{ "id": 3610710, "name": "JAMES GALLAGHER et al., Appellants, v. JAROSLAW ROBERT LENART et al. (Rail Terminal Services, LLC, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Gallagher v. Lenart", "decision_date": "2007-08-09", "docket_number": "No. 103522", "first_page": "208", "last_page": "245", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 208" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060088 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265962 ], "weight": 36, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298-99" }, { "page": "299-301" }, { "page": "301-02" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298-302" }, { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298" }, { "page": "299" }, { "page": "299-300" }, { "page": "300" }, { "page": "301" }, { "page": "301" }, { "page": "301" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302-03" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "298" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "302-03", "parenthetical": "concluding \"waiver of a workers' compensation lien must be more explicitly and affirmatively stated in a settlement agreement and cannot simply be implied by a lack of any reference to that lien\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3748767 ], "weight": 24, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "547-48" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" }, { "page": "551" }, { "page": "551" }, { "page": "551" }, { "page": "551" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "551" }, { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735798 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828029 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5263188 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35383 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 937", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267469 ], "weight": 14, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "939" }, { "page": "939" }, { "page": "939" }, { "page": "939" }, { "page": "939" }, { "page": "939" }, { "page": "939" }, { "page": "939" }, { "page": "939" }, { "page": "939" }, { "page": "943" }, { "page": "940-43" }, { "page": "943" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0937-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448779 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 U.S. 725", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6237509 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733" }, { "page": "519" }, { "page": "1777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/507/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926963 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216-17", "parenthetical": "even where employer forfeits lien by failing to obtain lien in third-party proceeding, employer or its insurer may still make claim for credits under section 5(b) following conclusion of third-party proceeding, as lien is merely means of enforcing statutory right" }, { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121957 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" }, { "page": "399" }, { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780269 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602359 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607023 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2848905 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592225 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "\"A release is a contract, and therefore is governed by contract law\"" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "release is contract and therefore governed by contract law, and intention of parties to contract must be determined from instrument itself" }, { "page": "444-45" }, { "page": "445" }, { "page": "445" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "\"where both parties were aware of an additional claim at the time of signing the release, courts have given effect to the general release language of the agreement to release that claim as well\"" }, { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121996 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122156 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2766109 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" }, { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/15/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238241 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 Ill. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2463501 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/397/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596964 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill. 2d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5364598 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1593027 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/111/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ill. App. 2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5131936, 5131794 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/4/0380-01", "/ill-app-2d/4/0380-02" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146414 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323-24", "parenthetical": "where release was \"comprehensive, precise and unambiguous\" and defendant knew at time he executed release that he might have basis for contribution claim, contribution claim fell within scope of release" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229713 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331-32" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "333" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130936 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591191 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 U.S. 70", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11076333 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80-81", "parenthetical": "union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination must be \"clear and unmistakable\"" }, { "page": "371", "parenthetical": "union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination must be \"clear and unmistakable\"" }, { "page": "397", "parenthetical": "union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination must be \"clear and unmistakable\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 F.3d 530", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9232884 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533, 536-37", "parenthetical": "applying \"clear and unmistakable\" waiver rule set forth in Wright" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/373/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266760 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "948 F.2d 49", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1859495 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55", "parenthetical": "recognizing that, under Maine law, employer cannot waive statutory right to immunity from suits arising out of employees' injuries \"unless the employer explicitly makes such a waiver\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/948/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ohio St. 3d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1820639 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st-3d/20/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1047", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1051" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "422 Pa. Super. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 923488 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187", "parenthetical": "holding that indemnification clause in contract between employer and equipment lessor did not meet statutory requirement that employer \"expressly provide! ] for\" indemnification to effectuate waiver of immunity from suits by third parties" }, { "page": "308", "parenthetical": "holding that indemnification clause in contract between employer and equipment lessor did not meet statutory requirement that employer \"expressly provide! ] for\" indemnification to effectuate waiver of immunity from suits by third parties" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/422/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5430186 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3748767 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596964 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0534-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1641, "char_count": 66889, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0763312634682218e-06, "percentile": 0.9849340637234063 }, "sha256": "aefad02c962cd1a7788608e36771bf4dc5bf2e4a33d27e0b30fa31c3652dd61d", "simhash": "1:b8b855f86248569d", "word_count": 10540 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:47:26.463284+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JAMES GALLAGHER et al., Appellants, v. JAROSLAW ROBERT LENART et al. (Rail Terminal Services, LLC, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas specially concurred, with opinion.\nJustice Burke took no part in the decision.\nOPINION\nPlaintiffs, James Gallagher and his wife, filed suit against defendants Jaroslaw Robert Lenart and Pacella Trucking Express, Inc., based on injuries Gallagher sustained when the truck he was operating for his employer, Rail Terminal Services, LLC, collided with the truck Lenart was operating for Pacella. After plaintiffs settled their lawsuit against defendants, Rail Terminal sought to enforce its workers\u2019 compensation lien against the settlement proceeds allocated to Gallagher (820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 2004)). The circuit court of Cook County found that Rail Terminal had waived its lien when it settled Gallagher\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim. Accordingly, the court granted defendants\u2019 motion to adjudicate third-party claims and issue settlement drafts. Rail Terminal appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that Rail Terminal had not waived its workers\u2019 compensation lien, and that the circuit court erred in granting defendants\u2019 motion. 