{ "id": 5704702, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ANDREW URDIALES, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Urdiales", "decision_date": "2007-02-16", "docket_number": "No. 98996", "first_page": "354", "last_page": "455", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 354" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131030 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578319 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096300 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554-55" }, { "page": "556-57" }, { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147627 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" }, { "page": "290", "parenthetical": "\"An error in a jury instruction is harmless if the result of the trial would not have been different if a proper instruction had been given\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725342 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5462052 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5589302 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224772 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508-10" }, { "page": "508-09" }, { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738560 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122553 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536-38" }, { "page": "539" }, { "page": "538-39" }, { "page": "537-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259062 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" }, { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256644 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" }, { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2569425 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139", "parenthetical": "\"Mr. Jones, the question is simple. The court believes the witness is being evasive about answering it\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/78/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2592149 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221", "parenthetical": "defendant complained that the court had admonished the defense expert by saying, \"Doctor, would you do me a favor? Answer the question yes or no, don't ramble.\" \"The witness has a tendency to ramble. These are yes or no questions and a date is a date\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5278860 ], "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608-09", "parenthetical": "repeatedly advising the witness to listen and answer the question" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/358/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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ANDREW URDIALES, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Kilbride concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.\nOPINION\nDefendant, Andrew Urd\u00edales, was indicted in the circuit court of Livingston County for the first degree murder of Cassandra Corum. See 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a) (West 2004). The State subsequently filed notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Defendant tendered a plea of guilty but mentally ill; however, the State disputed the existence of mental illness. The parties subsequently agreed to an evidentiary hearing in which the trial court simultaneously received evidence concerning the factual basis for the plea and conducted a bench trial on the issue of guilt/innocence. The trial court ultimately rejected defendant\u2019s plea of guilty but mentally ill and his bench trial defense of insanity. The court found defendant guilty of first degree murder. Defendant waived a jury for the eligibility stage of capital sentencing, and the circuit court subsequently found defendant eligible for the death penalty based upon prior murder convictions. See 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(b)(3) (West 2004). Defendant elected jury consideration for the aggravation/mitigation phase of sentencing. After considering evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the jury concluded that death was the appropriate sentence. See 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(g) (West 2004). The circuit court thereafter sentenced defendant to death. Because defendant was sentenced to death, his appeal was brought directly to this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a74(b); 134 Ill. 2d R. 603.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in ordering defendant restrained during trial, and instructing the jury that \u201csecurity measures\u201d had been implemented; (2) the trial court\u2019s repeated on-the-record criticisms of recent appellate court opinions deprived defendant of due process and fundamental fairness; (3) the trial court denied defendant due process and fundamental fairness when the court disparaged the motives and conduct of attorneys from the Office of the State Appellate Defender; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting defendant\u2019s plea of guilty but mentally ill; (5) the trial court\u2019s verdict of guilty, instead of guilty but mentally ill, was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (6) the trial court\u2019s statement to the sentencing jury, that the court had rejected defendant\u2019s insanity defense at trial, and the prosecutor\u2019s reference thereto in closing argument, \u201cimproperly demeaned the defendant\u2019s mitigating evidence of mental illness, and punished defendant for exercising his constitutional right to present a defense\u201d; (7) the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s request to submit experts\u2019 reports to the jury; (8) the trial court erred in improperly assisting the prosecutor in cross-examining a witness and thus establishing a foundation for a prosecution exhibit; (9) the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument denied defendant due process; (10) the sentencing jury should have been specifically instructed that a background of extreme emotional or physical abuse is a mitigating factor; and (11) the Illinois death penalty statute violates principles announced in Apprendi in that it does not require application of the reasonable doubt standard at the second stage of capital sentencing proceedings. We set forth, hereafter, a summary of the evidence pertinent to a discussion of the issues raised by defendant.\nBACKGROUND\nOn July 14, 1996, police found the nude body of an unidentified woman floating in the Vermilion River in Livingston County. The woman\u2019s wrists had been handcuffed, her ankles were bound with duct tape, and her mouth was covered with duct tape. An autopsy revealed that the victim had died of a single gunshot wound to the head and seven stab wounds to the head and chest. The body was later identified as that of Cassandra Corum. Corum had been reported missing from Hammond, Indiana.\nCorum\u2019s murder was subsequently linked to the murders of two young women in Cook County. The bodies of Laura Uylaki and Lynn Huber had been found in Wolf Lake, a body of water in Cook County, near the Indiana border. Each of those victims had also been shot in the head and stabbed multiple times. Ballistics tests indicated that all three victims were killed by bullets fired from the same gun.\nOn April 1, 1997, a police officer in Hammond, Indiana, responded to a call involving defendant and a prostitute. The prostitute told the officer that defendant had wanted to take her to Wolf Lake, handcuff and duct tape her, and have sex with her. In November of 1996, the same officer had arrested defendant for unlawful possession of a firearm, and at that time had found rolls of duct tape in defendant\u2019s truck. The Hammond police officer forwarded the information he had obtained to Chicago detectives, who subsequently obtained the gun seized from defendant as a result of his November 1996 arrest. Testing revealed that defendant\u2019s gun had fired the bullets that killed Cassandra Corum, Laura Uylaki, and Lynn Huber.\nOn April 22, 1997, Chicago police officers approached defendant, who voluntarily agreed to talk with them. At the police station, detectives showed defendant photographs of Corum, Uylaki, and Huber, but defendant claimed he did not recognize them. During the questioning, defendant indicated he had bought his handgun approximately four or five years earlier from a gun shop in Calumet City, and it had been under his exclusive control until it was confiscated in Hammond, Indiana. When officers told defendant the three women had been killed by bullets fired from his gun, defendant paused for a minute, took off his security guard badge, started taking off his shoelaces, and said, \u201cWell, I guess I\u2019m not going to work today.\u201d Defendant then provided the police with detailed confessions to all three Illinois murders. Without prompting from the police, defendant also mentioned \u201csome matters\u201d that California authorities \u201cmight be interested in.\u201d Defendant subsequently confessed to the murders of Bobbin Brandley, Julie McGhee, Mary Ann Wells, Tammy Erwin, and Denise Maney, as well as the kidnapping, rape, and attempted murder of J.A., all of which were committed in California between 1986 and 1995.\nThe details of those offenses were provided in testimony and evidence presented at the aggravation/ mitigation phase of sentencing, and will be recounted in our discussion of that portion of defendant\u2019s trial.\nOn March 10, 1998, a Livingston County grand jury returned a four-count indictment charging defendant with first degree murder for the killing of Cassandra Co-rum. In March of 2001, the State filed notice of its intent to seek the death penalty, alleging three possible eligibility factors: that the defendant had been convicted of murdering two or more individuals (720 ILCS 5/9\u2014 1(b)(3) (West 2000)), that he had killed Cassandra Corum during the course of an aggravated kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(b)(6) (West 2000)), and that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 l(b)(ll) (West 2000)).\nDefendant was convicted of the Cook County murders, and was sentenced to death on September 3, 2002. In that case, a jury rejected claims that defendant was legally insane or mentally ill as defined in section 6 \u2014 2(d) of the Criminal Code of 1961. See 720 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 2(d) (West 2002). On January 10, 2003, then-governor George Ryan commuted defendant\u2019s death sentence to one of natural life in prison without the possibility of parole.\nOn November 3, 2003, defendant\u2019s appointed counsel in this case, Steven Skelton and James Elmore, requested that the trial judge accept the appearance of attorney Stephen Richards as additional counsel for defendant. Richards was a deputy defender with one of the State Appellate Defender\u2019s Death Penalty Trial Assistance offices (hereafter DPTA). The trial judge allowed Richards to enter his appearance with the understanding that Skelton and Elmore would be \u201clead counsel\u201d and that the court would look to them for management of the case.\nRichards subsequently tendered a written entry of appearance during a hearing conducted on December 1, 2003. On that document, John Hanlon and Allan Sincox, staff attorneys of DPTA, were also listed as entering their appearance. The trial judge did not immediately notice the unauthorized addition of Hanlon and Sincox, a matter that came to the court\u2019s attention when the judge observed what he perceived as disruptive behavior in the courtroom:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Who is the gentleman behind Mr. Richards, because I am getting tired of the expressions on his face and his gyrations. *** And now he is quite red-faced and he seems very angry.\nSir, who are you?\nMR. SINCOX: My name is Allan Sincox. My appearance is now on file. Mr. Richards filed an appearance with my name listed on it today. I have been assisting with this case.\nTHE COURT: You are not an attorney in this case, sir. You are not now an attorney in this case.\nOh, I see the appearance has \u2014 well, I gave permission, Mr. Richards, for you to assist Mr. Elmore and Mr. Skelton at this relatively late date. I have not given permission for John Hanlon, Allan Sincox to do so. I have not heard from Mr. Elmore and Mr. Skelton that they want their assistance. So the way the record stands now, and I do thank you for calling that to my attention[,] Mr. Richards has been requested for assistance in this case by Mr. Skelton and Mr. Elmore. I have not heard from them as to John Hanlon or Allan Sincox. I am concerned about you, you are Mr. Sincox?\nMR. SINCOX: Yes, I am, Judge.\nTHE COURT: I am concerned about your professional demeanor here in court today. On four or five occasions you have gripped your head and shaken your head. And it is quite \u2014 it is at least distracting to me ***.\nMR. SINCOX: Well, that is my fault. And I do apologize.\nTHE COURT: Your apology is accepted. I didn\u2019t know you were an attorney. Quite frankly, I am shocked.\u201d\nAttorney Sincox then noted that he had been involved in the trial of defendant\u2019s cases in Cook County, and he explained: \u201c[T]here are things I find myself wanting to tell the lawyers.\u201d The court responded, \u201cI understand the emotional factor, but you are an attorney, and you should know better.\u201d The court then clarified the status of defendant\u2019s representation, noting that \u201cMr. Richards is in the case; Mr. Hanlon and Mr. Sincox are not.\u201d The record indicates that the names of Hanlon and Sincox were, at some point, stricken from the entry of appearance.\nAt a subsequent hearing on December 23, 2003, Richards was allowed to argue various pretrial motions for the defense, without comment or objection from the trial judge. The trial court reserved ruling on two of those motions, and denied the remainder.\nLater, on February 6, 2004, during a pretrial hearing attended only by the prosecutors and attorneys Skelton and Elmore, Skelton broached the possibility that he might ask the court to allow attorney Sincox to \u201center his appearance for the limited purpose of deposing Dr. [Park] Dietz in California.\u201d The trial judge asked counsel, \u201cIs this all going to get accomplished in time not to impact on the trial date?\u201d Counsel for defendant nodded affirmatively. The court then expressed \u201cconcern\u201d about Sincox\u2019s involvement in the case, noting that he had acted \u201cvery unlawyer-like the only time that he was here\u201d and that he had conducted himself \u201cin a very unprofessional manner.\u201d At that point, the prosecutor questioned why Sincox had to be involved and why Skelton and Elmore could not conduct the deposition.\nWithout further comment on the prosecutor\u2019s statement, the trial judge commended attorneys Skelton and Elmore for the job they had done to that point, and then stated his belief that attorneys Sincox and Richards had \u201can agenda far greater than\u201d the defendant\u2019s case. He indicated he wanted to ensure that Elmore and Skelton remained in control of the case and exercised their \u201cindependent judgment.\u201d Continuing, the trial court stated:\n\u201cI can see a deposition out there going into several areas, well, now they are objecting, and now I am supposed to rule on objections taking place out in California. I don\u2019t trust Mr. Sincox. *** His conduct in this courtroom was most unprofessional. It is clear to me that he has an agenda far greater than Mr. Urd\u00edales and he is motivated by that. And I am concerned that his conduct will be governed by that. *** And if he goes far afield out there, we have got a mess on our hands in terms of, well, now the deposition wasn\u2019t completed. Now we are going to certify some questions and get those back to this court. And we are moving great amounts of cases away from this calendar of mine in Livingston County. I got a heavy calendar and we are making lots of room and going through all kinds of exercises here to get this case tried in April. And I want to get it tried in April.\u201d\nThe trial judge observed: \u201cIt is premature to rule on this motion. It\u2019s not yet filed. If you do file it, you need to make plans. I have no problem hearing this motion by conference call ***.\u201d The court then moved on, questioning the prosecutors as to whether the reports of certain experts would be timely filed and were \u201con track.\u201d\nThe record indicates that a motion was later filed requesting that Sincox be allowed to enter a limited appear anee to take the deposition of Dr. Dietz. On March 4, 2004, in one of many pretrial conferences, the court addressed that motion:\n\u201cTHE COURT: There was a motion here with respect to Mr. Sincox. I am finding that motion rendered moot because Mr. Elmore is going to go [to California] and Mr. Sincox is not now a member of the defense team. I indicated some reluctance to increase the defense team at this point and bring in somebody new. And that issue simply goes away if Mr. Elmore is going to go to California if necessary.\nMR. ELMORE: Yes, I think both Mr. Skelton and myself anticipate making a trip out there.\u201d\nDefense counsel did not object to the court\u2019s statement that the motion was moot and did not take any action to obtain a ruling on the motion.\nAlso prior to trial, the court addressed the matter of courtroom security. On April 19, 2004, just prior to jury selection, the court noted for the record:\n\u201c[T]he defendant is seated there at table where his hands are free. He is in street clothes. There is an eyebolt in the floor. And there he has shackles on his legs. And that shackle is attached to the eyebolt in the floor. The jury, I believe it is correct, will not be able to see that shackling. They will be unaware of it unless Mr. Urd\u00edales makes some noise or some motion that would call their attention to it. And I want to at least see if there is any objection on the record.\u201d\nDefense counsel stated that the judge\u2019s remarks were \u201cfactual and correct,\u201d that the defendant wanted the record to reflect that he was secured in that fashion, and the defense had \u201cno objection to it now.\u201d\nThe trial court then discussed two recent appellate court cases pertaining to courtroom security and restraint of defendants, noting that he \u201crespectfully disagree[d] with both [of] those decisions,\u201d but he had to \u201ctake them into account.\u201d The trial judge also acknowledged this court\u2019s decision in People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261 (1977). The judge suggested that appellate court justices might not appreciate how \u201ctrial circumstances have changed,\u201d in part because some of them have \u201cnever been trial judges\u201d and have \u201cnever practiced criminal law.\u201d The trial judge offered his observation that \u201c[tjimes have simply changed,\u201d and that he had seen \u201ca great deal of violence occurring in [the] courtroom,\u201d noting the presence of two prisons within the county.\nThe court made clear that defendant had behaved appropriately up to that point. However, the judge observed that defendant had been recently convicted of two murders and, though his death sentence had been commuted, he was still serving two life sentences. The court stated that was one factor in its decision to restrain defendant. The court also noted that defendant was in good health and had no difficultly getting around; thus, suggesting that defendant could pose a physical threat. Moreover, the court observed that the Livingston County courthouse was built in 1875 and there were \u201call kind of security problems\u201d with the building and the courtroom. The judge pointed out that the courtroom was small and seating was close. He stated that two guards would be seated in the row behind the defendant. In that respect, the court observed:\n\u201cThe jurors, I think, will understand that. And importantly for a reviewing court, I have learned over the years that the jurors aren\u2019t stupid. And they will be told the defendant is in custody and that certain security measures have been taken, such as the guards being here. They would expect that. And I believe they can handle that and still give both sides a fair trial.\u201d\nWith that, the trial court asked: \u201cIs there anything else on that issue that either the State or the defense wishes to bring up?\u201d For the defense, attorney Skelton responded, \u201cNo, sir.\u201d\nThe court then recessed prior to the commencement of jury voir dire. During that recess, out of the presence of the trial judge and potential jurors, a disturbance occurred in the courtroom. Subsequently, without potential jurors present, the trial judge swore in one of the correctional officers guarding defendant in order to ascertain what had happened. The officer, Craig Valleroy, testified that defendant had turned to talk to a lady seated behind him. The officers initially thought the woman was a lawyer, but when she indicated otherwise, they told defendant he could not speak with her. Defendant then became angry. Stating, \u201cI don\u2019t give a damn,\u201d he slapped a cup of water on the table in front of him, sending it flying, and he \u201cthrew *** stuff around.\u201d He was told to settle down, and was then physically subdued and handcuffed.\nAfter ascertaining what had happened, the trial judge asked defendant, \u201cWill you promise to behave yourself if I do not shackle you.\u201d Defendant did not respond to the court directly. Rather, defendant had attorney Skelton note for the record that defendant had not been shackled during proceedings in Cook County and there had been no outbursts or problems. Counsel stated: \u201cAnd he is concerned about his perception of the respect he is being shown here by both the court and security personnel in the courtroom.\u201d Counsel acknowledged that he had attended defendant\u2019s trial in Cook County and that the \u201clogistics of that courtroom and the parameters of that courtroom are somewhat different.\u201d\nIn response to the concerns expressed by defendant, the trial judge observed that \u201cthe world changed\u201d for defendant with his murder convictions in Cook County, suggesting, had defendant been found not guilty there, the court \u201cwould have been doing something different here.\u201d The court also pointed out, \u201c[Y]ou are on trial here for your life.\u201d As a result of the incident, the court ordered defendant\u2019s left hand shackled under the table as well. Though the court allowed defendant\u2019s right hand to remain free, the court ordered that defendant be given no pencils or pens.\nTwo days later, in chambers, the trial judge, with defense counsel and counsel for the prosecution present, revisited the issue of courtroom security and addressed the circumstances of defendant\u2019s prior courtroom outburst. The court noted that jurors were not present when defendant \u201cwent ballistic,\u201d \u201cwent berserk, throwing water all over.\u201d The court observed that \u201ctwo very large guards were necessary to restrain him notwithstanding that he was already shackled by his feet to an eyebolt on the floor.\u201d The judge then asked attorney Elmore whether he had overstated the incident with the use of the terms \u201cballistic\u201d and \u201cberserk.\u201d\nElmore responded that the judge had not overstated the severity of the incident, and added that \u201cthere were actually three guards\u201d involved. Elmore indicated that the guards had to take defendant to the floor to subdue him and that defendant had knocked over the table where he was seated.\nAt that juncture, the trial judge criticized various justices of the appellate court for positions they had taken on the issue of shackling, stating that one of them had, in an appellate court opinion, \u201creally roughed me up because I shackled some inmates.\u201d The judge expressed concern \u201cthat people with that frame of mind will speculate that I contributed to the event on Monday because I had Mr. Urd\u00edales shackled.\u201d The court observed:\n\u201cFirst of all, the response of defendant to go berserk was an overreaction on his part. If he didn\u2019t like that, he should have communicated to counsel. He should have said something in court. We did not have a word of protest coming from him prior to that. He simply went off.\u201d\nThe court characterized defendant as a \u201chigh risk individual.\u201d The trial judge observed that there had been a change in defendant\u2019s demeanor after he was convicted of the murders in Cook County and sentenced to death. The court stated: \u201cMr. Urd\u00edales I have concluded fears that judgment day is coming closer.\u201d The judge noted \u201ca dramatic change\u201d at the prior pretrial hearing, when defendant \u201clearned that this trial was actually going to go forward finally.