{ "id": 5703823, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CLAUDE BROOKS, JR., Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Brooks", "decision_date": "2006-05-18", "docket_number": "No. 99293", "first_page": "381", "last_page": "394", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 381" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 Va. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 2108698 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va/240/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "959 P.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 11703779 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/959/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "949 S.W.2d 639", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 12019010 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/949/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "908 P.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10336404 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "holding that there is little question concerning the scientific acceptance of the theory underlying PCR DNA testing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/908/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 F.3d 1440", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7644048 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1448", "parenthetical": "concluding that courts in the Eighth Circuit can take judicial notice of the general reliability of PCR DNA testing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/102/1440-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260387 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703-05", "parenthetical": "noting that PCR testing accepted by the scientific community and collecting cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5873463 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171630 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 1153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5732064 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/1153-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974989 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799378 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549473 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974991 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450979 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609702 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0159-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 918, "char_count": 21173, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9372206851486048e-07, "percentile": 0.7350698824526063 }, "sha256": "3d5f3b76c460d9c05925098029d880824912602bff60fe5c5144455677c26053", "simhash": "1:c7baef061a3be4f5", "word_count": 3529 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:56:38.739058+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CLAUDE BROOKS, JR., Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices McMorrow, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nFollowing a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Claude Brooks, Jr., was convicted of the predatory criminal sexual assault of his eight-year-old stepdaughter. After the appellate court affirmed his conviction, defendant filed a pro se petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122\u20141 et seq. (West 2002)) as well as a motion for DNA testing pursuant to section 116\u20143 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116 \u2014 3 (West 2002)). The circuit court summarily dismissed defendant\u2019s postconviction petition as frivolous and lacking merit and denied the motion for DNA testing. The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. We granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the appellate court.\nBackground\nAt defendant\u2019s trial, the victim, L.N., testified that in 1997 she lived with her mother, brother, and defendant. On the evening of October 17, 1997, she was at the family\u2019s apartment alone with defendant. Before going to bed, L.N. took a bath and put on her two-piece pajamas. She then went into the dining room and lay down on a cot to watch television. Defendant, who was sitting in a chair near L.N.\u2019s room, approached her and pulled down her pajama pants. Then, defendant pulled down his pants and climbed on top of L.N. L.N. testified that defendant\u2019s \u201cprivate part\u201d touched her \u201cprivate part.\u201d L.N. testified that defendant was \u201cpumping\u201d on her and \u201cgoing in and out\u201d of her for about five minutes when her mother walked into the dining room. Defendant jumped up and pulled up his pants.\nL.N. further testified that one morning, several days before her birthday, defendant entered the bedroom L.N. shared with her brother. Defendant woke her up and took off her pajamas. Defendant then disrobed and climbed on top of L.N. L.N. stated that defendant put his \u201cprivate part\u201d inside her \u201cprivate part\u201d and started \u201cpumping\u201d her. L.N. testified that after a few minutes, something came out of defendant\u2019s private part. L.N.\u2019s brother was asleep at the time. L.N. did not shout or scream when defendant was on top of her because she was afraid that he would hurt her. On October 19, 1997, L.N. went with her mother to the hospital and told doctors what had occurred between defendant and her. During cross-examination, L.N. admitted that she could not recall the dates of these events without her mother\u2019s help.\nL.N.\u2019s mother, LaDell, testified that she was married to defendant and lived with him and her two children at the time of the incidents in question. On October 17, 1997, LaDell left the apartment at about 8 p.m. At that time, defendant was in the master bedroom, and L.N. was taking a bath. L.N.\u2019s brother was spending the night at a friend\u2019s house. LaDell returned to the apartment around 45 minutes later and discovered defendant on top of L.N. The child\u2019s legs were up in the air, and defendant was positioned between her legs. LaDell screamed for the defendant to get away from L.N. LaDell took her daughter into the master bedroom and asked L.N. whether this was the first time defendant had engaged in such behavior. L.N. responded in the negative. That night, LaDell slept in a chair by L.N.