{ "id": 3604683, "name": "VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. SWIDERSKI ELECTRONICS, INC., et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Valley Forge Insurance v. Swiderski Electronics, Inc.", "decision_date": "2006-11-30", "docket_number": "No. 101261", "first_page": "352", "last_page": "379", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 352" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "401 F.3d 876", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9175288 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "881, 883", "parenthetical": "insurer had duty to defend TCPA claim under policy that covered \"private nuisance\" and \"invasion of rights of privacy\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/401/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 S.W.3d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 9271489 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238-39", "parenthetical": "insured's action of sending unsolicited faxes in violation of TCPA constituted \"advertising injury\" under provision covering damages from \"[ojral or written publication of material that violates a person's right of privacy\"" }, { "page": "238-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/129/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 F. Supp. 2d 744", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11356679 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752-53", "parenthetical": "insurer had duty to defend under \"advertising injury\" provision that covered \"oral or written publication of material that violates a person's right of privacy\"" }, { "page": "752-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/223/0744-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 F. Supp. 2d 1365", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9101242 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/272/1365-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 F. Supp. 2d 890", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 908086 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895", "parenthetical": "insurer had no duty to defend under \"advertising injury\" provision that covered injury caused by \"oral, written or electronic publication of material in your Advertisement that violates a person's right of privacy\" (emphasis omitted)" }, { "page": "893" }, { "page": "895", "parenthetical": "\"[T]his court concludes that on this point American States is the better reasoned opinion and more likely to be followed by the Illinois Supreme Court [than the appellate court's opinion in the instant case]\"" }, { "page": "893" }, { "page": "894-95" }, { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/405/0890-01" ] }, { "cite": "05 C 5713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "05 C 2370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 F. Supp. 2d 836", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9104693 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847", "parenthetical": "\"The stated purpose of the TCPA *** is to protect the privacy of individuals from receiving unsolicited faxed advertisements\"" }, { "page": "846-47", "parenthetical": "insurer had duty to defend under \"advertising injury\" provision that covered \"[o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person's right of privacy\"" }, { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/269/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 F. Supp. 2d 488", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3153415 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500-01" }, { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "insurer had no duty to defend under \"advertising injury\" provision that covered \"making known to any person or organization covered material that violates a person's right of privacy\"" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "501-03", "parenthetical": "\"The Court finds persuasive the reasoning in Resource Bankshares, which examined language virtually identical to the Policy language\"" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "503" }, { "page": "503-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/432/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 F.3d 939", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9190270 ], "weight": 17, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n unexpected fax, like a jangling telephone or a knock on the door, can disrupt a householder's peace and quiet ***. Section 227(b)(1)(C) doubtless promotes this (slight" }, { "page": "943", "parenthetical": "insurer had no duty to defend under \"advertising injury\" provision that covered injury arising out of \"[o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person's right of privacy\"" }, { "page": "943", "parenthetical": "seventh circuit" }, { "page": "943" }, { "page": "943" }, { "page": "940" }, { "page": "940" }, { "page": "943" }, { "page": "941" }, { "page": "942" }, { "page": "942" }, { "page": "942" }, { "page": "942", "parenthetical": "\"A late-night knock on the door or other interruption can impinge on seclusion without any need for publication\"" }, { "page": "943" }, { "page": "940" }, { "page": "942" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/392/0939-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 F.3d 631", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 8972912 ], "weight": 18, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639-40" }, { "page": "641", "parenthetical": "insurer had no duty to defend under \"advertising injury\" provision that covered damages arising from \"[mjaking known to any person or organization written or spoken material that violates a person's right to privacy\"" }, { "page": "642", "parenthetical": "fourth circuit" }, { "page": "634" }, { "page": "639" }, { "page": "640" }, { "page": "640" }, { "page": "641" }, { "page": "641" }, { "page": "641" }, { "page": "641" }, { "page": "641-42" }, { "page": "641" }, { "page": "641" }, { "page": "641-42" }, { "page": "634" }, { "page": "641-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/407/0631-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 F.3d 1239", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1063897 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1249", "parenthetical": "\"Courts have consistently held the TCPA protects a species of privacy interests in the sense of seclusion\"" }, { "page": "1251", "parenthetical": "insurer had duty to defend under \"advertising injury\" provision that covered injury arising out of \"[o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person's right of privacy\"" }, { "page": "1251", "parenthetical": "tenth circuit" }, { "page": "1251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/442/1239-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592135 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" }, { "page": "73" }, { "page": "73", "parenthetical": "where underlying complaint alleges several theories of recovery against insured, duty to defend arises even if only one such theory falls potentially within coverage of policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198897 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777543 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" }, { "page": "391" }, { "page": "391" }, { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448460 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" }, { "page": "153" }, { "page": "153" }, { "page": "153" }, { "page": "155-56, 165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4059916 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "107-08" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "115-17" }, { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 