{ "id": 3604794, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ROBERT WOODRUM, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Woodrum", "decision_date": "2006-10-05", "docket_number": "No. 99984", "first_page": "286", "last_page": "318", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 286" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "508 U.S. 476", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11581 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489", "parenthetical": "the first amendment \"does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent\"" }, { "page": "448", "parenthetical": "the first amendment \"does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent\"" }, { "page": "2201", "parenthetical": "the first amendment \"does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/508/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 U.S. 62", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6218248 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/502/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3875001 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 391", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6224653 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "1893" }, { "page": "404" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "1893" }, { "page": "404" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "1893" }, { "page": "404-05" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "1893" }, { "page": "403" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "1893" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 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App. 3d 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3217239 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635-37" }, { "page": "637-38" }, { "page": "639-41" }, { "page": "641" }, { "page": "641" }, { "page": "641-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0629-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1583, "char_count": 53198, "ocr_confidence": 0.802, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.963716281329175e-07, "percentile": 0.8497750254937643 }, "sha256": "81e289f618495566afdc81732c01d6cbf19110aa6275c67973913d5b98e2dec6", "simhash": "1:bbfbf04b3f0b3f65", "word_count": 8721 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:23.819019+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ROBERT WOODRUM, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Carman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Burke took no part in the decision.\nOPINION\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Robert Woodrum was found guilty of seven counts of child abduction (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 5(b)(10) (West 1998)). The circuit court sentenced him to 24 months\u2019 probation. As conditions of probation, defendant was required to complete a sex offender program and register as a sex offender. Defendant was also ordered to submit blood for HIV/AIDS testing and genetic marker identification. The appellate court reversed defendant\u2019s convictions and remanded for the circuit court to expunge the order requiring him to submit blood samples for HIV/AIDS testing and genetic marker identification. 354 Ill. App. 3d 629.\nWe allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 317). The State raises several claims of error on appeal to this court, including that the appellate court erred in finding a presumption in the child abduction statute unconstitutional. We hold that the child abduction statute creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption, but the application of the presumption in this case was harmless error. We therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate court.\nI. BACKGROUND\nDefendant was arrested on November 10, 1999. He was subsequently charged in two indictments with a total of seven counts of child abduction. The first indictment alleged that on or about November 4, 1999, defendant intentionally lured S.S., N.W., G.S., and A.T., each under 16 years of age, into a dwelling without the consent of a parent or lawful custodian in violation of section 10\u2014 5(b)(10) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 5(b)(10) (West 1998)). The second indictment alleged that on or about November 5, 1999, defendant intentionally lured L.M., A.T., and S.S., each under 16 years of age, into a dwelling without the consent of a parent or lawful custodian in violation of section 10\u2014 5(b)(10) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 5(b)(10) (West 1998)).\nThe State later filed amended indictments. The amended indictments, filed on June 22, 2000, essentially restated the previous allegations and added that defendant acted \u201cfor other than a lawful purpose.\u201d The State subsequently filed a third set of indictments to correct scriveners errors.\nDefendant filed a motion for discovery. In his motion, defendant sought, among other things, a bill of particulars stating the \u201cspecific act that had an unlawful purpose\u201d and the \u201cspecific unlawful purpose\u201d he allegedly possessed. Defendant asserted this information was essential to the preparation of a defense. The State filed an objection to the request for a bill of particulars. The State asserted \u201ca video tape of the crime and the defendant\u2019s detailed written confession have been tendered to the defense giving unusually detailed discovery on what evidence the state is relying on to sustain their burden of proof.\u201d At the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cIn this particular case, the evidence against the Defendant is ninety percent on a video tape of the crime and is [sic] a written confession as to what happened. *** The only thing that is going to be added in this case is to have the victims identify themselves on tape and the parents to say they didn\u2019t give him consent. I have never seen a case in this Courtroom where the Defense has a better outline of exactly what the State is going to prove because not one word will be changed on the tape and not one word will be changed on the statement, so Counsel is well prepared on what is going to happen.\u201d\nThe trial court observed that the act of luring a child under 16 years of age into a dwelling without the parent\u2019s consent constitutes prima facie evidence of other than a lawful purpose under the child abduction statute. The court stated that the \u201c[b]urden basically falls to the Defendant to show that it was an affirmative defense. That there was a lawful purpose involved.\u201d The trial court, therefore, found a bill of particulars was not necessary and denied defendant\u2019s motion.\nOn July 28, 2000, defendant moved to dismiss the indictments, claiming his right to a speedy trial had been violated. At the hearing on the motion, defendant asserted that any delays in connection with the original charges could not be attributed to him on the subsequent indictments because those indictments contained new and additional charges. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, finding that the subsequent indictments were \u201cjust the re-indictment of the original charges.