{ "id": 5735852, "name": "ERMA RODRIGUEZ, Appellee, v. THE SHERIFF'S MERIT COMMISSION OF KANE COUNTY et al., Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Rodriguez v. Sheriff's Merit Commission", "decision_date": "2006-01-20", "docket_number": "No. 100165", "first_page": "342", "last_page": "357", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 342" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127069 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" }, { "page": "210" }, { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 Ill. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2640772 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/407/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974993 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422-23" }, { "page": "414, 424" }, { "page": "412" }, { "page": "421-22" }, { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3114487 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402-03" }, { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442033 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" }, { "page": "494-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198894 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451275 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3630013 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "agency decision mailed to plaintiff and attorney" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 1137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5604911 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "agency decision mailed to plaintiff" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/1137-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3335476 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "agency decision mailed to attorney" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 486632 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" }, { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404813 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3121957 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138416 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2594924 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3429926 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0705-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 885, "char_count": 24627, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6354572012639657e-07, "percentile": 0.822599309843933 }, "sha256": "4b8358dfdc7c507678022e67b819b15d6b0058f0a0d1d3b8b08d24055ed53b51", "simhash": "1:cfadffa26749389e", "word_count": 3988 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:47:37.235456+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ERMA RODRIGUEZ, Appellee, v. THE SHERIFF\u2019S MERIT COMMISSION OF KANE COUNTY et al., Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices McMorrow, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nPlaintiff, Erma Rodriguez, sought administrative review of a decision of the sheriffs merit commission of Kane County (commission). The circuit court of Kane County dismissed plaintiffs complaint for administrative review. The appellate court reversed. 355 Ill. App. 3d 676. We allowed the commission\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now reverse the judgment of the appellate court, and affirm the order of the circuit court dismissing plaintiffs complaint, albeit for a different reason than that upon which the circuit court relied.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe commission filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for administrative review pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 619(a) (West 2002)). The motion admits all well-pled allegations in the complaint and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts. Fireman\u2019s Fund Insurance Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 176 Ill. 2d 160, 161 (1997). We recite only those facts that are necessary for our disposition of the issues presented in this appeal.\nPlaintiff was employed by the Kane County sheriffs department as a corrections officer. Following a hearing, the commission terminated plaintiffs employment effective May 23, 2003. Mary Gray, secretary for the commission, swore in an affidavit that, on May 23, 2003, she mailed a copy of the commission\u2019s decision via certified mail to plaintiff. A postal receipt bearing plaintiffs name and address shows mailing via certified mail on May 23, 2003.\nPlaintiff filed her complaint for administrative review on June 30, 2003. In its motion to dismiss, the commission contended that section 3 \u2014 103 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2002)) required plaintiff to file her complaint within 35 days from the mailing of the commission decision to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court. The commission asserted that plaintiff was required to have filed her complaint by June 27, 2003. Therefore, according to the commission, the jurisdictional time period for plaintiff to file her action lapsed, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to hear the case, and the circuit court must dismiss plaintiffs complaint.\nIn her response to the commission\u2019s motion to dismiss, plaintiff asserted three alternative contentions. Plaintiff first asserted that the 35-day period of section 3 \u2014 103 of the Administrative Review Law began to run when she received the commission decision on May 24, 2003; the thirty-fifth day thereafter was Saturday, June 28, 2003; and, consequently, her complaint was timely filed on Monday, June 30, 2003. Second, plaintiff contended that, even if the 35-day filing period began to run on May 23, 2003, the first day is excluded and the last day is included, thereby rendering her complaint timely. Third, plaintiff contended that the 35-day time period was tolled because the commission did not mail a copy of its decision to her attorney of record.