U.S.C. \u00a7227", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(1)(C)" }, { "page": "(a)(4)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "C" }, { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 872", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5596081 ], "weight": 13, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891" }, { "page": "879-80" }, { "page": "883" }, { "page": "889" }, { "page": "885" }, { "page": "885-86" }, { "page": "886" }, { "page": "886-87" }, { "page": "887" }, { "page": "887" }, { "page": "889" }, { "page": "885-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/359/0872-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1379, "char_count": 48810, "ocr_confidence": 0.804, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.423766139755175e-07, "percentile": 0.9694177150868641 }, "sha256": "46ce5eb0ee06c01b770cf2c2cd3b7fa44a3dd391a5f23e978cc7e8ef2b883c0b", "simhash": "1:09efb38c2d70517c", "word_count": 7660 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:23.819019+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. SWIDERSKI ELECTRONICS, INC., et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nErnie Rizzo, doing business as Illinois Special Investigations, filed suit individually and on behalf of a class of those similarly situated against Swiderski Electronics, Inc., based on Swiderski\u2019s alleged sending of unsolicited facsimile advertisements. Swiderski tendered the defense of the suit to Valley Forge Insurance Company and Continental Casualty Corporation pursuant to insurance policies Swiderski had purchased from them. Subsequently, the insurers sought a declaratory judgment that they had no duty to defend Swiderski against Rizzo\u2019s lawsuit (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 701 (West 2002)). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the insurers\u2019 duty to defend (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005 (West 2002)), and the circuit court of McHenry County granted summary judgment in favor of Swiderski. The appellate court affirmed. 359 Ill. App. 3d 872. The issue before us is whether the insurers have a duty to defend Swiderski against Rizzo\u2019s lawsuit under the insurance policies. We hold that they do and affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nBACKGROUND\nErnie Rizzo operates a private investigation business known as Illinois Special Investigations. On June 19, 2003, Rizzo filed a three-count complaint in the McHenry County circuit court against Swiderski Electronics, Inc. According to the complaint, Swiderski sent Rizzo and numerous other individuals a fax advertisement with information on the sale, rental, and service of various types of electronic equipment. The complaint alleges that, by faxing copies of the advertisement without first obtaining the recipients\u2019 permission to do so, Swiderski (1) violated section 227 of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) (47 U.S.C. \u00a7227 (2000)), (2) unlawfully converted the fax machine toner and paper of those who received the faxes, and (3) violated section 2 of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2002)). The complaint seeks damages, attorney fees, and injunctive relief on behalf of all individuals who received an unsolicited fax advertisement from Swiderski within the four-year period preceding the filing of the complaint. As yet, no class has been certified.\nSwiderski tendered the defense of Rizzo\u2019s lawsuit to its primary insurer, Valley Forge Insurance Company, and its excess insurer, Continental Casualty Corporation. Under the Valley Forge policy, Valley Forge has a duty to defend Swiderski against any suit seeking damages caused by \u201cpersonal and advertising injury.\u201d \u201cPersonal and advertising injury\u201d includes injury that arises out of one or more of the following offenses:\n\u201ca. False arrest, detention or imprisonment;\nb. Malicious prosecution;\nc. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies, committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor;\nd. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person\u2019s or organization\u2019s goods, products or services;\ne. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy,\nf. The use of another\u2019s advertising idea in your \u2018advertisement\u2019; or\ng. Infringing upon another\u2019s copyright, trade dress or slogan in your \u2018advertisement.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe policy defines \u201cadvertisement\u201d as \u201ca notice that is broadcast or published to the general public or specific market segments about your goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters.\u201d It does not define \u201cpublication,\u201d \u201cmaterial,\u201d or \u201cprivacy.\u201d The policy excludes coverage for \u201c \u2018[pjersonal and advertising injury\u2019 caused by or at the direction of the insured with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict \u2018personal and advertising injury.\u2019 \u201d\nThe Valley Forge policy also obligates Valley Forge to defend Swiderski against any suit seeking damages caused by \u201cproperty damage.\u201d The policy defines \u201cproperty damage\u201d as:\n\u201ca. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the physical injury that caused it; or\nb. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the \u2018occurrence\u2019 that caused it.\u201d\nThe policy applies to \u201cproperty damage\u201d only if the damage is caused by an \u201coccurrence,\u201d which is defined as \u201can accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.\u201d The policy does not define \u201caccident.\u201d Coverage for \u201cproperty damage\u201d does not apply to \u201c \u2018property damage\u2019 expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.\u201d\nThe relevant provisions of the policy Continental issued to Swiderski are essentially the same as the provisions of the Valley Forge policy discussed above. Like the Valley Forge policy, the Continental policy covers \u201cadvertising injury,\u201d which is defined as:\n\u201ca. Oral, written, televised or videotaped publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person\u2019s or organization\u2019s goods, products or services;\nb. Oral, written, televised or videotaped publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy,\nc. The use of another\u2019s advertising idea in your advertisement; or\nd. Infringement upon another\u2019s copyright, trade dress or slogan in your advertisement.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe Continental policy also covers \u201cproperty damage\u201d with provisions nearly identical to those contained in the Valley Forge policy.\nOn October 29, 2003, Valley Forge and Continental informed Swiderski that the claims set forth in Rizzo\u2019s complaint were not covered by the policies they issued to Swiderski. Subsequently, on January 9, 2004, the insurers sought a declaration from the McHenry County circuit court that they had no duty to defend or indemnify Swiderski with regard to Rizzo\u2019s lawsuit. Thereafter, Swiderski filed a counterclaim against the insurers and a third-party claim against Rizzo, asserting that Rizzo\u2019s TCPA claim and conversion claim were covered by the policies.\nThe parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of the insurers\u2019 duty to defend. On July 23, 2004, after oral argument, the circuit court granted Swiderski\u2019s motion on the ground that the insurers had a duty to defend Swiderski under the policies\u2019 \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision. Because the court found a duty to defend under the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision, the court did not rule on whether a duty to defend existed on the basis of the policies\u2019 \u201cproperty damage\u201d provision. The court was not asked to rule on whether the insurers had a duty to indemnify Swiderski.