\u201d\nAt trial, the State introduced a videotape of the children and defendant\u2019s written statement. Additionally, several of the children and their parents testified. The evidence showed that four girls were playing in front of a condominium building on November 4, 1999. The girls were eight and nine years old. Defendant came outside and began videotaping them. Defendant asked the girls to wrestle or \u201ccat fight.\u201d While the girls were fighting, one of them stated another girl\u2019s \u201cfly was down.\u201d Defendant stated \u201c[ljet\u2019s see it\u201d while trying to videotape the girl. The girl turned around and zipped up her pants.\nDefendant invited the children to watch the videotape inside the condominium where he lived with his parents. The girls went inside with defendant and watched the tape. While they were still in the condominium, defendant asked the girls if they would like to \u201chave an Olympics show.\u201d Defendant videotaped them while they did cartwheels, somersaults, and backbends. Defendant and the children then watched the second videotape. After watching the second tape, defendant became worried that his mother would return and find the girls inside the condominium. Defendant, therefore, told them to leave and \u201cnot to say anything to their parents.\u201d\nThe next day, two of the girls and an eight-year-old boy were playing outside when they heard music coming from the building. The children went into the laundry room where defendant was listening to music while doing his laundry. Defendant had his video camera. At defendant\u2019s request, the children began wrestling. Defendant videotaped the children as they wrestled and spun around on a chair.\nDefendant then invited the children to watch the videotape inside his parents\u2019 condominium. While defendant and the children were watching the videotape, the father of one of the children knocked on the door. Defendant answered the door, and the girl left with her father. The other two children also left. As these two children were leaving, defendant told them not to tell anyone that they had been in his condominium watching videotapes. The parents of these children did not give defendant permission to have them in his residence on either of these occasions.\nThe mother of two of the children involved in these incidents later went to defendant\u2019s condominium. She demanded that defendant give her the videotape of her children. Defendant initially refused, but produced the videotape after the mother of the children threatened to call the police. After watching the videotape, the mother of the children gave it to the police.\nDefendant was arrested and gave a written statement recounting these events. Defendant asserted that he was sexually excited by the fact that the girl\u2019s zipper was open. While that same girl was doing the \u201cOlympics show,\u201d he could see her exposed stomach. Defendant stated he was sexually excited and hoped to see more of her body. Defendant thought about masturbating while watching the girls view the videotape. While he was videotaping the girls, he \u201cfantasized that he thought it would be nice to see them naked \u2018cat fighting.\u2019 \u201d Defendant further stated that he \u201chad a fantasy about having sex with the four girls he videotaped.\u201d Defendant knew it was wrong to have the children in his residence without the consent of their parents.\nDefendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State\u2019s case. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion. Defendant\u2019s mother then testified that defendant took pictures with his video camera as a hobby.\nIn closing argument, the prosecutor asserted that defendant\u2019s statement showed he invited the children into the condominium for his own sexual gratification or excitement. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to show defendant lured the children inside for an unlawful purpose. After taking a recess to read defendant\u2019s statement, the trial court found defendant guilty of child abduction, stating:\n\u201cThe defense is correct that many cases, just taking a video tape is not an unlawful act, does not have an unlawful purpose. But just as a picture of a naked child could be one of beauty, depending upon the eyes of the beholder, and the purpose of the beholder for taking it, it could also be something which would not have a lawful purpose. The statute states that luring a child into a house, dwelling, motor vehicle, who is under the age of sixteen, is prima facie evidence of other than a lawful purpose. The Defendant\u2019s statement is that he did these things because he enjoyed watching the children, he enjoyed especially watching if they showed parts of their body that were exposed, that these things sexually excited him. I cannot say that taking a video tape that sexually excites you, of little children, is a lawful purpose for videotaping. Therefore, the Defendant will be found guilty on all counts.\u201d Defendant\u2019s attorney asked for clarification of the\ncourt\u2019s decision concerning the unlawful purpose. The court stated:\n\u201cWhat I said was, the prima facie evidence is that his luring *** was for other than a lawful purpose. He has not shown he did this for a lawful purpose, and his taping, taking the video tape for exciting himself is not a lawful purpose, and therefore, I\u2019m making a finding of guilty.\u201d The trial court sentenced defendant to 24 months\u2019\nprobation. The court also ordered defendant to submit blood samples for HIV/AIDS testing and genetic marker identification. Defendant remained in custody from the date of his arrest until he was sentenced.\nThe appellate court held that defendant was convicted based upon his constitutionally protected thoughts rather than his actions. 354 Ill. App. 3d at 635-37. Additionally, the court concluded that the child abduction statute, as applied to defendant, contained an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. 354 Ill. App. 3d at 637-38. Further, the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a bill of particulars and in denying his motion to dismiss based on a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. 354 Ill. App. 3d at 639-41. The State conceded that the trial court was not authorized to order defendant to submit to HIV/AIDS and genetic marker identification testing in the circumstances of this case. 354 Ill. App. 3d at 641. The appellate court agreed that the trial court\u2019s order in this regard was error. 354 Ill. App. 3d at 641. The appellate court, therefore, reversed defendant\u2019s convictions of child abduction and remanded to the trial court for the purpose of expunging the order requiring defendant to submit to those tests. 354 Ill. App. 3d at 641-42.\nWe allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 134 Ill. 2d R. 317.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe State raises both constitutional and nonconstitutional issues in this appeal. This court will not address a constitutional question if an appeal can be decided on other grounds. People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 482 (2005). We will, therefore, first address the State\u2019s arguments that do not raise constitutional claims.\nA. Speedy Trial\nThe State argues that defendant\u2019s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated. The State contends the subsequent indictments did not add any new charges but, rather, essentially duplicated the original charges. The delays that defendant agreed to on the original charges should, therefore, continue to be attributed to him on the subsequent indictments.