{ "id": 5736031, "name": "ROBERT C. MAHONEY, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (United Airlines, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Mahoney v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "2006-01-20", "docket_number": "No. 100239", "first_page": "358", "last_page": "375", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 358" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599125 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" }, { "page": "271" }, { "page": "272" }, { "page": "274" }, { "page": "274" }, { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 885", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2567019 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "889-90" }, { "page": "889-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0885-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 Ill. App. 3d 972", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2968347 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "hereinafter, Rankins" }, { "page": "976" }, { "page": "976" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "980" }, { "page": "982-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/252/0972-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069700 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" }, { "page": "433" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3113892 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "hereinafter, Walker" }, { "page": "129" }, { "page": "130" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "132" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "136", "parenthetical": "Simon, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, C.J." }, { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259070 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781334 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243860 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ill. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4947678 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" }, { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/287/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ill. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5249346 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195-96" }, { "page": "199" }, { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/341/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "1951 Ill. Laws 1060", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469158 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144-45" }, { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 856", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2510331 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "866" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/0856-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2586157 ], "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/364/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317109 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" }, { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 840", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906782 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843" }, { "page": "843-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0840-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1066, "char_count": 30141, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.735660087945244e-08, "percentile": 0.49448114542585303 }, "sha256": "dc8b05fe4385983de2eae379df878da3f7ef144b557598704e1841a479b0d3b4", "simhash": "1:d9acbdf62ea66861", "word_count": 4798 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:47:37.235456+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROBERT C. MAHONEY, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (United Airlines, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, McMorrow, Fitzgerald, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nIn this worker\u2019s compensation case, we decide whether the site of a contract of hire is the sole determining factor for applying the Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2002)) to an employment injury sustained by a worker outside this state. Robert Mahoney, who was hired in Illinois, sustained two separate injuries while working for United Airlines (United) at its Orlando, Florida, facility. He filed applications for adjustment of his claims with the Illinois Industrial Commission (Commission), now known as the Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission (see 820 ILCS 305/13 (West 2004)) seeking benefits under the Act. After the claims were consolidated for hearing, an arbitrator denied benefits. The Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator\u2019s decision. On judicial review, the circuit court of Cook County confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision. The appellate court reversed. 355 Ill. App. 3d 267.\nOn denial of rehearing, all of the justices filed a statement that the case involved a substantial question warranting consideration by this court. We allowed United\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. We granted the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of Mahoney\u2019s position. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. We now affirm the appellate court.\nBACKGROUND\nThe arbitrator\u2019s findings of fact are undisputed. Robert Mahoney was hired by United Airlines on January 6, 1969, to work as a ramp serviceman at O\u2019Hare International Airport in Chicago, Illinois. He worked for United continuously in Illinois until 1993, when, following his divorce, he voluntarily applied for transfer to United\u2019s facility at Orlando International Airport in Orlando, Florida. Mahoney had the necessary seniority to choose among many locations throughout the United States.