{ "id": 3602394, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PERI ALLEN, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Allen", "decision_date": "2006-06-02", "docket_number": "No. 99977", "first_page": "340", "last_page": "391", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 340" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060088 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060183 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298, 308" }, { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224818 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 337", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054264 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "1061" }, { "page": "344" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "1061" }, { "page": "343-44" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "1061" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ill. App. 3d 858", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5348032 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864", "parenthetical": "reviewing court cannot speculate as to facts that do not appear in the record" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/20/0858-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3749723 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3875733 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269", "parenthetical": "as a general rule, a court of review will not decide moot or abstract questions or render advisory opinions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 814", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150259 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0814-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131032 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" }, { "page": "217", "parenthetical": "no error occurred where: (1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490032 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241", "parenthetical": "rejecting the defendant's contention that his conviction should be reversed due to his appearance before the venire in handcuffs, where he \"waived any error by failing to object\"" }, { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 U.S. 501", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179579 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512-13" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "1697" }, { "page": "513" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "1697" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/425/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736047 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant under the second prong of the plain error test, but before the court may apply either prong, there must be a plain error" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5441461 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121977 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 1037", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3364236 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "both holding that the physical restraint of a defendant at trial does not automatically amount to plain error" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/1037-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5766672 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597", "parenthetical": "\"The necessity to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process is a purpose of the [plain error] doctrine, not a lone, triggering factor for its implementation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578235 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799391 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 1088", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Rptr.", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "545 P.2d 1322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1329" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Cal. 3d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2295096 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-3d/16/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "749 N.E.2d 1179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11094016 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/749/1179-01" ] }, { "cite": "817 N.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ohio St. 3d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1503110 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st-3d/103/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 Ga. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 1698927 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/269/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "937 P.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 11980574 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/937/0826-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 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App. 3d 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3750300 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3950690 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1003" }, { "page": "1005-06" }, { "page": "1004" }, { "page": "1004" }, { "page": "1005" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 1681617 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/91/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 F.3d 1297", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9442884 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1305" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/287/1297-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 F. Supp. 2d 1244", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1386988 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1262", "parenthetical": "stating that \"a defendant may be reluctant to object or question the logic of a ruling - matters that a defendant has every right to do\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/33/1244-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill. 2d 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5333783 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994926 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456-57", "parenthetical": "Ryan, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238368 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569773 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453265 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621", "parenthetical": "\"[bjefore invoking the plain error exception, however, 'it is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at all' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5414856 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092094 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3172916 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 Ill. 2d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2786129 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/11/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069192 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224818 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" }, { "page": "138" }, { "page": "138" }, { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 337", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054264 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "1061" }, { "page": "344" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "1061" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Ill. 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Rptr.", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" }, { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "545 P.2d 1322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1327" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "16 Cal. 3d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2295096 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290-91" }, { "page": "290-91" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/cal-3d/16/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "749 N.E.2d 1179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11094016 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1193", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" }, { "page": "1194", "parenthetical": "noting that the stun belt, even if not activated, has the \"chilling effect\" of \"compromising the defense\"" }, { "page": "1193", "parenthetical": "reciting same general description" }, { "page": "1195-96", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that psychological impact of belt on a defendant can compromise the defense" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/749/1179-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Cal. 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Rptr. 2d", "weight": 11, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that the use of an electronic stun belt posed a significant risk of impairing a defendant's ability to participate and assist in his or her defense" }, { "page": "171" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "182-83", "parenthetical": "collecting cases" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "183" }, { "page": "183" }, { "page": "183" }, { "page": "183-84" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "52 P.3d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "weight": 7, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that the use of an electronic stun belt posed a significant risk of impairing a defendant's ability to participate and assist in his or her defense" }, { "page": "103" }, { "page": "111" }, { "page": "112-13" }, { "page": "113" }, { "page": "113" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "28 Cal. 4th 1201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 4th", "case_ids": [ 947602 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1227", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that the use of an electronic stun belt posed a significant risk of impairing a defendant's ability to participate and assist in his or her defense" }, { "page": "1214-15" }, { "page": "1226" }, { "page": "1226" }, { "page": "1226" }, { "page": "1228" }, { "page": "1226-27" }, { "page": "1229" }, { "page": "1229" }, { "page": "1229" }, { "page": "1230" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/cal-4th/28/1201-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811588 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35-36" }, { "page": "37" }, { "page": "38" }, { "page": "41-42", "parenthetical": "Ryan, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 U.S. 622", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5869317 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629-30" }, { "page": "963", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that \"the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial\"" }, { "page": "2012", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that \"the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial\"" }, { "page": "629" }, { "page": "962" }, { "page": "2012" }, { "page": "631" }, { "page": "963-64" }, { "page": "2013" }, { "page": "631-32" }, { "page": "964" }, { "page": "2013" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/544/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3950690 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464950 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" }, { "page": "266" }, { "page": "267" }, { "page": "265" }, { "page": "264" }, { "page": "265-66" }, { "page": "266-67" }, { "page": "267-68" }, { "page": "267-68" }, { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0261-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2288, "char_count": 99031, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.953417667438564e-07, "percentile": 0.9349925420362345 }, "sha256": "b53a84f5ded7c2397e95d2eba73378f8aceee37e3b80ac578e9a348f83f05252", "simhash": "1:b23ab5427f08b49b", "word_count": 16665 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:42:28.184369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PERI ALLEN, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Fitzgerald and Garman concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justices McMorrow and Kilbride.\nOPINION\nAfter a jury trial in the circuit court of Will County, defendant, Peri Allen, was found guilty of burglary and was sentenced to a four-year term of imprisonment. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that defendant had \u201cadequately alleged plain error\u201d where the trial court abused its discretion in requiring defendant to wear an electronic stun belt as a restraining device at trial without the explicit analysis and finding of necessity required by People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261 (1977). 354 Ill. App. 3d 442, 446. We granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315), and granted Paul J. Kaupas, Will County sheriff, permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the State (155 Ill. 2d R. 345(a)).\nDefendant was indicted for the offense of burglary for entering a motor vehicle, belonging to Will County Auto Wreckers, with the intent to commit a theft. Prior to jury selection on February 11, 2003, defense counsel asked to approach the bench for a sidebar conference with the trial judge, after which the judge stated: \u201cApparently the defendant still has his handcuffs on. They have been under the table there, so the jurors didn\u2019t get all the way into the courtroom so there should be no problem, but if we can take them off now. Okay. Thank you.\u201d Two days later, after the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict and immediately prior to the State resting and defense counsel calling defendant to the stand, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201c[Defense Counsel]: Oh, your Honor, one thing. I don\u2019t know exactly what it is that [defendant] has. There is something that he is wearing on his back and\u2014\nTHE COURT: Well, it is under his clothes, correct?\n[Defense Counsel]: Right, but even standing here I can notice it. It is a fairly noticeable object.\nTHE COURT: Would you prefer to just have him seated in the witness stand at this point?\n[Defense Counsel]: I would prefer unless that can be removed somehow.\nTHE COURT OFFICER: No.