\nIn its reply, the commission agreed with plaintiff that, in computing the 35-day filing period, the first day is excluded and the last day is included. However, the commission maintained that the crucial date, which began plaintiffs filing period, was May 23, 2003. The commission argued that 35 days thereafter, beginning on May 24, 2003, was Friday, June 27, 2003. Since plaintiff filed her complaint on Monday, June 30, 2003, it was untimely. Also, the commission did not dispute that it mailed a copy of its decision to plaintiff and not to her attorney. However, the commission responded that plaintiffs attorney was aware of the commission\u2019s service on plaintiff. The commission contended that the dispositive issue was not who received the commission\u2019s decision, but rather when plaintiff filed her complaint for administrative review.\nThe circuit court denied the commission\u2019s section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss. However, the Kane County sheriff separately filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint based on section 3 \u2014 109 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 109 (West 2002)), contending that plaintiff had not paid the cost of preparing and certifying the record of the administrative proceedings. The circuit court granted the sheriffs motion to dismiss on this basis.\nThe appellate court reversed the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiffs complaint. 355 Ill. App. 3d 676. Initially, the appellate court upheld the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of the commission\u2019s section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss. It was undisputed that plaintiff was represented by her attorney, but the commission mailed its decision to plaintiff personally and not to her attorney of record. The appellate court concluded that the commission\u2019s service of its decision on plaintiff and not her attorney violated Supreme Court Rule 11(a), which requires that service be made upon the party\u2019s attorney of record, and if the party is not represented by an attorney of record, service shall be made upon the party. 145 Ill. 2d R. 11(a). The appellate court held that the commission \u201cfailed to show that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d 355 Ill. App. 3d at 683.\nHowever, the appellate court concluded that dismissal of plaintiffs complaint based on section 3 \u2014 109 of the Administrative Review Law was erroneous. The appellate court reversed the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiffs complaint for administrative review on this basis and remanded the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. 355 Ill. App. 3d at 683-85. The commission appealed to this court. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).\nII. ANALYSIS\nBefore this court, the commission\u2019s sole contention is that the circuit court should have granted its section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint for administrative review based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The commission argues that the appellate court should have upheld the dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s complaint on this basis. Plaintiff, urging affirmance of the appellate court, raises two contentions. First, plaintiff contends that the appellate court properly upheld the circuit court\u2019s refusal to dismiss plaintiffs complaint based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, plaintiff contends that the appellate court correctly reversed the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s complaint based on section 3 \u2014 109 of the Administrative Review Law. We find the commission\u2019s contention to be meritorious.\nSection 2 \u2014 619(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure permits dismissal where, inter alia, \u201cthe action was not commenced within the time liniited by law\u201d (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(5) (West 2002)) and where \u201cthe claim asserted *** is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim\u201d (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 619(a)(9) (West 2002)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The court should grant the motion if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would support a cause of action. On appeal, review is de novo. In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 189 (1997).\nEnacted in 1945, the Administrative Review Law is now 60 years old, and its basic framework has remained unchanged. See 1945 Ill. Laws 1144; Comment, The Illinois Administrative Review Act, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 636 (1947); G. Mills, The Illinois Administrative Review Act, 28 Chi. B. Rec. 7 (1946). The Administrative Review Law was an innovation and a departure from the common law, and the procedures established therein must be followed. Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 210 (1985), quoting Winston v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 407 Ill. 588, 595 (1950). Section 3 \u2014 102 of the Administrative Review Law mandates that parties to a proceeding before an administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of the agency\u2019s administrative decision unless review is sought \u201cwithin the time and in the manner\u201d provided by the statute. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 102 (West 2002). Indeed, the circuit court exercises special statutory jurisdiction pursuant to the Administrative Review Law. If the statutorily prescribed procedures are not strictly followed, \u201cno jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit court.