{ "id": 3604887, "name": "RICHARD G. KRAUTSACK, Appellee, v. DAVID ANDERSON et al., Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Krautsack v. Anderson", "decision_date": "2006-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 101718", "first_page": "541", "last_page": "569", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 541" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910210 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 1029", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35404 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1035" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/1029-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 946", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894540 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "949" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0946-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317124 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "\"Rule 137 was adopted as a means of preventing false and frivolous filings\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442062 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34", "parenthetical": "identifying Rule 137 as one of the procedures in place to resolve contentions of bad-faith litigation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725386 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 F. Supp. 2d 956", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 637879 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "959" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/73/0956-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 F.3d 1028", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 943515 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1030" }, { "page": "1031" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/126/1028-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3450117 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801353 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. B.J. 266", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ill. B.J.", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801362 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083629 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288", "parenthetical": "the Act \"is a regulatory and remedial enactment intended to curb a variety of fraudulent abuses and to provide a remedy to individuals injured by them\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735959 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4258772 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475", "parenthetical": "rejecting \"the notion that a prevailing defendant must show bad faith on the part of the plaintiff prior to being awarded attorney fees\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 520949 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730-31", "parenthetical": "prevailing plaintiffs fee petition" }, { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 790", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333181 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825-26" }, { "page": "824-26", "parenthetical": "prevailing plaintiffs' fee petition" }, { "page": "825", "parenthetical": "affirming denial of fee award to the prevailing plaintiff where the trial found the defendants acted out of \"stupidity,\" as opposed to bad faith, and judgment of $1.7 million was a sufficient deterrent" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3569500 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318-19" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "318-19", "parenthetical": "affirming denial of fee award to the prevailing plaintiff where the plaintiff was awarded $1,125 in actual damages and $17,000 in punitive damages" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256676 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2573414 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" }, { "page": "600" }, { "page": "600" }, { "page": "602", "parenthetical": "noting the \"difficulty in envisioning a circumstance arising under the [Consumer Fraud] Act where fees should be awarded a defendant absent bad faith on the part of a plaintiff'" }, { "page": "602" }, { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 1015", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2930544 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1020" }, { "page": "1022-23" }, { "page": "1021", "parenthetical": "holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial court's exercise of discretion to award fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/1015-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462649 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16-17" }, { "page": "33-34" }, { "page": "30-31" }, { "page": "33", "parenthetical": "noting that consumer fraud defendants faced with defending a frivolous suit may seek recourse under the fee-shifting provision of section 10a(c)" }, { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828029 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351260 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462961 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736074 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295827 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576867 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5703875 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" }, { "page": "246" }, { "page": "246" }, { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045717 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130376 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096310 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" }, { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3337246 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" }, { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/223/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578232 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222668 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106-09", "parenthetical": "prevailing defendants' fee petition" }, { "page": "108", "parenthetical": "holding that trial court must make a threshold finding of plaintiffs bad faith before awarding fees to a prevailing defendant" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "107" }, { "page": "107" }, { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472375 ], "weight": 15, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Krautsack I" }, { "page": "677" }, { "page": "679" }, { "page": "679" }, { "page": "682" }, { "page": "684" }, { "page": "685" }, { "page": "685" }, { "page": "685-86" }, { "page": "685" }, { "page": "685" }, { "page": "685" }, { "page": "676" }, { "page": "677" }, { "page": "670-71", "parenthetical": "summarizing Anderson's deposition testimony" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. 2d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3598053 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/219/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799402 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461199 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8447969 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6-7" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1596, "char_count": 50714, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.239898649313846e-07, "percentile": 0.941165295737319 }, "sha256": "bd6030bf03024551c3f61ea6d52ffcd89b66ae5caf4b8a7aa575cc47e12f75c4", "simhash": "1:5fef53a62e8ce4f5", "word_count": 8285 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:23.819019+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RICHARD G. KRAUTSACK, Appellee, v. DAVID ANDERSON et al., Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, and Garman concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Karmeier dissented, with opinion.