{ "id": 3610870, "name": "LUCY MYDLACH, Appellee, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Mydlach v. Daimlerchrysler Corp.", "decision_date": "2007-09-20", "docket_number": "No. 102588", "first_page": "307", "last_page": "333", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 307" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a72301", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 8, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." }, { "page": "(7)" }, { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(3)" }, { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(5)" }, { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4262956 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" }, { "page": "158" }, { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637061 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628", "parenthetical": "collecting Illinois cases" }, { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "holding that cause of action for breach of three-year/ 36,000-mile limited warranty accrued when the vehicle was delivered and not when defendant failed to successfully repair the vehicle" }, { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295574 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253, 259-60", "parenthetical": "\"A warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act includes promises to repair products in the future whose inherent reliability is not warranted\" and includes six-year/60,000-mile repair or replacement warranty" }, { "page": "261" }, { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "holding that breach of six-year/60,000mile limited power-train warranty \"cannot occur until Ford refuses or fails to repair the powertrain if and when it breaks\"" }, { "page": "258-60" }, { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "holding that breach of six-year/60,000mile limited power-train warranty \"cannot occur until Ford refuses or fails to repair the powertrain if and when it breaks\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442060 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166688 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259112 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58932 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 F.2d 311", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 390782 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" }, { "page": "314" }, { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/660/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a72302", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(2)", "parenthetical": "prohibiting the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) from requiring \"that a consumer product or any of its components be warranted\"" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 C.F.R. \u00a7700.1", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 P.3d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 11212127 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626-27", "parenthetical": "concluding that one-year limited repair warranty \"falls within the definition\" of a written warranty under section 2301(6)(B) of the Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/2/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 Pa. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1837559 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "noting that 12-month/12,000-mile repair warranty \"fit[s] within the modern concept of warranty,\" citing section 2301(6)(B) of the Act" }, { "page": "1177", "parenthetical": "noting that 12-month/12,000-mile repair warranty \"fit[s] within the modern concept of warranty,\" citing section 2301(6)(B) of the Act" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "1178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/533/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Wash. U. L.Q. 357", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Wash. U. L.Q.", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a72304", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a72303", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a72310", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)(1)" }, { "page": "(d)(l)" }, { "page": "(d)(2)" }, { "page": "(d)(l)" }, { "page": "(d)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461950 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 F.3d 1268", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11393914 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1272" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/305/1268-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 F.3d 912", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9180364 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "917" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/402/0912-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569745 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5406059 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266075 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "96-97", "parenthetical": "following Cosman and holding that suit for breach of three-year/36,000-mile repair warranty filed within four years of repair attempt was timely" }, { "page": "96" }, { "page": "96-97", "parenthetical": "holding that suit for breach of three-year/36,000-mile repair warranty filed within four years of repair attempt was timely" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 151", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6186614 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" }, { "page": "485" }, { "page": "2287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 261", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6201048 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" }, { "page": "261" }, { "page": "1942" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 P.3d 877", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 F. Supp. 2d 1112", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9156643 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/341/1112-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 N.J. Super. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 110041 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" }, { "page": "111" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "110-11", "parenthetical": "under New Jersey law, cause of action for breach of seven-year/70,000-mile power-train warranty would not have accrued when the car was delivered, but rather when persistent problems appeared or when Daimler-Chrysler was unable to repair the defect" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/349/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 F. Supp. 2d 71", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9446906 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/192/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336069 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241", "parenthetical": "following Cosman and holding that breach of three-year/50,000-mile repair warranty \"cannot occur until Audi refuses or fails to repair the defect\"" }, { "page": "241", "parenthetical": "holding that breach of three-year/50,000-mile repair warranty \"cannot occur until Audi refuses or fails to repair the defect\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092944 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78", "parenthetical": "observing that UCC warranty rules \"determine the quality of the product the manufacturer promises and thereby determine the quality he must deliver\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 N.J. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 456708 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the U.C.C. provides for express warranties regarding the quality of goods\"" }, { "page": "269", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the U.C.C. provides for express warranties regarding the quality of goods\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/149/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ohio App. 3d 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 6708348 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "identifying UCC express warranties as one of the \"warranties of quality\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/17/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 N.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297", "parenthetical": "identifying UCC express warranties as one of the \"warranties of quality\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Dick. L. Rev. 935", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Dick. L. Rev.", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "939", "parenthetical": "\"Section 2 - 725(2) presumes that all warranties, expressed or implied, relate only to the condition of the goods at the time of sale\" and \"[a]s a result, the period of limitations begins to run at that time\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 B.U. L. Rev. 345", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "B.U. L. Rev.", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379", "parenthetical": "\"Article Two defines a range of express and implied warranties\" which \"[a] 11 go to the quality of the goods at tender\"" }, { "page": "381" }, { "page": "377-81", "parenthetical": "discussing the split among state courts in their approach to repair or replacement promises" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 713", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "U. Mich. J.L. Reform", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "369 F. Supp. 2d 1350", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8974336 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1356-57", "parenthetical": "under Georgia law, a written warranty that provides for repair or replacement of parts is breached when the purchaser returns the product to the dealer for repair and repair is refused or unsuccessful" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/369/1350-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 F.3d 876", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10513418 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "889-90", "parenthetical": "under New York law, cause of action for breach of a repair promise accrued when the generator malfunctioned and the seller refused to make the necessary repairs" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/6/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351256 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 67", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Geo. Wash. L. Rev.", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127156 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153-54", "parenthetical": "remanding the matter to the circuit court for a factual determination as to when the statute of limitations began to run against the county on its claims for defective design and construction of the county's administration building" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083558 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "holding that trier of fact must determine when the plaintiff had sufficient information as to the roof defect to start the running of the limitations period" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469943 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156", "parenthetical": "\"In many, if not most, cases the time at which an injured party knows or reasonably should have known both of his injury and that it was wrongfully caused will be a disputed question to be resolved by the finder of fact\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570927 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Md. App. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 157425 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270-71" }, { "page": "1091" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/120/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Conn. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 507238 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125", "parenthetical": "where the Maryland and Connecticut courts held that the remedy of revocation is only available against a seller of goods" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/172/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 A.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150", "parenthetical": "where the Maryland and Connecticut courts held that the remedy of revocation is only available against a seller of goods" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 N.J. Super. 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 891591 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/180/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 A.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "418 So. 2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9557669 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804", "parenthetical": "where the New Jersey and Mississippi courts allowed revocation of acceptance against the remote manufacturer" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/418/0801-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 C 7792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that the plaintiff could pursue revocation against the defendant manufacturer based on breach of the written warranty" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "03 C 2389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rejecting Soldinger and holding that revocation of acceptance is unavailable against a manufacturer who is not a party to the sales contract" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Va. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 2074647 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" }, { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va/227/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3471407 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3114309 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 C 3061", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "03 C 1884", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "384 F.3d 402", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9182312 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/384/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "03 C 2051", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3180014 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193494 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" }, { "page": "294-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 828", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3948781 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0828-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1612, "char_count": 48940, "ocr_confidence": 0.794, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.471864311857929e-07, "percentile": 0.8812782135174676 }, "sha256": "44f1353e4910cfc4428d37346c0c9132cfd1829171065b4b9b2177796011ff3b", "simhash": "1:21cb46135e1d6e29", "word_count": 7959 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:47:26.463284+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LUCY MYDLACH, Appellee, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nPlaintiff, Lucy Mydlach, filed a three-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against defendant, DaimlerChrysler Corporation, alleging claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty \u2014 Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Magnuson-Moss Act or Act) (15 U.S.C. \u00a72301 et seq. (1994)). The circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, holding that the claims were time-barred under the four-year statute of limitations contained in section 2 \u2014 725 of the Uniform Commercial Code \u2014 Sales (UCC) (810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 725 (West 2006)). The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. 364 Ill. App. 3d 135. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the appellate court and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings.\nBACKGROUND\nOn June 20, 1998, plaintiff purchased a used 1996 Dodge Neon, manufactured by defendant, from McGrath Buick-Nissan (McGrath) in Elgin, Illinois. The vehicle was originally put into service on June 24, 1996, with a three-year/36,000-mile limited warranty. The warranty provided, in relevant part, as follows:\n\u201cThe \u2018Basic Warranty\u2019 begins on your vehicle\u2019s Warranty Start Date which is the earlier of (1) the date you take delivery of your new vehicle, OR (2) the date the vehicle was first put into service ***.\nThe \u2018Basic Warranty\u2019 covers the cost of all parts and labor needed to repair any item on your vehicle (except as noted below) that\u2019s defective in material, workmanship, or factory preparation. You pay nothing for these repairs.\nThe \u2018Basic Warranty\u2019 covers every Chrysler supplied part of your vehicle, EXCEPT its tires and cellular telephone. ***\n$ %\nThese warranty repairs or adjustments (parts and labor) will be made by your dealer at no charge using new or re-manufactured parts.\n* * *\nThe \u2018Basic Warranty\u2019 lasts for 36 months from the vehicle\u2019s Warranty Start Date OR for 36,000 miles on the odometer, whichever occurs first.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nAt the time of plaintiffs purchase in 1998, the car\u2019s mileage was 26,296. Thus, the warranty had approximately one year or 10,000 miles remaining.\nBeginning July 7, 1998, plaintiff brought the car to McGrath and another authorized dealership several times for a variety of problems, including a recurring fluid leak. Plaintiff claimed that the dealerships\u2019 repair attempts were unsuccessful and, as a result, she could not use the vehicle as intended. Plaintiff ultimately filed suit against defendant on May 16, 2001, seeking legal and equitable relief, as well as attorney fees and costs, under the Magnuson-Moss Act. Plaintiff alleged breach of written warranty (count I), breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (count II), and revocation of acceptance (count III).