{ "id": 3598113, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RICHARD MORRIS, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Morris", "decision_date": "2006-04-20", "docket_number": "No. 99676", "first_page": "373", "last_page": "399", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "219 Ill. 2d 373" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974991 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278519 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801354 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453249 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 959", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083825 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "962" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0959-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 S.W.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 5217052, 10262149 ], "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829", "parenthetical": "construing governor's clemency order to be a 'reprieve' even though governor used the word 'furlough'; 'it is the substance of the proclamation of the governor and not the name by which it is designated, that controls its effect'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tex-crim/123/0472-01", "/sw2d/59/0828-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Tex. Crim. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tex. Crim.", "case_ids": [ 5217052 ], "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474", "parenthetical": "construing governor's clemency order to be a 'reprieve' even though governor used the word 'furlough'; 'it is the substance of the proclamation of the governor and not the name by which it is designated, that controls its effect'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tex-crim/123/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.W3d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 9110665 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196", "parenthetical": "construing power of the governor to issue 'pardons' under state constitution as including power to issue partial pardons" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/107/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2463105 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "462-63" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "463-64" }, { "page": "476-77" }, { "page": "476-77" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "476-77", "parenthetical": "\"it is the substance, not the terminology, of the clemency orders that controls\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461817 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" }, { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "967 F.2d 1166", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10519763 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1167", "parenthetical": "under Illinois law, consideration of clemency petitions is essentially a judicial function" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/967/1166-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224789 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722-24", "parenthetical": "Harrison, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57333 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121977 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225-29", "parenthetical": "Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176749 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 806", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3413558 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3422889 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1027" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/1017-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3242286 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415408 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 S.E. 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11253643 ], "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/145/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Idaho 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 4433823 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" }, { "page": "1219" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/114/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2463105 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476-77" }, { "page": "465-68" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "469-70, 477-78" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461817 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0137-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1641, "char_count": 49558, "ocr_confidence": 0.811, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.166512551399588e-08, "percentile": 0.3830304392263796 }, "sha256": "0be5150d7cc30b10c472c01260d00a40f56618982490a32e18ca4b190487482e", "simhash": "1:30af380d294058c2", "word_count": 7929 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:47:08.841300+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RICHARD MORRIS, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, and Garman concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Karmeier dissented, with opinion.\nOPINION\nThe defendant, Richard Morris, was convicted of first degree murder and other offenses and sentenced to death. While his case was pending before this court on direct appeal, then-Governor George H. Ryan issued a clemency order which stated that defendant\u2019s death sentence was commuted to natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release. Thereafter, this court retained jurisdiction of the case, reversed defendant\u2019s conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. See People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137 (2004).\nOn remand, the State indicated that if defendant should be convicted following retrial, it would again seek a sentence of death. Defendant, relying on the former Governor\u2019s clemency order, moved the circuit court to bar the State from pursuing the death penalty. In a written order, the circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion. The State then sought, and was granted, direct appeal to this court under Supreme Court Rule 302(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the circuit court.\nBackground\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant was convicted of first degree murder, aggravated vehicular hijacking and aggravated kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to death on the first degree murder conviction and his case was appealed directly to this court (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 4(b); 134 Ill. 2d R. 603). Oral argument was held and the case was taken under advisement.\nOn January 10, 2003, while defendant\u2019s case was still under advisement, former Governor George H. Ryan gave a public speech at Northwestern University Law School in which he announced that he was exercising the clemency authority given him under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, \u00a7 12), and \u201ccommuting the sentences of all death row inmates.