\nJustice Burke took no part in the decision.\nOPINION\nPlaintiff, Richard G. Krautsack, brought an action in the circuit court of Cook County against defendants, Luxury Adventures, Ltd. (Luxury), a California corporation, and David Anderson, Luxury\u2019s president and sole shareholder, for breach of contract and violations of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act or Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2004)). Defendants prevailed at trial and subsequently filed a petition seeking attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 10a(c) of the Act (815 ILCS 505/ 10a(c) (West 2004)) and Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137). The trial court granted plaintiffs motion to strike defendants\u2019 fee petition. Both parties appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs complaint, and affirmed the trial court\u2019s order striking defendants\u2019 fee petition. No. 1 \u2014 04\u20142135 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (Krautsack II). We allowed defendants\u2019 petition for leave to appeal and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nBACKGROUND\nOn January 9, 1998, plaintiff and three family members embarked on a two-week, $38,000 safari to East Africa arranged by Luxury. Although the trip was scheduled during what would ordinarily be the dry season, plaintiffs safari experience was marred by heavy rainfall reportedly due to the phenomenon known as \u201cEl Nino.\u201d Upon return from East Africa, plaintiff contacted Anderson and requested a cash refund, which Anderson declined. The parties were unable to resolve their dispute and on September 1, 1998, plaintiff filed suit against Anderson, seeking a full refund, attorney fees and costs, and punitive damages. Plaintiff later amended the complaint to add Luxury as a defendant.\nCount I of the amended complaint alleged a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act by Anderson. Plaintiff alleged that shortly before leaving on safari, he obtained information that the countries on the tour were experiencing heavy rainfall. Plaintiff contacted Luxury and \u201cwas assured by Anderson that the information he had received was incorrect and that the tour would neither be disrupted nor made more difficult because of the rain.\u201d Plaintiff claimed these representations were false and were made in an effort to convince plaintiff not to postpone the tour. Count II of the amended complaint alleged that Luxury, as Anderson\u2019s employer, was liable for his fraudulent conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Finally, count III of the amended complaint alleged that Luxury breached its contract with plaintiff \u201cbecause certain of the designated tour sites could not be visited, and certain other sites could only be reached with great difficulty.\u201d\nDefendants moved for summary judgment. Briefly, defendants argued that Anderson\u2019s statements regarding the weather in Africa were not actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act, but even if those statements were deceptive, they did not proximately cause plaintiff any injury. According to defendants, the statements were made shortly before the planned departure date and, under the parties\u2019 contract, plaintiff could not have cancelled the safari without forfeiting the entire cost of the trip. Defendants also argued that plaintiff signed a contract clearly stating that Luxury was not liable for acts of God or the weather. Finally, defendants claimed entitlement to a reasonable attorney fee under section 10a(c) of the Act.\nIn response, plaintiff argued that material issues of fact regarding the communications between the parties, the cancellation and refund provisions of the parties\u2019 contract, and other relevant matters precluded summary judgment. Plaintiff also refined his theory of recovery under the Consumer Fraud Act. Although plaintiff still maintained that defendant Anderson deceived plaintiff when he stated that the weather in Africa would not adversely affect the safari, plaintiff now argued that, based on the record generated in discovery, Anderson had a financial motive for deceiving him and acted out of \u201cgreed and avarice.\u201d According to plaintiff:\n\u201cWhen [plaintiff] asked for Anderson\u2019s recommendation, Anderson found himself in a bind because Anderson had already paid his African suppliers in advance for [plaintiffs] trip, and if [plaintiff] postponed, Anderson would lose all of that money. *** [I]nstead of being truthful with [plaintiff], Anderson lied to him, recommended to plaintiff that he leave for Africa on January 9, but not revealing that the reason for his recommendation was that he did not want to lose money.\n* * *\nAnderson\u2019s misrepresentation to [plaintiff] and his withholding from [plaintiff] the true basis of his recommendation, is actionable because [plaintiff] would clearly have acted differently had he known the truth, instead of being deceived by Anderson.\u201d\nThe trial court granted defendants summary judgment on all three counts of the amended complaint. With respect to the consumer fraud counts, the trial court stated in relevant part:\n\u201cAlthough [defendants\u2019 actions may have been motivated by self interest, as they had already forwarded certain non-refundable sums to their African suppliers, [defendants cannot predict the weather in such a harsh tropical environment. Defendants are clear that their representations about the weather and its effects on their clients\u2019 transportation were based purely on their personal experiences as well as those of their contacts in the region. There is no possible way that these statements could be viewed as fraudulent and deceptive. It would be against public policy to hold one Hable for acts of God. The choice was left to [pjlaintiff to cancel the trip \u2014 he chose not to. Therefore, the Court finds that there is no question of fact that [djefendants did not engage in any deceptive act or practice in this case.\u201d\nWith respect to the contract count, the trial court ruled that no evidence was introduced that Luxury had a contractual duty to recommend that plaintiff postpone his trip, and the evidence that was presented indicated that Luxury satisfied all of its contractual obligations. The trial court also noted that damages did not result directly from Luxury\u2019s action, but were the direct result of inclement weather, \u201csomething obviously outside of Luxury\u2019s control.\u201d The trial court concluded: \u201cThe facts are clear that Luxury used its best efforts to book a trip for [pjlaintiff during the dry season and there have been no facts presented by [pjlaintiff to contradict this.\u201d\nDefendants thereafter filed an amended petition for attorney fees under section 10a(c) of the Consumer Fraud Act. Section 10a(c) states that a court \u201cmay award *** reasonable attorney\u2019s fees and costs to the prevailing party.\u201d 815 ILCS 505/10a(c) (West 2004). Defendants also filed a motion for Rule 137 sanctions, arguing that no basis in fact or law existed to support plaintiff\u2019s claims. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. The trial court granted the fee petition and the sanctions motion, assessing fees of $10,499 and costs of $104. Plaintiff appealed.\nOn appeal, plaintiff further refined his theory of recovery under the Consumer Fraud Act, arguing that the relationship between plaintiff and defendants was that of principal and agent, and that the relationship was a fiduciary one. Plaintiff claimed Anderson had a conflict of interest when he advised plaintiff to continue with his travel plans. Plaintiff explained:\n\u201cThe source of the conflict was that any recommendation that Anderson could make to [plaintiff] could not have benefitted both of their respective financial interests. If Anderson advised [plaintiff] to postpone his travel plans, then Anderson would lose a substantial amount of money. If, on the other hand, Anderson advised [plaintiff] to continue with his travel plans, then [plaintiff] would travel to Africa during a period of torrential rainfall.\nFaced with this conflict, Anderson was obligated, as [plaintiff\u2019s] agent, and consistent with his fiduciary duty, to subordinate his personal interests to [plaintiff\u2019s] interests and to advise [plaintiff] without bias. Alternatively, if Anderson was unwilling to subordinate his personal interest, as was the case, then Anderson was required to fully disclose this interest to [plaintiff].\u201d\nPlaintiff also argued on appeal that the record contained substantial evidence supporting his consumer fraud claim that precluded summary judgment. In particular, plaintiff cited a March 1998 e-mail from Anderson to one of the African tour operators in which Anderson states that plaintiff \u201cdid not get what he paid for,\u201d and that Anderson \u201cwas protecting a lot of asses when [he] \u2018pushed\u2019 [plaintiff] to continue with his travel plans.\u201d\nAs to the contract count, plaintiff argued, inter alia, that an issue of disputed fact existed as to whether Luxury could fulfill its contractual obligations to arrange for a safari in the dry season where the dry season was so plagued by rainfall that the safari was made almost impossible to conduct. As to proximate causation, plaintiff argued that his damages were the direct result of Luxury\u2019s failure to reschedule the safari and not an act of God.\nThe appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment. Krautsack v. Anderson, 329 Ill. App. 3d 666 (2002) (Krautsack I). As to the consumer fraud count, the appellate court noted that \u201c[wjhile the failure to disclose or concealment of material information by a travel agent, based on the agent\u2019s fiduciary duty to his clients, is a novel and uncommon theory, it is not, however, unheard of.\u201d Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 677. Reviewing case law from this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions relative to a travel agent\u2019s duties, the appellate court concluded that \u201cif an agent has a conflict of interest or some interest that would be adverse to the client or affect the client\u2019s decision, the agent must disclose that fact to the client.\u201d Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 679. The appellate court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Anderson failed to disclose information material to the object of the parties\u2019 agency. Thus, summary judgment on the consumer fraud claim was improper. Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 679. The appellate court also held that material issues of fact existed as to the terms of the contract between the parties, and that the March 1998 e-mail was sufficient evidence of a breach to allow the contract claim to proceed to trial. Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 682.\nAs to the trial court\u2019s grant of attorney fees and costs under Rule 137, the appellate court concluded that because plaintiff\u2019s causes of action survived summary judgment, Rule 137 sanctions were not warranted. Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 684. In other words, no basis existed for concluding that plaintiff ran afoul of the rule\u2019s requirement that pleadings, motions and other papers must be well grounded in fact and law and not interposed for an improper purpose. 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.\nFinally, the appellate court addressed the trial court\u2019s grant of fees and costs to defendants under section 10a(c) of the Consumer Fraud Act. Because the appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, defendants were no longer the prevailing parties for purposes of section 10a(c), and thus were not eligible for an award of fees. Although the appellate court could have reversed the fee award on this basis, the court chose to address plaintiffs argument that the award of fees was improper because the record failed to disclose bad faith on his part. Relying principally on Casey v. Jerry Yusim Nissan, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 102 (1998), the appellate court held that an award of statutory fees must be supported by a finding that the plaintiff acted in bad faith, and that Rule 137 provided the proper standard for bad faith. If the trial court finds bad faith under this standard, the court can then consider other relevant factors. Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 685.\nThe appellate court inferred, based on the trial court\u2019s award of Rule 137 sanctions, that it had found bad faith. Because the appellate court reversed the grant of Rule 137 sanctions, however, the inference was no longer valid and no basis existed for awarding fees under the Consumer Fraud Act. Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 685. The appellate court reversed the statutory fee award and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 685-86.\nOn remand, the case proceeded to a bench trial. Two witnesses testified: plaintiff and defendant Anderson. The trial court denied defendants\u2019 motion for a directed finding after the close of plaintiff\u2019s case in chief, but ultimately entered judgment for defendants on all counts of the amended complaint. After judgment was entered, plaintiff learned for the first time that, prior to trial, the California Attorney General had filed a 34-count felony complaint against defendant Anderson, charging him with grand theft, failure to return money, and trust account violations in connection with his safari business. Based on the documentation provided to plaintiff by the California Attorney General, plaintiff moved to vacate the judgment in this case and enter judgment in his favor. Plaintiff argued that defendant had violated discovery rules by failing to disclose the California charges and had committed perjury when he testified that he was not a travel agent.\nThe trial court denied the motion to vacate judgment. Although agreeing with plaintiff that the California charges should have been disclosed, those charges, as well as Anderson\u2019s subsequent plea of \u201cno contest\u201d to three of the felony counts, were relevant for impeachment purposes only and did not establish a ground for vacating the judgment. The trial court also rejected plaintiff\u2019s claim that Anderson committed perjury.