\nThere was no interruption between Mahoney\u2019s last day of work in Chicago and the beginning of his work the next day in Orlando. He has worked continuously in ramp service for United at Orlando until the present time.\nMahoney continues to reside in Orlando, where he purchased a home in 1984. He remarried in Florida. He has a Florida driver\u2019s license, pays taxes in Florida, and pays no taxes in Illinois. Although he has the right, he has never sought to relocate back to Illinois or to any other state.\nSince his transfer, Mahoney has returned to Illinois approximately three times for training sessions and has also returned for family visits. When he returned to Illinois, he stayed in local hotels. He has not been injured in Illinois.\nMahoney sustained compensable injuries in Orlando, Florida, on March 19, 1999, and January 2, 2001. He received temporary total disability benefits consistent with the Florida Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, and medical treatment for his injuries was provided near his home in Orlando.\nMahoney filed applications for adjustment of his claims for both injuries in Illinois. On Mahoney\u2019s motion, the cases were consolidated for hearing. The arbitrator found no Illinois jurisdiction. The arbitrator noted that Mahoney relied exclusively on the fact that he was initially hired in Illinois as the basis for asserting Illinois jurisdiction. Rather than finding that fact solely determinative, the arbitrator also considered: (1) the continuity of employment between the time of contract and the time of injury; (2) whether the transfer was voluntary; (3) the length of time between the departure from Illinois and the injury; and (4) the significance of Mahoney\u2019s contacts with Illinois following his departure.\nThe arbitrator found Mahoney had no employment relationship with United in Illinois because neither the accident nor his resulting treatment occurred here and he voluntarily transferred to Florida from Illinois for personal reasons six years before the first accident. Accordingly, the arbitrator found no persuasive reason for the Commission to accept jurisdiction, and Mahoney\u2019s claims were denied.\nThe Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator\u2019s decision, finding the jurisdiction issue controlled by Carroll v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 205 Ill. App. 3d 885 (1990), and United Airlines v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 252 Ill. App. 3d 972 (1993) (hereinafter, Rankins). On judicial review, the circuit court confirmed the decision in a written order, finding it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and not clearly erroneous.\nThe appellate court reversed. 355 Ill. App. 3d 267. The court held the plain language of the Act \u201cclearly states that site of the contract for hire is the exclusive test for determining the applicability of the Act to persons whose employment is outside Illinois where the contract of hire is made within Illinois.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) 355 Ill. App. 3d at 269. The court noted that this court\u2019s decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 79 Ill. 2d 425 (1980), established a bright-line rule for future courts. If the employment contract is made in Illinois, a claimant injured in another state is covered under the Act. Conversely, if the contract of hire is not made in Illinois, there is no coverage for injuries incurred outside the state. 355 Ill. App. 3d at 271.\nThe appellate court reasoned United Airlines, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 96 Ill. 2d 126 (1983) (hereinafter, Walker), involving a fact situation nearly identical to the present case, is directly apposite. The appellate court noted that in light of Walker, this court interpreted the Act to provide jurisdiction when the contract of hire was made in Illinois, even if the employee permanently transferred to another state and the injury occurred several years after the transfer. 355 Ill. App. 3d at 272. Therefore, the appellate court held that the \u201csitus of the contract is the sole determinate of jurisdiction under the Act for a person whose employment is outside Illinois where the contract of hire is made within Illinois.\u201d 355 Ill. App. 3d at 274. The court \u201coverruled\u201d Carroll and Rankins, the appellate precedent relied on by the Commission, to the extent those cases deviated from its announced holding. 355 Ill. App. 3d at 274.\nANALYSIS\nSection 2 of the Act imposes liability on employers for injuries to employees arising out of and in the course of employment. 820 ILCS 305/2 (West 2002). Section 1(b)(2) of the Act defines \u201cemployee\u201d as:\n\u201cEvery person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, including persons whose employment is outside of the State of Illinois where the contract of hire is made within the State of Illinois, persons whose employment results in fatal or non-fatal injuries within the State of Illinois where the contract of hire is made outside of the State of Illinois, and persons whose employment is principally localized within the State of Illinois, regardless of the place of the accident or the place where the contract of hire was made ***.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/l(b)(2) (West 2002). Section 1(b)(3) of the Act provides:\n\u201cAn employee or his dependents under this Act who shall have a cause of action by reason of any injury, disablement or death arising out of and in the course of his employment may elect to pursue his remedy in the State where injured or disabled, or in the State where the contract of hire is made, or in the State where the employment is principally localized.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/l(b)(3) (West 2002).\nResolution of the issue presented in this appeal presents a question of law dependent on construction of the preceding statutory language. Questions of statutory construction are subject to de novo review. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001).