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MICHAEL RIVERA, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, McMor-row, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, and Garman concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nThe defendant, Michael Rivera, was charged in the circuit court of Cook County with two counts of first degree murder. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty and was subsequently sentenced to 85 years\u2019 incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant appealed, arguing that (1) the trial court erred when it sua sponte raised a reverse-Batson (see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986)) challenge to his use of a peremptory challenge during jury selection, (2) the procedure resulting in the imposition of his extended-term sentence violated the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), and (3) the procedure resulting in the imposition of his extended-term sentence violated his right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution. A divided appellate panel rejected those contentions and affirmed defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence. 348 Ill. App. 3d 168. We granted the defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.\nOn appeal, defendant advances multiple arguments, all of which are merely facets of the same Batson and Apprendi arguments defendant raised below. Specifically, defendant submits that (1) trial judges do not have third-party standing to raise Batson challenges sua sponte; (2) the trial court\u2019s sua sponte Batson challenge to defense counsel\u2019s peremptory strike of juror Deloris Gomez was incompatible with the three-step Batson process; (3) the trial court erred in proceeding to the second step of the Batson process where no inference of a prima facie case of discrimination had been established; (4) the trial judge erred in his ultimate determination that defense counsel discriminated against juror Gomez; (5) the trial court\u2019s improper denial of defense counsel\u2019s peremptory strike of juror Gomez was reversible error; (6) the trial court\u2019s \u201cviolation of state statutory and constitutional guarantees to jury trial\u201d are not amenable to harmless-error review; (7) Apprendi violations are not subject to harmless-error review; and (8) Apprendi violations in this case are not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant\u2019s individual contentions will be addressed, as warranted, in the context of the broader Batson and Ap-prendi issues he has raised. We will set forth only those facts pertinent to the issues defendant has raised.\nBACKGROUND\nDuring jury selection, defense counsel questioned juror Deloris Gomez, a business office supervisor at Cook County Hospital\u2019s outpatient orthopedic clinic. In the course of that questioning, Gomez acknowledged that Cook County Hospital is known for the treatment of gunshot victims and, as a part of her employment at the clinic, she has contact with patients, \u201cchecking them in.\u201d Gomez said her interaction with the victims of violent crime would not affect her ability to serve as a juror in the case. Following voir dire, and apparently in the presence of Gomez and other prospective jurors, defense counsel announced his intention to use his fourth peremptory challenge against Gomez, as the following excerpt from the transcript indicates:\n\u201cMR. DECKER [Defense attorney]: Your Honor, with thanks, we would ask to excuse Mrs. Gomez.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m going to ask you to remain, Mrs. Gomez. I\u2019m going to ask counsel to join me, if the court reporter will join me, and the defendant will join me in chambers. Excuse me, ladies and gentlemen.\u201d\nIn chambers, the court directed defense counsel to \u201ckindly articulate a basis of why you are excusing Ms. Gomez.\u201d Defense counsel protested, \u201cThe court has done it on its own motion sua sponte.\u201d The trial court responded: \u201cI will do it. It is the citizen\u2019s right to sit as a juror, and I will implicate myself sua sponte if I feel somebody\u2019s rights are being impinged upon ***.\u201d Defense counsel then complied with the court\u2019s directive, responding:\n\u201cMrs. Gomez has a connection to a hospital that on a daily basis probably sees more gunshot victims than any other hospital in the world ***. Given that fact that she\u2019s in the orthopedic section, I think on a daily basis even though she\u2019s a supervisor, even though she\u2019s not a rehabilitative nurse, she on a daily basis sees those victims who are victims of violent crime. For those reasons it constrains me. I know she has some kind of Hispanic connection given her name. I\u2019m pulled in two different ways. For those reasons I asked that the \u2014 .\u201d\nAt that point in defense counsel\u2019s explanation, the trial court interrupted counsel, noting that \u201cMrs. Deloris Gomez appears to be an African-American.\u201d The court then asked to \u201chear from\u201d the State on the issue, the prosecutor having been totally silent and uninvolved to that juncture. After some initial observations regarding the theory of the case and the issue for the jury\u2019s consideration, the prosecutor echoed the court\u2019s sentiment that the offered cause for excusing Gomez was insufficient. Defense counsel then noted that he had previously accepted an African-American woman to sit on the jury, and the court quickly pointed out that Gomez was the second African-American woman that the defense had sought to exclude. The court stated it was the articulated reason given for the peremptory challenge of Gomez that was of particular concern. The court concluded:\n\u201cI\u2019ve heard her answers to the questions. I\u2019ve looked at her jury information form, and I\u2019m quite frankly very much concerned, Counsel, as to why Mrs. Deloris is being excused \u2014 Mrs. Deloris Gomez is being excused. She works in a clinical division of this hospital. It may have a reputation of having many emergency cases, I presume, involving gunshot cases, but again she works in a business office, the very first line identifying her job.\nHi ^\nI did this sua sponte because I was concerned about the right of Mrs. Gomez to be a juror and participate. If the State in fact had done this, I certainly would have found they would have established a prima facie case by the very reason \u2014 what I\u2019m going to do is allow Ms. Gomez \u2014 allow her to be seated, not excuse her on the basis of your peremptory.\nI feel under these circumstances the reasons given by you, Mr. Decker, do not satisfy this Court. As far as I\u2019m concerned, it\u2019s more than a prima facie case of discrimination against Mrs. Gomez. I\u2019m not going to allow her to be excused. She will be seated as a juror over objection.\u201d\nDefense counsel then asked for, and was granted, leave to conduct further questioning of Gomez, and noted defendant\u2019s objection of record. Further questioning of Gomez was conducted by defense counsel in chambers. Gomez again acknowledged the \u201cgreat number of patients\u201d who are seen in Cook County Hospital\u2019s emergency room \u201cas a result of violent crimes\u201d; however, Gomez pointed out that the clinic where she works is a separate building. Defense counsel\u2019s questioning of Gomez continued:\n\u201cMR. DECKER: But the individuals that are seen there at Fantus Clinic, I know they are not seen in the emergency room on an emergency room basis; you don\u2019t have the facilities there. It\u2019s mainly appointments that people are awaiting and people picking up medications. I believe there is a pharmacy also, I believe, there on the first floor?\nJUROR GOMEZ: Yes, it is.\nMR. DECKER: Certainly some of those victims are\u2014 certainly some of those patients were victims of gun violence?\nJUROR GOMEZ: Yes, they were.\nMR. DECKER: Does that fact set you off against my client as opposed to if he was charged with something else, you know, suppose if he was a defendant charged with theft or possessing a stolen motor vehicle, that\u2019s our concern?\nJUROR GOMEZ: No, it does not. It does not affect me in that way.\nMR. DECKER: Do you still feel you\u2019d be able to fairly view the evidence and follow the instructions and the law that his Honor, Judge Fiala, will be giving you?\nJUROR GOMEZ: Yes, I do.\u201d\nWith the conclusion of counsel\u2019s questioning, the trial court directed Gomez to resume her seat in the jury box. Subsequently, out of juror Gomez\u2019s presence, the trial court inquired of defense counsel whether counsel wished to say anything further. Counsel responded:\n\u201cYes, your Honor. My feeling [sic] are still the same. I feel that I\u2019m trying to modify the composition of this panel. I\u2019m not trying to exclude a woman because of her race, but \u2014 strike that \u2014 not trying to excuse a juror because of her race. But also I think I can also factor in the fact that she would now be out of the \u2014 by the fact that the jury is predominantly women, I\u2019m trying to get some impact from possibly other men in the case. I just don\u2019t feel that under these circumstances my client should be precluded from his reason to exercise a peremptory challenge.