\nTHE COURT: That\u2019s a security device. The deputy has control of it. [Defendant] does not have shackles on. He does not have handcuffs on. He is in custody and he is restrained in no other manner whatsoever, so for security purposes we keep that on him. At this time it has been out of view. It is under his clothes, but I think that if he did walk across the room, [the jury] may view something or a form of some kind under his clothes, so if you prefer to have him seated in the box, we can do that now.\n[Defense Counsel]: Can we do that now?\nTHE COURT: Have a seat right up here, sir. When you\u2019re sworn in, I suppose you can just sit. You don\u2019t have to stand to be sworn in.\nDEFENDANT: Right.\nTHE COURT: That way they\u2019ll never see it. All right, bring the jurors in.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nNo further mention of the \u201csecurity device\u201d was made at trial, and defendant did not include any issue concerning the restraint in his posttrial motion.\nOn direct appeal, the sole issue raised by defendant was \u201cwhether it was error for the defendant to be forced to wear an electronic security belt as a restraining device at trial.\u201d 354 Ill. App. 3d at 443. Initially, we agree with the appellate court that while the trial court never referred to the \u201csecurity device\u201d as an electronic stun belt, \u201cwe feel confident in our assessment that it was indeed that type of restraining device.\u201d 354 Ill. App. 3d at 443. The State does not suggest what the bulging security device under defendant\u2019s shirt might have been, other than a stun belt. The appellate court\u2019s finding is especially probable where, in People v. Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1003 (2004), another recent Will County circuit court case, the State asked the appellate court to validate the Will County sheriff\u2019s \u201cstandard operating procedure\u201d of requiring all felony defendants in custody to wear a stun belt while appearing in court. Even the dissent agrees that such a \u201cblanket policy\u201d existed in the Will County sheriffs department. 222 Ill. 2d at 379 n.6 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.). In addition, there is at least one other case pending before this court involving the use of electronic stun belts on felony defendants in Will County. See People v. Johnson, 356 Ill. App. 3d 208 (3d Dist. 2005), appeal denied, 221 Ill. 2d 655 (2006).\nHaving agreed with the appellate court that defendant was wearing an electronic stun belt, we now examine whether Boose, which generally applies to the \u201cphysical restraint\u201d of defendants in the courtroom (Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266), also applies to the concealed electronic restraint involved in this case. First, the Will County sheriff, as amicus curiae, argues, inter alia, that an electronic \u201csecurity belt\u201d is not a restraining device that lends itself to due process scrutiny pursuant to Boose, citing Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 161 L. Ed. 2d 953, 125 S. Ct. 2007 (2005). However, Deck does not speak to the circumstances present here. In Deck, the United States Supreme Court concluded that due process \u201cprohibit[s] the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Deck, 544 U.S. at 629, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 963, 125 S. Ct. at 2012. Nowhere in Deck does the Court consider the question raised herein, i.e., whether a concealed electronic stun belt worn under a defendant\u2019s garments should be classified as a \u201cphysical restraint\u201d which lends itself to due process scrutiny. Accordingly, Deck does not support the argument of amicus, as it does not even address concealed restraints. Indeed, we find that the Deck Court\u2019s stated reasons which prompt due process scrutiny in visible restraint cases \u2014 the presumption of innocence, securing a meaningful defense, and maintaining dignified proceedings \u2014 may be applied with like force to stun belts which are not necessarily visible to the jury. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 631, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 963-64, 125 S. Ct. at 2013.\nIn In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33, 37 (1977), this court stated:\n\u201cThe possibility of prejudicing a jury, however, is not the only reason why courts should not allow the shackling of an accused in the absence of a strong necessity for doing so. The presumption of innocence is central to our administration of criminal justice. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, an accused has the right to stand trial \u2018with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man.\u2019 [Citation.] It jeopardizes the presumption\u2019s value and protection and demeans our justice for an accused without clear cause to be required to stand in a courtroom in manacles or other restraints while he is being judged.\u201d\nThus, even when there is no jury, any unnecessary restraint is impermissible because it hinders the defendant\u2019s ability to assist his counsel, runs afoul of the presumption of innocence, and demeans both the defendant and the proceedings. See Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 36-37; Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1005-06. We therefore agree with the appellate court herein which, citing Martinez, concluded that an electronic stun belt \u201cis no less a restraint than manacles or handcuffs.\u201d 354 Ill. App. 3d at 445.\nAs noted by defendant, it appears that almost every court which has reviewed this issue has held that electronic stun belts are restraining devices, the use of which is subject to the same restrictions as shackles. See, e.g., United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1299 (10th Cir. 2000); People v. Mar, 28 Cal. 4th 1201, 1219-20, 52 P.3d 95, 106, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161, 175 (2002); People v. Melanson, 937 P.2d 826, 835 (Colo. App. 1996); Young v. State, 269 Ga. 478, 479, 499 S.E.2d 60, 61 (1998); State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St. 3d 508, 529-30, 817 N.E.2d 29, 52-53 (2004). One exception to this approach for dealing with electronic stun belts is found in Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1194 (Ind. 2001), wherein the Supreme Court of Indiana banned the use of such restraints from its courtrooms altogether. However, contrary to the dissent\u2019s contention, in this case we are not faced with the question of whether stun belts should continue to be used in Illinois courtrooms. Rather, we are asked to determine whether, and we find that, this court\u2019s holdings in Boose and Staley regarding shackles apply equally to those defendants who are restrained by means of an electronic stun belt worn under their clothing at trial, and that nothing in Deck precludes applica- \u2022 tion of due process protections to such cases.\nGiven these findings, we hold that the use of electronic stun belts in the courts of this state is warranted only where there has been a showing of manifest need for the restraint. See Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 265-66. This holding comes with the understanding that there are certain circumstances that will require restraint of a defendant at trial. Factors to be considered by the trial court in making this determination may include: (1) the seriousness of the present charge against the defendant, (2) the defendant\u2019s temperament and character, (3) the defendant\u2019s age and physical characteristics, (4) the defendant\u2019s past record, (5) any past escapes or attempted escapes by the defendant, (6) evidence of a present plan of escape by the defendant, (7) any threats by the defendant to harm others or create a disturbance, (8) evidence of self-destructive tendencies on the part of the defendant, (9) the risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others, (10) the possibility of rescue attempts by other offenders still at large, (11) the size and mood of the audience, (12) the nature and physical security of the courtroom, and (13) the adequacy and availability of alternative remedies. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266-67.\nThe determination of whether and how to restrain a defendant is left to the discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court examines whether the trial court has abused that discretion. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 267. The trial court should state for the record its reasons for allowing the defendant to remain physically restrained, and it should give the defendant\u2019s counsel an opportunity to present reasons why the defendant should not be restrained. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266. In this case, the State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the stun belt to remain on defendant without conducting a Boose hearing. However, based on the record presented, we disagree. The only reason given by the court to sustain its ruling was that the restraint was necessary \u201cfor security purposes.\u201d While the security of the courtroom is indeed one of the factors to be considered, without further explanation or justification by the court and where it appears that no other \u201cBoose factors\u201d supported this decision, we find the trial court\u2019s ruling to be an abuse of its discretion.\nHere, as in Martinez, the trial court never made a Boose analysis; it simply deferred to the judgment of the sheriff. We agree with the Martinez court that this abdication of the trial court\u2019s responsibility is not acceptable. \u201cThe court must rigorously control its own courtroom procedures and, consistent with the mandates of due process, protect the rights of the parties and the public.\u201d Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1004. Indeed, the type of policy adopted by the Will County sheriff, requiring all custodial felony defendants to wear stun belts while in court, was frowned upon by this court almost 30 years ago in Boose.\n\u201c \u2018The fact that defendant was a state prison inmate who had been convicted of robbery and was charged with a violent crime did not, without more, justify the use of physical restraints. *** [T]he trial judge must make the decision to use physical restraints on a case-by-case basis. The court cannot adopt a general policy of imposing such restraints *** unless there is a showing of necessity on the record. The court\u2019s summary denial of the motion to release defendant from his shackles was not based upon such a showing of record and implies a general policy of shackling all inmate defendants accused of violent crimes.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 268, quoting People v. Duran, 16 Cal. 3d 282, 293, 545 P.2d 1322, 1329, 127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625 (1976).\nAccordingly, we hold that the trial court\u2019s failure to follow the procedures set forth in Boose before ordering that defendant continue to wear an electronic stun belt during his trial constitutes a due process violation. See People v. Crutchfield, 353 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1021 (2004); Martinez; 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1004.\nIn Martinez, the appellate court, upon finding that the trial court had abdicated its responsibility to determine the measures necessary to assure courtroom security, reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction and remanded for a new trial. Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1005. However, in this case, as the appellate court noted, defendant did not even mention the electronic restraint at any time until the third day of his trial, while the defendant in Martinez objected vigorously. 354 Ill. App. 3d at 445; see also Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 35-38 (reversal and remand for new adjudicatory hearing required where no Boose hearing conducted by trial court after defense counsel moved that defendant\u2019s handcuffs be removed during adjudicatory hearing). Defense counsel\u2019s statement \u201cI would prefer [defendant be seated in the witness stand before the jury returns] unless [the stun belt] can be removed somehow\u201d does not constitute an objection, but merely an alternative to the court\u2019s suggestion on how to keep the jury from seeing the device under defendant\u2019s clothing. After the court rejected counsel\u2019s alternative suggestion to remove the restraint, counsel did not ask that an objection be noted on the record or that a Boose hearing be held, but simply deferred to the procedure suggested by the court.\nThe failure to object to alleged error at trial and raise the issue in a posttrial motion ordinarily results in the forfeiture of the issue on appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-87 (1988). The appellate court herein therefore reasoned that it must decide whether the trial court\u2019s error \u201cwas so significant that it warrants plain error review.\u201d 354 Ill. App. 3d at 445. The majority then determined that People v. Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d 418 (2004), was controlling, as there \u201cwe found plain error, since the defendant was denied a fair trial because of the failure of the trial court to conduct the appropriate manifest need analysis before ordering the defendant to be shackled at trial.\u201d 354 Ill. App. 3d at 446. Thereafter, the appellate court held that here, as in Doss, defendant had \u201cadequately alleged plain error\u201d which justified its review and also required the reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction and remand for a new trial. 354 Ill. App. 3d at 446. We disagree with the appellate court\u2019s reasoning and also its conclusions.\nSupreme Court Rule 615(a) provides: \u201cAny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). In People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79 (2005), this court recently stated as follows:\n\u201cThe plain-error doctrine, as it has developed in Illinois, allows a reviewing court to reach a forfeited error affecting substantial rights in two circumstances. First, where the evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the jury\u2019s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preclude an argument that an innocent person was wrongly convicted. [Citation.] Second, where the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. [Citations.] This so-called disjunctive test does not offer two divergent interpretations of plain error, but instead two different ways to ensure the same thing \u2014 namely, a fair trial.