\u201d See Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University Law School (January 11, 2003); People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457, 462 (2004). In the speech, the former Governor discussed several problems that he believed existed with the death penalty in Illinois and stated that he was granting a \u201cblanket commutation\u201d because, in his view, the \u201cIllinois capital punishment system is broken.\u201d Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University Law School (January 11, 2003); Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 468. The same day that he delivered the speech, the former Governor issued clemency orders for each of the death row inmates, including defendant. Defendant\u2019s clemency order stated:\n\u201cWhereas, Richard Morris B\u201465709 was convicted of the crime of Murder, Case #96 CR 00123\u201401 in the Criminal Court of Cook County and was sentenced January 29, 1999 to Death and whereas it has been represented to me that said Richard Morris B\u201465709 is a fit and proper subject for Executive Clemency.\nNow, Know Ye, that I, GEORGE H. RYAN, Governor of the State of Illinois, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution of this State, do by these presents:\nCOMMUTE THE SENTENCE OF Richard Morris\nSentence Commuted to Natural Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Release[.]\u201d\nFollowing the issuance of the clemency orders, the Illinois Attorney General filed an original action in this court which challenged the validity of the orders with respect to two categories of death row inmates. See Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457. The first category consisted of a group of inmates who had failed to sign or otherwise consent to their clemency petitions. The Attorney General maintained that, pursuant to statute, the Governor had no authority to grant clemency to these inmates. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 462-63. The second category consisted of a group of inmates who had been sentenced to death, but whose sentences had been reversed on direct appeal or in postconviction proceedings. These inmates were awaiting new sentencing hearings at the time the clemency orders were issued. For most of the inmates in this category, the clemency orders stated that their sentences were \u201cCommuted to a Sentence Other Than Death for the Crime of Murder, So that the Maximum Sentence that may be Imposed is Natural Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief [sic].\u201d See Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 464. The Attorney General maintained that the Governor had no authority to grant a preemptive commutation to these \u201cunsentenced\u201d inmates and that he had improperly encroached upon the judiciary\u2019s sentencing powers in doing so. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 463-64.\nThis court rejected the Attorney General\u2019s challenges to both categories of inmates. With respect to the \u201cunsentenced\u201d inmates we stated:\n\u201cThis is a difficult question with little to guide us, but we believe that the grant of authority given the Governor under article Y, section 12, is sufficiently broad to allow former Governor Ryan to do what he did. As set forth above, the Governor\u2019s clemency powers, which attach upon an adjudication of guilt, allow him to mitigate or set aside the punishment for the crime by issuing a pardon. Pardons may be full or partial, removing some or all of the legal consequences of a crime, and may be absolute or imposed with conditions. Further, the Governor can grant a reprieve for any sentence imposed and may commute any sentence imposed to a lesser sentence. In this situation, what former Governor Ryan essentially did was to grant the inmates listed in count II a partial pardon by pardoning only the possible capital consequences of the offense. As we noted, a partial pardon exonerates a defendant from some but not all of the punishment or legal consequences of a crime. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1113 (6th ed. 1990); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 107 S.W3d 193, 196 (Ky. 2003) (construing power of the governor to issue \u2018pardons\u2019 under state constitution as including power to issue partial pardons). The Governor\u2019s pardon power allows him to remove or mitigate the consequences of a crime, and that is what he did here by removing the maximum sentence for these defendants in future sentencing hearings. We deem it irrelevant that the Governor used the term \u2018commutation\u2019 in his clemency orders, because we believe that it is the substance, not the terminology, of the clemency orders that controls. See Ex parte Black, 123 Tex. Crim. 472, 474, 59 S.W.2d 828, 829 (1933) (construing governor\u2019s clemency order to be a \u2018reprieve\u2019 even though governor used the word \u2018furlough\u2019; \u2018it is the substance of the proclamation of the governor and not the name by which it is designated, that controls its effect\u2019). We emphasize the limited nature of our holding. We hold only that the Governor\u2019s constitutional authority to issue pardons after conviction is sufficiently broad to allow him to reduce the maximum sentence the defendant is facing. In such a situation, the Governor is exercising his power to prevent or mitigate punishment by pardoning the defendant from the full extent of the punishment allowed by law.\u201d Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 476-77.\nDefendant in the case at bar was one of the death row inmates who did not sign his clemency petition. Consequently, his case remained under advisement in this court, pending the resolution of the Attorney General\u2019s complaint in Snyder. Following our decision in Snyder, we retained jurisdiction of defendant\u2019s case and entered judgment on defendant\u2019s direct appeal. See Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137.\nIn Morris, we concluded that defendant\u2019s trial counsel committed fundamental and indefensible errors during the course of trial. As a result, \u201cthere was a breakdown of the adversarial process during defendant\u2019s trial such that there was no meaningful adversarial testing of defendant\u2019s case.\u201d Morris, 209 Ill. 2d at 188. Accordingly, we held that defendant was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. We reversed defendant\u2019s convictions, and remanded the cause for a new trial.,Morris, 209 Ill. 2d at 188.\nOn remand, the State indicated that, despite the clemency order entered by former Governor Ryan, it again intended to seek the death penalty against defendant. In response, defendant filed a \u201cMotion to Preclude the State From Seeking Imposition of the Death Penalty.\u201d In support of this motion, defendant pointed to this court\u2019s discussion regarding the \u201cunsentenced\u201d inmates in Snyder. Defendant noted that, in Snyder, we concluded that the clemency orders entered for the \u201cunsentenced\u201d inmates were, in essence, partial pardons which removed the maximum sentence possible, i.e., death, for those inmates. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 476-77. Defendant maintained that his clemency order also acted as a partial pardon which removed the death penalty as a possible sentence if he were again to be convicted. According to defendant, \u201c[t]he governor\u2019s clemency order was not conditional. It was absolute. The governor did not qualify his order by granting the defendant clemency from the death penalty only if his conviction were affirmed on appeal, or by stating that the clemency order would not apply to any inmate whose conviction was subsequently reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial.\u201d\nThe State, in reply, noted that the clemency orders for the \u201cunsentenced\u201d defendants discussed in Snyder differed from defendant\u2019s. As noted, the clemency orders for the \u201cunsentenced\u201d inmates stated that their sentences were \u201cCommuted to a Sentence Other Than Death for the Crime of Murder, So that the Maximum Sentence that may be Imposed is Natural Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief [sic].\u201d See Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 464. The State maintained that the foregoing language indicated that the Governor intended to restrict the outcome of future judicial proceedings for the \u201cunsentenced\u201d inmates. In contrast, the State noted, defendant\u2019s clemency order states only that defendant\u2019s sentence is commuted, without any further qualifying language. Thus, according to the State, the Governor had no intention to limit the sentence that defendant could receive following retrial and the State was free to pursue the death penalty against defendant.\nIn addition to arguing that his clemency order was, in substance, a partial pardon, defendant also contended in his motion that the imposition of the death penalty on retrial would violate his due process rights and the statutory prohibition against increasing a sentence on remand under section 5\u20145\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5\u20145\u20144(a) (West 2004)). Defendant further maintained that the State\u2019s action in seeking the death penalty on retrial constituted prosecutorial vindictiveness.\nFollowing argument, the circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion. With respect to defendant\u2019s argument that his clemency order acted as a partial pardon, the circuit court stated:\n\u201cResolution of this issue must necessarily rest upon a determination of the Governor\u2019s intent in his grant of clemency. As the supreme court has recognized, the pardon power given the Governor in article V, section 12, is extremely broad. [Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 473.] In construing a governor\u2019s clemency order, it is the substance not the terminology of the order that controls. People v. Collins, [351 Ill. App. 3d 959, 962 (2004)]. Here, the Governor\u2019s public announcement on January 10, 2003, that he was granting blanket clemency informs our understanding of his intent, \u2018...today I am commuting the sentences of all death row inmates.\u2019 [Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University Law School (January 11, 2003).] The State misreads the teaching of People ex rel. Madigan. Under the supreme court\u2019s rubric and rationale in interpreting the Governor\u2019s exercise of power, it is reasonable to conclude that he intended to grant a partial pardon to all of the inmates then residing on death row. His actions accordingly served to invoke the fundamental protections provided by the double jeopardy clause and to bar the State from again seeking a sentence of death against this defendant.\u201d\nThe circuit court also agreed with defendant\u2019s contention that imposition of the death penalty would violate his due process rights and section 5\u20145\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections. However, the circuit court rejected defendant\u2019s argument regarding prosecutorial vindictiveness. The circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion and barred the State from seeking the death penalty.\nThe State then sought, and was granted, direct appeal to this court under Rule 302(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b)). We subsequently granted leave to former Governor Ryan to file an amicus curiae brief.\nAnalysis\nThe principal dispute raised on appeal before this court is the nature of the clemency order entered in defendant\u2019s case, specifically, whether the order acts as a partial pardon, such that the State is precluded from seeking the death penalty against defendant. The State does not dispute that the Governor has the authority to enter a partial pardon (see Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 476), and the State expressly acknowledges that \u201ca partial pardon survives the reversal of the conviction.\u201d However, as it did in the circuit court, the State contends that defendant\u2019s clemency order is a commutation, not a partial pardon, and that the effect of the commutation does not survive the reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction.\nDefendant maintains, however, that interpreting his clemency order as anything other than a partial pardon would lead to absurd results. Defendant notes that one of the principal reasons former Governor Ryan gave for issuing the blanket clemency was the frequency with which defense attorneys were providing inadequate counsel during capital trials. Defendant observes that this was the same reason that his conviction was reversed by this court. Defendant argues that the former Governor could not possibly have intended for the death penalty to be imposed upon a defendant, such as himself, who has established one of the very things that led to the blanket clemency in the first place.\nIn addition, defendant maintains that the only difference between his case and those of the \u201cunsentenced\u201d inmates in Snyder who were partially pardoned is one of procedural posture\u2014the \u201cunsentenced\u201d inmates had already had their death sentences overturned at the time the clemency orders were issued while defendant\u2019s reversal came after the orders were announced. Defendant contends that, because there is no substantive difference between his case and the \u201cunsentenced\u201d inmates, the former Governor could not have intended that his case be treated any differently than their cases. Moreover, according to defendant, to treat his case differently than the \u201cunsentenced\u201d inmates\u2019 cases would be directly contrary to the Governor\u2019s announcement that he was performing a uniform, or \u201cblanket,\u201d clemency for all death row inmates.