\u201d Fredman Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d at 210.\nRegarding the time for filing a complaint for administrative review, section 3 \u2014 103 provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c\u00a7 3 \u2014 103. Commencement of action. Every action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision ***[.] \u00a3\nThe method of service of the decision shall be as provided in the Act governing the procedure before the administrative agency, but if no method is provided, a decision shall be deemed to have been served either when a copy of the decision is personally delivered or when a copy of the decision is deposited in the United States mail, in a sealed envelope or package, with postage prepaid, addressed to the party affected by the decision at his or her last known residence or place of business.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 103 (West 2002).\nThe 35-day time period for filing a complaint for administrative review \u201cis a jurisdictional requirement and that judicial review of the administrative decision is barred if the complaint is not filed within the time specified.\u201d Fredman Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d at 211; accord Nudell v. Forest Preserve District, 207 Ill. 2d 409, 422-23 (2003).\nIn this case, as the appellate court recognized (355 Ill. App. 3d at 682), no method for service is provided in the statute governing the proceedings before the Commission (55 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 8002 et seq. (West 2002)). Consequently, the methods specified in section 3 \u2014 103 of the Administrative Review Law apply.\nIn Nudell v. Forest Preserve District, 207 Ill. 2d 409 (2003), this court clarified and reiterated the jurisdictional filing requirement of section 3 \u2014 103 of the Administrative Review Law. Relying on the above-quoted plain language of section 3 \u2014 103, this court in Nudell held that, where the administrative agency serves its decision via United States mail, the 35-day period for filing a complaint for administrative review begins on the date that the agency decision is mailed, as opposed to the date that the affected party actually receives the decision. Nudell, 207 Ill. 2d at 414, 424; accord Cox v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 399, 402-03 (1983).\nIn the present case, the commission\u2019s computation of plaintiffs 35-day filing period is correct. Plaintiffs filing period began on May 23, 2003, the date on which the commission mailed its decision. In computing the 35-day filing period, the first day is excluded and the last day is included. Cox, 96 Ill. 2d at 402, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 1, par. 1012 (now codified at 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2002)). Plaintiffs filing period ended on Friday, June 27, 2003, and after that date the circuit court lost subject matter jurisdiction to review the commission\u2019s decision. Since plaintiff filed her complaint on Monday, June 30, 2003, the complaint was untimely and the circuit court should have granted the commission\u2019s motion to dismiss on this basis.\nHowever, instead of simply applying section 3 \u2014 103, as clarified in Nudell, to this case, the appellate court distinguished this dispositive authority from the facts of this case:\n\u201cWhile the Commission focuses on when the decision was mailed, it ignores another important consideration: to whom it was mailed. The Commission mailed the decision to plaintiff personally, not to the attorney who represented her before the Commission. Conversely, in Nudell, the decision was mailed to the plaintiff\u2019s attorney, but was not mailed to the plaintiff.\u201d (Emphases in original.) 355 111. App. 3d at 682.\nThe appellate court concluded that Nudell would have applied but for the belief that Supreme Court Rule 11(a) (145 Ill. 2d R. 11(a)) distinguished this case from Nudell. Supreme Court Rule 11(a) states as follows:\n\u201cRule 11. Manner of Serving Papers Other Than Process and Complaint on Parties Not in Default in the Trial and Reviewing Courts\n(a) On Whom Made. If a party is represented by an attorney of record, service shall be made upon the attorney. Otherwise service shall be made upon the party.\u201d 145 Ill. 2d R. 11(a).\nThe appellate court in this case, after observing that the appellate court in Nudell cited to Supreme Court Rule 11 for authority that service to plaintiffs attorney was sufficient, reasoned as follows:\n\u201cAlthough the court did not rule that service on the plaintiff would have been insufficient, that is the logical extension of the court\u2019s reasoning, inasmuch as Rule ll\u2019s requirement that service be made upon the attorney is stated in mandatory terms. Moreover, in Nudell, the supreme court noted that the decision had been served on the plaintiffs attorney (Nudell, 207 Ill. 2d at 412), and although that court did not specifically address the Rule 11 issue, the outcome of the appeal is consistent with the view that Rule 11 applies to service of the decision of an administrative agency. Accordingly, Nudell appears to be distinguishable because in that case the administrative decision was properly served in accordance with Rule 11, whereas in this case the Commission did not comply with that rule.\u201d 355 Ill. App. 3d at 683.\nBased on this reasoning, the appellate court upheld the circuit court\u2019s denial of the commission\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nThe commission contends that the dispositive question in this case is not to whom the commission\u2019s decision was mailed. It is undisputed that the decision was mailed to plaintiff, as \u201cthe party affected by the decision,\u201d pursuant to the plain language of section 3 \u2014 103. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2002). Rather, according to the commission, the dispositive question in this case is when did plaintiff file her complaint for administrative review, so as to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court.\nIn support of the appellate court, plaintiff argues that the applicability of Supreme Court Rule 11(a) \u201cdictates a mandatory procedural requirement in notice.\u201d According to plaintiff, if \u201cthe party affected by the decision,\u201d in the words of section 3 \u2014 103 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2002)), is represented by an attorney of record, then service must be made upon the attorney. Plaintiff describes a mailing to the party and not to the party\u2019s attorney of record as \u201cfatal.\u201d\nWe disagree with the appellate court\u2019s conclusion that Supreme Court Rule 11(a) distinguishes this case from Nudell. There is no \u201cRule 11 issue,\u201d as the appellate court characterized, because Supreme Court Rule 11 does not apply to service of an administrative agency decision in the context of section 3 \u2014 103 of the Administrative Review Law. Of course, supreme court rules \u201c \u2018are not aspirational. They are not suggestions. They have the force of law, and the presumption must he that they will be obeyed and enforced as written.\u2019 \u201d Roth v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 202 Ill. 2d 490, 494 (2002), quoting Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995).\n\u201cIndeed, we do expect litigants to comply with our rules. As we expressed in Roth, \u2018our rules would have little force if the legal community perceived that we, as a court, do not enforce the rules or tailor them to fit the exigencies of the moment. *** [W]e must emphasize that the supreme court rules are rules of procedure and that it is incumbent upon litigants to follow them.\u2019 \u201d (Emphases added.) Wauconda Fire Protection District v. Stonewall Orchards, LLP, 214 Ill. 2d 417, 428-29 (2005), quoting Roth, 202 Ill. 2d at 494-95.\nFurther, supreme court rules, together with article II of the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 101(b) (West 2002)), apply to all proceedings in the trial court, except to the extent that the procedure in a particular type of action is regulated by a statute other than the Civil Practice Law. 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.\nHowever, in the present case, the commission can in no way be considered a \u201clitigant\u201d prior to plaintiff filing her complaint for administrative review Consequently, the commission was not required to comply with Rule II. As its title suggests, the Administrative Review Law is limited in coverage to review proceedings; it does not include procedures and practice before agencies. See 42 III. L. Rev. at 641. Rather, an administrative review action begins with the filing of a complaint within 35 days of the date on which the administrative agency served its decision on the affected party. Presumably the Administrative Practice and Review Commission, the drafters of the Administrative Review Law, hoped that the \u201ccomplaint\u201d will be regarded as starting an original action rather than an appeal. See 42 Ill. L. Rev. at 643; accord 28 Chi. B. Rec. at 8 (\u201cThe pleading initiating the review action is designated as a \u2018complaint\u2019 (emphasis added)\u201d). In this case, litigation commenced when plaintiff filed her complaint for administrative review. Prior to plaintiff filing her complaint, no litigation existed, hence no litigants existed and, hence, supreme court rules did not yet apply.\nFurther, a careful reading of Supreme Court Rule 11 itself supports our conclusion. Rule 11 refers to the \u201cManner of Serving Papers Other Than Process and Complaint.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Supreme Court Rule 2(b)(3) defines paper as follows: \u201c \u2018Paper\u2019 means pleading, motion, notice, affidavit, memorandum, brief, petition, or other paper or combination of papers required or permitted to be filed.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 2(b)(3). Rule 11 falls squarely in the context of motion practice. Rule 11 is recognized as amplifying Rule 104(b), which pertains to \u201cFiling of Papers and Proof of Service\u201d (134 Ill. 2d R. 104(b)) and Rule 131, which pertains to \u201cForms of Papers\u201d (145 Ill. 2d R. 131). See generally 1A Nichols Illinois Civil Practice \u00a7\u00a7 11:1, 11:17 (rev. 2001); 4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice \u00a7 37.3 (1989). Obviously, motion practice assumes a pending action. See 1A Nichols Illinois Civil Practice \u00a7 12:1, at 241 (rev. 2001) (\u201cObviously, a motion cannot be filed until an action is pending\u201d).\nIn the context of section 3 \u2014 103 of the Administrative Review Law, the administrative agency decision is not \u201cfiled\u201d in the circuit court. Rather, it is \u201cserved upon the party affected by the decision\u201d (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2002)), who then decides whether to commence litigation by timely filing a complaint for administrative review. Supreme court rules \u2014 specifically Rule 11\u2014 become applicable only when litigation commences.\nMoreover, a careful reading of Nudell itself dispels any significance of the appellate court\u2019s distinction. In Nudell, this court listed exemplary appellate court decisions where \u201cthe appellate court has held that a complaint for administrative review must be filed within 35 days of the mailing of the decision.