\nSubsequently, in an order dated September 9, 2004, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Swiderski. The order required the insurers to pay the defense costs already incurred in the underlying action, which amounted to $25,222.22. The order also required the insurers to advance future defense costs to Swiderski pending resolution of any appeal. In addition, the circuit court certified the duty-to-defend issue for immediate appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).\nThe appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 359 Ill. App. 3d at 891. The court observed that almost all prior litigation regarding insurance coverage for TCPA claims has proceeded in federal court, and that the federal courts are divided as to whether insurance provisions like the provision at issue in this case provide coverage for fax advertising claims under the Act. 359 Ill. App. 3d at 879-80. After evaluating the federal case law, the appellate court concluded that, pursuant to Illinois\u2019 rules of insurance-policy construction, the insurers had a duty to defend Swiderski against Rizzo\u2019s lawsuit. 359 Ill. App. 3d at 883. Specifically, the court held that the insurers owed Swiderski a duty to defend pursuant to the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision of their policies. 359 Ill. App. 3d at 889.\nComparing the allegations in Rizzo\u2019s complaint with the language of the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision, the appellate court determined that an average person would reasonably interpret that provision as affording coverage. 359 Ill. App. 3d at 885. The court rejected the insurers\u2019 argument that, in the context of the insurance policies, \u201cpublication\u201d requires injurious communication to a third party. 359 Ill. App. 3d at 885-86. The court reasoned that, given its plain and ordinary meaning, the term \u201cpublication\u201d does not convey to a reasonable person an intention to cover only communications sent to third parties. 359 Ill. App. 3d at 886. The court also rejected the insurers\u2019 argument that the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision covers only violations of secrecy interests, not intrusions upon seclusion. 359 Ill. App. 3d at 886-87. The court opined that a reasonable person would understand the term \u201cprivacy\u201d to encompass the right to be left alone. 359 Ill. App. 3d at 887. In light of these considerations, the court concluded that sending unsolicited fax advertisements falls potentially within the coverage of the policies\u2019 \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision. 359 Ill. App. 3d at 887. Because the court determined that the insurers had a duty to defend Swiderski pursuant to that provision, it did not consider whether the insurers owed Swiderski a duty to defend under the \u201cproperty damage\u201d provision. 359 Ill. App. 3d at 889.\nThe insurers filed a petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315), which we allowed. We granted the American Economy Insurance Company and American States Insurance Company leave to file an amicus curiae brief. 210 Ill. 2d R. 345.\nANALYSIS\nI\nSummary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992); 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2002). A circuit court\u2019s entry of summary judgment is subject to de novo review (General Agents Insurance Co. of America, Inc. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 215 Ill. 2d 146, 153 (2005)), and the construction of an insurance policy, which presents a question of law, is likewise reviewed de novo (Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 141, 153 (2004)).\nII\nThe issue we must decide is whether the insurers have a duty to defend Swiderski against Rizzo\u2019s lawsuit. The insurers argue they do not. Initially, they claim that the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision in the policies, which affords coverage for liability resulting from an insured\u2019s \u201cwritten *** publication *** of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy,\u201d is applicable only where the content of the published material reveals private information about a person that violates the person\u2019s right of privacy. According to the insurers, the basis of the TCPA liability alleged in Rizzo\u2019s complaint is the mere sending of an unsolicited fax containing no private information. This type of claim, they argue, does not give rise to the \u201ccontent-based privacy\u201d coverage provided by the policies. As further support for their position, the insurers emphasize that the TCPA\u2019s fax-ad prohibitions make no reference to \u201cpublication\u201d or \u201cright of privacy,\u201d suggesting that the policies, which refer both to \u201cpublication\u201d and \u201cright of privacy,\u201d were not intended to cover TCPA claims.\nThe insurers also argue that they have no duty to defend Swiderski under the \u201cproperty damage\u201d provision of the policies. They point out that the policies expressly exclude coverage for any property damage that is \u201cexpected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.\u201d According to the insurers, the property damage alleged in Rizzo\u2019s complaint, the loss of fax paper and toner, is the expected outcome of sending any fax, which renders the exclusion applicable. In addition, the insurers argue that the damage that occurs when a fax is sent does not constitute \u201cproperty damage\u201d within the meaning of the policies. They point out that, under the policies, \u201cproperty damage\u201d must be caused by an \u201coccurrence,\u201d which is defined as an \u201caccident.\u201d According to the insurers, under Illinois law, the natural and ordinary consequences of an act do not constitute an accident, and the loss of fax paper and toner are the natural and ordinary consequences of sending a fax.\nIn response, defendants Swiderski and Rizzo argue that Rizzo\u2019s complaint alleges facts potentially within the coverage of the policies, and that, as a result, the insurers have a duty to defend Swiderski against Rizzo\u2019s lawsuit. Defendants initially urge us to focus on the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision of the policies. They assert that \u201cpublication\u201d includes the communication of information to the public, \u201cmaterial\u201d has a broad meaning that encompasses fax advertisements, and one\u2019s \u201cright of privacy\u201d includes one\u2019s interest in \u201cseclusion,\u201d or being left alone. Defendants contend that, based on the plain meaning of the policies\u2019 language, a reasonable person would understand that an injury \u201carising out of *** written publication, in any manner, of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d potentially occurs when one sends fax advertisements to thousands of recipients without first obtaining their permission to do so.\nAlternatively, defendants argue that the insurers have a duty to defend Swiderski based on the \u201cproperty damage\u201d provision of the policies. Defendants contend that injury that occurs to the recipient of a fax when a party sends the fax with the mistaken belief that the fax is welcome qualifies as accidental injury, and thus potentially falls within the policies\u2019 definition of \u201cproperty damage.\u201d Relatedly, defendants argue that the policies\u2019 exclusion for property damage that is \u201cexpected or intended from the standpoint of the insured\u201d is inapplicable, because when a party sends a fax with the mistaken belief the fax is welcome, the party neither intends nor reasonably expects that injury will result.\nIII\nA court\u2019s primary objective in construing the language of an insurance policy is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed by the language of the policy. Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391 (1993). Like any contract, an insurance policy is to be construed as a whole, giving effect to every provision, if possible, because it must be assumed that every provision was intended to serve a purpose. Central Illinois Light, 213 Ill. 2d at 153. If the words used in the policy, given their plain and ordinary meaning, are unambiguous, they must be applied as written. Crum & Forster, 156 Ill. 2d at 391. However, if the words used in the policy are ambiguous, they will be strictly construed against the drafter. Central Illinois Light, 213 Ill. 2d at 153. Words are ambiguous if they are reasonably susceptible to more than, one interpretation (Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108), not simply if the parties can suggest creative possibilities for their meaning (Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mutual Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 520, 529 (1995)), and a court will not search for ambiguity where there is none (Crum & Forster, 156 Ill 2d at 391).\nTo determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insured from a lawsuit, a court must compare the facts alleged in the underlying complaint to the relevant provisions of the insurance policy. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 107-08. The allegations must be liberally construed in favor of the insured. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d 64, 73 (1991). If the facts alleged fall within, or potentially within, the policy\u2019s coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend its insured. General Agents Insurance, 215 Ill. 2d at 155. This is true even if the allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent, and even if only one of several theories of recovery alleged in the complaint falls within the potential coverage of the policy. United States Fidelity, 144 Ill. 2d at 73. Thus, an insurer may not justifiably refuse to defend a lawsuit against its insured unless it is clear from the face of the underlying complaint that the allegations set forth in the complaint fail to state facts that bring the case within, or potentially within, the coverage of the policy. General Agents Insurance, 215 Ill. 2d at 154.\nIV\nWe turn first to a comparison of the allegations in Rizzo\u2019s complaint regarding the TCPA and the insurance policies\u2019 \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision. The complaint alleges that Swiderski violated the TCPA by sending unsolicited fax advertisements to fax machines throughout Illinois. The TCPA makes it \u201cunlawful for any person within the United States *** to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine.\u201d 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(1)(C) (2000). An \u201cunsolicited advertisement\u201d includes \u201cany material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without the person\u2019s prior express invitation or permission.\u201d 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(a)(4) (2000). The Act creates a private right of action that permits recipients of unwanted fax advertisements to seek injunctive relief and damages, and treble damages may be awarded if a court finds that the sender of a fax acted \u201cwillfully and knowingly.\u201d 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b)(3) (2000).\nAs mentioned, the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision relevant to Rizzo\u2019s TCPA claim is nearly identical in the Valley Forge policy and the Continental policy. The Valley Forge policy provides, in pertinent part, that \u201cadvertising injury\u201d includes injury from \u201c[o]ral or written publication, in any manner, of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy.\u201d The Continental policy provides that \u201cadvertising injury\u201d includes \u201c[o]ral, written, televised or videotaped publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy.\u201d For present purposes, we need not distinguish between the Valley Forge policy and the Continental policy, as the phrase \u201cwritten *** publication *** of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy,\u201d which appears in both, is central to our inquiry into whether the allegations in Rizzo\u2019s complaint fall potentially within the policies\u2019 coverage.\nThe essence of a TCPA fax-ad claim is that one party sends another an unsolicited fax advertisement. See 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(b) (1)(C)(2000). The receipt of an unsolicited fax advertisement implicates a person\u2019s right of privacy insofar as it violates a person\u2019s seclusion, and such a violation is one of the injuries that a TCPA fax-ad claim is intended to vindicate. The cases cited to us by both sides overwhelmingly confirm as much. See, e.g., Park University Enterprises, Inc. v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania, 442 F.3d 1239, 1249 (10th Cir. 2006) (\u201cCourts have consistently held the TCPA protects a species of privacy interests in the sense of seclusion\u201d); Resource Bankshares Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 407 F.3d 631, 639-40 (4th Cir. 2005) (\u201c[T]he harm occasioned by unsolicited faxes involves protection of some sort of \u2018privacy.\u2019 Junk faxes cause some economic damage *** and what might be called some kind of harm to privacy ***. The TCPA\u2019s private right of action obviously meant to remedy and prevent these twin harms\u201d (emphasis in original)); American States Insurance Co. v. Capital Associates of Jackson County, Inc., 392 F.3d 939, 942 (7th Cir. 2004) (\u201c[A]n unexpected fax, like a jangling telephone or a knock on the door, can disrupt a householder\u2019s peace and quiet ***. Section 227(b)(1)(C) doubtless promotes this (slight) interest in seclusion, as it also keeps telephone lines from being tied up and avoids consumption of the recipients\u2019 ink and paper\u201d); Melrose Hotel Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 432 F. Supp. 2d 488, 500-01 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (\u201cIt is clear that the TCPA aims in part to protect privacy. *** Congress took aim at the intrusive nature of unsolicited faxes. Much the same way a telemarketing call invades one\u2019s right to be left alone, an unsolicited fax intrudes upon the right to be free from nuisance\u201d (emphasis in original)); Western Rim Investment Advisors, Inc. v. Gulf Insurance Co., 269 F. Supp. 2d 836, 847 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (\u201cThe stated purpose of the TCPA *** is to protect the privacy of individuals from receiving unsolicited faxed advertisements\u201d). Thus, the TCPA can fairly be described as protecting a privacy interest in seclusion.\nTurning to the TCPA claim set forth in Rizzo\u2019s complaint, we note that it makes no mention of the right of privacy. This, however, is unproblematic, as a violation of privacy in the sense of a violation of seclusion is implicit in a TCPA fax-ad claim, and the complaint clearly alleges that Swiderski \u201cviolated 47 U.S.C. \u00a7227 et seq. by transmitting [the attached fax advertisement] to [Rizzo] and the other members of the class without obtaining their prior express consent.\u201d\nGiven that the TCPA protects a fax recipient\u2019s privacy interest in seclusion, and that Rizzo\u2019s complaint implicitly alleges a violation of that interest on behalf of Rizzo and the members of the proposed class, the question we must ask is whether the words in the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision of the policies issued to Swiderski indicate that Swiderski and the insurers intended the policies to cover the type of injury to privacy that is the subject of Rizzo\u2019s TCPA fax-ad claim. Based on the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of those words, we believe this type of injury falls potentially within the coverage of the policies\u2019 \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision.\nThe policies do not define the terms \u201cpublication,\u201d \u201cmaterial,\u201d or \u201cright of privacy,\u201d which is why we must afford them their plain, ordinary, and popular meanings. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 115. To do so, we look to their dictionary definitions. See, e.g., Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 115-17; Crum & Forster, 156 Ill. 2d at 393.\nWebster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary defines \u201cpublication\u201d as \u201ccommunication (as of news or information) to the public,\u201d and alternatively, as \u201cthe act or process of issuing copies *** for general distribution to the public.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1836 (2002). Likewise, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201cpublication\u201d as \u201c[generally, the act of declaring or announcing to the public\u201d and, alternatively, as \u201c[t]he offering or distribution of copies of a work to the public.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1264 (8th ed. 2004).\nThe insurers have abandoned the argument they made before the appellate court that the conduct alleged in Rizzo\u2019s complaint did not constitute \u201cpublication.\u201d See 359 Ill. App. 3d at 885-86. However, in the interest of coherently interpreting all the relevant terms of the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision, we observe that Rizzo\u2019s complaint alleges conduct by Swiderski that amounted to \u201cpublication\u201d in the plain and ordinary sense of the word. By faxing advertisements to the proposed class of fax recipients as alleged in Rizzo\u2019s complaint, Swiderski published the advertisements both in the general sense of communicating information to the public and in the sense of distributing copies of the advertisements to the public.\nThe definition of \u201cmaterial\u201d is \u201csomething (as data, observations, perceptions, ideas) that may through intellectual operation be synthesized or further elaborated or otherwise reworked into a more finished form or a new form or that may serve as the basis for arriving at fresh interpretations or judgments or conclusions.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1392 (2002). This definition is quite broad and clearly encompasses advertisements, as the information contained in an advertisement is intended to serve as the basis for arriving at a judgment regarding the items advertised. Examining the definition of \u201cmaterial\u201d in isolation, however, is unhelpful. We must consider the connotation of \u201cmaterial that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy.\u201d\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201cright of privacy\u201d as \u201c[t]he right to personal autonomy\u201d and, alternatively, as \u201c[t]he right of a person and the person\u2019s property to be free from unwarranted public scrutiny or exposure.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1350 (8th ed. 2004). The definition also refers the reader to the entry for \u201cinvasion of privacy,\u201d which is defined as \u201c[a]n unjustified exploitation of one\u2019s personality or intrusion into one\u2019s personal activities\u201d and includes \u201cinvasion of privacy by intrusion\u201d and \u201cinvasion of privacy by disclosure of private facts.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 843 (8th ed. 2004). The former is defined as \u201c[a]n offensive, intentional interference with a person\u2019s seclusion or private affairs,\u201d and the latter as \u201c[t]he public revelation of private information about another in an objectionable manner.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 843 (8th ed. 2004). In addition, Webster\u2019s defines \u201cprivacy\u201d as \u201cthe quality or state of being apart from the company or observation of others: seclusion.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1804 (2004).\nThese definitions confirm that \u201cright of privacy\u201d connotes both an interest in seclusion and an interest in the secrecy of personal information. Accordingly, the policy language \u201cmaterial that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d can reasonably be understood to refer to material that violates a person\u2019s seclusion. Unsolicited fax advertisements, the subject of a TCPA fax-ad claim, fall within this category.\nConsidering these definitions in conjunction with one another, we believe Rizzo\u2019s TCPA fax-ad claim potentially falls within the coverage of the policies\u2019 \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision. By faxing advertisements to the proposed class of fax recipients as alleged in Rizzo\u2019s complaint, Swiderski engaged in the \u201cwritten *** publication\u201d of the advertisements. Furthermore, the \u201cmaterial\u201d that Swiderski allegedly published, advertisements, qualifies as \u201cmaterial that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy,\u201d because, according to the complaint, the advertisements were sent without first obtaining the recipients\u2019 permission, and therefore violated their privacy interest in seclusion. The language of the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision is sufficiently broad to encompass the conduct alleged in the complaint. To adopt the insurers\u2019 proposed interpretation of it \u2014 i.e., that it is only applicable where the content of the published material reveals private information about a person that violates the person\u2019s right of privacy \u2014 would essentially require us to rewrite the phrase \u201cmaterial that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d to read \u201cmaterial the content of which violates a person other than the recipient\u2019s right of privacy.\u201d This we will not do.\nThe insurers\u2019 argument, seconded by amici, that the context in which the clause \u201cwritten *** publication *** of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d appears should control our interpretation of it is similarly unavailing. As the insurers note, the Valley Forge policy\u2019s \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision encompasses injuries that arise out of \u201c[o]ral or written publication, in any manner, of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person\u2019s or organization\u2019s goods, products or services; *** [t]he use of another\u2019s advertising idea in your \u2018advertisement\u2019; [and] [infringing upon another\u2019s copyright, trade dress or slogan in your \u2018advertisement. \u2019 \u201d The Continental policy contains similar language. However, just because these types of \u201cadvertising injury\u201d appear to involve harm caused by the content of the advertisement involved does not compel us to conclude that injury that arises out of \u201cwritten *** publication *** of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d includes only injury that stems from the disclosure of private information. As mentioned, an insurance policy must be construed as a whole such that, if possible, every provision is given effect, because the operative assumption in interpreting a policy must be that every provision was intended to serve a purpose. Central Illinois Light, 213 Ill. 2d at 153. Interpreting the clause \u201cwritten *** publication *** of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d to encompass Rizzo\u2019s TCPA fax-ad claim, as we have done above, does not, in any way, prevent the policies\u2019 alternative definitions of \u201cadvertising injury\u201d from being given effect or thwart their respective purposes. Accordingly, we will not limit the clause\u2019s application based on a comparison of the surrounding clauses.