\u201d\nDefense counsel asked the trial judge if he had ever been to Fantus Clinic, and the court advised counsel that the court could not comment on that. Defense counsel then told the court: \u201cIt\u2019s wall to wall victims and patients coming in there, and I could see it\u2019s a disturbing place for me to be there when I\u2019ve been there.\u201d\nThe court concluded:\n\u201cI had the opportunity to question Deloris Gomez who I find is a very intelligent lady. I considered her statements very carefully, her testimony very carefully, and I again feel that she shall sit as a juror. I shall not excuse her, and I will override your peremptory challenge as to Ms. Gomez, and I find no basis for cause. So Mrs. Gomez shall sit as a juror.\u201d\nIn view of the court\u2019s ruling as to Gomez, defense counsel asked to excuse \u201cas [defendant\u2019s] fourth peremptory[,] Mr. Kurich.\u201d Inexplicably, the court responded as to that peremptory challenge, \u201cWith reluctance I will allow it.\u201d\nWhen the evidentiary portion of defendant\u2019s trial commenced, the State presented evidence establishing that defendant shot and killed 16-year-old Marcus Lee, erroneously believing that Lee was a member of a rival gang. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his murder conviction, and he raises, as additional error, only an Apprendi issue; therefore, we set forth only the trial evidence pertinent to that issue.\nAt trial, the State called Susan Shelton, Miguel Rodriguez, and Charles Oberlin to testify regarding the events of January 10, 1998, the night of the murder. All three witnesses were former members of defendant\u2019s gang, the Insane Deuces.\nSusan Shelton testified that she was with the defendant on the night of the murder. That evening, Shelton attended a party where defendant and several other members of the Insane Deuces were also in attendance. At some point in the evening, defendant, Shelton, Carlos Sanchez (also a gang member), and three others left the party in Sanchez\u2019s van, with Sanchez driving. While they were driving around defendant saw two persons walking down the street. Defendant identified those individuals as members of a rival gang. Defendant directed Sanchez to stop the van. Defendant then produced a gun and exited the van, but returned a few seconds later, instructing Sanchez to chase the two persons they had just seen. Shelton testified that they never saw those two individuals again that night, but defendant later noticed another individual on the street, and announced, \u201cThere go [sic] that pussy ass Stone from earlier.\u201d Shelton knew that the Insane Deuces and the Stones were rival gangs.\nDefendant pointed his gun at Sanchez and ordered him to \u201cstop the fucking van.\u201d When the van stopped, defendant exited the van, still holding the gun. Two other occupants followed. Defendant ran around the side of the van, and out of Shelton\u2019s sight. Shelton then heard gunshots. Defendant and the others returned to the van, with defendant still holding the gun. The two other individuals with defendant were yelling gang slogans until defendant told them to \u201cshut the fuck up,\u201d advising them that he still had \u201cone bullet left.\u201d Defendant was the only person Shelton saw armed with a weapon that evening. After the shooting, defendant continued to direct the van\u2019s movements. At one point, defendant ordered the van to stop in an alley. Defendant unloaded the gun and handed the shell casings to Shelton. Defendant got out of the van with the gun and later returned without it. Shelton gave the shell casings to Sanchez, and he apparently disposed of them. Sanchez then took defendant and three other individuals back to the party. Shelton testified that she believed defendant to be the \u201cchief enforcer\u201d of the Insane Deuces, a gang position below the chief, or \u201cjefa,\u201d and above the foot soldiers.\nMiguel Rodriguez testified that he was a member of the Insane Deuces on January 9, 1998, and several members of the gang \u2014 including defendant \u2014 were at his home that evening. Between 8:30 and 9 p.m. that day, the group was notified that there were some \u201cStones\u201d in a park near Rodriguez\u2019s home. The group, including defendant and a person named \u201cNelson,\u201d went to the park, where they saw some individuals playing basketball. Defendant began to \u201cthrow\u201d gang signs, indicating his allegiance to the gang. When those playing basketball did not respond, the group returned to Rodriguez\u2019s home.\nBack at Rodriguez\u2019s home, defendant referred to the individuals in the park as \u201cpussies\u201d because they were afraid to fight. Later that night, Rodriguez observed defendant in possession of two chrome revolvers. Thereafter, defendant began asking other gang members if they wanted to go with him to the projects. Defendant and other members of the gang left Rodriguez\u2019s home between 12:30 and 1 a.m. When Rodriguez next saw defendant it was approximately 3 a.m. At that time, defendant announced to Rodriguez that he was a \u201cStone killer,\u201d and he indicated he had shot someone that evening. Rodriguez identified Nelson as a \u201cchief\u2019 of the gang, and defendant as the \u201cchief enforcer.\u201d He explained that the role of the chief enforcer was to enforce the chiefs decisions.\nCharles Oberlin testified that he was a member of the Insane Deuces in January of 1998, and he knew defendant as the \u201cchief enforcer\u201d of that gang. Around 3 or 4 a.m. on January 10, 1998, Oberlin saw defendant in possession of a chrome gun, and defendant indicated that he had fired the weapon. Oberlin described his own position in the gang hierarchy at the time as that of an \u201cold-G,\u201d or elder. Oberlin explained that his position was above that of \u201cfoot soldiers,\u201d but below the chief enforcers, the chief and the vice president.\nDuring closing argument, the prosecutor argued that defendant was the \u201cchief enforcer\u201d of the Insane Deuces and killed Marcus Lee because he thought Lee was \u201ca Stone.\u201d The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. Juror Gomez served as the foreperson of the jury.\nAt a subsequent hearing, the circuit court denied defendant\u2019s posttrial motion and proceeded to sentencing. The State argued that an extended-term sentence was warranted because the murder was committed in a brutal and heinous manner indicative of wanton cruelty (see 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2) (West 2000)) and defendant was a leader in the Insane Deuces street gang and the murder was related to the gang\u2019s activities (see 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(8) (West 2000)). Defense counsel argued that the murder was not committed in a brutal and heinous manner and, though all the witnesses referred to defendant as the \u201cchief enforcer\u201d of the gang, \u201cit was not clearly shown that defendant was a leader, motivator or supervisor\u201d of the gang. The circuit court determined that an extended-term sentence was warranted, stating:\n\u201cI further find that [defendant] was indeed a chief enforcer of the Insane Deuces gang, *** and a weapon was obtained at his direction and a search for rival gang members was then had.\u201d\nContinuing, the court concluded, \u201cIt was a senseless, brutal killing and I feel that under the circumstances this was a gang incident, gang motivated at the direction of this defendant.\u201d The circuit court apparently accepted the State\u2019s contention \u2014 now discredited \u2014 that the principles of Apprendi do not apply because the sentencing range for first degree murder is \u201ctwenty to death by lethal injection.\u201d See People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378, 392 (2002) (sentencing range for first degree murder in Illinois is 20 to 60 years\u2019 imprisonment). The circuit court sentenced defendant to an extended-term sentence of 85 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.\nThereafter, defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence. At the hearing on that motion, defense counsel argued that Apprendi requires a jury to find the factors enabling the imposition of an extended-term sentence. Counsel also argued that defendant was not in a leadership position within the gang, as required by the statute, because his place in the gang hierarchy places him below \u201cthe chief\u201d and required him to carry out the chiefs orders. The circuit court persisted in its prior ruling and denied the motion for reconsideration. Defendant appealed.