367 Ill. App. 3d 293. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nBACKGROUND\nOn April 10, 2001, James Gallagher was operating a truck for his employer, Rail Terminal Services, LLC, when his truck collided with another truck driven by Jaroslaw Robert Lenart, an employee of Pacella Trucking Express, Inc. Gallagher injured his spine as a result of the accident and was required to undergo surgery and take pain medication.\nAfter the accident, Gallagher filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim against Rail Terminal. Initially, Rail Terminal paid him $24,903.51 in temporary total disability benefits and $53,392.21 in medical expenses. Then, on July 28, 2003, the parties settled Gallagher\u2019s claim for an additional lump-sum payment of $150,000.\nThe parties executed two documents as part of the settlement. The first was entitled \u201cIllinois Industrial Commission Settlement Contract Lump Sum Petition and Order.\u201d The settlement contract provided, in relevant part:\n\u201cRespondent [Rail Terminal] to pay the petitioner [Gallagher] $150,000.00 in full and final settlement of all claims under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act for injuries allegedly incurred on or about April 10, 2001 and any and all results, developments or sequale [szc], past, present or future resulting from this accident. Respondent denies these injuries are compensable and this settlement is made to settle those issues as a purchase of the peace against any and all claims of temporary total compensation, permanent partial disability and medical, surgical [or] hospital expenses, past, present or future. Review under Sections 19(h) and 8(a) are waived by the petitioner. The settlement is made in lieu of any additional compensation beyond the date of approval of this contract and includes only payment of temporary total compensation in the amount of $58,049.70, unpaid medical bills in the amount of $388.02, and the aforementioned purchase of the peace. Respondent is not responsible for any outstanding medical bills not submitted for payment prior to approval of this settlement contract.\u201d\nThe second document the parties executed was entitled \u201cResignation Agreement.\u201d It was contingent upon the workers\u2019 compensation arbitrator\u2019s approval of the settlement contract described above. In its recitals, the resignation agreement acknowledged that Gallagher had a pending workers\u2019 compensation claim against Rail Terminal, and that the claim was being settled. It further acknowledged that, as part of the settlement, Gallagher would voluntarily resign from his position with Rail Terminal and waive all claims arising from his employment. The agreement explained that the basis for the settlement was that Rail Terminal had \u201cno position available within [Gallagher\u2019s] permanent restrictions.\u201d Thus, \u201cin consideration of [Rail Terminal\u2019s] agreement to pay [Gallagher] the sum of $1.00 *** in a lump sum after an Order issued approving the settlement of [Gallagher\u2019s] workers\u2019 compensation claim,\u201d Gallagher agreed to be bound by a series of specific provisions.\nFirst, Gallagher agreed to the sufficiency of the stated consideration. Second, Gallagher agreed that, by signing the resignation agreement, he was \u201cvoluntarily resigning his employment with [Rail Terminal].\u201d Third, Gallagher agreed to \u201crefrain from suing [Rail Terminal], or authorizing any complaint or suit against [Rail Terminal], on his behalf for any action of any kind or character, in law or equity, suspected or unsuspected, arising out of or related to his employment with [Rail Terminal].\u201d Fourth, Gallagher agreed not to \u201cseek reinstatement, future employment or return to active employment status with [Rail Terminal].\u201d Fifth, Gallagher agreed to \u201crelease[ ] and forever discharge[ ]\u201d Rail Terminal from any and all claims arising out of his employment with Rail Terminal, including claims based on a variety of statutes and legal theories specifically enumerated in the resignation agreement. The latter provision concluded by stating that it did \u201cnot apply to claims, if any, for which releases are prohibited by applicable law or which arise after the date that [Gallagher] executes his agreement.\u201d\nThe resignation agreement also contained the following clause:\n\u201cThis Agreement does not constitute an admission by Employer of any liabihty or wrongdoing but it is intended to resolve in good faith any existing or potential disputes or claims arising out of Employee\u2019s relationship and separation with Employer.\u201d\nWhile Gallagher\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim was still pending, he filed a personal injury action against defendants Lenart and Pacella in the Cook County circuit court. Gallagher sought damages for the injuries he suffered as a result of the accident. In addition, in an amended complaint, his wife raised a loss of consortium claim.\nOn November 20, 2003, defendants filed a third-party action against Rail Terminal seeking contribution pursuant to the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/1 et seq. (West 2002)). Defendants alleged that Rail Terminal failed to properly train and supervise Gallagher. Rail Terminal filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it did not fail to train or supervise Gallagher, and that no additional training or supervision would have prevented the accident. The circuit court granted Rail Terminal\u2019s motion.\nSubsequently, on September 16, 2005, defendants reached a settlement -with plaintiffs. They agreed to pay Gallagher $125,000 for his personal injury claim and pay his wife $225,000 for her loss-of-consortium claim.\nShortly thereafter, Rail Terminal filed a motion to intervene in the personal injury action. It also filed a motion to set aside the allocation of the settlement proceeds and reallocate them. Rail Terminal\u2019s purpose for intervening was to assert its workers\u2019 compensation lien under section 5(b) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 2004)). Section 5(b) provides, in relevant part:\n\u201cWhere the injury or death for which compensation is payable under this Act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability for damages on the part of some person other than his employer to pay damages, then legal proceedings may be taken against such other person to recover damages notwithstanding such employer\u2019s payment of or liability to pay compensation under this Act. In such case, however, if the action against such other person is brought by the injured employee *** and judgment is obtained and paid, or settlement is made with such other person, *** then from the amount received by such employee *** there shall be paid to the employer the amount of compensation paid or to be paid by him to such employee ***. ***\n*** [T]he employer may have or claim a hen upon any award, judgment or fund out of which such employee might be compensated from such third party.\n*** The employer may[ ] at any time [after the filing of a third-party action] join in the action upon his motion so that all orders of court after hearing and judgment shall be made for his protection.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 2004).\nRail Terminal claimed its lien amounted to $228,295.72 based on the $24,903.51 it paid in temporary total disability benefits, the $53,392.21 it paid in medical expenses, and the $150,000 lump sum it paid pursuant to the settlement contract. In both of its motions, Rail Terminal stated that it did not participate in or approve of the settlement between defendants and plaintiffs. Furthermore, it claimed that plaintiffs had structured the settlement to circumvent its workers\u2019 compensation lien by allocating 64.3% of the settlement proceeds to Gallagher\u2019s wife.\nOn October 7, 2005, in response to Rail Terminal\u2019s motions, defendants filed a motion to adjudicate third-party claims and issue settlement drafts. They argued that language in the settlement contract between Rail Terminal and Gallagher constituted a waiver of Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien. In support of this contention, defendants relied on Borrowman v. Prastein, 356 Ill. App. 3d 546 (2005), where the Fourth District of the appellate court concluded that an employer that entered into a settlement contract similar to the one between Rail Terminal and Gallagher had given up its right to assert its workers\u2019 compensation hen.\nPlaintiffs joined defendants\u2019 motion and filed responses of their own to Rail Terminal\u2019s motion to intervene and its motion to reallocate the settlement proceeds. In their response to Rail Terminal\u2019s motion to intervene, plaintiffs, like defendants, relied on Borrow-man and argued that Rail Terminal had waived its workers\u2019 compensation lien. In addition, they pointed out that Rail Terminal received Gallagher\u2019s resignation as part of the settlement, suggesting that Rail Terminal had knowingly contracted away the lien in exchange for this concession. The response included an affidavit from plaintiffs\u2019 counsel, Jonathan Kurasch. He averred that Rail Terminal was aware of plaintiffs\u2019 personal injury action at the time it settled Gallagher\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim, and that, in negotiating the settlement, \u201cno claim was ever made or reserved for continuation of [Rail Terminal\u2019s] rights\u201d under section 5 of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nIn plaintiffs\u2019 response to Rail Terminal\u2019s motion to reallocate the settlement proceeds, they argued that their settlement with defendants was fairly achieved, because all interested parties had the opportunity to appear and protect their interests. They also argued that Rail Terminal\u2019s claim that the settlement funds were inappropriately allocated was speculative.