\u2019s bedroom. LaDell could not call police because the family did not have a telephone in the apartment. LaDell did not leave the apartment until two days later when her best friend came to the apartment to pick her up. LaDell took L.N. with her. LaDell told her friend what had occurred, and they drove to the police station.\nLaDell admitted to using crack cocaine after she had witnessed the incident between defendant and L.N. She further admitted that she had left the apartment to purchase cocaine to use with defendant.\nDr. Gail Allen, an assistant professor of pediatrics at the University of Chicago Children\u2019s Hospital, testified that on October 19, 1997, she was assigned to the emergency room where L.N. was admitted. Dr. Allen conducted an evaluation of L.N. for sexual assault. In a preliminary interview, L.N. told Dr. Allen that after she took a bath, defendant \u201cbegan feeling on\u201d her. L.N. stated that she pushed defendant away, but that he returned and \u201cstarted doing it to\u201d her. However, L.N. told Dr. Allen that she had not been vaginally penetrated at that time, but she had been in the past.\nDr. Allen performed a general physical examination of L.N., which revealed the presence of \u201cwhitish\u201d or \u201cyellowish\u201d secretions just outside of L.N.\u2019s vagina. Although L.N.\u2019s hymen was intact, Dr. Allen found it significant that during her examination, she discovered the development of \u201cwhitish\u201d scar tissue on the right side of L.N.\u2019s hymen. Such a finding is consistent with chronic abuse. Dr. Allen collected physical evidence for analysis and recommended that L.N. be admitted to the chronic care facility of the hospital.\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Allen admitted that she was unable to find any acute evidence of sexual abuse aside from the abnormal secretions. She explained that the term \u201cacute\u201d referred to evidence of sexual abuse occurring within 72 hours after the alleged incident.\nThe parties stipulated that Jennifer Shultz, a forensic scientist, received the vaginal swabs taken from L.N. and determined that they contained semen. The parties further stipulated that Amy Rehemstrom, a forensic scientist, compared the DNA from defendant\u2019s blood samples to the DNA from the vaginal swabs and determined that no conclusion could be drawn as to the source of the semen.\nDefendant\u2019s sole witness was Sergeant Kenneth Burke, a youth investigator for the Chicago police department. Burke had observed, on October 20, 1997, a victim-sensitive interview of L.N. at the hospital. He described L.N. as being very alert and articulate. He recalled L.N. telling the social worker that defendant \u201ckept messing\u201d with her and that he touched her private part while she was in the bathtub. L.N. denied that defendant touched her with his private part.\nThe circuit court found defendant guilty. Although the court acknowledged the chronological inconsistencies in L.N.\u2019s testimony, he found her description of the events to be credible. The court also found LaDell\u2019s testimony credible as well despite her admitted use of cocaine. The court found the medical evidence of scar tissue to L.N.\u2019s hymen to be consistent with sexual abuse and that the presence of semen suggested some contact. The court sentenced defendant to 22 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nThe appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding defendant\u2019s insufficiency of the evidence argument to be unpersuasive. People v. Brooks, No. 1\u201400\u20141176 (2002) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nDefendant thereafter sought postconviction relief. To that end, he filed a petition in which he asserted that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to call two witnesses, defendant\u2019s mother and his brother. Defendant alleged in his petition that their trial testimony would have called into question LaDell\u2019s credibility. Defendant also alleged that his appellate counsel, who was also his trial counsel, was ineffective for failing to raise his own ineffectiveness on direct appeal. Defendant\u2019s petition was supported by affidavits from both his mother and his brother. After reviewing the affidavits, the circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as being without merit.\nDefendant also filed with his postconviction petition a pro se motion to compel polymerase chain reaction DNA testing (PCR DNA testing) of the vaginal swab taken from L.N. This motion was made pursuant to section 116\u20143 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/116\u20143 (West 2002)). The circuit court denied the motion.\nDefendant appealed. The appellate court reversed the circuit court\u2019s summary dismissal of the postconviction petition because it found that the circuit court rendered the order more than 90 days after the date the petition was filed and docketed, in contravention of section 122\u2014 2.1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122\u2014 2.1 (West 2002\u00bb. No. 1 \u2014 03\u20140586 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). With respect to defendant\u2019s request for new DNA testing, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court\u2019s denial of the request, holding that defendant did not establish, as required under the statute, that the vaginal swab was not subjected to PCR DNA testing at the time of trial. Other pertinent facts will be discussed within the body of the analysis.\nAnalysis\nI\nThe State assigns error to the appellate court\u2019s conclusion that the circuit court\u2019s order of summary dismissal was void because it was rendered more than 90 days after the date the petition was filed and docketed. The State argues that the docketing requirement of section 122 \u2014 2.1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1 (West 2002)) is fulfilled on the date when the clerk of the court places it on the docket call of a trial judge with the authority to rule on it. Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the requirement is satisfied when the clerk of the court receives the petition.\nThe issue, as framed by the parties, involves the interpretation of a statute, which is a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 172 (2003). This court\u2019s primary objective when undertaking to interpret a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and the most reliable indicator of that intent is the language of the statute. People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (2004); People v. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 497 (2003).\nSection 122 \u2014 1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) provides that a postconviction proceeding \u201cshall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place a petition *** verified by affidavit.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(b) (West 2002). This same section also states that the \u201cclerk shall docket the petition for consideration by the court pursuant to Section 122 \u2014 2.1 upon his or her receipt thereof and bring the same promptly to the attention of the court.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(b) (West 2002). Section 122 \u2014 2.1 provides:\n\u201c(a) Within 90 days after the filing and docketing of each petition, the court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section.\n\u2756 *\n(b) If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to this Section, the court shall order the petition to be docketed for further consideration in accordance with Sections 122 \u2014 4 through. 122 \u2014 6.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1 (West 2004).\nThis court has previously recognized that the time requirement contained in section 122 \u2014 2.1(a) is mandatory, not directory, and that a trial court\u2019s noncompliance with the time requirement renders any summary dismissal void. People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 86 (1988).\nIn this case, the record reveals that defendant placed his petition in the institutional mail at Centraba Correctional Center on September 9, 2002. The notice of filing accompanying defendant\u2019s petition was stamped \u201cReceived\u201d by the clerk of the circuit court, criminal division, on September 13, 2002. That same notice of filing was also stamped \u201cFiled\u201d by Dorothy Brown, clerk of circuit court, on September 20, 2002. Defendant\u2019s actual pro se petition was stamped \u201cFiled\u201d by Dorothy Brown, clerk of circuit court, on September 20, 2002. On that same date, the clerk\u2019s office entered the following notation on the \u201chalf-sheet\u201d of the case, numbered 97 CR 29342 \u2014 01: \u201c9/20/02 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Filed Hearing Date Set: 9/30/02.\u201d The half-sheet notation reveals that the case was assigned to Judge Dern-bach from Judge Wood on September 30, 2002. Judge Dernbach summarily dismissed the case on December 18, 2002.\nAs noted above, the Act requires that within 90 days \u201cafter the filing and docketing\u201d of the petition, the circuit court shall examine the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122\u2014 2.1(a) (West 2002). In this case, the parties focus on the meaning of the word \u201cdocketing.\u201d Defendant maintains, as did the appellate court, that the plain language of the Act establishes that the 90-day review period begins to run when a postconviction petition is received by the clerk of the circuit court, which in this case was on September 13, 2002. The State contends that the 90-day review period begins to run when the clerk of the court places the case on the call of a judge with authority to rule on it, which in this case was on September 30, 2002, the day on which the case was placed on the call of Judge Dernbach. Thus, the parties give different meanings to the word \u201cdocketing\u201d as it is used in section 122 \u2014 2.1(a) of the Act.\nThe Act does not define the word \u201cdocketing.\u201d As such, we must interpret it, and in so doing, we must give the word its plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning. Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 507 (2003). When a term used by the legislature is clear and unambiguous, it is not necessary to resort to other aids of construction. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). According to Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, the word \u201cdocket,\u201d when used in its verb form, means \u201cto make a brief entry in the docket of the proceedings and filings in a court case *** to abstract and enter in a book *** or to schedule (a case) for trial or some other event.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 517 (8th ed. 2004). The standard dictionary meaning of the verb \u201cdocket\u201d is \u201cto make a brief abstract of (a legal matter) and inscribe it in a list.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 666 (1993). Clearly, then, the verb \u201cdocket\u201d connotes more than the mere act of receiving the petition, as defendant suggests. To \u201cdocket\u201d requires that the cause be entered in an official record. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the word \u201cdocket\u201d entails that the case be placed on a specific call of a judge, as the State maintains. The plain meaning of the word connotes that the cause is entered on the court\u2019s official docket for further proceedings. The record here reveals that defendant\u2019s postconviction petition was \u201cdocketed\u201d within the commonly understood meaning of the word on September 20, 2002, when the clerk of the court entered the petition into the case file and set it for a hearing. Thus, in this case, the clock began to run for purposes of the time requirement contained in section 122 \u2014 2.1 on September 20, 2002.\nIn view of the above, we cannot agree with the appellate court that the summary order of dismissal entered by the circuit court was void. The circuit court entered the summary dismissal order on December 18, 2002, and the petition was docketed on September 20, 2002. As such, the circuit court\u2019s ruling occurred within the statutory time span allowed in section 122 \u2014 2.1. The appellate court\u2019s conclusion to the contrary was erroneous.