{ "id": 3604764, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PHILBERT PENDLETON, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Pendleton", "decision_date": "2006-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 100493", "first_page": "458", "last_page": "476", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 458" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451151 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302617 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799395 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73", "parenthetical": "\"issues that the appellant fails to raise in the appellate court are waived for purposes of our review\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578352 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229709 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" }, { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578297 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578251 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3750348 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777558 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" }, { "page": "158-60", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived\"" }, { "page": "164" }, { "page": "164" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444097 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8449100 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3874667 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" }, { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8449055 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505", "parenthetical": "observing that \"this court has generally held that a claim not raised in a petition cannot be argued for the first time on appeal\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259103 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257-58" }, { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 863", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3749308 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870-71" }, { "page": "864" }, { "page": "864" }, { "page": "864, 868-69" }, { "page": "864" }, { "page": "870-71" }, { "page": "870-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0863-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 985, "char_count": 29391, "ocr_confidence": 0.801, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.379888726466461e-07, "percentile": 0.9591790872749724 }, "sha256": "bf488428d3f3f2d2ea47ae55639e03698969f0776238472bba83d93398da0b71", "simhash": "1:b3b67194632bac7e", "word_count": 4734 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:23.819019+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PHILBERT PENDLETON, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgeraid, Kilbride, and Garman concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Burke took no part in the decision.\nOPINION\nPursuant to a plea agreement, defendant, Philbert Pendleton, pled guilty in the circuit court of Ogle County to two counts of home invasion and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. In exchange for the guilty pleas, the State agreed not to charge petitioner with an unrelated offense. No agreement was reached as to sentence. The circuit court subsequently sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 15 years for the first count of home invasion, 30 years for the second, and 30 years for one of the aggravated criminal sexual assault counts. Neither a postjudgment motion nor a notice of appeal was filed. Nearly a year after sentencing, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. Counsel was appointed for defendant and subsequently filed an amended petition on his behalf. The circuit court denied defendant postconviction relief, and he appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded. 356 Ill. App. 3d 863. The appellate court found that an admonishment issue, which was raised for the first time on appeal, had been forfeited, but the court concluded that remand was nonetheless necessary because postconviction counsel had rendered deficient, unreasonable assistance in post-conviction proceedings. 356 Ill. App. 3d at 870-71. We allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and now reverse the judgment of the appellate court. The following facts are pertinent to our disposition.\nBACKGROUND\nOn August 31, 2001, defendant pled guilty to two counts of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(a)(2) (West 2000)) and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a)(2), (a)(5) (West 2000)) in exchange for the State\u2019s agreement not to charge him with an unrelated offense he allegedly committed in 1997. No agreement was reached as to sentence.\nPrior to taking defendant\u2019s guilty pleas, the circuit court conducted meticulous inquiries and admonishments pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402) in order to ensure that defendant\u2019s guilty pleas were informed, knowing, and voluntary. We set forth, at length, portions of the colloquy between defendant and the court.\nThe circuit court first asked defendant if he was \u201cin good health physically and mentally,\u201d to which defendant responded affirmatively. Defendant said he was not taking any prescription drugs or medication. The court then read the charges to defendant and asked if he understood them. Defendant indicated he understood; in fact, he took exception to the language of count I, and that charge was amended to comport with defendant\u2019s version of events.