{ "id": 3610512, "name": "SHAREE ULTSCH, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund", "decision_date": "2007-08-02", "docket_number": "No. 102232", "first_page": "169", "last_page": "207", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 169" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3363854 ], "weight": 15, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553-54" }, { "page": "554" }, { "page": "554" }, { "page": "554" }, { "page": "554-55" }, { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ill. 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Dec.", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "820 N.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480", "parenthetical": "Gilleran Johnson, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing" }, { "page": "480", "parenthetical": "Gilleran Johnson, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing" }, { "page": "481", "parenthetical": "Gilleran Johnson, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607155 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178", "parenthetical": "collecting cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 99", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11827125 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" }, { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/695/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 U.S. 549", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6158393 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" }, { "page": "1679" }, { "page": "1421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/331/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 F. Cas. 242", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Cas.", "case_ids": [ 6564779 ], "year": 1833, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254", "parenthetical": "Marshall, circuit judge" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-cas/20/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2953913 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 Ill. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2487049 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/383/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25353 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377-78", "parenthetical": "declining adjudication of alleged single-subject clause violation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Ill. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2729852 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/21/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5319673 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ill. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2703594 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/5/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29929 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58955 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351256 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735912 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229699 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735852 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349-50" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 Ill. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2640772 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/407/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483568 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477031 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544909 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588617 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318-21", "parenthetical": "construing together several sections of the Administrative Review Law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609703 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780281 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216-17" }, { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777554 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382-83", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" }, { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313540 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" }, { "page": "616-17" }, { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442052 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738292 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599259 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126348 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602-03", "parenthetical": "collecting cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266775 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39-43" }, { "page": "44" }, { "page": "44-45" }, { "page": "45-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "table" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138416 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704313 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609705 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780274 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313540 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616-17", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the Board of Review of the Department of Labor is both an administrative agency and \"a division or arm\" of the Department of Labor" }, { "page": "616-17", "parenthetical": "noting that a Board of Review may be both an administrative agency and \"a division or arm\" of another governmental department" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544909 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609703 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320-21" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442052 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704636 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451718 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442050 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100", "parenthetical": "noting that if the legislature's intent may be determined from the plain language of the statute, this court cannot read into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions in conflict with that intent" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704074 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0102-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1610, "char_count": 66567, "ocr_confidence": 0.79, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.8356800728661574e-07, "percentile": 0.8989887055191249 }, "sha256": "0aa52574a18db32de874a4e25af8b0645334b5178eda2e9f2d9e387f0544fa1d", "simhash": "1:5bd8b538c8270633", "word_count": 10811 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:47:26.463284+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SHAREE ULTSCH, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Fitzgerald, Gar-man, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Kilbride dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Karmeier.\nOPINION\nIn the circuit court of Lake County, plaintiff, Sharee Ultsch, sought to amend her complaint for administrative review to add the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund Board of Trustees as a defendant, relying on section 3 \u2014 103 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004)), as amended by Public Act 89\u2014 685 (eff. June 1, 1997). The circuit court dismissed plaintiffs complaint based on its ruling that Public Act 89 \u2014 685 was unconstitutional as violative of the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IM \u00a78(d)). This is the constitutional question presented for review. However, we need not reach this constitutional issue because we hold that section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Administrative Review Law did not allow plaintiff to so amend her complaint. Accordingly, we vacate the circuit court\u2019s order declaring Public Act 89\u2014 685 unconstitutional, and affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs complaint for the reasons herein stated.\nI. BACKGROUND\nPlaintiff is a Lake County employee, and Lake County participates in defendant, the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF) (see 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2004)). IMRF denied plaintiffs application for temporary disability benefits. Plaintiff appealed the denial to the Benefit Review Committee of the IMRF Board of Trustees. Following a hearing, the committee recommended that the full Board of Trustees deny plaintiffs application for temporary disability benefits. The Board of Trustees adopted the committee\u2019s recommendation as the final administrative decision. The Board of Trustees notified plaintiff of its decision via United States mail on April 25, 2005.\nOn May 25, 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review of the denial of her claim. The complaint named IMRF as the sole defendant and a single summons was served thereon. IMRF moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 619(a) (West 2004)). IMRF contended that dismissal was required because plaintiff failed to name the IMRF Board of Trustees as a defendant.\nPlaintiff subsequently moved for leave to amend the complaint to add the Board of Trustees as a defendant. In her motion, plaintiff claimed that section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004)) \u201callows a complaint in an administrative review action to be amended to add as a party defendant the board that acted on behalf of a governmental entity in effectuating the administrative action which is the basis of the claim. Estate of Smida v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 353 Ill. App. 3d 551, 289 Ill. Dec. 699, 820 N.E.2d 475 (2nd Dist. 2004).