\nWe note that it is difficult, due in part to the differences in the policy language at issue, to discern a clear majority approach in cases that have interpreted \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provisions. Compare Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 641 (insurer had no duty to defend under \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision that covered damages arising from \u201c[mjaking known to any person or organization written or spoken material that violates a person\u2019s right to privacy\u201d); American States, 392 F.3d at 943 (insurer had no duty to defend under \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision that covered injury arising out of \u201c[o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d); New Century Mortgage Corp. v. Great Northern Insurance Co., No. 05 C 2370 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (insured\u2019s action of sending unsolicited faxes in violation of TCPA did not constitute \u201cadvertising injury\u201d under provision covering injury arising out of \u201coral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d); American Home Assurance Co. v. McLeod USA, Inc., No. 05 C 5713 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (insurer had no duty to defend under \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision that covered damages resulting from \u201coral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right to privacy\u201d); Erie Insurance Exchange v. Watts, No. 1:05\u2014CV\u2014867\u2014JDT\u2014TAB (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (insurer had no duty to defend under \u201cadvertising provision\u201d that covered injury arising out of \u201coral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d); Melrose Hotel, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 503 (insurer had no duty to defend under \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision that covered \u201cmaking known to any person or organization covered material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d); St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 890, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (insurer had no duty to defend under \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision that covered injury caused by \u201coral, written or electronic publication of material in your Advertisement that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d (emphasis omitted)), with Park University, 442 F.3d at 1251 (insurer had duty to defend under \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision that covered injury arising out of \u201c[o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d); Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. American Global Insurance Co., 157 Fed. App\u2019x 201, 208 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion) (insured\u2019s action of sending unsolicited faxes in violation of TCPA constituted \u201cadvertising injury\u201d under provision covering harm from \u201c[o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d), aff\u2019g 272 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Ga. 2003); Western Rim Investment Advisors, Inc. v. Gulf Insurance Co., 96 Fed. App\u2019x 960 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion), aff\u2019g 269 F. Supp. 2d 836, 846-47 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (insurer had duty to defend under \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision that covered \u201c[o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d); Nutmeg Insurance Co. v. Employers Insurance Co. of Wasau, No. Civ.A. 3:04\u2014CV\u20141762B (N.D. Tex. August 24, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (insurer had duty to defend under \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision that covered injury arising out of \u201c[o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d); Registry Dallas Associates, L.P. v. Wasau Business Insurance Co., No. Civ.A. 3:02\u2014CV\u20142662L (N.D. Tex. February 26, 2004) (unpublished opinion) (insurer had duty to defend under \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision that covered injury arising out of \u201c[ojral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d); Prime TV, LLC v. Travelers Insurance Co., 223 F. Supp. 2d 744, 752-53 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (insurer had duty to defend under \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision that covered \u201coral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d); TIG Insurance Co. v. Dallas Basketball, Ltd., 129 S.W.3d 232, 238-39 (Tex. App. 2004) (insured\u2019s action of sending unsolicited faxes in violation of TCPA constituted \u201cadvertising injury\u201d under provision covering damages from \u201c[ojral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d).\nWe observe, however, that our conclusion in this case that the insurers owe Swiderski a duty to defend pursuant to the policies\u2019 \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision is consistent with the conclusion reached by the majority of federal courts of appeals that have considered the applicability of \u201cadvertising injury\u201d coverage to TCPA fax-ad claims. Compare Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 642 (fourth circuit); American States, 392 F.3d at 943 (seventh circuit), with Park University, 442 F.3d at 1251 (tenth circuit); Hooters of Augusta, 157 Fed. App\u2019x at 208 (eleventh circuit); Western Rim, 96 Fed. App\u2019x 960 (fifth circuit). See also Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Lou Fusz Auto Network, 401 F.3d 876, 881, 883 (8th Cir. 2005) (insurer had duty to defend TCPA claim under policy that covered \u201cprivate nuisance\u201d and \u201cinvasion of rights of privacy\u201d). In addition, our conclusion is consistent with that reached by the majority of courts that have examined policy language identical to the language at issue here. Compare American States, 392 F.3d at 943; New Century Mortgage, No. 05 C 2370 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2006); American Home Assurance, No. 05 C 5713 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2006); Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 1:05\u2014CV\u2014867\u2014JDT\u2014TAB (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2006), with Park University, 442 F.3d at 1251; Hooters of Augusta, 157 Fed. App\u2019x at 208; Western Rim, 96 Fed. App\u2019x 960; Nutmeg Insurance, No. Civ.A. 3:04\u2014CV\u20141762B (N.D. Tex. August 24, 2006); Registry Dallas Associates, No. Civ.A. 3:02\u2014CV\u20142662L; Prime TV, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 752-53; TIG Insurance, 129 S.W.3d at 238-39.\nWe are unpersuaded by the insurers\u2019 reliance on American States, 392 F.3d 939, Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d 631, Brunswick, 405 F. Supp. 2d 890, Melrose Hotel, 432 F. Supp. 2d 488, and Erie, No. 1:05\u2014CV\u2014867\u2014JDT\u2014TAB. American States was the first federal appellate decision to address whether an \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision covered the sending of unsolicited fax advertisements. American States, 392 F.3d at 943. In American States, the insurance policy, like the policies at issue here, defined \u201cadvertising injury\u201d to include \u201c[o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy.\u201d American States, 392 F.3d at 940. The district court held that American States had a duty to defend its insured pursuant to the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision, because an unsolicited fax invades the recipient\u2019s \u201cprivacy.