\nII\nIn a request for cross-relief, defendant contends that the appellate court erred in affirming the circuit court\u2019s denial of his motion for DNA testing pursuant to section 116 \u2014 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In his motion to allow DNA testing, defendant had stated that none of the DNA material collected from him \u201cwas subjected to test [sic] requested. Now [defendant] request [s\u00bfc] forensic (PCR DNA) testing.\u201d The defendant had also stated that \u201cThe DNA technology available today was not available at the time of trial.\u201d The circuit court denied the motion. The appellate court rejected defendant\u2019s claim of error on the grounds that defendant could not show that his evidentiary sample had not been previously subjected to PCR DNA testing at the time of his trial. No. 1 \u2014 03\u20140568 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nIn this court, defendant maintains that he made his prima facie case as required by section 116 \u2014 3 by asserting that identity was at issue at the trial; that the vaginal swab was not subject to testing at the time of the trial; and that the evidence to be tested had been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it had not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material respect.\nSection 116 \u2014 3 of the Code provides:\n\u201c(a) A defendant may make a motion before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case for the performance of fingerprint or forensic DNA testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial which resulted in his or her conviction, but which was not subject to the testing which is now requested because the technology for the testing was not available at the time of trial. ***\n(b) The defendant must present a prima facie case that:\n(1) identity was the issue in the trial which resulted in his or her conviction; and\n(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect.\n(c) The trial court shall allow the testing under reasonable conditions designed to protect the State\u2019s interests in the integrity of the evidence and the testing process upon a determination that:\n(1) the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant\u2019s assertion of actual innocence; [and]\n(2) the testing requested employs a scientific method generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/116 \u2014 3 (West 2002).\nThe denial of a request made pursuant to section 116 \u2014 3 is subject to de novo review upon appeal. People v. Shum, 207 Ill. 2d 47, 65 (2003).\nWe agree with the appellate court\u2019s conclusion that to have granted defendant\u2019s request for retesting under these circumstances would have been contrary to both the express language of the statute and the intent of the legislature. The plain language of subsection (a) of section 116 \u2014 3 requires that a defendant show (i) that the evidence in question was not subject to the requested test at the time of the trial and, (ii) that the reason it was not subject to testing is because the technology for the requested test was unavailable at the time of defendant\u2019s trial. People v. Lamming, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1153, 1156 (2005), quoting People v. Franks, 323 Ill. App. 3d 660, 662 (2001); People v. Price, 345 Ill. App. 3d 129 (2003). In his motion, defendant requested PCR DNA testing. The record indicates that the circuit court ordered the genetic samples collected from the victim tested for DNA analysis on November 8, 1999. Defendant\u2019s trial took place in January 2000. At the time of defendant\u2019s trial, the technology for PCR DNA testing was available and the method itself was recognized by the judiciary nationwide, including Illinois. See People v. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d 695, 703-05 (1996) (noting that PCR testing accepted by the scientific community and collecting cases); see also United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that courts in the Eighth Circuit can take judicial notice of the general reliability of PCR DNA testing); Harmon v. State, 908 P.2d 434, 440 (Alaska App. 1995) (holding that there is little question concerning the scientific acceptance of the theory underlying PCR DNA testing); State v. Brown, 949 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Mo. App. 1997) (same); Wood v. State, 959 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1998); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 393 S.E.2d 609 (1990). Thus, if the requested test was not done on the genetic samples collected from the victim, the reason it was not done was not because the technology for the testing was unavailable at the time of defendant\u2019s trial. However, that is the only reason the statute allows for granting a request. We hold that the circuit court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s request.\nConclusion\nIn light of the foregoing, we reverse that portion of the appellate court\u2019s judgment which held the circuit court\u2019s summary dismissal of defendant\u2019s postconviction petition void. Consequently, we remand the matter to the appellate court in order for it to consider the remainder of defendant\u2019s appellate challenges to the circuit court\u2019s summary dismissal of his postconviction petition. We affirm the appellate court\u2019s judgment in all other respects.\nAppellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Joan F. Frazier, Ashley Romito and Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Jennifer L. Blagg, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 99293.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CLAUDE BROOKS, JR., Appellee.\nOpinion filed May 18, 2006.\nRehearing denied June 29, 2006.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Joan F. Frazier, Ashley Romito and Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Jennifer L. Blagg, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0381-01", "first_page_order": 393, "last_page_order": 406 }