\nThereafter, sentencing options were explained to defendant. The court told defendant:\n\u201cFirst three [counts] you could be subject to an extended term in the Department of Corrections, also that would be from 30 to 60 years based on the aggravating factor of the age of the victims being over 60 years ***. There is a minimum mandatory six-year prison sentence involved in regard to all of these offenses, do you understand that?\u201d\nDefendant indicated he understood. The court then advised defendant \u201cthere would be a three year mandatory supervised release period\u201d upon his release from prison. Defendant again indicated he understood. Pursuant to the State\u2019s request, the court addressed the possibility of consecutive sentencing:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Mr. Pendleton. If, in fact, it is determined that under Counts II and III, were [sic] part of a single course of conduct, there\u2019s no substantial change in the criminal objective, and whether there is either severe bodily injury or criminal sexual assault then under Counts II and III it would be required of me if those findings are shown at the sentencing hearing [that] you receive consecutive sentences, that means one sentence ends, the other begins, you will not serve them at the same time. Do you understand that?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\n* * *\nTHE COURT: Also discretionary consecutive sentences in regard to all charges, that would be up to the court at the time of the sentence, do you understand that?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\u201d\nAfter giving defendant those admonishments, the court proceeded, first, to inform defendant of the rights he would give up by pleading guilty and, second, to ascertain that defendant had consulted with counsel:\n\u201cTHE COURT: All right. You also understand that if you plead guilty today you give up certain rights? You give up the right to have a trial before a judge or jury; you give up the right to meet and confront the witnesses against you and present evidence in your own behalf; and the right to remain silent and make the State prove this charge against you beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand the rights you\u2019d be giving up today if you plead guilty?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Do you understand there will be no trial in any of these charges if you plead guilty?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: All right. Have you had a chance to talk to [defense counsel] about this?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: And you\u2019ve had some considerable time with him talking about it over the days?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: Do you have any other questions you want to ask [defense counsel] today before we proceed any further?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No, sir.\nTHE COURT: You have a clear understanding where we\u2019re at right now?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\u201d\nWith that, the court asked defendant, successively, with respect to each charge, how he pled, guilty or not guilty. Defendant, without hesitation, pled guilty to each charge. The court then asked defendant whether he was pleading guilty to each of those charges of his \u201cown free will,\u201d and defendant again responded affirmatively. When asked if anyone had threatened him to get him to plead guilty, defendant stated, \u201cNot at all.\u201d When the court inquired whether there had been any promises made to him to get him to plead guilty, defendant responded negatively. At that point in the proceedings, the State interrupted for purposes of clarification, noting the State\u2019s agreement not to charge defendant with an unrelated offense he allegedly committed in 1997. The court then asked defendant, \u201cThat\u2019s been told to you Mr. Pendleton?\u201d Defendant confirmed that was part of the plea agreement.\nAt the court\u2019s request, the prosecutor provided a factual basis as to each charge. Defense counsel stipulated that would be the State\u2019s evidence. Thereupon, the circuit court found factual bases for the guilty pleas, found that the defendant\u2019s pleas were knowing and voluntary, and accepted defendant\u2019s guilty pleas, setting the matter over for a sentencing hearing.\nSince defendant raised no sentencing issue in the appellate court, and he advances no claim of sentencing error in briefs or oral argument before this court, there is no need to recount the events of defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing. Suffice it to say that a sentencing hearing was conducted on November 8, 2001, and, at the conclusion of that hearing, the circuit court imposed a 75-year aggregate prison sentence, consisting of consecutive terms of 15 years for the first home invasion count, 30 years for the second home invasion count, and 30 years for one of the aggravated criminal sexual assault counts. After sentencing defendant, the circuit court advised him as follows:\n\u201cYou have the right to appeal the sentence which I have imposed here today. You have the right to ask me to reconsider the sentence. You have the right to file a motion within 30 days and [defense counsel] can assist you in that. If you want me to reconsider the sentence, you file the motion within 30 days.\nIf you want to appeal the sentence you have the right to have a lawyer and a transcript of everything I\u2019ve done here. If you can\u2019t afford those you can have those free of charge.\nAny claim of error that you want to raise on appeal has to be put into that written motion filed within the next 30 days or you can\u2019t bring it up on appeal. That\u2019s all for today.