\nThe circuit court below resolved any confusion regarding the proper interpretation of defendant\u2019s clemency order by referring to the speech given by the former Governor at the time the clemency orders were announced. The circuit court explained that the former Governor\u2019s announcement \u201cthat he was granting blanket clemency informs our understanding of his intent.\u201d Based on the speech, and this court\u2019s holding in Snyder, the circuit court concluded that it was \u201creasonable to conclude that he [the former Governor] intended to grant a partial pardon to all of the inmates then residing on death row.\u201d Accordingly, the circuit court held that the State was barred from again seeking a sentence of death against defendant.\nThe State, however, contends that the circuit court erred when it relied on the former Governor\u2019s speech to discern his intent regarding defendant\u2019s clemency order. The State notes that the Governor\u2019s clemency power cannot be controlled by the courts or the legislature. From this, the State maintains that in order to ensure the constitutionally required separation of powers, judicial construction of clemency orders must be limited solely to the language of the order. The State contends that the circuit court in this case, when it tried to discern the former Governor\u2019s intent by referring to the speech, \u201cessentially assumed control of the governor\u2019s clemency authority and concluded that defendant had received a partial pardon because it presumed that was what Governor Ryan intended.\u201d Thus, according to the State, the circuit court\u2019s order should be reversed and the State should again be permitted to pursue the death penalty.\nContrary to the State\u2019s assertions, separation of powers principles have not been violated in this case. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that, in determining the intent of the legislature, a court \u201c \u2018may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but also the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved.\u2019 (Emphasis added.) Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 308, citing People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000); Stern v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 179 Ill. 2d 160, 164 (1997); People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 345 (1992). See generally 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction \u00a7 48:03 (6th ed. 2000).\u201d People v. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 502 (2003). There is no separation of powers violation when a court of law considers the reason for a statute or the purpose the statute is to achieve. Nor is there any separation of powers violation when a court of law applies these same principles of construction to the interpretation of a clemency order. In this case, the former Governor\u2019s speech clearly set forth the reasons for the clemency orders, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose the clemency orders were meant to achieve. As such, the former Governor\u2019s speech was properly considered by the circuit court.\nFurther, there is no question that the circuit court properly interpreted the meaning of the clemency order in light of the former Governor\u2019s speech. In the speech, the former Governor states that the blanket clemency which he ordered was intended to be systemwide, that it was made in response to what he believed to be systemic problems, and that he intended the relief he was granting to extend equally to all inmates on death row. Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University Law School (January 11, 2003). Moreover, in his amicus brief filed in this court, the former Governor expressly confirms that the circuit court properly understood the meaning of the speech. The former Governor states that he \u201cexpressed his intent clearly in his public address announcing his decision to grant blanket clemency,\u201d to wit, \u201che issued clemency to relieve each inmate of the death penalty as a legal consequence of the offense he had committed.\u201d Accordingly, it cannot reasonably be said, as the State contends, that the circuit court violated separation of powers principles in this case by \u201cassuming] control of the governor\u2019s clemency authority.\u201d\nThe cardinal rule of construction when interpreting a clemency order is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Governor. See Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 476-77 (\u201cit is the substance, not the terminology, of the clemency orders that controls\u201d). Former Governor Ryan\u2019s intent is unequivocal in this case. As explained in his speech and reaffirmed in his representations to this court, he issued clemency to relieve defendant \u201cof the death penalty as a legal consequence of the offense he had committed.\u201d To ignore that intent would be an inappropriate intrusion by this court upon the clemency power granted exclusively to the Governor under the Illinois Constitution. Accordingly, we conclude that the. State is precluded from pursuing the death penalty in this case.\nConclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" }, { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER,\ndissenting:\nOn January 10, 2003, just days before leaving office, then-Governor George H. Ryan issued commutation orders affecting all inmates of the Department of Corrections on death row. Four of those inmates, Madison Hobley, Stanley Howard, Aaron Patterson and Leroy Orange, were pardoned on the grounds that they were actually innocent of the crimes for which they had been sentenced to death. Three, Mario Flores, William Franklin, and Montell Johnson, had their death sentences commuted to a term of 40 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nTwo men, Robert St. Pierre and Patrick Wright, had their death sentences commuted to \u201cNatural Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief [sic]; or in the alternative, Sentence Commuted to a Sentence Other Than Death for the Crime of Murder, So that the Maximum Sentence that may be Imposed is Natural Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief [sic].\u201d Similar relief was granted 11 others. Ronald Alvine, William Bracey, Cortez Brown, Roger Collins, Tony Dameron, Tyrone Fuller, Julius Kuntu, Eric Lee, Willie Thompkins, Bobby O. Williams, and Martin Woolley each had their death sentences commuted \u201cto a Sentence Other Than Death for the Crime of Murder, So that the Maximum Sentence that may be Imposed is Natural Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief [sic].\u201d\nIn the 13 cases where Governor Ryan specified that natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release was to be the maximum sentence, the defendants were all awaiting resentencing. In four instances, those involving William Bracy, Roger Collins, Robert St. Pierre and Patrick Wright, resentencing had been ordered by federal court. In the other nine cases, those involving Ronald Alvine, Cortez Brown, Tony Damero, Tyron Fuller, Julius Kuntu, Eric Lee, Willie Thompkins, Bobby O. Williams and Martin Woolley, new sentencing hearings had been ordered by this court.