendant \u201cwas not named by the administrative agency in its final order as a party of record.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000). The majority finds this exception applies because the Board\u2019s order failed to identify the petitioners as parties of record. 218 Ill. 2d at 194-95. The majority notes that the caption of the order did not identify the parties, and the text of the order did not identify any of the individual petitioners or members of the Committee of Ten by name. 218 Ill. 2d at 195.\nI disagree with the conclusion that the order did not sufficiently identify the members of the Committee of Ten as parties of record within the meaning of the Review Law. The body of the order recites, in pertinent part, that \u201cthe Petition was signed by more than two-thirds (2/3) of the legal registered voters of the area involved, that a Committee of Ten was appointed in the Petition and that the legal requirements set forth in 105 Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/7 have been met by the Petitioners.\u201d Under the School Code, a committee of 10 is a group of petitioners designated in the petition as attorney in fact for all of the petitioners. 105 ILCS 5/7\u2014 6(c) (West 2000). Thus, the order, by referring to the appointment of the Committee of Ten, identifies the members of that group as petitioners. Under any characterization, the petitioners are parties of record. As noted by the majority, the petitioners were \u201cclearly parties of record.\u201d 218 Ill. 2d at 183. Thus, the order is sufficient to identify the members of the Committee of Ten as petitioners and as parties of record.\nIn my view, the majority gives the exception in section 3 \u2014 107 too broad of a construction. The majority would apparently require that each member of the Committee of Ten must be specifically named and referred to as \u201ca party of record\u201d for the exception not to apply. I believe the exception should be construed more narrowly. The identification of the Committee of Ten as petitioners in the order was sufficient to name the members of that group as parties of record. Thus, the exception in section 3 \u2014 107 that would allow the school districts to add the members of the Committee of Ten as defendants is not applicable based on the facts of this case.\nI would also note that the circumstances of this case show this construction of the exception cannot be considered unfair or \u201ca trap for the unwary.\u201d See Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Ill. 2d 567, 571 (1966) (Review Law \u201cwas not intended to be a trap for the unwary\u201d). The petitioners, who were represented by the Committee of Ten, instituted the proceedings. The Committee of Ten represented the petitioners throughout these proceedings. The record shows there were three separate hearings before the Board on this petition. The attorney for the petitioners appeared at each of these hearings. Julia Martinez, one of the members of the Committee of Ten, testified during the proceedings. The Board members referred to \u201cthe petitioners\u201d repeatedly throughout the hearings. The entire administrative proceeding focused on the petition, prominently identifying the members of the Committee of Ten by name on page one. The petition specifically states \u201c[tjhe following Petitioners are designated as the Committee of Ten to act as attorney in fact for all Petitioners.\u201d In sum, the record is replete with references to the petitioners and the Committee of Ten.\nBased on these facts, the school districts cannot claim that they did not know that the members of the Committee of Ten were parties of record. The status of the members of the Committee of Ten as parties of record could not be more apparent. Thus, denying the school districts additional time to add the members of the Committee of Ten as defendants would not be unfair.\nFinally, as noted by both Justice Fitzgerald and Justice Garman, section 3 \u2014 105 clearly required the school districts to serve each member of the Committee of Ten. 218 Ill. 2d at 201-02 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting); 218 Ill. 2d at 197 (Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The school districts failed to serve the members of the Committee of Ten when this action was initiated. Additionally, after the school districts were granted leave to add the members of the Committee of Ten as defendants, the school districts were obligated to arrange for the service of the defendants. Nonetheless, according to the record, the school districts completely failed to serve the members of the Committee of Ten\u2014 even after they were granted leave to add these parties as defendants. In failing to serve the committee members, the school districts failed to comply strictly with the Review Law.\nIn sum, this appeal should be resolved based on application of section 3 \u2014 105 as explained in Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s dissent. However, even if the exception in section 3 \u2014 107 were applicable to this appeal, the conditions for application of that exception have not been met. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court dismissing the complaint for administrative review should be affirmed.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE," } ], "attorneys": [ "John W. Leskera and John L. Bitzer, of Dunham, Boman & Leskera, of Collinsville, for appellant Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10.", "Pearson Bush, of East St. Louis, for appellant East St. Louis School District No. 189.", "Robert J. Sprague, of Sprague & Urban, of Belleville, for appellees Mark Ostendorf et al." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(Nos. 98649, 98668 cons.\nCOLLINSVILLE COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 10 et al., Appellants, v. THE REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF ST. CLAIR COUNTY et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed January 20, 2006.\nJohn W. Leskera and John L. Bitzer, of Dunham, Boman & Leskera, of Collinsville, for appellant Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10.\nPearson Bush, of East St. Louis, for appellant East St. Louis School District No. 189.\nRobert J. Sprague, of Sprague & Urban, of Belleville, for appellees Mark Ostendorf et al." }, "file_name": "0175-01", "first_page_order": 185, "last_page_order": 217 }