\u201d\nDefendant did not file a postjudgment motion or a notice of appeal. However, the common law record indicates that defendant sent a letter to the circuit clerk of Ogle County in June of 2002, inquiring about the status of his appeal. In that letter, defendant stated that he had instructed his public defender \u201cto appeal\u201d his \u201cconviction and sentence.\u201d Defendant said he had not heard from the Office of the State Appellate Defender and he was thus \u201cconcerned\u201d because he did not know whether his case was \u201cunder appeal.\u201d Defendant asked the circuit clerk to send him a status report of his case. In his letter of June 2002, defendant did not mention a motion to withdraw guilty plea or suggest that he had asked trial counsel to file one.\nThe next document appearing in the common law record is defendant\u2019s pro se postconviction petition, which bears a file stamp of October 30, 2002. In that petition, defendant alleged that improper evidence was presented at his sentencing hearing and that trial counsel was ineffective insofar as counsel did not object to that evidence. Defendant also claimed he had \u201cinformed his counsel that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea and *** asked counsel to file the appropriate papers.\u201d He contended, inter alia, that trial counsel \u201cwas ineffective *** for failing to file a motion to withdraw and vacate his guilty plea.\u201d Defendant did not suggest that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. He did not specify any basis for withdrawal of his guilty plea.\nThe circuit court appointed counsel to represent defendant, and, on April 21, 2003, counsel filed an amended postconviction petition on defendant\u2019s behalf. At the time he submitted defendant\u2019s amended postconviction petition, counsel filed a certificate of compliance pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)). The certificate recited that counsel had (1) consulted with the defendant \u201cto ascertain his contentions of deprivation of constitutional right,\u201d (2) \u201cexamined the record of the proceedings at the trial,\u201d and (3) \u201cmade any necessary amendments to the petition filed pro se.\u201d In the amended petition, counsel \u201cincorporate^] all allegations contained in the previously filed pro se petition\u201d and, \u201cin addition to\u201d those allegations, alleged that trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance insofar as counsel had (1) failed to provide sufficient information to an expert psychologist who testified for the defense at the sentencing hearing; and (2) allowed defendant to testify at the sentencing hearing that he had committed other uncharged criminal offenses. Neither the original petition, nor the amended petition, raised an admonishment issue. The State filed an answer to the petitions, requesting dismissal of the petitions and \u201csuch other relief as is just.\u201d\nAt a May 21, 2003, hearing on defendant\u2019s petitions\u2014 conducted by the same judge who had taken defendant\u2019s plea and had subsequently sentenced him \u2014 postconviction counsel first confirmed that the circuit court had before it transcripts from defendant\u2019s guilty plea and subsequent sentencing, and then asked the court to take judicial notice of those transcripts. Counsel, with defendant present, indicated he would present no additional evidence and would confine his argument to points in the amended petition relating to defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing. With respect to defendant\u2019s original, pro se petition, counsel stated:\n\u201cMr. Pendleton\u2019s original petition is incorporated herein, and we would rest on the argument made in the memorandum of law in support of that post-conviction petition as signed and sworn to by Mr. Pendleton.\u201d\nIn the memorandum supporting his pro se postconviction petition, defendant argued only sentencing error, and the only relief he requested was an \u201cevidentiary hearing or a new sentencing hearing.\u201d\nAfter counsel finished his argument on points raised in the amended petition, the State responded by first addressing matters raised in defendant\u2019s pro se petition:\n\u201cI\u2019m going to start at the beginning of the first petition that was filed by Mr. Pendleton, if I could go in order. As to 2(a) [of the pro se petition], the allegation that it is a violation of his rights that after the plea was entered and the sentence imposed that he informed his counsel he wished to withdraw his guilty plea and that he asked counsel to file the appropriate papers. I know [postconviction counsel] did not argue these two points in this petition directly. However, because my understanding is that they still remain a part of this petition, I do want to at least briefly address them.\u201d\nCiting this court\u2019s decision in People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239 (2001), the State argued it is not enough for a defendant in the second stage of postconviction proceedings to simply allege that he asked trial counsel to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and pursue an appeal, and that counsel failed to do so. Quoting from Edwards, the State noted that such a defendant must provide \u201csome explanation of the grounds that could have been presented in the motion to withdraw the plea.\u201d See Ed wards, 197 Ill. 2d at 257-58. With that observation, the State went on to address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to defendant\u2019s sentencing, the focus of both the pro se postconviction petition and the amended petition.