\u201d The court continued, \u201cI saw without a doubt an emotion in his eyes that I had not seen before. *** I saw furtive movements on the part of Mr. Urd\u00edales; and I see quite frankly, honestly a desperate man.\u201d The trial judge then embarked upon yet another diatribe against what he saw as the appellate court\u2019s unwarranted intrusion into the security concerns of the circuit court, expressing his belief that the appellate court seemed \u201cbent on causing trial judges trouble.\u201d The judge indicated he would have a transcript of the proceedings sent to certain named justices of the appellate court.\nFollowing that harangue, the judge again indicated that he did not believe the jury could see the shackling of defendant because of skirting around the table where defendant was seated. He asked defense counsel: \u201c[D]o you want me to free up Mr. Urd\u00edales more than I am contemplating doing?\u201d In response, attorney Skelton asked only that defendant be given a writing implement short enough that it would pose no danger to counsel or anyone else. The court then stated: \u201cDOC has had in the past inch pencils. *** It\u2019s a very small pencil. We\u2019ll explore that and come up with a writing material that couldn\u2019t do you harm.\u201d Still addressing the security issue, Skelton then stated:\n\u201cHalf facetiously, the only thing I want to make sure of is that Mr. Urd\u00edales is seated on a very heavy chair. For the record, I had an unfortunate experience about 14, 16 years ago where an inmate from Pontiac Correctional Center decided that a better place for a chair was on my head than on the floor. I know what the court\u2019s talking about. I\u2019ve been there.\u201d\nElmore thereafter sought to clarify what had prompted the defendant\u2019s courtroom outburst, noting that defendant \u201cbecame upset not because he was shackled but because he could not communicate with his parents and Kendra Moses.\u201d Elmore explained that defendant had originally told a Livingston County correctional officer that Moses was an attorney, and Elmore subsequently told them otherwise, noting that she was a \u201cmitigator,\u201d not an attorney. According to Elmore, defendant then turned and \u201cglared at [Elmore] for a second,\u201d prompting Elmore to caution defendant, \u201cAndrew, we\u2019re not going to do that now. She\u2019s not an attorney.\u201d Elmore said a correctional officer then politely informed defendant that he could not talk to Moses at that point in time. Elmore explained, \u201cThat\u2019s what precipitated him becoming upset. It wasn\u2019t even, in my mind, *** the fact he was shackled that\u2019s what caused him to go off. Just to support your position further, it wasn\u2019t the shackling I don\u2019t think that really upset him. It was the fact he couldn\u2019t communicate with Moses, and he went off.\u201d\nA prosecutor interjected, \u201cHe was lucky he was shackled at that point or he would have had much more free rein.\u201d The same prosecutor added: \u201cMr. Elmore should tell you, but it\u2019s up to him, that he knows something with regard to a previous meeting in prison in a room with Mr. Urd\u00edales that he later learned endangered his own self; but he\u2019d have to tell you that. I bring it up. I guess he doesn\u2019t want to. It solidifies [the court\u2019s] intuition, and I know about it from several months ago.\u201d Although the judge indicated he would \u201cask the details,\u201d the matter was apparently dropped as the court and parties moved on to matters bearing upon jury selection.\nJury voir dire began on April 19, 2004. At the outset, the trial judge advised potential jurors:\n\u201cYou may or may not notice that Mr. Urd\u00edales is in custody. And we have taken certain security measures because of that simple fact. You would expect us to do that for anyone who\u2019s in custody. The fact that Mr. Urd\u00edales is presently in custody should not impact in any way whatsoever on the determination of whether Mr. Urd\u00edales is found guilty or not guilty ***.\u201d\nA total of eight jurors were selected for trial on the first day of selection. When jury selection resumed on the morning of April 22, defense counsel advised the court in chambers that defendant, \u201cwithout any urging,\u201d had raised the possibility of entering an open plea of guilty to the murder charges against him. Attorney Skelton noted: \u201cIf *** Mr. Urd\u00edales determines that he wants to plead guilty without \u2014 and we are talking a straight guilty plea \u2014 not trying to structure in a way of guilty but mentally ill plea, that would \u2014 and it is an understatement to say \u2014 substantially modify the manner in which we would approach potential jurors, the remaining four, plus alternates in this case.\u201d\nThe trial judge expressed concern over developments and stated the obvious: that defendant should take such an action only after \u201cfull deliberation.\u201d The judge encouraged counsel to consult with defendant further.\nAfter another brief period of consultation with defendant, attorney Skelton reported that defendant was steadfast in his desire to plead guilty; however, it was likely that defendant would enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill. The defense contemplated \u201ca waiver of jury as to the first phase of the proceeding, plea of guilty, with the court determining the existence or lack of mental illness.\u201d The defendant would retain his right to a jury trial for the sentencing phase of the death penalty proceeding. A prosecutor advised the court and defense counsel that the State would dispute whether defendant was in fact \u201cmentally ill,\u201d as that term is defined in the statute. Attorney Skelton, again speaking to procedure, reiterated that the court would decide whether defendant was mentally ill: \u201cThere would be a bench trial as to the existence or lack of mental illness. There would not be a trial before the Court as to the elements of the offense, that is that he killed Cassandra Corum.\u201d Counsel advised the court that a jury would be needed for the \u201csecond and third\u201d stages of death penalty proceedings, the eligibility and aggravation/mitigation phases.\nAfter further discussion and consultation, it was decided that the court would admonish defendant the next morning and conduct a hearing on defendant\u2019s plea of guilty but mentally ill (GBMI); however, the court would reserve ruling until jury selection was complete. Then the court would take additional evidence on mental illness, and either accept the plea of guilty but mentally ill or proceed with the jury trial.\nOn April 23, 2004, the defendant tendered his plea of guilty but mentally ill. The trial court admonished defendant thoroughly concerning the nature of the charge, the possible penalties, the three separate stages of a capital trial, and the variety of verdicts possible in the event the defendant retained his right to trial. The trial court explained that, by pleading guilty but mentally ill, the defendant would be giving up the defense of insanity, and a finding of guilty but mentally ill would not insulate him from a possible death sentence. The defendant indicated he understood the admonitions. The judge determined that defendant had not been subject to threats or coercion, and that his plea of guilty but mentally ill was voluntary.\nThe trial judge indicated he would not decide whether to accept the plea of guilty but mentally ill until there had been a full evidentiary hearing. The court explained the possible outcomes and ramifications of that proceeding, and defendant again indicated he understood. Defendant then signed and tendered a plea of guilty but mentally ill, which specified that he retained his right to jury trial on all issues if the plea was rejected, and his right to a jury for sentencing if the plea was accepted.\nThe State then presented an extensive factual basis for the murder of Cassandra Corum. Defendant did not dispute the factual basis presented, and the court concluded that there was a sufficient factual basis \u201cwith respect to the murder elements themselves.\u201d The court again indicated that it would not accept the plea of guilty but mentally ill until there had been an evidentiary hearing on the issue of mental illness. Thereafter, jury selection resumed, with four additional jurors, and six alternates, chosen over the next several days.\nAfter the completion of jury selection, defense counsel informed the court that, in the event the court rejected the plea of guilty but mentally ill, the defendant was considering waiving a jury for the guilt/innocence phase and requesting a bench trial to preserve his insanity defense. Noting that a jury had already been chosen and was waiting to hear the case, the trial judge expressed some reluctance to allow the jury waiver, as well as frustration with both the defense and the appellate court.\nNonetheless, on May 4, 2004, the parties and the trial court agreed to conduct two hearings simultaneously. Pursuant to the agreed mode of procedure, the trial court would consider whether there was sufficient evidence of mental illness to support defendant\u2019s plea of guilty but mentally ill, i.e., whether defendant suffered from \u201ca substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior\u201d which afflicted him at the time of the offense and \u201cimpaired his judgment.\u201d See 720 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 2(d) (West 2004). In the event the court ultimately rejected the GBMI plea, the judge would also consider whether defendant had established the defense of insanity. The defense stipulated that the prosecutor\u2019s previously recited factual basis was sufficient to establish the basic elements of the murder charge. Defendant was admonished regarding the proposed procedure, and consented to it, waiving his right to a jury trial on the guilt/ innocence phase.\nFor purposes of the dual proceedings, the trial court admitted and considered several exhibits documenting psychiatric evaluations of the defendant, and also heard live testimony from expert witnesses. The defense called three witnesses: Drs. Terry Killian, James Merikangas, and Daniel Cuneo. The State called two witnesses: Drs. Janet Wilier and Park Dietz. Written reports of Drs. Killian, Cuneo, Merikangas, and Dietz were among the exhibits considered by the court, as were reports received from two nontestifying defense experts, Drs. Charles Opsahl and Dorothy Otnow Lewis.\nDr. Killian, a psychiatrist, believed defendant was legally sane, but mentally ill, at the time of Corum\u2019s murder. Killian diagnosed defendant as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), bipolar mood disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), dissociative disorder, Tourette\u2019s, personality disorder, and mild neurological impairment. Killian felt the most significant of these was dissociation, which is something like multiple personalities. Killian believed, in defendant\u2019s case, an \u201cangry part\u201d of him \u201ctakes some degree of control,\u201d though it \u201cdoes not appear to be complete control as you would see in a full blown, multiple personality disorder.\u201d Dr. Killian believed defendant was not malingering because he did not volunteer symptoms as he could have. Killian acknowledged that defendant had read a book by Dr. Lewis, his expert for his unsuccessful insanity defense in Cook County, and could have feigned symptoms from that book.\nAt one point in his testimony, Killian specifically stated that defendant, in his opinion, \u201cwas afflicted by a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which impaired his judgment but not to the extent that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior.\u201d Later, Killian was asked by defense counsel whether the term \u201cmentally ill,\u201d as used in section 6 \u2014 2(d) of the Criminal Code, was consistent with his understanding of that term, as used in his practice. At that time, he acknowledged:\n\u201cMentally ill is a pretty vague term in a clinical sense. Mentally ill is generally used in psychiatry to refer to a wide range of psychiatric disorders that impair people to mild extents, substantial extents, or impair them to the point where they are unable to function; so it\u2019s a very broad term without a very specific definition in clinical use.\u201d\nKillian explained he could only \u201cdescribe [defendant\u2019s] symptoms [as observed or described to him],\u201d put those together in \u201can organized diagnostic formulation,\u201d and explain the \u201cnature of the psychiatric disorders\u201d and the reasons, and extent to which, defendant has them. He concluded, \u201c[I]t is the fact finder\u2019s position to decide whether that meets the burden of the law.\u201d\nDr. Daniel Cuneo, a psychologist, also testified that defendant \u201chad a substantial disorder of thought, mood, and behavior which impacted upon his judgment.\u201d Cuneo examined defendant in 2003 and 2004, and concluded that he suffered from PTSD, bipolar disorder, Tourette\u2019s, OCD, personality disorder, mild neurologic impairment, and a history of sexually transmitted diseases. Unlike Killian, who believed that dissociation was the most significant or substantial of defendant\u2019s mental maladies, Cuneo thought that PTSD was the most significant of defendant\u2019s disorders. Cuneo did believe that the defendant occasionally suffered from episodes of dissociation, which occurred during periods of extreme stress. In that regard, he noted defendant\u2019s use of the pronoun \u201cwe\u201d and the names Eric, Andy, and Andrew to refer to aspects of his personality. Cuneo did not believe that defendant was malingering.\nIn his report, Cuneo concluded that defendant\u2019s mental illness \u201cdid not substantially impair his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct when he is alleged to have killed Cassie Corum. He could have controlled his behavior then and he knew that killing was wrong.\u201d However, Cuneo testified to his belief that defendant\u2019s \u201cjudgment was impaired throughout\u201d due to escalating anger.\nOn cross-examination, Cuneo acknowledged that defendant\u2019s actions during the killings exhibited planning and preparation, and that defendant \u201cwas clever enough to have killed individuals and hid it for a period of time.\u201d Cuneo also conceded that it is possible for a person to be a \u201cclever, mean, sexual, sadistic individual who likes to kill women,\u201d yet not suffer from a mental disorder.\nThe prosecutor asked Cuneo about defendant\u2019s \u201cexplosive anger,\u201d which Cuneo believed had resulted in impaired judgment and violence. In posing that question, the prosecutor first noted that defendant had initially become angry with Cassandra Corum at Wolf Lake, \u201chis favorite murder dumping ground of women.\u201d The prosecutor next observed that defendant had restrained her there and then \u201cdrove a hundred miles from where he exploded in *** anger *** all the way to Pontiac, so he had a whole hour and a half of driving with her.\u201d In light of those circumstances, the prosecutor asked whether defendant\u2019s anger would have subsided by the time he got to Pontiac.\nIn response, Cuneo stated that defendant\u2019s debilitating anger would not have subsided until \u201cthe murder was done.\u201d He continued, clarifying his position: \u201cI don\u2019t believe, at any point, this individual was impaired to the extent that he was unable to think *** what I am saying is that it\u2019s an impairment of judgment ***.\u201d\nDr. Merikangas, a psychiatrist, opined that defendant had an organic brain disease, which rendered him insane at the time of the crime. Merikangas disagreed with Killian and Cuneo insofar as they diagnosed defendant with PTSD and dissociative personality disorder. Merikangas noted that scans of defendant\u2019s brain in 2002 showed atrophy, which might have resulted from improper treatment of syphilis. Tests also showed frontal lobe damage, lack of reflexive response, and decreased blood flow and metabolism in the right temporal lobe of defendant\u2019s brain. Dr. Merikangas believed episodes of loss of control and loss of reason were brought on by stress, such as sexual situations when defendant was belittled or there was a fight. Though Merikangas did not identify a source of stress, he reported that defendant had \u201ca violent attack of rage at the Cook County jail\u201d during Merikangas\u2019 interview with defendant.\nDr. Opsahl\u2019s report set forth a diagnosis of \u201csignificant neuropsychological impairment\u201d and \u201cparanoid psychosis in the presence of a cyclic mood disorder that includes elements of both hypomania and depression.\u201d The report did not address defendant\u2019s behavior at the time of the murder.\nDr. Lewis\u2019 report concluded that defendant was \u201cflamboyantly psychotic at the time of the alleged offenses and was operating in response to delusions and command hallucinations.\u201d Lewis\u2019 report contained statements by defendant that he heard voices that gave him instructions from the CIA. She also reported references to \u201cAndrew and Eric\u201d as separate personalities.\nDr. Wilier, a psychologist who worked for the Veterans Administration, saw defendant approximately 105 times between 1991 and 1996. She believed defendant suffered from mild depression and avoidant personality disorder.\nDr. Dietz, a psychiatrist, testified, rendering his opinion that, at the time of Corum\u2019s murder, defendant had the capacity \u201cto appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law,\u201d and he did not fit within Illinois\u2019 statutory definition of guilty but mentally ill. Dietz concluded that defendant did not have a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior, as required by the statute. Dietz diagnosed defendant as suffering from Tourette\u2019s syndrome, a personality disorder with schizotypal traits, and sexual sadism. He believed it was defendant\u2019s anger, rather than a substantial mental disorder, that impaired defendant\u2019s judgment when he murdered Cassandra Co-rum. Dietz did not believe that defendant had PTSD, but even if he did, Dietz categorized PTSD as an anxiety disorder, not a mental illness; thus, it would not meet the definition of mental illness under Illinois law. He also rejected the possibility of organic, brain damage because neurological tests, and a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan in 2004, were within the normal range. In Dietz\u2019s opinion, defendant\u2019s use of the passive voice and plural pronouns when describing his actions while murdering his victims was nothing more than a linguistic device \u201cto distance himself from responsibility for the offense.\u201d\nDietz believed that defendant\u2019s judgment was in fact impaired when he committed the murder, but not by a mental illness. In Dietz\u2019s opinion, \u201cnearly everyone\u201d who commits murder \u201chas impaired judgment at the time, including this defendant.\u201d Dietz testified that anger was the \u201cone clearly provable element that impaired [defendant\u2019s] judgment.\u201d However, Dietz identified two other \u201cprime candidates\u201d as \u201csexual desire\u201d and \u201ca kind of predatory desire for conquest.\u201d The latter observations were consistent with Dietz\u2019s diagnosis that defendant was a sexual sadist, which he defined as one who exhibits \u201can enduring pattern of sexual excitement or desire involving the infliction of pain or the humiliation of others.\u201d\nDietz based his diagnosis of sexual sadism primarily upon the account given by defendant\u2019s sole surviving victim, J.A. As Dietz noted, her description of defendant\u2019s behavior at the time he raped and tortured her is the only description of defendant\u2019s criminal actions that was not given by defendant. Dietz summarized J.A.\u2019s account of her ordeal as follows:\n\u201c[In] that incident he called her a bitch, held a knife to her throat, pulled her head into the dashboard, bound her hands behind her back, pulled her by the hair to force fellatio, cut off her shorts, underwear and bra, gagged her with her underwear and bra, called her a bitch, a whore, a slut, as he raped her vaginally, scripted her language, namely telling her exactly what to say. He directed her to say that she loved him. Hit her, strangled her to the point of unconsciousness, and bit her neck drawing blood. That is a classic textbook description of the abducting and rape of a woman by a sexual sadist. Because he is demeaning her, controlling her, causing her pain while experiencing sexual excitement. Every feature of that is exactly what we expect to find in sexually sadistic types. And the significance of [J.A.\u2019s] account is that she is the only living victim of rape and abduction that can tell us what defendant actually does with a victim. For every other case, that is the eight homicides, we only know what the corpse can tell us and what the defendant is willing to say.\u201d\nDietz acknowledged that a single incident is not sufficient to diagnose sexual sadism, so he supported his diagnosis with another reported incident \u2014 one that led to defendant\u2019s arrest \u2014 in which a prostitute described a 1997 encounter with defendant. Patricia Kelly reported that defendant had asked her to accompany him to the Wolf Lake area and allow him to handcuff her, duct tape her, tie her up, and have sex with her in the back of his truck. Dietz believed that request was also suggestive of sexual sadism. Dietz answered affirmatively when the prosecutor asked whether there were \u201csome similarities concerning binding and gagging and binding and abusing the other victims even though they are not here to tell us.\u201d Finally, Dietz reported that defendant had acknowledged that there is a part of him \u201cthat enjoys torture, that would like to inflict as much damage as possible, that enjoys bondage and sadomasochistic activity, that wants to control.\u201d\nAt the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the hearing, the circuit court indicated it would entertain arguments of counsel. Attorney Skelton then asked the court: \u201cWhat standard is the Court applying concerning the existence of the factual basis for the existence of mental illness at the time of the offense?\u201d An extended discussion ensued between the parties and the court concerning the appropriate standards and evidentiary burdens the court would apply, with the defense arguing that the court had no authority to weigh the evidence adduced on the issue of mental illness. At the conclusion of that discussion, the court stated its belief that cases pertaining to uncontested guilty pleas would not apply to defendant\u2019s plea of guilty but mentally ill, since the State, in this case, was contesting whether defendant was in fact mentally ill as defined in section 6 \u2014 2(d) of the Criminal Code. The court nonetheless commented that \u201cthe burden the defense has at this proceeding *** dealing with whether the court should accept or reject the plea of guilty but mentally ill is not a preponderance of the evidence. That would be the case at bench trial. It is less than that.\u201d However, the court still determined that it should \u201cweigh\u201d the evidence presented at the hearing, noting that defendant was not entitled to have the court \u201csimply disregard the evidence presented by the State.\u201d Following arguments of the parties, the court indicated it would recess over the weekend to consider the evidence and arguments.\nOn the morning of May 10, 2004, the court announced its rulings in chambers in order to protect the defendant from media coverage and to ensure that the sentencing jury would not be tainted when it later heard evidence of mental illness. First, having weighed the evidence presented by the defense and the prosecution, the trial judge stated he was not satisfied that a factual basis existed to support defendant\u2019s plea of guilty but mentally ill, noting that \u201cthe evidence fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was guilty but mentally ill at the time of the incident complained of.\u201d Moreover, the court ruled that defendant had not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was insane at the time of Corum\u2019s murder. Finally, the court found the State had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of first degree murder as charged in the indictment.\nIn support of his ruling, the trial judge noted that the principal defense witnesses disagreed in their primary diagnoses. Cuneo believed that defendant suffered, primarily, from PTSD; Killian\u2019s principal diagnosis was dissociation; and Merikangas determined that defendant suffered from organic brain disease, disagreeing with Killian\u2019s and Cuneo\u2019s diagnoses of PTSD and dissociative personality disorder. Killian and Cuneo believed that defendant was legally sane, but mentally ill, as defined in section 6 \u2014 2(d); Merikangas testified that defendant was insane, as defined in section 6 \u2014 2(a).