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIn another recent case, People v. Brown, 356 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1090-91 (2005), the appellate court majority, as did the appellate court majority herein, cited Doss for the proposition that restraining defendants without a Boose hearing automatically constitutes plain error and is not subject to forfeiture. However, we agree with Justice Schmidt\u2019s partial dissent in Brown, which argued that the majority was misreading Doss. Indeed, Justice Schmidt, who authored the Doss opinion, stated: \u201cDoss did not hold that it is always plain error to shackle a defendant without a Boose hearing. Rather, the shackling issue was reviewed under the plain error doctrine because we found the evidence closely balanced.\u201d Brown, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 1091 (Schmidt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In the appeal before us, defendant appears to have accepted this interpretation of Doss. Indeed, defendant impliedly admits that the evidence was not closely balanced where he contends only that the second type of plain error occurred, stating: \u201c[I]t was such a serious error that it threatened the fundamental fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and the integrity of the judicial process.\u201d\nIn Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187, this court further described the second prong of the plain error test, stating: \u201cIn the second instance, the defendant must prove there was plain error and that the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. [Citation.] Prejudice to the defendant is presumed because of the importance of the right involved ***. *** [However,] the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Indeed, defendant, citing this passage from Herron, acknowledges that he bears the burden of persuasion as to whether the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of his trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. Thus, given the test for determining plain error under the \u201csecond prong\u201d as set forth in Herron, we agree with Crutchfield, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 1021, a case from the Fifth District of the appellate court which, under facts similar to those presented here, held that even constitutional errors can be forfeited (see People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363-64 (2003)) if the error is not of such magnitude that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. See People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003). See also People v. Barney, 363 Ill. App. 3d 590 (2006); People v. DuPree, 353 Ill. App. 3d 1037 (2004) (both holding that the physical restraint of a defendant at trial does not automatically amount to plain error).\nMoreover, a fair trial is different from a perfect trial. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177; People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 214 (1998). The plain-error doctrine is not \u201c \u2018a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.\u2019 \u201d Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177, quoting People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978). Instead, it is a narrow and limited exception to the general rule of forfeiture, whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177. Thus, while defendant herein has proven a due process violation which amounted to error by showing that he was required to wear an electronic stun belt at trial without the court having first determined that it was necessary, defendant has failed to persuade this court \u201cthat the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of [his] trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.\u201d Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187; see also People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121 (2005) (the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant under the second prong of the plain error test, but before the court may apply either prong, there must be a plain error).\nHere, defendant cannot, and does not, claim that the evidence presented was closely balanced. Further, he has not shown that his presumption of innocence, ability to assist his counsel, or the dignity of the proceedings was compromised. In fact, defendant wore the electronic device into the third day of his jury trial with no objection, complaint, or any apparent difficulty consulting with his counsel. Thus, we agree with the appellate court in Nicholas that although the failure to conduct a Boose hearing under these circumstances is an error, defendant\u2019s failure to object and to carry his burden of persuasion amounts to forfeiture of the error, where he cannot establish that it prevented him from obtaining a fair trial. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 135, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1697 (1976) (although the State cannot compel an accused to stand trial before a jury in prison clothes, the failure to make an objection to the court to being tried in such clothes, for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation); see also People v. Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d 229, 241 (1979) (rejecting the defendant\u2019s contention that his conviction should be reversed due to his appearance before the venire in handcuffs, where he \u201cwaived any error by failing to object\u201d).\nFurther, we reject the dissent\u2019s attempt to distinguish Estelle and Hyche, where those cases, as here, recognized that a serious assault on the defendant\u2019s presumption of innocence was implicated, but held that the defendant had failed to properly preserve the error for review. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 513, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 135, 96 S. Ct. at 1697; Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241. While the dissent contrasts Hyche with People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 215 (1999), wherein the court chose to review a shackling issue on its merits, the dissent fails to note that the defendant in Buss had filed a pretrial motion to preclude shackling and had included the issue in his posttrial motion. Only in the alternative did he argue plain error or that his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly preserve the issue for review. Additionally, although the dissent states that this court, in Buss, \u201ccited with approval People v. Bennett, 281 Ill. App. 3d 814 (1996)\u201d (222 Ill. 2d at 370 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.)), the Bennett court held \u201cit was plain error for the judge in this case to deny the defense request to have the defendant\u2019s shackles removed,\u201d when \u201cthe only reason the judge gave for refusing the defense motion related to the security of the courtroom\u201d and the court failed to address the other Boose factors. Bennett, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 825.\nNext, we note that in his dissent, Justice Freeman agrees with the majority opinion that the issue presented in this case is \u201cwhether defendant is entitled to a new trial because he was made to wear, without a showing of manifest need, an electronic stun belt as a restraining device during his trial.\u201d 222 Ill. 2d at 361 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.). However, after defining the parameters of the case, the dissent goes on to enlarge those parameters by contending that we should also address the propriety of using stun belts in any criminal trial. While we might agree with some of the medical and other important concerns identified in the lengthy dissent, as we previously noted, the issue of whether to continue to use such restraints in Illinois courts is, unfortunately, simply not raised in this case. Thus, despite the dissent\u2019s desire for this court to determine whether stun belts are an acceptable form of restraint in Illinois, until a case comes before us which actually raises that particular issue, any attempt to answer such an abstract question would be improper. See People v. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 269 (2005) (as a general rule, a court of review will not decide moot or abstract questions or render advisory opinions).\nTherefore, the dissent\u2019s claim that this court\u2019s opinion has \u201cthe effect of countenancing the continued use of stun belts\u201d in Illinois, simply because we decline to engage in dicta, is unfair at best. 222 Ill. 2d at 389 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.). Indeed, contrary to that assertion, the majority, in addressing the limited issues raised in this case of first impression, fully appreciates the impact that electronic restraints may have on a defendant\u2019s trial rights. This opinion sends a clear message to the trial courts: control of the courtroom is vested in the trial judge. While the sheriff may be responsible for courtroom security, it is the trial judge who makes the determination as to how security involving a defendant who is on trial is handled, so as to fully protect his constitutional rights. Towards that end, a Boose hearing is required in stun belt cases, as in shackle or handcuff cases, because regardless of the differences between the types of restraints, they each implicate due process concerns and thus require strict limits be placed on their use.\nAdditionally, this opinion takes judicial notice of the routine use of stun belts on felons in other Will County cases in order to establish the fact of their use here, and cites cases both in and outside our jurisdiction in support of our holding that stun belts should be subject to a Boose hearing. The dissent, however, relies on information outside the record and cases outside our jurisdiction to speculate as to the type and effect of the stun belt worn in this case and to proselytize for a ban on the use of stun belts in Illinois, an issue which we have clearly determined to be outside the scope of this appeal. The facts are that defendant himself did not ask that we determine whether the \u201cmedical impact\u201d or anxiety which stun belts may create makes them an improper form of restraint under all circumstances, and there is nothing of record to show that the type of electronic device worn in the nonprecedential cases cited by the dissent are in any way similar to the device worn by defendant. Further, although the dissent agrees that defendant has forfeited the issues regarding the trial court\u2019s requirement that he wear an electronic restraint where neither he nor his counsel made any overt complaint at trial or in a posttrial motion (People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-87 (1988)), the dissent then invites speculation as to what defendant could have been experiencing. Such speculation is completely irrelevant and has no place in this court\u2019s review, which must be based solely on the facts of record. See People v. Guerrero, 356 Ill. App. 3d 22, 28-29 (2005); People v. Colon, 20 Ill. App. 3d 858, 864 (1974) (reviewing court cannot speculate as to facts that do not appear in the record).\nA fair reading of the cold transcript leads us to the more likely conclusion that defendant was not suffering any of the anxiety or nervousness speculated upon by the dissent. As noted, what the record does show is that neither defendant nor his counsel objected to the use of the stun belt at any time. Counsel\u2019s only expressed concern, made on the third day of trial, when defendant was about to take the witness stand, was that whatever defendant was wearing under his clothes might be visible to the jury as he walked across the room to take the stand. The colloquy between defense counsel and the trial judge clearly reveals that counsel did not even know what defendant was wearing under his clothes. This fact supports the inference that defendant never expressed any concern to his attorney about wearing the device, nor did it impinge on his ability to work with counsel. See Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 217 (no error occurred where: (1) the trial court\u2019s initial failure to state his reasons for requiring shackling was \u201cpresumably because defense counsel indicated that defendant did not object to leg shackles so long as the jury did not see them\u201d; (2) the court explained its reasons for the shackling in detail during its denial of the defendant\u2019s posttrial motion; (3) \u201cthe tables in the courtroom had been skirted so that the shackling *** was \u2018never obvious to the jurors\u2019 \u201d; and (4) defendant\u2019s ability to consult with counsel had not been hindered by the shackling). Here, the dissent can point to nothing of record which demonstrates that defendant was made nervous or anxious by the fact that he was wearing the device. Thus, none of the actions of defendant, his counsel or the court support the conclusion that defendant\u2019s presumption of innocence or the dignity of the court was effected by the error in failing to hold the requisite Boose hearing. Instead, counsel\u2019s concern about the possibility of the jury\u2019s seeing the bulky device under defendant\u2019s clothing was resolved by the trial court\u2019s action in seating defendant on the stand before the jury reentered the courtroom.\nFurther, we disagree with the dissent\u2019s claim that this procedure of \u201cpreseating\u201d the defendant, because it was dissimilar to that used with previous witnesses, would cause the jury to \u201cattach undue significance to such discrepancies.\u201d 222 Ill. 2d at 377 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.). It is just as reasonable to draw the opposite conclusion, i.e., that while those of us \u201ctrained in the law\u201d (222 Ill. 2d at 377 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.)) and familiar with court proceedings would know that it is somewhat unusual for witnesses to already be seated when court reconvenes and the jury reenters, few laypeople, not being involved in jury trials on a regular basis, would actually discern this difference, much less impute a negative connotation toward defendant from it. Nor does the dissent\u2019s quotation from Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 359, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (1970), that disparate treatment of defendant from other witnesses not on trial \u201c \u2018might have a significant effect on the jury\u2019s feelings about the defendant\u2019 \u201d support his theory. 