\nIn response, postconviction counsel argued, inter alia, that Edwards does not control the result in this case because Edwards involved disposition of a defendant\u2019s postconviction petition during the first stage of postconviction proceedings, i.e., pronouncements regarding subsequent stages were not necessary to the court\u2019s disposition.\nThe circuit court took the matter under advisement and, in an order entered June 16, 2003, denied defendant\u2019s request for postconviction relief. The court\u2019s order notes that one of the issues presented at the May 21 hearing concerned trial counsel\u2019s alleged failure to \u201cfile a motion to withdraw the Defendant\u2019s guilty plea after being requested to do so.\u201d Citing this court\u2019s decision in Edwards, the circuit court observed:\n\u201cDefendant has failed to present any basis, assert any grounds or present any evidence by which a motion to withdraw plea of guilty would be successful. The Defendant\u2019s claim in this respect is not supported by the pleadings or the evidence and will be denied.\u201d\nThe circuit court also rejected defendant\u2019s other claims of ineffective assistance, which were based on trial counsel\u2019s conduct at sentencing.\nDefendant appealed, abandoning all of the arguments raised in his postconviction petitions. Instead, defendant argued for the first time that, after he pled guilty and was sentenced, the trial court failed to properly admonish him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(b) and that he is, therefore, entitled to a new hearing for proper Rule 605(b) admonishments. 356 Ill. App. 3d at 864. Defendant further contended that his postconviction counsel rendered \u201cineffective\u201d assistance insofar as he failed to include the admonishment issue in the amended petition. 356 Ill. App. 3d at 864.\nAcknowledging our recent decision in People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498 (2004), the appellate court first noted that defendant had forfeited his admonishment issue. 356 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 868-69. In Jones, a case involving a pro se defendant and summary dismissal of a postconviction petition at the first stage of postconviction proceedings, we reiterated the general rule that claims not raised in a postconviction petition cannot be argued for the first time on appeal.\nNotwithstanding defendant\u2019s forfeiture of the issue, the appellate court in this case went on to consider and purportedly decide the admonishment issue, \u201cindirectly,\u201d concluding, in the early portion of the opinion, that \u201cpostconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the admonishment issue in the [amended] petition.\u201d 356 Ill. App. 3d at 864. In the latter part of the appellate court\u2019s opinion, the court also appeared to fault postconviction counsel for not raising trial counsel\u2019s ineffectiveness in \u201cfailing to preserve defendant\u2019s right to a direct appeal.\u201d 356 Ill. App. 3d at 870-71. That separate and distinct assessment \u2014 rendered on an issue defendant had not even raised on appeal \u2014 appears to be proffered as both an independent indicator of postconviction counsel\u2019s allegedly deficient representation, and as an analytical bridge to salvage defendant\u2019s forfeited admonishment issue. Notwithstanding counsel\u2019s certificate of compliance, which indicates that counsel fulfilled his obligations under Rule 651(c), the appellate court opined that counsel\u2019s review of the prior proceedings in the case was deficient, as the court\u2019s concluding remarks indicate:\n\u201cDespite the certification by postconviction counsel, we conclude that defendant did not receive the reasonable level of assistance of counsel required by the Act. In defendant\u2019s pro se petition, he stated that \u2018after the plea was entered and sentences imposed, defendant informed his [trial] counsel that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea and defendant asked counsel to file the appropriate papers.\u2019 This assertion alone should have alerted postconviction counsel that trial counsel might have been ineffective for failing to preserve defendant\u2019s right to a direct appeal. As discussed, Rule 605 admonishments are a necessary antecedent to the filing of such an appeal. [Citation.] We believe that a reasonable review of the guilty plea proceedings would have disclosed that the trial court\u2019s admonishments were inadequate under Rule 605(b), a point conceded by the State on appeal. Such a review of the guilty plea proceedings is mandated by Rule 651(c) and, in any event, would be necessary to an investigation of defendant\u2019s pro se claim of his trial counsel\u2019s ineffectiveness. Under these circumstances, we conclude that post-conviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance and that defendant is entitled to an opportunity to move to withdraw his guilty plea.\u201d 356 Ill. App. 3d at 870-71.\nAs we will explain hereafter, we find the appellate court\u2019s reasoning flawed, as it ignores established principles of procedural default and it fails to follow established law governing the scope of postconviction counsel\u2019s duties. Thus, we cannot subscribe to the court\u2019s conclusions or affirm its judgment.\nANALYSIS\nThe Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2000)) provides a means by which a defendant may challenge his conviction or sentence for violations of federal or state constitutional rights. People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 183 (2005). To be entitled to postconviction relief, a defendant must show that he has suffered a substantial deprivation of his federal or state constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the conviction or sentence being challenged. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 183. Rule 605 admonishments are \u201cnot constitutionally required as a matter of due process.\u201d People v. Breedlove, 213 Ill. 2d 509, 519 (2004).\nIn cases not involving the death penalty, the Act provides for postconviction proceedings that may consist of as many as three stages. At the first stage, the circuit court has 90 days to review a petition and may summarily dismiss it if the court finds it is frivolous and patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a)(2) (West 2000). If the petition is not dismissed within that 90-day period, the circuit court must docket it for further consideration. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(b) (West 2000).\nAt the second stage of postconviction proceedings, counsel may be appointed for defendant, if defendant is indigent. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 4 (West 2000). Counsel\u2019s duties, pursuant to Rule 651(c), include consultation with the defendant to ascertain his contentions of deprivation of constitutional right, examination of the record of the proceedings at the trial, and amendment of the petition, if necessary, to ensure that defendant\u2019s contentions are adequately presented. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c). Fulfillment of the third obligation does not require counsel to advance frivolous or spurious claims on defendant\u2019s behalf. People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 205 (2004). Moreover, \u201c[p]ostconviction counsel is only required to investigate and properly present the petitioner\u2019s claims.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 164 (1993); see also People v. Vasquez, 356 Ill. App. 3d 420, 425 (2005). We note that a defendant in postconviction proceedings is entitled to only a \u201creasonable\u201d level of assistance, which is less than that afforded by the federal or state constitutions. People v. Munson, 206 Ill. 2d 104, 137 (2002).\nAfter counsel has made any necessary amendments to the petition, the State may move to dismiss a petition or an amended petition pending before the court. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 5 (West 2000). If that motion is denied, or if no motion to dismiss is filed, the State must answer the petition, and, barring the allowance of further pleadings by the court, the proceeding then advances to the third stage, a hearing wherein the defendant may present evidence in support of the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 6 (West 2000).\nThroughout the second and third stages of a postconviction proceeding, the defendant bears the burden of making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Coleman, 206 Ill. 2d 261, 277 (2002); Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 246. At the second stage of proceedings, all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the trial record are to be taken as true, and, in the event the circuit court dismisses the petition at that stage, we generally review the circuit court\u2019s decision using a de novo standard. People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 174 (2000). When a petition is advanced to a third-stage, evidentiary hearing, where fact-finding and credibility determinations are involved, we will not reverse a circuit court\u2019s decision unless it is manifestly erroneous. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d at 174. If no such determinations are necessary at the third stage, i.e., no new evidence is presented and the issues presented are pure questions of law, we will apply a de novo standard of review, unless the judge presiding over postconviction proceedings has some \u201cspecial expertise or familiarity\u201d with the trial or sentencing of the defendant and that \u201cfamiliarity\u201d has some bearing upon disposition of the postconviction petition. See People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 87-88 (2002).\nBefore we proceed further in our analysis, we will first summarize the circumstances of defendant\u2019s case. The circuit court advanced defendant\u2019s petition to the second stage of postconviction proceedings, thus affording defendant the advantages of appointed counsel. Clearly, postconviction counsel examined defendant\u2019s pro se petition and the record \u2014 in particular the transcript of the sentencing hearing \u2014 in the course of filing an amended petition that expanded upon the sentencing issues which were the focus of defendant\u2019s pro se petition, and in arguing those sentencing issues to the circuit court. The transcript of the sentencing hearing concluded with the Rule 605 admonishments at issue: admonishments that were adequate to apprise defendant of the steps necessary to preserve and appeal the sentencing issues which he ultimately raised in postconviction proceedings, but were inadequate to advise defendant of the procedure for challenging his plea of guilty, if that is what defendant intended to do.\nThe circuit court properly advised defendant that he had to first file a motion to reconsider the sentence if he wanted to appeal his sentence. Defendant does not suggest that he ever asked trial counsel to do that. Although the circuit court did not advise defendant that he had to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea if he wanted to challenge some other aspect of the proceeding, since defendant claims that he directed trial counsel to file that very motion, it is difficult to discern how defendant would have been prejudiced by the court\u2019s incomplete admonishment.