\u201d\nIMRF filed an objection to plaintiffs motion for leave to amend. In a supporting memorandum, IMRF acknowledged that the appellate court in Smida, with one justice dissenting on denial of rehearing, held that section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004)) allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint to name the Board of Trustees as an additional defendant. However, IMRF contended that \u201cthere is an additional issue, not decided by the Smida court, for this Court to consider.\u201d IMRF thereupon raised the constitutional issue that Public Act 89 \u2014 685, which amended, among other statutes, section 3 \u2014 103 of the Administrative Review Law, violates the single subject clause of section 8(d) of article IV of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.\nThe circuit court sustained IMRF\u2019s objection. In a memorandum order filed December 16, 2005, the court ruled that Public Act 89 \u2014 685 was unconstitutional as violative of the single subject clause of section 8(d) of article IV of the Illinois Constitution. Consequently, the circuit court denied plaintiffs motion for leave to amend her complaint. In an order filed January 31, 2006, the circuit court, pursuant to its prior ruling, granted IMRF\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for failure to add the Board of Trustees as a defendant.\nBecause the circuit court declared a statute of this state unconstitutional, this direct appeal followed. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a).\nII. ANALYSIS\nThis court acquired jurisdiction of the present case because a constitutional question is involved. However, while the case was under advisement, we discerned a threshold issue of statutory construction that could render adjudication of the constitutional issue unnecessary.\nA. Prudential Restraint\nIt is quite established that this court will not address constitutional issues that are unnecessary for the disposition of the case. See, e.g., In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 178 (2006) (collecting cases). This policy derives from a sensitive understanding of American constitutional government. The Illinois Constitution establishes three coequal branches of government, each with its own powers and functions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a71. The constitution declares that the legislative branch makes laws, and that the judicial branch decides cases. To properly perform its constitutional function, a court must occasionally determine the constitutionally of a statute. In so doing, the court is exercising the power to decide the case before it. The determination of the constitutionality of a statute when not required to decide the case can impinge upon the lawmaking function of the legislature. Indiana Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co. v. State, 695 N.E.2d 99, 107 (Ind. 1998). The policy of prudential judicial restraint is grounded in those considerations that form the unique character of judicial review of government action for constitutionality. The policy is based on the delicacy of that function, the necessity of each branch of government keeping within its power, and the inherent limitations of the judicial process. Indiana Wholesale Wine, 695 N.E.2d at 107, quoting Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 571, 91 L. Ed. 1666, 1679, 67 S. Ct. 1409, 1421 (1947).\nAccordingly: \u201cIf [constitutional questions] become indispensably necessary to a case, the court must meet and decide them; but if the case may be determined on other points, a just respect for the legislature requires, that the obligation of its laws should not be unnecessarily and wantonly assailed.\u201d Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (Marshall, circuit judge) (quoted in Indiana Wholesale Wine, 695 N.E.2d at 106 n.18). Illinois courts have exercised this policy of prudential judicial restraint in cases presenting constitutional issues arising from the legislative article of the Illinois Constitution. See, e.g., Bender v. City of Chicago, 58 Ill. 2d 284, 287 (1974); Commissioners of Drainage District No. 5 v. Arnold, 383 Ill. 498, 507 (1943); Town of Cicero v. Illinois Ass\u2019n of Firefighters, IAFF Local 717, 338 Ill. App. 3d 364, 377-78 (2003) (declining adjudication of alleged single-subject clause violation).\nIn the present case, the seminal question must be whether the Administrative Review Law, as amended by Public Act 89 \u2014 685, allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint for administrative review to add the Board of Trustees as a defendant. Manifestly, if the Administrative Review Law, as amended, does not allow plaintiff to amend her complaint to add the Board of Trustees as a defendant, then a nonconstitutional issue of statutory construction is presented, and the alternative constitutional issue should not be reached. See, e.g., Bismarck Hotel Co. v. Petriko, 21 Ill. 2d 481, 485-86 (1961); City of Aurora ex rel. Egan v. Young Men\u2019s Christian Ass\u2019n, 9 Ill. 2d 286, 290-91 (1956); Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. City of Freeport, 5 Ill. 2d 85, 89-90 (1955). Subsequent to oral argument, we directed both parties to file supplemental briefs on this nonconstitutional issue.\nB. Statutory Construction\nPlaintiffs complaint for administrative review named IMRF only and a single summons was served thereon. IMRF moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a) (West 2004)), because plaintiff failed to name the Board of Trustees as a defendant. The circuit court granted IMRF\u2019s motion. The purpose of a motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to afford litigants a means to dispose of issues of law and easily proved issues of fact at the outset of a case. People v. Philip Morris, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d 87, 94 (2001). An appeal from a section 2 \u2014 619 dismissal is the same in nature as one following a grant of summary judgment. In both instances, the reviewing court must ascertain whether the existence of a genuine issue of material fact should have precluded the dismissal, or absent such an issue of fact, whether dismissal is proper as a matter of law. Review is de novo. Carroll v. Paddock, 199 Ill. 2d 16, 22 (2002); Guzman v. C.R. Epperson Construction, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (2001).\nAs earlier discussed, this case turns on the correct interpretation of several sections of the Administrative Review Law. IMRF\u2019s enabling legislation provides that \u201cthe Administrative Review Law, and all amendments and modifications thereof and the rules adopted pursuant thereto shall apply to and govern all proceedings for the judicial review of final administrative decisions of the retirement board.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 220 (West 2004). Although the Illinois Constitution grants an appeal as a matter of right from all final judgments of the circuit court (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a76), the constitution provides that final administrative decisions are appeal-able only \u201cas provided by law\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a79). Because review of a final administrative decision may be obtained only as provided by statute, a court exercises \u201cspecial statutory jurisdiction\u201d when it reviews an administrative decision. Special statutory jurisdiction is limited to the language of the statute conferring it and the court has no powers from any other source. A party seeking to invoke a court\u2019s special statutory jurisdiction must strictly comply with the procedures prescribed by the statute. Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees of St. Clair County, 218 Ill. 2d 175, 181-82 (2006); ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26, 29-30 (2000). The Administrative Review Law was an innovation and a departure from the common law, and the procedures established therein must be followed. Rodriguez v. Sheriff\u2019s Merit Comm\u2019n, 218 Ill. 2d 342, 349-50 (2006). Thus, whether dismissal of plaintiffs complaint was warranted depends on whether plaintiff strictly complied with the requirements of the Administrative Review Law.\nSection 3 \u2014 102 of the Administrative Review Law mandates that parties to a proceeding before an administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of the agency\u2019s administrative decision unless review is sought \u201cwithin the time and in the manner\u201d provided by the statute. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 102 (West 2002). Section 3 \u2014 103 mandates: \u201cEvery action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2004). Section 3 \u2014 107(a) mandates that \u201cthe administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made defendants.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004). This requirement \u201cis mandatory and specific, and admits of no modification.\u201d Winston v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 407 Ill. 588, 595 (1950). Noncompliance with the joinder provisions of the Administrative Review Law requires dismissal of the review proceeding. Collinsville Community Unit School District, 218 Ill. 2d at 183; McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 165 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1995).