\nThe case initially proceeded to arbitration, where a decision was entered in favor of defendant. Plaintiff rejected the arbitrators\u2019 decision and the case was returned to the trial court. After further discovery, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant argued that counts I and II of plaintiffs complaint were subject to the four-year statute of limitations found in section 2 \u2014 725 of the UCC (810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 725 (West 2006)) and that, as provided by section 2 \u2014 725(2), the statute of limitations commenced upon \u201ctender of delivery\u201d of the vehicle to its original purchaser in June 1996. Thus, according to defendant, plaintiffs suit, filed in May 2001, was outside the four-year limitations period. With respect to count III, defendant argued that plaintiff was not entitled to seek revocation of acceptance because no privity existed between plaintiff and defendant, and because plaintiff could not prove the underlying breach of implied warranty claim.\nPlaintiff responded that her claims were not time-barred because the \u201ctender of delivery\u201d referenced in the UCC was the tender of delivery to her, and not to the original purchaser. Plaintiff also argued that a lack of privity is not a bar to a claim for revocation of acceptance against a manufacturer who is also a warrantor.\nRelying on Nowalski v. Ford Motor Co., 335 Ill. App. 3d 625 (2002), the trial court agreed with defendant that plaintiffs claims were time-barred and granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on all three counts. The trial court denied plaintiffs motion for reconsideration, and plaintiff appealed.\nThe appellate court reversed the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment on counts I and III, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment on count II. As to the limitations issue, the appellate court followed Cosman v. Ford Motor Co., 285 Ill. App. 3d 250 (1996), rather than Nowalski, and held that:\n\u201cplaintiffs right to bring a breach of written warranty action based on the promise to repair accrued when defendant allegedly failed to successfully repair her car after a reasonable number of attempts and that the four-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until that time.\u201d 364 Ill. App. 3d at 146.\nThe appellate court also held that plaintiff could properly pursue revocation of acceptance as an equitable remedy under the Magnuson-Moss Act if her breach of warranty claim was successful. 364 Ill. App. 3d at 158.\nWe allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 315. Because plaintiff does not seek cross-relief as to count II of her complaint, the only counts before this court are counts I and III.\nANALYSIS\nI\nThe purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is not to try an issue of fact, but rather to determine whether one exists. Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill. 2d 304, 307-08 (2001). Summary judgment is thus appropriate \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2006). Because summary judgment is a drastic measure, it should only be allowed \u201cwhen the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.\u201d Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986). In an appeal from the grant of summary judgment our review proceeds de novo. Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 35 (2001). In assessing whether summary judgment was appropriate here, we must determine when the limitations period, applicable to a breach of warranty claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act, commences. On this legal issue our review also proceeds de novo. See Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 350 (2002).\nII\nAs an initial matter we address defendant\u2019s argument that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not apply to limited warranties like the one at issue here.\nThe Magnuson-Moss Act, enacted by Congress in 1975, is a \u201cremedial statute designed to protect consumers from deceptive warranty practices.\u201d Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1981). The Act does not require a consumer product to be warranted. See 15 U.S.C. \u00a72302(b)(2) (1994) (prohibiting the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) from requiring \u201cthat a consumer product or any of its components be warranted\u201d). Where a warranty is provided, however, the warranty is subject to the Act\u2019s regulatory scheme (Skelton, 660 F.2d at 314), including rules promulgated by the FTC (15 U.S.C. \u00a72302(a) (1994); 16 C.F.R. \u00a7700.1 et seq. (2006)).\nThe Act speaks to both implied warranties and written warranties. An \u201cimplied warranty\u201d means \u201can implied warranty arising under State law,\u201d as modified by the Act. 15 U.S.C. \u00a72301(7) (1994). As already noted, plaintiffs implied warranty claim is not before this court. The Act defines a \u201cwritten warranty\u201d as:\n\u201c(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time, or\n(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a72301(6) (1994).\nThe parties are in agreement that the warranty at issue here constitutes a \u201cwritten warranty\u201d for purposes of the Act. Case law on this subject is in accord. E.g., Cos-man, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 253, 259-60 (\u201cA warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act includes promises to repair products in the future whose inherent reliability is not warranted\u201d and includes six-year/60,000-mile repair or replacement warranty); Pierce v. Catalina Yachts, Inc., 2 P.3d 618, 626-27 (Alaska 2000) (concluding that one-year limited repair warranty \u201cfalls within the definition\u201d of a written warranty under section 2301(6)(B) of the Act); Nationwide Insurance Co. v. General Motors Corp., 533 Pa. 423, 433, 625 A.2d 1172, 1177 (1993) (noting that 12-month/12,000-mile repair warranty \u201cfit[s] within the modern concept of warranty,\u201d citing section 2301(6)(B) of the Act); see also C. Reitz, Manufacturers\u2019 Warranties of Consumer Goods, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 357, 363 n.21 (1997) (\u201cThe Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act\u2019s key concept, called a \u2018written warranty,\u2019 is defined primarily as a promise to repair or replace goods,\u201d citing section 2301(6)(B) of the Act).