\nIn either case, as the appellate court acknowledged, even a liberal reading of defendant\u2019s petitions reveals no reference to an admonishment issue in either the defendant\u2019s pro se petition or the amended petition. 356 Ill. App. 3d at 869. As noted, there is an allegation in defendant\u2019s pro se petition that defendant directed trial counsel to file a motion to withdraw guilty plea, and counsel failed to do so, but that allegation bears no rational relationship to an admonishment issue, given the circumstances of this case. The admonishment issue aside, we emphasize that defendant\u2019s pro se postconviction petition was only a page and a half in length. It seems unlikely that postconviction counsel could have overlooked any issue therein. If, as is the case here, counsel chose not to include a certain claim from defendant\u2019s pro se petition in an amended petition, one might well infer that counsel made a decision not to pursue it.\nIn any event, we need not resolve this case on the merits of defendant\u2019s arguments because defendant has forfeited the admonishment issue under general principles of procedural default. Pursuant to principles set forth in our analyses in Jones and Davis, the admonishment issue is forfeited because defendant did not raise the issue in either his pro se petition or an amended petition. See Jones, 213 Ill. 2d at 505 (observing that \u201cthis court has generally held that a claim not raised in a petition cannot be argued for the first time on appeal\u201d); Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 158-60 (stating that \u201c[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived\u201d). Defendant did not claim in either his pro se petition or his amended petition that the Rule 605 admonishments given him were inadequate. Thus, that issue is forfeited. As we noted in Jones, \u201cour appellate court has repeatedly overlooked the waiver language of [the Act] and has addressed claims raised for the first time on appeal for various and sundry reasons.\u201d Jones, 213 Ill. 2d at 506. The appellate court\u2019s disposition in this case is yet another example of that inappropriate propensity.\nWith respect to the deficient-assistance prong of the appellate court\u2019s analysis, we note that defendant cannot successfully maintain that postconviction counsel rendered deficient assistance in failing to raise the admonishment issue, because \u2018 \u2018 [p] ost-conviction counsel is only required to investigate and properly present the petitioner\u2019s claims.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 164. In that regard, Rule 651(c) only requires postconviction counsel to examine as much of the record \u201cas is necessary to adequately present and support those constitutional claims raised by the petitioner.\u201d Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 164. Defendant did not raise an admonishment issue in his pro se petition. While postconviction counsel may conduct a broader examination of the record (Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 164), and may raise additional issues if he or she so chooses, there is no obligation to do so.\nFinally, we observe that defendant has also forfeited any contention that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to withdraw guilty plea \u2014 and that postconviction counsel was deficient for failing to argue that point \u2014 as defendant apparently did not preserve that claim by raising it in the appellate court. See Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64, 73 (2002) (\u201cissues that the appellant fails to raise in the appellate court are waived for purposes of our review\u201d).\nDefendant is, of course, free to pursue any defaulted claims he believes to be of merit by filing a successive postconviction petition in the circuit court in accordance with the \u201ccause and prejudice\u201d guidelines set forth in People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444 (2002). See also 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(f) (West 2004) (codifying the cause- and-prejudice test effective January 1, 2004). Pursuant to those guidelines, defendant will have to demonstrate \u201ccause\u201d for failing to raise the error in prior proceedings and actual \u201cprejudice\u201d resulting from the claimed error. See People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140, 148-50 (2004).\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and that of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.\nJUSTICE BURKE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John B. Roe, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin and Anderson M. Gansner, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Martin E Moltz and Joan M. Kripke, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.", "Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Patrick M. Carmody, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 100493.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PHILBERT PENDLETON, Appellee.\nOpinion filed December 21, 2006.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John B. Roe, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin and Anderson M. Gansner, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Martin E Moltz and Joan M. Kripke, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.\nThomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Patrick M. Carmody, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0458-01", "first_page_order": 476, "last_page_order": 494 }