{ "id": 3604920, "name": "In re RODNEY H., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois et al., Appellants, v. Rodney H., a Minor, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rodney H.", "decision_date": "2006-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 101385", "first_page": "510", "last_page": "526", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 510" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5765073 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 F.2d 352", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 203839 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/491/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 F.3d 1286", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7416395 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1293-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/67/1286-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 F.3d 697", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11888660 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/131/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "914 F.2d 846", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10537821 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849", "parenthetical": "\"[o]nce the state assumes custody of a person, it owes him a rudimentary duty of safekeeping\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/914/0846-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 U.S. 189", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12031841 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 991", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3621379 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "997" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0991-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 925", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Loy. U. Chi. L.J.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444129 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5703740 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487180 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2905706 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 1002", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3277308 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1006" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/1002-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2957771 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104", "parenthetical": "\"The first purpose of [a juvenile court] statute is not to punish but to correct\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 528", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027325 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" }, { "page": "658" }, { "page": "1984" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5465012 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222749 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725369 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 803", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156842 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0803-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 844", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5731163 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0844-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 U.S. 257", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6214309 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "2912" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/492/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307268 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828618 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156128 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609700 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596066 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799384 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444474 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5462174 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "950 F. 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Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7795141 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/950/0841-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 F.3d 780", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1567021 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/156/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131036 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0341-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1191, "char_count": 28806, "ocr_confidence": 0.795, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5719319137541337e-07, "percentile": 0.6788418938710327 }, "sha256": "4bb010199966c5fc38789410e155e8be0aaecc804a1eaa916af4e49cf8b8695f", "simhash": "1:cffbb56c610cbdf8", "word_count": 4831 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:23.819019+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re RODNEY H., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois et al., Appellants, v. Rodney H., a Minor, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nIn this direct appeal, the State challenges the circuit court of Cook County\u2019s order declaring section 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (see 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) (West 2004)) and section 5(1) of the Children and Family Services Act (see 20 ILCS 505/5(1) (West 2004)) unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711). For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.\nBACKGROUND\nOn September 24, 2004, 16-year-old Rodney H. entered an admission of guilt to misdemeanor battery, which occurred during an altercation at a park two years earlier. He was adjudicated delinquent, made a ward of the court, and placed on probation for one year. A condition of his probation was high school class attendance. Rodney received a suspension for truancy. On February 28, 2005, he entered an admission of guilt to this probation violation.