\u201d The question of to whom the agency decisions were mailed in those cases was not dispositive. Nudell, 207 Ill. 2d at 421-22, citing Laristos, Inc. v. City of Chicago License Appeal Comm\u2019n, 309 Ill. App. 3d 59 (1999) (agency decision mailed to attorney); Board of Education of St. Charles Community Unit School District, No. 303 v. Adelman, 137 Ill. App. 3d 965 (1985) (agency decision mailed to attorney); Schlobohm v. Police Board, 122 Ill. App. 3d 541 (1984) (agency decision mailed to plaintiff, who informed attorney); Ellis v. Miller, 119 Ill. App. 3d 579 (1983) (agency decision mailed to plaintiff and attorney); Chin v. Department of Public Aid, 78 Ill. App. 3d 1137 (1979) (agency decision mailed to plaintiff); Thompson v. Illinois Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 63 Ill. App. 3d 153 (1978) (agency decision mailed to attorney). Considered collectively, it is clear that the dispositive question was whether the plaintiff filed his or her complaint for administrative review within 35 days of the agency mailing its decision.\nFurther, in Nudell, this court affirmed the appellate court, which likewise held that the 35-day filing period of section 3 \u2014 103 began when the administrative decision was mailed. Nudell v. Forest Preserve District, 333 Ill. App. 3d 518, 522 (2002), aff'd, 207 Ill. 2d at 424. However, citing Supreme Court Rule 11(a), the appellate court in Nudell added that \u201cservice of the decision on Nudell\u2019s attorney, rather than Nudell, was sufficient.\u201d Nudell, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 522. This statement was dicta and unnecessary to the appellate court\u2019s holding in that case and our affirmance thereof. Not only was this statement dicta, but the citation to Supreme Court Rule 11(a) can cause confusion, as the appellate court\u2019s analysis in this cause aptly demonstrates. We are confident that with our decision today, this type of confusion will dissipate.\nReturning to the facts of the present case, plaintiff filed her complaint for administrative review more than 35 days after the commission mailed its decision. Supreme Court Rule 11 had no application prior to plaintiff filing her complaint. Consequently, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the cause. The court should have granted the commission\u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a) (West 2002)) based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The appellate court erred in holding to the contrary. Although the circuit court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s complaint for a different reason, the reasons given for a judgment or order are not material if the judgment or order itself is correct. Keck v. Keck, 56 Ill. 2d 508, 514 (1974). \u201cIt is the judgment and not what else may have been said by the lower court that is on appeal to a court of review. [Citations.] The reviewing court is not bound to accept the reasons given by the trial court for its judgment ***.\u201d Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1983). Rather, a reviewing court \u201ccan sustain the decision of the circuit court on any grounds which are called for by the record regardless of whether the circuit court relied on the grounds and regardless of whether the circuit court\u2019s reasoning was correct.\u201d Bell v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 106 Ill. 2d 135, 148 (1985). Our disposition of this jurisdictional issue obviates discussion of plaintiffs alternative contention.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the order of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.\nWe note that plaintiff ultimately filed an amended counteraffidavit. She \u201cdenied\u201d that the commission mailed a copy of its decision on May 23, 2003. She further swore that she \u201cnever received notice from [the commission] by general delivery mail, at any time, before or after May 24, 2003. The Commission\u2019s order was placed in plaintiffs mailbox on May 27, 2003 by an unknown person.\u201d\nHowever, as against the positive, detailed statements of fact in Mary Gray\u2019s affidavit, plaintiffs allegations, made on information and belief, are insufficient. An affidavit not based on personal knowledge is inadequate to rebut an affidavit which is based upon personal knowledge. See, e.g., Longo v. AAA-Michigan, 201 Ill. App. 3d 543, 551 (1990); Allied American Insurance Co. v. Mickiewicz, 124 Ill. App. 3d 705, 708-09 (1984). Plaintiffs amended counteraffidavit does not contain facts to establish any knowledge of plaintiff with respect to the commission\u2019s mailing practices.\nWe note that plaintiff, in her appellee\u2019s brief, erroneously describes the sheriffs motion to dismiss as \u201ca 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss\u201d based on her failure to pay costs pursuant to section 3 \u2014 109 of the Administrative Review Law. However, the sheriffs motion to dismiss is expressly based directly and solely on section 3 \u2014 109.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Timothy P. Dwyer, of St. Charles, and Timothy O\u2019Neil, of Foote, Meyers, Mielke & Flowers, of Geneva, for appellants.", "Herbert Hill, of Aurora, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 100165.\nERMA RODRIGUEZ, Appellee, v. THE SHERIFF\u2019S MERIT COMMISSION OF KANE COUNTY et al., Appellants.\nOpinion filed January 20, 2006.\nTimothy P. Dwyer, of St. Charles, and Timothy O\u2019Neil, of Foote, Meyers, Mielke & Flowers, of Geneva, for appellants.\nHerbert Hill, of Aurora, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0342-01", "first_page_order": 352, "last_page_order": 367 }