\nIn construing a statute, we are guided by familiar principles. The best indication of legislative intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994). When the language is clear and unambiguous, the court must apply it as written without reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions not expressed by the legislature. Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999). We presume the General Assembly did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). \u201cThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is to be interpreted liberally [citation] to effectuate its main purpose \u2014 providing financial protection for interruption or termination of a worker\u2019s earning power.\u201d Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232.\nIn Union Bridge & Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 287 Ill. 396 (1919), this court considered the question of whether the Act provided a remedy for the mother of a young construction worker hired in Illinois who was killed while working in Kentucky. The 1913 version of the Act, then in effect, defined the term \u201cemployee\u201d without the express extraterritorial application provisions contained in the present statute. As the statutory definition of \u201cemployee\u201d was of no assistance in deciding the question of Illinois jurisdiction, the court turned to the language of the Act\u2019s title, stating the express purpose of the Act was to provide \u201c \u2018compensation for accidental injuries or deaths suffered in the course of employment within this state.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) Union Bridge, 287 Ill. at 399, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1913, ch. 48. Based on this language, the court denied compensation. Although acknowledging the remedial purpose of the Act required a liberal construction, the court noted there was no provision authorizing compensation for an injury occurring outside this state. Union Bridge, 287 Ill. at 400.\nIn 1925, the legislature amended both the title to the Act and the definition of \u201cemployee,\u201d expressly providing for the Act\u2019s application to injuries occurring outside the state when the contract for hire is made within IIlinois. The constitutionality of the amendment was challenged in Beall Bros. Supply Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 341 Ill. 193 (1930). The amendment defined \u201cemployee\u201d as:\n\u201c \u2018every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, including persons whose employment is outside of the State of Illinois where the contract of hire is made within the State of Illinois.\u2019 \u201d Beall Bros., 341 Ill. at 195-96, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1925, ch. 48, par. 142.\nThis court upheld the statute, holding that when persons contract under the Act, \u201cthey are conclusively presumed to have accepted its provisions and to be bound thereby,\u201d and that \u201c[a] law effective in this State may create rights and liabilities arising from acts occurring outside of this State. [Citation.]\u201d Beall Bros., 341 Ill. at 199. Accordingly, the court upheld an award of compensation to a traveling salesman based in Denver, Colorado, who was injured in Colorado over a year after being hired in Illinois. Beall Bros., 341 Ill. at 199.\nIn 1951, the legislature repealed the Act of 1913 and reenacted it, restructuring sections of the previous Act and incorporating the 1925 amendment providing for extraterritorial application when the contract of hire is made in Illinois. The title of the Act was:\n\u201cAn Act to promote the general welfare of the people of this State by providing compensation for accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of employment within this State, and without this State where the contract of employment is made within this State; providing for the enforcement and administering thereof, and a penalty for its violation, and repealing an Act therein named.\u201d 1951 Ill. Laws 1060, eff. July 9, 1951.\nIn 1975, the legislature again amended section 1(b)(2), broadening the definition of employment to include \u201cemployment principally localized in Illinois.\u201d The section has not since been amended.\nAlmost three decades after its passage, this court construed the 1951 version of section 1(b)(2) in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 79 Ill. 2d 425 (1980). In Youngstown, the claimant was originally hired in Illinois, laid off, and rehired at a different facility in Indiana. A provision in the collective-bargaining agreement between the United Steelworker\u2019s Union and the company allowed the claimant to retain his seniority because he was rehired by the company within two years. The claimant was, however, required to serve a probationary period following his rehiring. After his injury in Indiana, the claimant filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim in Illinois and received an award. On appeal, this court reversed.\nThe court applied the place-of-hire test, finding it apparent from a reading of section 1(b)(2) that \u201can out-of-State injury falls within the Act where the contract of employment was made in Illinois.\u201d Youngstown, 79 Ill. 2d at 430. The court concluded, however, that a new contract of employment was formed in Indiana following the termination of the employment relationship in Illinois, noting the claimant was interviewed for employment in Indiana, underwent a preemployment physical examination in Indiana, received a new employee identification number, joined a different local of the union, and was not placed in a position comparable to his Illinois employment. Youngstown, 79 Ill. 2d at 433. Thus, the court held Illinois lacked jurisdiction, observing that its \u201cjurisdictional finding\u201d was \u201cparticularly appropriate *** where the employee has not even worked in the State in which he is seeking relief for over 12 years.