\nThereafter, with leave of court, defendants filed their amended petition for attorney fees pursuant to section 10a(c) of the Consumer Fraud Act and Rule 137. Defendants sought fees and costs totaling over $30,000. Plaintiff moved to strike the fee petition. Relying on the appellate court\u2019s judgment in Krautsack I, plaintiff argued that for purposes of section 10a(c) of the Act, defendants must first establish that plaintiff was guilty of bad faith under the standard set forth in Rule 137, and that defendants\u2019 fee petition, on its face, failed to identify any alleged violation of that rule. The trial court granted plaintiffs motion to strike:\n\u201cI agree that the Appellate Court decision in this case greatly undermines a defendant seeking fees in this case, because they discuss the validity of the legal theory that the plaintiff was asserting and also held there were material issues of fact that precluded entry of summary judgment at that time.\nEven if I don\u2019t strike the *** amended motion for attorney\u2019s fees and I consider the merits of the motion for fees, I still find that the defendants are not entitled to the fees under either the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act or [Rule] 137.\n* * *\nI don\u2019t think the requisite bad faith or culpability under [Rule] 137 has been shown ***.\u201d\nDefendants appealed the trial court\u2019s order striking their fee petition; plaintiff cross-appealed from the trial court\u2019s order granting judgment in favor of defendants on his consumer fraud and contract claims, as well as the trial court\u2019s order denying his motion to vacate that judgment.\nThe appellate court held that \u201cthe trial court properly struck defendants\u2019 petition for fees and costs because they failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 137.\u201d \u201c[T]here is not a single allegation by defendants of any false statement by plaintiff in any specific written document filed with the trial court. *** Additionally, defendants sought to recover fees and costs incurred for this entire litigation, which is improper.\u201d The appellate court further held that because defendants failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 137, their request for fees under the Consumer Fraud Act must also fail since defendants did not show bad faith on plaintiffs part. No. 1 \u2014 04\u2014 2135 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nWith respect to plaintiffs cross-appeal, the appellate court held that the trial court\u2019s judgment on the merits in favor of defendants was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that the trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs motion to vacate the judgment. No. 1 \u2014 04\u20142135 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nWe allowed defendants\u2019 petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.\nANALYSIS\nI\nDefendants first argue that the appellate court erred in holding that bad faith is a prerequisite to an award of attorney fees and costs to a prevailing defendant under section 10a(c) of the Consumer Fraud Act. Plaintiff counters that this is the same issue defendants litigated and lost in Krautsack I, and that defendants, having failed to seek review of Krautsack I in this court, are now precluded from relitigating this issue under the law of the case doctrine. We disagree.\nGenerally, the law of the case doctrine bars relitigation of an issue previously decided in the same case. People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 395 (2002). Thus, \u201cthe determination of a question of law by the Appellate Court on the first appeal may, as a general rule, be binding upon it on the second appeal.\u201d Zerulla v. Supreme Lodge Order of Mutual Protection, 223 Ill. 518, 520 (1906); accord Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d at 395. Significantly, however, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable to this court in reviewing the decision of the appellate court. Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 194 Ill. 2d 438, 447 (2000); People v. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d 463, 488 (1985); Zerulla, 223 Ill. at 520. Rather, \u201c[s]ince this is the first time this case has been before us, we may review all matters which were properly raised and passed on in the course of the litigation.\u201d Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 488, citing Relph v. Board of Education of De Pue Unit School District No. 103, 84 Ill. 2d 436, 442 (1981); accord Garibaldi, 194 Ill. 2d at 447. Accordingly, we will consider defendants\u2019 argument, raised in Krautsack I and Krautsack II, that an award of attorney fees to a prevailing defendant under section 10a(c) of the Act should not be conditioned upon a finding that the plaintiff acted in bad faith. Before examining the provisions of the Consumer Fraud Act, we briefly review the principles of law that guide a court\u2019s interpretation of a statute.\nThe cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 246 (2006); Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). The best indication of this intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d at 246; Lucas v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 171 (1997). Where the language is unambiguous, the statute must be given effect without resort to other aids of construction. In re R.L.S., 218 Ill. 2d 428, 433 (2006); Quad Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis, 208 Ill. 2d 498, 508 (2004). In examining a statute, a court must give effect to the entire statutory scheme. Thus, words and phrases should not be construed in isolation; rather, they must be interpreted in light of other relevant portions of the statute. Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d at 246; Primeco Personal Communications, L.P. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 196 Ill. 2d 70, 87-88 (2001). Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law which we review de novo. Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d at 246.\nSection 10a(a) of the Consumer Fraud Act authorizes a private right of action for \u201c[a]ny person who suffers actual damage as a result of a violation of [the] Act.\u201d 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 2004); Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 179 (2005); Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 12, 16-17 (2003). This section also authorizes the court, in its discretion, to \u201caward actual economic damages or any other relief which the court deems proper.\u201d 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 2004). Section 10a(c) supplements section 10a(a) by expressly authorizing, among other relief, an award of attorney fees and costs. Section 10a(c) states:\n\u201cExcept as provided in subsections (f), (g), and (h) of this Section, [ ] in any action brought by a person under this Section, the Court may grant injunctive relief where appropriate and may award, in addition to the relief provided in this Section, reasonable attorney\u2019s fees and costs to the prevailing party.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 815 ILCS 505/10a(c) (West 2004).\nThe term \u201cprevailing party\u201d encompasses a prevailing defendant, as well as a prevailing plaintiff. Allen, 208 Ill. 2d at 33-34, citing Graunke v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth Volvo, Inc., 247 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 1020 (1993); see also Haskell v. Blumthal, 204 Ill. App. 3d 596, 599 (1990). Because section 10a(c) states that the court \u201cmay\u201d award attorney fees and costs, and the word \u201cmay\u201d ordinarily connotes discretion (People v. Ullrich, 135 Ill. 2d 477, 484 (1990)), attorney fee awards are left to the sound discretion of the trial court (see Haskell, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 600; Tague v. Molitor Motor Co., 139 Ill. App. 3d 313, 318-19 (1985)).