\nHowever, Public Act 89 \u2014 685 (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 685, eff. June 1, 1997) amended, inter alia, these sections of the Administrative Review Law by adding similarly worded exceptions. The legislature added the following exception to the 35-day limitations period of section 3 \u2014 103:\n\u201c(2) *** a complaint filed within the time limit established by this Section may be amended to add an employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, who acted in an official capacity as a party of record to the administrative proceeding, if the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity is a party to the administrative review action. If the director or agency head, in his or her official capacity, is a party to the administrative review, a complaint filed within the time limit established by this Section may be amended to add the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004).\nSimilarly, Public Act 89 \u2014 685 inserted this corresponding exception in section 3 \u2014 107(a):\n\u201cNo action for administrative review shall be dismissed *** based upon the failure to name an employee, agent, or member, who acted in his or her official capacity, of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, where the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, has been named as a defendant as provided in this Section. Naming the director or agency head, in his or her official capacity, shall be deemed to include as defendant the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity that the named defendants direct or head. No action for administrative review shall be dismissed *** based upon the failure to name an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, where the director or agency head, in his or her official capacity, has been named as a defendant as provided in this Section.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004).\nWe must determine whether these exceptions to the mandatory joinder requirements of the Administrative Review Law allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint to add the Board of Trustees as a defendant.\nThe primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. The best evidence of legislative intent is the statutory language itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. The statute should be evaluated as a whole. Where the meaning of a statute is unclear from a reading of its language, courts may look beyond the statutory language and consider the purpose of the law, the evils it was intended to remedy, and the legislative history of the statute. Stroger v. Regional Transportation Authority, 201 Ill. 2d 508, 524 (2002); see Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 16-19 (1996).\nIn her supplemental brief, plaintiff contends that section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004)) allows a complaint for administrative review to be amended after the initial 35-day period to add the board of an administrative agency or public entity as a party defendant when the agency was named as a party in the initial complaint. Plaintiff relies primarily on Estate of Smida v. Ill. Municipal Retirement Fund, 353 Ill. App. 3d 551 (2004).\nIn Smida, the circuit court granted IMRF\u2019s motion to dismiss the plaintiff\u2019s complaint for administrative review because the plaintiff failed to comply with section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Administrative Review Law by not naming as a defendant the Board of Trustees. Smida, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 552. The appellate court in Smida was presented with the exact issue as presented in this case: \u201cOur inquiry is whether the Board [of Trustees], the party that plaintiff sought to add to the complaint, qualified for amendment under section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Review Law.\u201d Smida, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 553. IMRF argued that the statute permits the addition as a defendant of only \u201can employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2002). IMRF argued that the Board of Trustees was the \u201cadministrative agency\u201d and, therefore, could not be an employee, agent, or member of the agency. Thus, according to IMRF, the plaintiff was properly denied leave to amend the complaint.\nThe Smida majority acknowledged case law holding that \u201ca board that renders the final decision of an administrative agency satisfies the definition of \u2018administrative agency\u2019 in section 3 \u2014 101 of the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 (West 2002)) and therefore must be named as a defendant under section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law or the complaint must be dismissed.\u201d Smida, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 553. However, the Smida majority then distinguished that rule because it addressed who must be named as a defendant pursuant to section 3 \u2014 107(a), while the issue before the Smida court was whether plaintiff could amend her complaint pursuant to section 3 \u2014 103(2).\nThe court examined section 3 \u2014 103(2) and discerned three conditions to qualify for amendment. First, an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity must be a party to the action. Second, the party sought to be added must be an \u201cemployee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity.\u201d Third, the employee, agent, or member of the administrative agency must have \u201c \u2018acted in an official capacity as a party of record to the administrative proceeding.\u2019 \u201d Smida, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 553-54, quoting 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2002). The Smida majority considered this statutory language to be ambiguous because it was \u201cunclear\u201d whether it applied to the Board of Trustees. Smida, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 554.\nThe Smida majority then concluded that the Board of Trustees qualifies for amendment for the following reasons. In the complaint, plaintiff named a government entity, IMRF, as a party. Additionally, there was no dispute that the Board of Trustees was a party of record to the administrative proceeding. Lastly, whether the Board of Trustees was an employee, agent, or member of IMRF, the Smida majority concluded that the Board of Trustees was \u201ca member of IMRF.\u201d Smida, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 554. The court stated that its conclusion was consistent with the legislative intent behind section 3 \u2014 103(2), which requires a liberal construction. Smida, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 554. The Smida court reversed the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of the plaintiff\u2019s complaint. Smida, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 554-55.\nJustice Gilleran Johnson dissented from the denial of rehearing. Smida, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 554-A, 820 N.E.2d at 480 (Gilleran Johnson, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing). She was of the opinion that the Board of Trustees was the administrative agency that section 3 \u2014 107(a) required the plaintiff to name as a defendant. Further, she believed that section 3 \u2014 103(2) \u201cwas intended to allow a plaintiff to amend a complaint for administrative review to add an individual as an adverse party, if the individual was an employee, agent, or member of an agency, board, or entity, and the agency, board, or entity had been named in the original complaint.\u201d (Emphases added.) Smida, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 554-C, 820 N.E.2d at 480 (Gilleran Johnson, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing). As the Board of Trustees is not an individual, the dissent concluded that the exceptions contained in sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a) did not apply. Smida, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 554-D, 820 N.E.2d at 481 (Gilleran Johnson, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing).\nIn its supplemental brief, IMRF contends that the Smida majority misconstrued section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Administrative Review Law. IMRF asserts that the above-quoted exceptions to the mandatory joinder requirements, contained in sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a), do not apply to this case. IMRF contends that plaintiff, therefore, was required to name the Board of Trustees as a defendant, and her failure to do so required dismissal of her complaint for administrative review.\nWe agree with IMRF\u2019s contention. We reject the holding of the Smida court, upon which plaintiff relies, that the Board of Trustees is a \u201cmember\u201d of IMRF. The reasoning that the Smida majority employed to reach its conclusion was flawed in at least two respects.\nFirst, the Smida majority\u2019s attempt to construe section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Administrative Review Law in isolation and without reference to section 3 \u2014 107(a) was erroneous. We repeat: a court determines the legislative intent in enacting a statute by examining the entire statute and by construing each material part of the legislation together, and not each part or section alone. Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 318-21 (1989) (construing together several sections of the Administrative Review Law).\nSecond, the Smida court erred in concluding that section 3 \u2014 103(2) was ambiguous, thereby requiring the court to look beyond its statutory language. There is no rule of statutory construction that authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute says. Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 320-21 (2003). We repeat that a court should first look to the statutory language as the best indication of legislative intent without resorting to other aids for construction. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, a court need not consider other interpretive aids. Envirite Corp. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 158 Ill. 2d 210, 216-17 (1994); DiFoggio v. Retirement Board of the County Employees Annuity & Benefit Fund, 156 Ill. 2d 377, 382-83 (1993) (and cases cited therein).\nThe plain language of sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a), considered together, clearly refutes the erroneous reasoning of the Smida court. A complaint for administrative review, filed within the 35-day limitations period, may be amended to add \u201can employee, agent, or member\u201d of an agency, board, committee, or entity, who acted in an official capacity as a party of record in the administrative proceeding, if the entity is a party to the administrative review action. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004). Correspondingly, the complaint shall not be dismissed for failure to name as a defendant the same series of individuals, i.e., \u201can employee, agent, or member\u201d of the same list of entities, who acted in \u201chis or her\u201d official capacity, if the entity had been named as a defendant. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004). The complaint may be amended to add the entity if the director or agency head is a party to the administrative review action (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004)) and, further, naming the director or agency head is deemed to include the agency (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004)). Correspondingly, the action shall not be dismissed for failure to include as a defendant the entity where the director or agency head has been named as a defendant. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004). We find no legislative intent in this statutory language to overrule the long-established requirement that a complaint for administrative review name as a defendant the administrative agency. Cuny v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 613, 617 (1952); 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004). The only exceptions the statutory language has carved out are those specified above.\nThe plain meaning of these two provisions, considered together, expressly allows amending a complaint for administrative review to add an individual who is an employee, agent, or member of the decisionmaking agency when the agency has been named as a defendant. In other words, section 3 \u2014 103(2) applies only to an individual who is an employee, agent, or member of the decisionmaking body that has already been named as a defendant in the complaint for administrative review. However, this case does not present that situation. IMRF was not the agency that rendered the decision in this case. The Board of Trustees is not an individual who is a \u201cmember\u201d of IMRF.\nThe dissent views this reading of sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a) as \u201cflawed\u201d and \u201cunsound.\u201d 226 Ill. 2d at 199 (Kilbride, J., dissenting, joined by Karmeier, J.). The dissent construes sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a) separately, emphasizing the possessive pronouns \u201chis or her\u201d in section 3 \u2014 107(a), as to create a different exception in each section. The dissent views section 3 \u2014 107(a) as precluding the dismissal of any administrative review action because an individual who acted in his or her official capacity was not named as a defendant, as long as the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity has already been named. However, according to the dissent, section 3 \u2014 103(2) allows administrative review plaintiffs to amend their complaints belatedly to name any type of \u201cemployee, agent, or member\u201d who acted in an official capacity relevant to an agency, board, committee, or government entity that is already a party to the action. The dissent concludes that the plain language of sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a) does not prevent the application of section 3 \u2014 103(2) to cure plaintiffs failure to name the Board. 226 Ill. 2d at 199-201 (Kilbride, J., dissenting, joined by Karmeier, J.).\nBy failing to read sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a) in harmony and as a whole, the dissent errs in concluding that the legislature intended \u201cto identify different groups in these two sections.\u201d 226 Ill. 2d at 199-200 (Kilbride, J., dissenting, joined by Karmeier, J.). Initially, the dissent begins by quoting only to the first sentence of section 3 \u2014 103(2), overlooking the second sentence, which provides: \u201cIf the director or agency head, in his or her official capacity, is a party to the administrative review, a complaint filed within the time limit established by this Section may be amended to add the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2002). By this sentence the legislature plainly describes the only circumstance whereby a plaintiff may amend a complaint for administrative review to add a board. The dissent\u2019s construction of section 3 \u2014 103(2), based solely on its first sentence, would render the second sentence superfluous. \u201c[0]ne of the fundamental principles of statutory construction is to view all of the provisions of a statute as a whole. [Citation.] Words and phrases should not be construed in isolation, but interpreted in light of other relevant portions of the statute so that, if possible, no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless.\u201d Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002).\nIn addition, the dissent\u2019s reading of section 3 \u2014 103(2) would render section 3 \u2014 107(a) meaningless. Under the plain language of section 3 \u2014 107(a), the plaintiff was required to name the Board of Trustees as a defendant in her administrative review action, as the Board of Trustees issued the \u201cfinal decision\u201d subject to review. See 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004) (\u201c[I]n any action to review any final decision of an administrative agency, the administrative agency *** shall be made [a] defendant ]\u201d). Because the plaintiff failed to name the Board of Trustees as a defendant, her action clearly was subject to dismissal pursuant to section 3 \u2014 107(a). Yet, under the dissent\u2019s interpretation of section 3 \u2014 103(2), a complaint that improperly fails to name the Board of Trustees as a defendant could never be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because the plaintiff could amend the complaint to include the Board of Trustees as a defendant whenever it saw fit.\nFurther, the dissent errs in giving undue importance to the possessive pronouns \u201chis or her\u201d found in section 3 \u2014 107(a) and the indefinite article \u201can\u201d in section 3 \u2014 103(2). \u201cRather than meander through the intricacies of the many principles of statutory construction\u201d (Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 185 (1992)), we simply conclude that, viewing sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a) together, the legislature intended to establish the same corresponding exceptions to statutory filing requirements.\nAlthough we find sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a) unambiguous, our reading of these sections finds support in the legislative history. As earlier noted, Public Act 89 \u2014 685 (House Bill 346) added section 3 \u2014 103(2). When introducing the legislation, Senator Hawkinson stated:\n\u201c[House Bill 346] allows a plaintiff in an administrative review action to obtain service on the agency if they have already served the agency head or to refile against an employee acting in his official capacity if they have already served the agency. Without this change, we\u2019re finding them \u2014 some cases are being dismissed because all necessary parties have not been named and served.\u201d 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 8, 1996, at 12-13 (statements of Senator Hawkinson).\nThis explanation indicates the amendments to the Administrative Review Law contained in Public Act 89\u2014 685 were intended to allow a plaintiff to amend a timely filed complaint for administrative review by adding an agency if the agency head was named, or by adding an individual if the individual was an employee of a properly named agency.\nIn her supplemental brief, plaintiff characterizes this conclusion as \u201cspurious.\u201d Citing IMRF\u2019s enabling legislation, plaintiff argues that IMRF is, within the meaning of section 3 \u2014 103(2), an administrative agency or governmental entity. Further, according to plaintiff, the Board of Trustees would not exist without IMRF, and the legislature created the Board of Trustees to carry out IMRF\u2019s various functions. Therefore, according to plaintiff, the Board of Trustees is a \u201cmember,\u201d or acts as an \u201cagent,\u201d of IMRF. Consequently, since plaintiff\u2019s initial complaint named IMRF as a defendant, plaintiff argues that the Board of Trustees, as an agent or member of IMRF, can be added as a party defendant pursuant to section 3 \u2014 103(2). Plaintiff argues that this conclusion accords with the policy of the Code of Civil Procedure, in which the Administrative Review Law is codified, that the Code \u201cshall be liberally construed, to the end that controversies may be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive rights of the parties.