\nRail Terminal, for its part, filed both a reply to plaintiffs\u2019 responses and a response to defendants\u2019 motion to adjudicate third-party claims and issue settlement drafts. Rail Terminal argued that the settlement contract contained no specific waiver of its section 5(b) workers\u2019 compensation lien. It also argued that the Fourth District\u2019s decision in Borrowman was distinguishable from the instant case. In addition, Rail Terminal contended that the resignation agreement did not contain a waiver of its workers\u2019 compensation lien and denied that such a waiver provided the consideration for Gallagher\u2019s resignation. With respect to the allocation of the settlement, Rail Terminal criticized plaintiffs for failing to produce any evidence in support of allocating the majority of the proceeds to Gallagher\u2019s wife.\nRail Terminal bolstered its reply and its response with affidavits from William Ryan, its counsel; Patrick Holden, a claims adjuster for Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation insurer; and Michael McCabe, an employee of the third-party administrator that handled Gallagher\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim for Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation insurer. Ryan\u2019s affidavit contained a description of the events leading up to the September 16, 2005, settlement conference between plaintiffs and defendants. Ryan averred that at the previous settlement conference on August 19, 2005, he informed the court, plaintiffs\u2019 counsel, and defendants\u2019 counsel that Rail Terminal was not prepared to waive a portion of its workers\u2019 compensation hen to facilitate a settlement between plaintiffs and defendants. Ryan further averred that at no time prior to or during the August 19, 2005, settlement conference did plaintiffs\u2019 counsel or defendants\u2019 counsel ever take the position that Rail Terminal had waived its workers\u2019 compensation lien as part of its workers\u2019 compensation settlement with Gallagher. According to Ryan, the first time that position was taken was when defendants filed their motion to adjudicate third-party claims and issue settlement drafts.\nHolden\u2019s affidavit described his involvement with the settlement of Gallagher\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim. He averred that, prior to the settlement of that claim, he told plaintiffs\u2019 counsel that Rail Terminal would not waive its workers\u2019 compensation lien as part of the settlement. He also averred that both during the settlement negotiations and after the settlement was reached, plaintiffs\u2019 counsel acknowledged the existence of Rail Terminal\u2019s lien and indicated that Rail Terminal would recover any amounts paid in settlement of Gallagher\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim from subsequent civil recovery by Gallagher.\nMcCabe\u2019s affidavit, like Holden\u2019s, described his involvement with the settlement of Gallagher\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim. McCabe averred that it was not customary for Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation insurer to waive an employer\u2019s right to recover its workers\u2019 compensation lien as part of negotiations for the settlement of a workers\u2019 compensation claim without the receipt of additional consideration. McCabe further stated that if such a waiver was contemplated, a provision expressly memorializing it would have been included in the settlement contract. In addition, McCabe stated that Holden had communicated with plaintiffs\u2019 counsel and indicated that Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation insurer did not intend to waive Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien as part of the settlement with Gallagher.\nOn December 13, 2005, the circuit court held a hearing on Rail Terminal\u2019s motion to intervene, Rail Terminal\u2019s motion to reallocate the settlement proceeds, and defendants\u2019 motion to adjudicate third-party claims and issue settlement drafts. At the hearing, the parties reiterated the positions set forth in their respective pleadings. After considering the parties\u2019 arguments, the circuit court granted Rail Terminal\u2019s motion to intervene. It also granted defendants\u2019 motion to adjudicate third-party claims and issue settlement drafts, finding that Rail Terminal had no workers\u2019 compensation lien under Borrowman. The court noted that, in deciding to grant defendants\u2019 motion, it was not relying on the resignation agreement. Finally, the court denied Rail Terminal\u2019s motion to reallocate the settlement. The court reasoned that it did not need to reach the allocation issue in light of its determination that Rail Terminal had no lien.\nRail Terminal appealed, and the First District of the appellate court found in its favor, rejecting the Fourth District\u2019s analysis in Borrowman. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 298. The court reasoned that Borrowman is unsupported by case law (367 Ill. App. 3d at 298-99), contrary to several principles underlying the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (367 Ill. App. 3d at 299-301), and at odds with general principles of contract law (367 Ill. App. 3d at 301-02). It concluded that, in this case, Rail Terminal had a valid workers\u2019 compensation lien. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 303. Accordingly, it reversed the circuit court\u2019s decision to grant defendants\u2019 motion to adjudicate third-party claims and issue settlement drafts. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 303. With respect to Rail Terminal\u2019s motion to reallocate settlement proceeds, the appellate court declined to address the merits of the motion for the first time on appeal and remanded the cause to the circuit court for consideration of the allocation issue. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 303.\nPlaintiffs filed a petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315), which we allowed to address the conflict between Borrowman and the appellate court\u2019s decision in the instant case.\nANALYSIS\nI\nThis case requires us to consider the meaning of contract language that has received conflicting constructions from different districts of our appellate court. The construction of a contract presents a question of law. People ex rel. Department of Public Health v. Wiley, 218 Ill. 2d 207, 223 (2006). Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 129 (2005).\nII\nAs mentioned, the Fourth District addressed contract language similar to the language of the settlement contract at issue here in Borrowman v. Prastein, 356 Ill. App. 3d 546 (2005). In Borrowman, the plaintiff fractured his heel when the safety rigging he was using to paint the inside of a water tower collapsed. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 547. After an orthopedic surgeon performed surgery on the fracture, the plaintiff developed an infection in his bone, which the surgeon subsequently treated with antibiotics. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 547. Although the infection cleared, the plaintiff suffered a variety of negative side effects from the antibiotics. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 547.\nThe plaintiff filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim against his employer. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 547. He also filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the surgeon and a nursing association. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 547. The plaintiff settled the workers\u2019 compensation claim for $230,000 and subsequently settled the medical malpractice lawsuit for $750,000. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 547. Shortly after settling the medical malpractice lawsuit, the plaintiff moved to adjudicate the employer\u2019s claim that it was entitled to a workers\u2019 compensation lien against the plaintiff\u2019s recovery in the malpractice case. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 547. The circuit court determined that the employer was entitled to a lien of $175,973.71. Borrow-man, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 547-48.\nBoth the plaintiff and the employer appealed. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 548. The plaintiff argued that the employer was not entitled to a lien at all or, alternatively, that the employer was entitled to less than the amount awarded. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 548. The employer argued that the circuit court miscalculated the lien and that it was entitled to more than the amount awarded, relying on Robinson v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 222 Ill. App. 3d 443 (1991), and Kozak v. Moiduddin, 294 Ill. App. 3d 365 (1997). Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 548.\nThe appellate court defined the issue in the case as \u201cwhether [the employer] is entitled to a lien pursuant to section 5(b) of the [Workers\u2019 Compensation] Act [citation] when it agreed to settle its claims with [the plaintiff] knowing a medical malpractice case was pending.\u201d Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 548. After discussing Robinson and Kozak, the court distinguished those cases on the grounds that, in Robinson, the plaintiffs workers\u2019 compensation claim was not settled, and in Kozak, the employer settled the plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim before it knew of the plaintiffs medical malpractice lawsuit. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 550.\nThe court next quoted language from the settlement contract the plaintiff and the employer entered into while the plaintiffs medical malpractice lawsuit was pending:\n\u201c \u2018The above constitutes a full, final[,] and complete settlement of any and all claims for temporary total disability, permanent partial and/or permanent total disability incurred or to be incurred by said [pletitioner by reason of an industrial injury occurring on or about April 7, 1995, or by reasons of any claim or cause of action by [pletitioner against [respondent of any nature whatsoever. Rights under [s]ections 8(a) and 19(h) of the *** Act are hereby waived by both parties.