\nOn March 28, 2005, at a dispositional hearing, the trial court stated it intended to declare, sua sponte, Public Act 89 \u2014 21 unconstitutional under the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, \u00a78(d). Public Act 89 \u2014 21 added section 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) to the Juvenile Court Act and section 5(1) to the Children and Family Services Act. Section 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) provides that a court may place a ward of the court in the guardianship of DCFS, \u201cbut only if the delinquent minor is under 13 years of age.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) (West 2004). Similarly, section 5(Z) provides, \u201cA minor charged with a criminal offense under the Criminal Code of 1961 or adjudicated delinquent shall not be placed in the custody of or committed to the Department by any court, except a minor less than 13 years of age committed to the Department under Section 5 \u2014 710 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.\u201d 20 ILCS 505/ 5(1) (West 2004). On March 30, 2005, DCFS notified the Attorney General of the trial court\u2019s intent. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 19.\nAfter learning that this court had rejected a single subject clause argument regarding Public Act 89 \u2014 21 in Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341 (1999), the trial court changed direction. The court stated it still intended to declare, sua sponte, section 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) unconstitutional \u2014 this time, under the proportionate penalties clause \u2014 and gave the parties citations to case law to prepare for a hearing on this issue. On June 13, 2005, DCFS\u2019s attorney argued that section 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) did not offend the proportionate penalties clause. Rodney\u2019s attorney had \u201cno response to whether or not proportionality review is warranted,\u201d though he did point to the proposition that offenses with the same elements should not receive different sentences. The assistant Cook County State\u2019s Attorney announced that her office had \u201cno position on this issue.\u201d\nThe court then entered a written order, holding that section 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) and section 5(l), as well as their related regulations (see 89 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7304.4 (eff. October 1, 1998); 89 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7304.5 (eff. January 10, 1996)) violated the proportionate penalties clause. The trial court reviewed Rodney\u2019s history. At that time, Rodney lived with his grandmother, a recovering heroin addict who may have relapsed, but he was frequently away from her home. Rodney had no other relatives to care for him.\nAccording to the trial court, a commitment to the Department of Corrections was not practical: \u201cGiven the fact that the minor only has a misdemeanor conviction and will get credit for the time spent in custody, it is unlikely that he will spend more than several weeks in an institution.\u201d The court noted that Rodney\u2019s probation officer, social workers, and educators all recommended residential placement, but such a disposition was not an option here. The trial court could not order residential placement through DCFS because section 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) and section 5(1) do not allow DCFS to accept guardianship of delinquent minors over age 13. Further, the trial court could not order residential placement through Cook County. The court explained:\n\u201cIn Cook County a committee was originally formed pursuant to a consent decree in federal court to assist in the placement of minor delinquents. This committee should have been dissolved when that decree was vacated. [See David B. v. McDonald, 156 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 1998); David B. ex rel. Murphy v. Patla, 950 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ill. 1996).] Instead this committee has devolved over time until one judge and a small army of bureaucrats has the power to over rule [szc] the sentencing decisions of an entire court in order to please a few county politicians. In a county of over 5,000,000 inhabitants, placements have been reduced from over 400 to less than 120 with the stated goal of reducing placements further to a maximum of 88. This minor cannot be placed in a residential setting because there is presently a freeze ordered on all placements because all funds have been exhausted. Every county in the State of Illinois struggles with the cost of placing minors who are delinquent.\u201d\nThe trial court asserted that the proportionate penalties clause applies to delinquency dispositions, then balked at the distinction in sections 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) and 5(Z) between delinquent minors under and over age 13:\n\u201cThe wisdom of the framers of the Illinois Constitution is apparent in this case. A minor under the age of thirteen who is convicted of a simple battery can be sentenced to the guardianship of [DCFS] and be eligible for all the services offered by DCFS. [Citation.] A minor, like [Rodney] here, who is over thirteen years of age is not eligible for sentencing to the guardianship of DCFS under [section 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv)]. Age is not a permissible distinction in the sentencing of juveniles. The result of such a distinction is a different penalty for the same offense. Such a statutory scheme violates Art. 1, sec. 11 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.\u201d\nStating that an unconstitutional statute is void ab initio, the trial court examined law before Public Act 89 \u2014 21. The court determined that section 5 \u2014 23(l)(a)(4) of the Juvenile Court Act (see 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 23(l)(a)(4) (West 1994)) allowed residential placement through DCFS.