\u201d Youngstown, 79 Ill. 2d at 434. We note that the court\u2019s observation that the claimant had not worked in Illinois for 12 years was not dispositive. The decision was based solely on a determination that the claimant\u2019s contract of hire in Illinois was terminated, and a new contract of hire was then created in Indiana.\nIn 1981, this court upheld the constitutionality of the 1975 amendment in a case involving an employee hired in Illinois who worked in several states and sustained injuries resulting in his death in Michigan. Goldblatt Brothers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 86 Ill. 2d 141 (1981). The court rejected as without merit the employer\u2019s argument that section 1(b)(2) of the Act denied it equal protection of the law under the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution because the employee, if hired in Michigan and injured under the same circumstances, would be subject to Michigan law, and his survivors would receive much lower benefits. Goldblatt Brothers, 86 Ill. 2d at 144-45. The court noted that the claimant\u2019s widow was authorized to bring the action in either forum, and the fortuitous circumstance that the Illinois statute allowed a greater recovery did not defeat her right. Goldblatt Brothers, 86 Ill. 2d at 146.\nIn Walker, 96 Ill. 2d 126, the court upheld a Commission decision finding jurisdiction of the claims of a worker hired in Illinois in 1972, who voluntarily transferred to a permanent position in United\u2019s facility in San Francisco, California, in February 1976. Nearly eight months later, he sustained the first of three work-related injuries. Eight months after that, he sustained another injury and was injured again approximately two years later. He received temporary total disability benefits and filed applications for permanent compensation in California. While those applications were pending, he also filed applications for adjustment of his claims in Illinois. The Commission found Illinois jurisdiction, and United sought judicial review. The circuit court consolidated all three claims and reversed the Commission, finding that the \u201cspirit of this court\u2019s decision\u201d in Youngstown required a conclusion that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. Walker, 96 Ill. 2d at 129.\nThis court reversed the decision, holding the circuit court\u2019s reliance on Youngstown misplaced, because Youngstown is factually distinguishable. Walker, 96 Ill. 2d at 130. The court noted that the Youngstown claimant was permanently laid off from his position before learning, several months later, of an opening at his former employer\u2019s Indiana facility. He entered into a new contract of hire in Indiana, and his new employment relationship was governed by that contract, rather than his former employment contract in Illinois. Walker, 96 Ill. 2d at 131. Conversely, in Walker, the claimant\u2019s employment was continuous and uninterrupted at the time of his transfer to California. Therefore, the Commission\u2019s finding that the employment contract existing at the time of his injuries was made in Illinois was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Walker, 96 Ill. 2d at 132.\nOur court rejected United\u2019s argument urging application of a theory of jurisdiction suggested in a learned treatise by Professor Larson. According to Professor Larson, jurisdiction over compensation issues is present only in the forum where the employment relationship is \u201ccentered,\u201d and the status of the relationship should be determined by rules similar to those governing an individual\u2019s domicile. See 4 A. Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation, \u00a7\u00a7 87.40 through 87.42 (1982). The court held application of that theory is inconsistent with the contractual basis of jurisdiction specified in the Act, and any change would require a legislative mandate. Walker, 96 Ill. 2d at 131.\nThe dissent in Walker, authored by Justice Simon and joined by Chief Justice Ryan, relied principally on Professor Larson\u2019s theory. The dissent noted New Hampshire, whose workers\u2019 compensation statute has language nearly identical to the Illinois provision in question, has adopted the \u201cemployment relation\u201d standard advocated by Professor Larson. Walker, 96 Ill. 2d at 136 (Simon, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, C.J.).\nSubsequently, the Walker majority holding was applied by our appellate court in Trans World Airlines v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 191 Ill. App. 3d 856 (1989). The court upheld compensation awards to two employees injured in Missouri following transfer from their employer\u2019s Illinois facility. The court observed, \u201cOur supreme court has carefully explained that any exclusive application of the theory of using an analysis similar to those governing questions concerning an individual\u2019s domicile is not consistent with the contractual basis of jurisdiction specified by our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, and \u2018any change therein will have to be legislatively mandated.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Trans World Airlines, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 866.\nDespite the clear direction given by this court in an unbroken line of cases beginning with Beall Bros. in 1930, and despite the application of our holding in Walker by the appellate court in Trans World Airlines, the appellate court departed from a strict application of the place-of-the-contract-of-hire standard in two cases: Carroll v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 205 Ill. App. 3d 885 (1990), and Rankins, 252 Ill. App. 3d 972.