\u2019 \u201d Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 550.\nThe court observed that the settlement contract did not contain any reservation of rights or waiver of rights with regard to the plaintiffs pending medical malpractice lawsuit. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 550. The court then concluded that because the employer was aware of the medical malpractice lawsuit and made no reference to it in its \u201cfull, final[,] and complete settlement\u201d with the plaintiff, the employer forfeited its workers\u2019 compensation lien rights. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 551. In addition, the court surmised that because the employer did not mention its claim of a potential lien in the settlement contract, the lien was not an issue in the negotiations that led to the settlement. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 551. Accordingly, the court reasoned that to hold that the employer was entitled to a lien would \u201ccompletely nullify both parties\u2019 good-faith dealings.\u201d Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 551. In light of these considerations, the appellate court held that the employer \u201cshould be bound by the terms of its agreement and is not entitled to a section 5(b) lien on the malpractice case.\u201d Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 551. Thus, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court. Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 552.\nSince Borrowman was decided, both the First District and the Second District of the appellate court have declined to follow it. The First District rejected Borrow-man in the instant case. The court characterized Borrowman as holding that \u201can employer forfeits or waives its workers\u2019 compensation lien by not specifically reserving it in a settlement of the employee\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim when the employer knew of the employee\u2019s pending claim against a third-party tortfeasor.\u201d 367 Ill. App. 3d at 298. It then offered three criticisms of this holding. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 298-302.\nFirst, the court concluded that Borrowman is unsupported by case law. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 298. The court pointed out that Borrowman did not rely on the Robinson and Kozak cases in support of its holding, but rather distinguished those cases after the intervenor-employer cited them in support of its argument for a greater lien award. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 298. According to the court, the plaintiffs in Robinson and Kozak did not argue that the employers were not entitled to workers\u2019 compensation liens at all. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 298. Rather, in Ro bin-son, the plaintiff merely disputed the amount of the lien the employer would receive, and in Kozak, the plaintiffs argued that the employer was judicially estopped from asserting its otherwise valid lien because it took an inconsistent position in a third-party lawsuit. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 298 (citing Robinson, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 446, and Kozak, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 367). Moreover, neither of those cases discussed a workers\u2019 compensation settlement agreement. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 298.\nSecond, the appellate court determined that Borrow-man is contrary to several principles underlying the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 299. The court emphasized that section 5(b) of the Act is designed to allow employers and employees to reach the true tortfeasor responsible for an employee\u2019s injuries while preventing employees from obtaining a double recovery. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 299-300. The court also noted that, under section 5(b), courts have a duty to protect an employer\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 300. The court concluded that Borrowman\u2019s holding, which acknowledges the waiver or forfeiture of an employer\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien, conflicts with this scheme. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 301.\nFinally, the court concluded that Borrowman contradicts general principles of contract law. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 301. The court noted that the agreement at issue in Borrowman was a settlement contract between an employer and employee that settled the employee\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 301. The court further observed that the settlement contract did not contain any reference to the employer\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien and, specifically, did not include a waiver of that lien. 367 Ill.App. 3d at 302. According to the court, it was consistent with general contract principles to presume that if the employer meant to waive its statutorily created lien as part of the settlement of the employee\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim, it would have specifically included such a waiver in the settlement contract. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 302. Borrowman\u2019s holding, concluded the court, rewrote the settlement contract by adding a provision the parties did not include. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 302. The court reasoned that the plain language of the settlement contract in Borrowman indicated that the parties did not intend to resolve the issue of the employer\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien within that settlement. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 302. Accordingly, the court criticized the Borrowman court for assuming, without any basis, that the contract\u2019s silence on the issue of the workers\u2019 compensation lien meant that the employer chose to waive that lien. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 302. The court added that waiver involves the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, and the absence of any reference to an employer\u2019s lien in a settlement contract, without more, cannot constitute a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of that right. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 302.\nThe court went on to acknowledge that employers can, and sometimes do, choose to waive their workers\u2019 compensation liens. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 302. It concluded, however, that \u201cbased upon the protections of the Act and general contract principles, such a waiver of a workers\u2019 compensation lien must be more explicitly and affirmatively stated in a settlement agreement and cannot simply be implied by a lack of any reference to that lien.\u201d 367 Ill. App. 3d at 302-03.\nBased on this analysis, the court declined to follow Borrowman. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 303. The court noted that, in the instant case, \u201cRail Terminal\u2019s settlement of [Gallagher\u2019s] workers\u2019 compensation claim did not include any mention or waiver of Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien.\u201d 367 Ill. App. 3d at 303. Thus, the court held that \u201cRail Terminal had a valid workers\u2019 compensation lien and *** did not waive or forfeit this lien by failing to specifically reserve it in its settlement.\u201d 367 Ill. App. 3d at 303. Accordingly, the court reversed the circuit court\u2019s decision to grant defendants\u2019 motion to adjudicate third-party claims and issue settlement drafts. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 303.\nAfter this court granted leave to appeal in the instant case, the Second District handed down its decision in Harder v. Kelly, 369 Ill. App. 3d 937 (2007), which followed the approach taken by the First District in the instant case. In Harder, the plaintiff alleged that he was injured when his vehicle was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by an employee of the Canadian National Railroad Company (CNRC). Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 939. The plaintiff filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim against his employer and filed a personal injury action against CNRC and its employee. Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 939. Subsequently, he settled the workers\u2019 compensation claim. Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 939. The settlement contract provided, in pertinent part:\n\u201c[Employer] agrees to pay and [plaintiff] agrees to accept $16,634.25 in a lump sum in full and final settlement of all claims for compensation, medical, hospital and other expenses, past, present or future, arising out of the accident described and under the terms of the [Act]. *** Review under section 19(h) and all rights under Sections 4, 8, 16, and 19 of the Act are expressly waived by the parties hereto. It is the responsibility of [plaintiff] to satisfy the outstanding medical charges out of the proceeds of this settlement. It is not the responsibility of [employer] to satisfy any outstanding medical charges, known or unknown.\u201d Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 939.\nThe plaintiff also settled his personal injury action. Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 939.\nIn the wake of the plaintiffs personal injury settlement, his employer\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation insurer moved to intervene as the employer\u2019s subrogee to enforce the employer\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien. Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 939. The circuit court granted the insurer\u2019s motion to intervene. Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 939. However, the court ruled that, pursuant to Borrowman, the employer had forfeited its workers\u2019 compensation lien. Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 939. Although the circuit court expressed serious doubts about Borrowman\u2019s reasoning, it concluded that, in the absence of contrary authority, it was bound by Borrowman. Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 939. Therefore, the court entered an order denying the insurer\u2019s claim of a lien under section 5(b). Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 939.\nThe insurer appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded. Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 943. After discussing both Borrowman and the instant case in detail (Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 940-43), the appellate court stated:\n\u201cWe find the reasoning in Gallagher persuasive and we choose to follow that decision rather than Borrowman. Like the court in Gallagher, we see no reason under the Act or general contract principles why an employer should be required to include an affirmative reservation of rights in a settlement agreement when there is nothing in the agreement otherwise suggestive of an intent to waive the right ***.\u201d Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 943.\nIll\nBefore this court, plaintiffs urge that we construe the language of the settlement contract and the resignation agreement that the parties executed in a manner consistent with Borrowman. They claim that Borrowman correctly \u201caccepted the general principle that general releases are intended to surrender all claims between the parties.\u201d Plaintiffs argue that the settlement contract and the resignation agreement both contain general releases by which Rail Terminal waived the right to assert its section 5(b) workers\u2019 compensation lien against Gallagher\u2019s proceeds from the personal injury settlement. According to plaintiffs, the language of the settlement contract alone constitutes a waiver of Rail Terminal\u2019s section 5(b) lien, and if there is any doubt regarding the meaning of that language, the \u201ceven more encompassing\u201d language of the resignation agreement clearly expresses the parties\u2019 intent to extinguish all claims between them, including Rail Terminal\u2019s claim to enforce its lien.\nPlaintiffs further claim there is no need for this court to consider the affidavits presented by Rail Terminal in construing the settlement contract and the resignation agreement. They maintain that this case can be resolved based solely on the language of these documents and emphasize that neither the circuit court nor the appellate court relied on Rail Terminal\u2019s extrinsic evidence.\nFinally, plaintiffs argue that construing the settlement contract and the resignation agreement as waiving Rail Terminal\u2019s right to assert its section 5(b) lien is consistent with the public policy of preventing employees who file workers\u2019 compensation claims and personal injury actions from obtaining double recovery for their injuries. Plaintiffs contend that they settled their personal injury action for less than they otherwise would have in reliance on Rail Terminal\u2019s waiver of its lien. Thus, they reason that a finding by this court that Rail Terminal waived its lien will not result in a windfall for Gallagher. Conversely, they argue that a finding that Rail Terminal did not waive its lien will actually result in a double recovery for Rail Terminal by allowing it both to recover its workers\u2019 compensation payments and retain the benefit of Gallagher\u2019s resignation.\nIn response, Rail Terminal asks this court to follow the approach taken by the First District in the instant case and endorsed by the Second District in Harder. Rail Terminal argues that the First and Second Districts correctly rejected the rationale of Borrowman. It criticizes Borrowman for ignoring the principles of contract construction and argues that, under those principles, an employer cannot waive its workers\u2019 compensation lien unless it does so explicitly. According to Rail Terminal, Borrowman is based on the incorrect premise that if an employer intends to preserve its lien, it must include a specific reservation of the lien in the settlement agreement. Rail Terminal points out that the settlement contract and the resignation agreement at issue in this case contain no references to a section 5(b) workers\u2019 compensation lien. It contends that, construed as a whole, it is clear the settlement contract was intended to apply to Gallagher\u2019s rights to compensation under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, not to Rail Terminal\u2019s lien rights. With respect to the resignation agreement, it argues that the agreement\u2019s specific identification of claims Gallagher agreed to waive provides evidence that when Gallagher and Rail Terminal intended for there to be a waiver of a right, they clearly identified the right being waived and the party waiving it.\nAs further support for its position, Rail Terminal directs our attention to the affidavits of Holden and McCabe as evidence of the intent of the parties at the time they settled Gallagher\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim. Rail Terminal argues that these affidavits provide direct and unrefuted evidence that the parties did not intend to incorporate the waiver of Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien into the settlement.\nLastly, Rail Terminal responds to plaintiffs\u2019 arguments regarding double recovery. It argues that if this court adopts plaintiffs\u2019 position, employees who settled workers\u2019 compensation claims with their employers under terms similar to those at issue here \u201cwill gain an unintended and unauthorized windfall\u201d through the employers\u2019 loss of their lien rights. Rail Terminal also contends that plaintiffs have failed to cite anything in the record that supports their contentions that they accepted less favorable terms in the workers\u2019 compensation settlement and the personal injury settlement in reliance on Rail Terminal\u2019s waiver of its lien.\nIV\nTurning to the merits, we begin by clarifying precisely what is at issue. As mentioned, the Fourth District held in Borrowman that because the employer was aware of the plaintiffs medical malpractice lawsuit against the defendants at the time the employer and the plaintiff settled the plaintiffs workers\u2019 compensation claim, the employer \u201cforfeited its lien rights\u201d by failing to refer to them in its \u201c \u2018full, final[,J and complete settlement\u2019 with [the plaintiff].\u2019 \u201d (Emphases added.) Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 551. In this case, the First District summarized Borrowman as holding that \u201can employer forfeits or waives its workers\u2019 compensation lien by not specifically reserving it in a settlement of the employee\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim when the employer knew of the employee\u2019s pending claim against a third-party tortfeasor.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 367 Ill. App. 3d at 298. It then phrased its own holding in opposition to its summary of Borrowman\u2019s holding: \u201cRail Terminal had a valid workers\u2019 compensation lien and *** did not waive or forfeit this lien by failing to specifically reserve it in its settlement.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 367 Ill. App. 3d at 303.\nIn this case, the First District used the terms \u201cwaive\u201d and \u201cforfeit\u201d interchangeably, due in part to the fact that, in Borrowman, the Fourth District concluded that the employer forfeited its workers\u2019 compensation lien, but then referred to an affirmative statement in the settlement contract as evidence of that forfeiture. As this court has stated, \u201c[w]aiver arises from an affirmative act, is consensual, and consists of an intentional relinquishment of a known right.\u201d Home Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 307, 326 (2004). Forfeiture, strictly defined, is different from waiver, as we have noted in the criminal context. See People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 444 n.2 (2005). Rather than an intentional relinquishment of a known right, forfeiture is the \u201c \u2018failure to make the timely assertion of the right.\u2019 \u201d Blair, 215 Ill. 2d at 444 n.2, quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508, 519, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993).\nWe find this distinction instructive in the present case. Here, when plaintiffs argue that the relevant question is \u201cwhether the settlement (comprising the Commission contract and the resignation) constituted a general release of all claims related to the on-the-job incident,\u201d they are, in fact, asserting that Rail Terminal waived its workers\u2019 compensation lien through the language of the settlement contract and the resignation agreement. They are not arguing that Rail Terminal failed to assert its lien in a timely fashion and thereby lost its right to do so.\nIndeed, for plaintiffs to argue that Rail Terminal forfeited its lien under the circumstances of this case would run contrary to the plain language of section 5(b). The third paragraph of section 5(b) provides that an employer may claim a lien on the proceeds of a third-party action, and the fourth paragraph provides that \u201c[t]he employer may[ ] at any time [after the filing of a third-party action] join in the action upon his motion so that all orders of court after hearing and judgment shall be made for his protection.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 2004). Here, Rail Terminal filed a motion to intervene in plaintiffs\u2019 action against defendants, and the circuit court granted that motion. Thus, Rail Terminal properly asserted its lien. Cf Scott v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 184 Ill. 2d 202, 216-17 (1998) (even where employer forfeits lien by failing to obtain lien in third-party proceeding, employer or its insurer may still make claim for credits under section 5(b) following conclusion of third-party proceeding, as lien is merely means of enforcing statutory right). Accordingly, the issue before us is not whether Rail Terminal forfeited its workers\u2019 compensation lien.