\nIn determining whether a trial court abused its discretion, our appellate court has identified several factors or criteria a trial court may consider when ruling on a fee petition under section 10a(c). These factors include, but are not limited to, \u201c(1) the degree of the opposing party\u2019s culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the opposing party to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of fees against the opposing party would deter others from acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the party requesting fees sought to benefit all consumers or businesses or to resolve a significant legal question regarding the Act; and (5) the relative merits of the parties\u2019 positions.\u201d Graunke, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 1022-23; see also Washington Courte Condominium Ass\u2019n-Four v. Washington-Golf Corp., 267 Ill. App. 3d 790, 825-26 (1994). Although this nonexhaustive list of factors was first identified in a consumer fraud case involving a fee petition by a prevailing defendant (Haskell, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 600), these factors have been applied in cases involving fee petitions by both prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants (see Casey, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 106-09 (prevailing defendants\u2019 fee petition); Majcher v. Laurel Motors, Inc., 287 Ill. App. 3d 719, 730-31 (1997) (prevailing plaintiffs fee petition); Washington Courte Condominium, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 824-26 (prevailing plaintiffs\u2019 fee petition)).\nDefendants do not dispute that these factors are relevant to a trial court\u2019s determination of whether to award fees to a prevailing defendant under section 10a(c) of the Act. Instead, defendants dispute the significance of a trial court\u2019s finding that the plaintiff acted in bad faith. Defendants argue that the plaintiffs bad faith, if any, is simply one factor to consider, but is not the controlling factor. We note that our appellate court is divided as to whether a prevailing defendant must show bad faith on the part of the plaintiff prior to an award of attorney fees under section 10a(c). Compare Graunke, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 1021 (holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial court\u2019s exercise of discretion to award fees), and Boeckenhauer v. Joe Rizza Lincoln Mercury, 361 Ill. App. 3d 470, 475 (2005) (rejecting \u201cthe notion that a prevailing defendant must show bad faith on the part of the plaintiff prior to being awarded attorney fees\u201d), with Casey, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 108 (holding that trial court must make a threshold finding of plaintiffs bad faith before awarding fees to a prevailing defendant), and Haskell, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 602 (noting the \u201cdifficulty in envisioning a circumstance arising under the [Consumer Fraud] Act where fees should be awarded a defendant absent bad faith on the part of a plaintiff\u2019).\nIn the present case, the appellate court ruled in Krautsack I that a trial court must first determine whether the plaintiff acted in bad faith, and only if such finding is made should the trial court analyze the remaining factors. Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 685, quoting Casey, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 108. In Krautsack II, the appellate court adhered to its earlier ruling. No. 1 \u2014 04\u20142135 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendants argue that the appellate court\u2019s decision is contrary to the plain language of section 10a(c) of the Act, and that the legislature did not intend to establish a different standard for defendants seeking fees from that applicable to a plaintiff seeking fees. Plaintiff counters that section 10a(c) does not limit the trial court\u2019s discretion in awarding fees under the Act, and that requiring a bad-faith finding where a defendant seeks fees is entirely consistent with the remedial purposes of the Act.\nAlthough we agree with defendants that nothing in the plain language of section 10a(c) conditions a fee award to a prevailing defendant on a finding that the plaintiff acted in bad faith, we also agree with plaintiff that section 10a(c) does not expressly restrict a trial court\u2019s discretion or identify the circumstances under which a fee petition should be allowed. Thus, our analysis must go beyond the plain language of section 10a(c). We must examine the fee-shifting provision in light of the entire statute, keeping in mind the subject the statute addresses, the legislature\u2019s apparent objective in adopting the statute, and the evils sought to be remedied. See R.L.S., 218 Ill. 2d at 433; People v. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d 148, 156 (2006).\nAs the full title of the Consumer Fraud Act explains, it is \u201c[a]n Act to protect consumers and borrowers and businessmen against fraud, unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce ***.\u201d Pub. Act 78\u2014 904, eff. October 1, 1973 (amending the title of the Act and adding section 10a, among other amendments); see also Scott v. Ass\u2019n for Childbirth at Home, International, 88 Ill. 2d 279, 288 (1981) (the Act \u201cis a regulatory and remedial enactment intended to curb a variety of fraudulent abuses and to provide a remedy to individuals injured by them\u201d). In addition to the private right of action section 10a establishes, the Attorney General is empowered to investigate and prosecute offenders. 815 ILCS 505/3 through 7 (West 2004); Allen, 208 Ill. 2d at 16. By its own terms, the Act \u201cshall be liberally construed to effect the purposes thereof.\u201d 815 ILCS 505/1 la (West 2004).\nBecause individual consumer fraud claims are frequently small, the attorney fee provision in section 10a(c) ensures that defrauded consumers will be able to exercise their rights under the statute. Allen, 208 Ill. 2d at 30-31. As we explained in Cruz v. Northwestern Chrysler Plymouth Sales, Inc., 179 Ill. 2d 271, 279-80 (1997):\n\u201c[I]n consumer fraud cases the attorney fee awards can easily constitute the largest part of a plaintiffs recovery. The legislature realized this when it enacted the fee-shifting provision of the Consumer Fraud Act. That provision is premised on the recognition that plaintiffs would be reluctant to seek redress for consumer fraud if the recovery would be nearly or completely consumed by attorney fees and was designed to encourage plaintiffs who have a cause of action to sue even if recovery would be small.\u201d\nSee also A. Saltzman, A Brief Look at Statutory Attorneys\u2019 Fees in Illinois, 73 Ill. B.J. 266, 268 (1985) (\u201cWhere the legislature has enacted laws designed to protect the public or to create new rights in members of the public and has provided for private rights of action under these laws, it often also provides for fee shifting to ensure that the private rights of action will be exercised\u201d).\nThe legislature\u2019s allowance of fee awards to prevailing defendants is necessarily motivated by a different concern: \u201cto deter bad-faith conduct by a plaintiff and to reimburse a defendant when that occurs.\u201d Haskell, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 602; see also Allen, 208 Ill. 2d at 33 (noting that consumer fraud defendants faced with defending a frivolous suit may seek recourse under the fee-shifting provision of section 10a(c)).