{ "id": 2790743, "name": "The People ex rel. Joseph Rukavina, Appellant, vs. Frank G. Sain, Sheriff of Cook County, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Rukavina v. Sain", "decision_date": "1961-09-22", "docket_number": "No. 36315", "first_page": "546", "last_page": "550", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 546" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "368 Ill. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2571760 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/368/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5334125 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 Ill. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2520708 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/371/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 N.W. 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Minn. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 92735 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/111/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.W. 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 Mo. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 887735 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/295/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 Ill. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5255284 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/343/0608-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 365, "char_count": 6880, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1200010750808232e-07, "percentile": 0.7644242965516522 }, "sha256": "8487e47c9cddb28b9f14a319330744b0fc70b916f38062c31038cdf1ced34aac", "simhash": "1:c86a37a68b3a795a", "word_count": 1157 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:03.135869+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People ex rel. Joseph Rukavina, Appellant, vs. Frank G. Sain, Sheriff of Cook County, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Schaefer\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an extradition case, and the question is whether, upon the evidence put before the court, the writ of habeas corpus was properly quashed.\nThe relator, Joseph Rukavina, was arrested by the sheriff of Cook County on the authority of a rendition warrant issued by the Governor of Illinois on the requisition of the Governor of Minnesota. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the criminal court of Cook County to test the legality of the arrest and detention and the writ issued. After a hearing, the writ was quashed and the relator was remanded to the custody of the sheriff for delivery to the agent of the Governor of Minnesota. The relator has appealed directly to this court. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, chap. 60, par. 27.\nAt the hearing on the return to the writ of habeas corpus, the respondent introduced in evidence only the warrant of the Governor of Illinois, and his own return to that warrant. Section 3 of our Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which is essentially similar to the Federal act, provides that unless the fugitive from justice is an escaped convict or has violated the terms of his bail, probation or parole, a demand for extradition must be \u201caccompanied [ 1 ] by a copy of an indictment found or by information supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or [2] by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon; * * * [which] must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime * * (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, chap. 60, par. 20; cf. 18 U.S.C., par. 3182.) The rendition warrant in this case was based upon the second alternative and recited that \u201cThe Governor of the State of Minnesota demands of me the arrest and delivery of Joseph Rukavina * * * as a fugitive from justice, and has produced and laid before me a copy of an [sic] Complaint, Warrant, Affidavit certified as authentic by the said Governor and duly authenticated, * *\nThe relator urges that the warrant is insufficient because it does not show upon its face, and the respondent did not prove, that he was charged with a crime by an \u201caffidavit made before a magistrate.\u201d The respondent, on the other hand, maintains that \u201cThe words \u2018affidavit certified as authentic by the said Governor and duly authenticated\u2019 mean substantially the same as the statutory language \u2018affidavit made before a magistrate.\u2019 \u201d\nThe rendition warrant in this case does not show that it was issued upon an affidavit made before a magistrate. In several cases this court has stressed the importance of this requirement that the affidavit be executed before a judicial officer. In Lacondra v. Hermann, 343 Ill. 608, 613, the court said: \u201cThe warrant in this respect is of itself insufficient, because it must appear to the Governor, to give him authority to issue his warrant, that the fugitive is charged with crime in the remanding State by an indictment or affidavit made before a magistrate. (Ex parte Hagan, 295 Mo. 435, 245 S.W. 336; State v. Curtiss, 111 Minn. 240, 126 N.W. 719.)\u201d In that case, however, the requisition papers from the demanding State were introduced in evidence, and they cured the deficiency.\nAgain, in People ex rel. Poncher v. Toman, 371 Ill. 275, 279, the court said: \u201cAs held in the Lacondra case, it is necessary that the return of the sheriff show, either by the warrant of the Governor of the State, or by documents accompanying it, that the requisition of the Governor of the demanding State is based on either a copy of an indictment or of an affidavit made before a magistrate, certified as authentic by the Governor of the demanding State. Courts of this State cannot presume that the complaint here certified was an affidavit before a magistrate, or that the one before whom such complaint was made was a magistrate under the laws of the [demanding State]. No such showing appears in this record, and on such condition of the record it was error to remand plaintiff in error to the custody of the sheriff.\u201d People ex rel. Hackler v. Lohman, 17 Ill.2d 78, is another instance in which a defect upon the face of the warrant was cured by other evidence.\nIn the cases cited, the Governor\u2019s warrant stated that there was before him \u201ca copy of a complaint and warrant\u201d (or \u201ca complaint, warrant\u201d) \u201ccertified as authentic\u201d by the Governor of the demanding State, \u201cand duly authenticated.\u201d The Governor\u2019s warrant in the present case refers to an affidavit as well as a complaint and warrant. The respondent contends that the reference to an \u201caffidavit certified as authentic by the said Governor and duly authenticated\u201d means an \u201caffidavit made before a magistrate.\u201d But this contention overlooks the fact that the words \u201ccertified as authentic by the said Governor and duly authenticated\u201d are independently relevant, because the Federal statute requires that the indictment or affidavit must be \u201ccertified as authentic by the governor\u201d of the demanding State, (18 U.S.C., par. 3182) and our statute that they must be \u201cauthenticated by the Executive Authority making the demand.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, chap. 60, par. 20.) The rendition warrant does not, upon its face comply with the applicable statutes. The papers put before the Governor might have shown that the statutory requirements were satisfied, but we cannot presume that they would, and they were not put in evidence.\nThe respondent further contends that the relator can not now attack the sufficiency of the rendition warrant, because he did not object to its admission into evidence or attack its sufficiency in the trial court. The action is a civil one, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, chap. 110, par. 1,) and the question involved is the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding. In cases tried to a jury that question is preserved for review by a post-trial motion. (Huber v. Van Schaack-Mutual, Inc. 368 Ill. 142.) In cases tried without a jury, section 68.3 of the Civil Practice Act permits the filing of a post-trial motion but explicitly provides that \u201cNeither the filing of nor the failure to file a motion under this section limits the scope of review.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, chap. 110 par. 68.3.) The question raised by the relator is therefore properly before us.\nThe judgment of the criminal court of Cook County is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Schaefer" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jason Ernest Bellows, and Sherman C. Magidson, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "William G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach, Assistant Attorney General, and John T. Gallagher and Marvin E. Aspen, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 36315.\nThe People ex rel. Joseph Rukavina, Appellant, vs. Frank G. Sain, Sheriff of Cook County, Appellee.\nOpinion filed September 22, 1961.\nJason Ernest Bellows, and Sherman C. Magidson, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nWilliam G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach, Assistant Attorney General, and John T. Gallagher and Marvin E. Aspen, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for appellee." }, "file_name": "0546-01", "first_page_order": 546, "last_page_order": 550 }