\nNor is the issue before us whether it is possible for an employer to waive its workers\u2019 compensation lien. Rail Terminal does not call into question that an employer can do so. As this court has previously observed, \u201can employer can choose not to seek reimbursement of its workers\u2019 compensation obligation. An employer can waive the lien it holds on the worker\u2019s recovery in his personal injury action.\u201d LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 399 (1998). An employer might, for instance, waive its lien to avoid liability for contribution to the other tortfeasors allegedly responsible for an employee\u2019s injury. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 399, citing Lannom v. Kosco, 158 Ill. 2d 535 (1994). It might also waive its lien to avoid paying its share of attorney fees and costs under section 5(b). LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 400.\nThe issue we must consider is whether, based on the language of the settlement contract and the resignation agreement, Rail Terminal waived its workers\u2019 compensation lien.\nPreliminarily, we address Rail Terminal\u2019s argument that, as a procedural matter, plaintiffs have forfeited their reliance on the resignation agreement for purposes of this appeal. It is true that plaintiffs did not specifically quote the resignation agreement language on which they now rely before the circuit court or the appellate court, or in their petition for leave to appeal. In spite of this, plaintiffs have not forfeited their argument that the language in question constitutes a waiver of Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien. Before the circuit court, plaintiffs relied primarily on the language of the settlement contract to support their position, but they also attached a copy of the resignation agreement to their response to Rail Terminal\u2019s motion to intervene and suggested that Rail Terminal knowingly contracted away its workers\u2019 compensation lien in exchange for Gallagher\u2019s resignation. Moreover, Rail Terminal specifically addressed this point in replying to plaintiffs\u2019 response to its motion to intervene and did so again at the December 13, 2005, hearing before the circuit court. As for plaintiffs\u2019 argument before the appellate court, we note that plaintiffs were the appellees and were urging the appellate court to affirm a judgment the circuit court chose to base on its consideration of Borrowman and the settlement contract. It is well established that where the appellate court reverses the judgment of the circuit court, and the appellee in that court brings the case before this court as an appellant, that party may raise any issues properly presented by the record to sustain the judgment of the circuit court, even if the issues were not raised before the appellate court. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 430-31 (2006). Even though the circuit court relied on its consideration of Borrowman and the settlement contract in granting the motion to adjudicate third-party claims and issue settlement drafts, plaintiffs properly raised the resignation agreement before the circuit court. Thus, it is inconsequential whether they made the precise argument they now ask us to consider when they were before the appellate court. Finally, with respect to plaintiffs\u2019 petition for leave to appeal, we observe that while the briefs plaintiffs submitted to this court develop their argument regarding the resignation agreement in considerably more detail than their petition, the petition did refer to the resignation agreement and argue that it placed Rail Terminal on further notice that its settlement with Gallagher was intended to be a general settlement of all claims. Thus, plaintiffs\u2019 argument regarding the resignation agreement is properly before us.\nThe principles that guide our analysis are familiar. The primary objective in construing a contract is to give effect to the intent of the parties. Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 224 Ill. 2d 550 (2007); Schek v. Chicago Transit Authority, 42 Ill. 2d 362, 364 (1969); see also Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Whitlock, 144 Ill. 2d 440, 447 (1991) (\u201cA release is a contract, and therefore is governed by contract law\u201d). A court must initially look to the language of a contract alone, as the language, given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indication of the parties\u2019 intent. Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 556; Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 185 Ill. 2d 457, 462 (1999). Moreover, because words derive their meaning from the context in which they are used, a contract must be construed as a whole, viewing each part in light of the others. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 98 Ill. 2d 109, 122-23 (1983). The intent of the parties is not to be gathered from detached portions of a contract or from any clause or provision standing by itself. Martindell v. Lake Shore National Bank, 15 Ill. 2d 272, 283 (1958). If the language of the contract is susceptible to more than one meaning, it is ambiguous. Farm Credit, 144 Ill. 2d at 447. In that case, a court may consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties\u2019 intent. Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 141 Ill. 2d 281, 288 (1990).\nWe further note the long-standing principle that instruments executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction are regarded as one contract and will be construed together. Sandra Frocks, Inc. v. Ziff, 397 Ill. 497, 504 (1947); see also In re Estate of Mayfield, 288 Ill. App. 3d 534, 541 (1997). Here, the settlement contract and the resignation agreement were executed in conjunction with one another. Indeed, the resignation agreement provides:\n\u201cThis Agreement will become effective after it is signed and the settlement contracts in the aforementioned workers\u2019 compensation claim have been approved by the Arbitrator. This Agreement is contingent upon approval of said contracts.\u201d\nAccordingly, we shall consider the settlement contract and the resignation agreement with reference to one another.\nTurning to the settlement contract, plaintiffs argue that the following language constitutes a waiver of Rail Terminal\u2019s section 5(b) workers\u2019 compensation lien:\n\u201cRespondent [Rail Terminal] to pay the petitioner [Gallagher] $150,000 in full and final settlement of all claims under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act for injuries allegedly incurred on or about August 10, 2001 and any and all results, developments or sequale [sic], past, present, or future resulting from this accident.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nPlaintiffs emphasize that the settlement contract disposes of \u201call claims\u201d without restriction, in that it constitutes a \u201cfull and final settlement.\u201d Furthermore, according to plaintiffs, Rail Terminal\u2019s lien is a \u201cclaim[ ] under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act,\u201d and it resulted from Gallagher\u2019s \u201caccident.\u201d\nWe agree that a claim to enforce a workers\u2019 compensation lien qualifies as a \u201cclaim under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act\u201d in the abstract. As defined by Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, \u201cclaim\u201d can refer to any of the following:\n\u201c1. The aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court ***. 2. The assertion of an existing right; any right to payment or to an equitable remedy, even if contingent or provisional ***. 3. A demand for money, property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right ***. 4. An interest or remedy recognized at law; the means by which a person can obtain a privilege, possession, or enjoyment of a right or thing ***.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 264 (8th ed. 2004).\nThus, \u201cclaim\u201d is decidedly a broad term.\nA careful reading of the settlement contract, however, reveals that it specifies the claims under the Act to which it refers, and a claim to enforce a workers\u2019 compensation lien is not one of them. Plaintiffs\u2019 reading of the settlement contract ignores the sentence immediately following the sentence quoted above, to wit:\n\u201cRespondent denies these injuries are compensable and this settlement is made to settle those issues as a purchase of the peace against any and all claims for additional temporary total compensation, permanent partial disability and medical, surgical [or] hospital expenses, past, present or future.\u201d\nConstruing the terms of the settlement contract as a whole, as we must (Martindell, 15 Ill. 2d at 283), it is readily apparent that the second sentence of the contract informs the meaning of the first. In denying that \u201cthese injuries are compensable,\u201d Rail Terminal is denying the compensability of \u201cinjuries allegedly incurred on or about August 10, 2001,\u201d the same \u201cinjuries\u201d giving rise to the \u201cclaims under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act\u201d to which the settlement contract applies. The settlement contract goes on to state that \u201cthis settlement is made to settle those issues,\u201d which clearly refers to issues related to Rail Terminal\u2019s denial that the injuries are compensable. Subsequently, the contract specifies that, in settling the issues regarding the compensability of the injuries, Rail Terminal is purchasing the peace \u201cagainst any and all claims for additional temporary total compensation, permanent partial disability and medical, surgical [or] hospital expenses, past, present or future.\u201d In referring to claims for \u201cadditional\u201d benefits, it is obvious the contract is referring to claims beyond those already made by Gallagher at the time of the settlement. Thus, the settlement contract applies to all claims by Gallagher for \u201ctemporary total compensation, permanent partial disability and medical, surgical [or] hospital expenses\u201d based on \u201cinjuries allegedly incurred on or about August 10, 2001.\u201d It does not apply to a claim by Rail Terminal to enforce its workers\u2019 compensation lien.