\nThe court also found that defendant\u2019s experts had failed to explain how defendant was able to function in society during his seven years in the Marine Corps, or employed as a security guard, while suffering from the diagnosed illnesses. The court found that defendant\u2019s actions during the offense were inconsistent with those of a person overcome by anger. To the contrary, they demonstrated planning and organization. The court rejected the assessments of Merikangas and Killian that defendant\u2019s crimes were not characterized by planning and organization, noting that defendant brought a gun, a knife, duct tape, and handcuffs. The court concluded, \u201cthe defendant went prepared and in fact successfully carried out this murder as well as seven others.\u201d With respect to the defendant\u2019s psychiatric evaluations, the court observed that defendant had \u201clearned some things\u201d about evaluations in the course of his unsuccessful trial in Cook County. As Killian acknowledged in his testimony, defendant had read Lewis\u2019 book, titled \u201cGuilty But Mentally Ill.\u201d\nThe trial judge found the testimony of Dr. Dietz \u201csubstantially more persuasive and more convincing than that of the defense experts.\u201d As noted, Dietz believed that defendant was not legally insane and he did not meet the statutory criterion for a finding of guilty but mentally ill. The court accepted Dietz\u2019s assessment that defendant is a sexual sadist and is \u201cangry at the world and his unsuccessful circumstances in life.\u201d The court stated: \u201c[T]o rule in favor of the defense, I would have to totally set aside the testimony of Dr. Park Dietz, which *** I find to be the most convincing and persuasive of the witnesses,\u201d and \u201ceven more importantly, to find in favor of the defense, I would have to disregard the facts of this case.\u201d\nAfter announcing his ruling, and before convening in open court, the trial judge revisited the issue of courtroom security, noting that the jury would not see the shackling of defendant because of skirting around defendant\u2019s table, reiterating his earlier findings, and enunciating two additional factors. The court noted, since its original ruling regarding the physical restraint of defendant, the court had been apprised of the full extent and scope of defendant\u2019s homicidal activities in California, and had heard psychiatric testimony pertaining to defendant\u2019s explosive personality. With those additional comments, the court inquired of defense counsel:\n\u201cTHE COURT: So that is the record on shackling. I guess I should give the defense an opportunity to suggest that I do something differently. I would ask Mr. Skelton and Mr. Elmore, are you asking that I do something differently on shackling than I have decided to do?\nMR. SKELTON: Given the totality of the circumstances and the discretion given the Court which I believe is an accurate assessment of the physical layout of the courtroom and the shackling devices and means by which our client is secured in the courtroom, I don\u2019t think it is an issue, Judge.\nTHE COURT: All right. Mr. Elmore.\nMR. ELMORE: No, Judge. I think what you have done is appropriate under the circumstances.\u201d\nThe court then advanced the proceeding to the eligibility phase of sentencing. Defendant waived a jury for the purpose of determining whether he was eligible for the death penalty. Without objection, the State introduced defendant\u2019s birth certificate, showing him to be over 18 years of age, and certified copies of defendant\u2019s two murder convictions in Cook County. The trial court subsequently found that defendant was over the age of 18 when he murdered Cassandra Corum and he had been previously convicted of murdering two women in Cook County, thereby establishing his eligibility for a death sentence under section 9 \u2014 1(b)(3) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(b)(3) (West 2004)).\nAt the beginning of the third phase of this capital proceeding, the trial court advised the jurors of developments in the first two phases \u2014 to which the court had referred during jury selection \u2014 explaining why jurors had not participated in earlier stages of the proceeding, and bringing the jurors current on findings made during the initial phases of the trial. The court read the jurors the statutory definition of insanity, and advised jurors that the court, pursuant to defendant\u2019s jury waivers, had determined (1) that the State had proven defendant guilty of Corum\u2019s murder beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) that defendant had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he was legally insane at the time of the offense, and (3) that defendant was eligible for the death penalty because he was over 18 years of age at the time of the offense and had been previously convicted of murdering two or more persons. The court noted that those findings were binding upon the jury, and informed the jury that its function would be to determine whether death was the appropriate sentence. With that, the parties gave their opening statements.\nEarly in defense counsel\u2019s statement to the jury, he acknowledged that the trial judge had rejected defendant\u2019s \u201cplea of insanity,\u201d but he advised the jurors that they could \u201cstill consider the background of Mr. Urd\u00edales *** to see whether or not, not that he is insane, but did he suffer from any mental illness or mental disease or mental defects. Did it reduce his ability to think and act? Did it reduce his ability to perform like a normal, healthy person?\u201d Counsel told the jurors, \u201cThose are facts that you must also consider.\u201d\nLater, when describing the harsh conditions of incarceration, which he likened to life \u201cin a cage,\u201d counsel again stated, \u201cThe evidence will show that while Andrew Urd\u00edales is not insane, *** he suffers from mental illness or mental disease.\u201d Still later, counsel stated:\n\u201cMr. Urd\u00edales, in fact, does suffer from defects of the brain. And so the question then becomes do we as a society treat someone who is mentally ill as opposed to someone who is mentally healthy the same. And we suggest not. We suggest that the most appropriate way is to punish by life in prison without the possibility of parole.\u201d\nCounsel concluded his opening statement with yet another reference to defendant\u2019s mental illness. With the conclusion of opening statements, the State presented evidence in aggravation.\nIn aggravation, the State presented evidence of the eight murders committed by defendant, as well as J.A.\u2019s testimony describing how defendant kidnapped, raped, and attempted to murder her. In the interests of brevity, we will substantially summarize that evidence, which is derived from police investigations of the crime scenes and from interviews with defendant. We note that defendant\u2019s description of events did not always agree with the physical evidence discovered at the crime scenes, as was the case with the murder of Cassandra Corum; however, to simplify the descriptions of the murders, we will generally recount defendant\u2019s version of events.\nDefendant\u2019s first murder victim was Robbin Brandley, a California college student he killed in January of 1986. At that time, defendant was in the Marines and stationed at Camp Pendleton in California. Defendant told police he was upset about some friendships at the base, so he decided to rob someone. Defendant took a \u201cbig old hunting knife,\u201d approximately 11 inches long, and drove to a college just north of Camp Pendleton. When he arrived, he took up a position in a poorly lit area and waited for someone to walk by. When defendant saw Brandley, he came up behind her, put his hand over her mouth, and told her he wanted her purse. She immediately complied; however, defendant just put the purse on the hood of her car and began stabbing her in the back. After she fell to the ground, defendant stabbed her several more times in the chest. Once, when defendant stabbed her in the ribs, the knife got stuck, and he had to step on her body in order to remove it. Defendant left Brandley in the parking lot to die, having stabbed her a total of 41 times in the back, hands, neck, and chest. Defendant told police that his victim \u201ccould have been anybody,\u201d and that Brandley \u201cwas just a random female.\u201d\nAfter the murder, defendant had blood on his jeans, jacket, and hands. In order to conceal the blood, and get back on the base, defendant rubbed grease from his car\u2019s engine over his clothes to hide the blood. When he returned to the base, defendant told the military police that his car had broken down and he had to fix it. The police believed defendant\u2019s story, which made defendant think they were \u201cdumb shits.\u201d\nDefendant indicated he had the same knife with him when he later had sex with a prostitute in Hollywood. Defendant said, \u201c[S]he was lucky.\u201d\nIn July of 1988, defendant committed his second murder, killing Julie McGhee in Cathedral City, California. Defendant picked up McGhee on a road frequented by prostitutes and drove her to a remote construction area, where they had sex. Afterwards, defendant got his gun and ordered McGhee out of the car. When she got out, he shot her in the head. Defendant noted he \u201creally didn\u2019t feel anything\u201d after killing McGhee. He said it was \u201cjust so quiet and peaceful\u201d that he got in his car and drove to a bar where he \u201chad some beers and watched the girls dance.\u201d\nIn September of 1988, defendant killed his third victim, Mary Ann Wells. Defendant picked up Wells, who was working as a prostitute, and drove her to an industrial area in San Diego, where they had sex. After he finished, defendant shot Wells, recovered the $40 he had paid her, dumped her body in an alley, and drove away.\nDefendant murdered Tammy Erwin in Palm Springs in April of 1989. Defendant had had sex with Erwin on at least one occasion prior to April 1989. On the night of the murder, defendant picked up Erwin and took her to a vacant lot, where she performed oral sex on him. Defendant did not remember arguing with Erwin, but he did recall shooting her while he was outside of his truck. After defendant shot Erwin, he got into his truck to leave, but noticed that Erwin was still standing up, clutching her head. Without getting out of his truck, defendant shot Erwin a second time, after which she fell to the ground. Defendant shot her a third time, before driving off.\nDefendant was discharged from the Marines in 1991, and moved back to Chicago to live with his parents. In September of 1992, defendant returned to California for a short visit. During that visit, he kidnapped, raped, and attempted to murder J.A.\nIn his statement to police, defendant indicated he first saw J.A. at a bus stop and offered her a ride. En route to J.A.\u2019s house-sitting job, defendant obtained a telephone number from J.A., which he subsequently-determined was a \u201cbum\u201d number. The next morning, defendant waited for J.A. to get off work and offered to take her out for breakfast. J.A. agreed, and got in the car.\nDefendant later related he was \u201cjust feeling upset about the number or something,\u201d and \u201csomething was just kind of building up, you know, tension.\u201d After driving a short distance, defendant stopped the car, reached over and grabbed J.A. by the hair, and produced a gun. Defendant observed that J.A. became \u201cpretty much submissive from that part forward.\u201d Defendant ordered J.A. to turn around, and he tied her hands behind her back. Defendant later told a police officer:\n\u201cI think *** before we started moving after I tied her hands up, I reached over and I kissed her. I just put my lips on her mouth and then I just started, you know, I was trying to make out with her.\u201d\nWhen defendant started driving again, J.A. told defendant she would do anything he wanted, so defendant unzipped his pants, pulled J.A.\u2019s head down, and said \u201csuck my dick\u201d or \u201csuck my cock.\u201d J.A. then performed oral sex on defendant until he tired of it and \u201cpicked her back up.\u201d In an interview with police, defendant remarked: \u201cShe kept asking me where we were going and she\u2019ll do anything I want. Shit like that, you know.\u201d\nDefendant drove out into the desert, stopping at one point to cut J.A.\u2019s panties and bra off. Defendant then rolled up J.A.\u2019s panties and stuffed them in her mouth. Defendant eventually \u201ctried to rape\u201d J.A. Defendant said she \u201ctried to help\u201d him, but \u201cnothing happened\u201d because he could not achieve an erection. After a while, defendant became angry and the \u201ctension\u201d began to build. Defendant said he began to choke J.A., \u201cand she kept kicking and *** her saliva was coming out of her mouth and *** her face was turning blue and then red and it was just a battle *** for awhile.\u201d Eventually, defendant\u2019s hand started to get tired and stiff, so he got off J.A. and sat down.\nThereafter, defendant got his gun and pulled J.A. out of the car. He forced her to her knees and again made her perform oral sex on him. Defendant eventually tired of that. Frustrated, he grabbed J.A., walked her to the back of the car, forced her into the trunk, and drove off. At some point during the drive, the lid of the trunk popped open and defendant stopped to slam it shut. Before defendant could get underway again, the trunk popped open a second time, J.A. jumped out, and she ran away screaming. Defendant later told detectives his first thought was to shoot her, but he decided against it because there were several cars nearby. Defendant got into his car and drove away. He told the police: \u201cSo that was the last time I saw her. I don\u2019t know if somebody else picked her up and finished where I started.\u201d\nJ.A., defendant\u2019s sole surviving victim, testified at the defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing. Because J.A.\u2019s testimony provides unique insight into defendant\u2019s activities with one of his victims, and the perspective of that victim, we discuss J.A.\u2019s testimony at length.\nJ.A. said she accepted a ride with defendant on the evening of September 27, 1992, because she would otherwise have been late for work. Defendant repeatedly asked her for her phone number, so she eventually gave him a fake number. He then dropped her off at work.\nThe next morning, as J.A. left work, defendant drove up behind her and asked her if she wanted to get some breakfast. J.A. recalled that defendant \u201clooked friendly again, just kind of smiling like. I wasn\u2019t scared of him.\u201d So, J.A. got into defendant\u2019s car.\nDefendant soon confronted J.A. about the fake phone number. When she denied giving him the wrong number, defendant became angry. He pulled the car to the side of the road and produced a knife and twine. J.A. said, before she \u201ceven [had] time to think to jump out of the car,\u201d defendant had the knife to her throat. He pushed her head into the dashboard, calling her a \u201cwhore, a bitch, and kinds of crazy things.\u201d He then grabbed her arms behind her back and tied them together with the twine. Defendant hit J.A. and displayed a gun. J.A. testified she felt \u201ctotally helpless.\u201d She recalled, \u201cI was in his control totally; and I even told him, I let him know that I was.\u201d As defendant started to drive again, he grabbed J.A.\u2019s head and forced her to perform oral sex on him.\nDefendant drove into the desert and stopped the car. J.A. testified that she feared defendant would become even more aggressive if she attempted to resist him, so she said, \u201c[I]f you are going to rape me, rape me. But please don\u2019t kill me ***.\u201d Defendant did not respond. He proceeded to pull off her shorts and shoes, hitting her in the head with one of her shoes. Defendant then cut off J.A.\u2019s panties with his knife and shoved them into her mouth, causing her to vomit and gag. After that, defendant cut off J.A.\u2019s bra and tied it tightly around her mouth.\nJ.A. testified that defendant then raped her, an ordeal that she described in graphic detail:\n\u201cAnd then he spread my legs open, and then he had sex with me. And then he was hitting on me and just staring at me; and then he was calling me a bitch, a whore, a slut, and I was just crying. *** Then he told me to tell him that I loved him. *** I thought it was kind of stupid because I had underwear shoved down my throat and a bra tied around my mouth; and I was thinking, how *** am I going to say anything ***? I\u2019m gagged. So I just looked into his eyes; and he was saying, say it, bitch, say it. And I just looked into his eyes; and I tried to say like, hello, I can\u2019t say anything. I\u2019ve got stuff in my mouth. And when I tried to talk, I would just gag. *** I think he finally realized that I couldn\u2019t talk with the underwear down my throat so he took it off. And he said, say it, bitch.\u201d\nWhen J.A. said it, it \u2014 not surprisingly \u2014 sounded insincere. She observed, \u201cIt sounded like I was saying it so I wouldn\u2019t die.\u201d Defendant said, \u201cYou are lying,\u201d and struck J.A. again. He repeatedly urged her: \u201c[S]ay it. Say it. Tell me you love me like you mean it.\u201d\nWhen J.A. was unable to do so in a satisfactory manner, defendant started strangling her with his hands. J.A. testified:\n\u201cHe just grabbed me by the throat and started strangling me until my eyes started rolling back in my head; and then he was yelling at me, calling me a bitch, a slut, a whore. And this whole time I was just so confused, thinking, oh my God, I\u2019m going to die. *** I thought about everybody, and I was wishing some way they could know what my final thoughts were before I died because there was no way, there was no way nobody was going to know anything; and that was the scariest part was that something like this could happen when people are just driving around and going about their day; and I\u2019m in the desert about to be murdered.\u201d\nJ.A. either lost consciousness momentarily or went into shock. She testified she could not feel anything for a while. During that period, which she described as \u201creally peaceful,\u201d she thought she had died, and she felt \u201chappy.\u201d However, that momentary respite passed, and J.A. soon realized that defendant was still choking her, \u201cwhipping [her] back and forth trying to get [her] back to it.\u201d She related, \u201cAnd then all of a sudden I just came back to it, and I could feel everything again.\u201d\nJ.A. testified that defendant then began fondling her breasts and \u201csucking\u201d on her neck. Simultaneously, she felt something cold running down her neck. When defendant stopped, he put his face in front of hers. It was then that she noticed defendant had blood on his teeth, and J.A. started to panic again. She recounted: \u201cI knew he tried to bite me; but I couldn\u2019t feel it because I was in such bad shock some of the things I didn\u2019t even feel. But then he opened the door.\u201d\nDefendant exited the car with his gun, and pulled J.A. out of the car by her hair. With his pants down, defendant ordered J.A. to \u201csuck it, bitch.\u201d J.A. initially refused. She recalled: \u201cI just wanted to die so I said no. And I was hoping that he would just shoot me because I couldn\u2019t take it anymore, and I wanted to go back to that state I was in a little while ago.\u201d Defendant again ordered J.A. to \u201csuck it,\u201d and he hit her in the head for emphasis. J.A. resolved to \u201csuck it\u201d and \u201cbite it off.\u201d However, immediately after she began, defendant \u201cnailed [her] in the head again.\u201d She recalled, \u201c[H]e got really upset because it wasn\u2019t erect to suck it. It was never erect the whole time, and I think that makes him really mad.\u201d\nDefendant then left J.A. for a moment, removing a bag, with \u201cknife blades sticking of it,\u201d from the trunk of the car, and placing it in the backseat. J.A. seized the opportunity and tried to escape. She testified: \u201cI started running through the field as fast as I could; and I could see nothing. I could see no roads. I could see nothing; and I knew I was doomed; but if I\u2019m going to die, I want to at least *** have someone say that I tried to run.\u201d Defendant eventually caught J.A. by the hair, \u201cripped it back,\u201d and she fell to the ground. Defendant began to drag the partially naked J.A. through cacti and back to the car.\n. When he got J.A. back to the car, defendant decided to put her in the trunk. J.A. stated, \u201cI just wanted him to kill me; and he decided not to kill me right then.\u201d Defendant tried to force J.A. into the trunk, and she resisted. She recalled: \u201cI thought if I go into this trunk *** I am going to be dead. But he kept prolonging it and prolonging it; and it was driving me mentally insane.\u201d\nDefendant was eventually able to force J.A. into the trunk. J.A., who was tied with twine and clad only in a sweatshirt, thought \u201cabout being chopped up.\u201d She thought she would be taken somewhere and would be \u201chacked up in pieces.\u201d She tried to kill herself by holding her breath and by bashing her head against the inside of the trunk. She recalled, \u201cI didn\u2019t want him to kill me. I wanted to kill myself.\u201d\nWhen J.A. was unsuccessful in that attempt, she suffered through periods of panic, and eventually experienced a loss of energy, \u201clike *** having a seizure.\u201d J.A. said she then started to pray. After praying, she got \u201creally, really calm.\u201d J.A. testified: \u201cI just got all of my energy together; and then I just stretched my arms hardly; and all of the twine just busted right off my hands.\u201d\nHaving freed herself, J.A. again succumbed to panic and despair. She testified:\n\u201cAnd I kept saying, now what, God? *** I\u2019m in a frickin\u2019 trunk. How am I going to get out of this? And so I just lost hope again; and I got the twine; and I wound it up; and I put it around my neck; and I squeezed it really tight; and I was trying to choke myself. *** I couldn\u2019t strangle myself. And I couldn\u2019t think of any other way to kill myself.\u201d\nJ.A. briefly entertained the idea of fighting defendant when he opened the trunk, but she quickly decided against it, concluding, \u201cHe\u2019ll pull me out. We\u2019ll struggle. One of us will die. Probably me since I have no weapons.\u201d So, J.A. resolved to try and escape from the trunk.\nJ.A. eventually found the latch of the trunk. She recalled she \u201cpushed something, pulled something, turned something, and it went click.\u201d She lifted the trunk a little bit and there was \u201clight everywhere.\u201d J.A.\u2019s state of mind was such that she initially contemplated whether to \u201cjump out and get run over and die,\u201d which she \u201creally didn\u2019t mind\u201d at that point, or to actually try to save herself. She decided on the latter course, and raised the trunk lid in such a way as to draw defendant\u2019s attention.\nDefendant quickly pulled over, and shortly thereafter appeared at the rear of the car with his gun. Defendant slammed the trunk lid closed and yelled, \u201cDon\u2019t open that trunk, bitch. I\u2019ll shoot out the back seat.\u201d He then got back in the car, but was unable to drive away because the car had become stuck in the soft sand.\nDefendant kept trying to move the car while he intermittently threatened to kill J.A. if she tried to open the trunk again. J.A. eventually unlatched the trunk a second time, jumped out, and ran. As she did so, she looked back and saw defendant in pursuit with a machete. As she ran, J.A. tried to get motorists to stop, but they would just drive by. Finally, she saw a truck coming. J.A. recounted: \u201cSo I just ran in front of it with my eyes closed because I thought he was real near to me so I wanted to be run over before I was hit with that [machete].\u201d The occupants of the truck, two Marines, grabbed J.A. and put her in their truck. When she told them what had happened, they initially began chasing defendant, until she told them he was heavily armed, at which point they desisted. The two Marines took J.A. to a nearby gas station; the police were called; and J.A. was thereafter taken to a hospital.\nUnder cross-examination, J.A. acknowledged that she still has the experience \u201cfollowing [her] around\u201d and that she is now \u201cdifferent mentally.