{ "id": 5703617, "name": "SOLAIA TECHNOLOGY, LLC, et al., Appellees, v. SPECIALTY PUBLISHING COMPANY et al., Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co.", "decision_date": "2006-06-22", "docket_number": "No. 100555", "first_page": "558", "last_page": "612", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 558" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140192 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96", "parenthetical": "\"Portions of a reply brief will not be stricken if the arguments respond to arguments made in the appellee brief'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79361 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 U.S. 46", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 13322 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" }, { "page": "50" }, { "page": "880-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/485/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 U.S. 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 379234 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/376/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3356104 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746-47", "parenthetical": "\"A robust and unintimidated press is a necessary ingredient of self-government\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7 4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "878 A.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8939268 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/878/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "818 S.W.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9980906 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/818/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5573962 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2481100 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/197/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126429 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 917", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034069 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0917-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 F.2d 131", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2073116 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/380/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260367 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" }, { "page": "377", "parenthetical": "\"one must either make a complete and accurate report, or, if a summary is made, the summary must be 'fair' for the privilege to apply\"" }, { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 812", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171676 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0812-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 253023 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 966", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2533665 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "969" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0966-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2930827 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228", "parenthetical": "holding that a newspaper article suggesting the plaintiff was \"working a scam\" by filing \"frequent, unwarranted lawsuits to procure pecuniary settlements\" was not an opinion and thus actionable" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 647", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Fed. Comm. L.J.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 1184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3719417 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1192", "parenthetical": "noting that a newspaper may be liable if a letter to the editor that it publishes contains a defamatory statement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/1184-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221509 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467335 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511385 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324", "parenthetical": "\"expressions of opinion may often imply an assertion of objective fact and, in such cases, would be considered actionable\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6212323 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18-19" }, { "page": "17-18" }, { "page": "2705-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 U.S. 323", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173012 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339-40" }, { "page": "805" }, { "page": "3007" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/418/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256475 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3097134 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" }, { "page": "350-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2800594 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223609 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88-89" }, { "page": "90" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "99-100" }, { "page": "100-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122000 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173376 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820830 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "16" }, { "page": "14-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3217432 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777542 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 869", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279745 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0869-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473789 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" }, { "page": "167" }, { "page": "168" }, { "page": "168" }, { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3151315 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "744-45" }, { "page": "745-46" }, { "page": "746" }, { "page": "748" }, { "page": "746" }, { "page": "747" }, { "page": "747-48" }, { "page": "749" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7 15", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "any person who shall be \"injured [in his] business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws *** may sue\" and recover treble damages, interest, costs, and attorney fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4135381 ], "weight": 16, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7-8" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "8" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "16", "parenthetical": "Cahill, J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "16", "parenthetical": "Cahill, J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/357/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.W. 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "weight": 2, "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "official action required" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "133 Wis. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 8700102 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "official action required" }, { "page": "24-26" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/wis/133/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 P.2d 24", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30", "parenthetical": "\"A newspaper has a qualified or conditional privilege to report legal proceedings provided the publication is a fair and accurate statement of the contents and is made without malice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "7 Wash. App. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 1851459 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117", "parenthetical": "\"A newspaper has a qualified or conditional privilege to report legal proceedings provided the publication is a fair and accurate statement of the contents and is made without malice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/7/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "842 P.2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10364913 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "official action required and report must be made without malice" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/842/0896-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 S.W. 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "case_ids": [ 10321975 ], "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398", "parenthetical": "statute declaring a fair, true, and impartial account of court proceedings \"privileged[ ] does not justify the publication of a libelous written pleading, properly filed, upon which no action by the court, judge, or any other officer has been taken\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/sw/217/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 N.W. 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1910, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732", "parenthetical": "stating general rule that \" 'the publication of the contents of a petition or of other pleadings or papers filed in civil proceedings before trials or before any action has taken place on such pleadings or papers by the court is not privileged' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "24 S.D. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.D.", "case_ids": [ 773600 ], "year": 1910, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510", "parenthetical": "stating general rule that \" 'the publication of the contents of a petition or of other pleadings or papers filed in civil proceedings before trials or before any action has taken place on such pleadings or papers by the court is not privileged' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/sd/24/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Or. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 1986995 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court action is required for application of fair report privilege" }, { "parenthetical": "court action is required for application of fair report privilege" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/or/144/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "690 N.E.2d 903", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the publication of a fair report of a pleading is privileged unless the report was published maliciously" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "117 Ohio App. 3d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1222380 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the publication of a fair report of a pleading is privileged unless the report was published maliciously" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/117/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 N.D. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.D.", "case_ids": [ 8590557 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "observing that numerous cases have held \"that the rule of privilege does not apply to pleadings which, though filed, have not yet received judicial notice\"" }, { "page": "516", "parenthetical": "observing that numerous cases have held \"that the rule of privilege does not apply to pleadings which, though filed, have not yet received judicial notice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nd/63/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 N.J. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 712184 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "official action is required and a showing of malice will defeat the privilege" }, { "parenthetical": "official action is required and a showing of malice will defeat the privilege" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nj/136/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 N.W. 947", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court action is required and publication must be done without malice" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "116 Neb. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 2372236 ], "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court action is required and publication must be done without malice" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/neb/116/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Mont. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mont.", "case_ids": [ 2615659 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "fair report privilege applies to a report that is based on a complaint, but the report must be made without malice" }, { "parenthetical": "fair report privilege applies to a report that is based on a complaint, but the report must be made without malice" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/mont/222/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 S.W. 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court action is required for application of the fair report privilege" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "213 Mo. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 812147 ], "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court action is required for application of the fair report privilege" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/mo/213/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 N.W. 731", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1888, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "72 Mich. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1364322 ], "year": 1888, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/mich/72/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S.W.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "fair report privilege applies to report based on a complaint if the report is made without malice" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "274 Ky. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ky.", "case_ids": [ 2631178 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "fair report privilege applies to report based on a complaint if the report is made without malice" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ky/274/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 N.W 1083", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "official action is required and publication cannot be made with malice" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "155 Iowa 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 2188310 ], "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "official action is required and publication cannot be made with malice" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/155/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Haw. 804", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Haw.", "case_ids": [ 8828117 ], "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court action is required for application of fair report privilege" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/haw/23/0804-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 A.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8081599 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698", "parenthetical": "\"If the publication fairly and accurately repeats the wife's assertions as contained in the complaint, the defense of qualified privilege is available to appellee absent proof that the article was published with malice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/271/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ala. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "case_ids": [ 3429440 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court action is required and publication must be without malice" }, { "parenthetical": "court action is required and publication must be without malice" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ala/181/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "866 F. Supp. 355", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 9319 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "applying Tennessee law, court held that privilege applied to affidavit that was filed in court and became part of the judicial proceeding, but actual malice would defeat application of the privilege" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/866/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 F.3d 1044", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9141841 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "applying Colorado law and holding that the fair report privilege does not apply to the reporting of the contents of pleadings before any judicial action has taken place" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/327/1044-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910197 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "fair report privilege applies if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment of the occurrence reported" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 802", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2712776 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/0802-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3332269 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/64/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5431964 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3490567 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221479 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "following Lulay and holding the privilege may be defeated by a showing of malice" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 647", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "54 L. Ed. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 1002", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6485670, 6485576, 6485872, 6485490, 6485751 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/1002-03", "/us/434/1002-02", "/us/434/1002-05", "/us/434/1002-01", "/us/434/1002-04" ] }, { "cite": "556 F.2d 113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 956561 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/556/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856770 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.W 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "weight": 2, "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" }, { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "\"a complaint or other pleading in a civil action, which has never been presented to the court for its action, is not a judicial proceeding within the rule\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "101 Minn. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 1707360 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" }, { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/minn/101/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.E. 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1914, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "217 Mass. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 89595 ], "year": 1914, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/217/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 N.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "318 Mass. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 929844 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/318/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Colum. L. Rev. 1102", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Colum. L. Rev.", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1111" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "137 Mass. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 757898 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1884, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/137/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 F.2d 134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1202785 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140-41" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/643/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777540 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 U.S. 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 379234 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/376/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "878 A.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8939268 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/878/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260367 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2879392 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114-15" }, { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2930827 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467335 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256475 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473789 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "168-69" }, { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3151315 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0735-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2863, "char_count": 100781, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.42376053116373e-07, "percentile": 0.9447817227954217 }, "sha256": "378154e23094d74747c480aca8d685ef527af5e8c76726197ab7e07ff3e78e9a", "simhash": "1:7efc9d5fe4585c46", "word_count": 16145 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:56:38.739058+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SOLAIA TECHNOLOGY, LLC, et al., Appellees, v. SPECIALTY PUBLISHING COMPANY et al., Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices McMorrow, Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas took no part in the decision.\nJustice Freeman concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.\nOPINION\nThe plaintiffs, Solaia Technology, LLC (Solaia Technology), the law firm of Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro, Ltd. (NSHN), and Raymond Niro, filed a defamation complaint against the defendants, Specialty Publishing Company, Peggy Smedley, John Buell, and John Doe. The circuit court of Cook County dismissed the complaint; the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part (357 Ill. App. 3d 1).\nThe central issue in this case is whether the so-called fair report privilege defeats the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations that the defendants made false statements with actual malice. The defendants argue it does; the plaintiffs argue it does not. The plaintiffs also request cross-relief, asserting that the appellate court erred in holding various statements made by the defendants were not defamatory. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.\nBACKGROUND\nIn 2001, Solaia Technology purchased United States Patent No. 5,038,318, commonly known as the \u2019318 patent, from Schneider Automation, Inc. (Schneider Automation). The \u2019318 patent relates to a system or standard for communicating real-time information between computers and machines. According to Solaia Technology, this standard is employed by virtually every company that uses a computer to control its manufacturing operation. Since purchasing the patent, Solaia Technology has aggressively enforced it, bringing infringement claims against various well-known companies. Solaia Technology has been represented in these suits by Niro and his firm, NSHN.\nSpecialty Publishing Company publishes Start magazine, whose target readership is manufacturing company executives. In an April 2002 article entitled \u201cChaos in Manufacturing,\u201d Start began its coverage of Solaia Technology\u2019s infringement claims. Before discussing \u201cpatent attorneys pitting customers against suppliers,\u201d Start sketched the background of this litigation. According to Start, the \u201cOPC Foundation\u201d was founded in 1996 by a group of companies seeking to develop an \u201copen standard\u201d to provide \u201cinteroperabilty\u201d between computers and machines used in manufacturing. The standard became very successful and was adopted by hundreds of companies:\n\u201cClearly, on the surface, the goal of [the OPC Foundation] was to enable the staunchest of competitors to play nice in the sandbox and develop an elusive open standard. In the end, an open standard would mean less expense for vendors and more solutions for users.\nThus, came the birth of what is known as the OPC Foundation today. It all seemed so perfect. *** Sharing data and information that was once was [sic] proprietary. Innocent enough. And it was, in the beginning.\u201d\nStart described what it termed \u201cThe legal entanglement\u201d:\n\u201cSo far, you should be asking yourself, what\u2019s the big deal? Until last year, there really wasn\u2019t any until a lawsuit was filed against [three] world-class manufacturers ***.\nSolaia Technology *** filed the lawsuit alleging that all three end user manufacturers are violating a patent that it purchased from Schneider Electric\u2019s Automation Business ***. Schneider sold the rights to its patent to Solaia between March and August of last year. Now Solaia, aided by the legal firm of Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro, Chicago, Ill. is on a legal campaign targeting manufacturers who might be infringing on its patent.\u201d\nStart then detailed Solaia Technology\u2019s infringement claims and offered comments on them from the OPC Foundation\u2019s attorney and Solaia Technology\u2019s attorney.\nUnder a subheadline \u201cBaying for blood,\u201d Start continued:\n\u201cBefore we discuss who created this mess, we need to stipulate to a few points. As we stated earlier, this is an amazing [sic] irresistible story that deserves a lot of coverage. It involves intrigue and lots of money. And the innocent compames who are being forced to defend themselves in this debacle \u2014 the victims whose fate is fueling the outrage \u2014 deserve a lot of sympathy. So how did this get so far out of fine? Blame old-fashioned market mania, aided and abetted by deeply greedy people who wanted to make more money despite the costs. Without question, most of the frenzy is simply about money.\n*** [T]here is certainly a lot of finger-pointing going on and no one wants to take responsibility for creating this legal nightmare. To really grasp the enormity of the problem, we will need to explore in detail each of the players and what they had hoped to accomplish.\nThe manufacturing mob is baying for blood, and many companies blame Schneider. In fact, just about everyone Start spoke with either on or off the record within the manufacturing community is furious over Schneider\u2019s initial actions. Their anger is only being fanned by Solaia\u2019s lawsuits against leading manufacturers.\u201d\nStart summarized the history of the \u2019318 patent and Schneider Automation\u2019s sale of it to Solaia Technology:\n\u201cSolaia Technology acquired the patent for an undisclosed amount. Although Solaia and its legal firm will not confirm or deny it, some companies are speculating the offer for the patent was based on a contingency bid. If this assessment is correct, Schneider would only be paid if So-laia wins its legal battle.\u201d\nAccording to Start, \u201cIf Solaia proves victorious, it clearly intends to turn its sights on other prey.\u201d But \u201c[attorneys from Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro reiterate that they are just following the law and that its clients should not be punished for taking advantage of the rules.\u201d\nStart closed with a general comment on patent reform:\n\u201cIt seems that new patents are issued monthly, if not weekly, granting more and more patents. Some argue that the U.S. Patent And [sic] Trademark Office is not supposed to issue patents on ideas[;] however, many contend that is what it is doing with software patents. The end result is having a chilling effect on the software industry as more and more companies file lawsuits to defend these so-called patents.\n* * *\nWatergate spawned campaign-finance reform, perhaps the Solaia lawsuits will spawn patent reform.\u201d\nIn August 2002, Start\u2019s cover announced, \u201cThe Chaos Deepens: Clorox Settles ... Others Are Sued.\u201d The cover and the accompanying article also featured a photocopy of the first page of Solaia Technology\u2019s patent infringement complaint against 16 well-known companies. Inside, Start noted that Clorox had settled with the \u201cSolaia Technology LLC legal machine,\u201d but that more manufacturers \u201chave been tossed into the legal fray as Solaia cast out a bigger net. *** If Solaia is successful in its legal carnage it could set the stage for many other manufacturers, both large and small, to be sued, or to be forced to pay Solaia royalty fees.\u201d In fact, Start reported, \u201c[t]he legal nightmare deepens\u201d for the 16 \u201cworld class manufacturers\u201d named as defendants by Solaia Technology \u201cjust two days before Americans celebrated their independence.\u201d Start continued:\n\u201cAttorneys at Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro strongly stress that this is just the beginning. Solaia\u2019s attorneys intend to continue to file suits against manufacturers they believe are infringing on patent \u2019318. However, more and more manufacturers are publicly vowing to defend their positions in court.\n$ :{: $\nAlthough individual inventors have been selling their patents for quite some time, many observers are frustrated the patent system is being used as a vicious legal weapon to generate revenue.\u201d\nStart repeated much of its coverage of Solaia Technology\u2019s infringement claims from the April 2002 issue. Schneider Automation sold the \u2019318 patent to Solaia Technology; Solaia Technology then began enforcing it. Start noted that one of Solaia Technology\u2019s attorneys and a member of NSHN denied any connection between Solaia Technology and Schneider Automation, but Start further noted that documents reveal \u201cthe relationship between these two companies might be more intimately linked.\u201d After reviewing these documents, Start continued:\n\u201cDespite the devastating news that more manufacturers are being targeted, what makes this litigation even more disturbing is how it will impact the manufacturing industry as a whole.\n* * *\nDaniel Henderson, the president of Solaia Technology, aided by the legal firm of Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro is on a legal campaign targeting manufacturers that might be infringing on its patent. Henderson and his legal machine have a war chest of many patent victories. Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro intend to parlay these victories into more money for both its client and its law firm.\u201d\nStart concluded:\n\u201cFor these *** manufacturers there is no escape. They are now embroiled in a legal battle that many insist can only harm the manufacturing industry, costing manufacturers millions.\nAs industry observers, Start editors admit Solaia is hungry and will continue to target manufacturers. ***\n# ifc *\nIn the end, no one wins and money prevails.\u201d\nIn a column titled \u201cExhibit 5,\u201d Start president and publisher Peggy Smedley questioned why \u201cpeople, and perhaps companies,\u201d including Solaia Technology, are \u201cso gung ho to sue these days.\u201d Smedley answered herself, \u201cIt\u2019s about money, pure and simple.\u201d She noted that the Clorox settlement with the \u201cSolaia legal machine\u201d has cast a cloud of pessimism over the industrial marketplace:\n\u201cAs we dig deeper into this case, we are uncovering information that points to a few disturbing facts about patent infringement cases. Namely, litigation in the manufacturing industry has become a runaway train, fueled by lawyers and their clients hoping to cash in on patent infringement claims. *** It seems that corporations of all sizes and shapes are taking advantage of the patent law and exercising their legal right to defend their patents. Clearly, this has become a great new revenue source for many companies.