\nA divided appellate panel affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The court was united in holding that a \u201ctrial court has standing to act on behalf of a juror subject to discriminatory jury selection practices.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 176. The appellate court cautioned that the trial court has a right to raise Batson objections sua sponte, but it has no corresponding duty to do so. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 176.\nRelying upon this court\u2019s opinion in People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401 (1993), the appellate majority found it unnecessary to \u201cconsider whether combined race-gender discrimination can be used to establish a prima facie case under Batson.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 177. The majority cited this court\u2019s opinion in Hudson for the general proposition that \u201conce the trial court rules on the ultimate question of discrimination the question of whether a prima facie case had been established is moot,\u201d and thus the majority rejected the dissent\u2019s argument that the \u201cmatter should be remanded for a hearing on whether a prima facie case existed.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 177. The appellate majority observed, \u201cbecause the trial court\u2019s determination [on the prima facie issue] is based on its own observations, the first stage of the Batson inquiry will necessarily collapse.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 178. The majority recognized that \u201callowing a trial court to sua sponte raise a Batson issue creates the potential for abuse\u201d; however, the court majority rejected the dissent\u2019s call for the trial court to make a record and \u201carticulate the basis for the perceived Batson violation\u201d as \u201ca meaningless rhetorical exercise\u201d and \u201cmindless adherence to the three-step analysis of Batson.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 178. The appellate majority then noted that \u201cgreat deference\u201d is accorded the trial court\u2019s ultimate determination on review (348 Ill. App. 3d at 178, citing People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2002)) and concluded that the trial court, \u201cweighting] the credibility of defense counsel\u2019s explanation\u201d for defendant\u2019s peremptory challenge, \u201ccould rationally find a motive to discriminate against African-Americans, women, or both groups simultaneously.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 178-79.\nJustice Gallagher, specially concurring, acknowledged that \u201cit is arguable that the excusal did not constitute a pattern of strikes against African-Americans, since defense counsel also excused a white male and a white female\u201d; however, he believed there was at least \u201can inference of purposeful discrimination.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) 348 Ill. App. 3d at 182 (Gallagher, J., specially concurring). Justice Gallagher stated, \u201c[I]t is inferable that the court believed that a prima facie case was established when defense counsel excluded a second African-American.\u201d The justice concluded, \u201cWhether one agrees or disagrees is not the point. The point is that step one of the Batson process was followed.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 182 (Gallagher, J., specially concurring).\nPresiding Justice O\u2019Mara Frossard, dissenting, disagreed, arguing that the trial court improperly \u201ccollapsed what ought to be a three-step procedure into an undifferentiated review of the jury selection process.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 183 (O\u2019Mara Frossard, EJ., dissenting). Fresiding Justice O\u2019Mara Frossard noted that the record in this case fails to reflect that the trial court examined relevant factors bearing upon the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 183 (O\u2019Mara Frossard, EJ., dissenting). Presiding Justice O\u2019Mara Frossard argued that \u201cHudson is not determinative in the factual context of this case, where a trial judge sua sponte raised a reverse-Batson violation and bypassed any determination of a prima facie case by requesting race-neutral explanations from defense counsel for his peremptory challenge.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 185 (O\u2019Mara Frossard, P.J., dissenting). The dissent observed that the \u201ctrial judge\u2019s failure to make a record of the prima facie case regarding this uncommon sua sponte reverse-Batson challenge makes proper review of the Batson ruling impossible.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 185 (O\u2019Mara Frossard, EJ., dissenting).\nPresiding Justice O\u2019Mara Frossard also pointed out that the majority failed to address defendant\u2019s argument that Batson is not applicable to combined race-gender discrimination, suggesting that the majority\u2019s resort to our opinion in Hudson did not obviate the need to determine whether the trial court ultimately based its rejection of defendant\u2019s peremptory challenge on its perception of combined race-gender discrimination. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 186 (O\u2019Mara Frossard, P.J., dissenting). The dissent correctly observes that this court has held the \u201cfocus of Batson is on the exclusion of members of a single identifiable group, not of different groups considered together\u201d (348 Ill. App. 3d at 186 (O\u2019Mara Frossard, P.J., dissenting), citing People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322, 344 (1994)), and an appellate panel has actually held that Batson does not apply \u201cto alleged combined race-gender discrimination.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 186 (O\u2019Mara Frossard, EJ., dissenting), citing People v. Washington, 257 Ill. App. 3d 26, 34 (1993). We note in passing that this court mentioned the appellate court\u2019s disposition in Washington in the course of our opinion in Harris, citing the appellate court\u2019s holding as an analogous proposition lending support to our own decision, \u201cdeclining] *** to expand the Batson rule to embrace the simultaneous consideration of different racial or ethnic groups.\u201d See Harris, 164 Ill. 2d at 344. Eresiding Justice O\u2019Mara Frossard concluded:\n\u201c[T]he trial court\u2019s failure to articulate the circumstances that demonstrate a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination leaves unanswered the question of whether the court\u2019s finding a Batson violation was based on combined race-gender discrimination. The trial judge, by collapsing the Batson stages and failing to make findings of fact to clarify the record regarding the relevant circumstances demonstrating a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, has made proper review of this race-gender issue impossible.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 186 (O\u2019Mara Frossard, P.J., dissenting).\nCiting the procedure this court sanctioned in People v. Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d 189, 194 (1990), Presiding Justice O\u2019Mara Frossard would have retained jurisdiction and remanded \u201cfor a three-step Batson hearing on the present record and any additional record the trial court or parties decide to make.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 187 (O\u2019Mara Frossard, P.J., dissenting). If the circuit court then found a Batson violation, Presiding Justice O\u2019Mara Frossard would have required the circuit court to clarify the nature of the violation, i.e., race, gender, or combined race-gender discrimination. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 187 (O\u2019Mara Frossard, P.J., dissenting).\nUnlike the Batson issue, there was no separate opinion written with respect to defendant\u2019s Apprendi issue. The appellate court held that an Apprendi violation had occurred because the judge \u2014 rather than the jury\u2014 found the facts necessary to extend the sentencing range applicable to defendant. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 179-80. However, relying upon this court\u2019s decisions in Swift and People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363 (2003), the appellate court determined that \u201can Apprendi violation may be subject to a plain-error or harmless-error analysis\u201d (348 Ill. App. 3d at 180) and ultimately concluded, based on the uncontested evidence of defendant\u2019s position in the gang hierarchy, that the Apprendi violation was harmless error. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 181. Finally, the court rejected defendant\u2019s contention that the Illinois Constitution affords greater protection than its federal counterpart, concluding:\n\u201c[W]e find nothing in defendant\u2019s discussion of the history of criminal defendants\u2019 right to a jury trial in Illinois that compels us to break lockstep and conclude that the harmless-error analysis of Thurow is impermissible under the Illinois Constitution.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 181.\nANALYSIS\nWe begin our analysis with a review of the function of peremptory challenges in our judicial system and of relevant principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), and other pertinent cases.\nIn Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 85 S. Ct. 824 (1965), the Supreme Court stated that the peremptory challenge is \u201c \u2018one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused\u2019 \u201d in our criminal justice system because the challenge eliminates \u201cextremes of partiality on both sides\u201d and assures the parties that the case will be decided on the basis of evidence placed before the jurors. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219, 13 L. Ed. 2d at 772, 85 S. Ct. at 835, quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408, 38 L. Ed. 208, 214, 14 S. Ct. 410, 414 (1894). See also People v. Daniels, 172 Ill. 2d 154, 165 (1996) (relying upon the foregoing proposition).\nIn Batson, the Supreme Court again acknowledged the important role peremptory challenges occupy in our trial procedures and held, as a constitutional matter, that peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude potential jurors based solely on race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 89, 106 S. Ct. at 1724. The Court, in Batson, held that a prosecutor cannot utilize peremptory challenges to excuse potential jurors solely on the basis of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 83, 106 S. Ct. at 1719. In Batson, the defendant and the potential juror in question shared the same racial characteristics.\nSubsequently, in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, 419, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1366 (1991), the Court held that a defendant in a criminal trial has standing to challenge the State\u2019s use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on account of their race irrespective of whether the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same racial characteristics. In so holding, the Court determined that a litigant may raise a claim on behalf of a third party if the litigant can demonstrate that he has suffered a concrete injury, that he has a close relation to the third party, and there exists some hindrance to the third party\u2019s ability to protect its own interests. Powers, 499 U.S. at 410-11, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 425, 111 S. Ct. at 1370-71. The Court found that jurors have rights under its Batson jurisprudence, stating, although \u201c[a]n individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, *** he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race.\u201d Powers, 499 U.S. at 409, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 424, 111 S. Ct. at 1370. Speaking of discriminatory jury-selection practices, the Court stated: \u201cThe overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel, casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of the cause.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Powers, 499 U.S. at 412, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 426, 111 S. Ct. at 1371. The Court concluded that the defendant was a proper party to raise a violation of a juror\u2019s rights under Batson.\nTwo justices of the Court were not of the belief that jurors actually possess rights in the jury-selection process which are independent of the rights of the parties. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 417-31, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 429-39, 111 S. Ct. at 1374-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). In dissent, Justice Scalia wrote:\n\u201cTo affirm that the Equal Protection Clause applies to strikes of individual jurors is effectively to abolish the peremptory challenge. *** Not only is it implausible that such a permanent and universal feature of our jury-trial system is unconstitutional, but it is unlikely that its elimination would be desirable. The peremptory challenge system has endured so long because it has unquestionable advantages. As we described in Holland, 493 U.S. at 484, it is a means of winnowing out possible (though not demonstrable) sympathies and antagonisms on both sides, to the end that the jury will be the fairest possible. In a criminal-law system in which a single biased juror can prevent a deserved conviction or a deserved acquittal, the importance of this device should not be minimized.\u201d Powers, 499 U.S. at 425, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 434-35, 111 S. Ct. at 1378 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).\nSubsequently, the Court again focused on the equal protection rights of excluded jurors in its decision in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 120 L. Ed. 2d 33, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). In McCollum, the Court held that the constitution prohibits not only the prosecution, but also a criminal defendant, from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 51, 112 S. Ct. at 2359. In so holding, the Court recognized the State\u2019s standing to attack the defendant\u2019s use of peremptory challenges on racial grounds, observing that, \u201c[a]s the representative of all its citizens, the State is the logical and proper party to assert the invasion of the constitutional rights of the excluded jurors in a criminal trial.\u201d McCollum, 505 U.S. at 56, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 49, 112 S. Ct. at 2357.\nIn J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), the Supreme Court again extended the reasoning, prohibitions, and procedures of Batson, this time to peremptory strikes based on gender. Reminiscent of the analysis employed in Powers and McCollum, the Court in J.E.B. stated: \u201cDiscrimination injury selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process.\u201d J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 104, 114 S. Ct. at 1427. The Court pointedly observed that the \u201c [discriminatory use of peremptory challenges may create the impression that the judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing full participation by one gender.\u201d J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 104, 114 S. Ct. at 1427.\nFive justices wrote or subscribed to separate opinons in J.E.B., either concurring and expressing concerns, or dissenting outright. Justice O\u2019Connor, concurring in the judgment, expressed her concerns over the proliferation of \u201cBatson minihearings\u201d in the state and federal trial courts, and over the further erosion of the role of the peremptory challenge, which she acknowledged to be a valuable practice that \u201chelps produce fair and impartial juries.\u201d J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 108, 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O\u2019Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy, who also concurred in the judgment, expressed this perplexing cautionary concern: \u201cWe do not prohibit racial and gender bias in jury selection only to encourage it in jury deliberations. Once seated, a juror should not give free rein to some racial or gender bias of his or her own.\u201d J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 153, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 112, 114 S. Ct. at 1434 (Kennedy, J, concurring). Justice Scalia \u2014 with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in dissent \u2014 expressed his view that the Batson principle is \u201ctheoretically boundless\u201d (J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 161, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 117, 114 S. Ct. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.)), he reiterated his criticism of the \u201cuniquely expansive third-party standing analysis of Powers\u201d (J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 158-59, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 115-16, 114 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.)), and he offered the following analysis of the equal protection issue:\n\u201cThe core of the Court\u2019s reasoning is that peremptory challenges on the basis of any group characteristic subject to heightened scrutiny are inconsistent with the guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause. That conclusion can be reached only by focusing unrealistically upon individual exercises of the peremptory challenge, and ignoring the totality of the practice. Since all groups are subject to the peremptory challenge (and will be made the object of it, depending upon the nature of the particular case) it is hard to see how any group is denied equal protection.