\u201d\nThree years after he kidnapped, raped, and attempted to kill J.A., defendant murdered Denise Maney in Palm Springs. During a vacation to California in March of 1995, defendant picked up Maney in the same area where he had earlier picked up McGhee and Erwin. Defendant drove Maney to the desert, and stopped the car on a deserted side road, where he ordered Maney to strip and perform oral sex on him. Defendant said he got \u201ctired\u201d of that after a while, so he grabbed Maney by the hair, walked her over to the front of the car, and told her to lie facedown on the ground. Defendant got on top of her and tied her hands behind her back. He again directed her to perform fellatio. However, defendant said, he \u201cwasn\u2019t really feeling satisfied,\u201d so he turned Maney over on her knees and \u201cshoved\u201d one of his fingers into Maney\u2019s anus. Maney screamed. Defendant recalled, \u201cAnd then after awhile I drove in two fingers. I just kept going \u2014 shoving my fingers in her ass. *** And that went on for a while. I just kept doing that to her.\u201d Defendant said, when he got tired of that, he picked her up and walked her toward the desert. When she turned around, defendant put his gun in her mouth. \u201cAnd then it went off.\u201d The gunshot blew off the back of Maney\u2019s head.\nDefendant stated: \u201cThen she fell and she was still like gurgling *** making a lot of noises. But I had some blood on me a little bit and the gun[,] so I just walked away.\u201d Defendant got in his car, and started to drive away, but he eventually stopped. Defendant stated: \u201cI didn\u2019t feel nothing *** I didn\u2019t really think. I just kind of like wiped \u2014 cleaned my hand off a little bit and I stopped, turned around and I went back to her.\u201d Defendant then described his mood as \u201cangry\u201d and \u201cvery upset.\u201d He said, this time, he took his knife out.\nIn relating what he did next, defendant slipped back and forth between use of the singular pronoun \u201cI\u201d and the plural pronoun \u201cwe.\u201d He told the police:\n\u201c[W]e took the knife out and we went back toward the\u2014 back to her where she was lying at we just started stabbing for some reason. Just on the body several times, in the chest maybe, stomach. *** I remember I made a slashing motion by the throat. *** Then we went back to the car. And I \u2014 we, we \u2014 picked up her clothes. *** Then we were driving, we just started driving ***.\u201d\nDefendant said he threw most of Maney\u2019s belongings on the side of the road. However, he said, alternately: \u201cWe just *** I just\u201d buried \u201cher panties and her little lingerie stuff.\u201d\nDefendant murdered a sixth woman, Laura Uylaki, in April of 1996. Defendant told police he met Uylaki in the winter of 1995-96, and they went out a few times. He and Uylaki had sex twice at Wolf Lake in a sleeping bag defendant kept in the back of his truck. In April of 1996, defendant again picked up Uylaki and they drove to Wolf Lake. On the way, they began to argue. According to defendant, when they arrived at Wolf Lake, defendant took his loaded .38-caliber revolver from underneath the driver\u2019s seat and was \u201cshowing it to Laura,\u201d when the gun went off, shooting a hole in the roof of the truck. Defendant stated, after his gun went off, \u201cLaura got mad and all hell broke loose.\u201d\nDefendant claimed that Uylaki grabbed for his gun, breaking his left index finger in the process. He said she then jumped out of the truck and began to run. Defendant stated that he followed her and fired \u201ca couple more times\u201d in her direction. She fell to the ground. When he determined that she was dead, he decided to throw her body into the lake. According to defendant\u2019s version of events, he then took off her clothes, carried her body to the lake, and pushed her in. Thereafter, defendant said he drove back to Chicago, and on the way, he threw Uylaki\u2019s clothes from the passenger side of his truck.\nDefendant told police he met Lynn Huber, his seventh murder victim, in the summer of 1996, when she was working as a prostitute in Chicago. Defendant said they had sex a couple of times that summer. One evening in late July or early August of 1996, defendant saw Huber carrying a large garbage bag full of clothes. He stopped and offered her a ride, which she accepted. According to defendant, he pulled into an alley to have sex with Huber, but she started arguing with him and \u201cacting kind of ditzy.\u201d Defendant said that Huber tried to get out of the truck, but he grabbed her and shot her in the head, using the loaded gun he kept under his seat.\nDefendant stated he then put Huber\u2019s body in the bed of the truck and drove to Wolf Lake. In defendant\u2019s version of events, he then removed Huber\u2019s clothing and, in the process, pricked his finger with a needle. Defendant claimed that made him angry enough that he took out a knife, stabbed her \u201ca lot of times\u201d in the back, and shot her again. Defendant dragged her body to the lake and threw her in. Defendant later disposed of the clothes Huber had been wearing and gave her bag of clothes to the Salvation Army. Defendant observed, \u201c[S]he won\u2019t need them anymore.\u201d\nDefendant told police he killed his eighth and final murder victim, Cassandra Corum, on the night of July 13, 1996. Defendant said he had known Corum for about two years prior to the murder. On the night of the murder, defendant met Corum in a Hammond, Indiana, bar and the two drove to Wolf Lake, where they had sex. According to defendant, Corum said something that made him angry \u2014 though he could not remember what \u2014 so he hit her in the face several times with his fist and open hand. Defendant stated that Corum started to become afraid and panicked, \u201cso she began to fight *** back.\u201d Defendant said it was at that point that he forced Co-rum\u2019s hands behind her back and handcuffed her. He also claimed he then removed her clothing. Defendant told police that Corum \u201cseemed numb with anxiety and fear. So she became passive and submissive.\u201d Defendant then bound her feet together with duct tape, put duct tape over her mouth, and positioned her so that her head was in his lap.\nDefendant said he was \u201cstill pissed off\u201d so he began driving south, down Interstate 55. He recalled he had driven \u201cfor a couple hours or so\u201d when he started getting tired. At that point, he pulled off the interstate and continued driving until he went over a bridge that crossed a river. He then drove into a little park and shut off his truck. Defendant claimed he removed the duct tape and handcuffs from Corum \u2014 though that assertion is inconsistent with the state in which her body was found. Defendant said he and the still-naked Corum exited the truck. Defendant had gotten his gun from beneath the driver\u2019s seat of his truck. Defendant stated that Corum had walked to the back of the truck, and had turned to face him, as if to say something, when he pointed the gun at her and fired once. She fell to the ground. Because he was still mad at her for fighting and biting him, he then got his knife out of the truck and stabbed her \u201ca few times.\u201d\nThereafter, defendant picked up her body, carried it to the bridge, and dumped the body into the river. He observed that he \u201cdidn\u2019t feel anything for Cassie *** she was just a whore.\u201d He added that he was \u201ctrained to kill in the Marine Corps.\u201d Defendant said he drove back toward home, throwing Corum\u2019s clothes out the window on the way. He noted they were \u201cjust garbage *** and there was no sense in keeping them.\u201d\nAs noted, much of the foregoing evidence comes from defendant\u2019s own statements to police. At sentencing, Detective Don McGrath of the Chicago police department testified that he escorted defendant back to the lockup after the interviews. McGrath testified, when they got to the lockup door, defendant looked at McGrath and said: \u201cWell, you know, I\u2019m kind of glad in a way that you caught me. *** I was starting to get the urge again.\u201d\nWhen the State had finished presenting aggravating evidence of defendant\u2019s criminal activity, the parties and the court discussed the commencement of the defense case in mitigation. In that regard, defense counsel stated his intention of introducing the psychiatrists\u2019 reports into evidence and asking that the reports go back to the jury. The State objected to the reports going back to the jury, arguing that the experts should testify in person and \u201cbe subject to cross-examination.\u201d The court expressed concern, noting that the reports in question were \u201cextremely voluminous\u201d and that Dr. Killian\u2019s report alone was 75 pages long. The trial judge advised the parties:\n\u201cI\u2019m not limiting either the direct or cross-examination of a particular expert. So you want to have an expert on the stand for two days, that\u2019s fine with me. You can go over his entire report if you like. *** [I]f all those questions are then asked of a witness, then the opposite side knows what to cross on. *** So the only point I\u2019m making is that there is an unlimited opportunity to inquire of these experts.\u201d\nThe trial court subsequently ruled that the reports would not be sent back to the jury, noting, inter alia, \u201cthat\u2019s why we have the experts testifying because we are in a realm beyond the normal knowledge of the jurors.\u201d\nWith that, the defense commenced its case in mitigation. In mitigation, the defendant called Drs. Merikangas and Killian, Kendra Moses, a mitigation expert, Roger Cowan, former warden of Menard Correctional Center, and Steven Hardy, a clinical psychologist.\nKendra Moses, a defense mitigation specialist, testified regarding negative and positive experiences in defendant\u2019s life and the impact of defendant\u2019s conduct on his family. Moses observed that defendant was the youngest of six children. The Urd\u00edales family was \u201cfairly close\u201d prior to defendant\u2019s arrest for the Cook County murders; however, that is no longer the case. As of the time of trial, the only family members who regularly visited defendant in prison were his parents, his sister, Cynthia, and her son. All of the siblings and grandchildren, except for Cynthia and her son, stopped visiting defendant\u2019s parents once they learned of the Cook County murders.\nMoses noted that defendant\u2019s oldest brother, Alfred, was killed in Vietnam when defendant was three or four years old. Defendant was \u201cvery close\u201d to Alfred. According to family members, defendant would sit on the porch and wait for his brother to come home, not understanding that his brother had died.\nAlfred\u2019s death impacted defendant in another sense as well. After Alfred was killed, defendant\u2019s mother suffered through an \u201cextended period\u201d of depression for \u201ctwo or three years.\u201d She had \u201ctrouble continuing to function in her everyday life.\u201d Moses testified it was during that period of time that defendant\u2019s older sisters, Cynthia and Monica, became his primary caretakers.\nMoses suggested it was \u201cin that environment that Monica eventually started to sexually abuse\u201d defendant, though it would appear that the abuse \u2014 reported by defendant to have taken place when he was 11 years old and Monica was 13 or 14 \u2014 would have taken place approximately four years after defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s period of depression. In any event, defendant told his psychologist and Moses that Monica had sexually abused him on several occasions and the abuse caused him intense feelings of fear and helplessness.\nMoses further testified that defendant was subjected to bullying, beatings, and harassment from third grade through eighth grade. She explained that the Urd\u00edales family \u2014 of Mexican origin \u2014 moved to Burnham, Illinois, when defendant was in third grade. They were the only family of Hispanic heritage living in the area. That ethnic difference, as well as defendant\u2019s small size and the developing symptoms of Tourette\u2019s syndrome, led to neighborhood children harassing, chasing and physically attacking him on his way home from school. In one instance, the police were called. The harassment was so bad that the family moved back to Chicago when defendant was in high school.\nDefendant\u2019s parents believed that defendant\u2019s experiences growing up in Burnham made him \u201cvery anxious socially.\u201d He did not develop friendships easily and in fact \u201chad at various times maybe one friend that he would play with or hang out with.\u201d As he got older, defendant was \u201cfearful\u201d around girls and did not date.\nWhen defendant graduated from high school, he enlisted in the Marines, serving from 1984 until he was honorably discharged in 1991. Moses described defendant\u2019s experience in the military as \u201cnot a failed career,\u201d but certainly \u201cnot the success he hoped it would be.\u201d Moses indicated that defendant did not make friends in the Marines and he had some unspecified difficulties.\nWhen defendant was discharged from the Marines, he moved back to Chicago, where he lived with his parents. He is the godfather of Cynthia\u2019s son, Brian, and the two were described as \u201cvery close.\u201d Moses testified that defendant had a close relationship with all of his nieces and nephews.\nFinally, Moses testified that defendant did seek counseling through the Veteran\u2019s Administration after his discharge from the Marines. He was referred to psychologist Janet Wilier. He advised Dr. Wilier that he needed help dealing with his temper and an inferiority complex. He also spoke to Wilier about childhood harassment, sexual abuse, inability to relate to women, and the death of his older brother. Defendant attended over 100 sessions with Wilier between 1991 and 1995. According to Moses, defendant stopped attending sessions when the Veteran\u2019s Administration changed its billing practices and he \u201cdidn\u2019t feel like he could afford the copayment.\u201d\nThe defense\u2019s next witness was Roger Cowan, former warden of Menard Correctional Center. Defendant was incarcerated at Menard at the time of trial. Cowan explained that an inmate who serves a life sentence without the possibility of parole would always be housed in a maximum security facility; an inmate on death row would be segregated from the general population. Cowan described in detail the tight security and highly restrictive conditions that apply to an inmate serving a natural life sentence. Cowan characterized incarceration at Menard as \u201ca very rigid lifestyle *** very demanding on the inmates *** a tough life.\u201d He noted that Menard is not air-conditioned. Inmates can receive five visits per month, and they get five hours of recreation each week.\nCowan noted that defendant had spent seven years in the correctional system. He had been ticketed only twice: once for throwing his lunch tray from his cell onto the floor; once for failing to enter his cell on time. Cowan offered his assessment that defendant had made a \u201cvery good adjustment\u201d to prison life.\nDr. Stephen Hardy, a clinical psychologist who had worked several years for both the Department of Corrections and the Department of Mental Health/Human Services, testified that he had evaluated defendant on six occasions and had reviewed records pertinent to defendant\u2019s mental condition. Hardy diagnosed defendant with Tourette\u2019s disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, bipolar disorder, and personality disorder with avoidant and borderline features. Hardy based the PTSD diagnosis on defendant\u2019s \u201chistory of severe sexual and physical abuse involving an older sister and neighborhood bullies respectively.\u201d Hardy explained that a PTSD diagnosis based on childhood sexual abuse does not necessarily have to entail \u201can event where the person was threatened or suffered serious injury. *** Sexually traumatic events may include developmentally inappropriate sexual experiences without threatened or actual violence or injury.\u201d\nConcerning the abduction and murder of Cassandra Corum, Hardy concluded that defendant acted while \u201cunder the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance but not such to constitute a defense to the prosecution.\u201d Hardy noted in defendant\u2019s history a \u201cclear pattern\u201d involving \u201cchronic feelings of emptiness and inappropriate anger and difficulty controlling this anger.\u201d\nHardy recognized that defendant \u201chad some difficulties getting along with people, and there were some personal conflicts at work.\u201d Defendant consistently displayed an unwillingness to be involved with other people, particularly adult females. Notwithstanding defendant\u2019s \u201cdifficulties getting along with people,\u201d Hardy testified that defendant\u2019s potential for acting out violently in prison was low, an assessment he based upon the structure of prison and the prison authorities\u2019 ability to quickly intervene should defendant become violent. In that respect, Hardy concluded: \u201cLooking at the circumstances under which he acted out violently in the past, examining the means he had to do so, the characteristics of his past victims, and you combine that with his behavior the past seven years in two maximum security environments, I think the potential for him to act out violently it\u2019s my opinion is very low.\u201d\nHardy acknowledged that defendant would still come into contact with women in prison. He also described an incident during which defendant became very loud and threw some papers while Hardy was interviewing him. Although Hardy did not call the guards, Hardy was nonetheless \u201cconcerned about it.\u201d\nDr. James Merikangas reiterated much of his testimony from the bench trial/GBMI hearing. Commenting on the MRI and the single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) scan evidence, which suggested shrinkage of defendant\u2019s brain, Merikangas observed that such findings were often associated with dementia, loss of intellectual capacity, and abnormalities of motor control. Merikangas did not believe that defendant\u2019s criminal conduct could be explained simply in terms of inability to control his anger. Merikangas concluded: \u201cI would call it rage attacks, I would call it impulse disorder, intermittent explosive disorder. I wouldn\u2019t simply call it anger.\u201d Merikangas stated his belief that antiseizure medication could prevent defendant\u2019s violent outbursts and antipsychotic medication could be used to treat \u201cthe disorder of thinking that he has.\u201d\nUnder cross-examination, Merikangas maintained that defendant\u2019s brain \u201cshrinkage\u201d and, inferentially, his \u201creduced mental capacity[,] *** probably did have something to do with the murders.\u201d Merikangas rejected the prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that defendant\u2019s actions during the murders showed he had no \u201ccoordination problems,\u201d and that he had displayed an \u201cability to plan,\u201d and select as victims women whom he could manipulate, control, and ultimately kill. Merikangas insisted that defendant\u2019s actions showed \u201can inability to communicate with women in a normal manner.\u201d When the prosecutor stated that defendant \u201cnever had enough guts to do it to a man, *** he always had to pick out a woman,\u201d Merikangas brought up \u201cthe outburst that he had here in the courtroom, when the jury wasn\u2019t present, where he turned over the table and went wild with even these guards standing next to him.\u201d Merikangas pointed to that incident as an indication that defendant suffers from a \u201creal loss of control.\u201d Inquiring further about defendant\u2019s spontaneous loss of control, his impulse disorder, and his intermittent explosive disorder, the following colloquy ensued between the prosecutor and Merikangas:\n\u201cPROSECUTOR: You think carrying around knives and a machete in a rental car in California when he picked up [J.A.], you think that showed a disorder of thought or did it show planning?\nMERIKANGAS: That shows that he was looking for something but also indicates a certain paranoia to be carrying all those weapons.\u201d\nThe final defense witness was Dr. Terry Killian. Killian testified consistently with his testimony from the bench trial/GBMI hearing, focusing again on the defendant\u2019s mental state and dissociation at the time of Co-rum\u2019s murder. Killian emphasized, however, that the defendant accepted responsibility for his conduct and did not blame it on an alter ego. Killian also believed that defendant\u2019s voluntary counseling sessions with Dr. Wilier represented \u201ca good-faith effort\u201d to obtain treatment \u201cwithin the limitations of what I believe he is capable of doing.\u201d\nKillian\u2019s testimony about defendant\u2019s diagnosis, background, family history, childhood trauma, and history of mental health treatment was also consistent with his testimony from the bench trial/GBMI hearing. Killian noted that he had reviewed medical records, arrest reports, and police records, and had conducted over 22 hours of interviews. Summarizing his findings, Killian explained that defendant was not insane and was responsible for his actions; however, Killian concluded that defendant suffered from extreme mental and emotional disturbances that reduced his mental capacity at the time of his offenses. Killian believed that defendant felt some remorse for his actions, but, even though it would have been to his advantage to express remorse in death penalty proceedings, defendant feared that expressing remorse would be perceived as self-serving and insincere.\nOn cross-examination, Killian testified that he had \u201creviewed\u201d a sentence-completion test administered by Dr. Opsahl when forming his opinion. When the prosecutor handed Killian the sentence-completion test, and asked if that was the test he had reviewed, defense counsel objected, arguing that the test was not relevant unless Killian had relied upon the test in formulating his opinion. The prosecutor was then allowed to question Killian as to whether he had relied on the report when forming his opinion. Killian responded:\n\u201cA. I looked at this, but I didn\u2019t include this, I\u2019m pretty sure I did not include a description of this in my report. I read through it and didn\u2019t see anything that, that was significantly different from what I already knew about him; so I didn\u2019t include the specifics of it.\nQ. Did you rely upon, at all, in any respect, rely upon, for your opinions here and your assessment of Mr. Urdiales\u2019s personality, did you rely upon any of his answers here?\nA. I don\u2019t think I did. I don\u2019t think I put much into the sentence completion test. I remember looking at it but not making much of it and setting it aside, and I don\u2019t think I relied on that. I relied on lots of other things but not that test specifically.\nQ. So you don\u2019t recall if some of the answers that he gave on this two-page test helped you formulate that he had this rage towards women?\nA. I don\u2019t specifically recall. I\u2019d be happy to look at it if you\u2019d like.\u201d\nAfter looking at the report, Killian stated:\n\u201cWell, they\u2019re consistent with what I already believed about him from everything else I had read. In other words, he does make comments in here about women that are pretty negative. That should hardly be surprising given everything else about him.\u201d\nWhen the prosecutor asked for specifics, defense counsel objected and asked to approach the bench. The court announced a brief recess and made the following comments out of the presence of the jury:\n\u201cTo cut to the core, the witness is not being responsive, and the right question I don\u2019t believe has been answered. The witness has testified very clearly to the tune of $36,000 that he has gone over with great care all of the materials of a psychiatric nature. The witness has acknowledged that this is among the materials. Now, what the witness has said here, is he has not included it in his report because it is consistent with what he already knew. He has not yet testified that he disregarded it and did not rely on it, but yet he has skirted the issue and not testified that he discarded it and didn\u2019t take it into account in arriving at his decisions. I think we need a vigorous interrogation on foundation by the State to see where this witness goes because he\u2019s going in both directions.\u201d\nIn subsequent foundational questioning, out of the presence of the jury, Killian conceded that he had taken into account all the materials placed before him, and then qualified his answer by adding, \u201c[I]t\u2019s not accurate to say that each piece of paper received the same amount of attention as any other piece of paper.