\nIn Carroll, the circuit court reversed a Commission award to a truck driver hired in Illinois, who lived and worked in other states under the same contract of employment, and who was injured in the State of Washington 19 years after his hiring in Illinois. On appeal, the claimant contended that his employment pursuant to his contract of hire in Illinois was continuous and uninterrupted because he was not required to fill out a new employment application or submit to a physical examination before reporting to each new jobsite. The appellate court acknowledged that those kinds of facts affect the continuity of employment, but are not exclusively determinative, and held that the court looks to \u201cthe totality of arrangements for reemployment. [Citations.]\u201d Carroll, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 889-90.\nThe court then considered that the claimant\u2019s transfer was involuntary and without a right of recall to employment in Illinois; that the injury occurred 18 years after his transfer and 19 years after he last lived in Illinois; and that the employment relationship\u2019s most significant contacts were in states other than Illinois. The court then concluded that the claimant\u2019s original hiring in Illinois did not lead to an automatic finding of jurisdiction, and thus held the trial court correctly found no jurisdiction. Carroll, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 889-90.\nIn Rankins, the appellate court found the reasoning in Carroll dispositive of the issue of jurisdiction in the case of an airline flight attendant domiciled in San Francisco, California, who was injured in California. Her initial employment interview in 1969 was in California, where she was told she would be hired if she successfully completed a 5V2-week training course in Chicago, Illinois. At the completion of her training, she was commissioned to perform the duties of a \u201cmainliner stewardess\u201d and, at her request, was assigned to duty in New York. She later transferred to California. Her employer maintained a seniority list governing bidding on schedules, flight passes, vacation, retirement, and insurance benefits. Her date of hire, for purposes of seniority, was the first date of her attendance at the training school.\nFollowing her injury in 1983, she filed an application for adjustment of claim in Illinois. The Commission found that the contract for hire was finalized at the completion of the training program in Illinois and therefore found jurisdiction over the claim. Rankins, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 976. The circuit court reversed, relying on the analysis in Carroll. Rankins, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 976.\nThe appellate court acknowledged the holding in Beall Bros, that the Act may be applied to claimants hired in Illinois who are injured outside of Illinois. The court distinguished Beall Bros., however, on the basis that it did not address what factors should be considered in determining the Act\u2019s applicability to a particular claim and further noted that Beall Bros, involved annual contracts entered into in Illinois. Rankins, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 978.\nThe court then held that the site of the contract for hire is not the exclusive test for determining the applicability of the Act, but \u201cis only one of the factors the Commission is to consider within the totality of the arrangements. Carroll, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 888 ***.\u201d Rankins, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 978.\nThe appellate court acknowledged that the finding of the arbitrator, Commission and circuit court, determining that the contract of hire was made in Illinois, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Rankins, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 980. Further, the court acknowledged that the evidence indicated the claimant did not have to submit a new application or undergo another physical examination to be \u201crehired\u201d each time she changed domiciles. Yet, despite acknowledging that the employment contract was made in Illinois and that the claimant\u2019s injury occurred while she was working under that contract, the court nevertheless found those facts not solely determinative of the jurisdiction issue. Instead, the court relied on the lapse of time between her hiring in Illinois and her work history in other jurisdictions, the fact that she did not continue to maintain significant contacts with Illinois following her initial training period, and the voluntariness of her transfer to California when she could have worked in Illinois. Accordingly, the court held the Commission lacked jurisdiction of the claim. Rankins, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 982-83.\nNonetheless, the appellate court here correctly noted that this court in Youngstown applied a bright-line test based on the plain language of the Act for future courts. \u201c[I]f the employment contract was made in Illinois, a claimant injured while working in another state was covered under the Act. Conversely, if the contract for hire was not entered into in Illinois, then there was no coverage.\u201d 355 Ill. App. 3d at 271. United argues this is not a correct interpretation of Youngstown because that case clearly reviewed the \u201ctotality of the arrangements\u201d for reemployment.\nThe Youngstown court indeed reviewed the \u201ctotality of the arrangements,\u201d but only in the context of determining whether the claimant continued employment under the initial contract of hire executed in Illinois. The threshold issue of determining the place of the initial contract of hire and the continuation of the contract is an entirely separate inquiry. Here, United concedes Ma-honey was hired in Illinois and has not severed his employment contract. The Youngstown court\u2019s holding that there was no jurisdiction under the Act resulted from its determination that the claimant\u2019s old contract of hire ended with his layoff and that his injury occurred while working under a new contract of hire executed in Indiana. Youngstown, 79 Ill. 2d at 433. Accordingly, a review of the \u201ctotality of the arrangements\u201d in this case leads only to the conclusion that Mahoney was still working under his original contract of hire at the time of his injuries.