\u201d American States, 392 F.3d at 940. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. American States, 392 F.3d at 943.\nAccording to the court, the word \u201cprivacy\u201d has many connotations, the two principal meanings being \u201csecrecy and seclusion.\u201d American States, 392 F.3d at 941. The court criticized the district court for not recognizing the difference between secrecy and seclusion and for not addressing which type of privacy interest the policy covered. American States, 392 F.3d at 942. Section 227 of the TCPA, the court explained, \u201cdoubtless promotes\u201d a \u201cslight\u201d interest in seclusion, as \u201can unexpected fax, like a jangling telephone or a knock on the door, can disrupt a householder\u2019s peace and quiet, even though it is easy to throw a junk fax, like a piece of junk mail, in the trash without any risk that someone will observe activities that occur inside one\u2019s home.\u201d American States, 393 F.3d at 942. The court went on to clarify, however, that the relevant question in the case was whether the insurance policy covered the sort of seclusion interest affected by fax advertisements. American States, 393 F.3d at 942.\nIn answering this question in the negative, the court relied, in part, on the fact that the plaintiff in the underlying action was a corporation. American States, 393 F.3d at 942. According to the court, while businesses have interests protected by section 227 of the Act, those interests cannot accurately be called \u201cprivacy\u201d interests, as businesses lack interests in seclusion. American States, 392 F.3d at 942. The court also relied on the policy\u2019s use of the word \u201cpublication.\u201d American States, 392 F.3d at 942. \u201cPublication,\u201d the court reasoned, matters in a \u201csecrecy situation\u201d but is irrelevant in a \u201cseclusion situation.\u201d American States, 392 F.3d at 942 (\u201cA late-night knock on the door or other interruption can impinge on seclusion without any need for publication\u201d). The court summarized this rationale by explaining that section 227 of the Act \u201ccondemns a particular means of communicating an advertisement, rather than the contents of that advertisement,\u201d while the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision of the insurance policy, which referred to \u201cpublication,\u201d dealt with informational content. American States, 392 F.3d at 943.\nThe Fourth Circuit relied on American States in Resource Bankshares. There, the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision at issue included coverage for damages arising from \u201c[mjaking known to any person or organization written or spoken material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy.\u201d Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 634. The court acknowledged that \u201cthe harm occasioned by unsolicited faxes involves protection of some sort of \u2018privacy.\u2019 \u201d Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 639. Then, as in American States, the court defined the relevant question as \u201cwhether, when read in context, a reasonable purchaser of insurance would believe that the sort of privacy interests protected by the policies overlap with the sort of privacy with which the TCPA is concerned.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 640.\nNoting its approval of American States, the court held that the policies in question did \u201cnot cover the sorts of privacy invasions envisioned by the TCPA\u2019s unsolicited fax prohibition.\u201d Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 640. American States, the court reasoned, \u201cput words to the gut instinct\u201d felt when comparing the complaint in the underlying action with the policies. Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 641. According to the court, if the complaint alleged any violation of privacy, it was \u201cseclusion\u201d privacy, as the complaint was concerned with the manner of the insured\u2019s advertisement. Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 641. In contrast, the court reasoned, the policies\u2019 \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision was \u201cexclusively concerned with those types of privacy [citation] which, like secrecy, are implicated by content of the advertisements.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 641.\nThe court stated that \u201cthe plainest and most common reading of the phrase [\u2018Making known to any person or organization written or spoken material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u2019] indicates that \u2018making known\u2019 implies telling, sharing, or otherwise divulging, such that the injured party is the one whose private material is made known, not the one to whom the material is made known.\u201d (Emphases in original.) Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 641. The court also concluded that the context in which the clause at issue appeared supported this interpretation of it. Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 641-42. Another clause of the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision, the court pointed out, provided coverage for damages arising from \u201cmaking known\u201d disparaging material. Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 641. According to the court, because it was difficult to imagine how \u201cmaking known\u201d disparaging material could harm the recipient of the material, it followed that both clauses containing \u201cmaking known\u201d focused on harm to third parties. Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 641. The court added that, under this interpretation of the clause at issue, all four of the offenses set forth in the policies\u2019 \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision shared the common thread of assuming that the victim of the advertising injury was harmed by the sharing of the content of the advertisement, not by the mere receipt of the advertisement. Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 641-42.\nAmerican States and Resource Bankshares served as the basis for the three federal district court decisions on which the insurers rely, Brunswick, 405 F. Supp. 2d 890, Melrose Hotel, 432 F. Supp. 2d 488, and Erie Insurance Exchange v. Watts, No. 1:05\u2014CV\u2014867\u2014JDT\u2014TAB (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2006). The \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision at issue in Brunswick applied to injury caused by \u201coral, written or electronic publication of material in your Advertisement that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy.\u201d Brunswick, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 893. Relying on American States, the court held that this provision did not give rise to a duty to defend the insured from the TCPA claim brought against it. Brunswick, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 895 (\u201c[T]his court concludes that on this point American States is the better reasoned opinion and more likely to be followed by the Illinois Supreme Court [than the appellate court\u2019s opinion in the instant case]\u201d).\nIn Melrose Hotel, the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision in question defined \u201cadvertising injury offense\u201d to include \u201c \u2018making known to any person or organization covered material that violates a person\u2019s right to privacy.\u2019 \u201d Melrose Hotel, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 496. There, the court held, based on Resource Bankshares, that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured pursuant to the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision. Melrose Hotel, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 501-03 (\u201cThe Court finds persuasive the reasoning in Resource Bankshares, which examined language virtually identical to the Policy language\u201d).