\nLimiting a consumer fraud defendant\u2019s ability to recover fees to instances where the plaintiff acted in bad faith is consistent with the purpose of the Act. If this limitation did not exist, a prevailing defendant could be awarded fees simply because the plaintiff, although having a legitimate claim and proceeding in good faith, lost at trial on the proofs. The potential for such a penalty would act as a deterrent to the filing of valid consumer fraud claims. Casey, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 107. Our duty, of course, is to avoid a construction that would defeat the statute\u2019s purpose or yield absurd or unjust results. In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 195 (1997).\nDefendants argue that a bad-faith requirement for fee awards to prevailing defendants unfairly distorts consumer fraud actions in favor of plaintiffs. According to defendants, the legislature could not have intended to create a massive incentive for plaintiffs to sue by providing an almost automatic right to attorney fees, while at the same time extinguishing any possibility that defendants could recover their fees unless they demonstrated that the plaintiff acted in bad faith.\nContrary to defendants\u2019 argument, an attorney fee award to a prevailing plaintiff is not automatic. A prevailing plaintiff, like a prevailing defendant, is entitled to petition the court for an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 10a(c), but the award of fees is discretionary, not mandatory. See, e.g., Majcher, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 730; Haskell, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 600; Tague, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 318. Circumstances may exist which militate against an award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff. See Washington Courte Condominium, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 825 (affirming denial of fee award to the prevailing plaintiff where the trial found the defendants acted out of \u201cstupidity,\u201d as opposed to bad faith, and judgment of $1.7 million was a sufficient deterrent); Tague, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 318-19 (affirming denial of fee award to the prevailing plaintiff where the plaintiff was awarded $1,125 in actual damages and $17,000 in punitive damages).\nAlthough an award of attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff is not automatic, we recognize that a prevailing plaintiff is more likely than a prevailing defendant to recover attorney fees. This result, however, is not a function of any distortion of statutory language or legislative intent. Rather, it is a function of the remedial purpose of the Act. That is, without the ability to recover attorney fees, the protections of the Act are illusory. Allen, 208 Ill. 2d at 31.\nDefendants\u2019 argument also overlooks that a prevailing plaintiff has already proven that the defendant is guilty of consumer fraud. An award of fees under that circumstance causes defendants \u201cto bear the full and fair consequences of their illegal conduct\u201d (Warren v. LeMay, 142 Ill. App. 3d 550, 583 (1986)) and fulfills the Act\u2019s laudatory purpose of protecting consumers\u2019 rights. A prevailing defendant, on the other hand, has not necessarily established anything more than that the plaintiffs efforts at suit were unsuccessful. In light of the uncertainty of litigation, routinely awarding fees under this circumstance would discourage consumer fraud plaintiffs from pursuing their statutory rights, frustrating the legislature\u2019s intent when it adopted the Act. See Casey, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 107.\nWe conclude that a bad-faith requirement for fee awards to a prevailing defendant, without a corresponding bad-faith requirement for fee awards to a prevailing plaintiff, is consonant with the purposes of the Consumer Fraud Act. Thus, where a prevailing defendant petitions the trial court for a reasonable attorney fee under section 10a(c), only if the trial court makes a threshold finding that the plaintiff acted in bad faith should the trial court consider other circumstances relevant to its exercise of discretion. Although a prevailing plaintiff may seek to demonstrate a defendant\u2019s bad faith, a plaintiff is not required to do so. Accordingly, a trial court need not make a threshold finding of bad faith in order to award a plaintiff attorney fees under section 10a(c) of the Act.\nII\nWe next consider whether, as the appellate court held, Rule 137 provides the proper standard for judging a party\u2019s bad faith when considering the propriety of fees under section 10a(c) of the Act. No. 1 \u2014 04\u20142135 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (applying its earlier ruling in Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 685). Relying on Door Systems, Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Systems, Inc., 126 F.3d 1028 (7th Cir. 1997), defendants argue that the appellate court\u2019s standard is too narrow.\nIn Door Systems, a federal district court awarded attorney fees to the prevailing defendant in a suit under the Act, treating such award as an automatic right. The court of appeals recognized that a fee award under the Act is not automatic and then sought to clarify the appropriate standard for fee awards, stating in relevant part:\n\u201cWe think it reasonably plain that bad faith is too narrow a standard. Even if a suit is brought in good faith, it could be so lacking in merit or so burdensome to defend against as to be oppressive, in which event the defendant would have a powerful equitable claim to recover a reasonable attorneys\u2019 fee.\u201d Door Systems, 126 F.3d at 1030.\nThe court of appeals explained that an oppressive suit \u201cwas something that might be described not just as a losing suit but as a suit that had elements of an abuse of process, whether or not it had all the elements of the tort.\u201d Door Systems, 126 F.3d at 1031.\nThe difference between the oppression standard adopted by the court of appeals and the bad-faith standard employed by our appellate court is unclear, and defendants here do not attempt to illuminate the matter. We note that one federal district court has concluded that \u201c[a]ny significant distinction between the \u2018bad faith\u2019 standard and the \u2018oppression\u2019 standard is not overtly apparent.\u201d Janikowski v. Lynch Ford, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 956, 959 (N.D. Ill. 1999).\nWhile we are not persuaded that this court should adopt the rationale of Door Systems, we agree with defendants that the bad-faith standard, as articulated by the appellate court, is too narrow. As already noted, the appellate court held that \u201cRule 137 provides the proper standard for bad faith\u201d when determining the propriety of fees under section 10a(c) of the Act. Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 685, citing Casey, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 108. Rule 137 provides in relevant part:\n\u201cThe signature of an attorney or party [on a pleading, motion or other paper] constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. *** If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the fifing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney fee.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.\n\u201cThe purpose of Rule 137 is to prevent abuse of the judicial process by penalizing claimants who bring vexatious and harassing actions.