\n* * *\nNiro, Scavone, Haller & Niro, attorneys for Solaia, reiterate that they are just following the law and its clients should not he punished for taking advantage of the rules. Perhaps they are right. I just can\u2019t help but feel sorry for these companies that are being forced to defend themselves.\n* * *\nWhile much information has been revealed in legal documents and briefs that have been filed in the court, still key details continue to be revealed. Speculation and concern about certain misdeeds are on the rise. Thus, we will continue to follow these cases as well as continue to investigate all the facts.\u201d\nThis issue of Start also contained a sidebar article entitled \u201cMore Than Just About Money,\u201d which sympathetically presented Niro\u2019s comments on patent litigation and the controversy surrounding Solaia Technology\u2019s infringement claims.\nMany of the companies subject to these claims purchased the technology incorporating the \u2019318 patent from Rockwell Automation, Inc. (Rockwell Automation), and these companies filed third-party claims against Rockwell Automation, alleging that it refused to indemnify them. According to Start, Rockwell Automation then filed a complaint in Illinois federal court against Solaia Technology, claiming that the \u2019318 patent was invalid and that Solaia Technology\u2019s infringement claims constituted an unfair method of competition. Rockwell Automation asked the court to hear its case prior to hearing the third-party claims. The court evidently dismissed Rockwell Automation\u2019s complaint, but Rockwell pressed forward.\nIn December 2002, Rockwell Automation filed another complaint in Wisconsin federal court against Solaia Technology, NSHN, and Schneider Automation. In strong language, Rockwell Automation alleged that Solaia Technology, NSHN, and Schneider Automation, whom Rockwell Automation collectively labeled \u201cthe Conspirators,\u201d engaged in \u201cconcerted action\u201d to extract money from its customers through a \u201cbad-faith campaign\u201d of \u201cbaseless and repetitive threats, allegations and suits *** in an apparent effort to \u2018shakedown\u2019 manufacturers.\u201d According to Rockwell Automation, the conspirators overstated \u201cin a reckless and misleading fashion\u201d the scope of the \u2019318 patent that they sought to enforce in an effort to weaken Rockwell Automation and to garner \u201ctens of millions in strike suit settlements.\u201d Rockwell Automation charged that Solaia Technology is a \u201cfront\u201d or \u201cshell\u201d entity created for the sole purposes of holding the \u2019318 patent and instituting litigation based on it. Rockwell Automation also charged that NSHN orchestrated this litigation scheme \u2014 from the sale of the \u2019318 patent to the preparation of \u201cfalse, misleading and threatening infringement letters\u201d and later the filing of baseless and serial patent infringement claims. Rockwell Automation called this conduct \u201cunlawful,\u201d and its complaint asserted that Solaia Technology, NSHN, and Schneider Automation violated, inter alia, section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1 (2000). Rockwell Automation asked for compensatory damages, treble damages and attorney fees under the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. \u00a7 15(a) (2000)), punitive damages, and injunc-tive relief.\nStart covered Rockwell Automation\u2019s move, and the Solaia Technology\u2019s infringement claims, in the January 2003 issue, the cover of which previewed, \u201cCHAOS UPDATE: CONSPIRACY SHAKEDOWN.\u201d On a page titled \u201cMAILCALL\u201d and under the headline \u201cSOLAIA MESS\u201d Start published an email containing \u201c[tjhoughts on the Solaia patent from an industry veteran who prefers to remain nameless.\u201d The industry veteran stated:\n\u201cThere are a number of issues related to this mess that might appear mysterious.\nFirst and foremost, if this patent is as valuable as has been suggested then why (a) did Schneider sell it to Solaia for $1 (plus a cut of the settlements) and why (b) did the hundreds of process control vendors who were notified that the patent was available decline to bid on it?\nThe answer is pretty clear if you actually read the patent.\n*** [T]his is an extremely narrow patent.\n*** [T]he reason why Schneider wanted to unload the patent and why none of the [other] existing control companies wanted to buy it was because the patent is essentially worthless.\nWhich brings us to the next question. If the patent is worthless then why is Solaia suing everyone and why are the manufacturers caving in? The answer to the first half is obvious. Why did Johnny Cochrane defend O.J.? Why was the Washington sniper killing people? Why did Enron and WorldCom cook the books? Because there are people in the world who want to make a lot of money and they don\u2019t care how they do it. Alas, there always have been and there always will be.\nAs for the second half, lets [sic] say you are walking home and you meet four large guys with baseball bats who claim that they own the street and want you to give them a $20 \u2018toll\u2019 for using it. What do you do? *** [Y]ou might suggest that you and the guys with the bats appear before a competent court of law to discuss the matter. But, while the guys with the hats ostensibly agree to this, they also point out that in order to properly prepare for the trial it will he necessary for them to heat the crap out of you every day until the matter is decided (the legal term for this is \u2018discovery.\u2019) [sic] So even though you know you would win if you lived long enough to get to the courtroom, in the end you pay the $20 because its easier. As does the next guy and the guy after that.\nWhich brings me to the only thing I don\u2019t understand about this mess. Why do the end-user companies keep walking down that dark street alone? It seems to me that if all of the companies got together with their own bats and walked down the street as a group then, just maybe, the muggers would go find another street.\u201d\nStart disclaimed these opinions, asserting that they do not necessarily represent those of the magazine or its readers.\nAn article titled \u201cConspiracy of a Shakedown\u201d appeared later in the issue. This article began:\n\u201cAs 2002 was coming to a close, Rockwell Automation was contemplating its next legal move with the intensity of a grand chess master at an international tournament. While it had been believed that Rockwell had been checkmated, and other manufacturers had been swept off the boards like so many sacrificial pawns, Rockwell was readying itself for its biggest move to date.\nRockwell *** turned the tables on Solaia Technology, *** Schneider Automation, *** and attorney Raymond Niro, Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro, *** filing a lawsuit charging the aforementioned with unfair business practices.\nOn Dec. 10, 2002, Rockwell filed a lawsuit *** claiming that Solaia, Schneider, and Niro\u2019s law firm have conspired in violation of antitrust laws to \u2018shakedown\u2019 Rockwell\u2019s customers with baseless patent infringement claims.\nWhen an Illinois Circuit Court Judge last year effectively dismissed Rockwell\u2019s attempt to intervene in the manufacturers\u2019 lawsuits, Rockwell decided to fight fire with fire.\u201d\nStart then dissected Rockwell Automation\u2019s complaint:\n\u201cThere are a couple of key points that appear to standout in the 29-page document. First, Rockwell claims that Niro, in conjunction with Solaia and Schneider, \u2018have made and continue to make false and objectively-baseless claims of patent infringements against numerous manufacturers\nRockwell\u2019s suit charges that Solaia\u2019s lawsuits have made claims that have caused injury to Rockwell in its business and injury to competition in one or more markets for industrial automation systems.\nBut that\u2019s not all. In particular, as part of the plan to injure Rockwell and disrupt competition, the \u2018conspirators\u2019 have made, \u2018baseless threats and allegations against manufacturing entities that those manufacturers are infringing the \u2019318 *** patent by, among other things, using [Rockwell] products; have overstated in a reckless and misleading fashion the scope, applicability and importance of the \u2019318 patent to suppliers and users of industrial automation equipment in general; and have instituted repetitive, baseless, sham patent infringement litigation against those manufacturers.\u2019\nThe legal document states that the defendants extract \u2018substantial sums\u2019 of money from Rockwell\u2019s customers through an ongoing bad-faith campaign to enforce and license patent \u2019318.\n* * *\nIn the end, Rockwell claims that Solaia, Schneider, and Niro have specifically targeted Rockwell customers to interfere with its relationship with both its actual and prospective customers.\n* * *\nRockwell filed its complaint under federal antitrust laws: the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, and Lanham Act.\nThe Sherman Antitrust Act outlaws all contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain interstate and foreign trade. *** The Sherman Act also makes it a crime to monopolize or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce.\u201d\nStart recapped its earlier coverage of \u201cTHE SAGA.\u201d According to Start, \u201cTo date, 20 world-class manufacturers have been the targets of this legal nightmare that has resulted in millions of dollars in settlements and legal fees. After the original settlements, Solaia continued its legal carnage, filing suit against 16 more manufacturers ***.\u201d Start noted that \u201c[t]he ongoing legal battles between Solaia, Rockwell, and the manufacturers have been outlined in previous articles written by Start magazine.\u201d Start directed, \u201cTo read the history of the previous twists and turns in this legal entanglement, [April \u201802, Chaos in Manufacturing],\u201d and also listed seven other prior issues containing features, updates, and editorials on \u201cCHAOS IN MANUFACTURING.\u201d\nStart then turned its attention to Niro. Under a sub-headline \u201cNIRO FIRES UP ROCKWELL,\u201d Start stated:\n\u201cIt could be said that Niro inspired Rockwell to make its most aggressive legal move to date. In fact, prior to Rockwell filing its lawsuit, Niro told Start that if Rockwell really wanted to intervene it better be committed all the way.\nClearly, Rockwell\u2019s recent filing proves that it is committed. Rockwell admits that it will not acquiesce and will continue to fight for manufacturers.\n$ \u00a3 \u00a3\nNiro anticipates garnering total settlements in the range of $550 million to more than $600 million, before his company ends its legal rampage. Without Rockwell taking an aggressive stance to challenge the alleged patent infringement cases, some industry observers believe Niro would have run amuck suing even more manufacturers.\nAlthough actual numbers are confidential, Niro confirms that Solaia has already collectively secured millions of dollars in settlements. All of these settlements set the stage for hundreds, if not thousands, of other manufacturers to be sued before the patent expires at the end of the decade.\u201d\nStart then provided its historical perspective on So-laia Technology\u2019s infringement claims:\n\u201cTo really grasp the enormity of this litigation, manufacturers need to understand what is at stake here.\nSolaia filed its lawsuits claiming that manufacturers are violating the patent that it purchased from Schneider Electric\u2019s Automation Business. Schneider sold the rights to its patent to Solaia between March and August 2001.\nIn less than six months after obtaining the rights to the patent, Solaia had not only contacted manufacturers questioning their use of the technology based on the \u2019318 patent, but filed a lawsuit in August.\nAccording to the Rockwell filing, \u2018Solaia Technology\u2019s single purpose is a \u201cshell company[\u201d] formed to serve as the [\u201c]front[\u201d] for baseless lawsuits on a Solaia patent previously owned by Schneider.\u2019\nSince the original lawsuit was filed *** in 2001, rumors have been flying around about the relationship that exists between Solaia and Schneider.\nAs more and more information is revealed, Rockwell believes it has enough proof to make its case that Schneider sold the patent rights because it was an easy way to \u2018monopolize\u2019 and target Rockwell customers.\u201d\nStart noted that \u201cNiro, lead attorney for Solaia, emphatically denies these claims and insists that he will fight back with all the legal fervour in his arsenal.\u201d Start quoted Niro:\n\u201c \u2018I believe this is an act of desperation by Rockwell. It strikes me that since they are losing before the court at every turn, *** their frustration level must be so high that they are desperate enough to not only bring a lawsuit against our client and Schneider, but also against us.\u2019\n* * *\nNiro explains the last time somebody tried a deal like this, involving one of his clients in naming him as a party, the case was not only dismissed, but there was an award of attorney fees.\n% #\nForcefully Niro says, T think it\u2019s disgraceful. I have received comments from other attorneys, including attorneys who have represented some of the parties who have settled with us. They think it\u2019s disgraceful. I think it will speak for itself. Rockwell will ultimately pay the price for bringing a frivolous lawsuit.\u2019 \u201d\nOn January 21, 2003, shortly after that issue of Start was published, Solaia Technology, NSHN, and Niro filed a complaint against Specialty Publishing Company, Smedley, John Buell, the editor of Start, and \u201cJohn Doe,\u201d the unnamed industry veteran who wrote the letter in the January 2003 issue of Start. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that certain false statements in Start\u2019s April 2002, August 2002, and January 2003 issues constituted defamation per se. Regarding the April 2002 issue, the plaintiffs challenged the references to \u201cinnocent companies,\u201d \u201cdeeply greedy people,\u201d and \u201cso-called patents.\u201d Regarding the August 2002 issue, the plaintiffs challenged the references to patent litigation as a \u201crunaway train, fueled by lawyers and their clients hoping to cash in,\u201d rising \u201cspeculation and concern about certain misdeeds\u201d by the plaintiffs, and Solaia Technology\u2019s \u201clegal carnage.\u201d\nRegarding the January 2003 issue, the plaintiffs challenged the cover headline, \u201cCHAOS UPDATE: CONSPIRACY SHAKEDOWN,\u201d the cover story headline, \u201cConspiracy of a Shakedown,\u201d as well as the references to Rockwell Automation\u2019s charging Niro personally with unfair business practices and to the Sherman Antitrust Act criminalizing monopolies. The plaintiffs also attacked references in the industry veteran\u2019s letter, labeling Sola-ia\u2019s patent \u201cessentially worthless\u201d and likening the plaintiffs to \u201cpeople in the world who want to make a lot of money and *** don\u2019t care how they do it,\u201d such as O.J. Simpson\u2019s criminal defense attorney Johnny Cochrane, Enron and WorldCom executives charged with various financial improprieties, the Washington, D.C., sniper, and later to a group of muggers armed with baseball bats.\nOn February 20, 2003, the defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619.1 (West 2002)), arguing that these statements were not defamatory and that some of them were privileged. On May 21, 2003, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, concluding that each of the challenged statements was either subject to an innocent construction, protected as an expression of opinion, or privileged as \u201ca fair abridgment of the litigation.