222 Ill. 2d at 366, 377 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.), quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 359, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (1970). This comment by the Court in Allen in no way dealt with any disparate treatment of defendant from other witnesses, but concerned the jury\u2019s response to \u201cthe sight of shackles and gags\u201d on that defendant after he displayed conduct which was disorderly, disruptive and disrespectful to the court. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343-44, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 359, 90 S. Ct. at 1061.\nFinally, we object to the dissent\u2019s statement that \u201cthe unjustified use of the stun belt in this case is deemed inconsequential by a majority of this court.\u201d 222 Ill. 2d at 389 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.). The instant matter presented a narrow issue which we have resolved through the consistent use of this court\u2019s previous case law. We have cited as controlling this court\u2019s findings in Boose and Staley that a trial court\u2019s failure to examine the necessity of requiring a defendant to wear restraints at trial is a due process violation, and continued this line of reasoning to include not only visible restraints, but the type of \u201csemi-hidden\u201d electronic device used herein. Therefore, contrary to the dissent\u2019s assertion, we have most definitely shown that an error such as occurred here has consequences. However, Boose and Staley, as well as Martinez and Deck, present a different factual situation which allows for a per se finding of reversible error which is not applicable under the facts presented in this case. Here, unlike the aforementioned cases where a trial objection was made, due to defendant\u2019s complete forfeiture of the issue, not only the fact of the error but proof that the error \u201caffected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process\u201d was necessary. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187; see also Barney, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 597 (\u201cThe necessity to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process is a purpose of the [plain error] doctrine, not a lone, triggering factor for its implementation\u201d). Thus, simply because we follow the strict application of that doctrine as recently set forth in Herron and find that defendant has not met his burden of persuasion does not mean we are in conflict with our decisions in Boose and Staley, cases with different facts must be decided based on those facts. Nor is the Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Deck that a defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation contrary to our decision, which finds a due process violation but refuses to find plain error in the violation.\nAs this court stated in People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 138 (2000), \u201c[t]o determine whether defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial has been compromised *** [under] the second prong of the plain error test *** [w]e ask whether a substantial right has been affected to such a degree that we cannot confidently state that defendant\u2019s trial was fundamentally fair.\u201d We thus agree with the dissent and with defendant that the trial court\u2019s actions here amounted to error. However, under the circumstances presented, we are not persuaded that such error resulted in fundamental unfairness or caused a \u201csevere threat\u201d to the fairness of defendant\u2019s trial. See People v. Durr, 215 Ill. 2d 283, 298, 308 (2005). Thus, where defendant has failed to establish plain error under the second prong as set forth in Herron, we hold that the procedural default of this issue must be honored. See Durr, 215 Ill. 2d at 308; see also Blair, 215 Ill. 2d at 444 n.2 (\u201cprocedural default\u201d relates to the failure by counsel to comply with certain procedural requirements which results in the forfeiture of the defendant\u2019s right to raise that error on appeal). Because we find that the right to review is forfeited in this case, we need not reach the question which divided the appellate court below, i.e., whether a new proceeding or merely a retrospective Boose hearing is the proper remedy where plain error has occurred.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of conviction entered by the circuit court is affirmed.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.\nWhile courts often use the terms \u201cforfeit,\u201d \u201cwaive,\u201d and \u201cprocedural default\u201d interchangeably in criminal cases, for purposes of this opinion, we choose to use \u201cforfeited\u201d to mean issues that could have been raised, but were not, and are therefore barred. See People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 444 n.2 (2005).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN,\ndissenting:\nThe issue in this case is whether defendant is entitled to a new trial because he was made to wear, without a showing of manifest need, an electronic stun belt as a restraining device during his trial. This court has never addressed the propriety of using this particular kind of restraint at a criminal trial. However, as today\u2019s opinion makes clear, there exists a body of our case law which addresses how other types of security devices impact upon a defendant\u2019s trial rights. Indeed, the court acknowledges that the \u201cstated reasons which prompt due process scrutiny in visible restraint cases \u2014 the presumption of innocence, securing a meaningful defense, and maintaining dignified proceedings \u2014 may be applied with like force to stun belts which are not necessarily visible to the jury.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 222 Ill. 2d at 346. My colleagues in the majority then hold that this court\u2019s holdings in People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261 (1977), and In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33 (1977), \u201capply equally to those defendants who are restrained by means of an electronic stun belt worn under their clothing at trial, and that nothing *** precludes application of due process protections to such cases.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 222 Ill. 2d at 347. The court further holds that a \u201ctrial court\u2019s failure to follow the procedures set forth in Boose before ordering that defendant continue to wear an electronic stun belt during his trial constitutes a due process violation.\u201d 222 Ill. 2d at 349. However, in finding that an error of constitutional proportions has occurred in this case, the court states that it is \u201cnot persuaded that such error resulted in fundamental unfairness or caused a \u2018severe threat\u2019 to the fairness of defendant\u2019s trial.\u201d 222 Ill. 2d at 360. After considering our case law on restraints and the nature of the electronic stun belt, I am persuaded that the error resulted in fundamental unfairness or caused a \u201csevere threat\u201d to the fairness of the trial. I would hold that defendant has satisfied the second prong of our plain-error rule, i.e., that the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of defendant\u2019s trial and that it challenged the integrity of the judicial process. For these reasons, I dissent.\nI\nThe court correctly notes that defendant did not properly preserve this issue for review. While my colleagues view the remarks between defense counsel and the trial judge as a failure to object, I view them somewhat differently. Defense counsel stated that his preference was for defendant not to wear the belt at all. As the excerpt from the transcript demonstrates, however (see 222 Ill. 2d at 344), the trial judge made clear that such a preference would be out of the question. In other words, the use of the belt was not open to argument. I would characterize the colloquy between the two as being enough to register a contemporaneous objection. This is an academic quibble, however, as defendant did not include the matter in his posttrial motion, and his failure to do so results in the issue\u2019s procedural default on appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988).\nNevertheless, this court has long recognized that the doctrine concerning procedural default is not absolute. People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576 (1980), citing People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360 (1957). Indeed, this court has developed a plain-error doctrine which allows a reviewing court to reach a forfeited error in certain circumstances. The doctrine, adopted formally as Supreme Court Rule 615, serves as a \u201c \u2018narrow and limited exception to the general *** rule [of procedural default].\u2019 \u201d People v. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 94 (1986), quoting People v. Pastorino, 91 Ill. 2d 178, 188 (1982).\nThis court has recently acknowledged that the purpose of the doctrine is \u201cto protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and reputation of the judicial process.\u201d People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 177 (2005), citing People v. Howell, 60 Ill. 2d 117, 121 (1975). In Herron, we reaffirmed that our plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error in two distinct circumstances: (i) in instances of prejudicial error which may have affected the outcome in a closely balanced case, and (ii) in instances of presumptively prejudicial error which must be remedied even though it may not have affected the outcome. Herron, 215 Ill, 2d at 185. Under the first prong, a defendant must both prove that an error occurred (see People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 621 (2000) (\u201c[bjefore invoking the plain error exception, however, \u2018it is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at all\u2019 \u201d), quoting People v. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370, 376 (1989)) and that \u201cthe evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against him. The State, of course, can respond by arguing that the evidence was not closely balanced, but rather strongly weighted against the defendant.\u201d Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187. Under the second prong, a defendant must prove both that an error occurred and that\n\u201cthe error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. [Citation.] Prejudice to the defendant is presumed because of the importance of the right involved [emphasis added], \u2018regardless of the strength of the evidence.\u2019 (Emphasis in original.) Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138. In both instances, the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant.\u201d Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187.\nUnder the first prong, a defendant must establish that he was prejudiced by the error. Under the second prong, defendant need not establish specific prejudice, but rather, must show that the error served to erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermined the fairness of the trial proceedings.\nIt is important to distinguish between the two prongs of the rule. As this court noted in People v. Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d 394, 402 (1990), in cases \u201cwhere the evidence is closely balanced, the probability that a defendant\u2019s conviction was caused by even a minor trial error is greatly enhanced. Therefore, in those cases, the court will invoke the plain error rule so that it can determine whether an error, which was not objected to at trial and in post-trial motions, raises doubt as to the validity of the jury\u2019s verdict.\u201d Thus, the reviewing court concerns itself with the specific effect that an alleged error may have had on the jury. In contrast, the second prong of the rule encompasses those errors \u201cof such magnitude that the commission thereof denies the accused a fair and impartial trial.\u201d People v. Carlson, 79 111. 2d 564, 576-77 (1980). As Justice Ryan explained over 25 years ago,\n\u201cunder this second aspect of the plain error rule, the errors that will be considered as not having been waived, although not properly preserved, are those that are so fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process that they cannot be waived or forfeited by the failure to raise them in the trial court. I also believe that, being so fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process, they must be considered by the court regardless of the guilt of the defendant and therefore the harmless error test, even harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, is not relevant.\u201d People v. Green, 74 Ill. 2d 444, 456-57 (1979) (Ryan, J., specially concurring).\nThus, this prong is designed to give the court the ability to act in those cases where systemic, structural errors serve to undermine the presumptions of fairness that normally attach to our criminal trials. As such, very few errors will fall within its ambit. The second prong of our test thus \u201cguards against errors that erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial.\u201d Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186.\nRelying on Herron, defendant argues that the error committed by the circuit court in this case eroded the integrity of the judicial process and undermined the fairness of his trial. He contends that he has satisfied his burden of persuasion because the error involved here is so serious that prejudice can be presumed. In other words, he argues that plain error occurred in this case pursuant to the second prong of our plain error rule. The court responds to this argument by noting \u201ceven constitutional errors can be forfeited [citation] if the error is not of such magnitude that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial.\u201d 222 Ill. 2d at 352. Finding that defendant \u201chas not shown that his presumption of innocence, ability to assist his counsel, or the dignity of the proceedings was compromised,\u201d the court concludes that while error occurred, the error did not result in fundamental unfairness. 