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 106 (West 2004).\nThis contention completely lacks merit. Section 3 \u2014 101 of the Administrative Review Law defines \u201cadministrative agency\u201d as a person or group having the power to make administrative decisions. 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 101 (West 2004). Several sections of IMRF\u2019s enabling legislation, codified in article VII of the Pension Code, clearly define the Board of Trustees as the \u201cadministrative agency.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 178, 7 \u2014 200, 7 \u2014 220 (West 2004). While the Board of Trustees may be an arm of IMRF, the Board of Trustees is the body that acted as the administrative agency and entered the administrative decision that is subject to administrative review. Therefore, we hold that the Board of Trustees is the \u201cadministrative agency\u201d as that term is defined by the Administrative Review Law. Cuny, 411 Ill. at 616-17; see Wilson v. State Employees\u2019 Retirement System, 336 Ill. App. 3d 199, 203-05 (2002); Veazey v. Baker, 322 Ill. App. 3d 599, 602-03 (2001) (collecting cases). Consequently, the Board of Trustees cannot be an \u201cemployee, agent, or member\u201d of IMRF within the meaning of sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Administrative Review Law. The statutory language, being mandatory and specific, and admitting of no modification (Cuny, 411 Ill. at 617), does not require any aids for construction, such as section 1 \u2014 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 106 (West 2004)).\nThe Smida court summarily concluded that the language of section 3 \u2014 103(2) was \u201cunclear\u201d and, therefore, ambiguous. Smida, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 554. However, a court should not attempt to read a statute other than in the manner in which it was written. In applying plain and unambiguous language, it is not necessary for a court to search for any subtle or not readily apparent intention of the legislature. Envirite, 158 Ill. 2d at 217; DiFoggio, 156 Ill. 2d at 383. The Smida court had to look no further than the plain language of the Administrative Review Law itself. Estate of Smida v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 353 Ill. App. 3d 551 (2004), is hereby overruled.\nIn its supplemental brief, IMRF cites to McGaw Medical Center of Northwestern University v. Department of Employment Security, 369 Ill. App. 3d 37 (2006), appeal allowed, 223 Ill. 2d 637 (2007) (table). In McGaw, the plaintiffs complaint for administrative review named as defendants the Illinois Department of Employment Security (IDES) and its Director, but failed to name the IDES Board of Review. After the expiration of the 35-day limitations period, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the plaintiffs failure to name the Board as a defendant. The plaintiff moved to amend the complaint. However, the circuit court denied the plaintiffs motion for leave to amend and granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the complaint. Before the appellate court, the plaintiff contended that it should have been allowed to add the Board as a defendant pursuant to section 3 \u2014 103(2), relying on Smida. McGaw, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 39-43. Expressly disagreeing with the reasoning and conclusion of the Smida majority, the McGaw court construed section 3 \u2014 103(2) to not allow a plaintiff to amend a complaint for administrative review to add a \u201cboard\u201d as a defendant.\nThe McGaw court opined that \u201c[sjection 3 \u2014 103 conforms to section 3 \u2014 107.\u201d McGaw, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 44. Construing sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a) together, the McGaw court reasoned:\n\u201cThe statutes create exceptions to the rule that a complaint for administrative review that fails to name all necessary parties within the 35-day limitations period must be dismissed without leave to amend. But the exceptions do not apply here. Section 3 \u2014 107 makes clear that the administrative agency rendering the decision sought to be reviewed must be named as a defendant. If the administrative agency is not named, it may be joined if the agency\u2019s director or agency head was made a defendant. The administrative agency that rendered the decision in this case is the Board. As such, plaintiff was required to name the Board as a defendant or, under the exceptions created by sections 3 \u2014 107 and 3 \u2014 103, the Board\u2019s director or agency head. Plaintiff failed to name either.\u201d McGaw, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 44-45.\nThe McGaw court concluded \u201cthat plaintiffs complaint was properly dismissed, without leave to amend, for failure to comply strictly with sections 3 \u2014 103 and 3 \u2014 107 of the Review Law.\u201d McGaw, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 45-46.\nIn the present case, the Board of Trustees was the administrative agency that plaintiff, under section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004)), was required to name as a defendant. IMRF\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for administrative review is meritorious because plaintiff failed to name the Board of Trustees as a defendant within the initial 35-day limitations period, and because sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2), 3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004)) do not allow plaintiff to so amend her complaint. Although the circuit court dismissed plaintiffs complaint for a different reason, the reasons given for a judgment or order Eire not material if the judgment or order itself is correct. It is the judgment that is on appeal to a court of review and not what else may have been said by the lower court. The reviewing court need not accept the reasons given by the circuit court for its judgment. Rather, a reviewing court can uphold the decision of the circuit court on any grounds which are called for by the record regardless of whether the circuit court relied on the grounds and regardless of whether the circuit court\u2019s reasoning was correct. Rodriguez, 218 Ill. 2d at 357, quoting Bell v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 106 Ill. 2d 135, 148 (1985) (and cases cited therein). Accordingly, we affirm the ultimate judgment of the circuit court granting IMRF\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for administrative review for the reasons stated in this opinion.\n\u201cIt remains the mandate of this court that constitutional issues be considered only when the case may not be decided on nonconstitutional grounds.\u201d Mulay v. Mulay, 225 Ill. 2d 601, 611 (2007). Our disposition of this cause obviates the need to determine the constitutionality of Public Act 89 \u2014 685. See, e.g., Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 378 (2003); Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 399 (1994).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the December 16, 2005, order of the circuit court of Lake County, which declared Public Act 89 \u2014 685 unconstitutional, is vacated. The January 31, 2006, order of the circuit court, which granted IMRF\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for administrative review, is affirmed for the reasons stated in this opinion.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part.\nPublic Act 89 \u2014 685 also inserted a corresponding exception in the summons requirement of section 3 \u2014 105 (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 2004)).\nThe dissent accepts this argument. 226 Ill. 2d at 194-99 (Kilbride, J., dissenting, joined by Karmeier, J.).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I believe section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004)) permits Ultsch to add the Board of Trustees as a defendant after the expiration of the 35-day limitations period. Thus, I believe this court should address the constitutional issue presented in this appeal.\nSection 3 \u2014 103(2) allows an otherwise timely complaint to be amended belatedly:\n\u201cto add an employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, who acted in an official capacity as a party of record to the administrative proceeding, if the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity is a party to the administrative review action ***.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004).\nHere, determining if this section applies requires us to consider whether: (1) IMRF is an \u201cadministrative agency, board, committee, or government entity\u201d; (2) IMRF is \u201ca party to the administrative review action\u201d; (3) the Board of Trustees is \u201can employee, agent, or member\u201d of IMRF; and (4) the Board acted \u201cin an official capacity as a party of record to the administrative proceeding.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004).\nThe answers to the second and fourth inquiries are undisputably \u201cyes.\u201d IMRF is a party named in the administrative review action, and the Board was a party of record when it rendered its final administrative decision in its official capacity. Thus, the only pending questions are whether IMRF is an \u201cadministrative agency, board, committee, or government entity\u201d and whether the Board is \u201can employee, agent, or member\u201d of IMRF within the meaning of the statute. To resolve these questions, the court must employ our traditional rules of statutory construction. As the majority notes (226 Ill. 2d at 181), the goal of statutory construction is to effectuate the legislature\u2019s intent, as best revealed by the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute.\nApplying this rule, the court must first consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \u201centity.\u201d The dictionary defines \u201centity\u201d to mean \u201cBEING, EXISTENCE; esp.: independent, separate, or self-contained existence.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 758 (1993). To determine whether IMRF meets this definition, the court looks to IMRF\u2019s legislative roots and its real-world functions.\nThe legislature created IMRF in section 7 \u2014 101 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 101 (West 2004)) for the stated purpose of \u201cproviding] a sound and efficient system for the payment of annuities and other benefits, *** to certain officers and employees, and to their beneficiaries, of municipalities\u201d (40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 102 (West 2004)). Its mission is \u201cto efficiently and impartially develop, implement and administer programs that provide income protection to members and their beneficiaries on behalf of participating employers in a prudent manner.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 102 (West 2004). Notably, the legislature expressly granted IMRF, not the Board, statutory authority to institute litigation against participating municipalities and instrumentalities to recover delinquent contributions when other statutory measures have failed. 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 172.1 (West 2004). Thus, the enabling legislation recognized IMRF as a separate government entity, capable of actions independent of the Board.\nIndeed, the record on appeal further establishes IMRF as a separate entity. In its supplemental brief, IMRF does not argue that it is not a government entity. IMRF\u2019s court filings, including its motion to dismiss Ultsch\u2019s complaint for administrative review and related documents, were filed in its own name. IMRF has a main office, a mailing address, its own letterhead, and a staff, including the associate general counsel involved in this case. Ultsch\u2019s 1987 \u201cNotice of Participation in IMRF\u201d was on a form bearing only IMRF\u2019s name in the heading. In addition, Ultsch applied for disability benefits on an IMRF form stating its mailing address and the phone number of its own service representatives, with no reference to the Board. Similarly, other forms in the record noted IMRF\u2019s unique contact information. IMRF and members of its disability claims department were also expressly named in extensive correspondence with the medical experts who reviewed Ultsch\u2019s claim, but the Board was not mentioned. Similar designations appear on correspondence between IMRF and Ultsch, or her counsel. The record contains no evidence that the Board originally received or sent any of these materials.\nMoreover, Ultsch\u2019s initial denial letter was from the IMRF benefits manager on IMRF letterhead. That letter stated, \u201cWe reviewed [Ultsch\u2019s] disability claim to determine [her] eligibility for temporary disability benefits. Our decision is that, based on the medical evidence in our file, you do not meet IMRF\u2019s definition of temporary disability as defined by IMRF law.\u201d (Emphases added.) The letter further explained that any appeal hearings before the Board of Trustee\u2019s Benefit Review Committee would be conducted \u201cin the IMRF office.\u201d Nothing in the denial letter indicated that IMRF was simply acting on behalf of the Board. Similarly, the letter notifying Ultsch\u2019s employer, Lake County, of the denial of benefits was also submitted by the IMRF benefits manager rather than the Board.\nBased on the documentary evidence, it is apparent that IMRF was the sole entity processing Ultsch\u2019s disability claim. Perhaps most importantly, the IMRF benefits manager, not the Board, sent the official letter notifying Ultsch that both the Benefit Review Committee\u2019s decision and the Board of Trustees\u2019 final administrative decision had upheld the denial of her claim. That letter, submitted on IMRF letterhead, also noted that the \u201caction by the Board of Trustees constitutes its final administrative decision, and IMRF will take no further action regarding this disability claim.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Notably, this wording formally recognized the termination of IMRF\u2019s processing of the claim. The record establishes that IMRF actually processed Ultsch\u2019s disability claim through the issuance of the final administrative decision. Accordingly, whether viewed from a functional or a statutory perspective, IMRF is a government entity separate from the Board, capable of independent action. Thus, I conclude that IMRF is a \u201cgovernment entity.\u201d\nThe majority does not address the effect that the IMRF\u2019s status as a government entity has on the application of section 3 \u2014 103(2), however. Instead, it avoids the question by simply concluding that because IMRF is not the administrative \u201cagency that rendered the decision in this case,\u201d section 3 \u2014 103(2) does not apply. 226 Ill. 2d at 186. The majority\u2019s analysis fails to address the critical language in section 3 \u2014 103(2) that also allows the late addition of \u201can employee, agent, or member of *** [a] government entity.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 103(2) (West 2004). The majority appears to recognize only the portion of the statutory exception allowing the late naming of \u201can employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency.\u201d (Emphasis added.) See 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 (West 2004); 226 Ill. 2d at 189-90.\nThe majority\u2019s position excludes the possibility that the Board can fulfill dual roles, being both a decision-making administrative agency and \u201can employee, agent, or member\u201d of another government entity, such as IMRF. See Cuny v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 613, 616-17 (1952) (recognizing that the Board of Review of the Department of Labor is both an administrative agency and \u201ca division or arm\u201d of the Department of Labor). Thus, the majority\u2019s view improperly renders the portion of the section allowing the addition of \u201can employee, agent, or member *** of a government entity\u201d mere surplusage. That result effectively eliminates a portion of section 3 \u2014 103(2) and violates one of this court\u2019s cardinal rules of statutory construction. See Fisher, 221 Ill. 2d at 115; 226 Ill. 2d at 187, quoting Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002). That rule mandates that each word, clause, and sentence in a statute be given a reasonable meaning whenever possible. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (1996). Applying that rule here compels the court to conclude that IMRF is covered by section 3 \u2014 103(2) and is a \u201cgovernment entity\u201d within the plain meaning of that section.\nHaving made this determination, the court must next consider whether the Board is \u201can employee, agent, or member\u201d of IMRF within the meaning of section 3 \u2014 103(2). The Board is not an \u201cemployee\u201d of IMRF as that term is defined in the Pension Code because its members do not \u201c[r]eceive[ ] earnings as payment for the performance of personal services or official duties out of the general fund of a municipality, or out of any special fund or funds.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 109 (West 2004). Indeed, section 7 \u2014 175 of the Pension Code specifically precludes Board members from receiving payments for their services, stating that they \u201cshall serve without compensation.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 174(g) (West 2004).\nThe term \u201cagent,\u201d however, does fit the Board\u2019s role with IMRF. An \u201cagent\u201d is \u201c[o]ne who is authorized to act for or in place of another; a representative.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 68 (8th ed. 2004). See also Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 40 (1993) (defining an \u201cagent\u201d as \u201cone that acts for or in the place of another by authority from him: as *** a representative, emissary, or official of a government\u201d). Among the powers and duties statutorily granted to the Board (40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 178 (West 2004)) are preparing IMRF\u2019s operating budget (40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 180 (West 2004)), compelling witnesses \u201cto testify upon any necessary matter concerning the fund\u201d (40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 181 (West 2004)), requesting information \u201cas is necessary for the proper operation of the fund\u201d (40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 183 (West 2004)), keeping permanent records of Board proceedings and other records \u201cnecessary or desirable for administration of the Fund\u201d (40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 197 (West 2004)), and \u201ccarrying] on generally any other reasonable activities, including, without limitation, the making of administrative decisions on participation and coverage, which are necessary for carrying out the intent of this fund\u201d (40 ILCS 5/7\u2014 200 (West 2004)). By performing these duties, the Board acts as a representative of IMRF, making it an agent of the fund.