\nUnited also urges reversal of the appellate court decision because it is inconsistent with the purpose of the Act and the legislative intent expressed in its title. While acknowledging the plain language of section 1(b)(2), United nevertheless argues that it does not exist in a vacuum. United notes that the title of the Act describes its application as \u201cto promote the general welfare of the people of this State ***.\u201d 1951 Ill. Laws 1060, eff. July 9, 1951. The title of an act can provide guidance in interpreting the statute. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Ames, 364 Ill. 362, 365 (1936). \u201cTo the extent that any express language in a statute contradicts a preamble, the statutory language controls.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Atkins v. Deere & Co., 177 Ill. 2d 222, 234 (1997).\nIn Burtis v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 275 Ill. App. 3d 840 (1995), the court held that the title suggests that the purpose of the Act is to benefit the citizens of the State of Illinois. Burtis, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 843. The claimant in Burtis, although injured in New Jersey after a transfer to Tennessee, was, at the time of the Commission hearing, a resident of Illinois. The court thus distinguished Carroll and Rankins and found that, under those circumstances, the Illinois contract of hire was sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the Act. Burtis, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 843-44. United argues that a person who at one point lived and worked in Illinois but has since moved to a different state and has lived and worked there for many years, while maintaining no contact with Illinois, cannot be considered a citizen of Illinois.\nWe note that in Walker this court considered both the title of the Act and the express language of section 1(b)(2) in determining the claimant\u2019s injuries were within the jurisdictional scope of the Act. Walker, 96 Ill. 2d at 130. We do not consider the expression in the title of the Act of an intention to promote the general welfare of the people of this state to limit application of the plain, unambiguous language of section 1(b)(2). See Atkins, 177 Ill. 2d at 234.\nUnited also argues that to allow nonresidents of Illinois who fail to maintain significant contact with this state to claim workers\u2019 compensation benefits here would unfairly burden Illinois. United suggests a parade of negative consequences likely to result, including increased taxpayer cost due to a congested Industrial Commission docket, loss of potential employers who will fear high insurance premiums, and distorted statistics on work-related injuries, thus affecting promulgation of IIlinois safety regulations and laws. Allowing Mahoney to file a claim in Illinois despite the availability of a forum in Florida encourages forum shopping for the jurisdiction with the most liberal benefits. The legislature, United asserts, could not have intended this result. Accordingly, United urges this court to adopt Professor Larson\u2019s employment relation analysis, as advocated by the dissenters in Walker, and confirm the application of the Carroll-Rankins standard by the Commission.\nWe decline United\u2019s invitation. The plain, unambiguous language of section 1(b)(2), as consistently interpreted by this court in an unbroken line of cases dating to 1930, confers jurisdiction to the Commission over injuries occurring outside Illinois when the contract of hire is made within Illinois. As long as the initial contract remains in force, the Commission retains jurisdiction. The section does not speak to lapse of time, failure to maintain significant contacts, or voluntariness of transfers, and imposes no requirement other than the existence of an employment contract in this state. Although Professor Larson\u2019s analysis is certainly reasonable, adoption of the standard he advocates is properly addressed by the legislature, not this court.\nAccordingly, we hold that the place of the contract of hire is the sole determining factor for the existence of jurisdiction over employment injuries occurring outside this state. Mahoney\u2019s original contract of hire was still in effect when he was injured in Florida and, thus, he is entitled to pursue his claims in Illinois.\nCONCLUSION\nThe arbitrator, Commission, and the circuit court of Cook County erred in applying a broader standard than the situs of the employment contract in finding no jurisdiction. As Mahoney\u2019s injuries occurred while his employment was still governed by his initial Illinois contract of hire, he is entitled to assert his claims in IIlinois. We therefore affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nAppellate court judgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul W. Wiedner, Richard J. Leamy, Jr., and Emily E. Borg, of Wiedner & McAuliffe, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jason H. Rubens, of Rudich, Rubens & Taradji, L.L.C., of Chicago, for appellee.", "Martha Garcia and Richard Johnson, of Katz Friedman Eagle Eisenstein & Johnson, PC., of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 100239.\nROBERT C. MAHONEY, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (United Airlines, Appellant).\nOpinion filed January 20, 2006.\nPaul W. Wiedner, Richard J. Leamy, Jr., and Emily E. Borg, of Wiedner & McAuliffe, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nJason H. Rubens, of Rudich, Rubens & Taradji, L.L.C., of Chicago, for appellee.\nMartha Garcia and Richard Johnson, of Katz Friedman Eagle Eisenstein & Johnson, PC., of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association." }, "file_name": "0358-01", "first_page_order": 368, "last_page_order": 385 }