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 argument that the \u201cfull and final settlement of all claims\u201d language creates a general release to which we must give broad effect is similarly unavailing. Plaintiffs contend that general releases are intended to surrender all claims between the parties and terminate their relationship. They suggest that where, as here, there is no dispute that Rail Terminal, the alleged releasor, was aware of the claim it was releasing, the general release should be given effect as to that claim. In support of their argument, plaintiffs rely on this court\u2019s observation in Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Whitlock that \u201cwhere both parties were aware of an additional claim at the time of signing the release, courts have given effect to the general release language of the agreement to release that claim as well.\u201d Farm Credit, 144 Ill. 2d at 447, citing Frank Rosenberg, Inc. v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 28 Ill. 2d 573, 578 (1963). See Perschke v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 111 Ill. App. 2d 23, 31 (1969); Cwik v. Condre, 4 Ill. App. 2d 380, 383 (1954).\nWe have no quarrel with the statement from Farm Credit on which plaintiffs rely. It is, however, inapposite here. As described above, the settlement contract is explicitly limited to the settlement of claims by Gallagher against Rail Terminal for temporary total disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, and medical expenses. It therefore does not contain a \u201cgeneral release\u201d of the type to which this court was referring in Farm Credit. Indeed, \u201cgeneral release\u201d is a conclusory term, and determining whether particular language constitutes a general release is entirely a matter of construing that language. See Farm Credit, 144 Ill. 2d at 447 (release is contract and therefore governed by contract law, and intention of parties to contract must be determined from instrument itself).\nIn Farm Credit, for instance, the plaintiff, a bank, filed a foreclosure action against the defendants after they defaulted on the second of two loans. Farm Credit, 144 Ill. 2d at 444-45. The defendants raised the affirmative defense that a release agreement they entered into after the default barred the foreclosure action, which was directed at the property used to secure the first loan. Farm Credit, 144 Ill. 2d at 445. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the appellate court affirmed. Farm Credit, 144 Ill. 2d at 445. This court reversed, holding that the release agreement was ambiguous because it was unclear, based on the language of the agreement, whether the parties intended the agreement to release the defendants from all claims or merely claims related to the second loan, in which case the plaintiff could proceed with its foreclosure action. Farm Credit, 144 Ill. 2d at 448. The plaintiff and the defendants were aware of claims that could arise in relation to the first loan at the time they executed the release agreement (Farm Credit, 144 Ill. 2d at 448), a fact that would have placed the defendant\u2019s foreclosure action within the purview of the release, and thus barred it, if the language of the agreement had unambiguously created a general release (see Farm Credit, 144 Ill. 2d at 447 (\u201cwhere both parties were aware of an additional claim at the time of signing the release, courts have given effect to the general release language of the agreement to release that claim as well\u201d)). However, because it was unclear whether the release constituted a general release, this court concluded it was necessary to refer to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties\u2019 intent and remanded the cause for further proceedings. Farm Credit, 144 Ill. 2d at 448. The approach we have taken in this case to analyzing the settlement contract accords with the approach we took to analyzing the language of the agreement at issue in Farm Credit, only here the contract language unambiguously does not constitute a general release. Cf. Rakowski v. Lucente, 104 Ill. 2d 317, 323-24 (1984) (where release was \u201ccomprehensive, precise and unambiguous\u201d and defendant knew at time he executed release that he might have basis for contribution claim, contribution claim fell within scope of release).\nWe further hold that, even if the language of the settlement contract did constitute a general release, it would not be sufficiently explicit to waive Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien. Considering the integral role the workers\u2019 compensation lien plays in the workers\u2019 compensation scheme, we do not believe general language is sufficient to effect such a waiver. On the contrary, the waiver of a workers\u2019 compensation lien must be explicitly stated. Accord 367 Ill. App. 3d at 302-03 (concluding \u201cwaiver of a workers\u2019 compensation lien must be more explicitly and affirmatively stated in a settlement agreement and cannot simply be implied by a lack of any reference to that lien\u201d). Here, the language of the settlement contract contains no mention of Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien and therefore is not sufficiently explicit to waive the lien.\nThe adoption of an explicit-waiver rule in this context is consistent with this court\u2019s previous recognition in In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326 (2000), that \u201c[t]he plain language of section 5(b) shows that an employer\u2019s reimbursement of workers\u2019 compensation payments from an employee\u2019s third-party recovery is crucial to the workers\u2019 compensation scheme.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d at 331. As this court explained in Dierkes, because an employer may be required to pay compensation to an injured employee under the Act even though the employer was without fault, section 5(b) serves the important purpose of allowing \u201c \u2018both the employer and the employee an opportunity to reach the true offender while preventing the employee from obtaining a double recovery.\u2019 \u201d Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d at 331-32, quoting J.L. Simmons Co. ex rel. Hartford Insurance Group v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 108 Ill. 2d 106, 112 (1985). In the end, \u201c \u2018[t]his is fair to everyone concerned: the employer, who, in a fault sense, is neutral, comes out even; the third person pays exactly the damages he or she would normally pay ***; and the employee gets a fuller reimbursement for actual damages sustained than is possible under the compensation system alone.\u2019 \u201d Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d at 332, quoting 6 A. Larson & L. Larson, Larson\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Laws \u00a7110.02, at 110 \u2014 3 to 110 \u2014 4 (1999). This court underscored its discussion of the significance of the workers\u2019 compensation lien by reiterating that \u201c \u2018[i]t is of utmost importance that the trial court protect an employer\u2019s [workers\u2019 compensation] lien.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d at 333, quoting Blagg v. Illinois F.W.D. Truck & Equipment Co., 143 Ill. 2d 188, 195 (1991).\nAs Dierkes confirms, the workers\u2019 compensation lien is deeply rooted in the overall scheme of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Consequently, there must be something more than general waiver language before the lien can be considered waived. Requiring explicit waiver will ensure that a lien that is \u201ccrucial to the workers\u2019 compensation scheme\u201d (Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d at 331) and of \u201cutmost importance\u201d (Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d at 333) will not be considered waived absent unmistakable settlement language to that effect. Such a rule will have the salutary effect of placing both the parties and the courts in workers\u2019 compensation cases on notice that a specific reference to the lien in a waiver provision is required before the lien can be deemed waived. As a result, settling parties will be less likely to expend time and money arguing over the interpretation of settlement provisions, and valuable judicial resources will be conserved.\nWe note it is not uncommon to require the explicit waiver of certain rights. In various other contexts, where an important statutory right is at issue, an explicit manifestation of intent is required before the right in question can be deemed waived. See, e.g., Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80-81, 142 L. Ed. 2d 361, 371, 119 S. Ct. 391, 397 (1998) (union-negotiated waiver of employees\u2019 statutory right to judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination must be \u201cclear and unmistakable\u201d); Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Massey, 373 F.3d 530, 533, 536-37 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying \u201cclear and unmistakable\u201d waiver rule set forth in Wright); Forest Preserve District v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 369 Ill. App. 3d 733, 754 (2006) (\u201cA party to a collective bargaining agreement may waive its rights to bargain under the [Illinois Public Labor Relations] Act where the contractual language evinces an unequivocal intent to relinquish such rights. [Citation.] However, evidence that a party to a labor agreement intended to waive a statutory right must be clear and unmistakable. The language sustaining the waiver must be specific and waiver is never presumed\u201d); Fowler v. Boise Cascade Corp., 948 F.2d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 1991) (recognizing that, under Maine law, employer cannot waive statutory right to immunity from suits arising out of employees\u2019 injuries \u201cunless the employer explicitly makes such a waiver\u201d); Kendall v. U.S. Dismantling Co., 20 Ohio St. 3d 61, 65, 485 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (1985) (\u201cThe statutory and constitutional immunity granted to complying employers is crucial to workers\u2019 compensation law. *** [B]efore this immunity may be considered to have been waived, the waiver must be express, and must refer specifically to this particular immunity. Although express indemnity agreements worded in general terms may suffice for other purposes, we are not inclined to construe them as effective waivers of this immunity absent a clear evocation of the parties\u2019 intent to that effect\u201d); Bester v. Essex Crane Rental Corp., 422 Pa. Super. 