\nThe court then held a dispositional hearing at which only Rodney\u2019s probation officer testified. The probation officer discussed Rodney\u2019s situation and recommended residential placement through DCFS for two reasons: first, because Cook County is not placing minors \u201cat this time\u201d and, second, because \u201cthis is a dependency situation.\u201d The trial court extended Rodney\u2019s probation for three years and entered a DCFS guardianship placement order. The court agreed to stay this order pending a motion to reconsider from the State.\nOn August 15, 2005, the court held a hearing on the State\u2019s motion to reconsider. The State again argued that sections 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) and 5(1) did not violate the proportionate penalties clause. Rodney, tracking the court\u2019s written order, argued that these statutes created different sentences for the same offense. The assistant Cook County State\u2019s Attorney stated that her office still had no position on this issue. In denying the State\u2019s motion, the court referred to its written order and stated that \u201con the face of it, the statutory scheme is disproportionate.\u201d According to the court, \u201ca sentence is disproportionate and unconstitutional if identical offenses are given different sentences. That\u2019s exactly what the statute provides for. If he is under 13, he gets one sentence. If he is over 13, he does not get the same sentence.\u201d The court agreed to stay this order pending the State\u2019s appeal.\nThe State filed this direct appeal (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 603), and Rodney requested cross-relief. We allowed the Loyola University Chicago School of Law Civitas Child-Law Center to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of Rodney 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. Whether a statute is unconstitutional is a question of law, and, accordingly, our review proceeds de novo. Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 536 (2004).\nANALYSIS\nAll statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. People v. Botruff, 212 Ill. 2d 166, 178 (2004). To overcome this presumption, a party challenging a statute must clearly establish that it violates the constitution. People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 290 (2003). The procedural posture of this case, however, is unique because neither party challenged the constitutionality of section 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) of the Juvenile Court Act or section 5(1) of the Children and Family Services Act below. The trial court\u2019s ruling that these statutes facially violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution was sua sponte. The State, as the appellant here, argues that those statutes pass constitutional muster. Rodney, as the appellee, is left to defend a trial court ruling he never sought by clearly estabhshing that the statutes violate the Illinois Constitution.\nRodney acknowledges that the trial court \u201costensibly stated that it found the statute[s] to be facially unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause,\u201d but attempts to recast the court\u2019s ruling: \u201cthe court\u2019s finding and its reasoning, as set forth in its order, make plain that the finding of unconstitutionality was premised on the application of this statute to the facts of this particular case.\u201d Rodney then abandons the trial court\u2019s reasoning that the statutes created different penalties for the same offense, and instead presents an amalgam of constitutional arguments premised on the due process clauses of both the state and the federal constitutions (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a72; U.S. Const., amend. XIV), as well as the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the United States Constitution (see U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV). These arguments were not presented to the trial court, and were not addressed by the State in its opening brief before us. According to Rodney, an appellee may present any basis to uphold a lower court\u2019s decision (see People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 220 (1991)), and may raise new constitutional challenges to a statute at any time (see In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 61 (2003)).\nBefore we address Rodney\u2019s arguments, we will first dispense with the narrow issue decided by the trial court and appealed by the State: whether sections 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) and 5(1) facially violate the proportionate penalties clause because they create different penalties for the same offense. The proportionate penalties clause provides in part, \u201cAll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711. \u201cSection 11 is directed to the legislature in its function of declaring what conduct is criminal and the penalties for the conduct.\u201d People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 206 (1984). Our proportionate penalties clause is coextensive with the cruel and unusual punishment clause. See People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 517 (2005), citing People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 455 (1995). Both clauses apply only to the criminal process \u2014 that is, to direct actions by the government to inflict punishment. See Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260, 106 L. Ed. 2d 219, 228, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2912 (1989); Horvath v. White, 358 Ill. App. 3d 844, 854 (2005), citing Department of Corrections ex rel. People v. Adams, 278 Ill. App. 3d 803, 810 (1996). We therefore must determine whether the petition for adjudication of wardship here was a direct action by the state to inflict punishment.