\u201d The trial court even stated, \u201cThe language used and allegations made in the Rockwell lawsuit are considerably more aggressive than Start\u2019s report of the complaint.\u201d The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint, which the trial court dismissed with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed.\nA divided appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 357 Ill. App. 3d 1. The appellate court cataloged the statements in Start\u2019s coverage of the Solaia Technology litigation that, according to the plaintiffs, constituted defamation per se. The appellate court held that Start\u2019s statement in April 2002 that \u201cinnocent companies\u201d have been forced to defend themselves against Solaia Technology\u2019s infringement claims is capable of an innocent construction: \u201c[I]t is clear that the phrase \u2018innocent companies\u2019 is referring not to plaintiffs here, but to the companies that integrated what they thought was a nonproprietary standard into their business before it was revealed that a patent was owned on technology that had been incorporated into the standard.\u201d 357 Ill. App. 3d 1 (contained in material unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23). With respect to Start\u2019s statements that \u201cdeeply greedy people\u201d created the mess of Solaia Technology\u2019s infringement claims, and that \u201cspeculation and concern about certain misdeeds are on the rise,\u201d the appellate court again held that they are capable of an innocent construction. 357 Ill. App. 3d 1 (contained in material unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23). According to the court, the deeply greedy people whose misdeeds have spurred concern could be Schneider Automation, its officers, the officers of other companies filing infringement claims, or the lawyers who represent these other companies. 357 Ill. App. 3d 1 (contained in material unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23). With respect to the industry veteran\u2019s letter, the appellate court held that it was an expression of opinion and therefore not actionable. 357 Ill. App. 3d 1 (contained in material unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court also held that Start\u2019s statements regarding the Sherman Act were not actionable because they were not false. 357 Ill. App. 3d 1 (contained in material unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nThe court then turned to the January 2003 cover article, \u201cConspiracy of a Shakedown.\u201d The court reviewed the common law fair report privilege and section 611 of the first and second Restatements of Torts. 357 Ill. App. 3d at 7-8. Relying upon Newell v. Field Enter prises, Inc., 91 Ill. App. 3d 735 (1980), the appellate court concluded that the fair report privilege attaches when the complaint reported is filed. 357 Ill. App. 3d at 11. The appellate court determined that the title was an accurate summary of Rockwell Automation\u2019s complaint, which contained express allegations that Solaia Technology and NSHN engaged in a shakedown scheme. 357 Ill. App. 3d at 8. The court further determined that the title was fair because it did not refer to Solaia Technology or NSHN:\n\u201c[T]here is nothing misplaced or omitted in the headline of the article that would convey the impression that Solaia or its law firm engaged in a \u2018Conspiracy of a Shakedown\u2019 to those who read it, and, accordingly, we find that the headline was a fair abridgment of the proceedings. ***\n[T]he remaining issue to be decided in this case is whether Illinois law still allows allegations of actual malice to defeat any claim of protection by the fair report privilege.\u201d 357 111. App. 3d at 9-10.\nThe appellate court reviewed Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146 (1980), and noted that, since Catalano, there has been a divergence of authority on this issue:\n\u201cAn examination of the Catalano decision reveals that it is ultimately unclear as to whether the supreme court chose to adopt section 611 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts because the court never expressly so stated. However, regardless of whether our supreme court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts\u2019 approach, we read Cata-lano as holding that allegations of actual malice defeat the privilege set forth in section 611, i.e., the fair report privilege.\u201d 357 111. App. 3d at 14.\nThe appellate court stated that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded actual malice. 357 Ill. App. 3d at 15. Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding that the title \u201cConspiracy of a Shakedown\u201d did not support a claim for defamation. 357 Ill. App. 3d at 15.\nFinally, the appellate court addressed the plaintiffs\u2019 argument that the \u201coverriding point\u201d of Start\u2019s coverage of the Solaia Technology\u2019s patent claims was defamatory. The court stated that except for the headline \u201cConspiracy of a Shakedown,\u201d none of the challenged statements were individually defamatory per se, and it consequently rejected the plaintiffs\u2019 contention that their sum was defamatory. 357 Ill. App. 3d 1 (contained in material unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nJustice Cahill wrote a special concurrence, in which he agreed with the result, but stated that he would not have addressed the fair report privilege with respect to the headline \u201cConspiracy of a Shakedown.\u201d 357 Ill. App. 3d at 16 (Cahill, J., specially concurring). According to Justice Cahill,\n\u201cThere is nothing in the text of the headline that would leave the reader with an impression that the underlying article reports on a complaint alleging unfair business practices and conspiracy. Without reference to the official proceeding, the reader is left with only one conclusion: plaintiffs entered into an illegal conspiracy. *** The headline in this case is known as a \u2018catcher\u2019 or \u2018eye-stopper\u2019 in the media trade. Though sometimes misleading, such headlines carry the reputational weight, for whatever it is worth, of the media outlet. That is why the headline in this case, if run in a newspaper or magazine with no axe to grind, would have read \u2018Conspiracy of a Shakedown, Complaint Alleges.\u2019 It is of little solace to plaintiffs that their names are not identified in the headline or that the reader later learns that the allegation comes from a privileged legal document.\u201d 357 Ill. App. 3d at 16 (Cahill, J., specially concurring).\nWe allowed the defendants\u2019 petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We then allowed the Illinois Press Association, the Chicago Tribune Company, the Copley Press, Inc., and the Chicago Reader, Inc., to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the defendants. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.\nANALYSIS\nA motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 615(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615(a) (West 2002)) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiffs claim; a motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 619(a) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a) (West 2000)) admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff\u2019s claim, but asserts certain defects or defenses outside the pleading that defeat the claim. See Provenzale v. Forister, 318 Ill. App. 3d 869, 878 (2001). Under either section, our standard of review is de novo. See Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116 (1993).\nIn this appeal, the defendants argue that the appellate court erred in holding that the fair report privilege could be trumped by an allegation of actual malice. The plaintiffs respond that the appellate court did not err in this regard, but it did err in holding that the privilege applied at all because the defendants\u2019 statements were not a fair abridgement of the Rockwell Automation antitrust complaint. In their request for cross-relief, the plaintiffs also argue that the appellate court erred in holding that various statements in the January 2003 issue of Start were not defamatory.\nTo state a defamation claim, a plaintiff must present facts showing that the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff, the defendant made an unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party, and that this publication caused damages. Krasinski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 124 Ill. 2d 483, 490 (1988), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 558 (1977). A defamatory statement is a statement that harms a person\u2019s reputation to the extent it lowers the person in the eyes of the community or deters the community from associating with her or him. Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1992), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 559 (1977). A statement is defamatory per se if its harm is obvious and apparent on its face. Owen v. Carr, 113 Ill. 2d 273, 277 (1986). In Illinois, there are five categories of statements that are considered defamatory per se: (1) words that impute a person has committed a crime; (2) words that impute a person is infected with a loathsome communicable disease; (3) words that impute a person is unable to perform or lacks integrity in performing her or his employment duties; (4) words that impute a person lacks ability or otherwise prejudices that person in her or his profession; and (5) words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication. Van Horne v. Muller, 185 Ill. 2d 299, 307 (1998), citing Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 88-89 (1996).\nHowever, a statement that is defamatory per se is not actionable if it is reasonably capable of an innocent construction. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 90. The so-called \u201cinnocent-construction rule\u201d requires a court to consider the statement in context and to give the words of the statement, and any implications arising from them, their natural and obvious meaning. Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 11; John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442 (1962). \u201c[I]f, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted or reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be actionable per se.\u201d Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352 (1982). \u201c[A] statement \u2018reasonably\u2019 capable of a nondefamatory interpretation, given its verbal or literary context, should be so interpreted. There is no balancing of reasonable constructions ***.\u201d Mittelman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220, 232 (1989). That is, a court must interpret the words of the statement \u201cas they appear[ ] to have been used and according to the idea they were intended to convey to the reasonable reader.\u201d Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93, citing 33A Ill. L. & Prac. Slander & Libel \u00a7 12, at 25 (1970). When the defendant clearly intended and unmistakably conveyed a defamatory meaning, a court should not strain to see an inoffensive gloss on the statement. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93; Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 350-51.\nAdditionally, if a statement is defamatory per se, but not subject to an innocent construction, it still may enjoy constitutional protection as an expression of opinion. \u201cUnder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.\u201d Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789, 805, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3007 (1974). However, there is no artificial distinction between opinion and fact: a false assertion of fact can be defamatory even when couched within apparent opinion or rhetorical hyperbole. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 99-100, citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1, 17-18, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705-06 (1990); Dubinsky v. United Airlines Master Executive Council, 303 Ill. App. 3d 317, 324 (1999) (\u201cexpressions of opinion may often imply an assertion of objective fact and, in such cases, would be considered actionable\u201d). Indeed, \u201c[i]t is well established that statements made in the form of insinuation, allusion, irony, or question, may be considered as defamatory as positive and direct assertions of fact.\u201d Berkos v. National Broadcasting Co., 161 Ill. App. 3d 476, 487 (1987). Similarly, \u201c[a] defendant cannot escape liability for defamatory factual assertions simply by claiming that the statements were a form of ridicule, humor or sarcasm.\u201d Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 16. The test is restrictive: a defamatory statement is constitutionally protected only if it cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual fact. Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 14-15. Several considerations aid our analysis: whether the statement has a precise and readily understood meaning; whether the statement is verifiable; and whether the statement\u2019s literary or social context signals that it has factual content. See Mittelman, 135 Ill. 2d at 243; Hopewell v. Vitullo, 299 Ill. App. 3d 513, 518-19 (1998); see generally Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 100-01; Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 566 (1977). If a statement is factual, and it is false, it is actionable.\nThe plaintiffs list several statements from the January 2003 issue of Start which they contend are defamatory per se: the cover headline \u201cCHAOS UPDATE: CONSPIRACY SHAKEDOWN\u201d; the reference in the cover article \u201cConspiracy of a Shakedown\u201d to the Sherman Act\u2019s criminal provisions; the assertion in that article that Rockwell Automation sued Niro personally; the reference in that article to earlier issues of Start covering the Solaia Technology litigation, particularly the statement in the April 2002 issue of Start that \u201cinnocent companies\u201d have been forced to defend themselves from \u201cdeeply greedy people\u201d; and the industry veteran\u2019s letter, particularly the comment that the \u2019318 patent was \u201cessentially worthless\u201d and was being used to coerce settlements. Two of these statements \u2014 the reference to earlier articles and the comment in the industry veteran\u2019s letter \u2014 do not concern Rockwell Automation\u2019s antitrust complaint. We will address these statements first, then address the other statements and the fair report privilege.\nThe plaintiffs contend the reference to earlier articles was defamatory because the earlier articles contained false statements that the plaintiffs were using unfounded claims to exact settlements. The plaintiffs specify that in the April 2002 article \u201cChaos in Manufacturing,\u201d Start announced that \u201cinnocent companies\u201d are being forced to defend themselves from \u201cdeeply greedy people.\u201d The appellate court found an innocent construction to this statement: \u201cinnocent companies\u201d did not refer to the plaintiffs, and \u201cdeeply greedy people\u201d could refer to Schneider Automation, its officers, its attorneys, or other companies filing infringement claims and their attorneys.\nWe find the appellate court\u2019s reasoning unconvincing. Certainly, \u201cinnocent companies\u201d does not refer to the plaintiffs, but the natural and obvious implication of the entire passage \u201cthe innocent companies who are being forced to defend themselves in this debacle \u2014 the victims whose fate is fueling the outrage \u2014 deserve a lot of sympathy\u201d is that less-than-innocent, less-than-sympathetic parties are victimizing them. Start quickly identified these parties: \u201cdeeply greedy people\u201d who aid and abet \u201cmarket mania.