\nThe Magnuson-Moss Act also distinguishes between \u201cfull\u201d and \u201climited\u201d warranties, and sets forth minimum standards for \u201cfull\u201d warranties. 15 U.S.C. \u00a72304 (1994). If a written warranty meets the federal minimum standards, \u201cthen it shall be conspicuously designated a \u2018full (statement of duration) warranty.\u2019 \u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a72303(a)(l) (1994). If a warranty does not meet the federal minimum standards, \u201cthen it shall be conspicuously designated a \u2018limited warranty.\u2019 \u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a72303(a)(2) (1994). The parties agree that the warranty at issue here is a \u201climited\u201d warranty, as opposed to a \u201cfull\u201d warranty. We note that defendant\u2019s warranty booklet for the 1996 Dodge Neon repeatedly refers to defendant\u2019s warranties as \u201cLimited Warranties.\u201d\nTo enforce its provisions, the Magnuson-Moss Act authorizes suits by the Attorney General and the FTC to enjoin \u201cany warrantor from making a deceptive warranty\u201d or to enjoin \u201cany person from failing to comply with any requirement *** or from violating any prohibition\u201d contained in the Act. 15 U.S.C. \u00a72310(c)(1) (1994). Significantly, the Act also \u201cprovides a statutory private right of action.\u201d Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 209 Ill. 2d 376, 386 (2004); accord Skelton, 660 F.2d at 315; Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002); Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imports, Ltd,., 402 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 2005).\nSection 2310(d)(1) states in relevant part:\n\u201c[A] consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief\u2014\n(A) in any court of competent jurisdiction in any State or the District of Columbia; or\n(B) in an appropriate district court of the United States ***.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a72310(d)(l) (1994).\nThe term \u201cconsumer\u201d is broadly defined under the Act as\n\u201ca buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of any consumer product, any person to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written warranty (or service contract) applicable to the product, and any other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service contract).\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a72301(3) (1994).\nA \u201csupplier\u201d means \u201cany person engaged in the business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a72301(4) (1994). A \u201cwarrantor\u201d means \u201cany supplier or other person who gives or offers to give a written warranty or who is or may be obligated under an implied warranty.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a72301(5) (1994). No dispute exists that plaintiff is a \u201cconsumer\u201d within the meaning of the Act or that defendant is a \u201cwarrantor\u201d under the Act.\nA consumer who prevails in any action brought under section 2310(d)(1) may be allowed by the court to recover costs and expenses, including attorney fees. 15 U.S.C. \u00a72310(d)(2) (1994). Plaintiffs complaint was filed under section 2310(d)(1) of the Act.\nDefendant\u2019s argument that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not apply to limited warranties is not entirely clear. As noted above, defendant does not dispute that its warranty constitutes a limited warranty, as defined by the Act. Additionally, defendant does not argue that plaintiff is precluded from bringing a breach of warranty claim under the Act. Indeed, defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment \u201c \u2018assumes that a cause of action has been stated.\u2019 \u201d Delgatto v. Brandon Associates, Ltd., 131 Ill. 2d 183, 190 (1989), quoting Janes v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass\u2019n of Berwyn, 57 Ill. 2d 398, 406 (1974). Moreover, as set forth above, the remedies provision of section 2310 of the Act brings within its reach the failure of a warrantor to comply with any obligation \u201cunder a written warranty.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a72310(d)(l) (1994). Section 2310 does not distinguish between a full warranty and a limited warranty.\nDefendant makes the related argument that the Magnuson-Moss Act is merely a conduit to apply state law remedies. This is the same argument defendant raised in Cogley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 368 Ill. App. 3d 91, 98 (2006), where the appellate court considered the same statute-of-limitations issue that is before us today. The appellate court rejected defendant\u2019s argument, stating:\n\u201cAccording to defendants, in cases arising under limited warranties, the Magnuson-Moss Act serves only as a \u2018conduit\u2019 for claims arising under state law. Even if this statement is true, we fail to see how it has any bearing on the question of when the statute of limitations begins to run. As seen, all of the relevant Illinois decisions are in agreement that the Magnuson-Moss Act borrows the UCC\u2019s statute of limitations. This would appear to be true whether state law or federal law governs the substance of the claim. In other words, for statute of limitations purposes, it should make no difference whether the Magnuson-Moss Act provides the substantive law or merely serves as a conduit for a state law claim.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Cogley, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 98.\nWe agree with the appellate court. Whether state law will ultimately determine if a breach of limited warranty occurred here is irrelevant to the limitations issue this case presents. Accordingly, we need not consider defendant\u2019s \u201cconduit\u201d argument further and, instead, focus on the limitations issue.