\nIn the remaining 150 cases, including the case of Robert Morris, the defendant in the proceeding now before us, the death sentences were simply commuted to \u201cnatural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release.\u201d At the time Governor Ryan granted those commutations, most of the affected death row inmates had exhausted their legal remedies. Only 53 still had cases pending in our court. Twenty-eight of those cases were in the briefing stage. In six additional cases, briefing had been stayed pending various developments, including remand for a fitness hearing and to permit filing of a corrected record. Six other cases were on our rehearing docket. The remaining 14 cases, including defendant Morris\u2019 case, had been fully briefed and argued and were on our advisement docket awaiting a decision.\nShortly after Governor Ryan granted the commutations, our court entered an order, on its own motion, permitting counsel for parties in the capital cases still pending before us to \u201cfile with this court any motion deemed appropriate, including but not limited to the Supreme Court\u2019s continued jurisdiction.\u201d Based upon the responses we received and the circumstances of the individual cases, we entered orders retaining jurisdiction in 15 of the 20 cases on our advisement and rehearing dockets and transferring 3 of those 20 cases to the appellate court. Of the 34 cases where briefing was underway or had been stayed, we allowed the defendant to withdraw his appeal in one case, dismissed the appeals in three cases, retained jurisdiction in eight cases and transferred 22 cases to the appellate court.\nAfter this court entered its order permitting counsel to file appropriate motions with respect to the still-pending capital cases, the Attorney General filed an original action for mandamus. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 4(a); 188 Ill. 2d R. 381. Through that action, the State sought to block implementation of Governor Ryan\u2019s commutation orders with respect to the group of death row inmates whose convictions remained intact but who were awaiting resentencing by the courts at the time their original sentences were commuted by the Governor. As the majority opinion points out, this court rejected that claim. With respect to this group of inmates, we held that the Governor\u2019s commutations were tantamount to partial pardons and that it was within the Governor\u2019s authority to grant such pardons, following conviction, to reduce the maximum sentence the defendants faced. People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457, 476-77 (2004).\nThe Attorney General\u2019s mandamus action also challenged the Governor\u2019s authority to commute sentences of certain of the death row inmates, including the defendant in this case, who had not signed clemency applications or otherwise given consent for clemency to be requested on their behalf. Holding that the statutory procedure governing clemency applications (see 730 ILCS 5/3\u2014 3\u201413 (West 2002)) does not limit the Governor\u2019s constitutional authority to grant clemency (Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, \u00a7 12), we concluded that the failure of certain inmates to consent to the clemency petitions did not prevent the Governor from acting in their favor. People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 465-68.\nBased upon the foregoing considerations, this court denied the Attorney General\u2019s petition for mandamus. We then vacated orders we had previously entered retaining jurisdiction over four of the cases on the rehearing docket. We also ordered an additional two cases on the advisement docket transferred to the appellate court.\nIn the period which followed, the various capital cases still pending proceeded toward final resolution. Richard Morris\u2019 case, over which we continued to retain jurisdiction, was ultimately decided by our court in March of 2004, approximately 14 months after Governor Ryan had commuted the death sentence imposed on Morris in the case we were reviewing. Our opinion reversed Morris\u2019 convictions and remanded the cause to the circuit court for a new trial on the grounds that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel. People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137 (2004).\nHad Morris not challenged the validity of his underlying convictions and simply been granted a new sentencing hearing, there is no question that Governor Ryan\u2019s commutation order would continue to control and that Morris would not be eligible for capital punishment. The maximum penalty that could be imposed is natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release, the punishment specified in the Governor\u2019s commutation order.\nThe problem posed by this case, and what distinguishes it from any of the other cases pending before us at the time Governor Ryan issued his pardons and commutation orders in 2003, is that Morris succeeded in obtaining more than a new sentencing hearing. Because his original trial counsel was so ineffective that \u201cthere was a breakdown of the adversarial process\u201d (People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d at 188), Morris will receive a completely new trial at which he will be free to contest not only whether he is eligible for capital punishment, but whether he is even guilty of the murder for which he has been prosecuted.\nIn assessing the effect of Governor Ryan\u2019s 2003 commutation order on Morris\u2019 new trial, the majority interprets the Governor\u2019s order by relying on principles of statutory construction. 219 Ill. 2d at 383. Clemency proceedings, however, are not legislative enactments. Although I have located no Illinois authority on point, courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that pardon and commutation decisions by the executive branch are a quasi-judicial function. See, e.g., Mellinger v. Idaho Department of Corrections, 114 Idaho 494, 500, 757 P.2d 1213, 1219 (1988); State v. Bowman, 145 N.C. 452, 454, 59 S.E. 74, 75 (1907); see also Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1167 (7th Cir. 1992) (under Illinois law, consideration of clemency petitions is essentially a judicial function). Clemency determinations are therefore more akin to judicial decisions and should be construed according to the standards governing judgments, not statutes.\nThe general rule in Illinois is that judicial orders are to be construed like other written instruments. See Fieldcrest Builders, Inc. v. Antonucci, 311 Ill. App. 3d 597, 605 (1999). They should be interpreted reasonably and as a whole so as to give effect to the apparent intention of the entity which rendered them. See Winter v. Winter, 69 Ill. App. 3d 359, 363 (1978). They must also be construed with reference to the issues they were intended to decide. Weigel v. O\u2019Connor, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1027 (1978). In determining the meaning of a judgment or decree, one must therefore examine the situation as it existed when the judgment or decree was rendered. See Thomas v. Thomas, 56 Ill. App. 3d 806, 808 (1978).