\nThe purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is, in part, to secure for minors subject to the Act \u201csuch care and guidance *** as will serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 2(1) (West 2004). The Act, stated the General Assembly, \u201cshall be administered in a spirit of humane concern, not only for the rights of the parties, but also for the fears and the limits of understanding of all who appear before the court.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 2(2) (West 2004). In 1999 when it retooled article V of the Act, the legislature stated its intent with respect to delinquent minors:\n\u201cIt is the intent of the General Assembly to promote a juvenile justice system capable of dealing with the problem of juvenile delinquency, a system that will protect the community, impose accountability for violations of law and equip juvenile offenders with competencies to live responsibly and productively. To effectuate this intent, the General Assembly declares the following to be important purposes of this Article:\n(a) To protect citizens from juvenile crime.\n(b) To hold each juvenile offender directly accountable for his or her acts.\n(c) To provide an individualized assessment of each alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile, in order to rehabilitate and to prevent further delinquent behavior through the development of competency in the juvenile offender. As used in this Section, \u2018competency\u2019 means the development of educational, vocational, social, emotional and basic life skills which enable a minor to mature into a productive member of society.\n(d) To provide due process, as required by the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Illinois, through which each juvenile offender and all other interested parties are assured fair hearings at which legal rights are recognized and enforced.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 101(1) (West 2004).\nOnce a minor is found delinquent, the trial court \u201cshall determine whether it is in the best interests of the minor or the public that he or she be made a ward of the court, and, if he or she is to be made a ward of the court, the court shall determine the proper disposition best serving the interests of the minor and the public.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014705(1) (West 2004). The trial court then has a wide range of options. The court may, inter alia, order a delinquent minor to perform community service, order a delinquent minor to make restitution, order a delinquent minor to undergo substance abuse assessment and treatment, order a delinquent minor partially or completely emancipated, suspend a delinquent minor\u2019s driver\u2019s license, place a delinquent minor on probation or conditional discharge, place a delinquent minor under age 13 in the guardianship of DCFS, place a delinquent minor in detention for up to 30 days, or commit a delinquent minor to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division (DOC). See 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014710 (West 2004). The court may place various conditions on a delinquent minor\u2019s probation or conditional discharge, including residential placement. See 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014715(2)(e) (West 2004). And, if the court finds that a delinquent minor\u2019s parent, guardian, or custodian is unfit, unable, or unwilling to provide care for the minor, the court may decide it is in the minor\u2019s best interests to place the minor in the custody of a suitable relative or in the guardianship of a probation officer, or to commit the minor to an agency besides DCFS or DOC, a vocational school, or any appropriate institution. See 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014740(1) (West 2004).\nEven as the legislature recognized that the juvenile court system should protect the public, it tempered that goal with the goal of developing delinquent minors into productive adults, and gave the trial court options designed to reach both goals. Article V may represent \u201ca fundamental shift from the singular goal of rehabilitation to include the overriding concerns of protecting the public and holding juvenile offenders accountable for violations of the law,\u201d but proceedings under the Act still are not criminal in nature. See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317 (2001). \u201cDelinquency proceedings are *** protective in nature and the purpose of the Act is to correct and rehabilitate, not to punish.\u201d In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 320 (1995); see also In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d 385, 390 (1977), citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647, 658, 91 S. Ct. 1976, 1984 (1971); In re Armour, 59 Ill. 2d 102, 104 (1974) (\u201cThe first purpose of [a juvenile court] statute is not to punish but to correct\u201d). Indeed, \u201cno suggestion or taint of criminality attaches to any finding of delinquency by a juvenile court.\u201d In re Dow, 75 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1006 (1979), citing People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Felt, 48 Ill. 2d 171, 174-75 (1971); accord People v. Brazee, 333 Ill. App. 3d 43, 48 (2002). Thus, because the petition for adjudication of wardship was not a direct action by the state to inflict punishment, neither the proportionate penalties clause nor the cruel and unusual punishment clause apply here.\nFurther, even if those provisions applied, sections 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) and 5(1) would not be facially unconstitutional. A facial challenge to a statute must fail if it could be validly applied in any instance. See In re M.T., 221 Ill. 2d 517, 533 (2006); In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253, 269 (2004). The trial court assumed that sections 5\u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) and 5(1) created different penalties for the same offense: delinquent minors under age 13 could receive residential placement through DCFS, and delinquent minors over age 13 could not. The trial court, however, retains discretion in fashioning a disposition for a delinquent minor; there is no discrete sentence for any offense, but instead a range of options. See, e.g., 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 710 (West 2004). It is not clear that a minor under age 13 adjudicated delinquent of misdemeanor battery would receive residential placement and a minor over age 13 adjudicated delinquent of the same offense would receive a harsher disposition. More importantly, sections 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) and 5(Z) blocked only one avenue for residential placement of a delinquent minor over age 13.