\u201d The prosecutor then asked if defendant\u2019s answers in the sentence-completion test were important in his analysis of defendant. Killian responded: \u201cI\u2019m answering this as well as I can.\u201d\nAt that point the court asked Killian if he understood the question, and directed him to answer it if he understood. The court advised Killian, if he did not understand, he should say so. At the court\u2019s direction, the prosecutor\u2019s question was read back, and Killian responded that he considered defendant\u2019s answers in the sentence-completion test \u201csomewhat important.\u201d The prosecutor then returned to the critical question: \u201cDid you take his answers to these questions into account in arriving at your conclusion?\u201d Killian answered: \u201cNot specifically, I did not include them in my report.\u201d As the prosecutor began to protest, the court again interceded:\n\u201cAll right. Once again, let me stop you here. Sir, there was a question asked you and you answered a different question. I\u2019m going to have the court reporter read back the question once again. *** I want you to listen to the question that\u2019s asked of you and then I want you to answer that question unless you don\u2019t understand it. Do we understand each other?\u201d\nKillian answered affirmatively. When the question was read back by the court reporter, Killian finally answered, unequivocally: \u201cYes, I took them into account.\u201d With that, the court determined there was a sufficient foundation to go into the report before the jury. Before the jury was called back into the courtroom, the court asked attorney Elmore if there was anything he wanted to contest in terms of that ruling. Defense counsel responded: \u201cIt\u2019s proper, I agree. He took it into account; so, it\u2019s fair game.\u201d\nBefore the jury, Killian again acknowledged that defendant\u2019s answers in the sentence-completion test were considered in his assessment of defendant, and defendant\u2019s answers were consistent with defendant\u2019s attitudes toward, and feelings about, women. Although, at trial, the prosecutor then read aloud the open-ended portions of the sentences in the test, and Killian responded by supplying the words defendant used to complete the sentences, we set forth here the completed sentences, utilizing hyphens to separate the test portions from defendant\u2019s responses:\n\u201cSentence # 2: A wife should \u2014 be a good provider.\nSentence # 4: A man feels good when \u2014 he comes.\nSentence # 7: Men are lucky because \u2014 we have cocks.\nSentence # 8: I just can\u2019t stand people who \u2014 get in my face.\nSentence # 11: A woman feels good when \u2014 we stick it in them.\nSentence # 12: My main problem is \u2014 people.\nSentence # 13: A husband has the right to \u2014 beat his wife.\nSentence # 14: A woman should always \u2014 please her man.\nSentence # 19: If I can\u2019t get what I want \u2014 I take it.\nSentence # 22: My conscience bothers me \u2014 if I let it.\nSentence # 23: A man should always \u2014 be right.\nSentence # 25: When I am criticized \u2014 I get mad.\nSentence # 27: Being with other people \u2014 sucks.\nSentence # 30: What gets me into trouble is \u2014 sex.\nSentence # 35: A woman has a right to \u2014 be silent.\u201d\nAfter going through the foregoing portions of the sentence-completion test, the prosecutor asked: \u201cHates women, doesn\u2019t he?\u201d Killian agreed, adding that defendant had \u201ca great deal of anger, and most of that anger is directed at women.\u201d\nThe prosecutor followed up by asking about the sexual abuse that defendant reported involving his sister, Monica. Killian acknowledged, on page 73 of his report, he wrote: \u201cThere were apparently only a few incidents of sexual activity between them, and Andrew told me that he did not experience the sexual contact with Monica as traumatic and he did not even think of it as being wrong until he was well into his adult years.\u201d Killian, however, disagreed with the prosecutor\u2019s assertion that there \u201cwasn\u2019t any sexual trauma,\u201d suggesting that \u201cit was more traumatic than he currently admits to for whatever reasons.\u201d At the conclusion of Killian\u2019s testimony, outside the presence of the jury, the court ruled that the sentence-completion test would be included in the record, but would not go to the jury.\nAfter Killian\u2019s testimony, the defense rested. Defendant elected not to testify in his own behalf or deliver a statement in allocution.\nIn rebuttal, the State called Dr. Park Dietz, who testified consistently with his testimony at the bench trial/ GBMI hearing. Prior to the defense\u2019s stipulation that Dietz was qualified as an expert \u201cin the area of forensic psychiatry,\u201d the State elicited testimony that Dietz had been previously involved in examinations of various high-profile individuals such as John Hinckley, Jeffery Dahmer, and Ted Kaczynski, also known as the Unibomber. After the defense stipulation, Dietz testified to his finding that defendant shows clear signs of a personality disorder with antisocial and schizotypal features. Dietz defined a personality disorder as \u201ca lifelong pattern of maladaptive behavior\u201d that \u201ctends to cause impairment\u201d in a person\u2019s \u201crelationships with other people.\u201d\nDietz believed that three factors may have played a part \u2014 to a greater or lesser extent \u2014 in defendant\u2019s development of a personality disorder. First and foremost, Dietz felt that the taunting and bullying defendant experienced as a child was a significant factor. Dietz noted that defendant had been \u201ctaunted and bullied and teased\u201d as a child, and he \u201cblamed his crimes to some extent o[n] what people had done to him as a kid because it made him so angry and resentful.\u201d Second, Dietz believed that the death of defendant\u2019s brother may have contributed to the development of his disorder. Although defendant did not remember his brother, and he did not feel impacted by his brother\u2019s death directly, there was evidence that defendant\u2019s mother became withdrawn after Alfred\u2019s death, and was \u201cno longer as attentive and participatory as a caretaker.\u201d Finally, Dietz mentioned the defendant\u2019s report of sexual intercourse with his sister as a possible factor; however, Dietz noted that defendant was not \u201cparticularly pleased or upset by it. He did not regard this as a very important aspect of what had happened to him as a child.\u201d Dietz did not believe it was \u201ca particular[ly] traumatic event\u201d for defendant. He placed more importance on the \u201cunavailability\u201d of defendant\u2019s mother after his brother\u2019s death.\nDietz believed that anger played an important part in all of the crimes committed by defendant, and in his work-related problems as well. Dietz also testified that hatred of women and sexual sadism were significant factors in the commission of defendant\u2019s crimes.\nUnder cross-examination, Dietz stated that he normally uses the terms \u201cmental illness\u201d or \u201cmental disease\u201d to describe conditions \u201cin which the person\u2019s experience is categorically different from normal human experience.\u201d Using the terms in that manner would equate the terms to psychosis, and they would thus apply to persons with \u201challucinations, delusions, or a formal thought disorder.\u201d Dietz acknowledged Illinois\u2019 definition of mental illness for purposes of a finding of guilty but mentally ill, and he paraphrased that definition for the jury, \u00a1Le., \u201ca substantial disorder of mood, thinking or behavior that impaired judgment at the time of the crime.\u201d Dietz concluded that defendant was not mentally ill when he killed Cassandra Corum.\nFollowing Dietz\u2019s testimony, Cassandra Corum\u2019s mother, Sherry Alsalah, read a victim impact statement, touching upon the effect Corum\u2019s disappearance and murder had had upon her, the victim\u2019s sister, and the victim\u2019s young son.\nPrior to closing argument, the prosecutor sought clarification of the limits of permissible argument, inquiring as to which of the court\u2019s rulings from the guilt phase would be the subject of proper comment. The prosecutor noted he had \u201cplanned on arguing that the Court has previously found the defendant to be sane, not to be mentally ill.\u201d The court told the prosecutor: \u201cNo. You got to stay away from mental illness.\u201d The prosecutor accepted that prohibition without objection or argument, stating, \u201cThat is what I wanted to be sure about.\u201d Defense counsel then interjected, \u201cInsanity is fair game.\u201d The court confirmed that insanity was \u201cfair game,\u201d and the parties could discuss that finding, because the court had already advised the jury of that ruling.\nIn his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jurors:\n\u201cYou\u2019re not here to decide the Defendant\u2019s guilt. That has already been decided. The Court decided, Judge Frobish has already decided that the Defendant is guilty of the murder of Cassandra Corum. He also has decided that the Defendant was not, at the time that murder was committed, insane.\u201d\nThe prosecutor subsequently acknowledged that defendant\u2019s mental condition was relevant in the jury\u2019s sentencing decision, noting that the jury would receive instructions pertaining to \u201cextreme mental or emotional disturbance\u201d and \u201creduced mental capacity.\u201d\nIn his closing statement, defense counsel summarized the evidence presented on defendant\u2019s behalf, and took issue with the State\u2019s evidence, particularly the testimony of Dr. Dietz. The focal point of the defendant\u2019s closing argument was the defendant\u2019s mental and emotional condition. Defense counsel informed the jury it was \u201ca factor in mitigation\u201d that defendant \u201csuffers from a reduced mental capacity.\u201d He suggested there was \u201c[ajbundant testimony concerning that.\u201d Counsel noted it was a mitigating factor that \u201cthe murder of Cassandra Corum was committed while Defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance although not such as to constitute a defense to the prosecution.\u201d Counsel stated he had asked Dr. Dietz to provide a \u201cdefinition of mental illness\u201d; however, he provided the \u201cdefinition of insanity.\u201d Attorney Skelton underscored: \u201cAs Judge Frobish has told you, insanity is not an issue at this stage of the proceeding.\u201d Counsel emphasized that insanity was not at issue and that Dr. Dietz had provided the \u201cwrong definition of what we\u2019re dealing with at this stage of the case.\u201d Skelton observed that the jury had seen photographs evincing the \u201chandiwork\u201d of a \u201csick mind.\u201d He directed the jury to \u201clook at the mitigating factors,\u201d noting that defendant \u201csuffers from a mental illness\u201d and \u201chad a reduced mental capacity.\u201d Counsel concluded:\n\u201cWhat we are talking about here is mitigation. What we are talking about here is does society, do we as a people who do not have the same deficits, the same problems, the same illnesses as Andrew Urd\u00edales, punish the mentally ill in the same fashion that we would punish someone who does not have that mental illness?\u201d\nCounsel suggested that life in prison was the appropriate sentence.\nIn rebuttal argument, the prosecutor reiterated that insanity was not an issue; however, he immediately followed that remark with a question that unequivocally apprised the jury that mental illness was still an issue: \u201cIs [defendant] mentally ill at some level?\u201d What followed was a discussion of the evidence and testimony bearing upon that issue. The prosecutor\u2019s subsequent remarks also made clear that defendant\u2019s mental state was considered a viable, and perhaps determinative, factor in the jury\u2019s sentencing decision. We quote pertinent portions of the prosecutor\u2019s argument:\n\u201cExtreme mental or emotional disturbance or reduced mental capacity. That\u2019s what you are going to see [in instructions] when you decide whether or not you believe that factor in mitigation and because of that its inappropriate to impose a death penalty.\nReduced mental capacity. *** I pose to you, think about this. *** If this defendant were suffering from such an extreme emotional disturbance and reduced mental capacity, if a cop was at his elbow during all these crimes, he\u2019d still do them because he couldn\u2019t help himself because he\u2019s suffering from those types of mental problems.\nDoes one of you think that if there was a policeman at his elbow when [J.A.] was in that trunk she would have still been in the trunk and that he would have done that? Do you think if a policeman would have been at his elbow that he would have blown the back of Denise Haney\u2019s head off? Do any of you really think that that if there would have been a cop there with him, I\u2019m just emotionally disturbed, I can\u2019t help myself, and he\u2019d do it anyway? Is there a single person that can truly believe that?\u201d\nThe prosecutor noted, even if the jurors believed that defendant was \u201cemotionally disturbed\u201d or his \u201cmental capacity was reduced,\u201d they could still \u201cvote to impose the death penalty despite that.\u201d\nFollowing the arguments of the parties, the trial court issued final instructions to the jury. The jury was instructed that mitigating factors include:\n\u201cFirst: Any or all of the following if supported by the evidence:\nThe murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to the prosecution.\nThe defendant suffers from a reduced mental capacity.\nSecond: Any other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death.\nWhere there is evidence of a mitigating factor, the fact that such mitigating factor is not a factor specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your consideration of the evidence.\u201d\nDuring jury deliberations, the jury sent a note asking to see the sentence-completion test. The court initially considered whether to send only the portion of the test referred to in the questioning of Dr. Killian. The court then inquired, \u201cShould they get the questions that were not asked of Dr. Killian?\u201d Attorney Skelton responded for the defense, \u201cI need to review the entirety of the exhibit before I can comment on that.\u201d After further consideration, attorney Shelton stated: \u201cI would suggest that it be sent in its entirety.\u201d Attorney Elmore concurred. By agreement of the parties, the entire sentence-completion test was sent to the jury.\nThe jury ultimately determined that death was the appropriate sentence. Subsequently, defendant filed a posttrial motion, which was considered and denied. The court sentenced defendant to death, and this appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nPretrial Proceedings\nI. Shackling and Other Security Measures\nDefendant first contends that he was deprived of due process and fundamental fairness where the trial court initially ordered defendant\u2019s legs shackled under a skirted table during courtroom appearances and later, after defendant created a disturbance in the courtroom, ordered his left arm shackled under the table as well. Defendant also argues that he was improperly denied writing utensils after the courtroom disturbance and, in the issue statement of his brief, suggests that the court erred in \u201cinstruct[ing] the jury that the defendant was restrained for security reasons.\u201d\nIn response to defendant\u2019s contentions, the State first argues that defendant acquiesced in the trial court\u2019s ordering of restraints and forfeited the issue by failing to object at trial or preserve the issue in a posttrial motion. Beyond that, the State contends that defendant cannot obtain relief under the plain error doctrine because there was no error.\nIn addressing defendant\u2019s plain error argument, we first \u201cconsider whether error occurred at all.\u201d People v. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370, 376 (1989). Applying the principles expressed in People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144 (1999) \u2014 which remain good law after this court\u2019s decision in People v. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340 (2006), and the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 161 L. Ed. 2d 953, 125 S. Ct. 2007 (2005) \u2014 we conclude that no error occurred as a result of the defendant\u2019s wearing shackles during the proceedings in this case. We note that the trial court made findings sufficient to justify the use of physical restraints, it appears the shackling was not visible to the jury, and the measures imposed by the trial court did not affect defendant\u2019s ability to assist and communicate with counsel.\nIn People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 265 (1977), this court noted that shackling is generally disfavored because (1) it tends to prejudice the jury against the accused; (2) it restricts the defendant\u2019s ability to assist counsel during trial; and (3) it offends the dignity of the judicial process. Nonetheless, this court explained that a defendant may be shackled if there is an indication he may try to escape, pose a threat to the safety of courtroom occupants, or disrupt the order of the courtroom. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266. The Boose court identified several factors a circuit court should consider in determining whether to shackle a defendant, including:\n\u201c \u2018[T]he seriousness of the present charge against the defendant; defendant\u2019s temperament and character; his age and physical attributes; his past record; past escapes or attempted escapes, and evidence of a present plan to escape; threats to harm others or cause a disturbance; self-destructive tendencies; the risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others; the possibility of rescue by other offenders still at large; the size and mood of the audience; the nature and physical security of the courtroom; and the adequacy and availability of alternative remedies.\u2019 \u201d Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 266-67, quoting State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 368, 226 S.E.2d 353, 368 (1976).\nThe need for shackling is a determination within the discretion of the circuit court. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 216. A court of review will examine that decision to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 267. Consequently, a trial court must \u2014 outside the presence of the jury \u2014 place its reasons for shackling a defendant on the record and provide defense counsel with an opportunity to offer reasons why the defendant should not be shackled. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 216. As this court observed in Buss, a single reason for shackling has generally been held to be insufficient justification for the restraint; whereas, \u201cIllinois courts have found no abuse of discretion in shackling a defendant when the circuit court has expressed more than a single reason for shackling a defendant.\u201d Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 216-17 (compiling cases).\nPerhaps because the trial judge in this case had been subject to appellate court criticism in a previous matter, he was particularly sensitive to the Boose issue, and he took care to comply with the mandated procedure. The court first noted that defendant\u2019s legs would be shackled under a skirted table and that the jurors would not be aware of it unless defendant drew their attention to it. The judge asked defense counsel if they had \u201cany objection on the record.\u201d Counsel responded that the defense had \u201cno objection to it now.\u201d The trial court then specifically identified three factors to support its decision to shackle defendant\u2019s legs. First, the court observed that defendant had been recently convicted of two murders in Cook County and had been sentenced to death. Although his death sentence was subsequently commuted, he was, at the time of trial, still serving two life sentences. Second, the court mentioned defendant\u2019s physical attributes, noting that he was in good health and had no difficulty getting around. Third, the court made reference to the age of the Livingston County courthouse and stated there were \u201call kind of security problems with the building and the courtroom.\u201d Although the court did not initially mention the first Boose factor, i.e., the seriousness of the charge against defendant, that consideration must have been obvious to all, and the court\u2019s subsequent reference to that factor indicates that it no doubt was significant in the court\u2019s ruling at the outset. After the court set forth its reasons for the restraint, the judge stated his intention to instruct the jury that \u201csecurity measures have been taken, such as the guards being here.\u201d With those comments on the restraint of defendant and attendant security measures, the trial court again asked: \u201cIs there anything else on that issue that either the State or the defense wishes to bring up?\u201d For the defense, attorney Skelton responded, \u201cNo, sir.\u201d\nThe court then recessed prior to the commencement of jury voir dire. During that recess, defendant began cursing and threw a cup of water because a guard, and his own attorney, had instructed him that he could not speak with his parents and Kendra Moses. Defendant had to be physically subdued and handcuffed, and he turned over a table in the process. After the trial judge ascertained what had happened, the court asked defendant: \u201cWill you promise to behave yourself if I do not shackle you?\u201d Defendant gave no explicit assurances, stating only, through counsel, that he had not been shackled in the prior Cook County proceedings, and there had been no outbursts or problems. The court then made the additional observation: \u201c[Y]ou are on trial here for your life.\u201d As a result of the outburst, the court ordered defendant\u2019s left arm shackled under the table as well and directed that defendant be given no pencils or pens.\nTwo days later, in chambers, the court revisited the issue of security. The court observed that two \u201cvery large guards\u201d had been necessary to restrain defendant \u201cnotwithstanding that he was already shackled to an eyebolt on the floor.\u201d The judge described defendant\u2019s conduct and characterized it as going \u201cballistic\u201d or \u201cberserk.\u201d Attorney Elmore, for the defense, acknowledged that the court had not overstated the severity of the incident. The court then stated that defendant was a \u201chigh risk individual\u201d and noted that his demeanor had changed after it became clear that the trial was \u201cactually going to go forward finally.\u201d The judge stated his belief that defendant was a \u201cdesperate man.\u201d With those additional observations, bearing upon the second and sixth factors mentioned in Boose (see Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266-67 (\u201c \u2018defendant\u2019s temperament and character\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018threats to harm others or cause a disturbance\u2019 \u201d), quoting State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 368, 226 S.E.2d 353, 368 (1976)), the court again asked defense counsel: \u201c[D]o you want me to free up Mr. Urd\u00edales more than I am contemplating doing?\u201d Attorney Skelton initially responded by asking that the court reconsider its decision to deny defendant a writing implement. The court then stated: \u201cDOC has had in the past inch pencils. *** It\u2019s a very small pencil. We\u2019ll explore that and come up with a writing material that couldn\u2019t do you harm.\u201d Other than that single request, defense counsel did not object to the security measures ordered by the court, and in fact concluded his remarks on the subject by implicitly agreeing that the court\u2019s measures were appropriate under the circumstances, stating, \u201cI know what the court\u2019s talking about. I\u2019ve been there.\u201d\nWe find that the trial court set forth more of record than was necessary to justify the physical restraints and security measures it utilized. The court gave the defense an opportunity to offer reasons why defendant should not be shackled, and the defense in effect conceded that the court\u2019s actions were appropriate. The use of physical restraints, which were not visible to the jury, did not impair defendant\u2019s ability to communicate with counsel and assist in his defense. In short, we find that the court acted appropriately, and did not abuse its discretion in this regard.