\nIn response, defendant initially asserts that the original indictments failed to allege that he acted with \u201cother than a lawful purpose.\u201d Defendant argues that the State held him in custody for over 120 days before properly charging him with child abduction by including this element of the offenses in the subsequent indictments, thus violating his statutory right to a speedy trial.\nThe cases defendant cites in support of this argument only address the sufficiency of the charging instrument. See People v. Pujoue, 61 Ill. 2d 335 (1975); People v. Abrams, 48 Ill. 2d 446 (1971). These cases do not discuss speedy-trial challenges. This argument is more properly addressed to challenging the indictments themselves than to a speedy-trial challenge.\nMoreover, defendant\u2019s argument is without merit because the original indictments were sufficient to allow him to prepare his defense. Defendant never sought dismissal of the original indictments in the trial court. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of an indictment for the first time on appeal, a court of review need only determine whether the indictment apprised the defendant of the precise offense charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense. People v. Phillips, 215 Ill. 2d 554, 562 (2005). This is the proper standard for determining whether defendant was prejudiced by the allegedly defective original indictments. We will not look to formal rules of pleading in analyzing defendant\u2019s speedy-trial challenge.\nThe charges in the original indictments were complete with the exception that they did not include the phrase \u201cfor other than a lawful purpose.\u201d The original indictments included the correct statutory citation for these offenses, and the statutory language contained that phrase. We find that the original indictments sufficiently notified defendant of the charges for the purpose of preparing a defense. Thus, defendant was not prejudiced by the allegedly defective indictments for speedy-trial purposes. The continuances defendant agreed to on the original indictments are properly charged to him in connection with those indictments. Defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial was not violated by holding him for over 120 days on the original indictments.\nDefendant also argues that the subsequent charges of child abduction constitute new and additional charges. Defendant asserts that any delay cannot be attributed to him because those charges were not before the court at the time of the continuances. Therefore, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds.\nDefendants possess both constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78; 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 5(a) (West 1998). While these provisions address similar concerns, \u201c \u2018the rights established by each are not necessarily coextensive.\u2019 \u201d People v. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d 530, 535 (2002), quoting People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 326 (2000). Defendant only asserts a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial and has not raised a constitutional issue.\nThe speedy-trial statute provides that every person in custody for an alleged offense must be tried within 120 days from the date that person was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant. 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 5(a) (West 1998). If a defendant remains in custody, the 120-day statutory period begins to run automatically, and a formal demand for trial is not required. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d at 536. A defendant not tried within the statutory period must be discharged from custody, and the charges must be dismissed. 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 5(d), 114 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West 1998); Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d at 536; People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 114-15 (1998).\nAny period of delay occasioned by the defendant tolls the speedy-trial period. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d at 536. An agreed continuance generally constitutes an act of delay attributable to the defendant. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 115. Delays attributable to a defendant in connection with the original charges, however, are not always attributable to the defendant on subsequently filed charges. On this point, the appellate court has stated:\n\u201cWhere new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charges and the State had knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the prosecution, the time within which trial is to begin on the new and additional charges is subject to the same statutory limitation that is applied to the original charges. Continuances obtained in connection with the trial of the original charges cannot be attributed to defendants with respect to the new and additional charges because these new and additional charges were not before the court when those continuances were obtained.\u201d People v. Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d 241, 248-49 (1981).\nThis court subsequently clarified that this rule applies only when the original and subsequent charges are subject to compulsory joinder. People v. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d 191, 207 (2003); People v. Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d 209, 218 (2000).\nIn this case, defendant does not dispute that he agreed to delays on the original indictments. Instead, defendant contends that the delays on the original charges cannot be attributed to him in connection with the subsequent indictments. The resolution of this issue depends upon whether the charges in the subsequent indictments were \u201cnew and additional.\u201d This issue involves a comparison of the charges contained in the indictments. The facts as they relate to this issue are not in dispute. Thus, this is a legal issue that is reviewed de novo. See Hobbs v. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17 (2005) (de novo standard applies when facts are undisputed and appeal involves only a legal issue).\nThis court has not previously defined when charges are \u201cnew and additional\u201d within the meaning of the speedy-trial statute. However, we have stated the purpose of the rule announced in Williams is to prevent \u201ctrial by ambush.\u201d Williams, 204 Ill. 2d at 207. In the absence of such a rule:\n\u201c[t]he State could lull the defendant into acquiescing to pretrial delays on pending charges, while it prepared for a trial on more serious, not-yet-pending charges. *** When the State filed the more serious charges, the defendant would face a Hobson\u2019s choice between a trial without adequate preparation and further pretrial detention to prepare for trial.\u201d Williams, 204 Ill. 2d at 207.\nThus, the purpose of the rule is to prevent the State from surprising a defendant with new and additional charges, thereby circumventing the defendant\u2019s statutory right to a speedy trial. See Williams, 204 Ill. 2d at 207.