\nThis conclusion brings us squarely to Rodney\u2019s argument. Rodney contends, for the first time before this court, that a constitutional violation results from the confluence of section 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) and sections 6\u2014 7(1) and 6 \u2014 8(2) of the Juvenile Court Act. According to Rodney, Public Act 89 \u2014 21, which added section 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv), was part of an effort to balance the state budget (see Arangold Corp., 187 Ill. 2d at 352), but also to answer DCFS\u2019s complaints that providing residential placement for delinquent juveniles over age 13 depleted its funds. See generally J. Hammer, Denying Child Welfare Services to Delinquent Teens: A Call to Return to the Roots of Illinois\u2019 Juvenile Court, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 925 (2005). Section 5 \u2014 710(1)(a)(iv), in effect, shifted financial responsibility for residential placement of delinquent juveniles over age 13 from the state to the counties.\nRodney asserts that the counties also sought to limit their own expenditures in this regard after Greve v. County of Du Page, 177 Ill. App. 3d 991, 997 (1988), which held that \u201cthe amounts ordered paid for the care and support of minors placed under the Juvenile Court Act are charges upon the county imposed by law independently of any action by the county board.\u201d The result of the counties\u2019 lobbying efforts was sections 6 \u2014 7 and 6 \u2014 8. Section 6 \u2014 7(1) provides:\n\u201cEach county board shall provide in its annual appropriation ordinance or annual budget *** a reasonable sum for payments for the care and support of minors, and for payments for court appointed counsel in accordance with orders entered under this Act in an amount which in the judgment of the county board may be needed for that purpose. Such appropriation or budget item constitutes a separate fund into which shall be paid not only the moneys appropriated by the county board, but also all reimbursements by parents and other persons and by the State.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/6 \u2014 7(1) (West 2004).\nSection 6 \u2014 8(2) provides:\n\u201cWhenever a ward of the court is placed under Section *** 5 \u2014 740, the court may order the county to make monthly payments from the fund established pursuant to section 6 \u2014 7 in an amount necessary for his care and support to the guardian of the person or legal custodian appointed under this Act, or to the agency which such guardian or custodian represents.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/6 \u2014 8(2) (West 2004).\nAccording to Rodney, the county board determines the reasonable amount to appropriate for residential placements of delinquent juveniles over age 13, and the trial court cannot order the county to pay for such placements, except from a fund established for that purpose. Rodney states that the Cook County board has decreased appropriations to the fund, and at the time of his dispositional hearing, the fund was exhausted and a freeze was placed on further placements. Thus, Rodney states, these statutes, \u201cby their plain language, now delimit the ability of the court to order the county to pay for residential placement of delinquent *** minors where the fund set aside by the county is exhausted.\u201d\nRodney does not assert that these statutes together violate separation of powers principles. His argument is much less direct. According to Rodney, when he became a ward of the court, the state created a special relationship with him as parens patriae and effectively took him into custody. Through wardship, the state could select his guardians, place him on probation with conditions that restrict his activities, or commit him to the DOC. Rodney claims that the state thus assumed a duty to provide him with rehabilitative care and individualized treatment, congruent with the duty it owes to abused and neglected minors (see 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 27 (West 2004)). And because the trial court found that residential placement was the only appropriate disposition, the state had a duty to provide \u2014 and Rodney had a corresponding \u201cliberty interest\u201d or right to receive \u2014 residential placement. This duty, Rodney continues, could not be \u201cstatutorily abdicated,\u201d nor this right statutorily denied, by sections 5 \u2014 710(1)(a)(iv), 6 \u2014 7(1), and 6 \u2014 8(2).\nRodney\u2019s argument implicates the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions, as well as the proportionate penalties clause of the state constitution and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment. Because juvenile dispositions are not penalties, we are left with a due process claim. Rodney relies upon DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989), and other federal circuit court cases, holding that the state owes an affirmative duty to protect persons in its custody whom it places in harm\u2019s way. See K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[o]nce the state assumes custody of a person, it owes him a rudimentary duty of safekeeping\u201d); accord Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 702-03 (7th Cir. 1997); Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1293-94 (7th Cir. 1995); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 359 (7th Cir. 1974). We do not disagree with the holdings in these cases, but we need not dissect them to determine whether Rodney\u2019s wardship placed him in state custody, and, if so, whether that custody created a duty to provide residential placement. Even accepting Rodney\u2019s characterization of the trial court as a \u201csuper-guardian\u201d (see David B., 156 F.3d at 783), his argument fails.