\nAlthough we believe the court would have been justified in denying defendant writing implements, and such a deprivation would not have affected his ability to communicate with counsel \u2014 who was sitting right next to defendant \u2014 the record does not support defendant\u2019s contention that the court actually denied defendant the means to write. There is no indication in the record that the court did not, ultimately, \u201ccome up with a writing material that couldn\u2019t do [defense counsel] harm.\u201d We note that an appellant has the burden of presenting the court with an adequate record regarding a claimed error, and any doubts arising from an inadequate record will be resolved against him. See Redmond v. Socha, 216 Ill. 2d 622, 631 (2005); Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 546-47 (1996).\nAlthough defendant, in the issue statement of his brief, claims that the court erred in \u201cinstruct[ing] the jury that the defendant was restrained for security reasons,\u201d defendant misrepresents the trial judge\u2019s statement, apparently in an attempt to link it to his shackling argument. The court did not tell jurors that defendant was \u201crestrained.\u201d Rather, the court advised jurors that defendant was \u201cin custody\u201d and \u201ccertain security measures\u201d had been taken. While that admonishment might have been the basis for an argument in and of itself, defendant\u2019s brief includes no argument or citation of authority bearing upon either the trial court\u2019s actual statement to the jury or the statement as he misrepresents it. A point raised in an appellant\u2019s brief must be supported by argument and relevant legal authority. People v. Davis, 213 Ill. 2d 459, 470 (2004); People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d 247, 278 (2001). Failure to comply with those requirements results in forfeiture. People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 332 (2005); Davis, 213 Ill. 2d at 470; Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d at 278. Defendant has forfeited the issue.\nII. Remarks Regarding Appellate Court Opinions\nDefendant next contends that he was \u201cdeprived of due process and fundamental fairness where the [trial] judge disparaged various justices of the Illinois appellate court, expressed contempt for recent appellate opinions restricting a trial court\u2019s authority to shackle or restrain defendants, and indicated he would mail a transcript regarding the defendant\u2019s single courtroom disruption to appellate and supreme court justices who potentially would review this case on appeal.\u201d Defendant cites this court\u2019s decision in In re Dominique F., 145 Ill. 2d 311 (1991), for the proposition that \u201c[i]t is unacceptable for a trial judge to disregard *** precedent because he disagrees with it.\u201d We find that the trial judge in this case registered his disagreement with precedent, but he did not disregard it.\nAs previously noted, perhaps because the trial judge in this case had been subject to appellate court criticism in a previous matter, he was particularly sensitive to the Boose issue, and he took care to comply with the mandated procedure. The trial court set forth more of record than was necessary to justify the physical restraints and security measures it utilized. Thus, defendant was not denied due process or fundamental fairness by the court\u2019s comments, all of which were made outside the presence of the jury.\nWe do not, however, mean to encourage the kind of rambling, amorphous diatribe in which the trial court engaged. While restrained and reasoned disagreement with the ruling of a superior court is not to be discouraged, and may well be constructive in a proper setting, as our appellate court has observed, dignity is necessary for judicial proceedings. See People v. Thurmond, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1133, 1145 (2000). As the appellate court noted in Thurmond, a trial judge should be the exemplar of dignity, he should exercise restraint over his conduct and utterances, and should control his emotions. Thurmond, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 1145. We trust that the judge in this case will, in the future, circumscribe his conduct and comments so as to reflect the dignity his office, in particular, and that of the judicial system, of which he is but one part.\nIII. Involvement of DPT A Attorneys\nDefendant next contends that he was deprived of due process and fundamental fairness because the trial court \u201cdisparaged the motives and conduct of attorneys for the State Appellate Defender Death Penalty Trial Assistance Unit, who were an integral part of the defense team representing Andrew Urd\u00edales.\u201d Defendant states that the trial court\u2019s \u201cexpressed animosity\u201d may indicate that the judge was not \u201cimpartial.\u201d Defendant also argues: \u201cOnce [the trial judge] appointed the Appellate Defender and Mr. Richards, the trial judge had no authority to preclude Mr. Richards from assigning his assistants to the case, or to strike Mr. Hanlon and Mr. Sincox from the entry of appearance.\u201d Moreover, defendant submits that the court excluded Sincox because the court \u201cobjected to his demeanor\u201d and the court had \u201cno inherent authority to discipline\u201d Sincox in that manner. We begin this portion of our analysis with a review of the pertinent statutes.\nSection 10 of the State Appellate Defender Act prescribes the powers and duties of the State Appellate Defender (725 ILCS 105/10 (West 2004)), and applies to all attorneys employed by the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) (725 ILCS 105/2 (2) (West 2004)). The Act governs the circumstances under which the State Appellate Defender may be appointed to represent defendants in any given case (Kirwan v. Welch, 133 Ill. 2d 163, 164-65 (1989)), and the attorneys of that agency may represent defendants \u201conly as the Act provides.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Kirwan v. Karns, 119 Ill. 2d 431, 434 (1988); see also Alexander v. Pearson, 354 Ill. App. 3d 643, 647 (2004).\nThe State points out that the version of the State Appellate Defender Act in effect at the time of defendant\u2019s trial did not \u201cmandate\u201d that an attorney from OSAD be allowed to file his or her appearance as trial counsel in a death penalty case and participate in that capacity. Our reading of the statute in question indicates that it did not even authorize OSAD attorneys to act as trial counsel in capital cases, much less \u201cmandate\u201d that they be allowed to do so. See 725 ILCS 105/10(a), (b)(5) (West 2004) (\u201cThe State Appellate Defender shall represent indigent persons on appeal *** when appointed to do so by a court under a Supreme Court Rule or law of this State. *** The Office of the State Appellate Defender shall not be appointed to serve as trial counsel in capital cases\u201d). In fact, a literal reading of the pertinent statute indicates it did not even authorize the assistance of attorneys from OSAD. Section 10(c)(5) of the applicable version of the Act stated in relevant part:\n\u201c(c) The State Appellate Defender may:\n(5) in cases in which a death sentence is an authorized disposition, provide trial counsel with the assistance of expert witnesses, investigators, and mitigation specialists from funds appropriated to the State Appellate Defender specifically for that purpose by the General Assembly. The Office of State Appellate Defender shall not be appointed to serve as trial counsel in capital cases.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 105/10(c)(5) (West 2004).\nUnder a literal reading of the provision, the statute allowed the State Appellate Defender to provide only \u201cthe assistance of expert witnesses, investigators, and mitigation specialists.\u201d\nOf course, with the passage of Public Act 94 \u2014 340, effective January 1, 2006, the State Appellate Defender Act was amended to specifically allow the State Appellate Defender to provide trial counsel in capital cases with \u201clegal advice,\u201d in addition to the services previously authorized (725 ILCS 105/10(c)(5) (West Supp. 2005)), and the Capital Crimes Litigation Act was amended to provide as follows: \u201cAt the request of court appointed counsel [in capital cases], attorneys employed by the State Appellate Defender may enter an appearance for the limited purpose of assisting counsel appointed under this Section.\u201d 725 ILCS 124/5 (West Supp. 2005).\nAlthough the amended versions of the State Appellate Defender Act and the Capital Crimes Litigation Act were not in effect at the time of his trial, defendant simply proceeds in his argument as if they were. He does not argue that those provisions apply retroactively; he does not advance reasons why they should apply retroactively; and he cites no relevant authority in that regard. Thus, defendant has forfeited any contention that the amended provisions apply. See People u. Mertz, 218 Ill. 2d 1, 91 (2005) (defendant\u2019s failure to offer analysis and cite legal authority in support of retroactive application resulted in forfeiture of the issue). We thus examine defendant\u2019s contentions utilizing the statutes in effect at the time of defendant\u2019s trial \u2014 the provisions presumably known to the presiding trial judge.\nThose provisions did not, by their terms, authorize OSAD attorneys to serve as counsel in capital cases or provide legal advice to the attorneys actually serving as trial counsel. If they did, it would hardly seem necessary to amend section 10(c)(5) of the State Appellate Defender Act to specifically so state, and that is exactly what Public Act 94 \u2014 340 did. See 725 ILCS 105/10(c)(5) (West Supp. 2005) (adding the phrase \u201clegal advice\u201d). The version of the Act in effect at the time of trial, and the current version, both state that the \u201cState Appellate Defender shall not be appointed to serve as trial counsel in capital cases.\u201d Compare 725 ILCS 105/10(c)(5) (West 2004) with 725 ILCS 105/10(c)(5) (West Supp. 2005). That provision is at once a prohibition directed to circuit courts and to the attorneys of OSAD. Trial courts are not to appoint attorneys of that agency to serve as trial counsel in capital cases, and attorneys of that agency are not statutorily authorized to serve in that capacity. The State Appellate Defender Act governs the circumstances in which the attorneys of that state agency are authorized to render their state-supported services. They are not free agents who can act as counsel when and where they see fit.\nThat is not to say that the unauthorized actions of an OSAD attorney on behalf of a criminal defendant are a nullity. After all, the attorney who chooses to exceed his statutory authorization, and is allowed to do so by a trial court, is nonetheless a licensed attorney, and his actions will be judged by the standards applicable to any licensed attorney acting in that context. However, such an attorney has no right to interject himself, or herself, into the trial.\nApplying those principles to this case, it is clear that the trial court was not required to allow OSAD attorneys to participate as \u201cpart of the defense team.\u201d In fact, the court should not have allowed Richards to participate. Defendant was fortunate to receive the able services of Richards, but he was not statutorily entitled to them.\nBecause Sincox and Hanlon were not statutorily authorized to participate as defendant\u2019s attorneys in this case, and the trial judge was not required to allow them to do so, the judge did not err in striking their names from the entry of appearance filed by Richards. For the same reasons \u2014 and irrespective of the concerns actually expressed by the court \u2014 there would have been no error in precluding Sincox from participating in the deposition of Dietz.\nHowever, the record indicates the court never denied defendant\u2019s motion for Sincox to participate in that deposition. Defendant\u2019s trial attorney, Elmore, appeared to agree with the court\u2019s statement that the defense motion was moot because Elmore and Skelton planned to travel to California for the deposition, and, in any event, defense counsel never obtained a ruling on the motion. A movant has the responsibility to obtain a ruling on his motion if he is to avoid forfeiture on appeal. People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 35 (1996). Because defendant did not obtain a ruling, the issue is forfeited.\nThe court\u2019s comments about Sincox\u2019s behavior in the courtroom \u2014 though apparently warranted \u2014 are irrelevant, given that Sincox did not, and could not, represent the defendant. We note that the court\u2019s remarks regarding the attorneys who actually represented the defendant were highly complimentary, and there was no hint of animosity or disparagement therein. None of the court\u2019s comments to or about the attorneys were made in the presence of the jury.\nWe are compelled to comment on one remark the court made about attorneys Richards and Sincox. At one point, during a discussion of the contemplated deposition of Dr. Dietz in California, the trial court expressed concern that attorneys Sincox and Richards had \u201can agenda far greater than\u201d the defendant\u2019s case. Later, in that same discussion, the trial judge specified the nature of his concern, focusing on attorney Sincox. Referring specifically to Sincox, whose possible participation in the anticipated deposition had been broached by attorney Skelton, the court stated:\n\u201cHis conduct in this courtroom was most unprofessional. It is clear to me that he has an agenda far greater than Mr. Urd\u00edales and he is motivated by that. And I am concerned that his conduct will be governed by that. *** And if he goes far afield out there, we have got a mess on our hands in terms of, well, now the deposition wasn\u2019t completed.\u201d Clearly, although the court included attorney Rich-\nards in his initial remark, the comment was prompted by the suggestion that Sincox participate in the deposition of Dietz. We note that attorney Richards was otherwise treated with respect and consideration by the court in all of the pretrial proceedings in which he participated. We see no evidence of prejudice with respect to him. With respect to Sincox, the record suggests that the court may have had good reason to mistrust him and question his professionalism.\nIn any event, placed in context, the judge\u2019s initial statement, and his subsequent expansive comments, appear to reflect the court\u2019s justifiable concern that the admittedly broader agenda of the DPTA might result in questioning \u201cfar afield\u201d in areas not particularly pertinent to defendant\u2019s case, resulting in an unnecessary delay and docketing problems. We believe those were valid considerations.\nWe note that allegations of judicial bias or prejudice must be viewed in context and should be evaluated in terms of the trial judge\u2019s specific reaction to the events taking place. People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d 247, 277 (2001). The fact that a judge displays displeasure or irritation with an attorney\u2019s behavior is not necessarily evidence of judicial bias against the defendant or his counsel. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d at 277. As noted, the report of proceedings reveals nothing in the way of judicial displeasure or irritation with Richards. Since Sincox was not allowed to serve as counsel for defendant, or represent him in any way, we need not consider the possible repercussions of the court\u2019s interaction with Sincox. In short, the court\u2019s conduct with respect to the DPTA attorneys did not deny defendant due process.\nGuilt Phase\nGuilty Plea and Bench Trial\nDefendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his plea of guilty but mentally ill, and, in a related claim, argues that the trial court\u2019s bench trial verdict of guilty, \u201crather than guilty but mentally ill,\u201d was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The relief defendant requests in each instance is \u201ca new sentencing hearing.\u201d Defendant suggests he is \u201centitled to a new capital sentencing hearing because the trial court\u2019s rejection of his GBMI plea tainted the weight and credibility of his mitigation evidence\u201d at his sentencing hearing. We begin this section of our analysis with a review of the applicable statutes and this court\u2019s pertinent opinions.\nThe pertinent version of section 6 \u2014 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides:\n\u201c(c) A person who, at the time of the commission of a criminal offense, was not insane but was suffering from a mental illness, is not relieved of criminal responsibility for his conduct and may be found guilty but mentally ill.\n(d) For purposes of this Section, \u2018mental illness\u2019 or \u2018mentally ill\u2019 means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted a person at the time of the commission of the offense and which impaired that person\u2019s judgment, but not to the extent that he is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior or is unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 2(c), (d) (West 1994).\nThe burden is on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was mentally ill, as defined in subsections (c) and (d) of section 6 \u2014 2. 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 3(c)(3), 116 \u2014 4(j) (West 2004); People v. Lantz, 186 Ill. 2d 243, 254 (1999). When a trier of fact finds a defendant guilty but mentally ill, that verdict does not relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility. People v. Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d 109, 131 (1991). A defendant who has been found guilty but mentally ill is subject to any sentence that could have been imposed upon a defendant who had been convicted of the same offense without a finding of mental illness, including the death penalty. Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d at 131-32. Indeed, the only discernible difference between the two verdicts is that, upon a finding of guilty but mentally ill, the Department of Corrections must \u201ccause periodic inquiry and examination to be made concerning the nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of the defendant\u2019s mental illness\u201d and provide \u201csuch psychiatric, psychological, or other counseling and treatment for the defendant as it determines necessary.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5\u20142\u20146(b) (West 2004); see People v. Morris, 237 Ill. App. 3d 140, 145 (1992). As is the case when a defendant raises a defense of insanity, for which a defendant also bears the burden of proof, the existence of \u201cmental illness,\u201d as defined in section 6 \u2014 2, is a question of fact; thus, the trial court\u2019s resolution of that issue will not be overturned unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d at 128-29.\nThe Criminal Code also provides for a plea of guilty but mentally ill. Section 115 \u2014 2 of the Criminal Code governs pleas of guilty, as well as pleas of guilty but mentally ill. Subsection (b) of section 115 \u2014 2 provides that a plea of guilty but mentally ill \u201cmay be accepted\u201d by the court when, inter alia:\n\u201c(3) the judge has held a hearing, at which either party may present evidence, on the issue of the defendant\u2019s mental health and, at the conclusion of such hearing, is satisfied that there is a factual basis that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense to which the plea is entered.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 2(b)(3) (West 2004).\nDefendant initially argues that the trial court erred when it rejected his plea of guilty but mentally ill and, in doing so, \u201cdecided that the legal standards for determining a factual basis for a traditional plea *** were inapplicable to determining the factual basis for pleas of guilty but mentally ill.\u201d Citing this court\u2019s decision in People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425 (2001), defendant maintains that this aspect of his argument presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review. We agree with defendant as to the applicable standard of review. However, we otherwise reject the substance of his argument.\nDefendant notes that the language of subsection (b) of section 115 \u2014 2, i.e., \u201cmay be accepted,\u201d substantially mirrors the language of subsection (a), which addresses \u201cthe traditional guilty plea.\u201d Ergo, defendant argues that cases interpreting standards applicable to subsection (a) should provide guidance as to the proper interpretation of subsection (b). Defendant conveniently overlooks a significant difference between the procedures set forth in subsections (a) and (b). Subsection (b) appears to provide for a contested hearing \u201con the issue of defendant\u2019s mental health,\u201d a hearing \u201cat which either party may present evidence.\u201d Notwithstanding this difference, defendant maintains that proceedings on a plea of guilty but mentally ill should be governed by the identical principles applicable to \u201cthe traditional guilty plea,\u201d and cites this court\u2019s decision in People v. Barker, 83 Ill. 2d 319, 328 (1980), for the following proposition:\n\u201cIn evaluating the sufficiency of the factual basis to support a plea of guilty, a trial judge is in much the same position and would apply similar standards as those used in determining the sufficiency of the State\u2019s evidence at trial to withstand a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s argument suggests that the trial court was obligated to accept his plea, and thus find he was \u201cmentally ill\u201d as defined in section 6 \u2014 2 of the Criminal Code, if defendant presented some evidence to support such a finding, irrespective of evidence to the contrary presented by the State. Defendant\u2019s position is untenable.\nIt would seem self-evident that a proceeding in which there are no contested issues may be subject to different standards than one in which a controversy exists. In this case, the State chose to dispute the existence of \u201cmental illness,\u201d as defined in section 6 \u2014 2 of the Criminal Code. Because there was a dispute regarding an element of the guilty plea, this case does not present a \u201ctraditional guilty plea,\u201d we are not concerned with one party\u2019s evidence alone, and the standard for sufficiency referenced in the quoted passage from Barker cannot ultimately apply. Whether evidence could support a particular finding or verdict (the inquiry upon a motion for directed verdict) is a different question from whether the evidence does in fact support that finding or verdict after a full evidentiary hearing. See People v. Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d 905, 915 (2001). In the latter instance, the trier of fact necessarily weighs all the evidence and passes upon the credibility of witnesses in resolving disputed issues. Connelly, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 915. Because the State contested the existence of mental illness, that is what the trial court was obligated to do in this case.\nAcceptance of defendant\u2019s argument would allow defendants who plead guilty but mentally ill to effectively evade the burden of proof that the legislature has placed upon those who raise the issue at trial. The legislature could not have intended such a result. As we have noted, a defendant whose case is tried would have to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she is mentally ill, as defined in subsections (c) and (d) of section 6\u20142. 725 ILCS 5/115\u20143(c)(3), 115\u20144(j) (West 2004). A preponderance of the evidence is evidence that renders a fact more likely than not. Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 279 (2004); see Lindsey v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 354 Ill. App. 3d 971, 986 (2004). Thus, at trial, following the presentation of evidence by both the defendant and the State, a trial court would have to determine whether it was \u201cmore likely than not\u201d that defendant suffered from a mental illness, as defined in the statute, at the time he or she committed the offense. A defendant pleading guilty but mentally ill should have the same burden of proof. He cannot absolve himself of that burden by admitting an element he has the burden of proving. The directed verdict standard, mentioned in Barker, cannot apply to a contested proceeding, where evidence is adduced to controvert defendant\u2019s claim of mental illness.