222 Ill. 2d at 353-54.1 disagree.\nIt has long been recognized that an accused should never be placed in restraints in the presence of the jury \u201c \u2018unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints.\u2019 \u201d Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 265-66 , quoting People v. Duran, 16 Cal. 3d 282, 290-91, 545 E2d 1322, 1327, 127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 623 (1976); see also Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629-30, 161 L. Ed. 2d 953, 963, 125 S. Ct. 2007, 2012 (2005) (acknowledging that \u201cthe Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial\u201d). This means that a defendant has the right to appear without restraints, unless such restraints are necessary to prevent escape, to protect the safety of those in the courtroom, and to maintain order during trial. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266; Deck, 544 U.S. at 629, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 962, 125 S. Ct. at 2012. This determination is left to the discretion of the trial judge, who should select the type of restraint suitable in light of all of the circumstances. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266. This court requires that, in such cases, the trial judge (i) allow a defendant to be heard on the question of restraint, (ii) state for the record the reasons for allowing a defendant to be placed in restraints, and (iii) make this determination outside of the presence of the jury. On appeal, such a decision will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 267.\nCourts from all jurisdictions have recognized that the foregoing procedures are necessary in restraint cases because placing a defendant in restraints impacts on a defendant\u2019s right to due process in several different ways. Shackles and gags visible to the jury \u201cmight have a significant effect on the jury\u2019s feelings about the defendant.\u201d Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 359, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (1970). As such, the presumption of innocence that a defendant enjoys may be eroded. Courts have also found that restraints may restrict a defendant\u2019s ability to assist counsel during the trial and offend the dignity of the judicial process. Deck, 544 U.S. at 631, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 963-64, 125 S. Ct. at 2013.\nThis court has long acknowledged these very concerns in restraint cases. For example, in Boose, the defendant, a 15-year-old, was charged with murder. The juvenile court waived jurisdiction of the case and transferred it to the criminal division of the circuit court. Subsequent to the defendant\u2019s indictment, the defendant successfully moved for a hearing to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. The defendant was brought to court wearing handcuffs which were threaded through shackles attached to a restraining belt wrapped around his waist. The defendant\u2019s attorney moved that all of the restraints be removed whenever the jury was present. The trial judge denied the motion, stating that \u201cdue to the nature of the charges against the defendant, I believe it would be better to have the shackles remain.\u201d See Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 265. After the jury found the defendant competent to stand trial, his attorney moved for a new trial, arguing that the shackling of the defendant was not necessary. The trial judge denied the motion. Defendant then pled guilty to the charge of murder and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. On appeal, the appellate court reversed, holding that the trial judge abused his discretion by ordering that the defendant appear shackled before the jury at the hearing on his competency. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 264.\nNoting that an \u201caccused should never be placed in restraints in the presence of the jury \u2018unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints,\u2019 \u201d this court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 265-66, quoting People v. Duran, 16 Cal. 3d 282, 290-91, 545 P.2d 1322, 1327, 127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 623 (1976). The court emphasized the three distinct due process concerns the question raised and then described the various factors that should be considered by the trial judge when determining whether such a manifest need exists. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266-67. In so holding, the court specifically rejected the notion that the nature of the charges alone could justify the use of restraints. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 267-68. Rather, the decision to use restraints must be made on a case-by-case basis, and should not be the product of a general policy of imposing restraints on all criminal defendants. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 267-68. In rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the need for such standards on the question of shackling at a competency hearing is not as great as it might be at the actual trial to determine guilt or innocence, this court noted that a fair trial, in all its stages, \u201c \u2018is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law\u2019 \u201d no matter \u201c \u2018how strong the evidence against an accused may be.\u2019 \u201d Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269, quoting People v. Finn, 17 Ill. 2d 614, 617 (1959).\nTwo months later, in Staley, this court reaffirmed its teaching in Boose. In Staley, a juvenile defendant was found delinquent for severely beating a teacher in the detention home where the defendant had been previously placed. At his initial hearing before the juvenile court, the assistant Attorney General recommended that the defendant remain handcuffed. The trial judge followed the recommendation, stating that he did not want the behavior that occurred at the detention home to occur in the courtroom. At the ensuing adjudicatory hearing held on the State\u2019s petition for delinquency, the defendant\u2019s attorney asked that the handcuffs be removed. The trial judge denied the motion, and ultimately found the defendant delinquent. On appeal, the appellate court reversed and remanded the matter for a new adjudicatory hearing because the trial judge erred in requiring the defendant to appear at the adjudicatory hearing in handcuffs. Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 35-36.\nIn affirming the appellate court\u2019s judgment, this court noted, once again, the three distinct trial rights that restraints negatively impact, i.e., the presumption of innocence, the ability to assist in the defense, and the dignity of the judicial process. This court rejected the State\u2019s contention that, because the adjudicatory hearing took place before a judge and not a jury, no error occurred. Prejudice to the jury, the court noted, was not the only reason why shackling had been disapproved:\n\u201cIn the absence of exceptional circumstances, an accused has the right to stand trial \u2018with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man.\u2019 [Citation.] It jeopardizes the presumption\u2019s value and protection and demeans our justice for an accused without clear cause to be required to stand in a courtroom in manacles or other restraints while he is being judged.\u201d Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 37.\nThe court emphasized that in the absence of a showing of manifest need, \u201cwhich must be established clearly on the record,\u201d an accused \u201ccannot be tried in shackles whether there is to be a bench trial or a trial by jury.\u201d Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 38. The court did not engage in any type of harmless error analysis, despite the fact that the utility of such an inquiry was raised in the dissent. See Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 41-42 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (arguing that defendant \u201cshould be required to demonstrate that he has in some manner suffered prejudice by being handcuffed during the trial\u201d).\nIn examining the holdings in both Boose and Staley, it becomes clear that the court was concerned with more than the effect that shackles would have on the fact finder\u2019s ability to adjudicate guilt in light of a defendant\u2019s right to the presumption of innocence. Both cases identify other trial rights that have the potential to be negatively impacted by the unjustified use of restraints, namely, the defendant\u2019s right to participate and assist in his defense and the right to a dignified trial proceeding. The importance of the latter right, the right to a dignified trial proceeding, was certainly at the center of this court\u2019s decision in Staley, where the court ordered a new trial despite the fact that the adjudicatory proceeding in question was tried by a judge and not a jury and where the court chose not to apply a harmless-error analysis to the case. Thus, the court in Staley considered the error to be so egregious that actual prejudice need not be shown and that it was of no import if the defendant was shackled in front of a jury or a judge.\nSince our decision in Staley, this court has not spoken with clarity with respect to what happens if a defendant raises the issue of unjust restraint on appeal without properly preserving it in the trial court. For example, in People v. Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d 229 (1979), the defendant claimed that his conviction must be reversed because he appeared before the venire in handcuffs on the first day of jury selection. This court held that defendant \u201cwaived any error by failing to object to his appearance in handcuffs.\u201d Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241. In so holding, this court found that the United States Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 96 S. Ct. 1691 (1976), provided guidance on the question. In Estelle, the defendant appeared at trial in prison garb without objection. The Supreme Court held that the State cannot, consistent with the fourteenth amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison garb; however, the defendant\u2019s failure to raise an objection \u201cis sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation.\u201d Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241. This court found that a similar conclusion was justified in Hyche \u201csince similar considerations involving a defendant\u2019s right to the presumption of innocence are implicated when the defendant appears before the jury in handcuffs.\u201d Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241. The court also rejected defendant\u2019s contention that Staley and Boose mandated a different result: \u201c[Those cases] are distinguishable in that the defendants there, unlike the defendant here, were improperly compelled to appear in handcuffs over objection.\u201d Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241.\nIn contrast to Hyche, this court in People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144 (1999), declined to hold a shackling claim waived and, instead, elected to address the issue on the merits. In so doing, the court cited with approval People v. Bennett, 281 Ill. App. 3d 814 (1996), which found plain error existed when a defendant did not properly preserve the issue of unnecessary shackling. In Bennett, the defendant, like defendant here, asked that his restraints (shackles) be removed, and, just like defendant here, did not include the issue in his posttrial motion. The appellate court held that despite the defendant\u2019s failure to properly preserve the issue, plain error allowed for the court to address the issue and provide relief. Bennett, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 823-25.\nIn my view, the value of Hyche to today\u2019s discussion is limited for several reasons. First, the case dealt with a question of pretrial restraint as opposed to the present case, which concerns a defendant who was restrained throughout the entirety of his adjudicatory proceeding. Specifically, the defendant in Hyche appeared in a single handcuff before members of the venire on the first day of jury selection. It is unclear from the court\u2019s opinion in Hyche how many of the venire members who saw the defendant so restrained ultimately served on the jury, as the opinion indicates the jury was not selected in a single day. More importantly, however, Hyche is inconsistent with the principles announced in Boose and Staley. In contrast to those cases, the Hyche court focused on only one of the three trial rights previously identified in Staley and Boose as being the focus of the restraint issue, i.e., the presumption of innocence, and failed to mention the other two trial rights, the ability to assist and participate in the defense and the right to dignified proceedings. For this reason, the Hyche court\u2019s observation that Estelle provided guidance to the question missed the mark. As I noted previously, Estelle addressed the propriety of appearing before a jury in prison garb without objection. While being seen by the jury in prison garb might well devalue the presumption of innocence, prison attire is not the equivalent of physical restraints. Unlike manacles, prison clothes do not restrict movement such that the ability to assist in the defense is compromised. Prison clothes also do not undermine the dignity of the courtroom in the same way that the use of shackles has traditionally been found to do. The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the deep-rooted, historical aversion the judiciary has long had toward trying a criminal defendant in restraints:\n\u201cThe courtroom\u2019s formal dignity, which includes the respectful treatment of defendants, reflects the importance of the matter at issue, guilt or innocence, and the gravity with which Americans consider any deprivation of an individual\u2019s liberty through criminal punishment. And it reflects a seriousness of purpose that helps to explain the judicial system\u2019s power to inspire the confidence and to affect the behavior of a general public whose demands for justice our courts seek to serve. The routine use of shackles in the presence of juries would undermine these symbolic yet concrete objectives. As this Court has said, the use of shackles at trial \u2018affront[s]\u2019 the \u2018dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.