\nIll\nAlthough the Magnuson-Moss Act provides a private right of action for breach of a written warranty, the Act does not contain a limitations provision for such an action. Where a federal statute fails to specify a limitations period for suits under it, \u201ccourts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law.\u201d DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 76 L. Ed. 2d 476, 485, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2287 (1983); accord Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254, 261, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (1985); Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust v. Gorman Brothers Ready Mix, 283 P.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2002). In suits brought under the Magnuson-Moss Act, our appellate court, as well as courts in other jurisdictions, generally consider the UCC to be the most closely analogous statute and have borrowed the limitations provision contained therein. See, e.g., Nowalski, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 628 (collecting Illinois cases); Hillery v. Georgie Boy Manufacturing, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1114 (D. Ariz. 2004); Poli v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 349 N.J. Super. 169, 181, 793 A.2d 104, 111 (2002); Murungi v. Mercedes Benz Credit Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 71, 79 (W.D.N.Y. 2001); Keller v. Volkswagen, 1999 PA Super. 153, 115. We agree with the foregoing authorities and will look to the limitations provision contained in the UCC to determine the timeliness of plaintiffs complaint. Specifically, we will look to article 2 of the UCC, which applies to \u201ctransactions in goods.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 102 (West 2006).\nSection 2 \u2014 725 of the UCC, titled \u201cStatute of limitations in contracts for sale,\u201d generally provides a four-year limitations period:\n\u201c(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within 4 years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.\n(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party\u2019s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 725 (West 2006).\nPreliminarily, we note that the future-performance exception to the four-year limitations period, set forth in subsection (2) above, is not at issue in this case. As will be discussed in greater detail below, a repair or replacement warranty like the one issued by defendant here \u201chas nothing to do with the inherent quality of the goods or their future performance.\u201d Cosman, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 261. See also C. Reitz, Manufacturers\u2019 Warranties of Consumer Goods, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 357, 364 n.24 (1997) (\u201cPromises to repair or replace refer to future performanee of sellers, not to future performance of goods\u201d); L. Lawrence, Lawrence\u2019s Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code \u00a72 \u2014 625:129, at 332 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing difference between a warranty of future performance and a covenant to repair or replace). Accordingly, we turn our attention to the balance of the statute and the parties\u2019 arguments relative thereto.\nDefendant argues that section 2 \u2014 725 should be applied as written. Thus, because the statute provides that a \u201cbreach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made,\u201d and tender of delivery of the Dodge Neon was first made in June 1996, plaintiff\u2019s suit, filed in May 2001, was untimely. See Nowalski, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 632 (holding that cause of action for breach of three-year/ 36,000-mile limited warranty accrued when the vehicle was delivered and not when defendant failed to successfully repair the vehicle). Plaintiff argues that a repair warranty cannot be breached until the manufacturer fails to repair the vehicle after a reasonable opportunity to do so, and that the appellate court did not err in finding her complaint was timely filed. See Cosman, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 260 (holding that breach of six-year/60,000mile limited power-train warranty \u201ccannot occur until Ford refuses or fails to repair the powertrain if and when it breaks\u201d); Belfour v. Schaumberg Auto, 306 Ill. App. 3d 234, 241 (1999) (following Cosman and holding that breach of three-year/50,000-mile repair warranty \u201ccannot occur until Audi refuses or fails to repair the defect\u201d); Cogley, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 96-97 (following Cosman and holding that suit for breach of three-year/36,000-mile repair warranty filed within four years of repair attempt was timely).\nWe begin our analysis by turning to the language of article 2 of the UCC. Section 2 \u2014 725(2) plainly states that \u201c[a] breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 725(2) (West 2006). The Nowalski opinion, on which defendant relies, concluded that once article 2 of the UCC is chosen as the analogous state statute from which to borrow the statute of limitations, the analysis begins and ends with the \u201ctender of delivery\u201d language quoted above. Nowalski, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 632. We disagree.\nAlthough courts generally consider article 2 of the UCC to be the statute most closely analogous to the Magnuson-Moss Act, the two enactments are not identical. For example, article 2 addresses warranties that are created by the \u201cseller.\u201d See 810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 312, 2 \u2014 313, 2 \u2014 314, 2 \u2014 315 (West 2006). The Magnuson-Moss Act, however, addresses warranties from a \u201csupplier\u201d or \u201cwarrantor\u201d who may or may not be the immediate seller. See 15 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a72301(4), (5), (6) (1994). In addition, the term \u201cwarranty,\u201d as used in the two enactments, is not the same. As discussed above, the Act speaks of implied warranties and written warranties, the latter of which may be either full or limited. 