\nThe clemency decisions made by Governor Ryan in this case and in the case of every other inmate on Illinois\u2019 death row in January of 2003 were made against the backdrop of a capital punishment system whose reliability had fallen into serious question. Although the groundwork was set for reintroduction of capital punishment as early as 1977, when the General Assembly enacted a revised death penalty statute following the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976), Illinois did not resume executions until 1990, when Charles Walker was put to death after waiving further challenges to his conviction and sentence. Even after that, executions did not become a regular feature of the judicial landscape until after John Wayne Gacy was put to death in 1994.\nMarch of 1995 brought the state\u2019s first double execution when James Free and Hernando Williams were put to death on the same day. A succession of executions followed that year. By March of 1999, 12 men had been put to death.\nAs the pace of executions quickened and the size of Illinois\u2019 death row increased, flaws in this state\u2019s system of capital punishment began to surface. Defendants found guilty and sentenced to death were shown to be innocent of the crimes for which they were convicted. These were not isolated instances. By the end of 1998, just four years after regular executions had resumed, more defendants on death row were being exonerated than were being put to death.\nThe mounting evidence that Illinois\u2019 system of capital punishment was yielding unreliable results created dissension on our court (see People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 225-29 (1998) (Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) and controversy throughout the state. Four of the exonerated defendants received a $36 million settlement from the county in which they had been wrongly convicted. Investigative reports were published in the press. A national conference on wrongful convictions and the death penalty was convened in Chicago.\nIn February of 1999, Justice Harrison sent an open letter to Governor Ryan calling upon him to exercise the powers conferred upon him by article V, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, \u00a7 12) to declare a moratorium on executions until the problems presented by the state\u2019s death penalty law could be addressed. The Governor declined to act. The following month, when Andrew Kokoraleis was scheduled to be executed, this court denied Kokoraleis\u2019 motion for a stay and summarily dismissed the appeal from the denial of his second postconviction petition, which included a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. That action triggered a vigorous dissent from Justice Harrison, who wrote:\n\u201cThe fatal defects I have noted in our capital punishment system are not theoretical. My prediction in Bull that an innocent person would inevitably be executed has very nearly come to pass. Last September, another capital defendant, Anthony Porter came within 48 hours of being executed. At the time, there was no real question as to his guilt. The delay was granted for reasons wholly unrelated to Porter\u2019s culpability. Subsequent developments showed, however, that he was, in fact, completely innocent. Significantly, those developments had nothing whatever to do with the efficacy of the courts. The courts were content to take Anthony Porter\u2019s life. He walks free today only because, as in so many other cases that preceded his, a dedicated group of volunteers decided to take up his cause.\nIn the wake of Bull and the Anthony Porter case, there has been nearly universal recognition by this state\u2019s legal community that our system of capital punishment is in dire need of change. Even those who have been ardent supporters of capital punishment have begun to concede the law\u2019s potentially horrific shortcomings. I do not know what the solution is. No one seems to. Committees have been convened and reforms have been proposed, but answers remain elusive. Perhaps there is no answer. I do know, however, that until we have a better understanding of where the system is failing and how, if at all, it can be remedied, the State of Illinois has no business continuing to send defendants to their deaths. It must be stopped from executing Kokoraleis and every other defendant sentenced under the existing capital punishment system. It is within the power of the governor to effectuate this result through the exercise of his constitutional authority to grant reprieves. Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, \u00a7 12. If he is unwilling to exercise that authority, as he has shown himself to be in this case, it is incumbent upon our court to intercede.\nEven if our present capital punishment laws were constitutional, I would still grant a stay of execution in the matter before us today. Our court routinely stays executions where, as here, a defendant seeks relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122\u20141 et seq. (West 1996)). In fact, the clerk of this court has prepared a stock form for that purpose. There is no basis for deviating from our usual practice here. Kokoraleis\u2019 claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence presents a constitutional question appropriate for post-conviction relief. People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996). Kokoraleis had no way of raising this matter in his initial petition, and putting him to death without affording him the opportunity to fully litigate the matter is fundamentally unfair.\nWhere a post-conviction petitioner brings a facially valid appeal in accordance with the procedures established by our court, as Kokoraleis has done here, we have no authority under the law to summarily dismiss it. The General Assembly has expressly decreed that final judgments entered upon post-conviction petitions \u2018shall be reviewed in a manner pursuant to the rules of the Supreme Court.\u2019 725 ILCS 5/122\u20147 (West 1996). Supreme Court Rule 651(d) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(d)) provides that the procedures for appeals in post-conviction proceedings \u2018shall be in accordance with the rules governing criminal appeals, as near as may be.\u2019 Nothing in the rules governing criminal proceedings permits the summary dismissal of a facially valid, timely, and technically proper appeal. ***\n*** I do not wish to minimize the gravity of the offenses for which Kokoraleis has been convicted. The evidence presented at his trial depicted conduct that is almost beyond belief. I doubt that any rational person could read the accounts of [his victim\u2019s] shocking murder without feeling utter disgust and revulsion. The depravity of the crime, however, cannot blind us to our constitutional obligations. No matter how despicable a defendant might be, we cannot forsake our allegiance to the rule of law.\u201d People v. Kokoraleis, 189 Ill. 2d 721, 722-24 (1999) (Harrison, J., dissenting).