\u2019 Allen, supra, at 344; see also Trial of Christopher Layer, 16 How. St. Tr., at 99 (statement of Mr. Hungerford) (\u2018[T]o have a man plead for his life\u2019 in shackles before \u2018a court of justice, the highest in the kingdom for criminal matters, where the king himself is supposed to be personally present,\u2019 undermines the \u2018dignity of the Court\u2019).\u201d Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. at 631-32, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 964, 125 S. Ct. at 2013.\nThese concerns clearly underscore the critical differences between prison garb and physical restraints. For this reason, Hyche\u2019s reliance on Estelle is not persuasive as the case is not truly relevant to the question presented in Hyche. Finally, the court in Hyche did not address plain error in any way.\nThis court\u2019s more recent opinion in Buss certainly does not follow the analysis set forth in Hyche. In Buss, as I noted previously, we rejected the defendant\u2019s claim of improper shackling, but in so doing, we eschewed the State\u2019s claims of waiver and decided the question on its merits. Our opinion did not cite to Hyche, but instead cited to an appellate court decision which found plain error in the unjustified use of restraints at trial even though the defendant had failed to include the issue in his posttrial motion.\nAfter reviewing our precedents, I find the Staley court\u2019s refusal to subject the error to a harmless-error analysis to be important to today\u2019s discussion regarding the second prong of the plain error rule. In essence, the court\u2019s refusal to predicate a reversal on actual prejudice in Staley reveals that the court was more concerned with the error\u2019s ramifications on the proceedings as a whole. As I noted previously, in Staley, the defendant was not tried by a jury, but by a judge. Surely a judge understands the presumption of innocence and would not equate the presence of restraints on a defendant with that defendant\u2019s guilt of the charged crime. Yet, this court still reversed despite this fact and without a showing of prejudice because unjust shackling jeopardized more than the value and protection of the presumption of innocence. It also \u201cdemeans our justice for an accused without clear cause to be required to stand in a courtroom in manacles or other restraints while he is being judged.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 37. Thus, the error did not just affect the defendant\u2019s substantial rights, it seriously affected the fairness, integrity and public reputation of the judicial proceedings and it was the systemic effect on the trial proceedings as a whole that warranted the new trial in Staley. If this is so, then why are not these same concerns, which clearly are present in all restraint-without-manifest-cause cases, not enough to satisfy the second prong of our plain error rule? As this court noted in People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 138 (2000), \u201cprejudice to a defendant\u2019s case is not the sole concern that drives our analysis of defendant\u2019s appeal.\u201d We further recognized in Blue that when a defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial has been denied, \u201cthis court must take corrective action so that we may preserve the integrity of the judicial process.\u201d Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138. In so doing, we pointed specifically to the second prong of the plain error rule:\n\u201cTo determine whether defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial has been compromised, we employ the same test that this court uses whenever it applies the second prong of the plain error test. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). We ask whether a substantial right has been affected to such a degree that we cannot confidently state that defendant\u2019s trial was fundamentally fair. [Citations.]\n*** [W]hen an error arises at trial that is of such gravity that it threatens the very integrity of the judicial process, the court must act to correct the error, so that the fairness and the reputation of the process may be preserved and protected.\u201d Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138.\nI note that these concerns echo the United States Supreme Court\u2019s observations about the importance to the criminal justice system of maintaining dignified proceedings in which defendants are treated respectfully. Contrary to the court\u2019s assertions, it today is not \u201cfollow[ing] the strict application of [the plain error] doctrine as recently set forth in Herron\u201d (222 Ill. 2d at 359), rather it is corrupting the second prong of the rule by requiring defendant to establish that he was specifically prejudiced even though the rule itself does not require a showing of prejudice.\nIn light of the above, it is unclear to me how this defendant\u2019s failure to raise this matter in the posttrial motion transforms what would have been a due process violation not subject to a harmless error analysis into an error that now requires a showing of actual prejudice in order to warrant relief. To the extent that the court finds Estelle v. Williams relevant to this issue (222 Ill. 2d at 353-54), I strongly disagree. As I discussed above, in Estelle, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether an accused who is compelled to wear identifiable prison clothing at his trial by a jury is denied due process or equal protection of the laws. In addressing this issue, the Court acknowledged that the \u201cparticular evil\u201d in these types of cases is \u201ccompelling a defendant, against his will, to be tried in jail attire.\u201d Estelle, 425 U.S. at 507, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 133, 96 S. Ct. at 1694-95. However, the Court noted that case law showed that it was \u201cnot an uncommon defense tactic to produce the defendant in jail clothes in the hope of eliciting sympathy from the jury\u201d especially in Texas, where the defendant had been tried. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 508, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 133, 96 S. Ct. at 1695. For this reason, the Court found that it was necessary for a defendant to register an objection to the jail attire before the trial judge so as to show the lack of compulsion. Unlike the Court in Estelle, I can point to no case law which reveals that it is a common defense tactic to produce a defendant in restraints in the hope of eliciting sympathy from the jury. I further note that the Court in Estelle in no way likened appearing before the jury in jail attire with the use of physical restraints. In fact, the Court pointed out that the decision to have a defendant appear in jail attire is one that belongs to defense counsel, not the trial judge. In contrast, case law makes clear that the decision to use restraints at trial lies solely in the discretion of the trial judge. A careful reading of Estelle thus demonstrates that it provides little guidance to the question presented in the case at bar.\nI believe that in order to determine whether the second prong of the plain error rule is satisfied in this case, it is essential for us to evaluate the general characteristics of a stun belt, especially in this case because it appears from the trial judge\u2019s remarks that he believed that such a restraint was preferable to handcuffs or shackles. I believe we must assess what kind of impact a restraint such as an electronic stun belt has on a defendant\u2019s trial rights, particularly those rights that have been traditionally recognized as having the most potential to be affected by the use of restraints at trial (i.e., the presumption of innocence, the right to consult with counsel, and the maintenance of dignity in the judicial process), and whether that impact results in fundamental unfairness or causes a severe threat to the fairness of the trial such that the second prong of our plain error rule is implicated. To answer these questions, I look to the same opinions from other jurisdictions where this issue has been previously addressed that my colleagues cite in their opinion.\nWith respect to the presumption of innocence, courts have recognized that they must \u201cguard against practices that unnecessarily mark the defendant as a dangerous character or suggest that his guilt is a foregone conclusion.\u201d Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1193 (Ind. 2001) (and cases cited therein). In this case, the State claims that the electronic stun belt was not visible to the jury. The record, however, does not reflect that the belt was invisible. Indeed, the belt is described in the record as a \u201cfairly noticeable object.\u201d The fact that the belt is, in fact, somewhat noticeable has been a source of concern to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which has stated that\n\u201cif the stun belt protrades from the defendant\u2019s back to a noticeable degree, it is at least possible that it may be viewed by the jury. If seen, the belt \u2018may be even more prejudicial than handcuffs or leg irons because it implies that unique force is necessary to control the defendant.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Durham, 287 F.3d at 1305.\nMoreover, the record here establishes that the bulge from the belt was noticeable enough to cause the trial judge to break from the usual trial protocol and have defendant preseated on the witness stand outside the presence of the jury. Thus, the use of the stun belt in this case necessitated the trial judge to treat defendant, upon his testifying, differently from the other witnesses who testified for the State at trial. Police officers Breen, Reid, Jensen, and Proschaska, in addition to auto yard owner Bill Clemmons, all walked up to the witness stand and were sworn in as witnesses in the presence of the jury, as is usually done in all criminal cases. Such things may mean little to those of us trained in the law, but jurors are not so trained and may well attach undue significance to such discrepancies. The disparate treatment of defendant from other witnesses who are not on trial \u201cmight have a significant effect on the jury\u2019s feelings about the defendant\u201d (see Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 359, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (1970)) and may cause jurors to believe that the difference in treatment is somehow related to defendant\u2019s status as a defendant. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals\u2019 acknowledgment, with respect to this facet of the due process inquiry, that \u201c[t]he use of a stun belt as a security device undoubtedly raises some concern about possible prejudice to the defendant, and this is a concern that needs to be considered before the device is imposed on a defendant\u201d (Durham, 287 F.3d at 1305) rings especially true in this case.\nNotwithstanding the above, the courts that have addressed this issue are more concerned with the electronic stun belt\u2019s potential to \u201cdisrupt a different set of a defendant\u2019s constitutionally guaranteed rights.\u201d Durham,, 287 F.3d at 1305; see also People v. Mar, 28 Cal. 4th 1201, 1227, 52 P.3d 95, 112, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161, 181 (2002) (acknowledging that the use of an electronic stun belt posed a significant risk of impairing a defendant\u2019s ability to participate and assist in his or her defense); Wrinkles, 749 N.E.2d at 1194 (noting that the stun belt, even if not activated, has the \u201cchilling effect\u201d of \u201ccompromising the defense\u201d). In order to adequately appreciate the concerns raised by these courts with respect to this set of rights, it is necessary to understand how the electronic stun belt works.\nIn his brief, defendant reiterates the appellate court\u2019s finding that the belt worn by defendant was the same type of belt described in another case from the Third District of our appellate court. According to defendant, the belt, when activated, delivers a 50,000 volt shock to the wearer which lasts for approximately eight seconds. The shock would knock the wearer to the ground and would incapacitate the wearer for 45 minutes. At oral argument, however, the State maintained that defendant could not point to the description in the Martinez case to argue against the use of the belt in his own case. I find the State\u2019s argument particularly unpersuasive since the State does not deny defendant\u2019s description of the belt nor does it attempt to otherwise enlighten this court about the belt in any meaningful way. The State, in its brief, does not once describe the device used in this case, yet argues nonetheless that its use at this trial should not be considered prejudicial in any way. The State\u2019s amicus, the sheriff of Will County, represented by the State\u2019s Attorney of Will County, speaks of his interest in \u201cpreserving the ability to use a stun belt as a security measure at trial,\u201d but tells us little about the characteristics of the restraining device he advocates. The lack of such information from the sheriff is even more troubling since the record makes clear it was the Will County sheriff who insisted on the use of the electronic stun belt in this case.\nIn any event, descriptions of the electronic belt can be readily found in opinions rendered in courts which have closely examined this issue. The following description is fairly representative:\n\u201cAs the Court of Appeal explained: \u2018Stun belts are used to guard against escape and to ensure courtroom safety. This device, manufactured by Stun-Tech, is known as the Remote Electronically Activated Control Technology (REACT) belt. The type of stun belt which is used while a prisoner is in the courtroom consists of four-inch-wide elastic band, which is worn underneath the prisoner\u2019s clothing. This band wraps around the prisoner\u2019s waist and is secured by a Velcro fastener. The belt is powered by two 9-volt batteries connected to prongs which are attached to the wearer over the left kidney region. ***\n\u2018The stun belt will deliver an eight-second, 50,000-volt electric shock if activated by a remote transmitter which is controlled by an attending officer. The shock contains enough amperage to immobilize a person temporarily and cause muscular weakness for approximately 30 to 45 minutes. The wearer is generally knocked to the ground by the shock and shakes uncontrollably. Activation may also cause immediate and uncontrolled defecation and urination, and the belt\u2019s metal prongs may leave welts on the wearer\u2019s skin requiring as long as six months to heal. An electrical jolt of this magnitude causes temporary debilitating pain and may cause some wearers to suffer heartbeat irregularities or seizures. [Citations.]