{ "id": 2789786, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Stephen Kalec, Plaintiff in Error", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kalec", "decision_date": "1961-09-22", "docket_number": "No. 35385", "first_page": "505", "last_page": "512", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 505" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "302 Ill. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5011855 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/302/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5175578 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/323/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Ill.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12124159 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0186-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 548, "char_count": 10992, "ocr_confidence": 0.8, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4155445678921878e-07, "percentile": 0.6479163457020081 }, "sha256": "9ea9716316dfdcb1bf80698e79ec20967efb609328051127050e02b587ebd939", "simhash": "1:d6acd900f7504d33", "word_count": 1928 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:03.135869+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Stephen Kalec, Plaintiff in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Solfisburg\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Stephen Kalec, was indicted on a charge of murder of one Joseph Bryniczka. He was tried before a jury, found guilty and after motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were denied, his punishment was fixed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. The case comes to us on writ of error.\nThe defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, and that he was denied a fair trial by the interference of the trial judge. His additional contention that he was not tried within four months of confinement was waived upon oral argument.\nIt appears that defendant worked as a bartender in a Chicago tavern located at 1858 West 47th Street, owned by Joseph Pietrzyk. On May 2, 1958, he returned to the tavern in the evening after working all day. He had several drinks with Pietrzyk, one Nendza, the deceased Bryniczka and three girls. It appears that everyone there was drinking a substantial amount. Defendant left the side door of the tavern between 9:45 and 10:00 P.M. It is undisputed that the deceased and Nendza also left about the same time, but the testimony is in conflict as to the exact order of their leaving. The witnesses in the tavern then heard three or more shots, and the defendant was seen walking away from the body of the deceased. They heard no argument between the defendant and the deceased, and did not see defendant with a gun.\nThe witness Nendza testified that he knew both the defendant and the deceased for many years; that he left the tavern about 10 :oo P.M. with the defendant at his request. When they reached an alley next to the tavern, defendant turned, drew a gun and fired three shots wounding Nendza. Nendza got up and while walking out of the alley heard three more shots.\nAngela Stefaniak lived next to the tavern, and was at home on the second floor the night of May 2, 1958, when she heard three shots. She went to the kitchen window and saw the defendant and deceased walking from the tavern. She heard defendant say to deceased, \u201cYou---, we\u2019ll settle this in the alley.\u201d Before they reached the alley, the defendant turned and fired three shots at deceased who fell back upon the ground, and defendant walked back to the tavern.\nThe police found defendant asleep in a booth in the tavern when they arrived. They did not find the gun used to kill the deceased.\nWe think the record clearly supports the verdict of the jury. The testimony of the eyewitness, Stefaniak, is credible and corroborated by other witnesses. We do not give substantial significance to the discrepancy in the testimony of witnesses in the tavern regarding the exact number of shots heard and the exact sequence in which Nendza, the deceased and the defendant left the tavern. Considering the atmosphere in the tavern, the conflict in the testimony is understandable.\nDefendant also asks us to reverse the judgment and remand the cause because of alleged misconduct of the trial judge. He cites four instances which he claims constitute reversible error. The first arose when the trial judge refused to permit certain questions to be put to an investigating officer on cross-examination, although the State had made no objection. We have examined the record carefully and it is patent that these questions involving certain facilities of the Crime Laboratory\u2019s Mobile Unit were both immaterial and beyond the scope of the direct examination.\nAgain, without objection on the part of the State, the court refused to permit defendant\u2019s counsel to examine a witness with regard to an argument between defendant and deceased five months before, on the ground the incident was too remote. From an examination of the record, we think that the questions asked were objectionable. Considering the entire record, we think the trial judge did not commit prejudicial error in limiting the scope of the testimony to the relevant issues in the case in these two instances.\nDefendant further complains of the trial court\u2019s statements upon cross-examination of the State\u2019s witness Angela Stefaniak. The first colloquy, which took place when the witness was being cross-examined concerning a photograph of her apartment, was as follows:\n\u201cQ. And, when you first heard, that is, you heard the first three shots, you looked out the window of your mother\u2019s apartment, isn\u2019t that correct ?\nA. That is right.\nQ. Well, that is the second floor, isn\u2019t it?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Well, that particular window isn\u2019t shown.\nThe Court: That isn\u2019t her fault.\nThe Witness: A. That is the first three shots I heard.\nThe Court: She said it would have been shown if that post wasn\u2019t in the way.\nMr. Egan: This picture, to me, doesn\u2019t show the second floor.\nThe Court: I don\u2019t know anything about it.\nMr. Egan: That\u2019s the picture.\nThe Court: This is only part of the building; obviously, the building goes up.\nMr. Egan: Yes, judge.\nThe Court: She says the window is up here (indicating) It doesn\u2019t show because the post is in the way.\nThe Witness: The post is in the way.