\u201d According to Start, \u201cthere is certainly a lot of finger-pointing going on and no one wants to take responsibility for creating this legal nightmare.\u201d In an effort to place responsibility, Start then attempted \u201cto explore in detail each of the players and what they had hoped to accomplished,\u201d noting in preface that \u201cmany companies blame Schneider\u201d and that \u201c[tjheir anger is only being fanned by Solaia\u2019s lawsuits.\u201d Later in this article, Start stated that \u201c[i]f So-laia proves victorious, it clearly intends to turn its sights on other prey.\u201d\nThere is simply no innocent construction for this statement. The defendants characterized the plaintiffs as deeply greedy people, responsible for a legal nightmare, as well as industrywide anger with patent enforcement lawsuits against an increasing number of prey. This statement clearly impugns the plaintiffs\u2019 integrity and thus falls within one of the recognized categories of defamation per se. But it also falls within the bounds of constitutionally protected opinion. The phrase \u201cdeeply greedy people\u201d has no precise meaning, and it is not verifiable. Further, the context in which that phrase appeared indicates that it may have been judgmental, but it was not factual. This statement is not actionable.\nThe plaintiffs also contend that the comment in the industry veteran\u2019s letter was defamatory. See Barrett v. Fonorow, 343 Ill. App. 3d 1184, 1192 (2003) (noting that a newspaper may be liable if a letter to the editor that it publishes contains a defamatory statement), quoting J. Friedman & F. Buono, Limiting Tort Liability for Online Third-Party Content Under Section 230 of the Communications Act, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 647, 650-51 (2000); see generally 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel & Slander \u00a7 256, at 517 (1995). The plaintiffs focus upon the statement that the \u2019318 patent was \u201cessentially worthless\u201d and being used to generate settlement proceeds. The appellate court held that this statement falls within the bounds of constitutionally protected opinion.\nAgain, we disagree with the appellate court. Though the phrase \u201cessentially worthless\u201d has no precise meaning in the abstract, it has a very precise meaning in the context of the letter. The industry veteran asked why Schneider Automation sold the \u2019318 patent to Solaia Technology for $1 \u201cplus a cut of the settlements,\u201d while other companies declined to bid on it. The industry veteran then stated, \u201cThe answer is pretty clear if you actually read the patent,\u201d to wit: \u201cthis is an extremely narrow patent.\u201d According to the industry veteran, \u201cthe reason why Schneider wanted to unload the patent and why none of the [other] existing control companies wanted to buy it was because the patent is essentially worthless.\u201d Thus, the letter not only places a value on the patent, but bases this value on an informed reading of the patent by the industry veteran. The letter accuses the plaintiffs of filing infringement claims, obviously, \u201cto make a lot of money,\u201d regardless of the means, then compares their tactics to those of muggers armed with baseball bats.\nThe letter undoubtedly employs hyperbole, but this statement is not an opinion. Under its metaphorical chaff hides a kernel of fact: Solaia Technology secured a worthless patent and filed infringement claims with the sole aim of extracting settlements. See Kumaran v. Brotman, 247 Ill. App. 3d 216, 228 (1993) (holding that a newspaper article suggesting the plaintiff was \u201cworking a scam\u201d by filing \u201cfrequent, unwarranted lawsuits to procure pecuniary settlements\u201d was not an opinion and thus actionable). The statement directly impugns the plaintiffs\u2019 integrity by questioning the validity of the patent and consequently the validity of Solaia Technology\u2019s infringement claims, and thus falls within one of the recognized categories of defamation per se. We now turn to the remaining allegedly defamatory statements, all of which concern Rockwell Automation\u2019s antitrust complaint, and thus implicate the fair report privilege.\nA defamatory statement is not actionable if it is privileged; this is a question of law. See Layne v. Builders Plumbing Supply Co., 210 Ill. App. 3d 966, 969 (1991). There are two classes of privileged statements: those subject to an absolute privilege, and those subject to a conditional or qualified privilege. See Joseph v. Collis, 272 Ill. App. 3d 200, 210 (1995). The fair report privilege is a qualified privilege, which promotes our system of self-governance by serving the public\u2019s interest in official proceedings, including judicial proceedings. See Newell, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 744-45, citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328, 347, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 1044-45 (1975). Section 611 of the second Restatement of Torts provides: \u201cThe publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611 (1977). The parties dispute whether this privilege can be defeated by allegations of actual malice.\nMore than 20 years ago, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted, \u201cIllinois law is in disarray on the question whether actual malice defeats the privilege of fair summary.\u201d Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 272 (7th Cir. 1983). In Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 112 (1966), we stated that section 611 of the first Restatement of Torts \u201cdefinitely expresses the prevailing, if not unanimous, weight of judicial authority.\u201d Lulay, 34 Ill. 2d at 115. Following that section, we held that the media enjoys a privilege to report a defamatory statement made in a government proceeding if the report is an accurate and complete rendition or a fair abridgement of the proceedings, and the report was not motivated by common law malice \u2014 it was not \u201cconceived or inspired solely because of a malicious design to injure the plaintiff or his business.\u201d Lulay, 34 Ill. 2d at 115-16.\nIn Catalano, we discussed Lulay, the first Restatement, and the rule that the fair report privilege was \u201cdefeasible if the statement was made with malice, in the common law sense of the term,\u201d i.e., the statement was intended to cause harm. Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 167. We then noted, \u201cWhen Lulay was decided that limitation had of course been rendered obsolete by New York Times v. Sullivan.\u201d Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 167. We then quoted the second Restatement\u2019s version of section 611, in effect adopting it as our rale. Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 168.\nThe plaintiffs in Catalano did not argue that the report was not accurate or fair. Instead, they argued that the fair report privilege was inapplicable because the reporter did not hear the defamatory statement at a governmental proceeding, but only as later paraphrased by a government official. \u201cThese points,\u201d we stated, \u201craise questions not addressed in Lulay\u201d and the fair report privilege. Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 168. We held that the plaintiffs did not show actual malice by the media defendants in republishing the government official\u2019s account of the proceeding, as required by New York Times v. Sullivan. Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 168, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 578 (1977). We did not incorporate actual malice into the fair report privilege. See Tepper v. Copley Press, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 713, 719 (1999); see also Hurst v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 323 Ill. App. 3d 812, 817-18 (2001). In fact, the first amendment itself prevents actual malice from defeating the privilege. See Gist v. Macon County Sheriff\u2019s Department, 284 Ill. App. 3d 367, 376 (1996), citing Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328, 95 S. Ct. 1029.\nWe hold that the fair report privilege overcomes allegations of either common law or actual malice. As comment a to section 611 explains,\n\u201cThe basis of this privilege is the interest of the public in having information made available to it as to what occurs in official proceedings and public meetings. *** [T]he privilege exists even though the publisher himself does not believe the defamatory words he reports to be true and even when he knows them to be false. Abuse of the privilege takes place, therefore, when the publisher does not give a fair and accurate report of the proceeding.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment a, at 297-98 (1977).\nComment b states that the Constitution requires a defamation plaintiff show that the defendant was at fault. Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment b, at 298 (1977). The fair report privilege in section 611 permits a defendant to publish a report of an official proceeding even though the defendant knows the report contains a false and defamatory statement. Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment b, at 298 (1977). Accordingly, \u201c[t]he constitutional requirement of fault is met in this situation by a showing of fault in failing to do what is reasonably necessary to insure that the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment. *** If the report of a public official proceeding is accurate or a fair abridgment, an action cannot constitutionally be maintained.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment 6, at 298 (1977).\nThus, the fair report privilege has two requirements: (1) the report must be of an official proceeding; and (2) the report must be complete and accurate or a fair abridgement of the official proceeding. Here, the parties dispute whether Rockwell Automation\u2019s antitrust complaint itself is sufficient to satisfy the first requirement.\nComment d to section 611 states that the fair report privilege extends to the report of any official proceeding, including proceedings before any court. Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment d, at 299 (1977). However,\n\u201c[a] report of a judicial proceeding implies that some official action has been taken by the officer or body whose proceedings are thus reported. The publication, therefore, of the contents of preliminary pleadings!,] such as a complaint or petition, before any judicial action has been taken is not within the rule stated in this Section. An important reason for this position has been to prevent implementation of a scheme to file a complaint for the purpose of establishing a privilege to publicize its content and then dropping the action.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment e, at 300 (1977).\nComment c makes this clear:\n\u201cA person cannot confer this privilege upon himself by making the original defamatory publication himself and then reporting to other people what he had stated. *** Nor may he confer the privilege upon a third person, even a member of the communications media, by making the original statement under a collusive arrangement with that person for the purpose of conferring the privilege upon him.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment c, at 299 (1977).\nIn 1980, Illinois joined a growing trend, declining to place a judicial-action limitation on the privilege. In New-ell, the appellate court weighed the arguments in favor of the majority view that the privilege does not attach until judicial action has occurred and the minority view that the privilege attaches when the complaint is filed. Newell, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 745-46. The court mentioned that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Illinois courts would adopt the minority view. Newell, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 746, citing American District Telegraph Co. v. Brink\u2019s Inc., 380 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1967). The appellate court agreed, offering four distinct reasons. First, the filing of a complaint is itself a public act. Newell, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 748. Second, the privilege serves the public\u2019s interest in the judicial system, and this interest begins with the filing of a complaint. Newell, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 746. Third, a judicial-action limitation on the privilege would purportedly decrease the risk of publishing scurrilous pleadings, but this limitation is ineffective: \u201cSimply because a suit has proceeded to the point where judicial action of some kind has taken place does not necessarily mean that the suit is less likely to be groundless and brought in bad faith.\u201d Newell, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 747. Fourth, the public has a sophisticated understanding of the court system and is capable of evaluating information gleaned from a complaint. Newell, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 747-48.\nThough we have not previously noted our concurrence with Newell, we do so now. We hold that there is no judicial-action limitation on the fair report privilege in Illinois. Once Rockwell Automation filed its antitrust complaint, Start could report any defamatory statements in the complaint, provided it met the second requirement of the fair report privilege.\nStart\u2019s coverage of the Rockwell Automation case was not a complete and accurate rendering of a complaint, so we must determine whether it was a fair abridgement. Gist, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 377 (\u201cone must either make a complete and accurate report, or, if a summary is made, the summary must be \u2018fair\u2019 for the privilege to apply\u201d). A fair abridgment means that the report must convey to readers \u201c \u2018a substantially correct account.\u2019 \u201d Tepper, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 720, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment f, at 300 (1977). Comment f of the second Restatement observes:\n\u201c[I]t is necessary that nothing be omitted or misplaced in such a manner as to convey an erroneous impression to those who hear or read it ***. The reporter is not privileged under this Section to make additions of his own that would convey a defamatory impression, nor to impute corrupt motives to any one, nor to indict expressly or by innuendo the veracity or integrity of any of the parties.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment/, at 300-01 (1977). In this regard, a court must determine if the sting of\nthe defamatory statement in the proceeding is the same as the sting of the defamatory statement in the report. See Myers v. The Telegraph, 332 Ill. App. 3d 917, 923 (2002). If so, the privilege defeats the defamation claim because the accuracy of the summary is the \u201cbenchmark of the privilege\u201d; the report is the public\u2019s window to the proceeding. Gist, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 376, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment i, at 301 (1977); accord Maple Lanes, Inc. v. News Media Corp., 322 Ill. App. 3d 842, 844 (2001), citing Dolatowski v. Life Printing & Publishing Co., 197 Ill. App. 3d 23, 27 (1990); see also Newell, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 749.\nWe note that the defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss, arguing in the alternative that the statements challenged by the plaintiffs were not defamatory and that any defamatory statements in the January 2003 issue fell within the fair report privilege. Thus, with respect to the remaining statements, we first must determine whether they were defamatory. If they were, we then must determine whether the fair report privilege applies, i.e., whether the statements were a fair abridgement of Rockwell Automation\u2019s antitrust complaint.