15 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a72301(6), (7), 2303 (1994). In contrast, the UCC speaks of express warranties (which may be oral or written), implied warranties, and warranty of title. 810 ILCS 5/2\u2014 312, 2 \u2014 313, 2 \u2014 314, 2 \u2014 315 (West 2006).\nAlthough the parties agree that defendant\u2019s warranty is a \u201cwritten warranty\u201d under the Magnuson-Moss Act, they disagree as to whether the warranty is an \u201cexpress warranty\u201d under the UCC. Defendant argues that the repair warranty qualifies as an express warranty and that plaintiffs claim is therefore governed by the tender-of-delivery rule in section 2 \u2014 725(2). Plaintiff argues that it does not qualify as an express warranty and that her claim is not subject to the tender-of-delivery rule.\nSection 2 \u2014 313 of the UCC explains how express warranties are created.\n\u201cExpress warranties by the seller are created as follows:\n(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.\n(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.\n(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 313(1) (West 2006).\nThe UCC makes plain that an express warranty is related to the quality or description of the goods. See Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 78 (1982) (observing that UCC warranty rules \u201cdetermine the quality of the product the manufacturer promises and thereby determine the quality he must deliver\u201d); Alloway v. General Marine Industries, L.P., 149 N.J. 620, 630, 695 A.2d 264, 269 (1997) (stating that \u201cthe U.C.C. provides for express warranties regarding the quality of goods\u201d); Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v. Herbolt, 17 Ohio App. 3d 230, 233, 479 N.E.2d 293, 297 (1984) (identifying UCC express warranties as one of the \u201cwarranties of quality\u201d); 1 W. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series \u00a72 \u2014 313.4, at 546 (2002) (\u201cexpress warranties relate exclusively to quality, description and title of the goods and have nothing to do with the other terms of the contract\u201d).\nIn other words, an express warranty, for purposes of the UCC, obligates the seller to deliver goods that conform to the affirmation, promise, description, sample or model. If a seller delivers conforming goods, the warranty is satisfied. If the seller delivers nonconforming goods, the warranty is breached at that time. Even if the buyer is unaware that the goods, as delivered, do not conform to the seller\u2019s affirmation, promise, description, sample or model, the warranty has been breached. Under this scenario, the statutory pronouncement that \u201c[a] breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made\u201d (810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 725(2) (West 2006)) makes perfect sense, and the four-year limitations period commences at that time. See M. Klinger, The Concept of Warranty Duration: A Tangled Web, 89 Dick. L. Rev. 935, 939 (1985) (\u201cSection 2 \u2014 725(2) presumes that all warranties, expressed or implied, relate only to the condition of the goods at the time of sale\u201d and \u201c[a]s a result, the period of limitations begins to run at that time\u201d); L. Garvin, Uncertainty and Error in the Law of Sales: The Article Two Statute of Limitations, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 345, 379 (2003) (\u201cArticle Two defines a range of express and implied warranties\u201d which \u201c[a] 11 go to the quality of the goods at tender\u201d).\nThe warranty in the present case, however, is not related to the quality or description of the goods at tender. It does not warrant that the vehicle will conform to some affirmation, promise, description, sample or model. Rather, the warranty promises only that the manufacturer will repair or replace defective parts during the warranty period. As defendant made clear in its brief before this court:\n\u201cDaimlerChrysler\u2019s limited warranty was not a promise that the vehicle would be defect free and in the event of a breach of warranty, Plaintiff would be limited to repair or replacement of the vehicle. Rather, DaimlerChrysler\u2019s limited warranty promised to cover the cost to repair or replace defective parts in the automobile for the time period covering 36 months or 36 thousand miles.\u201d\nAlthough defendant\u2019s warranty qualifies as a \u201cwritten warranty\u201d under the Act, it is not an \u201cexpress warranty\u201d under the UCC, and is thus not the type of warranty that can be breached on \u201ctender of delivery\u201d (810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 725(2) (West 2006)). See Cogley, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 96; Cosman, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 258-60; C. Dewitt, Note, Action Accrual Date for Written Warranties to Repair: Date of Delivery or Date of Failure to Repair, 17 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 713, 722 n.35 (1984) (promise to repair \u201crelates not to the goods and their quality, but to the manufacturer and its obligation to the purchaser,\u201d and thus \u201ca repair \u2018warranty\u2019 falls beyond the scope of *** the on-delivery rule\u201d); C. Reitz, Manufacturers\u2019 Warranties of Consumer Goods, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 357, 364 n.24 (1997) (tender-of-delivery date for commencement of four-year UCC limitations provision is \u201ccompletely inappropriate to promises to repair or replace goods that are later determined to be defective\u201d). Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s argument that the four-year limitations period for breach of the repair warranty commenced upon delivery of the Dodge Neon in 1996, and we overrule the Nowalski opinion on which defendant relies.\nOur conclusion that the repair warranty is not a UCC express warranty, and thus not subject to the tender-of-delivery rule set forth in the second sentence of section 2 \u2014 725(2), does not render section 2 \u2014 725(2) irrelevant for purposes of determining when the limitations period began on plaintiffs claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act. The first sentence of section 2 \u2014 725(2) remains applicable. The first sentence states: \u201c[a] cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party\u2019s lack of knowledge of the breach.