\nThus, adhering strictly to the plain language of the statute, the Board is an agent of IMRF, a government entity already named as a party on administrative review, that acted in its official capacity as a party of record in this administrative proceeding. That is all that is required under section 3 \u2014 103(2) to allow Ultsch to amend her administrative complaint to name the Board after the expiration of the 35-day limitations period. See 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004).\nNonetheless, the majority attempts to support its contrary conclusion by reading section 3 \u2014 103(2) with section 3 \u2014 107(a) (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004)) and the definitions in section 3 \u2014 101 (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 (West 2004)). 226 Ill. 2d at 185-89. The majority first correctly states that section 3 \u2014 107(a) mandates that \u201c \u2018the administrative agency *** shall be made [a] defendant ].\u2019 \u201d 226 Ill. 2d at 179, quoting 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 107(a) (West 2004). Relying on the definitions in section 3 \u2014 101 (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 (West 2004)), the majority next states that the Board is \u201cthe administrative agency\u201d that must be named because it had the power to make the administrative decision denying Ultsch benefits. 226 Ill. 2d at 189. While I agree with these statements, I believe the majority\u2019s subsequent statutory construction, based on a flawed comparison of the language in section 3 \u2014 103(2) and section 3 \u2014 107(a), is unsound.\nSection 3 \u2014 107(a) precludes the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of any administrative review action \u201cbased upon the failure to name an employee, agent, or member, who acted in his or her official capacity, of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004). Section 3 \u2014 103(2), meanwhile, allows the late naming of \u201can employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, who acted in an official capacity.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004). Although the hmiting language used in the two sections is similar, one critical difference undeniably remains.\nIn section 3 \u2014 107(a), the legislature chose to use the words \u201chis or her\u201d to describe the type of \u201cemployee, agent or member\u201d at issue; i.e., \u201can employee, agent, or member, who acted in his or her official capacity,\u201d thus limiting its application to individuals. (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004). To its credit, the majority recognizes the import of this language. 226 Ill. 2d at 185 (recognizing that the term \u201chis or her\u201d limited the application of section 3 \u2014 107(a) to individuals). Its analysis falters, however, when it carries that same restriction over to the type of \u201cemployee, agent, or member\u201d addressed in section 3 \u2014 103(2). 226 Ill. 2d at 185-86.\nA comparison of the plain language reveals the legislature\u2019s intent to identify different groups in these two sections. Unlike section 3 \u2014 107(a), section 3 \u2014 103(2) does not use the descriptive words \u201chis or her\u201d in its restrictive language. Instead, the scope of the exception in section 3 \u2014 103(2) is limited to an \u201cemployee, agent, or member *** who acted in an official capacity.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004). Thus, the legislature\u2019s decision to use different words to describe the relevant limitations requires this court to interpret those sections differently. While the \u201chis or her\u201d used in section 3 \u2014 107(a) is properly construed to limit the covered group to individual persons, the broader, impersonal \u201can\u201d of section 3 \u2014 103(2) suggests no such restriction.\nIf the legislature intended the two sections to address the same group, it would have used identical descriptive language to signal that intent. Indeed, the legislature chose to use virtually identical language in the remaining portions of the two provisions. Compare 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004) (addressing \u201can employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity *** if the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity is a party to the administrative review action\u201d) with 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004) (addressing \u201can employee, agent, or member, *** of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, where the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, has been named as a defendant\u201d). The legislature\u2019s decision to use different descriptions to identify the \u201cemployee[s], agent[s], or member[s]\u201d at issue in sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a) signals its intent to create distinct qualifications for each group.\nAs repeatedly noted by the majority (226 Ill. 2d at 181, 184, 185, 190), the plain meaning of the language adopted by the legislature is the best indicator of its intentions. Town & Country Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Pol lution Control Board, 225 Ill. 2d 103, 117 (2007). Despite this overt acknowledgment, however, the majority strays from this principle by overlooking the obvious linguistic differences in the language used to describe the groups covered by the two sections, thereby concluding that the legislature intended that both sections be applied only to individuals. 226 Ill. 2d at 185-86.\nWhile the majority\u2019s interpretation unduly limits the broad reach of section 3 \u2014 103(2) by ignoring the legislature\u2019s language choices, the proper statutory analysis reads section 3 \u2014 103(2) and section 3 \u2014 107(a) in harmony, without rendering any portion of the statutes inoperative. See Flynn v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 211 Ill. 2d 546, 555 (2004). Properly construed, the two sections address different types of situations that may arise on administrative review.\nAfter mandating the naming of the administrative agency issuing the final administrative decision, section 3 \u2014 107(a) precludes the dismissal of any administrative review action for want of jurisdiction because an individual \u201cemployee, agent, or member, who acted in his or her official capacity\u201d was not named, as long as the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity has already been named. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004). On the other hand, section 3 \u2014 103(2) extends a deadline for administrative review complainants, allowing them to amend their complaints belatedly to name any type of \u201cemployee, agent, or member *** who acted in an official capacity\u201d relevant to an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity that is already a party to the action. 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 103(2) (West 2004). Nothing in the sections states, or even implies, that the exception in section 3 \u2014 103(2) cannot be used to cure the defect addressed in section 3 \u2014 107(a), namely, the failure to name all appropriate parties.\nThe majority claims that this interpretation \u201coverlooks\u201d the second sentence of section 3 \u2014 103(2). That sentence allows the addition of \u201cthe administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity\u201d when \u201cthe director or agency head, in his or her official capacity, is a party to the administrative review.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004); 226 Ill. 2d at 187. The majority concludes that the sentence \u201cplainly describes the only circumstance whereby a plaintiff may amend\u201d an administrative review complaint to add a board. (Emphasis added.) 226 Ill. 2d at 187. That conclusion is flawed because it does not comport with the plain wording of the second sentence. That sentence simply provides one path for adding a board, i.e., when its head has already been named. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004). Nothing in the sentence declares, or even suggests, that this is the sole statutory means of adding a board. The first sentence in section 3 \u2014 103(2) presents additional ways the legislature has seen fit for a plaintiff to add a board, or any other entity, falling within the strictures in that sentence.\nHere, Ultsch does not seek to invoke the second sentence of section 3 \u2014 103(2). In fact, that sentence is inapplicable here because Ultsch did not make the head of the Board a party. Even though it is not implicated here, however, that sentence continues to govern cases where a complaint timely names a director or agency head in his or her official capacity but fails to name the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity. The rationale in this dissent does not render that sentence superfluous. There is no conflict between this rationale and the continued application of the second sentence of section 3 \u2014 103(2) in appropriate cases.\nYet another flaw exists in the majority\u2019s interpretation of the second sentence of section 3 \u2014 103(2). The majority\u2019s conclusion that the second sentence of section 3 \u2014 103(2) provides the only way for a plaintiff to add a board suffers from a fatal error already refuted in this dissent. The majority\u2019s interpretation erroneously presumes that a board cannot fulfill multiple roles within the statutory scheme. See Cuny, 411 Ill. at 616-17 (noting that a Board of Review may be both an administrative agency and \u201ca division or arm\u201d of another governmental department). Interestingly, the majority accepts this very proposition, recognizing that here \u201cthe Board of Trustees may be an arm of IMRF\u201d as well as an administrative agency. 