\nFinally, in Erie, the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision before the court applied to \u201cinjury arising out of oral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy.\u201d Erie, slip op. at 5. Relying on American States, the court held that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured under the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision. Erie, slip op. at 11-12 (\u201cThis court finds the analysis in the American States case to be on point in this case\u201d).\nOf the cases discussed above, Resource Bankshares, Brunswick, and Melrose Hotel are distinguishable from the instant case in one particularly significant respect: they involved the interpretation of different policy language. As mentioned, the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision at issue in Resource Bankshares covered damages arising from \u201c[m]aking known to any person or organization written or spoken material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy.\u201d (Emphasis in original and omitted.) Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 634. This wording seems to have been an important factor in the court\u2019s decision. See Resource Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 641-42. Brunswick dealt with an \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision applicable to injury caused by \u201coral, written or electronic publication of material in your Advertisement that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Brunswick, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 893. Notably, while the court in Brunswick focused most of its analysis on the phrase \u201cviolates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d (Brunswick, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 894-95), it ultimately observed that, as compared to the policies in this case and American States, the addition of the words \u201cin your Advertisement\u201d to the policy at issue \u201cunambiguously demonstrate^] that to be covered the injury must be a result of the content of the material\u201d (Brunswick, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 895). Finally, in Melrose Hotel, the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision covered \u201c \u2018making known to any person or organization covered material that violates a person\u2019s right to privacy.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) Melrose Hotel, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 496. There, the court went so far as to note that courts that had found a duty to defend for TCPA violations under other \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provisions had \u201cconsidered broader language, which could arguably be read to include violations of the right to be left alone, the privacy right protected by the TCPA.\u201d Melrose Hotel, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 503. The \u201cbroader language\u201d to which the court referred was identical to the language at issue here: \u201c \u2018oral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy.\u2019 \u201d Melrose Hotel, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04, quoting Western Rim, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 840.\nThis leaves the insurers with American States and Erie, which addressed policy language identical to the language at issue here. American States, 392 F.3d at 940; Erie, slip op. at 5. Erie, of course, relied on American States, which hinged considerably on the proposition that \u201cpublication\u201d matters in a \u201csecrecy situation,\u201d but not in a \u201cseclusion situation.\u201d See American States, 392 F.3d at 942. This may very well hold true as a general matter in the realm of privacy law. We believe, however, that relying on this proposition as a basis for interpreting the insurance policy language \u201cpublication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy\u201d is inconsistent with this court\u2019s approach to interpreting insurance policy provisions. Affording undefined policy terms their plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meanings is of central importance to this approach (see, e.g., Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 115; Central Illinois Light, 213 Ill. 2d at 155-56, 165), and doing so here yields the conclusion, as set forth above, that Rizzo\u2019s TCPA fax-ad claim potentially falls within the coverage of the policies\u2019 \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provisions. Accordingly, we decline to follow American States and Erie.\nV\nHaving determined that the allegations in Rizzo\u2019s complaint set forth facts that bring Rizzo\u2019s lawsuit potentially within the coverage of the policies\u2019 \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision, we need not consider whether the insurers have a duty to defend Swiderski pursuant to the policies \u201cproperty damage\u201d provision. See United States Fidelity, 144 Ill. 2d at 73 (where underlying complaint alleges several theories of recovery against insured, duty to defend arises even if only one such theory falls potentially within coverage of policy).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons expressed above, we hold that the insurers have a duty to defend Swiderski against Rizzo\u2019s lawsuit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which upheld the circuit court\u2019s partial grant of summary judgment in favor of Swiderski.\nAffirmed.\nOn January 22, 2004, the circuit court dismissed Rizzo\u2019s Consumer Fraud Act claim without prejudice. That claim is not at issue in this appeal.\nGiven the policies\u2019 similarity, the insurers have simply referred to the language of the Valley Forge policy as representative of both policies in the briefs submitted to this court.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Hugh C. Griffin, Arthur J. McColgan and Adam L. Frankel, of Lord, Bissell & Brook, L.L.E, of Chicago, and Andrew Butz, Joseph S. Crociata and William H. White, Jr., of Bonner Kieurnan Trebach & Crociata, of Washington, D.C., for appellants.", "Anthony C. Valiulis and Joanne Sarasin, of Much Shelist Freed Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, EC., of Chicago, for appellee Swiderski Electronics, Inc.", "Fhillip A. Bock and Robert M. Hatch, of Diab & Bock, L.L.C., of Chicago, and Brian J. Wanca and Steven A. Smith, of Anderson & Wanca, of Rolling Meadows, for appellee Ernie Rizzo, d/b/a Illinois Special Investigations.", "Ferry M. Shorris, of Bollinger, Ruberry & Garvey, of Chicago, for amici curiae American Economy Insurance Company and American States Insurance Company." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 101261.\nVALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. SWIDERSKI ELECTRONICS, INC., et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed November 30, 2006.\nHugh C. Griffin, Arthur J. McColgan and Adam L. Frankel, of Lord, Bissell & Brook, L.L.E, of Chicago, and Andrew Butz, Joseph S. Crociata and William H. White, Jr., of Bonner Kieurnan Trebach & Crociata, of Washington, D.C., for appellants.\nAnthony C. Valiulis and Joanne Sarasin, of Much Shelist Freed Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, EC., of Chicago, for appellee Swiderski Electronics, Inc.\nFhillip A. Bock and Robert M. Hatch, of Diab & Bock, L.L.C., of Chicago, and Brian J. Wanca and Steven A. Smith, of Anderson & Wanca, of Rolling Meadows, for appellee Ernie Rizzo, d/b/a Illinois Special Investigations.\nFerry M. Shorris, of Bollinger, Ruberry & Garvey, of Chicago, for amici curiae American Economy Insurance Company and American States Insurance Company." }, "file_name": "0352-01", "first_page_order": 370, "last_page_order": 397 }