\nThe original indictments filed in this case are virtually identical to the subsequent ones, with the exception that the subsequent indictments added the phrase \u201cfor other than a lawful purpose.\u201d The original and subsequent indictments contained the same statutory citation for the charges. The phrase \u201cfor other than a lawful purpose\u201d is part of the statute cited in the indictments. Additionally, the factual basis was the same for the original and subsequent indictments. The addition of the phrase \u201cfor other than a lawful purpose\u201d did not transform the charges. Rather, as the trial court found, the subsequent indictments were essentially a \u201cre-indictment of the original charges.\u201d\nIn this case, defendant could not have been surprised by the subsequent charges because they were essentially the same as the original ones. Based on these facts, we conclude that the charges in the subsequent indictments are not \u201cnew and additional\u201d for purposes of defendant\u2019s speedy-trial challenge. The delays attributable to defendant on the original indictments continue to be attributable to him on the subsequent indictments. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated.\nB. Bill of Particulars\nThe State also contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a bill of particulars because the indictments sufficiently apprised him of the nature and elements of the offenses. In response, defendant argues that the denial of his motion for a bill of particulars deprived him of the ability to prepare a defense to the charges. Defendant asserts the denial of his motion left him to \u201cguess among hundreds of potential offenses\u201d that could have constituted the \u201cother than a lawful purpose\u201d element of child abduction.\nWhen an indictment fails to specify the particulars of the charged offense sufficiently to enable the defendant to prepare a defense, the trial court may require the State to furnish a bill of particulars. 725 ILCS 5/111 \u2014 6 (West 1998). The purpose of a bill of particulars is to give the defendant notice of the charge and to inform the defendant of the particular transactions in question, thus enabling preparation of a defense. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 137-38. There is no need for a bill of particulars when the indictment sufficiently informs the defendant of the charged offense. People v. Lego, 116 Ill. 2d 323, 337 (1987). A trial court\u2019s decision on a motion for a bill of particulars is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Lego, 116 Ill. 2d at 336-37. An abuse of discretion will be found only when the trial court\u2019s decision is arbitrary and no reasonable person would adopt the view of the court. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991).\nDefendant claims a specific statement of the alleged unlawful purpose was necessary to prepare a defense to these charges. In its written objection to the request for a bill of particulars, however, the State informed defendant that the evidence consisted of the videotape and defendant\u2019s \u201cdetailed written confession.\u201d At the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion, the prosecutor stated that the only additional evidence to be presented was testimony of the children identifying themselves on the videotape and the parents\u2019 testimony that defendant did not have permission to take the children inside his residence. At trial, the State confined its evidence to the videotape, defendant\u2019s written statement, and the testimony of the children and their parents.\nThe record shows that defendant was aware of the charges and the alleged underlying transactions. Moreover, he knew the State would introduce his statements at trial and rely upon them as the basis for the alleged unlawful purpose. Defendant\u2019s statements of his sexual thoughts and intentions identified the alleged unlawful purpose. An intent to commit a sex offense can easily be inferred from defendant\u2019s statements. We find that the indictment and the State\u2019s disclosures were sufficient to enable defendant to prepare his defense. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a bill of particulars.\nC. Vagueness\nIn a related claim, defendant argues that the child abduction statute did not give him adequate notice of his allegedly unlawful purpose. Moreover, as a result of the denial of his motion for a bill of particulars, defendant was forced to go to trial without notice of the allegedly unlawful purpose. Defendant, therefore, argues the child abduction statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.\nTo comply with due process requirements, the proscription of a criminal statute must be clearly defined and provide a sufficiently definite warning of the prohibited conduct as measured by common understanding and practices. People v. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d 379, 385 (1989). Criminal statutes must be definite so that a person of ordinary intelligence will have a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d at 385. Additionally, a definite criminal statute prevents arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by police officers, judges, and juries. People v. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d 263, 269 (1987).\nThis court has previously held that the phrase \u201cother than a lawful purpose\u201d in the child abduction statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face. People v. Williams, 133 Ill. 2d 449, 454 (1990). This phrase, given its ordinary meaning, implies actions that violate the Criminal Code. Williams, 133 Ill. 2d at 454. Thus, the phrase gives adequate notice of the conduct that will subject a person to criminal penalties. Williams, 133 Ill. 2d at 453-54.\nFurther, as noted above, defendant\u2019s unlawful purpose or intent was apparent from his detailed statement. The statement implied an intent to commit a sex offense. Defendant had notice of the unlawful purpose the State was seeking to prove based on the indictment and on the State\u2019s evidentiary disclosures. Given these facts, we conclude that the child abduction statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant.\nD. First Amendment Claims\nNext, the State contends that the child abduction statute is constitutional as applied to defendant because he was not convicted for his private thoughts. Rather, defendant was convicted based on his actions of luring the children into his residence with an unlawful purpose. Defendant\u2019s statements that he wanted to see the children naked and have sex with them revealed his intent to gratify himself sexually with the children. Thus, defendant acted with other than a lawful purpose when he lured the children into his residence for his potential sexual gratification.\nDefendant argues that he was convicted based solely upon the thoughts he revealed in his statement. However, any thoughts that he had of committing a criminal offense do not, by themselves, constitute an offense. According to defendant, the court violated his rights under the first amendment to the United States Constitution by using his private thoughts as the sole basis for concluding that he acted with other than a lawful purpose.\nThe first amendment prohibits the government from premising legislation on the desirability of controlling a person\u2019s private thoughts. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403, 423, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1403 (2002), quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566, 22 L. Ed. 2d 542, 550, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1249 (1969). The Supreme Court has, therefore, drawn distinctions between ideas and conduct. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 423, 122 S. Ct. at 1403. The government cannot regulate mere thought without conduct. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 2004), citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67-68, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 463, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2640-41 (1973). Regulations targeting thought plus conduct, however, do not implicate the first amendment\u2019s freedom of mind principle. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 765 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 67-68, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 463, 93 S. Ct. at 2640-41, and Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109, 109 L. Ed. 2d 98, 109, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1696 (1990).\nIn City of Lafayette, the city banned John Doe, a person with a long history of sex offenses, from its public parks. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 758. The ban was imposed by the city after Doe was observed \u201c \u2018cruising\u2019 parks and watching young children.\u201d City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 759. In his deposition testimony, Doe stated he went to the park to look for children. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 759-60. When he saw several teenage children in the park, he thought of possibly exposing himself to them or having sexual contact with them. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 760. Doe stated, \u201cThose thoughts were there, but they, you know, weren\u2019t realistic at the time. They were just thoughts.\u201d City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 760.\nDoe challenged the ban, contending, in pertinent part, that it violated his constitutional rights under the first amendment because the city was punishing him for his private thoughts. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 765. The court noted that the city had not banned Doe from having sexual fantasies about children. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 766-67. Doe did not simply entertain thoughts, however. He took dangerous steps toward gratifying his sexual urges toward children by going to a place where he could find children in a vulnerable situation. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 767. The court concluded that it would be required to ignore Doe\u2019s actions in order to characterize the ban as directed purely at thought. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 767. The court further explained:\n\u201cThe children and their parents are not concerned about Mr. Doe\u2019s thoughts. They are concerned about his coming to the park to achieve sexual gratification. They do not need to wait until a child is molested to take steps to protect their children. The First Amendment does not prohibit the City from taking the action it did to protect its children. It does not require the City to act in an ostrich-like fashion and expose the children of the City to the risk that, on a future date, a child will wander further from the group, present a better opportunity and experience the tragic consequences.\u201d City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 767.\nWe recognize that City of Lafayette is a civil case involving a ban from the city\u2019s public parks. The first amendment principles discussed in that case are, nevertheless, equally applicable to this criminal case. Applying those principles results in a finding that defendant was not punished simply for having sexual fantasies about children. Rather, he was punished for acting on those thoughts by luring the children into his residence. If defendant had not acted by luring the children, he would not be subject to any criminal penalty. This is not a case where defendant was convicted based solely upon his thoughts or fantasies.\nWe note that defendant also argues he was not convicted based on his conduct as he did not attempt or commit any criminal offense after the children were inside his residence. Thus, defendant apparently contends that the State was required to prove that he attempted or committed an offense inside the residence to sustain the child abduction convictions.\nA person commits child abduction by intentionally luring or attempting to lure a child under 16 years of age into a dwelling without the consent of a parent or lawful custodian for other than a lawful purpose. 720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 5(b)(10) (West 1998). The language of this statute does not require proof of a separate criminal offense after a child has been lured into a dwelling.\nThe child abduction statute is analogous to the offense of residential burglary. A residential burglary is committed when a person knowingly and without authority enters the dwelhng of another with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein. 720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 3(a) (West 1998). This court has held that the offense of residential burglary \u201c \u2018is complete upon entering with the requisite intent. The actual commission of the intended offense is irrelevant.\u2019 \u201d People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 353 (2001), quoting People v. Palmer, 83 Ill. App. 3d 732, 734 (1980).\nSimilarly, the offense of child abduction is complete upon luring a child into a dwelling with the requisite unlawful purpose. The State is not required to prove that defendant completed his unlawful purpose or intended offense after luring the children inside. The completion or attempted completion of the unlawful purpose would result in a prosecution for a separate offense. Thus, contrary to defendant\u2019s argument, the State was not required to prove that a separate crime or attempt occurred inside the residence to sustain the charge of child abduction.\nIn sum, defendant was not convicted based solely upon his thoughts or sexual fantasies. He was convicted for his actions in luring the children into his residence with an unlawful purpose. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s convictions were not obtained in violation of his constitutional rights under the first amendment.\nE. Constitutionality of the Presumption\nThe State\u2019s final contention is that the appellate court erred in finding the presumption in section 10\u2014 5(b)(10) of the child abduction statute unconstitutional. The State asserts that the presumption is constitutional because it is permissive, rather than mandatory. Defendant responds that section 10 \u2014 5(b)(10) creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption.\nThe constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000). All statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging the statute bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by demonstrating clearly a constitutional violation. People v. Dinelli, 217 Ill. 2d 387, 397 (2005) , quoting People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 406 (2003). This court has a duty to construe a statute in a manner that upholds its constitutionality, if reasonably possible. Dinelli, 217 Ill. 2d at 397.