\nAlthough Justice Harrison\u2019s protestations did not alter the outcome of Kokoraleis\u2019 case, Kokoraleis was the last person to be executed in Illinois. Within a month of his execution, this court acted to establish a special committee to study the trial and sentencing processes in capital cases. Approximately nine months later, Governor Ryan followed the course suggested by Justice Harrison and imposed a moratorium on executions in Illinois, declaring: \u201cUntil I can be sure that everyone sentenced to death in Illinois is truly guilty, until I can be sure with moral certainty that no innocent mem or woman is facing a lethal injection, no one will meet that fate.\u201d See http:// www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm? SubjectID=3&RecNum=359.\nConcerns over reliability of Illinois\u2019 system of capital punishment deepened as the number of exonerated defendants rose. To my knowledge, 18 men were ultimately determined to have been wrongly convicted and sentenced to death. Although complaints were raised by some that the death penalty was not being applied fairly across racial and geographic lines, criticism of our system of capital punishment focused on the risks it posed of condemning to death individuals who were actually innocent.\nWhen Governor Altgeld pardoned three of the Hay-market anarchists in 1893, he issued a lengthy pardoning statement to explain his reasons. J. Altgeld, Reasons for Pardoning the Haymarket Anarchists (1893). Governor Ryan published no similar document regarding the clemency orders he issued for Illinois\u2019 death row inmates 110 years later. As the majority notes, however, Governor Ryan\u2019s decision to issue those orders was accompanied by a speech at Northwestern University Law School detailing the evolution of his views and the considerations that motivated his action. That speech, of which we have previously taken judicial notice (see People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 468), makes clear that Governor Ryan set aside the death sentences imposed on Richard Morris and the others on death row for two reasons: the first was his ongoing concern that the system under which they had been convicted was unjust and unreliable. \u201cOur capital system is haunted by the demon of error,\u201d he wrote. \u201c[E]rror in determining guilt, and error in determining who among the guilty deserves to die.\u201d See Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University Law School (January 11, 2003).\nThe second was his belief that the other branches of government had failed to adequately address the system\u2019s flaws. His speech spoke of his frustration as he watched\n\u201cas members of the Illinois General Assembly failed to pass even one substantive death penalty reform. Not one. They couldn\u2019t even agree on one. How much more evidence is needed before the General Assembly will take its responsibility in this area seriously?\nOne of the few disappointments of my legislative and executive career is that the General Assembly failed to work with me to reform our deeply flawed system. I don\u2019t know why legislators could not heed the rising voices of reform. I don\u2019t know how many more systemic flaws we needed to uncover before they could be spurred to action.\nI cannot say it as eloquently as Justice Blackmun. The legislature couldn\u2019t reform it. Lawmakers won\u2019t repeal it. But I will not stand for it. I must act.\u201d See Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University Law School (January 11, 2003).\nThe majority construes Governor Ryan\u2019s statements as evincing an intention to extend a blanket partial pardon from capital punishment to everyone on death row who was not pardoned or whose sentence was not commuted to a term of years. If that were so, however, his clemency orders would not have been limited to this group of defendants. They would also have encompassed Cecil Sutherland, who had been previously sentenced to death but had succeeded in obtaining not only a new sentencing hearing, but a new trial. Sutherland, who had won the right to a new trial prior to the Governor\u2019s actions, received no executive clemency. As a result, he remained subject to the death penalty on retrial and was, in fact, sentenced to death again.\nProcedurally, the only difference between Richard Morris\u2019 case and Cecil Sutherland\u2019s is that at the time Governor Ryan made his clemency decisions, Sutherland had already been granted a new trial. Morris\u2019 case was still pending and the Governor did not know the outcome. Had the Governor been aware that Morris would likewise be granted a new trial, there is nothing to suggest that Morris would still have received clemency where Sutherland did not.\nIn my view, the events leading up to the Governor\u2019s clemency orders, the statements made by the Governor in his January 2003 speech, and the different manner in which Cecil Sutherland\u2019s case was handled demonstrate that the Governor\u2019s actual intention was simply to insure that no one who had been convicted under the system he regarded as fundamentally flawed would be put to death based on that conviction. Achievement of that goal will not be compromised by permitting the State to seek the death penalty on Morris\u2019 retrial.\nThe risk of being put to death pursuant to a conviction obtained under the old system of capital punishment had already been eliminated by the time Sutherland was retried and is not present now. That is so because the old system of capital punishment no longer exists. Extensive reforms have been instituted both by the General Assembly and by this court.\nAfter becoming aware of the problems with this state\u2019s death penalty law, Governor Ryan appointed a Commission on Capital Punishment to determine what reforms, if any, would ensure that Illinois\u2019 capital punishment system is fair, just and accurate. The Commission\u2019s efforts yielded 85 separate recommendations dealing with all aspects of how death penalty cases are investigated, filed, tried, and reviewed.\nIn the wake of the Commission\u2019s report, the General Assembly enacted a number of new laws aimed at improving the state\u2019s system of capital punishment. That legislation includes Public Act 93\u20140517, mandating the electronic recording of confessions in homicide cases; Public Act 93\u20140655, which requires the decertification of police officers who commit perjury in the course of a homicide case; and Public Act 93\u20140605, which addresses a wide range of issues, including DNA testing, the reliability of jailhouse snitches, lineup and photo spread procedures, postconviction proceedings to establish actual innocence, reduction of death eligibility factors and allowing our court to set aside a particular death sentence on review whenever we find that the sentence is not fundamentally just as applied in that case.