\nWe also find meritless defendant\u2019s claim that the trial court erred in rejecting his plea of guilty but mentally ill, and his contention that the trial court\u2019s verdict of guilty, as opposed to guilty but mentally ill, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. As the foregoing analysis indicates, defendant had the burden of proving his mental illness by a preponderance of the evidence. As our subsequent discussion will show, the court\u2019s determination, that he did not sustain that burden, was not against the weight of the evidence.\nAs Illinois courts have noted, the credibility and weight to be given psychiatric testimony are matters for the trier of fact, who is not obligated to accept the opinions of defendant\u2019s expert witnesses over those opinions presented by the State. People v. Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (1995); see People v. Dresher, 364 Ill. App. 3d 847, 855-56 (2006). In fact, \u201c[e]ven if several competent experts concur in their opinion and no opposing expert testimony is offered, it is still within the province of the trier of fact to weigh the credibility of the expert evidence and to decide the issue *** in light of all of the facts and circumstances of the case ***.\u201d In re Glenville, 139 Ill. 2d 242, 251 (1990).\nIn this case, the trial court found that defendant had not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was mentally ill, as defined in section 6 \u2014 2, when he killed Cassandra Corum. In announcing that ruling, the trial judge stated he found the testimony of Dr. Dietz \u201csubstantially more persuasive and more convincing than that of the defense experts.\u201d However, the court also found the facts of the case themselves a compelling refutation of testimony given by the defense experts.\nAs previously noted, Dietz testified that defendant suffered principally from a personality disorder, and he displayed obvious characteristics of a sexual sadist. Dietz did not consider personality or anxiety disorders to be mental illnesses, as defined in section 6 \u2014 2 of the Criminal Code. He believed that defendant\u2019s criminal behavior was driven by sexual desire, anger, and \u201ca kind of predatory desire for conquest.\u201d If defendant\u2019s judgment was impaired, Dietz believed those were the factors causing impairment, not mental illness. Dietz also rejected Merikangas\u2019 diagnosis of organic brain disease, noting that defendant\u2019s 2004 MRI was within the normal range, and defendant\u2019s actions at the time of Corum\u2019s murder did not bespeak someone who suffered from significant impairment of the central nervous system. Dietz noted that the murder required planning\u2014 defendant brought handcuffs, duct tape, a knife, and a gun with him \u2014 a certain degree of physical prowess and coordination \u2014 defendant was able to overpower Corum, drive her 100 miles, murder her, and carry her body to a bridge, where he threw her into the river \u2014 and rational thought \u2014 insofar as defendant decided to drive Corum to a secluded location, where he could kill her without being observed.\nThe trial court observed that the principal defense witnesses disagreed in their primary diagnoses. Cuneo believed that defendant suffered, primarily, from PTSD; Killian\u2019s principal diagnosis was dissociation; and Merikangas determined that defendant suffered from organic brain disease. Merikangas disagreed with Killian\u2019s and Cuneo\u2019s diagnoses of PTSD and dissociative personality disorder. Killian and Cuneo believed that defendant was legally sane, but mentally ill, as defined in section 6 \u2014 2(d). Merikangas testified that defendant was insane.\nIn addition to their conflicting diagnoses, the court noted that the testimony of defendant\u2019s experts also failed to account for defendant\u2019s ability to function adequately in the Marine Corps, and later as a security guard, while suffering from the diagnosed illnesses. Their diagnoses failed to explain how a person thus afflicted could successfully plan, execute, and conceal eight murders over a period of 10 years. Disagreeing with the assessments of Merikangas and Killian \u2014 that defendant\u2019s crimes were not characterized by planning and organization \u2014 the court noted that defendant brought a gun, a knife, duct tape, and handcuffs on the night of Corum\u2019s murder. The court believed that defendant\u2019s actions during the offense were inconsistent with those of a person overcome by anger, noting, on the night defendant killed Cassandra Corum, he drove well over an hour, and approximately 100 miles, after he supposedly became angry and kidnapped her. It would appear that defendant had time to cool off, but defendant killed Corum anyway.\nWe have held that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence when an opposite conclusion is apparent, or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary or not based on the evidence. Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill. 2d 213, 242 (1996). After careful review of this record, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s rulings in this regard were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although defendant argues that Dietz\u2019s definition of mental illness was unduly restrictive and his views diverged from those generally accepted in the psychiatric community, a review of an expert opinion recently rendered in another capital case would seem to refute defendant\u2019s position.\nWe note the testimony of Dr. Andrew Kowalkowski, as summarized in People v. Thompson, 222 Ill. 2d 1 (2006). Like Dr. Dietz, Kowalkowski believed that mental disorders or illnesses are characterized by evidence of delusions, false fixed beliefs, or misinterpretation of external reality. Thompson, 222 Ill. 2d at 24-25. Kowalkowski differentiated such \u201cdelusional disorders\u201d from \u201cbehavioral\u201d disorders, such as personality disorders, which are \u201cnot significant mental disorders.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Thompson, 222 Ill. 2d at 39. Kowalkowski believed that Thompson\u2019s personality disorder \u201cmanifested itself in *** his impulsiveness, his irritability and aggressiveness, his repeated failure to maintain consistent work behavior and his lack of remorse.\u201d Thompson, 222 Ill. 2d at 25. Kowalkowski testified that Thompson\u2019s killing spree could be explained by his personality disorders. Thompson, 222 Ill. 2d at 40.\nThe similarities between Dietz\u2019s and Kowalkowski\u2019s diagnoses, and Thompson\u2019s and this defendant\u2019s symptoms, are so obvious as to require no further comment. Dietz\u2019s opinion does not appear to be out of the mainstream of his profession, and it finds support in the facts of record. As the trial court\u2019s ruling suggests, the attendant facts and circumstances of defendant\u2019s crimes are themselves a compelling refutation of testimony given by the defense experts, independent of Dietz\u2019s testimony. For the foregoing reasons, we find no basis for reversing the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant failed to sustain his burden on the issue of mental illness.\nWe would add, even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the circuit court erred in rejecting defendant\u2019s plea of guilty but mentally ill, defendant is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing, as he argues before this court. As we will explain later, the circuit court\u2019s rejection of defendant\u2019s plea did not affect defendant\u2019s ability to present mitigating evidence of his mental condition at sentencing, and references to defendant\u2019s unsuccessful insanity defense were proper and duly circumscribed.\nSentencing\nI. Ruling Regarding the Admission of Experts\u2019 Reports\nDefendant next claims that the trial court deprived him of his right to present relevant mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury when the court denied defense counsel\u2019s request to provide the jury with the defense experts\u2019 written reports. Quoting People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 344 (1998), defendant observes that \u201cthe State cannot place any limitation on the admission of relevant and reliable evidence offered in mitigation at a death penalty hearing\u201d and \u201cthe sentencing authority, whether judge or jury, may not refuse to consider such mitigating evidence as a matter of law.\u201d As the State points out, the trial court\u2019s ruling was a limitation only on the method defendant could use to present evidence, not on the admission of evidence itself.\nWhen defense counsel stated his intention of introducing psychiatrists\u2019 reports into evidence, and asked that the reports go back to the jury, the State objected, arguing that the experts should testify in person and \u201cbe subject to cross-examination.\u201d The court expressed concern, noting that the reports in question were \u201cextremely voluminous\u201d and that Dr. Killian\u2019s report alone was 75 pages long. The trial judge then advised the parties: The trial court subsequently ruled that the reports would not go to the jury, noting, inter alia, \u201cthat\u2019s why we have the experts testifying because we are in a realm beyond the normal knowledge of the jurors.\u201d The court\u2019s statement evinces its concern that, in the absence of explanatory expert testimony, psychiatric reports in the hands of the jurors could have been a source of misunderstanding, confusion, and unchallenged opinion evidence.\n\u201cI\u2019m not limiting either the direct or cross-examination of a particular expert. So you want to have an expert on the stand for two days, that\u2019s fine with me. You can go over his entire report if you like. *** [I]f all those questions are then asked of a witness, then the opposite side knows what to cross on. *** So the only point I\u2019m making is that there is an unlimited opportunity to inquire of these experts.\u201d\nWe find no error in the circuit court\u2019s ruling. No restrictions were placed on defendant\u2019s right to present relevant evidence. The court made clear that defendant could call an expert and \u201cgo over his entire report\u201d if defendant chose to do so. The limitation the court placed on the method for introducing that evidence appears, in part, to have been for the purpose of safeguarding the opposing party\u2019s right of confrontation and cross-examination, and in part to ensure that the jury received adequate explanatory testimony. We find that the court\u2019s ruling was reasonable and entirely proper.\nDefendant could have called any of his experts he deemed necessary. Presumably, he called those whom he believed were important to his defense. Moreover, defendant could have questioned the experts he did call about specific information contained in a nontestifying expert\u2019s report, so long as the former relied upon information contained in the report of the latter. In that way, he could have elicited some of the information contained in the reports of nontestifying experts. We conclude there was no error, and defendant was accorded the rights he was due.\nII. Trial Court\u2019s Conduct in the Cross-Examination of Killian\nDefendant next contends that the trial court deprived him of due process by acting \u201cas an advocate for the State, where the trial judge assisted the prosecutor in cross-examining a defense expert and establishing a foundation for admission of an exhibit that was highly prejudicial to the defense.\u201d For purposes of clarity, we note that defendant\u2019s argument of error is confined to the trial court\u2019s conduct in the sentencing examination of Dr. Killian. Defendant does not otherwise argue that the evidence in question was improperly elicited and placed before the jury. In fact, his argument appears to concede that there was an adequate foundation for the introduction of the evidence.\nThe evidence elicited consisted of certain questions posed to defendant by Dr. Opsahl as part of the sentence-completion test, and defendant\u2019s answers to those questions. During the prosecutor\u2019s cross-examination of Dr. Killian, Killian admitted that he had \u201creviewed\u201d the sentence-completion test when forming his opinion. When the prosecutor handed Killian the sentence-completion test, and asked if that was the test he had reviewed, defense counsel objected, arguing that the test was not relevant unless Killian had relied upon the test in formulating his opinion. The prosecutor was then allowed to question Killian as to whether he had relied upon the report. Killian responded to the prosecutor\u2019s question by first acknowledging that he had \u201clooked at\u201d the test, but had \u201cnot included a description\u201d of it in his own report. When the prosecutor again asked if Killian had relied on the test in his assessment of defendant, Killian said, equivocally, he did not \u201cthink\u201d he did. Pressing for an unequivocal answer, the prosecutor again asked if some of the answers on the test had helped Killian formulate his opinion. Killian then answered that he could not \u201cspecifically recall,\u201d but offered to examine the test again. After he had done so, Killian stated that the defendant\u2019s test answers were \u201cconsistent with\u201d what Killian \u201calready believed about him from everything else [Killian] had read.\u201d When the prosecutor asked Killian to specify, defense counsel objected and asked to approach the bench. The trial court responded by announcing a brief recess and, outside the jury\u2019s presence, observed that the witness was \u201cnot being responsive.\u201d The court noted that Killian had stated he had not included the test in his report, but had not unequivocally stated whether he had disregarded the test or relied upon it. He had essentially \u201cskirted the issue.\u201d The court concluded: \u201cI think we need a vigorous interrogation on foundation by the State to see where this witness goes because he\u2019s going in both directions.\u201d It is unclear from the transcript whether Killian was present when the court\u2019s remarks were made; however, it is obvious that the remarks were not directed to him personally.\nWhen questioning resumed, out of the presence of the jury, Killian conceded that he had taken into account all of the materials placed before him, and then qualified his answer by adding, \u201c[Ijt\u2019s not accurate to say that each piece of paper received the same amount of attention as any other piece of paper.\u201d When the prosecutor asked if defendant\u2019s test answers were important in Killian\u2019s analysis, Killian stated: \u201cI\u2019m answering this as well as I can.\u201d\nThe court then admonished Killian to answer the question asked, if he understood it, and, if he did not understand the question, to simply say so. When the court had the question read back, Killian appeared to better understand the question, and answered that he considered defendant\u2019s answers to the sentence-completion test \u201csomewhat important.\u201d When the prosecutor returned to the critical question he had posed at the outset, asking Killian whether he taken defendant\u2019s answers into account in arriving at his conclusion, Killian responded with the same unresponsive answer that had initiated the exchange: \u201cNot specifically, I did not include them in my report.\u201d As the prosecutor began to protest, the court again interceded, stating:\n\u201cSir, there was a question asked you and you answered a different question. *** I want you to listen to the question asked of you and then I want you to answer that question unless you don\u2019t understand it. Do we understand each other?\u201d\nKillian responded affirmatively. When the question was read back, he finally answered, unequivocally, that he took defendant\u2019s answers into account when forming his own opinion. With that, the court determined that a sufficient foundation existed to go into the sentence-completion test before the jury. Before the jury was called back into the courtroom, the court asked defense counsel if there was anything he wanted to contest in terms of that ruling, and counsel responded, \u201cIt\u2019s proper, I agree. He took it into account; so, it\u2019s fair game.\u201d The prosecutor then proceeded to question the witness about the sentence-completion test, questioning which \u2014 as we have observed \u2014 defendant does not otherwise challenge.\nWe note that a trial judge has the discretion, when necessary to admonish a witness to answer questions directly and responsively. People v. Arnold, 2 Ill. 2d 92, 97 (1954); see People v. Gonzalez, 238 Ill. App. 3d 303, 320 (1992). In our view, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in this case, admonishing a witness who was being evasive. Similar admonitory remarks, even when made in front of a jury, have been found appropriate and not prejudicial. See People v. Kukulski, 358 Ill. 601, 608-09 (1934) (repeatedly advising the witness to listen and answer the question); People v. Williams, 201 Ill. App. 3d 207, 221 (1990) (defendant complained that the court had admonished the defense expert by saying, \u201cDoctor, would you do me a favor? Answer the question yes or no, don\u2019t ramble.\u201d \u201cThe witness has a tendency to ramble. These are yes or no questions and a date is a date\u201d); People v. Osborne, 78 Ill. App. 2d 132, 139 (1966) (\u201cMr. Jones, the question is simple. The court believes the witness is being evasive about answering it\u201d).\nWe find that the court in this case did not act in the capacity of an advocate, as defendant suggests. Rather, the court sought to ensure the State\u2019s right to responsive answers from an evasive witness.\nIII. Comments Regarding Defendant\u2019s Insanity Defense\nDefendant next contends he was \u201cdenied due process and fundamental fairness where the trial judge informed the sentencing jury that he had rejected the defendant\u2019s insanity defense at trial, and where the prosecutor reminded the sentencing jury in closing argument that the trial judge had rejected the insanity defense.\u201d According to defendant, those statements \u201cimproperly demeaned [his] mitigating evidence of mental illness, and punished [him] for exercising his constitutional right to present a defense.\u201d\nThe State points out, inter alia, that defense counsel asked the trial court to explain to the jurors why insanity was no longer an issue in the case, and attorney Elmore and the court advised the prosecutor that he could clarify the status of insanity as an issue in closing argument. Thus, the State contends, if there was error, the defense invited the court and prosecutor to commit it. We would agree; however, we conclude there was no error.\nWhen the initial eight jurors were selected, they were told that defendant had asserted the defense of insanity and they were questioned about their ability to find defendant not guilty by reason of insanity if the defendant established that defense by a preponderance of the evidence. When the defendant subsequently chose to have the trial court consider and decide whether he was legally insane at the time of the offense, that issue was removed from the jury\u2019s consideration, and some explanation became necessary. Recognizing that need, attorney Skelton asked the trial judge to \u201cgive thought to a potential admonition\u201d to the jurors. Skelton explained:\n\u201cI think in fairness to the State as well as the defense, the Court needs to advise them *** not that they were selected under *** a now nonexistent theory, but something to lighten the blow for both *** of us. *** And there might be some fallout. I think the likely destination for that fallout is on the defense. But I would like the Court to give some thought to a potential admonition to the jury to straighten them out.\u201d\nPursuant to that request, the court later submitted its proposed remarks to counsel for the defense and the State. Both defense attorneys indicated they had no problem with the content of the court\u2019s proposed explanation. The court then read those remarks to the jurors, explaining why they would not be participating in the first two stages of the tripartite capital procedure, and advising them of the findings the court had made in the first two phases. In the course of the court\u2019s explanation, the judge told jurors he had rejected defendant\u2019s defense of insanity, and thrice read the jurors the statutory definition of insanity. He did not mention the rejection of defendant\u2019s plea of guilty but mentally ill, and he did not in any way suggest that defendant\u2019s mental condition was irrelevant to the jury\u2019s sentencing decision.\nMoreover, as previously noted, defense counsel\u2019s opening statement to the jurors made clear that they could still consider whether defendant \u201csuffer[ed] from any mental illness or mental disease or mental defects\u201d that affected his behavior. In their closing arguments during the sentencing phase, the parties both acknowledged that \u201cinsanity\u201d was no longer an issue; however, the existence and consequences of defendant\u2019s alleged mental or personality disorders were nonetheless the subject of extensive comment. Indeed, after each of two instances when the prosecutor reminded the jury that insanity was no longer an issue, he eventually addressed statutory mitigating factors pertaining to defendant\u2019s mental condition. His argument made clear that defendant\u2019s mental condition was a viable sentencing issue, but he felt that defendant should receive a death sentence notwithstanding. Finally, the trial court\u2019s instructions to the jury also underscored the relevance of defendant\u2019s mental condition in the sentencing decision. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the comments of the court and the prosecutor were proper, and no error occurred.\nIV Other Prosecutorial Comments\nDefendant contends that other comments of the prosecutor were improper and denied him a fair sentencing hearing. Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor acted improperly when he (1) \u201cemphasized that the jurors had taken an oath and promised to follow the law, and then argued that the evidence in aggravation required them under oath to impose a death sentence\u201d; (2) invoked the integrity of his office as a justification for seeking the death penalty; and (3) inflamed the passions of the jurors by referring to the families of the victims left behind and speculating about \u201chow many children and grandchildren will not be born because of the actions of the defendant.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s first claim of error is based upon two remarks of the prosecutor that appear 90 pages apart in the record of proceedings. In the early portion of his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jurors:\n\u201c[Y]ou were all selected to serve in this serious case based on those promises that you made to the attorneys during jury selection. Now on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois and the People of the County of Livingston, I\u2019m asking you to keep those promises that you made under oath several weeks ago.\u201d\nMuch later, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cIs he really worthy of your mercy? Ask yourselves with all he did, is he really worthy of your mercy? I hate to admit it, but we\u2019ve really become a nation of excuse makers. There\u2019s always an excuse. Nothing is ever our fault. There must be something in this person\u2019s past that made him do things. Well, we can\u2019t take responsibility.\nAllowing Andrew Urd\u00edales to receive a natural life sentence rather than the death penalty diminishes the importance of Cassie Corum\u2019s life and doesn\u2019t serve the ends of justice.\u201d\nDefendant actually argues that these two passages are related and that the jurors would have so perceived them: \u201cCollectively, these comments lectured the jury that imposing any penalty short of a death sentence would be irresponsible, and would constitute a violation of the jury\u2019s oath.\u201d\nObviously, the prosecutor never told the jurors that their oath required them to impose the death penalty. The construction defendant places upon these remarks is simply preposterous. The quoted comments do not support defendant\u2019s claim of error even when they are taken out of context and placed in artificial tandem for argumentative exposition. This allegation of error deserves no further comment.\nWe also reject defendant\u2019s contention that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing because the prosecutor, during closing argument, improperly \u201cinvoked the integrity of his office as a justification for seeking the death penalty.\u201d We note, initially, that defendant did not object to the remarks in question; therefore, he has forfeited this issue. See People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 111 (1990). As in Franklin, we find that the remarks did not constitute error in any event.