\nA presumption is a legal device that either permits or requires the trier of fact to assume the existence of an ultimate fact, after establishing certain predicate facts. People v. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d 198, 203 (2003), citing People v. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d 133, 141 (1998). Although due process requires the State to prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970)), the State may properly rely on certain presumptions or inferences in proving those elements. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 202.\nPresumptions may be permissive or mandatory. A permissive presumption allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer the existence of the ultimate fact upon proof of the predicate fact, without placing a burden on the defendant. People v. Jordan, 218 Ill. 2d 255, 265 (2006) , citing Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 203; Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 141-42. The fact finder is free to accept or reject a permissive presumption. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 142, quoting People v. Hester, 131 Ill. 2d 91, 99 (1989).\nA mandatory presumption, on the other hand, requires the fact finder to accept the presumption. Jordan, 218 Ill. 2d at 265, citing Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 203; Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 141-42. Mandatory presumptions have been classified as conclusive or rebuttable. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 203; Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 142. The Supreme Court has held that mandatory conclusive presumptions are unconstitutional because they conflict with the presumption of innocence. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521-23, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 49-51, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 2458-59 (1979). In Sandstrom, the Supreme Court further held that mandatory rebuttable presumptions shifting the burden of persuasion to a defendant are per se unconstitutional, as they relieve the State of the burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 51, 99 S. Ct. at 2459. This court has held that mandatory rebuttable presumptions shifting the burden of production to a defendant are also unconstitutional because they could, in effect, require a trial court to direct a verdict against a defendant on an element proved by the presumption. Jordan, 218 Ill. 2d at 266, quoting Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 147. Thus, under Illinois law, all mandatory presumptions are per se unconstitutional. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 204.\nHere, the child abduction statute states that \u201cthe luring or attempted luring of a child under the age of 16 into a motor vehicle, building, housetrailer, or dwelling place without the consent of the parent or lawful custodian of the child shall be prima facie evidence of other than a lawful purpose.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 5(b)(10) (West 1998). The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 116 (2005). The best indication of legislative intent is the language used in the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People ex rel. Ryan v. Agpro, Inc., 214 Ill. 2d 222, 226 (2005), quoting Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82, 88 (2003).\nAccording to Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, \u201cprima facie evidence\u201d is \u201c[ejvidence that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless contradictory evidence is produced.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 598 (8th ed. 2004). Likewise, \u201cprima facie\u201d is defined as \u201c [sufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1228 (8th ed. 2004). Thus, given its plain and ordinary meaning, the term \u201cprima facie evidence\u201d in section 10 \u2014 5(b)(10) suggests a shift in the burden of production. That shift is made mandatory by use of the term \u201cshall.\u201d See People v. Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d 176, 182 (2005) (use of the word \u201cshall\u201d generally indicates legislature intended to impose mandatory obligation). Accordingly, the language \u201cshall be prima facie evidence\u201d creates a mandatory presumption. Specifically, it shifts the burden of production to the defendant as to the unlawful purpose element of the offense of child abduction by requiring the finder of fact to presume the existence of an unlawful purpose upon proof that the defendant lured a child into a vehicle, building, housetrailer, or dwelling place without the consent of the child\u2019s parent. See 720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 5(b)(10) (West 1998). In accordance with Watts, this mandatory rebuttable presumption is unconstitutional.\nThis conclusion is supported by our decision in Pomykala. In Pomykala, we considered the constitutionality of a presumption in the reckless homicide statute. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 202. The presumption provided that being under the influence of alcohol or any other drug at the time of the alleged offense \u201c \u2018shall be presumed to be evidence of a reckless act unless disproved by evidence to the contrary.\u2019 \u201d Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 202, quoting 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3(b) (West 2000). We noted that \u201c[t]his court has interpreted the word \u2018shall\u2019 to connote a mandatory obligation unless the statute indicates otherwise. [Citation.] In addition, the word \u2018presume\u2019 in this context means \u2018to suppose to be true without proof.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 205-06. We concluded that this statutory language could not reasonably be construed as creating a permissive presumption but, rather, it created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 208-09.\nWe also noted that a prior version of the statute stated that being under the influence of alcohol or any other drug at the time of the alleged offense \u201c \u2018shall be prima facie evidence of a reckless act.\u2019 \u201d Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 204, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 3(b). We did not take a position on the meaning or constitutionality of this language, noting simply that the case law was \u201cin conflict\u201d at the time of our decision on whether the prior version of section 9 \u2014 3(b) created a mandatory presumption. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 206. There was no need for us to resolve that conflict because the language before us differed from the language in the prior version of the statute. Although we properly limited our holding to the language before us, we noted that, in amending the statute, the legislature intended to incorporate the definition of \u201cprima facie evidence.\u201d Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 205.