\nSimply put, the problem with Rodney\u2019s argument is that sections 6 \u2014 7(1) and 6 \u2014 8(2) are not a problem, constitutionally. We have stated that section 5\u2014 710(l)(a)(iv) blocked one avenue to ordering residential placement for delinquent minors over age 13. As a practical matter, Cook County\u2019s lack of funds, not sections 6 \u2014 7(1) and 6 \u2014 8(2), blocked another avenue. That is, contrary to Rodney\u2019s argument, sections 6 \u2014 7(1) and 6\u2014 8(2) do not \u201cinsulate the County from the responsibility of providing residential placement to delinquent minors\u201d and do not prevent the trial court from ordering residential placement by counties. These sections, in fact, do not even address juvenile dispositions. Instead, they direct counties to create reasonably sized funds to pay for the care of delinquent minors and allow courts to order disbursements from such funds. See In re Moses W., 363 Ill. App. 3d 182, 189 (2006). The fact that Cook County\u2019s fund was exhausted when the trial court sought a residential placement for Rodney does not render those statutes invalid. When Cook County has funds to provide residential placements, the purported constitutional problem identified by Rodney disappears. As the State correctly notes, a failure to appropriate reasonable funds to care for delinquent minors may violate section 6 \u2014 7(1), but that does not mean that section 6 \u2014 7(1), section 6 \u2014 8(2), and section 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv), separately or together, are unconstitutional. Rodney\u2019s argument is better levied against the county, who is not a party to this appeal and further declined to offer an opinion on any constitutional issue below, than against the statutes. We express no opinion on the merits of such a claim here.\nRodney finally raises two equal protection arguments. Rodney contends that sections 5 \u2014 710(l)(a)(iv), 6 \u2014 7(1), and 6 \u2014 8(2) together violate equal protection because delinquent minors over age 13 whose cases reach the trial court before and after county funds are exhausted are arbitrarily treated differently. Rodney also contends that these statutes together violate equal protection because delinquent minors with affluent families can pay their way into residential placement (see 705 ILCS 405/ 6 \u2014 9 (West 2004)), while indigent minors cannot. These arguments collapse if the county has funds to provide residential placements.\nIn his request for cross-relief, Rodney asks us to order the trial court to terminate his wardship if we decide that the state had a duty to provide him with residential placement and that placement through DCFS is not possible. This would sever the special relationship formed between the state and Rodney, and extinguish the state\u2019s duty toward him.\nBecause we need not decide whether the state had a duty to provide residential placement, we reject Rodney\u2019s request. Further, we decline to micromanage juvenile court orders. The trial court on remand remains as free as it was before this appeal to fashion any disposition consistent with statutory directives. The court could, of course, terminate the wardship of Rodney, who is no longer a minor.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons that we have stated, we reverse and remand.\nReversed and remanded.\nRodney turned 18 years old on July 19, 2006, while this appeal was pending. Though he is no longer a minor (see 755 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 1 (West 2004)), the Juvenile Court Act provides that a wardship may extend until a person is 21 years old (see 705 ILCS 405/ 5 \u2014 755 (West 2004)). Neither party argues mootness.\nIn this order, the trial court mentioned sections 2 \u2014 10 and 2 \u2014 27 of the Juvenile Court Act, which also provide that a delinquent minor less than 13 years old shall not be committed to DCFS. See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 10(2), 2 \u2014 27(l)(d) (West 2004). The court did not declare these sections unconstitutional.\nSection 5 \u2014 23(l)(a)(4) stated that a delinquent minor over age 13 could be committed by the court to DCFS, but only subject to section 5 of Children and Family Services Act. 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 23(l)(a)(4) (West 1994). Section 5, in turn, provided that DCFS has discretion to accept delinquent minors, \u201cbut no such child shall be committed to the Department by any court without the approval of the Department, except a minor less than 13 years of age.\u201d 20 ILCS 505/5(l) (West 1994).\nRodney has not asked us to hold that a trial court could order a county to make payments for residential placement outside the fund required by section 6 \u2014 7(1). We express no opinion on this question.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Diane M. Potts, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Maya Szilak, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.", "Bruce A. Boyer, of Chicago, and Jeffrey Hammer, law student, for amicus curiae Loyola Civitas ChildLaw Center." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 101385.\nIn re RODNEY H., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois et al., Appellants, v. Rodney H., a Minor, Appellee).\nOpinion filed December 21, 2006.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Diane M. Potts, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Maya Szilak, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.\nBruce A. Boyer, of Chicago, and Jeffrey Hammer, law student, for amicus curiae Loyola Civitas ChildLaw Center." }, "file_name": "0510-01", "first_page_order": 528, "last_page_order": 544 }