\u201d Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 195 Ill. 2d 257, 285-86 (2001); see also Kingbrook, Inc. v. Pupurs, 202 Ill. 2d 24, 34 (2002) (identifying Rule 137 as one of the procedures in place to resolve contentions of bad-faith litigation); Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology International, 177 Ill. 2d 267, 279 (1997) (\u201cRule 137 was adopted as a means of preventing false and frivolous filings\u201d).\nBecause Rule 137 addresses the pleadings, motions and other papers a litigant files, the rule does not provide a sanction against all asserted instances of bad-faith conduct by a litigant or the litigant\u2019s attorney during the course of litigation. See In re Marriage of Oleksy, 337 Ill. App. 3d 946, 949 (2003). For example, a party\u2019s pleadings may conform to Rule 137, yet the party may be guilty of other rule violations amounting to bad faith. We discern no reason why a prevailing defendant should be limited by Rule 137 in establishing a plaintiffs bad faith. Rule 137, and the body of case law that has developed around it, provide useful guidance to litigants and judges, but a defendant\u2019s failure to demonstrate bad faith by the plaintiff under Rule 137 is not fatal to a prevailing defendant\u2019s fee petition under the Act. Appellate court opinions which hold to the contrary, including Krautsack I, are overruled.\nIn the present case, the appellate court found that defendants failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 137 and held that defendants\u2019 request for fees under the Consumer Fraud Act \u201cwas likewise properly stricken since there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff.\u201d No. 1 \u2014 04\u20142135 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Because defendants were not required to demonstrate bad faith under Rule 137, defendants\u2019 petition for statutory fees was improperly stricken.\nAlthough we might ordinarily remand this matter to the trial court to consider defendants\u2019 fee petition anew, we find remand to be unnecessary. In their response to plaintiff\u2019s motion to strike defendants\u2019 fee petition, defendants argued: \u201cAssuming this Court [i.e., the trial court] determines that the Defendants are required to show bad faith, the Petition for Attorney\u2019s Fees does not require an evidentiary hearing. *** All of the allegations contained in Defendants\u2019 Petition for Attorney\u2019s Fees are reflected in the court file, pleadings and trial record. *** An evidentiary hearing will needlessly add delay and expenses to this matter.\u201d See also No. 1 \u2014 04\u20142135 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (holding that defendants waived any challenge to the trial court\u2019s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing). Accordingly, we will conduct our own review of defendants\u2019 fee petition.\nIll\nThe overriding theme of defendants\u2019 request for attorney fees and costs under section 10a(c) of the Act is that plaintiffs suit was frivolous because it \u201chad nothing to do with consumer fraud,\u201d \u201cbut everything to do with a client that was merely upset because it rained on a trip.\u201d According to defendants, plaintiff unreasonably, and without any legal basis, sought to hold them liable for the weather. We disagree.\nAlthough the rains in East Africa prior to and during the safari formed part of the backdrop for the present litigation, plaintiff was not, contrary to defendants\u2019 argument, seeking to hold defendants liable for the inclement weather. Rather, as the appellate court observed in Kraut-sack I:\n\u201c[Plaintiff] maintains that it is not his position *** that Anderson and Luxury Adventures were responsible for the weather, but, rather, his position is that Anderson and Luxury Adventures failed to disclose their personal interest in having [plaintiff] not postpone the trip.\nSubstantively, [plaintiff]\u2019s claim is based on Anderson\u2019s failure to disclose certain facts with respect to his motives and interests based on his fiduciary duty to [plaintiff].\u201d Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 676.\nThe appellate court recognized that plaintiffs theory of recovery, although \u201cuncommon,\u201d was \u201cnot *** unheard of.\u201d Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 677. We thus decline to find that plaintiffs suit was frivolous.\nAs a further basis for statutory fees, defendants argued that plaintiff, in his memorandum in support of his motion to vacate the judgment order, \u201cfalsely alleged that David Anderson was personally involved in any fraudulent activities when the evidence clearly established that he did not.\u201d In support of this argument, defendants cited finding No. 44 in the trial court\u2019s judgment order, which states: \u201cDavid Anderson did not actively participate in any fraud, and cannot be found personally liable for consumer fraud.\u201d\nPlaintiffs statement that Anderson was personally involved in any fraudulent activities was based on the felony charges brought against Anderson in California which had not been disclosed to plaintiff prior to the instant trial. Based on the case law plaintiff cited in his memorandum filed in the trial court, it was his argument that the trial court could consider this new evidence to show Anderson\u2019s state of mind, motive and intent in his dealings with plaintiff. See Thompson v. Petit, 294 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1035 (1998) (\u201cadmission of evidence of prior similar tortious or wrongful conduct to establish purpose, intent, motive, knowledge or other mental state of a party to a civil action forms an exception to the general rule that prohibits proof of one wrongful act by evidence of the commission of another such act\u201d); accord Reinneck v. Taco Bell Corp., 297 Ill. App. 3d 211, 215 (1998). Plaintiff obviously hoped to persuade the trial court that, contrary to its finding, Anderson was, in fact, personally involved in any fraudulent activities and that the trial court should vacate the judgment in favor of defendants. Although the trial court ultimately denied plaintiff\u2019s motion to vacate the judgment, the subject statement and related argument do not demonstrate bad faith by the plaintiff.\nDefendants also argued that statutory fees are warranted because plaintiff continually alleged that he was allowed to \u201cpostpone\u201d the safari under the parties\u2019 agreement, but was unable to offer any evidence at trial to support this claim. We note that defendant Anderson testified in his deposition that plaintiff raised the issue of postponement with Anderson shortly before the scheduled safari departure date, and agreed that plaintiff was looking for advice as to whether he should proceed with the scheduled safari, reschedule, or cancel. Anderson advised plaintiff, \u201c[B]efore you decide to do that [t.e., postpone the safari], why don\u2019t you let me contact my people on the ground in East Africa to see what kind of report they come back with.\u201d Anderson also testified that rescheduling to a different date \u201cdefinitely\u201d would have been possible. Finally, Anderson testified that the document setting forth Luxury\u2019s limitation of liability did not address postponement. See also Krautsack I, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 670-71 (summarizing Anderson\u2019s deposition testimony). Although the trial court, after hearing all the evidence presented at trial, concluded that the parties\u2019 agreement did not provide for postponement, in light of Anderson\u2019s pretrial deposition testimony, we cannot say that plaintiffs allegation concerning postponement of the safari was made in bad faith.