\nSince Pomykala was decided, our appellate court has reviewed the constitutionality of other statutes that incorporated the phrase \u201cprima facie evidence.\u201d See People v. Quinones, 362 Ill. App. 3d 385 (2005) (reviewing section 24 \u2014 5(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 5(b) (West 2002))); People v. Miles, 344 Ill. App. 3d 315 (2003) (reviewing section 16 of the Illinois Credit Card and Debit Card Act (720 ILCS 250/16 (West 2002))). In Miles, the appellate court held that \u201c[cjonsistent with the Pomykala analysis, if a statute incorporating the definition of \u2018prima facie\u2019 to establish an element of a criminal offense creates a prohibited mandatory presumption, then a statute that uses the object of the definition, that is, \u2018prima facie,\u2019 to establish an element is similarly prohibitive.\u201d Miles, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 319-20. The appellate court, therefore, held that section 16 of the Illinois Credit Card and Debit Card Act created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. Miles, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 320. In Quinones, the appellate court also relied on Pomykala in finding that the phrase \u201cprima facie evidence\u201d in section 24 \u2014 5(b) of the Criminal Code created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. Quinones, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 394.\nBased on People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53 (1995), the State argues that section 10 \u2014 5(b)(10) creates a constitutional permissive presumption. In Robinson, this court considered whether the State had satisfied its burden of proving the defendant eligible for sentencing as a habitual criminal. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 74. The Habitual Criminal Act provided that certified copies of prior convictions constituted prima facie evidence of such convictions. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 74. This court stated that prima facie evidence, in the criminal context, is in the nature of a presumption, more precisely described as an instructed inference. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 75, citing M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7304.1, at 114-16 (5th ed. 1990). We stated that prima facie evidence may be defined as a quantum sufficient to satisfy the burden of production on a basic fact that allows an inference of a presumed fact. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 75, citing M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7302.8, at 102 (5th ed. 1990). When the burden of production is satisfied, the fact finder is permitted but not required to find the presumed fact. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 75, citing M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7304.1, at 115-16 (5th ed. 1990).\nRobinson is inapposite because it dealt with whether the State produced sufficient evidence to prove the defendant\u2019s eligibility for sentencing as a habitual criminal. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 74. To the extent Robinson discussed the meaning of \u201cprima facie evidence,\u201d it determined whether the State presented sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of persuasion on the fact of the defendant\u2019s 1984 armed robbery conviction. Robin son, 167 Ill. 2d at 75. As Robinson noted, \u201c[o]nce the burden of production is satisfied, the judge is permitted but not required to find the burden of persuasion satisfied depending on the judge\u2019s consideration of all the evidence. The defendant\u2019s introduction of contradictory evidence does not diminish the prima facie evidence, but such evidence is considered by the trial judge in determining whether the State has satisfied the burden of persuasion.\u201d Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 75. In Robinson, the issue of whether the \u201cshall be prima facie evidence\u201d language contained in the Habitual Criminal Act created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption was not before this court.\nConsistent with Pomykala, we conclude that the plain meaning of the phrase \u201cshall be prima facie evidence\u201d in section 10 \u2014 5(b)(10) is that the ultimate fact must be presumed upon proof of the predicate facts unless disproved by evidence to the contrary. The plain language of section 10 \u2014 5(b)(10) incorporating \u201cshall be prima facie evidence\u201d creates a facially unconstitutional mandatory presumption.\nAs a final point, the State has relied upon several prior appellate court cases interpreting section 10\u2014 5(b) (10) as creating a constitutional permissive presumption. See People v. Tirado, 254 Ill. App. 3d 497 (1993); People v. Joyce, 234 Ill. App. 3d 394 (1992); People v. Marcotte, 217 Ill. App. 3d 797 (1991); People v. Embry, 177 Ill. App. 3d 96 (1988). The appellate court has reasoned that section 10 \u2014 5(b)(10) \u201c \u2018speaks in terms of prima facie evidence and there is no restraint on the trier of fact\u2019s ability to accept or reject the inference.\u2019 \u201d Tirado, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 510, quoting Embry, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 101. These appellate court decisions interpreting section 10 \u2014 5(b)(10) as permissive are inconsistent with our construction of that section as an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. Accordingly, we hereby overrule Tirado, Joyce, Marcotte, and Embry to the extent that those cases are inconsistent with our decision.\nNext, we must consider whether the unconstitutional mandatory presumption is severable from the remainder of the statute. An unconstitutional presumption may be severed from a statute if what remains is complete in itself and capable of being executed independently of the severed portion. Jordan, 218 Ill. 2d at 267, citing Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 209. Statutory provisions are not severable when they are essentially and inseparably connected in substance, and the legislature would not have passed the valid portions without the invalid portions. Jordan, 218 Ill. 2d at 267, citing Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 151.\nIn Watts, this court severed an unconstitutional mandatory presumption from the Home Repair Fraud Act. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 151. The presumption required the fact finder to presume that the defendant intended not to perform work as promised upon proof of three predicate factors, unless that presumption was rebutted. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 141. In finding that the unconstitutional presumption was severable, this court reasoned, in part, that the remainder of the statute could be executed without the presumption because that provision operated only to ease the State\u2019s burden of proof on the intent element of the offense. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 151.\nHere, the first sentence of section 10 \u2014 5(b)(10) contains all of the elements of the offense of child abduction. It is complete in itself and capable of being executed without the mandatory presumption set forth in the second sentence. The mandatory presumption operates only to ease the State\u2019s burden of proving an element of the offense, namely, the defendant\u2019s unlawful purpose. See Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 151. The excision of the unconstitutional presumption does not impair the meaning or operation of the remainder of the statute. We therefore conclude that the second sentence of section 10 \u2014 5(b)(10) may be severed from the remainder of the statute.