\nDefendant cites the following remarks in support of his argument:\n\u201cThe decision to seek a death penalty is not a decision that is lightly made by any prosecutor. A lot of things go into consideration as to whether or not a person such as myself would decide to seek the death penalty. I think a lot of people think that every time there\u2019s a murder committed that a prosecutor gets to decide whether or not he\u2019s going to seek the death penalty. That\u2019s simply not true. The law of the State of Illinois only provides for the death penalty under certain circumstances; and when those certain circumstances exist, it is only then that the prosecutor has the discretion to make the decision of whether or not to seek the death penalty. Careful consideration has to be given and justice must be done, and careful consideration has been given in this case as to whether or not to seek the death penalty. Now we\u2019re seeking that justice be done in this case.\u201d\nAlthough not referenced in defendant\u2019s brief, the prosecutor made other pertinent comments thereafter, remarks that we believe have a bearing upon the disposition of this issue. For example, soon after he made the foregoing statements, the prosecutor made clear to the jurors that the decision to impose the death penalty was theirs, and theirs alone:\n\u201cYou\u2019ve seen and heard all the evidence that\u2019s going to be introduced in this case, and now the decision is yours. It\u2019s your decision to decide whether or not this Defendant, Andrew Urd\u00edales, in this case if it\u2019s appropriate to impose the death penalty. That\u2019s your decision.\u201d\nThe prosecutor later spoke to the jurors about the procedures for determining whether defendant would receive a death sentence. He correctly informed them that they would consider factors in aggravation and mitigation in arriving at the appropriate sentence, that unanimity would be required for a death sentence, and that defendant would be sentenced to life in prison, without the possibility of release, if they were unable to find unanimously that death was the appropriate sentence.\nThe prosecutor made clear that his role in the adversarial process, his \u201cjob,\u201d was to talk to the jury about aggravating evidence. He observed: \u201cMy job is not to mitigate here. *** [Yjou\u2019ll hear mitigating evidence when the defense gets to argue. But at this point in time, I\u2019m going to give you the reasons, the evidence that support [sic] the Defendant should receive the death penalty from you folks when you go in and deliberate.\u201d\nThe prosecutor then discussed, at length, the aggravating evidence, and urged the jury find that death was the appropriate sentence. As he concluded the initial portion of his closing argument, the prosecutor\u2019s remarks again served to remind the jurors that he, as the prosecutor, was part of an adversarial process: \u201cI\u2019m sure that Mr. Skelton will have the opportunity now to address you; and he\u2019ll make a detailed argument as to why these eight murders and rape don\u2019t justify a verdict on you folks\u2019 part in favor of the death penalty.\u201d\nFollowing defense counsel\u2019s closing argument, wherein he discussed the evidence in mitigation, the prosecutor made an abbreviated rebuttal argument, and the jury was then instructed in the applicable law. It is in this context that we consider the defendant\u2019s claim of error.\nAs we observed in People v. Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d 135, 161 (2001), this court has long recognized that the State\u2019s Attorney is endowed with the exclusive discretion to decide which of several charges shall be brought, or whether to prosecute at all. A prosecutor\u2019s discretion extends to the decision about whether or not the death penalty should be sought. Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d at 162.\nIn this case, the prosecutor correctly explained to the jurors the procedure for seeking the death penalty, and advised them of his role in the capital process, as well as theirs. He obviously believed it was appropriate to seek the death penalty, or he would not have done so. In that respect, his comments did not tell the jurors anything they had not already deduced. To suggest that those comments could have improperly swayed the jury is, in our opinion, to discredit the common sense and intelligence of those who served on the jury. In his argument, the prosecutor left no doubt that his role was that of an advocate in an adversarial process, and he clearly and repeatedly advised the jurors that the decision whether or not to impose the death penalty was theirs alone.\nIn that respect, the prosecutor\u2019s argument was very different from those found objectionable in other cases. For example, in People v. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d 502, 536-38 (1983), the prosecutor, in effect, told the jury that he would assume responsibility for imposition of the death penalty. As this court noted, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney in that case also suggested that his \u201cprevious experience was somehow relevant to whether [the] defendant should be sentenced to death.\u201d Yates, 98 Ill. 2d at 539. This court ordered a new sentencing hearing, concluding that both remarks were improper: the former, because it \u201cobviously served to diminish the jury\u2019s sense of responsibility and mitigate the serious consequences of its decision\u201d; the latter, because it \u201cserved to inject an improper and irrelevant consideration into the jury\u2019s deliberations.\u201d Yates, 98 Ill. 2d at 538-39. In this capital case, as in others, a principal concern in our review is that comments of the prosecutor in closing argument do not diminish the sentencing jury\u2019s sense of responsibility. See People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 288 (1992); People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 111 (1990). A capital sentencing jury bears the sole responsibility for determining whether a defendant is sentenced to death, and it may not be informed either directly or by implication that this responsibility is shared or rests elsewhere, either with the court (see Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 288) or with the prosecutor (see Yates, 98 Ill. 2d at 537-38).\nIn this case, the prosecutor advised the jury that it was his decision to seek the death penalty, and it was for them to decide whether to impose it. That is a correct statement of law and procedure. His comments further made clear that he was not an impartial arbiter on the question of whether the death penalty should be imposed, but was in fact an advocate for a position in an adversarial process. Common sense would indicate that his opinion was reflected in the discretionary actions he took \u2014 as is the case with any prosecutor. The comments in question did not undermine or diminish the jury\u2019s sense of responsibility. Considering the complained-of remarks in the context of the entire closing argument, we find no error.\nWe finally consider defendant\u2019s contention that the prosecutor \u201cimproperly inflamed the passions of the jury by referring to the families the victims left behind and speculating about \u2018how many children and grandchildren will not be born because of the actions of the defendant.\u2019 \u201d During closing argument to the sentencing jury, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cJ.A. is the only one to get away with her life. The others weren\u2019t so lucky. How many children and grandchildren will not be born because of the actions of the defendant? Each of these girls had a family. Each one of them had their lives in front of them. Each one of them would have been able to have kids probably I assume at some point in their lives. Those were all taken away by the acts of this one man.\u201d\nIn People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 508-10 (2000), this court held that similar remarks constituted an improper appeal to the emotions of the jurors. In Emerson, the prosecution argued:\n\u201c \u2018Her name was Belinda Byrd. Belinda Byrd, a victim in this case. She had a life. She had hopes. She had dreams. They were taken away from her by Bennis Emerson. They were taken away from her only because he cared about nothing. Nothing, but himself. The last moments of her life were spent struggling for breath while 90 percent of her skin was being burned. Imagine her terror. Imagine her fear. ***\n*** This is the defendant that did that to her, that turned her into a corpse, who took away all her hopes and dreams and took away all of what she could contribute to society and to the community, and all of what she could contribute to everyone that knew her and enriched their lives.\u2019 \u201d Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d at 508-09.\nAlthough we found the foregoing remarks improper, we nonetheless concluded that the comments, \u201cin and of themselves,\u201d were not so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d at 510. Similarly, in People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235, 285 (1989), the prosecutor commented on the victims\u2019 rights to get married, have a family, have children, and spend time with their families. Though this court found that the prosecutor\u2019s argument was improper, the court concluded that the remarks did not affect the overall fairness of the sentencing hearing. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d at 285.\nWe so find in this case. The jury heard the details of defendant\u2019s eight murders and the graphic testimony of his one surviving victim. The prosecutor\u2019s brief and isolated comments, while improper, were not so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing or change the outcome of the proceeding.\nV Instructions Pertaining to Mitigation\nDefendant next contends that his \u201cdeath sentence is fundamentally unjust because the sentencing jury was never instructed that it could consider the defendant\u2019s background of extreme emotional or physical abuse as a mitigating factor.\u201d As defendant points out, as part of the death penalty reforms enacted by the General Assembly (see Pub. Act 93\u2014605, eff. November 19, 2003), a new provision was added to section 9 \u2014 1(c) of the Criminal Code, specifically stating that a defendant\u2019s background of \u201cextreme emotional or physical abuse\u201d shall be considered as a mitigating factor. Although defendant\u2019s brief does not acknowledge that this provision was in effect at the time of his trial in May of 2004, it clearly was in effect as of November 19, 2003.\nWe note, initially, that defendant tendered an instruction addressing applicable mitigating factors, and that instruction was given by the trial court; however, the tendered instruction did not include the language which defendant now claims was erroneously omitted. It is well established, by case law and rule, that a defendant may not raise on appeal the failure to give an instruction unless the defendant tendered the instruction at trial. People v. Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2004); People v. Casillas, 195 Ill. 2d 461, 473 (2000); People v. Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d 273, 286 (1996); 155 Ill. 2d R. 366(b)(2)(i). The pertinent portion of the instruction tendered by defendant read as follows:\n\u201cMitigating factors include:\nFirst: Any or all of the following if supported by the evidence:\nThe murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to the prosecution.\nThe defendant suffers from a reduced mental capacity.\nSecond: Any other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death.\nWhere there is evidence of a mitigating factor, the fact that such mitigating factor is not a factor specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your consideration of the evidence.\u201d\nObviously, the language that forms the basis of defendant\u2019s contention of error was not included in the instruction tendered by defense counsel \u2014 the instruction the trial court ultimately gave. The issue was not raised in a posttrial motion. Defendant does not claim that trial counsel was ineffective insofar as he tendered an instruction that did not include the language in question. The defendant does not argue plain error.\nRather, defendant repeatedly refers to subsection (c)(6) of section 9 \u2014 1 as \u201crecently enacted\u201d and \u201cnew,\u201d suggesting that he erroneously believes the statutory provision was not in effect at the time of his sentencing hearing. This inference is supported by a concluding sentence in his original brief: \u201cThat future defendants will have that benefit, while Andrew Urd\u00edales did not, is \u2018fundamentally unjust.\u2019 \u201d\nSubsection (c)(6) was available to defendant; however, trial counsel did not utilize it in their tendered instruction. Defendant does not claim that they were ineffective in that respect; nor does he explain why he believes the statutory provision was not available to counsel. In short, defendant does not address his procedural default in any way. Thus, defendant has forfeited the issue.\nAlthough defendant does not cite Supreme Court Rule 451(c) (177 Ill. 2d R. 451(c)), we note that rule\u2019s \u201cexception to the waiver rule for substantial defects applies when there is a grave error or when the case is so factually close that fundamental fairness requires that the jury be properly instructed.\u201d Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d at 7. Neither factor is a consideration in this case.\nThe instruction the jury received was adequate to encompass consideration of the evidence in question. In addition to specific instructions bearing upon defendant\u2019s mental state, the jury was instructed that it could consider, in mitigation, \u201c[a]ny other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death.\u201d Continuing, the instruction informed the jury: \u201cWhere there is evidence of a mitigating factor, the fact that such mitigating factor is not a factor specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your consideration of the evidence.\u201d\nIn People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502 (2000), this court considered the efficacy of an identical catchall instruction. In that case, defendant claimed he was improperly denied a specific instruction pertaining to the likelihood of his rehabilitation. Defendant claimed reversible error because the trial court refused to instruct the jury that mitigating factors include that \u201c[t]he defendant may be rehabilitated or restored to useful citizenship.\u201d Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d at 554-55. In Kirchner, this court determined that a new sentencing hearing was not necessary, holding that the catchall instruction was adequate, under the facts of that case, to apprise the jury that it could consider defendant\u2019s potential for rehabilitation. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d at 556-57.\nIn this case, Kendra Moses, defendant\u2019s mitigation expert, testified at length about the hardships and abuses defendant suffered in his formative years. Moreover, the jury heard extensive evidence regarding defendant\u2019s mental condition \u2014 be it a mental illness or personality disorder \u2014 and the origins of that condition. At least three of the testifying experts, including the State\u2019s expert, believed that defendant\u2019s childhood experiences of abuse and/or neglect were contributing factors in the formation of his current mental makeup, a conclusion that few laymen would find surprising. That testimony was inextricably tied to defendant\u2019s argument that his mental condition militated against the imposition of the death penalty. We have no doubt that the jury considered defendant\u2019s formative experiences \u2014 particularly his mother\u2019s temporary withdrawal, his sexual experience with his sister, and childhood teasing and bullying \u2014 and, correlatively, his mental condition, and appropriately weighed them against the details of eight brutal murders and the terrorization of J.A.\nWe have thoroughly reviewed the evidence in this case. Assuming, arguendo, that the abuse defendant suffered would qualify as \u201cextreme,\u201d we are confident that the jury\u2019s verdict would not have been otherwise had the instruction been given with the proposed language. See Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d at 557, quoting Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d at 290 (\u201cAn error in a jury instruction is harmless if the result of the trial would not have been different if a proper instruction had been given\u201d).\nApprendi Issue\nFinally, defendant argues that the Illinois death penalty statute violates principles announced in Apprendi in that it does not require application of the reasonable doubt standard at the second stage of capital sentencing proceedings. We have addressed and rejected that argument in People v. Thompson, 222 Ill. 2d 1, 52-54 (2006), People v. Mertz, 218 Ill. 2d 1, 93-94 (2005), and People v. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d 151, 202-05 (2002). Defendant raises no new arguments in this respect, and we decline to revisit the issue.\nCONCLUSION\nWe find in defendant\u2019s arguments no basis for reversal or remand. Although defendant has not specifically argued that the evidence is insufficient to support his death sentence, it is our responsibility in every death penalty case to consider the appropriateness of the sentence. People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 85 (1999). After careful consideration of the evidence adduced, we concur in the jury\u2019s determination that death is the appropriate penalty. Pursuant to section 9 \u2014 l(i) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 l(i) (West 2004)), we find no fundamental injustice in this case. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the defendant\u2019s conviction and death sentence. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting Tuesday, May 8, 2007, as the date on which the sentence of death shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119 \u2014 5 (West 2004). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and the warden of the institution where defendant is confined.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI agree with the majority\u2019s analysis of virtually all the issues presented in this case, including its examination of the questions impacting on the guilt phase of defendant\u2019s trial. I part company only with the majority\u2019s view that during the sentencing phase the jury need not be specifically instructed on the mitigating effect of a defendant\u2019s history of abuse, as expressly required by subsection (c)(6) of section 9 \u2014 1 (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(c)(6) (West 2004)). 225 Ill. 2d at 449.\nSubsection (c)(6) is one of a parcel of statutory protections enacted following the spate of seriously flawed capital cases that prompted the current moratorium on executions in this state. This subsection states:\n\u201cThe court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. *** Mitigating factors may include but need not be limited to the following:\n* * *\n(6) the defendant\u2019s background includes a history of extreme emotional or physical abuse[.Y\u2019 (Emphases added.) 720 ILCS 5/9\u20141(c)(6) (West 2004).\nAfter noting that this subsection was in effect at the time of defendant\u2019s trial, the majority concludes that he has forfeited this claim. 225 Ill. 2d at 450. Ordinarily, I would agree that it is unnecessary to conduct a new sentencing hearing solely due to the omission of a specific mitigating factor as long as a catchall instruction is included informing the jury that the failure to list a particular mitigating factor \u201c \u2018does not preclude [the jury\u2019s] consideration of the evidence\u2019 \u201d (225 Ill. 2d at 449). See Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d at 556-57. In this instance, however, I am otherwise persuaded by the historical underpinnings of the statutory changes at issue. The legislature enacted those changes to reform our seriously flawed capital punishment system. The legislature\u2019s efforts, combined with those of this court (see 188 Ill. 2d Rs. 43, 411, 412(c), 416, 417, 701(b), 714), have effectuated fundamental changes in capital proceedings with the laudable goal of reducing the number of erroneous capital convictions and sentences entered in this state.\nWith that goal in mind, the legislature added subsection (c)(6), requiring a jury instruction specifically pointing out the need for jurors to consider a defendant\u2019s background as a victim of abuse. 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(c)(6) (West 2004). The statutory language mandates that the court \u201cshall\" instruct the jury on the listed mitigating factors, including a history of abuse noted in subsection (c)(6). The plain language added to redress Illinois\u2019 troubled capital punishment system demonstrates the legislature\u2019s clear intent to differentiate this factor from the myriad of possible mitigation sources encompassed by the catchall instruction relied on by the majority. 225 Ill. 2d at 450. Thus, where, as here, there was evidence that defendant had undergone emotional and physical abuse as a child, the statute obliged the trial court to instruct the jury on this mitigating factor. Reliance on a catchall instruction does not adhere to the will of the legislature or uphold the spirit of the amendments.\nFurthermore, the legislature added another statutory protection to overcome the fundamental defects in our prior capital punishment system. That provision grants this court the authority to vacate a particular death sentence and impose a term of years if that sentence is \u201cfundamentally unjust\u201d (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1 (i) (West 2004)). Here, it is fundamentally unjust to ignore the legislature\u2019s clear mandate that juries must be specifically apprised of the relevance of mitigating abuse evidence. Our legislature\u2019s capital punishment reforms merit the highest degree of judicial adherence because they are designed to rectify the serious problems in our prior system.\nIn addition, all the mental-health witnesses in this case agreed that defendant suffered from some type of mental disorder, including possible organic brain disease, although they could not agree on a single diagnosis. 225 Ill. 2d at 374-81. To submit to a jury the question of whether to impose the death penalty on defendant without strict adherence to the safeguards imposed by both this court and our legislature flies in the face of fundamental justice and undermines these fundamental reform efforts. The absence of the mitigating-factor instruction in subsection (c)(6) unjustly contravenes the clear intent of our legislature and leaves the jury to resolve the life-and-death issue of imposing the death penalty without the specific guidance of a mitigating factor the legislature has deemed sufficiently critical to single out for express consideration. Here, the evidence of abuse was relegated to the broad, undefined category of nonspecific potential mitigation material, failing to give it the distinct recognition intended by the legislature.\nGiven the immense gravity of the issues in capital proceedings, I believe both fundamental justice and the reliability of this state\u2019s capital punishment system require our courts to apply all legislative and judicial reform measures unwaveringly. If we do not, we risk a recurrence of the tragic circumstances that prompted those reforms. Thus, although I abhor the heinous crimes committed by this defendant, I cannot countenance any erosion of our revised system of capital punishment caused by lax enforcement of the newly minted safeguards. Because the jury was not properly instructed in this case, I would remand this cause for a new sentencing hearing incorporating an instruction specifically noting the mitigating effect of emotional or physical abuse inflicted on defendant. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Duane E. Schuster, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Thomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Claire E. Labb\u00e9 and Michael M. Glick, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 98996.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ANDREW URDIALES, Appellant.\nOpinion filed February 16, 2007.\nModified on denial of rehearing May 29, 2007.\nCharles Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Duane E. Schuster, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Thomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Claire E. Labb\u00e9 and Michael M. Glick, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0354-01", "first_page_order": 366, "last_page_order": 467 }