\nDefendants additionally argued that plaintiff falsely stated, in his memorandum in support of his motion to vacate the judgment order, \u201cthat a California judge called David Anderson \u2018a travel agent who is registered with the State.\u2019 \u201d According to defendants, plaintiff failed to quote the California judge completely and, had he done so, it would have been apparent that the California judge had not labeled Anderson a travel agent.\nPlaintiffs allegedly false statement was made in the context of his argument that Anderson committed perjury when he testified that he was not a travel agent. In support of this proposition, plaintiff provided a copy of Luxury\u2019s California certificate of registration as a \u201cSeller of Travel,\u201d copies of the California code defining and regulating sellers of travel, and a transcript from the hearing from which plaintiffs allegedly incomplete statement by the California judge was drawn. After reviewing the transcript, we agree with defendants that the quote, \u201ca travel agent who is registered,\u201d was not intended by the California judge to refer specifically to Anderson. That said, during the course of the same colloquy the judge did indicate that \u201cdefendant is registered\u201d in California as a seller of travel. We note that whether defendant was a \u201ctravel agent,\u201d as that term is used in the industry, was a source of disagreement and confusion during the course of this litigation. See No. 1 \u2014 04\u20142135 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We need not determine the differences, if any, between a seller of travel and a travel agent. For purposes of the present argument, inasmuch as plaintiff provided the complete transcript of the hearing in California, we have difficulty concluding that plaintiff intended to deceive the trial court by quoting only a portion of the judge\u2019s actual statement, and will therefore infer no bad faith.\nAlthough defendants raised still further arguments in their fee petition and their response to plaintiffs motion to strike, we find it unnecessary to review these arguments in detail here. After careful review, we conclude that these arguments are either not supported by the record or insufficient to demonstrate bad faith by the plaintiff. Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under section 10a(c) of the Consumer Fraud Act.\nIV\nDefendants next argue that the appellate court improperly affirmed the trial court\u2019s refusal to award sanctions pursuant to Rule 137. In their fee petition, defendants made the same arguments in support of Rule 137 sanctions as they did in support of statutory fees. Having rejected those arguments, no basis exists for an award of fees under our rule.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons discussed above, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nJUSTICE BURKE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nThis court has held subsections (f), (g), and (h) of section 10a(c) of the Consumer Fraud Act unconstitutional as special legislation. Allen, 208 Ill. 2d at 33.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD" }, { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER,\ndissenting:\nSection 10a(c) of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Act) provides in relevant part that:\n\u201cin any action brought by a person under this Section, the Court may grant injunctive relief where appropriate and may award, in addition to the relief provided in this Section, reasonable attorney\u2019s fees and costs to the prevailing party.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 815 ILCS 505/10a(c) (West 2004).\nThe majority holds that when the defendant is the prevailing party, the trial court necessarily abuses its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs absent a finding that the plaintiff acted in bad faith. Because the majority is effectively amending the statute to add a requirement that is not there, I respectfully dissent.\nThe cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The best indication of that intent is the language of the statute itself, and where that language is unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written. Paszkowski v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 1, 6-7 (2004). This court cannot depart from the plain language of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature. In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 437 (2004).\nThe majority acknowledges that nothing in the plain and unambiguous language of section 10a(c) conditions a fee award on a finding that the plaintiff acted in bad faith, but contends that because section 10a(c) does not expressly restrict a trial court\u2019s discretion or identify the circumstances under which a fee petition should be allowed, section 10a(c) must be examined in light of the entire statute to determine whether the trial court\u2019s proper exercise of discretion requires a finding of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff before a prevailing defendant can be awarded costs and fees. 223 Ill. 2d at 556. I submit that the legislature\u2019s failure to include such a requirement in section 10a(c) demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to require a prevailing defendant to demonstrate bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. The majority relies on the rule that when interpreting a statute, a court must give effect to the entire statutory scheme, interpreting words and phrases in light of other relevant portions of the statute. 223 Ill. 2d at 553. However, proper application of this rule does not permit this court to create additional requirements which are not found in the plain and unambiguous text of the statute, but which this court deems necessary to effectuate the statute\u2019s purpose. Although the majority makes a persuasive case as to why section 10a(c) should require a prevailing defendant to demonstrate that the plaintiff acted in bad faith, the legislature chose not to include such a requirement, and it is not the prerogative of this court to correct the legislature\u2019s \u201comissions.\u201d In re Marriage of Murphy, 203 Ill. 2d 212 (2003). As we recently noted: \u201cThis court may not legislate, rewrite or extend legislation. If a statute, as enacted, seems to operate in certain cases unjustly or inappropriately, the appeal must be to the General Assembly, and not to this court.\u201d DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006). Because the majority is, under the guise of defining the trial court\u2019s proper exercise of its discretion, imposing a limitation on a defendant\u2019s right to costs and fees under section 10a(c) which is not found in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, I dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER," } ], "attorneys": [ "John N. Bielski II, of Messer & Stilp, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.", "James A. Flesch, of Gordon, Glickman, Flesch & Rosenwein, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 101718.\nRICHARD G. KRAUTSACK, Appellee, v. DAVID ANDERSON et al., Appellants.\nOpinion filed December 21, 2006.\nJohn N. Bielski II, of Messer & Stilp, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.\nJames A. Flesch, of Gordon, Glickman, Flesch & Rosenwein, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0541-01", "first_page_order": 559, "last_page_order": 587 }