\u201d 511 U.S. at 159, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 116, 114 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.).\nSuffice it to say that the expansion of the Batson principle, and the correlative, creeping circumscription of peremptory challenges, has not proceeded without misgivings and dissent among the justices of the Supreme Court.\nWe turn now to the procedure the Court established to effectuate the Batson principle. In Batson, the Supreme Court established a three-step process for evaluating alleged discrimination in jury selection. The Court held that the party objecting to the exercise of a peremptory challenge is first required to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination \u201cby showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.\u201d See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 85-86, 106 S. Ct. at 1721. If the objector demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the other party to explain his challenge by articulating a nondiscriminatory, \u201cneutral\u201d explanation related to the particular case to be tried. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24. Finally, the trial court considers the reasons provided for the peremptory strike. As part of that process, the objector may argue that the reasons given are pretextual. The trial court then makes a final determination as to whether the objector has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88-89, 106 S. Ct. at 1724.\nIn the course of implementing the principles and procedures of Batson, this court has repeatedly cautioned that the first and second steps in the process \u201cshould not be collapsed into a single, unitary disposition that dilutes the distinctions between a *** prima facie showing of discrimination and the *** production of neutral explanations for its peremptory challenges.\u201d People v. Wiley, 156 Ill. 2d 464, 475 (1993); see also People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43, 98 (1991) (warning trial courts not to omit the first step in the Batson analysis altogether), vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 802, 121 L. Ed. 2d 5, 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992); People v. Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d 189, 201 (1990). Accord Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834, 839, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1770-71 (1995).\nIn Batson, the Supreme Court stated that courts should consider \u201call relevant circumstances\u201d in deciding whether a party has made the requisite showing of a prima facie case. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-88, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. This court has held, in determining whether the objector has demonstrated purposeful discrimination against African-Americans at the prima facie stage, a trial judge should consider, inter alia, the following relevant factors:\n\u201c(1) racial identity between the [party exercising the peremptory challenge] and the excluded venirepersons; (2) a pattern of strikes against African-American venirepersons; (3) a disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against African-American venirepersons; (4) the level of African-American representation in the venire as compared to the jury; (5) the prosecutor\u2019s questions and statements [of the challenging party] during voir dire examination and while exercising peremptory challenges; (6) whether the excluded African-American venirepersons were a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only common characteristic; and (7) the race of the defendant, victim, and witnesses.\u201d People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 71 (1996).\nThe list of factors would obviously be modified appropriately to address claims of purposeful discrimination directed at other protected groups.\nThe party attempting to exercise a peremptory chai-lenge is not required to provide race-neutral reasons for the exercise of its peremptory challenge if a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination has not been demonstrated. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. A ruling on the sufficiency of a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination is a finding of fact that will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Coleman, 155 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1993).\nAs this court has noted, a trial court\u2019s third stage finding on the ultimate issue of discrimination rests largely on credibility determinations. McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 527 (2000). Consequently, the trial court\u2019s finding is entitled to \u201cgreat deference\u201d and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. McDonnell, 192 Ill. 2d at 527; People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 175 (1996). As the Supreme Court observed in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 409, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991), there will seldom be much evidence bearing upon the ultimate question of discrimination and the \u201cbest evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.\u201d The evaluation of the attorney\u2019s state of mind is most often \u201cbased on demeanor and credibility\u201d and thus \u201clies \u2018peculiarly within the trial judge\u2019s province.\u2019 \u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 409, 111 S. Ct. at 1869, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 854, 105 S. Ct. 844, 854 (1985). As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Hernandez, the credibility of the attorney\u2019s explanation \u201cgoes to the heart of the equal protection analysis, and once that has been settled, there seems nothing left to review.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 367, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 410, 111 S. Ct. at 1870.\nWith these principles in mind, we turn to the question of the trial court\u2019s standing and authority to raise a Batson issue sua sponte. Applying the Supreme Court\u2019s three criteria for standing, and our own state principles, it seems clear to us that trial courts possess such authority.\nFirst, the Supreme Court\u2019s pronouncements dictate the conclusion that a trial court suffers an injury as significant as either of the parties when discrimination takes place in jury selection. In Powers, the Court explicitly stated that the \u201covert wrong\u201d of discrimination in jury selection \u201ccasts doubt over the obligation of *** the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of the cause.\u201d Powers, 499 U.S. at 412, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 426, 111 S. Ct. at 1371. In J.E.B., the Court observed that the \u201c[discriminatory use of peremptory challenges may create the impression that the judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing full participation\u201d by the aggrieved juror. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 104, 114 S. Ct. at 1427. In short, perceived discrimination in jury selection reflects negatively on the integrity of the judge who presides over the proceedings.\nSecond, as the appellate court in this case observed, \u201cthe relationship between the trial court and the jury is even closer than the relationship between the parties and the jury.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 175. As the appellate court noted: \u201cThe trial court and the jury are the only participants in the trial duty bound to act impartially, and the jury relies on the trial court for its instructions ***.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 175. Indeed, the jurors look to the trial judge as the overseeing authority and impartial arbiter of the proceedings, and the judge is the only participant in the trial who will supervise and direct their activities while they serve as jurors. As a practical matter, the presiding judge is an authority figure for those who serve as jurors. Thus, we find that the second criterion for standing has been satisfied.\nFinally, the Supreme Court has already found that the third criterion \u2014 hindrance to the third party\u2019s ability to protect its own interests \u2014 exists in this context. In Powers, the Court concluded: \u201c[Tjhere exist considerable practical barriers to suit by the excluded juror because of the small financial stake involved and the economic burdens of litigation. [Citations.] The reality is that a juror dismissed because of race probably will leave the courtroom possessing little incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his own rights.