\nFinally, relying upon Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 114 L. Ed. 2d 432, 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991), defendant argues that application of the presumption in this case was not harmless error. A constitutional error is harmless if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 428 (2005). The Supreme Court has established a two-part test for determining whether application of an unlawful presumption is harmless error. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. at 404, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 449, 111 S. Ct. at 1893, overruled on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385, 399 n.4, 112 S. Ct. 475, 482 n.4 (1991). First, the reviewing court must determine what evidence the trier of fact actually considered in reaching the verdict. Second, the court must weigh the probative force of the evidence actually considered by the trier of fact against the probative force of the presumption standing alone. Yates, 500 U.S. at 404, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 449, 111 S. Ct. at 1893. The issue is whether the trier of fact rested its verdict on evidence that establishes the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the presumption. Yates, 500 U.S. at 404, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 449, 111 S. Ct. at 1893. A court must determine whether the force of the evidence presumably considered by the trier of fact is \u201cso overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that evidence would have been the same in the absence of the presumption.\u201d Yates, 500 U.S. at 404-05, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 449, 111 S. Ct. at 1893.\nUnlike Yates, this case was tried to the court rather than a jury. The trial court\u2019s findings on the record give us some insight into the basis for the finding of guilty. The trial court mentioned the presumption, but also relied upon defendant\u2019s statement and his conduct in finding that he acted with other than a lawful purpose. The court also referred to the videotape in its findings. There is nothing in the record indicating that the court declined to consider any of the evidence presented by the parties. We conclude that the trial court considered all of the evidence in finding defendant guilty.\nWe must, therefore, weigh the probative force of all the evidence on whether defendant acted with other than a lawful purpose against the probative force of the presumption standing alone. The required showing that a defendant had \u201cother than a lawful purpose\u201d is essentially a statement of the criminal intent, or mens rea. Criminal intent is a state of mind that is usually inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 354. Here, defendant gave a statement highly illustrative of his state of mind. Defendant\u2019s statement may be used to establish his purpose in luring the children into his residence without improperly infringing on his first amendment rights. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489, 124 L. Ed. 2d 436, 448, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993) (the first amendment \u201cdoes not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent\u201d).\nIn his statement, defendant asserted that he was sexually excited by seeing the open zipper on one of the girls\u2019 pants and the girl\u2019s exposed stomach. Defendant stated he hoped to see more of that girl\u2019s body. Further, he thought about masturbating in the presence of the girls. Defendant also fantasized about seeing the girls \u201cnaked \u2018cat fighting\u2019 \u201d and about having sex with them. Defendant\u2019s statement is replete with references to his sexual intent and purpose. At a minimum, the statement permits an inference that defendant intended to commit the offense of sexual exploitation of a child by masturbating in the presence of the children. 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 9.1 (West 1998). A trier of fact could also infer from the statement that defendant intended to have sex with the children if given the opportunity, thus committing the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1 (West 1998).\nThe evidence also showed that defendant lured these children into his residence on two separate occasions with the offer of viewing themselves on the videotapes. The children were eight and nine years old. The parents did not consent to their children being inside defendant\u2019s residence. In fact, the second incident was interrupted by the father of one of the children coming to retrieve his child. When the mother of two of the children later demanded the videotape, defendant initially refused and only produced the videotape after she threatened to call the police. Defendant admitted he knew it was wrong to have the children inside his residence without the consent of their parents.\nAdditionally, defendant told the children not to tell their parents or anyone else that they had been inside his residence. The facts, therefore, show that defendant intended for these events to remain secret. Defendant\u2019s unlawful purpose is further shown by his attempt to view and videotape the girl with her zipper down and his attempt to see more of the bodies of the children by encouraging them to do an \u201cOlympics show.\u201d\nWe find that this evidence, considered independently of the presumption in section 10 \u2014 5(b)(10), overwhelmingly establishes defendant\u2019s unlawful purpose in luring the children into his residence. The application of the unconstitutional presumption is \u201cunimportant in relation to everything else\u201d the court considered on this issue. See Yates, 500 U.S. at 403, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 449, 111 S. Ct. at 1893. We conclude that the finding of guilt based upon all the evidence of defendant\u2019s unlawful purpose would have been the same in the absence of the presumption. Thus, the application of the presumption in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, except as it concerns the circuit court\u2019s HIV/AIDS and genetic marker testing orders. Those orders are not at issue in this appeal and we make no comment on them. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.\nJUSTICE BURKE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, John E. Nowak, James E. Fitzgerald and Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Samuel Algozin and Steven W Becker, Assistant Appellate Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 99984.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ROBERT WOODRUM, Appellee.\nOpinion filed October 5, 2006.\nRehearing denied November 27, 2006.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, John E. Nowak, James E. Fitzgerald and Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Samuel Algozin and Steven W Becker, Assistant Appellate Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0286-01", "first_page_order": 304, "last_page_order": 336 }