178, 187, 619 A.2d 304, 308 (1993) (holding that indemnification clause in contract between employer and equipment lessor did not meet statutory requirement that employer \u201cexpressly provide! ] for\u201d indemnification to effectuate waiver of immunity from suits by third parties). We find additional support in these decisions for requiring the explicit waiver of a workers\u2019 compensation lien.\nBased on the foregoing analysis, the decision in Borrowman is overruled. Initially, we note the court in Borrowman made no attempt to apply the fundamental principles of contract construction to the settlement contract at issue in that case. Instead of giving effect to all the relevant contract language, the court focused narrowly on the declaration that the contract constituted a \u201cfull, fmal[,] and complete settlement.\u201d In doing so, the court overlooked that the contract straightforwardly provided for a \u201cfull, final[,] and complete settlement of any and all claims for temporary total disability, permanent partial and/or permanent total disability\u201d incurred by the plaintiff by reason of his accident. (Emphasis added.) Borrowman, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 550. Just as the settlement contract at issue here applies only to Gallagher\u2019s claims against Rail Terminal for \u201cadditional temporary total compensation, permanent partial disability and medical, surgical [or] hospital expenses,\u201d so too was the settlement contract in Borrowman restricted to claims by the employee against the employer. Accord Harder, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 939, 943 (reversing judgment of circuit court that employer waived workers\u2019 compensation lien where settlement contract provided for \u201cfull and final settlement of all claims for compensation, medical, hospital and other expenses\u201d arising out of the plaintiffs accident). In addition, because the language of the settlement contract in Borrowman contained no mention of the employer\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien, that language obviously was not sufficiently explicit to waive the lien.\nOur analysis cannot end here. We must also consider the effect of the language contained in the resignation agreement. Turning to that agreement, plaintiffs argue that the sixth paragraph effectuates a waiver of Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien. Paragraph six provides:\n\u201cThis Agreement does not constitute an admission by Employer of any liability or wrongdoing but it is intended to resolve in good faith any existing or potential disputes or claims arising out of Employee\u2019s relationship and separation with employer.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nPlaintiffs assert that Rail Terminal\u2019s lien qualifies as a \u201cdispute[ ] or claim[ ]\u201d arising out of Gallagher\u2019s relationship with Rail Terminal.\nUnlike the language of the settlement contract, paragraph six of the resignation agreement expresses no limitations on the types of \u201cdisputes\u201d and \u201cclaims\u201d to which it refers. However, like the language of the settlement contract, it contains no specific reference to Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien. As a result, it is not sufficiently explicit to effectuate the waiver of the lien.\nIn light of the foregoing, there is no need for us to refer to the extrinsic evidence presented by the parties. A court may consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intent of the parties to a contract if the language of the contract is ambiguous. Quake, 141 Ill. 2d at 288. Here, there is no ambiguity to resolve. As discussed, the settlement contract, by its own terms, waives only Gallagher\u2019s claims against Rail Terminal, and neither the settlement contract nor the resignation agreement explicitly refers to Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien, as would be required to waive the lien.\nThis leaves only plaintiffs\u2019 arguments regarding the policy of preventing double recovery in workers\u2019 compensation cases. Plaintiffs first contend that they settled their personal injury action for less than they otherwise would have in reliance on Rail Terminal\u2019s waiver of its lien, so a finding that Rail Terminal waived its lien will not result in a double recovery for Gallagher. This argument rests on a factual assertion regarding plaintiffs\u2019 basis for settling the personal injury action that is not borne out by the record. Plaintiffs\u2019 second argument regarding double recovery is that finding, as we have, that Rail Terminal did not waive its lien will result in a double recovery for Rail Terminal by allowing it both to recover its workers\u2019 compensation payments and retain the benefit of Gallagher\u2019s resignation. We note that plaintiffs\u2019 attempt to relate this argument to the policy of preventing double recovery is purely rhetorical, as that policy involves \u201cthe general principle that an employee is not entitled to a double recovery.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Scott, 184 Ill. 2d at 217. In reality, plaintiffs are merely asking us to conduct a generalized inquiry into the fairness of Gallagher\u2019s bargain with Rail Terminal, which we decline to do. Courts generally will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration for a contract. Sta-Ru Corp. v. Mahin, 64 Ill. 2d 330, 338 (1976). Moreover, Gallagher specifically acknowledged in the resignation agreement that a $1 payment and the approval of the settlement contract, which unambiguously did not waive Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien, would constitute sufficient consideration for his resignation.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons expressed above, we hold that Rail Terminal did not waive its section 5(b) workers\u2019 compensation lien when it settled Gallagher\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the circuit court\u2019s decision to grant defendants\u2019 motion to adjudicate third-party claims and issue settlement drafts and remanded the cause to the circuit court for consideration of Rail Terminal\u2019s motion to set aside and reallocate the settlement.\nAffirmed.\nJUSTICE BURKE\ntook no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARMAN JUSTICE BURKE" }, { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS,\nspecially concurring:\nI agree with the result reached by my colleagues in affirming the appellate court\u2019s decision in the instant case and in overruling Borrowman v. Prastein, 356 Ill. App. 3d 546 (2005). I also agree with the conclusion that a bright-line rule should be adopted so as to require an explicit and affirmative reference to the workers\u2019 compensation lien before it can be waived by settlement language.\nI would only add that even in the absence of such a bright-line rule, I do not believe that the general language of paragraph six of the parties\u2019 resignation agreement was intended to encompass Rail Terminal\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien. Paragraph six provides that \u201c[t]his Agreement does not constitute an admission by Employer of any liability or wrongdoing but it is intended to resolve in good faith any existing or potential disputes or claims arising out of Employee\u2019s relationship and separation with Employer.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The first clause of the above-quoted sentence suggests \u2014 like all of the other language of both agreements \u2014 that it is only concerned with claims that Gallagher may have against Rail Terminal. Although the second clause uses some broad language about \u201cany existing or potential disputes or claims,\u201d I believe that this second clause must be read in relation to the first clause. Reading paragraph six in this way leads to the conclusion that the second clause is simply referring to claims that the employee (Gallagher) may have against the employer (Rail Terminal) and not claims that Rail Terminal may have against Gallagher, such as a workers\u2019 compensation hen. This becomes even clearer when all of the language of both documents are read together as a whole, as they must be. See In re Estate of Mayfield, 288 Ill. App. 3d 534, 541 (1997). All of the rights that are specifically mentioned as being waived in both documents are claims that Gallagher may have against Rail Terminal. Paragraph six reinforces this theme by stating that the agreement does not constitute an admission by the employer of any liability or wrongdoing even though it is resolving in good faith existing or potential disputes and claims. In essence, the parties intended that Gallagher receive $150,000 in immediate compensation for permanent partial disability, plus an additional $1 in consideration, in exchange for his resignation and his waiver of any claims against Rail Terminal.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael W Rathsack (Jonathan Kurasch, of counsel), and David E. Neumeister, of Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., all of Chicago, for appellants.", "William P. Ryan and Terry L. Welch, of Marwedel, Minichello & Reeb, PC., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 103522.\nJAMES GALLAGHER et al., Appellants, v. JAROSLAW ROBERT LENART et al. (Rail Terminal Services, LLC, Appellee).\nOpinion filed August 9, 2007.\nMichael W Rathsack (Jonathan Kurasch, of counsel), and David E. Neumeister, of Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., all of Chicago, for appellants.\nWilliam P. Ryan and Terry L. Welch, of Marwedel, Minichello & Reeb, PC., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0208-01", "first_page_order": 220, "last_page_order": 257 }