\u201d Powers, 499 U.S. at 415, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 428, 111 S. Ct. at 1373. Thus, Supreme Court precedent supports our conclusion that a trial court has the standing to raise a Batson issue sua sponte.\nMoreover, this court has held that courts possess the inherent power \u201cto enable them to perform their judicial functions with *** dignity.\u201d People ex rel. Bier v. Scholz, 77 Ill. 2d 12, 19 (1979). Since the \u201c[discriminatory use of peremptory challenges may create the impression that the judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing full participation\u201d of potential jurors (J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 104, 114 S. Ct. at 1427), it follows that the trial judge should have the means to preserve the dignity of his or her office. Furthermore, this court has held that a trial court has the right \u2014 though not the duty \u2014 to remove a juror for cause. See People v. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d 544, 557 (2002). Granting trial courts the authority to raise Batson issues sua sponte is merely a logical extension of the powers circuit courts already possess. Thus, we conclude that a trial court has the authority to raise a Batson issue sua sponte in appropriate circumstances.\nOur holding in this regard is consistent with the conclusion reached by courts of other jurisdictions. See Hitchman v. Nagy, 382 N.J. Super. 433, 889 A.2d 1066 (2006); People v. Bell, 473 Mich. 275, 702 N.W.2d 128 (2005); State v. Evans, 100 Wash. App. 757, 998 P.2d 373 (2000); Commonwealth v. Carson, 559 Pa. 460, 741 A.2d 686 (1999); Williams v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1372 (Ind. 1996); Brogden v. State, 102 Md. App. 423, 649 A.2d 1196 (1994); Lemley v. State, 599 So. 2d 64 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). However, as the court observed in Hitchman, courts so holding have generally been careful to insist upon a clear indication of a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination before trial courts are authorized to act. Hitchman, 382 N.J. Super, at 444-47, 889 A.2d at 1072-74. We agree that a prima facie case of discrimination must be abundantly clear before a trial court acts sua sponte. Moreover, when a trial court chooses to act sua sponte, it must make an adequate record, consisting of all relevant facts, factual findings, and articulated legal bases for both its finding of a prima facie case and for its ultimate determination at the third stage of the Batson procedure.\nIn this regard, we reject the appellate majority\u2019s reliance upon a general statement from this court\u2019s opinion in People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 427-28 (1993), as a means to avoid consideration of \u201cwhether combined race-gender discrimination can be used to establish a prima facie case under Batson.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 176-77. The appellate majority concluded that \u201conce the trial court rules on the ultimate question of discrimination, the question of whether a prima facie case had been established is moot.\u201d 348 Ill. App. 3d at 177, citing Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 427. Such a statement does indeed appear in Hudson, on more than one occasion; however, the statement has been taken out of its original context, and it does not comport with the procedural requirements we hereby adopt when a trial court acts sua sponte to raise a Batson issue.\nIn Hudson, this court quoted from the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991): \u201c \u2018Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.\u2019 \u201d Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 427, quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405, 111 S. Ct. at 1866. We later observed: \u201c[T]his court has recently held that once the trial court rules on the ultimate question of discrimination, the question of whether the defendant established a prima facie case became moot. People v. Mitchell (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 274, 289-90.\u201d Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 427-28. This court then concluded its discussion of the issue, stating, \u201cPursuant to Hernandez, the question of whether defendant in the instant case established a prima facie case of discrimination became moot when the trial court found the State\u2019s explanations were valid.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 428. Similarly, in Mitchell, this court cited Hernandez in support of its conclusion that \u201cthe question of whether defendant established a prima facie case of racial discrimination became moot when the trial court found that the prosecutor\u2019s explanations for the challenges were valid and neutral.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d at 289. Indeed, in Hernandez, the reasons given by the prosecutor were also deemed valid and neutral. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 372, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 414, 111 S. Ct. at 1873.\nClearly, whether a prima facie case of discrimination exists at the outset becomes a moot point after the trial court finds valid and race-neutral reasons supporting the peremptory challenge and a court of review ultimately affirms that ruling. The party exercising a peremptory challenge suffers no prejudice in that instance because the juror in question is excused pursuant to that party\u2019s original challenge. The converse, however, is not true. Where a prima facie case does not exist, a party whose challenge is ultimately denied is prejudiced, because the matter should not have been advanced to the second step of the Batson process, and he should never have been compelled by the trial court to offer justification for his challenge in the first place. By definition, a \u201cprima facie case\u201d entails \u201c[t]he establishment of a legally required rebuttable presumption\u201d or \u201c[a] party\u2019s production of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party\u2019s favor.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1228 (8th ed. 2004). In every procedural context wherein a prima facie case is required, the party with the burden of establishing a prima facie case must first meet its burden in order to advance the litigation to subsequent stages and, ultimately, to be entitled to relief. See generally People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326, 338 (1988) (\u201cSince the [initial] burden was upon the [suspended] motorist [to present a prima facie case for rescission], the circuit court erred: first, by requiring the State to go forward with evidence justifying the suspension, and, second, by rescinding the suspension even though the motorist had not presented any evidence for rescission\u201d). The burden of establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury selection is on the party making the Batson claim. McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 526 (2000). It defies procedural logic that proof of a prima facie case could be insufficient to advance the Bat-son process to the second and third steps; yet, the party attempting to exercise its challenge could ultimately lose when the matter is erroneously advanced to the subsequent stages. Therefore, when a party is ultimately denied its right to exercise a peremptory challenge, we hold that matters bearing upon the first stage of the Batson process are properly within the scope of appellate review and not moot.