\u2019 \u201d Mar, 28 Cal. 4th at 1214-15, 52 P.3d at 103, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.\nSee also Wrinkles, 749 N.E.2d at 1193 (reciting same general description). Given these characteristics, a number of courts have been concerned about the effect such devices can have on a defendant\u2019s ability to assist counsel and participate in the defense. For example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was particularly troubled about the adverse impact the device can have on a defendant\u2019s sixth amendment and due process rights to be present at trial and participate in his defense:\n\u201cWearing a stun belt is a considerable impediment to a defendant\u2019s ability to follow the proceedings and take an active interest in the presentation of his case. It is reasonable to assume that much of a defendant\u2019s focus and attention when wearing one of these devices is occupied by anxiety over the possible triggering of the belt. A defendant is likely to concentrate on doing everything he can to prevent the belt from being activated, and is thus less likely to participate fully in his defense at trial. We have noted that the presence of shackles may \u2018significantly affect the trial strategy [the defendant] chooses to follow.\u2019 [Citation.] A stun belt is far more likely to have an impact on a defendant\u2019s trial strategy than are shackles, as a belt may interfere with the defendant\u2019s ability to direct his own defense.\u201d Durham, 287 F.3d at 1306.\nSimilarly, the Supreme Court of California has acknowledged that \u201cit is by no means clear that the use of a stun belt upon any particular defendant will, as a general matter, be less debilitating or detrimental to the defendant\u2019s ability fully to participate in his or her defense\u201d than would be the use of the more traditional methods of restraint, such as handcuffs or shackles. Mar, 28 Cal. 4th at 1226, 52 E3d at 111, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181. On the contrary, the court warned that\n\u201c[t]he psychological effect of wearing a device that at any moment can be activated remotely by a law enforcement officer (intentionally or accidentally), and that will result in a severe electrical shock that promises to be both injurious and humiliating, may vary greatly depending upon the personality and attitude of the particular defendant, and in many instances may impair the defendant\u2019s ability to think clearly, concentrate on the testimony, communicate with counsel at trial, and maintain a positive demeanor before the jury.\u201d Mar, 28 Cal. 4th at 1226, 52 E3d at Ill, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181.\nIn this vein, the court was also deeply troubled by claims made in promotional literature from manufacturers of the belts that touted the belt\u2019s ability \u201cto provide law enforcement with \u2018total psychological supremacy ... of potentially troubling prisoners.\u2019 \u201d Mar, 28 Cal. 4th at 1226, 52 P.3d at 111, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181. Other courts have voiced similar concerns. See Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that \u201ca defendant may be reluctant to object or question the logic of a ruling \u2014 matters that a defendant has every right to do\u201d); Wrinkles, 749 N.E.2d at 1195-96 (acknowledging that psychological impact of belt on a defendant can compromise the defense).\nFinally, I note that courts have found that stun belts possess \u201cthe potential to be highly detrimental to the dignified administration of criminal justice.\u201d Durham, 287 F.3d at 1306. For example, the California Supreme Court acknowledged a \u201cdisturbing number of accidental activations\u201d of stun belts across the country. The court specifically pointed to accidental activations recorded in judicial opinions from Idaho, Nevada, Ohio, and California. Mar, 28 Cal. 4th at 1228, 52 P.3d at 112-13, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182-83 (collecting cases). In the same opinion, the court expressed concern over the fact that the device can also be distracting, specifically referencing a quote from a stun belt use trainer that, \u201cat trials, people notice that the defendant will be watching whoever has the monitor.\u201d Mar, 28 Cal. 4th at 1226-27, 52 E3d at 111, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181. These examples demonstrate how this kind of device can be detrimental to dignified proceedings in a criminal trial.\nIn light of the foregoing, I believe that stun belts plainly raise many of the same constitutional concerns that this court recognized in Boose and Staley, though in somewhat different ways. Although a stun belt may be less visible than devices such as handcuffs or shackles, the belt imposes a more substantial burden on the ability of a defendant to participate in his own defense and to confer with counsel during trial than do other devices. The stun belt also poses a serious threat to courtroom decorum and dignity. Because of the importance of these rights to our criminal justice system, the unjustified use of an electronic stun belt should result in plain error. Given the psychological effects the stun belt has on its wearer, as identified by courts in other jurisdictions, I am unwilling to hold, as my colleagues do, that because of defendant\u2019s procedural default, defendant must establish prejudice with specific reference to the record in order to warrant relief on appeal. Such a holding is inconsistent with Boose and Staley, which do not require that specific prejudice be shown.\nMoreover, I am puzzled by the court\u2019s holding that defendant here \u201chas not shown that his presumption of innocence, ability to assist his counsel, or the dignity of the proceedings was compromised.\u201d 222 Ill. 2d at 353. How exactly is a defendant to show that his presumption of innocence was compromised? What type of record evidence would support a finding of a compromised presumption of innocence? It is ironic that it is I, writing in my dissent, who has demonstrated with actual citation to the record how the use of the stun belt in this case affected the normal procedure of this criminal trial, where the record reveals that defendant was preseated in the witness box outside the presence of the jury. My colleagues\u2019 response to the very type of record evidence that they demand throughout their opinion is that I am speculating about what kind of effect that had on the jury. 222 Ill. 2d at 356-57. I sincerely hope that my colleagues are not insinuating that an activation of the stun belt must occur before a defendant\u2019s presumption of innocence will be deemed \u201ccompromised.\u201d The court intimates that, because defendant \u201cwas before the jury for two days\u201d with \u201cno objection\u201d and without \u201cany apparent difficulty consulting with his counsel,\u201d all was fine. As a reviewing court, we are left with a cold transcript of the proceedings from which we are unable to glean nuances in tone, demeanor, and appearance. That, of course, is why we defer to findings made by the trier of fact who, having been present at the trial, is in a better position to assess these particular things. For these reasons, I am unwilling to assume, as my colleagues appear to, that because the record does not reflect any overt signs of nervousness or distress on defendant\u2019s part over the use of the belt, defendant did not experience any anxiety or suffer any prejudice. All people react to stress differently. The record may not reflect anxiety on a defendant\u2019s part because he or she may not manifest anxiety in an outwardly discernable manner, e.g., nervous twitching, stuttering, shaking, and the like. Instead, a defendant may be the type of individual who internalizes anxiety in ways that are not visible to observers. Similarly, a defendant\u2019s lack of outcry to the trial judge or his counsel does not necessarily establish a comfort level with the stun belt or acquiescence in its use. Rather, such a defendant may be afraid of saying anything to anyone, lest an objection lead to activation of the stun belt.\nThe court\u2019s resolution of this matter reveals that it has overlooked the most glaring problem that occurs when a stun belt is placed upon a criminal defendant without showing a manifest need. A defendant has the right to be free from restraint at trial because, as courts have long recognized, restraints unduly erode the trial protections afforded to a defendant by the Constitution. It is only when a defendant misbehaves or poses a great danger through past behavior that those trial protections are rightfully diminished. Such a defendant\u2019s trial protections are less, but that is constitutionally permissible because just cause has been shown. The unjustified imposition upon a criminal defendant of a remote-controlled electronic restraint \u2014 a device which is designed to give \u201cpsychological supremacy\u201d over its wearer to the person who holds its activation button \u2014 poses a \u201csevere threat\u201d to the fairness of the proceedings. This results in a benefit to the prosecution because the defendant unjustifiably enjoys lesser trial protections through no fault of his own. It is the prosecution, not the defense, which benefits when a defendant, without just cause, is \u2014 for a lack of better description \u2014 psychologically neutralized, e.g., his attention focused on the stun belt and not the trial, his demeanor affected by trying not to be shocked, and the like. Such a defendant stands at a disadvantage at trial, and the proceedings become tainted. This is precisely the kind of error that the second prong of the plain-error rule seeks to guard against. It is the type of error that \u201cerode[s] the integrity of the judicial process and undermine [s] the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial.\u201d See Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186. For these reasons, I believe that the second prong of the plain-error rule has been satisfied in this case.\nFrankly and with all due respect, I have difficulty understanding the court\u2019s treatment of defendant\u2019s argument in this case. The court stresses often in its opinion that it is not \u201caddressing] the propriety of using stun belts in any criminal trial\u201d and that the \u201cuse [of] such restraints in Illinois courts is *** not raised in this case.\u201d 222 Ill. 2d at 355. However, that issue is clearly and necessarily raised in this case. Defendant argues that the use of electronic stun belts is so inherently prejudicial that it served to undermine the basic trial rights he has been afforded under our Constitution. On some level, the court must be concerned with the use of electronic stun belts because it does indeed hold that to restrain a defendant with such a device without first determining whether the Boose test is met violates due process. The court holds that Boose and Staley apply with equal force in electronic stun belt restraint cases. I point out that Boose and Staley allow for restraints to be used in cases where manifest need has been established on the record. Therefore, if Boose and Staley apply with equal force to stun belt restraints, as the court holds, then, ipso facto, electronic stun belts can be used in Illinois courtrooms consistent with the teachings of Boose and Staley. Given this ruling, I simply do not understand why the court states that today\u2019s opinion does not address the use of stun belts at a criminal trial. I have similar difficulties understanding the court\u2019s holding that putting a defendant in a restraint like the one at issue here, without first establishing just cause, constitutes a violation of due process. Why does the court rule in this manner? According to our opinions in Boose and Staley, the main concern the courts had was on the magnitude of the error to the proceedings on a whole and not on any actual prejudice to a defendant. It was that concern which prompted those courts to hold that the error violated due process. None of the defendants in Boose or Staley pointed to specific instances in the record where the presumption of innocence, the right to participate and assist at trial and the right to a dignified proceeding were actually compromised. Instead, it was this court that was concerned with the effect the unjustified use of the restraints would have on the integrity of the judicial proceedings because the restraints had the potential to compromise those important trial rights. Nevertheless, today\u2019s opinion, while stating that a due process violation occurred here, demands actual proof of an impact on those rights even though, in our earlier cases, the due process violation was not predicated upon a finding of actual prejudice. Defendant\u2019s procedural default does not lessen the due process violation since that violation, under Boose and Staley, is not dependent on actual prejudice.\nThe court\u2019s opinion also appears to be inconsistent. At the outset of its analysis, the court states that although the trial court never referred to the \u201csecurity device\u201d as an \u201celectronic stun belt,\u201d it, like the appellate court below, is \u201cconfident\u201d in its assessment that \u201cit was indeed that type of restraining device.\u201d 222 Ill. 2d at 345. The court then states that its finding is \u201cespecially probable\u201d because in another recent Will County circuit court case, People v. Martinez, the State asked the appellate court to validate the \u201cWill County sheriffs \u2018standard operating procedure, of requiring all felony defendants in custody to wear a stun belt while appearing in court.\u2019 \u201d 222 Ill. 2d at 345. The court also cites to other cases currently pending before this court involving the use of stun belts in Will County. Thus, it appears that, from that point of its opinion on, the court is operating under the assumption that electronic stun belts are at issue in this case. The court cites to a number of cases from outside of our jurisdiction which hold that electronic stun belts are restraining devices, the use of which is subject to the same restrictions as shackles. 