226 Ill. 2d at 189. In this case, the Board of Trustees also serves as \u201can employee, agent, or member\u201d of IMRF, a government entity, a proposition that remains uncontradicted by the majority. It is the Board\u2019s role as an agent of IMRF that brings it within the control of the first sentence of section 3 \u2014 107(3) and permits Ultsch to amend her complaint to name the Board as a necessary party.\nThe majority argues that this interpretation of section 3 \u2014 103(2) makes section 3 \u2014 107(a) \u201cmeaningless\u201d because it would preclude the dismissal for want of jurisdiction of any case where a board could be later added as a defendant. 226 Ill. 2d at 187. This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, the sole purpose of the relevant portion of section 3 \u2014 103(2), as shown by its plain language, is to allow plaintiffs to overcome their prior omissions by belatedly adding \u201can employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity\u201d if they can fulfill all the statutory requirements. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004). It is not the role of this court to contravene the clear legislative purpose as expressed by the plain language of the statute because it believes another result would be preferable. See 226 Ill. 2d at 184 (\u201cThere is no rule of statutory construction that authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute says\u201d), citing Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 320-21 (2003). See also People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 100 (2002) (noting that if the legislature\u2019s intent may be determined from the plain language of the statute, this court cannot read into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions in conflict with that intent).\nMoreover, the majority\u2019s view of the first sentence of section 3 \u2014 107(a) infers that it is intended to provide defendants with a means of dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 complaints for want of jurisdiction. 226 Ill. 2d at 187 (\u201cBecause the plaintiff failed to name the Board of Trustees as a defendant, her action clearly was subject to dismissal pursuant to section 3 \u2014 107(a)\u201d). The actual purpose of that portion of section 3 \u2014 107(a) is simply to specify the parties that must be named as defendants. 226 Ill. 2d at 187 (quoting the first sentence of section 3 \u2014 107(a)). The first sentence merely requires the plaintiff to name as defendants \u201call persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency,\u201d as well as the agency. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004). Nothing in the section states or implies that the legislature intended to make it impossible for plaintiffs to overcome their initial failures to name mandatory parties.\nIndeed, the remainder of section 3 \u2014 107(a) provides plaintiffs with a variety of ways to avoid dismissal. The plain language of the statute does not convey the same fatalistic approach taken by the majority, making dismissals for want of jurisdiction the favored dispositions when administrative plaintiffs\u2019 original complaints mistakenly fail to include all necessary parties. Rather, the legislature\u2019s approach, as expressed in the plain words of section 3 \u2014 107(a), is to present the rule specifying the necessary parties and then to provide multiple methods for plaintiffs not initially meeting that hurdle to overcome it.\nThe same may be said for the savings provisions in section 3 \u2014 103(2), at issue in this case. Simply permitting plaintiffs to use the additional methods enacted by the legislature in section 3 \u2014 103(2) to add previously unnamed parties does not mean that those savings provisions, read in full accord with their plain, uncontradicted meaning, render section 3 \u2014 107(a) superfluous. On the contrary, this interpretation upholds the clear intent of the legislature, namely, to provide plaintiffs with the means to name additional parties, and thus avoid dismissal, despite their initial failures to name all necessary defendants.\nIn addition, the majority\u2019s claim that the interpretation of sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a) presented in this dissent will inevitably render section 3 \u2014 107(a) superfluous erroneously presupposes that every plaintiff can satisfy the requirements of section 3 \u2014 103(2). See 226 Ill. 2d at 187 (\u201cYet, under the dissent\u2019s interpretation of section 3 \u2014 103(2), a complaint that improperly fails to name the Board of Trustees as a defendant could never be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because the plaintiff could amend the complaint to include the Board of Trustees as a defendant whenever it saw fit\u201d (emphasis added)). There is no guarantee, however, that a given plaintiff will successfully exercise the savings provision of section 3 \u2014 103(2). To be successful, a plaintiff must satisfy the statutory requirements that the additional defendant be \u201can employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, who acted in an official capacity as a party of record to the administrative proceeding, if the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity is a party to the administrative review action\u201d (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2004)). The uncertainty of successfully making this showing demonstrates the patent error of the absolutist approach taken by the majority. The complaint of any plaintiff who could not make the showing required in section 3 \u2014 103(2) would still be subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction under section 3 \u2014 107(a).\nFinally, although the majority emphasizes that the statute is unambiguous, thus requiring us to apply its plain words \u201cwithout resorting to other aids for construction\u201d (226 Ill. 2d at 184, 190) and without making any \u201cmodification\u201d of the \u201cmandatory and specific\u201d statutory language (226 Ill. 2d at 179, 190), it ignores these principles not only by reading the controlling portions of section 3 \u2014 103(2) out of the statute but also by relying on an outside construction aid itself. The majority cites legislative history in an attempt to bolster its flawed construction of the plain statutory language by quoting from Senator Hawkinson\u2019s brief summary introduction of the amendments. 226 Ill. 2d at 188. Not only is this reliance sorely misplaced for the exact reasons cited by the majority (226 Ill. 2d at 179, 184, 190), but the cited quotation does not even purport to outline the amendments in their entirety.\nIn relevant part, the cited statements specifically acknowledge only two aspects of the amendments, one allowing an agency to be served if its head has already been served and one allowing an agency employee acting in \u201chis\u201d official capacity to be added if the agency has already been served. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 8, 1996, at 12-13 (statements of Senator Hawkinson). The brief summary comments do not address any of the other conditions specifically set forth in the sections.\nThe best indicator of the true intent of the amendments is derived from the actual language enacted by the legislature. Unlike the intentionally limited scope of Senator Hawkinson\u2019s summary comments, the plain language of sections 3 \u2014 103(2) and 3 \u2014 107(a) expressly governs a far broader set of circumstances. It permits the addition of any employee, agent or member, who acted in the specified capacity, of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity that was already a defendant or a party to the administrative review action. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2), 3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004). This language refutes the majority\u2019s conclusion that the amendments were only \u201cintended to allow a plaintiff to amend *** by adding an individual if the individual was an employee of a properly named agency.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 226 Ill. 2d at 188. This conclusion selectively acknowledges only one small portion of the legislation and fails to implement the statutory language in its entirety, improperly rendering the remainder mere surplusage. See Fisher v. Waldrop, 221 Ill. 2d 102, 115 (2006). Surely unambiguous statutory language cannot be ignored merely because a brief oral introduction on the Senate floor failed to incorporate a detailed description of all aspects of the legislation. See 226 Ill. 2d at 184, 190 (rejecting the use of outside aids to interpret an unambiguous statute and advocating the use of only the plain statutory language).\nAccordingly, I would hold that section 3 \u2014 103(2) applies in this case. Ultsch had a statutory right to amend her administrative review complaint to name the Board as an agent of IMRF. This court should address the constitutionality of section 3 \u2014 103(2) as originally raised by the parties to this appeal because Ultsch properly seeks relief under the challenged statute. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.\nJUSTICE KARMEIER joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph Moscov, of Waukegan, for appellant.", "Michael B. Weinstein, of Oak Brook, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 102232.\nSHAREE ULTSCH, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND, Appellee.\nOpinion filed August 2, 2007.\nJoseph Moscov, of Waukegan, for appellant.\nMichael B. Weinstein, of Oak Brook, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0169-01", "first_page_order": 181, "last_page_order": 219 }