\nComprehensive appellate review of Batson proceedings, and adequate records and findings enabling such a review, are critical when a trial court decides to raise a Batson claim sua sponte. There are at least three reasons why this is so. First, a litigant objecting to an opposing party\u2019s peremptory challenge, as the party making the Batson claim, would normally have the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, and the ultimate burden of establishing purposeful discrimination. See McDonnell, 192 Ill. 2d at 526. When the trial court acts sua sponte, it relieves a litigant of those burdens. Second, when a trial court acts sua sponte, it necessarily means that the opposing party \u2014 in this case the State \u2014 has failed to act. The evidentiary implications associated with that inaction are not conclusive, but they are nonetheless cause for concern. Inaction may suggest that the opposing party did not perceive circumstances indicating purposeful discrimination, which in some instances may indicate that no such circumstances exist. In that situation, articulation of the bases for the trial court\u2019s finding is essential, because the normal adversarial process will not provide the requisite bases and record. Finally, without an adequate record, consisting of all relevant facts, factual findings, and articulated legal bases for both the trial court\u2019s finding of a prima facie case and its ultimate determination at the third stage of the Batson procedure, the trial court\u2019s rulings may be virtually immune from appellate review. If, for example, we were to hold \u2014 as the appellate court did \u2014 that the existence of a prima facie case is a moot point, we would not be able to review the circuit court ruling that required defense counsel to justify his peremptory challenge of Gomez. Once that procedural frontier is crossed, the outcome of the Batson inquiry then hinges upon whatever facts the trial court has deigned to provide for us and, more importantly, whether the trial court finds counsel\u2019s explanation for the peremptory challenge credible and benign. As the Supreme Court noted in Hern\u00e1n- dez, evaluation of the attorney\u2019s state of mind is most often \u201cbased on demeanor and credibility\u201d and thus \u201clies \u2018peculiarly within the trial judge\u2019s province\u2019 \u201d (Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 409, 111 S. Ct. at 1869, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 854, 105 S. Ct. 844, 854 (1985)), \u201cand once that has been settled, there seems nothing left to review.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 367, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 410, 111 S. Ct. at 1870. Thus, the inability to review the propriety of a trial court\u2019s first-stage Batson ruling, combined with the problems associated with sua sponte action and a deficient record on appeal, might well result in a decision that is for all intents and purposes unreviewable, giving trial courts carte blanche to apply \u2014 or misuse \u2014 the principles of Batson in any way they wish. That specter is the impetus for the procedural requirements we adopt today. Indeed, strict adherence to the three-step procedure specified by the Supreme Court would seem to be the surest way to guarantee compliance with Batson principles.\nWe now examine the pertinent portions of the record in this case. During defense counsel\u2019s brief preliminary questioning of juror Gomez, counsel inquired about Gomez\u2019s employment with an outpatient clinic of Cook County Hospital. Gomez acknowledged that Cook County Hospital is known for the treatment of gunshot victims and, as a part of her employment at the clinic, she has contact with patients, \u201cchecking them in.\u201d When defense counsel sought to excuse Gomez, the trial judge raised the Batson issue, and compelled defense counsel to \u201carticulate a basis\u201d for the peremptory challenge, without any mention of a prima facie case of discrimination or of any facts bearing upon that issue. It was only after defense counsel had begun to state the nondiscriminatory basis for his challenge \u2014 Gomez\u2019s connection to the clinic and victims of violent crime \u2014 that the court interrupted, noting that \u201cMrs. Deloris Gomez appears to be an African American.\u201d When counsel observed that he had previously accepted an African-American woman to sit on the jury, the court quickly pointed out that Gomez was the second African-American woman that the defense had sought to exclude. The court also stated it was counsel\u2019s articulated reason for the peremptory challenge that was of particular concern. Obviously, the articulated reason for a challenge is a matter of \u201cconcern\u201d only after a prima facie case has been established. The existence of a prima facie case is a prerequisite for the court to demand an explanation. In any event, the court then stated for the record, \u201cIf the State in fact had done this, I certainly would have found they would have established a prima facie case by the very reason \u2014 what I\u2019m going to do is allow Ms. Gomez \u2014 allow her to be seated, not excuse her on the basis of your peremptory.\u201d It is telling that the trial court never explained \u201cthe very reason\u201d it believed a prima facie case of discrimination existed. The court simply stated, \u201cI feel under these circumstances the reasons given by you, Mr. Decker, do not satisfy this Court. As far as I\u2019m concerned, it\u2019s more than a prima facie case of discrimination against Mrs. Gomez. I\u2019m not going to allow her to be excused.\u201d\nDefense counsel then asked for, and was granted, leave to conduct further questioning of Gomez. In the course of that questioning, Gomez conceded that some of the patients she interacts with are \u201cvictims of gun violence\u201d; however, she maintained that fact would not affect her ability to be fair. After questioning Gomez, defense counsel explained that he was \u201cnot trying to excuse a juror because of her race.\u201d Counsel then stated that one consideration was his attempt to \u201cget some impact from *** men in the case\u201d as the jury panel was then composed of \u201cpredominantly women.\u201d Counsel further informed the court that he was familiar with the clinic where Gomez worked and it was \u201cwall to wall victims and patients.\u201d Counsel described it as \u201ca disturbing place.\u201d The court responded: \u201cI\u2019ve had the opportunity to question Deloris Gomez [,] who I find is a very intelligent lady. I considered her statements very carefully, her testimony very carefully, and I again feel that she shall sit as a juror.\u201d In view of the court\u2019s ruling, defense counsel then chose to exercise his fourth peremptory challenge against Kurich. With respect to that peremptory challenge, the judge responded, \u201cWith reluctance, I will allow it.\u201d\nBecause the trial court did not state the basis for its finding of prima facie discrimination, we do not know whether the trial court believed the peremptory challenge defendant sought to exercise against Gomez represented an instance of racial discrimination, or gender discriminaton, or combined race-gender discrimination. We do know that defendant had exercised a peremptory challenge against an African-American woman previously, and had accepted another African-American woman for service on the jury. Morever, the record indicates that defense counsel had previously exercised peremptory challenges against Rosalee Hui-zenga and Thomas Hickey, whose racial characteristics are not specified in the record. In his opening brief, defendant states that Huizenga \u201cwas not a black woman and Thomas Hickey [was] a white male.\u201d The State, in its own statement of facts, merely names Huizenga and Hickey as persons who were excused by the defense. The State does not dispute defendant\u2019s representation regarding their racial characteristics. In fact, in arguing that the trial court did not act on the basis of perceived race-gender discrimination, the State asserts that \u201cthe trial court\u2019s remarks make it clear that the court\u2019s sua sponte reverse-Batson challenge was grounded solely on the race of Ms. Gomez.\u201d The State\u2019s argument in that respect necessarily admits that Hickey was white, because, if he was not, the trial court surely would have commented on the use of a peremptory to excuse him, and it did not. Given the statements of the parties and the court on the record, it is reasonable to assume, at least, that Hui-zenga was not an African-American woman, and Hickey was a white male.\nNormally, the party asserting a Batson claim has the burden of proving a prima facie case and preserving the record, and any ambiguities in the record will be construed against that party. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 92 (1999); see also People v. Furdge, 332 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1031 (2002). Given the requirements we impose today, when a trial court acts sua sponte, the trial court must see to it that adequate facts are preserved in the record to support its ruling, and the trial court in this instance has not done so.\nThis court has held that the mere number of African-American venirepersons peremptorily challenged, without more, will not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 56 (1999); Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d at 203. Where a party claiming a Bat-son violation has not provided any other information to support his claim of discriminatory jury selection, he has failed to establish a prima facie case. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d at 56. The number of persons struck takes on meaning only when coupled with other information such as the racial composition of the venire, the race of others struck, or the voir dire answers of those who were struck compared to the answers of those who were not struck. United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1044 (11th Cir. 2005). As previously noted, in determining whether the objector has demonstrated purposeful discrimination against African-Americans at the prima facie stage, a trial judge should consider the following relevant factors:\n\u201c(1) racial identity between the [party exercising the peremptory challenge] and the excluded venirepersons; (2) a pattern of strikes against African-American venirepersons; (3) a disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against African-American venirepersons; (4) the level of African-American representation in the venire as compared to the jury; (5) the prosecutor\u2019s questions and statements [of the challenging party] during voir dire examination and while exercising peremptory challenges; (6) whether the excluded African-American venirepersons were a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only common characteristic; and (7) the race of the defendant, victim, and witnesses.\u201d People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 71 (1996).\nWe also note, when a Batson claim is made regarding discrimination against a particular race, the unchallenged presence of jurors of that race on the seated jury is a factor properly considered (People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 35 (1996); see People v. Martinez, 335 Ill. App. 3d 844, 854 (2002)) and tends to weaken the basis for a prima facie case of discrimination (Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d at 1044-45).\nExamining the facts that are included in this record, in the framework of the foregoing factors, we see no clear indication of a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The only factor that appears to weigh in favor of finding a prima facie case is the fact that defendant is Hispanic and both the victim and Gomez were African-American. Given the current state of the record, we find that none of the other considerations supports the trial court\u2019s apparent belief that a prima facie case existed. First, we do not find an impermissible pattern of strikes against African-Americans or a disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against African-American venirepersons. We know only that, prior to the attempt to strike Gomez, defense counsel used peremptory challenges to strike one African-American woman, but he also accepted one African-American woman for service on the jury. Counsel also struck one woman who was not African-American and a white male. It seems to us that for this court to say that a pattern developed when defendant attempted to strike a second African-American woman, we would have to find that a pattern would have developed if defendant had moved to strike a second woman who was not of African-American heritage or a second white male. We do not believe that inference is warranted or wise as it would result in precedent that a pattern develops anytime a party strikes more than one juror of any race or gender. Second, we are unable to compare the level of African-American representation in the venire with that of defendant\u2019s jury \u2014 as Illinois courts have done so effectively in prior cases (see People v. Edwards, 301 Ill. App. 3d 966, 973-74 (1998)) \u2014 because the requisite information has not been made a part of the record on appeal. Other than the African-American woman accepted by defendant, we do not know the race of any other members of the jury that convicted defendant. Third, we do not find the questions or statements of defense counsel particularly troubling prior to the time that the trial court advanced the matter to the second stage of the Batson procedure and demanded an explanation from counsel. The questions asked by counsel pertained to Gomez\u2019s employment at a clinic and her contact with the victims of violent crime. Defendant was on trial for a crime of violence. We note in this regard that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that \u201ca challenge based on a juror\u2019s social or medical work is race-neutral and understandable\u201d in the context of a criminal case. See United States v. Griffin, 194 F.3d 808, 826 (7th Cir. 1999), citing Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912, 919-20 (7th Cir. 1998). While defense counsel did, eventually, make comments suggesting an impermissible gender-based motive for removing Gomez from jury service, that remark was made after the court had already denied the peremptory challenge, and it is unclear whether the factor had a bearing on the court\u2019s ruling as the basis for the court\u2019s ruling itself is uncertain. Finally, from this record, we are unable to say that the African-Americans defendant sought to exclude were a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only common characteristic. In short, the record in its current state does not reveal a prima facie case of racial discrimination, if indeed that \u2014 as opposed to race-gender discrimination\u2014 was the basis for the trial court\u2019s sua sponte action.\nIn sum, we hold that a trial court may raise a Batson issue sua sponte, but it may do so only when a prima facie case of discrimination is abundantly clear. Moreover, the trial court must make an adequate record consisting of all relevant facts, factual findings, and articulated bases for both its finding of a prima facie case and for its ultimate determination at the third stage of the Batson procedure. The record in this case is insufficient to demonstrate either a prima facie case of racial discrimination or the bases for the trial court\u2019s rulings.\nAlthough we have previously warned circuit courts against collapsing the Batson procedure, it was, perhaps, not clear until today that the existence of a prima facie case of discrimination would continue to be a relevant issue for purposes of appeal where, as here, the circuit court ruled upon the ultimate issue of discrimination, and decided that issue adversely to the party attempting to exercise a peremptory challenge. In this case, there may be evidence that was not made a part of the record because the trial court believed that the preliminary matter of a prima facie case would become moot after it ruled on the third-stage issue.\nIn light of that possibility, we believe it is appropriate to remand this cause to the circuit court for a hearing on the matter of the existence of a prima facie case of discrimination. At that hearing, any omitted evidence pertinent to that question may be included in the record. The circuit court shall articulate proper findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the threshold question of a prima facie case of discrimination and shall specify what kind of discrimination it believes is at issue, i.e., race, gender, or combined race-gender. If the court persists in its belief that a prima facie case of discrimination exists, the court shall proceed to the ultimate question of whether defense counsel\u2019s peremptory challenge of Gomez violated the standards of Batson, stating appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law on that issue as well. We also offer the circuit court an opportunity to explain its \u201creluctance\u201d to allow a subsequent peremptory challenge against juror Kurich. In that respect, we note that a defendant is entitled to an \u201cimpartial judge,\u201d meaning one who is not predisposed to rule in a given manner. See People v. Williams, 124 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (1988). The circuit court shall file its findings and conclusions with the clerk of this court within 60 days of the issuance of the mandate in this matter, accompanied by a record of the proceedings on remand. We note that this procedure complies with that sanctioned by this court in Garrett (see Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d at 192-96) and utilized in Wiley (see Wiley, 156 Ill. 2d at 477). After the Batson proceedings on remand have been completed, and any supplementary issues have been briefed and argued, this court will announce its judgment on any and all pending issues requiring resolution at that time. See Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d at 195.\nCause remanded with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "James K. Leven, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and James E. Fitzgerald, Mary L. Boland, Alan J. Spellberg and Judy L. DeAngelis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 98609.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appel-lee, v. MICHAEL RIVERA, Appellant.\nOpinion filed May 18, 2006.\nModified on denial of rehearing June 29, 2006.\nJames K. Leven, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and James E. Fitzgerald, Mary L. Boland, Alan J. Spellberg and Judy L. DeAngelis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0481-01", "first_page_order": 493, "last_page_order": 528 }