222 Ill. 2d at 347. The court further holds that, in this case, the trial court\u2019s failure to follow the procedures set forth in Boose before ordering that defendant continue to wear an electronic stun belt constituted a due process violation. 222 Ill. 2d at 349. Notwithstanding all of the above, the court faults me for my use of \u201cinformation outside the record and cases outside our jurisdiction to speculate as to the type and effect of the stun belt worn in this case and to proselytize for a ban on the use of stun belts in Illinois.\u201d 222 Ill. 2d at 356. Clearly, the court has misapprehended my dissent as much as it has misapprehended the reasoning behind Boose and Staley. Nowhere in this dissent do I \u201cproselytize for a ban on the use of stun belts\u201d as the court erroneously charges. As stated below, I believe that stun belts can be used in our courtrooms at the discretion of our trial judges after application of the factors identified in Boose and additional factors associated with the unique nature of this particular restraining device. The court then states that \u201cthere is nothing of record to show that the type of electronic device worn in the nonprecedential cases cited by the dissent are in any way similar to the device worn by defendant.\u201d 222 Ill. 2d at 356. If the court is, in fact, concerned with this defendant\u2019s lack of establishing on the record the specific type of electronic stun belt that is at issue in this case, then I do not understand why the court accepted the speculation of the appellate court that the security device was an electronic stun belt in the first place. Why does the court look to \u201cnonprecedential\u201d Third District appellate court cases in order to determine the standard operating procedure of the Will County sheriff? Taking the court at its own word, I do not understand why the court takes note of the actions of the Will County sheriff in this case, but then does not take note of the actions of other Will County defendants. If the actions of the other Will County defendants are of no moment in this case, then the actions taken by the Will County sheriff in other cases should likewise be of no moment in this case. I do not understand the basis on which the court decides what facts outside the record can be relied upon in this case and what facts outside the record cannot be relied upon.\nI also have similar difficulties understanding why, if my colleagues are so troubled by the fact that the type of electronic restraint involved in this case is \u201cnot even known,\u201d they would issue an opinion which establishes as precedent that electronic stun belts are devices that are the equivalent of physical restraints and must comply with Boose. How can the court rule that such a restraint is the equivalent of something else if the court does not take the time to understand how the device works and refuses to look to other opinions from other jurisdictions which have set forth this necessary information? In my view, it is appropriate, and indeed necessary, to look to other cases to understand what these devices are and how they work in order to address defendant\u2019s argument that the use of these restraints compromised his trial such that the second prong of the plain error test is satisfied. The court\u2019s criticism of my use of cases from outside the jurisdiction (some of which the court itself cites in the body of its opinion) in order to assess defendant\u2019s plain error argument is simply not justified.\nII\nDespite its holding that a trial court must follow the procedures set forth in Boose before ordering that defendant continue to wear an electronic stun belt at trial and the failure to do so results in a due process violation, the court believes that its opinion does not have the effect of countenancing the continued use of stun belts in Will County or any other county in this state. See 222 Ill. 2d at 348-49. I do not believe that the court\u2019s opinion will be read in the narrow manner it believes, especially when the unjustified use of the stun belt in this case is deemed inconsequential by a majority of this court. However, the use of such devices raises significant questions that generally have not been considered by trial courts when addressing the more traditional forms of trial restraints. Today\u2019s opinion fails to consider these questions as well, despite its recognition that the Boose factors apply to stun belts. I note that the court does not acknowledge the potential health risks that are associated with the use of stun belts. The California Supreme Court has noted that\n\u201cthe manufacturer of the REACT stun belt and regular users of the device apparently recognize that the stun belt poses special danger when utilized on persons with particular medical conditions, such as serious heart problems.\u201d Mar, 28 Cal. 4th at 1229, 52 P.3d at 113, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 183.\nThe court also pointed to a statement from the assistant director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which instituted a policy not to use stun belts on (i) pregnant female inmates, (ii) inmates with heart disease, (iii) inmates with multiple sclerosis, (iv) inmates with muscular dystrophy, and (v) inmates who are epileptic. Mar, 28 Cal. 4th at 1229, 52 P.3d at 113, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 183. Based on these facts, the court warned \u201cwhen the risk of accidental activation is considered, use of stun belt without adequate medical precautions is clearly unacceptable.\u201d Mar, 28 Cal. 4th at 1229, 52 P.3d at 113, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 183.1 share these concerns.\nFinally, today\u2019s opinion fails to acknowledge the importance of adequate training for those officers of the court who control the device at trial. This is especially necessary in view of the stun belt\u2019s troubling potential for accidental activation. I believe that the trial court should make an inquiry concerning the amount of training the officer in charge of the activation button has received before allowing the device to be used in the courtroom.\nIn light of the concerns regarding health risks and accidental activations, I agree with those courts that hold that \u201cif a stun belt is to be used to restrain a particular defendant, a court must subject that decision to careful scrutiny. This scrutiny should include addressing factual questions related to its operation, the exploration of alternative, less problematic methods of restraint, and a finding that the device is necessary in that particular case for a set of reasons that can be articulated on the record.\u201d Durham, 287 F.3d at 1309. See also Mar, 28 Cal. 4th at 1230, 52 E3d at 113-14, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 183-84 (holding that trial court can approve use of stun belt only after traditional restraint factors are met, the belt is the least restrictive device that will serve the court\u2019s security interest and only upon determination that the use of the belt is safe and appropriate under the particular circumstances). Consistent with today\u2019s application of the Boose factors to cases involving electronic stun belt restraining devices, I would also require that any trial judge who employs the use of electronic stun belt restraining devices in his courtroom make specific findings on the record with respect to the defendant\u2019s medical history and the training given to the deputies before allowing such a method of restraint to be used. Given this position, I fail to see how the court can accuse me of using this dissent \u201cto proselytize for a ban on the use of stun belts in Illinois.\u201d 222 Ill. 2d at 356.\nIll\nAs the foregoing demonstrates, I disagree strongly with the court\u2019s treatment of this issue of first impression. The opinion demonstrates that a majority of the court fails to appreciate the significant and profound impact that this relatively new means of restraint has on a defendant\u2019s trial rights. I respectfully dissent.\nJUSTICES McMORROW and KILBRIDE join in this dissent.\nThe court \u201creject[s] the dissent\u2019s attempt\u201d (222 Ill. 2d at 354) to distinguish Estelle. The court\u2019s rejection is made without any real discussion of the salient points of the United States Supreme Court\u2019s analysis as it fails to discuss the importance the invited-error doctrine had on the United State Supreme Court\u2019s analysis in refusing to excuse the defendant\u2019s procedural default.\nI would further note that in Estelle there was no objection made at all during the proceedings, which strengthened the Court\u2019s conclusion that the defendant chose to wear the jail attire as part of some trial strategy. In this case, it is clear that an objection was made to the wearing of the stun belt by defense counsel, who indicated that he preferred that defendant not wear the belt. The record indicates that counsel\u2019s request was denied by both a court officer and the trial judge, who stated that the device would remain on defendant. This type of exchange made on the record is enough in my view to establish that defendant was \u201ccompelled\u201d to wear this restraint during this trial. Thus, I believe this record sufficiently establishes the element of \u201ccompulsion\u201d that the United States Supreme Court found wanting in Estelle.\nIt appears that electronic stun belts are not undetectable or invisible. In United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir. 2002), the court noted that the \u201cbelt protrudes some three inches from the wearer\u2019s back.\u201d In State v. Flieger, 91 Wash. App. 236, 242, 955 P.2d 872, 874 (1998), the electronic restraining device in use was so noticeable that it piqued jurors\u2019 curiosity about what the device was.\nThe court accuses me of speculating about the effect that this discrepancy had on the jury. I note that the court indulges in speculation itself when it states that the discrepancy did not affect the jury. This misses the point. One should not have to resort to speculation to appreciate that what occurred at trial raised the danger of prejudice, which in restraint cases, is what courts are supposed to be guarding against.\nThe record reveals that when defendant\u2019s counsel raised the issue of removing the belt, the first person to respond was the court officer, who stated \u201cNo\u201d before the trial judge could even speak. The sheriffs position on electronic stun belts was discussed in People v. Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d 1001 (2004), and I take judicial notice of the fact of the following, taken from the appellate court\u2019s decision in that case:\n\u201cThe [trial] court added that it would not \u2018tell the Sheriff how to run his jail.\u2019 The judge elaborated: \u2018[Jail officials] tell me now that it is standard operating procedure, even if it\u2019s a [sic] 80-year-old lady who is in custody with the cuffs off and going to trial on a Class 4 Felony, it\u2019s [the stun belt] worn in court now. And I am not going to change the Sheriffs Department\u2019s policy.\u2019 \u201d Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1003.\nI point out that the trial judge in Martinez was the same trial judge who presided over defendant\u2019s trial in this case. I note that the court, in today\u2019s opinion, refers to other cases arising from the Third District, and Will County in particular. Thus, it appears that the sheriff of Will County has established a general, blanket policy of restraining all felony prisoners with electronic stun belts without regard for particularized circumstances and clearly not on the case-by-case basis that this court required for imposition of restraints in Boose and Staley. The sheriffs actions in this regard appear to run afoul of the rule that it is the trial judge who traditionally exercises his or her discretion in maintaining order in the trial courtroom.\nDuring the State\u2019s presentation at oral argument, Justice Garman asked whether actions on the part of the defendant can \u201ctrigger\u201d the belt. The assistant Attorney General answered that only the \u201cdeputy\u201d holds the button, implying that there could not be any type of accidental activation. These recorded instances of accidental activation in other jurisdictions demonstrate that accidents do in fact occur.\nThe court\u2019s treatment of this issue indicates that but for counsel\u2019s failure to include the matter in defendant\u2019s posttrial motion, defendant\u2019s challenge to the use of the stun belt would have been resolved differently. See 222 Ill. 2d at 359 (noting Boose, Staley, Martinez, and Deck all present a \u201cdifferent factual situation which allows for a per se finding of reversible error which is not applicable under the facts presented in this case\u201d). In light of this, defendant may have a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel cognizable under our Post-Conviction Hearing Act.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James W. Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin and Russell K. Benton, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.", "Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Fletcher E Hamill, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.", "James W. Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Domenica A. Osterberger, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for amicus curiae Paul J. Kaupas, Will County Sheriff." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 99977.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PERI ALLEN, Appellee.\nOpinion filed June 2, 2006.\nRehearing denied September 25, 2006.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James W. Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin and Russell K. Benton, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Fletcher E Hamill, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.\nJames W. Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Domenica A. Osterberger, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for amicus curiae Paul J. Kaupas, Will County Sheriff." }, "file_name": "0340-01", "first_page_order": 350, "last_page_order": 401 }