\nIndependent of the efforts undertaken by the executive and legislative branches, our court initiated its own investigation into how capital trials could be improved. In April of 1999, nine months before Governor Ryan declared a moratorium on executions, this court appointed its own committee to study the trial and sentencing processes in capital proceedings. The Special Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases issued its first set of findings and recommendations on October 28, 1999, followed by supplemental findings and recommendations in October of 2000 and a second set of supplemental findings and recommendations in January of 2001. As a result of the Special Committee\u2019s efforts, our court undertook one of the most comprehensive revisions of its rules in recent history, amending four existing rules and adding four entirely new rules.\nHighlights of the rules revisions included:\n(1) creation of a capital litigation trial bar, establishing minimum standards of training and experience for defense counsel and assistant prosecutors appearing in capital cases;\n(2) provision for Capital Litigation Regional Seminars to give specialized training for all judges who may preside over death penalty cases as part of their designated duties;\n(3) implementation of new requirements for the management and administration of death penalty cases, including imposition of time deadlines for the State to give notice of its intention to seek the death penalty, appointment of two properly certified members of the capital litigation trial bar to represent every indigent capital defendant, authorization for discovery depositions of witnesses, and requiring case management conferences;\n(4) imposition of standardized requirements for disclosures concerning DNA evidence;\n(5) extension of criminal discovery rules to sentencing hearings in capital cases; and\n(6) revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct to specify that \u201cthe duty of a public prosecutor or other government lawyer is to seek justice, not merely to convict.\u201d\nThe new measures enacted by the General Assembly and by this court will be fully applicable to Richard Morris\u2019 case on retrial. Our experience with these new measures is admittedly limited, and we do not know yet whether they will be adequate to remedy all of the problems that precipitated the overhaul of our system of capital punishment. In my view, however, we have no reason to doubt that they will be sufficient to redress the problem that required us to set aside Morris\u2019 original conviction and which led the Governor to commute his original sentence.\nAs previously indicated, the fatal flaw in Morris\u2019 original trial was that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Ensuring the adequacy of representation is, however, one of the cornerstones of the recent capital punishment reforms. Under our new rules, no one who is not fully qualified and experienced will be permitted to provide legal defense to Morris or anyone who is being prosecuted for a capital offense. The predicate for Morris\u2019 commutation having thus been addressed, we have no more reason to bar the State from seeking the death penalty when he is tried again than we would in any new capital case coming up for trial for the first time.\nMorris has raised various subsidiary arguments regarding his future eligibility for the death penalty, but these are also without merit. Morris asserts that the State should be precluded from seeking a sentence of death because its conduct is motivated by vindictiveness. The circuit court specifically rejected this contention, however, and there is no basis in the record to question its conclusion.\nThere is likewise no basis for Morris\u2019 argument that subjecting him to the prospect of capital punishment on retrial contravenes his right to due process of law. Indeed, it strikes me as incongruous for Morris to suggest that the clemency order somehow invested him with due process protections where, as here, he did not petition for clemency himself and did not consent to having a clemency petition filed on his behalf.\nFinally, I cannot accept Morris\u2019 claim that imposition of the death penalty again is precluded by statutory prohibitions against imposing a more severe sentence after the original sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack. See 730 ILCS 5/5\u20145\u20144(a) (West 2004). Capital punishment is not more serious than Morris\u2019 original sentence. It is the same. Moreover, the original sentence was not set aside on direct review or on collateral attack. It was overridden by an act of executive clemency.\nFor the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. The circuit court erred in granting Morris\u2019 motion to bar the state from seeking the death penalty on retrial. Its order should therefore be reversed.\nOne of the six cases in which briefing had been stayed concerned the same defendant, Ralph Harris, involved in one of the 28 cases in which briefing remained underway.\nOf the 20 death row inmates whose cases remained on our advisement and rehearing dockets, only Cortez Brown received one of the commutations couched in terms of a maximum sentence. That was because among this group, he alone had been granted a new sentencing hearing. The other 19 defendants in this group, including defendant Morris, were among the 150 death row inmates whose sentences were commutated to \u201cnatural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release.\u201d\nFor technical reasons not relevant here, our court also concluded that four of the so-called \u201cunsentenced\u201d defendants, Gregory Madej, Renaldo Hudson, William Bracey and Roger Collins, actually remained under sentence. Bracey and Collins moved to be dismissed from the mandamus action, and their motion was allowed. People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 469-70, 477-78.\nThey are, in alphabetical order, Joseph Burrows, Perry Cobb, Rolando Cruz, Gary Gauger, Alejandro Hernandez, Madison Hobley, Stanley Howard, Verneal Jimerson, Ronald Jones, Carl Lawson, Steven Manning, Leroy Orange, Aaron Patterson, Anthony Porter, Steven Smith, Gordon (Randy) Steidl, Darby Tillis, and Dennis Williams.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER," } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and James E. Fitzgerald, Ashley Romito and Alan J. Spell-berg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Thomas A. Gibbons, of Kreiter and Gibbons & Associates, of Chicago, for appellee.", "James R. Thompson, Kimball R. Anderson, Linda T. Coberly and Tiana F. Nell, of Winston & Strawn, L.L.E, of Chicago, for amicus curiae George H. Ryan." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 99676\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RICHARD MORRIS, Appellee.\nOpinion filed April 20, 2006.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and James E. Fitzgerald, Ashley Romito and Alan J. Spell-berg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nThomas A. Gibbons, of Kreiter and Gibbons & Associates, of Chicago, for appellee.\nJames R. Thompson, Kimball R. Anderson, Linda T. Coberly and Tiana F. Nell, of Winston & Strawn, L.L.E, of Chicago, for amicus curiae George H. Ryan." }, "file_name": "0373-01", "first_page_order": 383, "last_page_order": 409 }