\nStart\u2019s January 2003 cover headline \u201cCHAOS UPDATE: CONSPIRACY SHAKEDOWN\u201d and its cover story headline \u201cConspiracy of a Shakedown\u201d were not defamatory. As the appellate court correctly observed, these headlines do not directly refer to the plaintiffs. Nothing in the headlines leaves the implication that the plaintiffs were involved in a conspiracy or a shakedown. Even if we were to accept the argument made in Justice Cahill\u2019s concurrence and adopted by the plaintiffs that the headlines were defamatory, they were a fair abridgement of Rockwell Automation\u2019s antitrust complaint. \u201cCHAOS UPDATE\u201d was a cue to Start\u2019s readers that an article in this issue would contain an update on the \u201cChaos in Manufacturing\u201d article from April 2002, as well as \u201cThe Chaos Deepens\u201d article from August 2002. \u201cCONSPIRACY SHAKEDOWN\u201d and \u201cConspiracy of a Shakedown\u201d simply borrow words from Rockwell Automation\u2019s complaint. According to the defendants, Rockwell Automation used a form of the word \u201cconspiracy\u201d 25 times and the word \u201cshakedown\u201d three times in its complaint. The headlines do not identify the plaintiffs as conspirators, and read together with the article (see Harrison v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 555, 570 (2003)), the headlines simply announce Start\u2019s coverage of Rockwell Automation\u2019s complaint.\nThe statement in the \u201cConspiracy of a Shakedown\u201d article that Rockwell Automation sued Niro personally, charging him with unfair business practices, impugned his integrity, prejudiced his practice of law, and implied that he committed a crime. It thus falls within several of the recognized categories of defamation per se. See Hoeflicker v. Higginsville Advance, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 650, 652-53 (Mo. App. 1991); see also Weber v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., 2005 PA Super. 192, \u00b6\u00b6 29-34, 878 A.2d 63, 73-74. Further, this statement was not a fair abridgement. It was baldly inaccurate. Even though Start corrected its error in the very next sentence, Start perpetuated this error throughout the article. In presenting \u201ckey points\u201d from Rockwell Automation\u2019s complaint, Start quoted part of the complaint\u2019s first paragraph and stated: \u201cRockwell claims that Niro, in conjunction with Solaia and Schneider, \u2018have made and continue to make false and objectively-baseless claims of patent infringements against numerous manufacturers.\u2019 \u201d Rockwell Automation\u2019s complaint used \u201cDefendants,\u201d rather than \u201cNiro, in conjunction with Solaia and Schneider.\u201d Start later stated, \u201cIn the end, Rockwell claims that Solaia, Schneider, and Niro have specifically targeted Rockwell customers to interfere with its relationship with both its actual and prospective customers.\u201d\nFinally, in describing how Niro personally inspired Rockwell Automation to file its complaint, Start stated, \u201cNiro anticipates garnering total settlements in the range of $550 million to more than $600 million, before his company ends its legal rampage.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Perhaps Start was referring to Niro\u2019s limited liability company, NSHN, and not NSHN\u2019s client, Solaia Technology, but elsewhere in the article, Start used \u201cNiro\u2019s firm,\u201d not Niro\u2019s company. Start\u2019s statement regarding Niro was not a fair abridgement of Rockwell Automation\u2019s complaint, and the fair report privilege does not apply. Accordingly, the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations regarding this statement survive.\nFinally, the statement regarding the Sherman Antitrust Act was defamatory. In its \u201cConspiracy of a Shakedown\u201d article, Start outlined Rockwell Automation\u2019s complaint and stated, \u201cRockwell filed its complaint under federal antitrust laws: the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, and Lanham Act.\u201d Start then added, \u201cThe Sherman Antitrust Act outlaws all contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain interstate and foreign trade. *** The Sherman Act also makes it a crime to monopolize or conspire with any person or persons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The appellate court correctly characterized the statement as substantially true, but the plaintiffs did not challenge the veracity of this statement standing alone. Instead, they challenged the veracity of the implication left by the statement, namely, they had committed a crime.\nRockwell Automation\u2019s civil antitrust complaint did not charge the plaintiffs with a crime. According to Rockwell Automation, Solaia Technology, NSHN, and Schneider Automation violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by contracting, combining, or conspiring to restrain trade in the \u2019318 patent, thus injuring competition and Rockwell Automation. Rockwell alleged that the plaintiffs threatened, instituted, and perpetuated a series of objectively baseless infringement claims for financial gain, namely, pretrial settlements. Rockwell Automation did not mention any criminal proceedings. In fact, enforcement of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act is left to the United States Attorney (see 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 4 (2000)), and there is no indication in the record that such proceedings against the plaintiffs were ever contemplated.\nThere is no innocent construction for this statement. The natural and obvious implication of this statement is that the plaintiffs committed a crime. The defendants assert that this statement was \u201ca summary for manufacturing company executives who constitute Start\u2019s readership of the basic provisions of the federal antitrust laws,\u201d but they offer no explanation why this summary did not include references to other provisions more relevant to Rockwell Automation\u2019s complaint, e.g., section 15(a) of the Clayton Act, which provides a private remedy for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 15(a) (2000) (any person who shall be \u201cinjured [in his] business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws *** may sue\u201d and recover treble damages, interest, costs, and attorney fees). Indeed, it is difficult to fathom why Start would make a gratuitous reference to the criminality of conduct violating the Sherman Antitrust Act after it had just noted that the statute \u201coutlaws\u201d such conduct.\nStart\u2019s statement regarding the Sherman Act implied that the plaintiffs committed a crime, particularly when read with the background of Start\u2019s other coverage of So-laia Technology\u2019s infringement claims. It thus falls within one of the recognized categories of defamation per se. However, we hesitate to conclude that this statement falls outside the fair report privilege. Cursory research would have revealed to Start that the only section of the Sherman Antitrust Act cited in Rockwell Automation\u2019s complaint clearly states that a person found to have violated the act is guilty of a crime:\n\u201c[E]very contract *** or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States *** is declared to he illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1 (2000).\nThis section does not refer to prosecution of such violations, but we cannot expect reporters to possess the same skills as lawyers and to venture further into the filigree of federal antitrust law, searching for a distinction between criminal and civil enforcement actions. In light of the language of the statute, we conclude that the statement was a fair abridgement of Rockwell Automation\u2019s antitrust complaint.\nPlainly, freedom of the press is illusory if a cloud of defamation liability darkens the media\u2019s reports of official proceedings. See Krauss v. The Champaign News Gazette, Inc., 59 Ill. App. 3d 745, 746-47 (1978) (\u201cA robust and unintimidated press is a necessary ingredient of self-government\u201d). We recognize that the media must have \u201cbreathing space\u201d (see Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 701, 84 S. Ct. at 721) in order to act effectively and escape self-censorship. But we remind reporters it is objectivity and civility that mark our finest journalism. Reports of official proceedings must be as fair as they are ardent if they are to help the public assess the value of our government in action. Had Start\u2019s statement regarding the Sherman Antitrust Act strayed a bit farther from the statutory language, the implication left by the statement would have been actionable.\nIn sum, we hold that the fair report privilege does not yield to allegations that a media defendant reported with actual malice false statements made in an official proceeding. Further, we hold that there is no judicial-action limitation on the fair report privilege in Illinois. Finally, we remand this cause to the trial court, so the plaintiffs may proceed on their defamation claims regarding the statement in the letter to the editor and the statement that Niro was sued by Rockwell Automation.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons that we have stated, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgments below, and remand this cause to the circuit court.\nJudgments affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nCHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nThough not all of Start\u2019s coverage of Solaia Technology\u2019s infringement claims is allegedly defamatory, we quote extensively from the three issues of Start mentioned in the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint in order to provide context for the statements at issue.\nIt is unclear whether the headline \u201cSOLAIA MESS\u201d was provided by the unnamed author or by Start.\nAs the defendants note, the term \u201cactual malice\u201d means \u201cconstitutional malice,\u201d as described in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964). Actual or constitutional malice \u2014 subjective awareness of the falsity or probable falsity of a statement \u2014 is distinguishable from common law malice \u2014 ill will or intent to harm. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41, 50, 108 S. Ct. 876, 880-81 (1988).\nThe appellate court stated that the \u201csting\u201d issue was forfeited because the plaintiffs did not raise it until their reply brief. 357 Ill. App. 3d at 15, citing Todt v. Ameritech Corp., 327 Ill. App. 3d 359, 369 (2002). In their response brief below, the defendants argued that the sting of the \u201cConspiracy of a Shakedown\u201d article came from Rockwell Automation\u2019s antitrust complaint. The plaintiffs were entitled to counter. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(g); Lieb v. Judges\u2019 Retirement System of Illinois, 314 Ill. App. 3d 87, 96 (2000) (\u201cPortions of a reply brief will not be stricken if the arguments respond to arguments made in the appellee brief\u2019).\nWe note that in paragraph 38 of Rockwell Automation\u2019s antitrust complaint, Rockwell Automation stated, \u201cSolaia and Niro identified Rockwell products as the basis for their infringement claims.\u201d The defendants have not brought this passage to our attention, but it does not change our conclusion. This passage does not mean that Rockwell Automation sued Niro personally, and it is likely that Niro, as a named partner of the firm representing Solaia Technology, advised his client about which companies may have infringed on the \u2019318 patent.\nIn April 2002 Start created a narrative of innocent corporate victims deserving sympathy against deeply greedy people who \u201caid and abet\u201d maniacal markets, namely, Schneider Automation and Solaia Technology, as well as \u201cSolaia\u2019s legal machine,\u201d Niro and NSHN. \u201cAid and abet\u201d means \u201cassist or facilitate the commission of a crime, or *** promote its accomplishment.\u201d See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 76 (8th ed. 2004); see also 720 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 2(c) (West 2002) (\u201cA person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when *** he *** aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the [criminal] offense\u201d).\nIn August 2002 Start labeled Solaia Technology\u2019s infringement claims as \u201clegal carnage,\u201d noting that \u201cmany observers are frustrated that the patent system is being used as a vicious legal weapon to generate revenue.\u201d Start then noted that, while Solaia Technology\u2019s attorneys in NSHN denied any connection between Solaia Technology and Schneider Automation, documents reveal \u201cthe relationship between these companies might be more intimately linked.\u201d Smedley hinted that \u201ckey details\u201d in the Rockwell Automation antitrust case \u201ccontinue to be revealed. Speculation and concern about certain misdeeds are on the rise.\u201d \u201cMisdeed\u201d means \u201ca wrong deed: an immoral or criminal action.\u201d See Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1443 (1986).\nFinally, in January 2003 Start published the industry veteran\u2019s letter, which observed, \u201cthere are people in the world,\u201d like Johnny Cochrane, the Washington, D.C., sniper, and Enron and WorldCom executives, \u201cwho want to make a lot of money and they don\u2019t care how they do it.\u201d Start later mentioned that \u201crumors have been flying around about the relationship that exists between Solaia and Schneider.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD" }, { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that certain statements made by defendants fall within one or more of the recognized categories of statements that are defamatory per se. I disagree, however, with the majority\u2019s conclusion that the fair report privilege shields defendants from liability for some of the statements they made. Therefore, I write separately to explain my position in this case.\nThe majority applies the fair report privilege to statements that were based upon the bare and untested allegations of a complaint. In my opinion, some action by the trial court is necessary to trigger application of the fair report privilege. Indeed, such a restriction on the fair report privilege is salutary and preserves a proper balance between the individual\u2019s right to protect his reputation and the public\u2019s interest in being informed of court proceedings.\nThe majority\u2019s willingness to apply the fair report privilege to the statements at issue is particularly troubling when considered in light of the court\u2019s concurrent holding that a showing of malice, whether actual malice or malice in fact, will not defeat the defendants\u2019 claimed protection under the fair report privilege. The majority\u2019s holding invites collusion between a party who files a frivolous complaint containing defamatory statements and a defendant who publishes the defamatory statements, with full knowledge of the falsity of the statements but with equal certainty of protection through application of the fair report privilege. Because I believe that the majority does not strike the proper balance between the rights of individuals to their good reputation and the interest of the public in being informed of court proceedings, I respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion.\nANALYSIS\nAt issue in this case is the proper balance between an individual\u2019s right to a good reputation and the public\u2019s interest in being informed of court proceedings. As the majority recognizes, a defamatory communication violates an individual\u2019s right to a good reputation and gives rise to a cause of action to recover damages for the violation. See J. Lee & B. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law \u00a7 36:1, at 36 \u2014 3 (2d ed. 2002); W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984). A defamatory statement becomes actionable when it is actually communicated to a third person and understood by that person as being defamatory. Modern Tort Law \u00a7 36:4, at 36 \u2014 9; Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7 113, at 797-98. When a defamatory statement is published to a third person, that person in turn may be liable for republication of the communication to yet another individual. Modern Tort Law \u00a7 36:4, at 36 \u2014 11.\nTwo classes of privileges have evolved as exceptions to the general rule of Lability for defamatory communications. Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7\u00a7 114, 115. The first class encompasses absolute privileges where immunity is conferred \u201cregardless of motive and is based on the personal position or status of the actor.\u201d Modern Tort Law \u00a7 36:24, at 36 \u2014 39. Statements made in judicial proceedings are afforded immunity by absolute privilege. Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7 114, at 816. It is generally recognized that the fair and impartial administration of judicial proceedings, the search for truth, and the vindication of personal rights in legal proceedings may be fostered only through \u201ctotal freedom for the exchange of ideas\u201d (Modern Tort Law \u00a7 36:25, at 36 \u2014 40) and, consequently, require absolute immunity for statements made by judicial officers, attorneys, parties, and witnesses in the proceedings.\nThe second class encompasses conditional or qualified privileges where immunity is conferred because of \u201cthe occasion upon which the allegedly false statement is published.\u201d Modern Tort Law \u00a7 36:24, at 36 \u2014 39. A conditional or qualified privilege generally applies \u201cwhere society\u2019s interest in compensating a person for loss of reputation is outweighed by a competing interest that demands protection.\u201d Modern Tort Law \u00a7 36:32, at 36\u2014 47. See also Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7 115, at 824. A conditional or qualified privilege may be lost if the privilege is abused. Modern Tort Law \u00a7 36:33, at 36 \u2014 53; Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7 115, at 832. As this court has heretofore explained:\n\u201cWhere no qualified privilege exists, the plaintiff need only show that the defendant acted with negligence in making the defamatory statements to prevail. [Citation.] However, once a defendant establishes a qualified privilege, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant either intentionally published the material while knowing the matter was false, or displayed a reckless disregard as to the matter\u2019s falseness.\u201d Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d 16, 24 (1993).\nThus, where a person publishes a statement with knowledge of the falsity of the statement, a qualified privilege may not be sufficient to shield the person from liability. Likewise, where a person publishes a statement despite a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity or despite entertaining serious doubts as to truth of the statement, liability may not be defeated by application of a qualified privilege. Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 24-25; Mittelman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220, 237 (1989).\nAs the majority notes correctly, the fair report privilege falls within the class of conditional or qualified privileges. 221 Ill. 2d at 585. The privilege furthers the interest of the public to have information about official proceedings and public meetings. In Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981), the court explained the three rationales that have been used to justify the fair report privilege. First,\n\u201can agency theory was offered to rationalize a privilege of fair report: one who reports what happens in a public, official proceeding acts as an agent for persons who had a right to attend, and informs them of what they might have seen for themselves. The agency rationale, however, cannot explain application of the privilege to proceedings or reports not open to public inspection.\u201d Medico, 643 F.2d at 140-41.\nSecond is a theory of public supervision:\n\u201c(The privilege is justified by) \u2018the security which publicity gives for the proper administration of justice. ... It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should always act under the sense of public responsibility and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.\u2019 \u201d Medico, 643 F.2d at 141, quoting Cowley v. Pul-sifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).\nThe third rationale for the fair report privilege rests \u201con the public\u2019s interest in learning of important matters.\u201d Medico, 643 F.2d at 142. The linchpin, however, is that the information reported must be of some import. \u201cMere curiosity in the private affairs of others is of insufficient importance\u201d to warrant granting the privilege. Note, Privilege to Republish Defamation, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1102, 1111 (1964).\nLooking at the theoretical underpinnings of the fair report privilege, it is clear that the privilege serves the interest of the public in information about governmental and court proceedings. Where the public is not clearly entitled to the information in question, such as where a meeting is not open to the public, where the information is not fair and accurate, or where the information is false, the interest of the public in such information is less compelling, and protection of the plaintiffs right to his good reputation may call for a new balance. In my opinion, the majority in the present case does not strike the proper balance between the right of the plaintiffs to their reputations and the interest of the public in obtaining information about court proceedings.\nThe majority adopts the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that the publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding is privileged. 221 Ill. 2d at 586, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611 (1977). As explained in comment d of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:\n\u201cThe privilege covered in this Section extends to the report of any official proceeding, or any action taken by any officer or agency of the government of the United States, or of any State or of any of its subdivisions. Since the holding of an official hearing or meeting is in itself an official proceeding, the privilege includes the report of any official hearing or meeting, even though no other action is taken. The filing of a report by an officer or agency of the government is an action bringing a reporting of the governmental report within the scope of the privilege.\nThe privilege is thus applicable to the report of proceedings before any court, whether it is one of general or of special and limited jurisdiction.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment d, at 299 (1977).\nAlthough the majority adopts the statement of the fair report privilege outlined in section 611, the majority rejects the limitation imposed by comment e on the use of the fair report privilege. See 221 Ill. 2d at 589. Instead, the majority concurs in the holding of Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 91 Ill. App. 3d 735 (1980), that the fair report \u201cprivilege serves the public\u2019s interest in the judicial system, and this interest begins with the filing of a complaint.\u201d 221 Ill. 2d at 589.1 disagree.\nI believe the interests of the citizens of Illinois are better served by adopting the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Comment e provides in part:\n\u201ce. Necessity of official action in judicial proceedings. A report of a judicial proceeding implies that some official action has been taken by the officer or body whose proceedings are thus reported. The publication, therefore, of the contents of preliminary pleadings such as a complaint or petition, before any judicial action has been taken is not within the rule stated in this Section. An important reason for this position has been to prevent implementation of a scheme to file a complaint for the purpose of establishing a privilege to publicize its content and then dropping the action. (See Comment c). It is not necessary, however, that a final disposition be made of the matter in question; it is enough that some judicial action has been taken so that, in the normal progress of the proceeding, a final decision will be rendered.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment e, at 300.\nThe rationale for the restriction on the fair report privilege is explained thus by a leading treatise:\n\u201cAn important field for the privilege is the reporting of any judicial proceeding, no matter how inferior the tribunal, and regardless of its jurisdiction over the particular matter. The proceeding may be an ex parte one, so long as some official action is taken, even though it is only the holding of a hearing; but a mere contemplated lawsuit not yet begun is clearly not enough. Because of the opportunity afforded for malicious public defamation and even extortion, through suits begun and promptly discontinued, most courts are agreed that some official action is essential to the privilege. Thus it is the prevailing view, with some few courts to the contrary, that a pleading or a deposition filed in a case but not yet acted upon may not he reported under the claim of privilege.\u201d Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7 115, at 837.\nI hasten to emphasize that under the approach advocated in comment e and followed by a number of jurisdictions, the public will gain access to information regarding the court proceedings, and the policy consideration for providing such access will be heeded. The issue, after all, is not whether the public has an interest in information concerning the court proceedings which is being denied. Rather, the issue is whether a media defendant reporting on the court proceedings may base its report on the bare, untested, and unsubstantiated allegations of a complaint. When some official action has been taken by the court in the proceedings, the media defendant will be able to report on the proceedings, including the allegations of the complaint. At that point, however, the media defendant may have access to additional information which will allow it to present a more balanced view of the court proceedings. Further, the oversight of the proceedings provided by the court and the possibility of sanctions for a frivolous complaint may stay the hand of a plaintiff whose sole purpose is to defame an innocent individual. The public\u2019s interest in obtaining information about the court proceedings will be met. Concomitantly, the risk to the individual subjected to the defamatory statements in the complaint will be minimized.\nI agree with the observations made by the court in Sanford v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 318 Mass. 156, 159, 61 N.E.2d 5, 7 (1945), in balancing the interests in an action for defamation:\n\u201cPublic policy requires a glare of publicity upon the doings of courts, even though individual litigants suffer unmerited harm. But the publication of accusations made by one party against another in a pleading is neither a legal nor a moral duty of newspapers. Enterprise in that matter ought to be at the risk of paying damages if the accusations prove false. To be safe, a newspaper has only to send its reporters to listen to hearings rather than to search the files of cases not yet brought before the court. The older doctrine of the [Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884)] and [Lundin v. Post Publishing Co., 217 Mass. 213, 104 N.E. 480 (1914)] cases still seems to us well founded in principle and without injustice in its practical operation. It is supported by the great weight of authority in other jurisdictions.\u201d\nSee also Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309, 312, 112 N.W 258, 258 (1907) (\u201c[I]f the filing of such a complaint must be construed as a judicial proceeding within the rule stated, then any one who happens to read the complaint after it is filed is privileged to publish it ***. *** If such be the law, then an easy and safe way has been provided whereby a party desiring to libel another may do so with impunity by entitling the libel in an action, labeling it a complaint, and filing it with the clerk\u201d). The majority here applies the fair report privilege to statements that were based upon the bare and untested allegations of a complaint. In my opinion, some action by the trial court is necessary to trigger application of the fair report privilege. Indeed, a restriction on the privilege preserves a proper balance between the individual\u2019s right to protect his reputation and the public\u2019s interest in being informed of court proceedings. Under the watchful eye of the trial court, the risk of collusion between the individual filing the frivolous, defamatory complaint and the media outlet republishing the defamatory allegations of the complaint is lessened.\nThe majority\u2019s concurrent holding that malice, whether actual malice or malice in fact, will not defeat a defendant\u2019s claimed protection under the fair report privilege only serves to throw the balance further off. In Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 112 (1966), plaintiff proprietor of a combined bakery, grocery store and restaurant in Peoria was cited by city health officers for sanitary code violations. Plaintiff proprietor satisfied the objections of the Department of Health and received his food license. The following day, defendant newspaper, after an interview with the director of the health department, published the allegedly defamatory article. The court first recognized that a privilege exists to report government proceedings. Lulay, 34 Ill. 2d at 114-15. The court then held:\n\u201cThe privilege to report governmental acts or utterances can only be defeated by proving that a particular publication was motivated solely by actual malice. [Citations.] As expressed in the Restatement of Torts, section 611, a publication reporting government proceedings is nonactionable unless published \u2018solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed.\u2019 \u201d Lulay, 34 Ill. 2d at 115.\nAlthough the Lulay court spoke in terms of actual malice, the definition the court provided, that is, a communication made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed, was that of common law malice or malice in fact.\nThe court\u2019s holding in Lulay was followed in Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp., 40 Ill. 2d 257, 261 (1968), where the court observed:\n\u201cWith respect to defendant\u2019s contention that the article was a privileged comment on quasi-judicial proceedings, the appellate court correctly stated the controlling principle as expressed in the Restatement of Torts, \u00a7 611, that a newspaper is privileged to report the activities of a \u2018municipal corporation or of a body empowered by law to perform a public duty *** although it contains matter which is false and defamatory, if it is (a) accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of such proceedings, and (b) not made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed.\u2019 \u201d\nIn Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146 (1980), the court considered whether the plaintiffs, seven of the eight aldermen that comprised the city council of Berwyn, could maintain an action for a defamatory statement allegedly made by defendant Pechous at a council meeting, repeated by Pechous several months later to a reporter, and quoted by the reporter in a newspaper article. The plaintiffs argued the fair report privilege did not apply because the reporter did not attend the council meeting; the article was not published until five months after the council meeting; the article was based on an account given by Pechous; and not all of the statements by Pechous which appear in the article were made at the meeting. In discussing the concept of malice, the Catalano court noted that the Lulay court had actually defined common law malice, that is, a statement made for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed, in holding that malice defeats the fair report privilege. Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 168. In the wake of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964), however, recovery for a defamatory statement concerning a public official may be allowed only upon a showing of actual malice, that is, \u201conly if it is established both that the utterance was false and that it was made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or true.\u201d Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 155. The Catalano court then observed that it need not decide whether, as argued by the plaintiffs, the fair report privilege did not apply to the statement at issue in the first instance. The plaintiffs, all public officials, were not able to show actual malice on the part of the newspaper defendants, as required by New York Times. Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 168-69.\nThe majority rejects the holding of Lulay, and presents Catalano as support for its holding that a showing of malice, whether actual malice or common law malice, will not defeat application of the fair report privilege. The majority\u2019s analysis is overly dependent on Catalano, however. The Catalano court itself noted it was not holding that the fair report privilege applies where the individual claiming the privilege knew of the statement\u2019s falsity. The Catalano court observed:\n\u201cWe think it is also appropriate to state that in holding that Pechous is liable and that the other defendants are not, we are not, as the plaintiffs assert, applying different standards, and we are not indicating approval of the position taken by the court in Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc. (2d Cir. 1977), 556 F.2d 113, cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 1002, 54 L. Ed. 2d 498, 98 S. Ct. 647, that a newspaper, under some circumstances, is protected against liability in reporting a defamatory statement about a public official or public figure even if the newspaper knew that the statement was false.\u201d Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 170.\nThe majority\u2019s analysis enjoys greater support in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment b, at 298 (1977).\nThe majority\u2019s decision on the issue of malice provides timely guidance for the Illinois courts. As noted by the majority, Illinois law has been in disarray as to whether a showing of malice defeats the fair report privilege. 221 Ill. 2d at 585. Compare Lykowski v. Bergman, 299 Ill. App. 3d 157 (1998) (following Lulay and holding the privilege may be defeated by a showing of malice); Kumaran v. Brotman, 247 Ill. App. 3d 216 (1993); Reed v. Northwestern Publishing Co., 129 Ill. App. 3d 133 (1984); Emery v. Kimball Hill, Inc., 112 Ill. App. 3d 109 (1983); Nagib v. News-Sun, 64 Ill. App. 3d 752 (1978); Colucci v. Chicago Crime Comm\u2019n, 31 Ill. App. 3d 802 (1975), with Snitowsky v. NBC Subsidiary (WMAQTV), Inc., 297 Ill. App. 3d 304 (1998) (fair report privilege applies if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment of the occurrence reported); Gist v. Macon County Sheriff\u2019s Department, 284 Ill. App. 3d 367 (1996). See also Berkos v. National Broadcasting Co., 161 Ill. App. 3d 476, 493 (1987) (Presiding Justice McMorrow, writing for the court, collecting cases and observing: \u201cthe question of whether the common law fair report privilege can be forfeited upon a showing that the defendant acted either with common law \u2018express malice\u2019 or constitutional law \u2018actual malice,\u2019 where the news media has falsely defamed a public official, a public figure, or a private figure with respect to a matter of \u2018public concern,\u2019 is apparently unsettled because of conflicting Illinois precedent\u201d). Without venturing into the fray, I note simply that the majority\u2019s holding that a defamatory report is privileged if based on the contents of a complaint is exacerbated by the concurrent holding that malice does not defeat the fair report privilege.\nIt should be remembered that a plaintiff in a judicial proceeding enjoys an absolute privilege for defamatory statements he makes in the proceedings. As explained in a leading treatise, the privilege \u201cdoes not depend for its existence upon the good faith of the defamen An absolute privilege confers immunity regardless of motive and is based on the personal position or status of the actor.\u201d Modern Tort Law \u00a7 36:25, at 36 \u2014 40. To allow a newspaper to publish the defamatory statements the plaintiff includes in his complaint, and to give the newspaper immunity when the newspaper is aware of the falsity of the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint, is to degrade the right of the defamed individual to his good reputation without real necessity. What damage a plaintiff causes to the defamed individual by including defamatory statements in a complaint will be multiplied exponentially by publication of the defamatory statements in a newspaper. A complaint in a court proceeding will go unnoticed by the vast majority of the citizens of our state. Defamatory statements broadcast in a newspaper or other media outlet may magnify both the reach and the sting of the defamatory statements. A private individual in particular most likely will not have the resources to counter the defamatory allegations when they are given voice in a media outlet.\nAgain, the trade-off is not between affording a defamed individual the right of redress and denying the public\u2019s interest in access to information concerning judicial proceedings. Rather, the trade-off is between protecting the right of the individual to his good reputation and delaying, for a short time, publication of information about the court proceedings. I note that numerous jurisdictions that have considered the issue at bar have drawn a more appropriate balance, holding either that the fair report privilege does not extend to a report based on the contents of a complaint, or that the fair report privilege may be defeated by a showing of malice. See Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying Colorado law and holding that the fair report privilege does not apply to the reporting of the contents of pleadings before any judicial action has taken place); Stem v. Gannett Satellite, Information Network, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tenn. 1994) (applying Tennessee law, court held that privilege applied to affidavit that was filed in court and became part of the judicial proceeding, but actual malice would defeat application of the privilege); Parsons v. Age-Herald Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439, 61 So. 345 (1913) (court action is required and publication must be without malice); Johnson v. Johnson Publishing Co., 271 A.2d 696, 698 (D.C. 1970) (\u201cIf the publication fairly and accurately repeats the wife\u2019s assertions as contained in the complaint, the defense of qualified privilege is available to appellee absent proof that the article was published with malice\u201d); Murphy v. Maui Publishing Co., 23 Haw. 804 (1917) (court action is required for application of fair report privilege); Flues v. New Nonpareil Co., 155 Iowa 290, 135 N.W 1083 (1912) (official action is required and publication cannot be made with malice); Paducah Newspapers, Inc. v. Bratcher, 274 Ky. 220, 118 S.W.2d 178 (1938) (fair report privilege applies to report based on a complaint if the report is made without malice); Sanford, 318 Mass. 156, 61 N.E.2d 5 (official action is required); Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 568, 40 N.W. 731, 734 (1888) (\u201cIf pleadings and other documents can be published to the world by any one who gets access to them, no more effectual way of doing malicious mischief with impunity could be devised than filing papers containing false and scurrilous charges, and getting those printed as news\u201d; Nixon, 101 Minn, at 313, 112 N.W. at 259 (\u201ca complaint or other pleading in a civil action, which has never been presented to the court for its action, is not a judicial proceeding within the rule\u201d); Brown v. Globe Printing Co., 213 Mo. 611, 112 S.W. 462 (1908) (court action is required for application of the fair report privilege); Cox v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 222 Mont. 527, 723 P.2d 238 (1986) (fair report privilege applies to a report that is based on a complaint, but the report must be made without malice); Fitch v. Daily News Publishing Co., 116 Neb. 474, 217 N.W. 947 (1928) (court action is required and publication must be done without malice); Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 643 A.2d 1012 (1994) (official action is required and a showing of malice will defeat the privilege); McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N.D. 435, 447, 248 N.W. 512, 516 (1933) (observing that numerous cases have held \u201cthat the rule of privilege does not apply to pleadings which, though filed, have not yet received judicial notice\u201d); Pollock v. Rashid, 117 Ohio App. 3d 361, 690 N.E.2d 903 (1996) (the publication of a fair report of a pleading is privileged unless the report was published maliciously); Mannix v. Portland Telegram, 144 Or. 172, 23 P.2d 138 (1933) (court action is required for application of fair report privilege); Weber v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., 2005 PA Super. 192, 878 A.2d 63 (fair report privilege applies to pleadings but malice in fact will defeat application of the privilege); Williams v. Black, 24 S.D. 501, 510, 124 N.W. 728, 732 (1910) (stating general rule that \u201c \u2018the publication of the contents of a petition or of other pleadings or papers filed in civil proceedings before trials or before any action has taken place on such pleadings or papers by the court is not privileged\u2019 \u201d), quoting 25 Cyc. 406, 407; Baten v. Houston Oil Co., 217 S.W. 394, 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (statute declaring a fair, true, and impartial account of court proceedings \u201cprivileged[ ] does not justify the publication of a libelous written pleading, properly filed, upon which no action by the court, judge, or any other officer has been taken\u201d); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992) (official action required and report must be made without malice); O\u2019Brien v. Tribune Publishing Co., 7 Wash. App. 107, 117, 499 P.2d 24, 30 (1972) (\u201cA newspaper has a qualified or conditional privilege to report legal proceedings provided the publication is a fair and accurate statement of the contents and is made without malice\u201d); Ilsley v. Sentinel Co., 133 Wis. 20, 113 N.W. 425 (1907) (official action required).\nCONCLUSION\nI cannot join fully in today\u2019s opinion. I believe the opinion does not strike a proper balance between an individual\u2019s right to his good reputation and the public\u2019s interest in information regarding court proceedings. The majority applies the fair report privilege to statements that were based upon the bare and untested allegations of a complaint. In my opinion, some action by the trial court is necessary to trigger application of the fair report privilege. Indeed, a restriction is salutary, forestalling possible collusion between an individual who files a frivolous complaint and the media defendant who republishes the allegations of the complaint. As explained by the court in Ilsley, 133 Wis. at 24-26, 113 N.W. at 426-27:\n\u201cThe whole foundation for that privilege is the interest of the public to know the conduct of judicial officers and legislators, to the end that misconduct or incapacity may be promptly discovered and remedied. ***\nThe fundamental reason is the same which demands that proceedings of courts and legislatures shall be open to the public. [Citations.] When this reason is understood, it obviously fails wholly to justify publication of defamatory contents of mere pleadings and other preliminary papers which have simply been filed in the clerk\u2019s office. In those the public have no concern until they are actually brought to the attention of some judicial officer and some action on his part is demanded based thereon. *** The fact that any one who wishes may, on other grounds, have access to such papers for examination, if any such right exists, has no bearing on the question. The degree of publicity likely to be so accomplished is trifling in comparison with general publication, and, at best, results incidentally from a public policy of nondiscrimination by a mere clerk which is in no wise promoted by spreading abroad the information which one may acquire by such inspection. In absence of dominating public interest, surely the individual ought not to be subjected to such assaults upon his character and reputation as may result from general publication of charges which may thus be made. The author of a pleading is broadly privileged in asserting his claims against his opponent, and may, and often does, make the most damaging charges with little or no foundation. He may make them with no expectation of proving them, nay, with no purpose of ever proceeding further with his action, and yet furnish most salacious matter for the enterprising reporter upon whose industry the pleader may indeed have counted to render his charges effective to injure his opponent before the public, though he never expected any effect for them in court.\u201d\nIn my opinion, comment e to the Restatement (Second) of Torts carves out a proper balance between the individual\u2019s right to protect his reputation and the public\u2019s interest in being informed of court proceedings and should be followed by this court. In light of the foregoing, I respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Frederick J. Sperling and Sondra A. Hemeryck, of Schiff Hardin, L.L.P., of Chicago, for appellants.", "Paul K. Vickrey, Patrick F. Solon and Eric Mersmann, of Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro, Ltd., of Chicago, for ap-pellees.", "David W. Andich, of Andich & Andich, of Rock Island, for amicus curiae Chicago Reader, Inc.", "James A. Klenk, Samuel Fifer, Gregory R. Naron and Natalie Spears, of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, of Chicago, for amici curiae Chicago Tribune Company and The Copley Press, Inc.", "Donald M. Craven, of Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Press Association." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 100555.\nSOLAIA TECHNOLOGY, LLC, et al., Appellees, v. SPECIALTY PUBLISHING COMPANY et al., Appellants.\nOpinion filed June 22, 2006.\nFrederick J. Sperling and Sondra A. Hemeryck, of Schiff Hardin, L.L.P., of Chicago, for appellants.\nPaul K. Vickrey, Patrick F. Solon and Eric Mersmann, of Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro, Ltd., of Chicago, for ap-pellees.\nDavid W. Andich, of Andich & Andich, of Rock Island, for amicus curiae Chicago Reader, Inc.\nJames A. Klenk, Samuel Fifer, Gregory R. Naron and Natalie Spears, of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, of Chicago, for amici curiae Chicago Tribune Company and The Copley Press, Inc.\nDonald M. Craven, of Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Press Association." }, "file_name": "0558-01", "first_page_order": 570, "last_page_order": 624 }