\nThe Court: It is obvious in the picture itself that this is what the situation is. That only shows the first floor of the building.\nMr. Egan: That is the point I wanted to make.\nThe Court: There is no point to it. That only shows the first part of the building and that is all. That\u2019s pretty obvious.\nMr. Egan: That is what I wanted to clarify.\nThe Court: She pointed out to you that the window she is talking about is up on the second floor behind this post.\nMr. Egan: No, she didn\u2019t say it.\nThe Witness: I did, too.\nMr. Egan: I don\u2019t want to haggle about it. She pointed it out to me. \u2022 \u2022\nThe Court: I saw what she pointed out. She said the upper window would be behind that post.\nMr. Egan: I must have been mistaken, your Honor.\u201d Another complaint concerns remarks which occurred during an attempted impeachment of the same witness, and is reported as follows:\n\u201cQ. You remember being questioned by a deputy coroner (at the coroner\u2019s inquest), don\u2019t you, or somebody there ?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Was this question asked of you and did you\u2014\n\u2018O. How many shots did you hear fired?\nA. I could not tell you the amount fired. It was three originally.\nQ. To the best of your knowledge ?\nA. I could not never say anything like that\u2019\nQ. Were those questions asked of you at the coroner\u2019s inquest and did you make those answers ?\nA. Shall I give you my answer ?\nQ. Yes, please.\nA. At the coroner\u2019s inquest, I was asked how many shots were fired.\nQ. The point is yes or no.\nThe Court: The objection is sustained. It\u2019s not impeaching in any way.\nMr. Egan: You mean at the coroner\u2019s inquest, Judge?\nThe Court: That\u2019s what you just read. I didn\u2019t see the coroner\u2019s inquest.\nMr. Egan: It says, \u201cI cannot tell you the shots fired. It was three originally,\u201d meaning the three she first heard. Then, \u201cto the best of your knowledge. I cannot never say anything like that.\u201d\nThe Witness: Those were not even put up to me.\nThe Court: Let\u2019s see the transcript. I thought I heard or understood you to say that.\nMr. Egan: She looked out and saw nobody and then she heard three more shots.\nThe Witness: A. I saw two men walk out.\nMr. Egan: I submit that that\u2019s not what she talked about at the coroner\u2019s inquest.\nMr. Stamos: I object to counsel arguing.\nMr. Egan: She said she\u2014\nThe Court: It says, \u201cHow many shots did you hear fired? I could not tell the amount fired. I was three originally.\u201d It\u2019s a misprint by the court reporter.\nThe Witness: I told the coroner directly it was three shots, sir. There were men there listening.\nThe Court: That\u2019s an incorrect transcription.\nMr. Egan: Judge, I must object to that remark.\nThe Court: It\u2019s only fair to say it, because the record says, \u201c/ was three shots fired.\u201d\nMr. Egan: I don\u2019t know.\nThe Court: I do. She didn\u2019t say, \u201cI was.\u201d I\u2019m quite sure its a mistranscription.\nMr. Egan: How about the part, \u201cI could not tell you the amount fired.\u201d\nQ. Did you say that ?\nA. No, sir, I didn\u2019t say that.\nQ. You didn\u2019t say that at the coroner\u2019s inquest ?\nA. I said three shots, I said there were three shots fired.\nThe Court: Q. No. The Question is: Did you say you didn\u2019t know how many shots were fired?\nA. No, sir, I never said that.\nMr. Egan: Q. Did you say, \u201cI could not tell you the amount fired\u201d ?\nA. No, sir.\u201d\nNeither the photograph nor the transcript of the coroner\u2019s inquest are before us on this appeal.\nIn the absence of the actual photograph, the examination with regard to it is ambiguous. The transcript of the testimony, taken in its proper context, appears to us to be little more than an attempt by the trial court to eliminate a semantic misunderstanding between witness and counsel. We also note that defense counsel clearly established the point he desired to make; that the picture did not show the second floor of the apartment.\nTurning next to the questioning relating to the coroner\u2019s inquest, we think the defense was permitted sufficient latitude in cross-examination. It is significant that when the witness denied much of her purported testimony at the inquest, the defense made no effort to impeach by proving the alleged prior testimony. The only comments of the trial judge objected to were his references to a misprint or incorrect transcription of the court reporter. The context makes it clear that the only misprint referred to was the statement \u201cI was three shots fired.\u201d We cannot see how this could prejudice the defense.\nWe have condemned the interjection of the trial judge into a case by extended interrogation of witnesses or by impertinent remarks or comments reflecting on the veracity of witnesses or the integrity of counsel, and will not hesitate to reverse when such action is prejudicial to the defendant. (People v. Coli, 2 Ill.2d 186; People v. Pelletri, 323 Ill. 176; People v. Judycki, 302 Ill. 143.) The trial judge, however, may properly act to confine the evidence to the matters at issue and aid in clarifying obvious confusion between a witness and counsel. Such a function of the trial judge must, however, be exercised with restraint so that there is no suggestion that the judge is occupying the role of a prosecutor.\nWe have carefully examined the entire record in the light of the foregoing principles, and we find that the conduct of the trial court was not prejudicial to the defendant.\nIt is our conclusion that the defendant was fairly tried and that the verdict was amply supported by the evidence. The judgment of the criminal court of Cook County is accordingly affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Solfisburg" } ], "attorneys": [ "Julius Lucius Echeles and Barry Goodman, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.", "William G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach, Assistant Attorney General, and John T. Gallagher, and Marvin E. Aspen, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 35385.\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Stephen Kalec, Plaintiff in Error.\nOpinion filed September 22, 1961.\nJulius Lucius Echeles and Barry Goodman, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.\nWilliam G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach, Assistant Attorney General, and John T. Gallagher, and Marvin E. Aspen, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0505-01", "first_page_order": 505, "last_page_order": 512 }