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 725(2) (West 2006). Although the UCC does not expressly state when the breach of a repair promise occurs, we may refer to the law that exists outside of the UCC. See 810 ILCS 5/1\u2014 103 (West 2006) (\u201cUnless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity *** shall supplement its provisions\u201d); L. Lawrence, Lawrence\u2019s Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code \u00a72\u2014 725:99, at 301 (3d ed. 2001) (because the UCC provides no assistance as to when a nonwarranty breach of contract \u201coccurs\u201d for purposes of computing the limitations period, \u201cit is necessary to resort to the general non-Code law of contracts,\u201d which \u201chas not been displaced by the Code and therefore continues in force\u201d).\nGenerally, \u201c[w]hen performance of a duty under a contract is due any non-performance is a breach.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7235, at 211 (1979). Performance under a vehicle manufacturer\u2019s promise to repair or replace defective parts is due not at tender of delivery, but only when, and if, a covered defect arises and repairs are required. In that event, if the promised repairs are refused or unsuccessful, the repair warranty is breached and the cause of action accrues, triggering the four-year limitations period. See Cosman, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 260 (holding that breach of six-year/60,000mile limited power-train warranty \u201ccannot occur until Ford refuses or fails to repair the powertrain if and when it breaks\u201d); Belfour, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 241 (holding that breach of three-year/50,000-mile repair warranty \u201ccannot occur until Audi refuses or fails to repair the defect\u201d); Cogley, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 96-97 (holding that suit for breach of three-year/36,000-mile repair warranty filed within four years of repair attempt was timely). See also Monticello v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1350,1356-57 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (under Georgia law, a written warranty that provides for repair or replacement of parts is breached when the purchaser returns the product to the dealer for repair and repair is refused or unsuccessful); Poli, 349 N.J. Super, at 180, 793 A.2d at 110-11 (under New Jersey law, cause of action for breach of seven-year/70,000-mile power-train warranty would not have accrued when the car was delivered, but rather when persistent problems appeared or when Daimler-Chrysler was unable to repair the defect); Long Island Lighting Co. v. IMO Industries Inc., 6 F.3d 876, 889-90 (2d Cir. 1993) (under New York law, cause of action for breach of a repair promise accrued when the generator malfunctioned and the seller refused to make the necessary repairs).\nThis is the approach advocated by some commentators. For example, in his discussion of the appropriate treatment of a manufacturer\u2019s express warranty to repair or replace defective parts, Professor Lawrence states:\n\u201cThe sounder approach is to recognize that the failure to repair or replace is merely a breach of contract and not a breach of warranty, and therefore no cause of action arises until the seller has refused to repair or replace the goods. This is because until the seller has failed or refused to make the repairs or provide a replacement, the buyer, not being entitled to such a remedy, has no right to commence an action for damages. As a result, the action is timely if brought within four years of the seller\u2019s failure or refusal.\u201d L. Lawrence, Lawrence\u2019s Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code \u00a72 \u2014 725:101, at 303 (3d ed. 2001).\nAccord L. Garvin, Uncertainty and Error in the Law of Sales: The Article Two Statute of Limitations, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 345, 381 (2003).\nThe correctness of this approach is manifest when we consider consumer claims for breach of repair warranties that run for periods longer than the three years/36,000 miles at issue here. For example, consider the case of a consumer who purchases a vehicle carrying a five-year/ 50,000-mile repair warranty. If the four-year limitations period commences at \u201ctender of delivery,\u201d the limitations period for a breach of the repair promise occurring in year five will expire before the breach even occurs, thus rendering the repair warranty unenforceable during its final year. Statutes of limitations, however, are intended \u201cto prevent stale claims, not to preclude claims before they are ripe for adjudication.\u201d Guzman v. C.R. Epperson Construction, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 391, 400 (2001). Even a four-year warranty could be rendered unenforceable if breach of the repair promise occurred near the end of the warranty period. In that case, the buyer would have only the briefest of periods in which to file suit. See Nationwide Insurance Co., 533 Pa. at 434, 625 A.2d at 1178.\nDefendant argues that concerns about the enforceability of longer-term repair warranties are inapplicable to the facts of this case and without merit. We disagree. Although the repair warranty at issue here ran for three years, our holding in this case will apply equally to longer-term warranties. Such warranties are common in the automobile industry. Adoption of defendant\u2019s position would be an invitation to manufacturers and sellers of automobiles, as well as other goods, to engage in misleading marketing. That is, a manufacturer or seller could use the marketing advantage of a longer repair warranty, yet escape the accompanying obligations of that warranty by pleading the statute of limitations in defense. C. Williams, The Statute of Limitations, Prospective Warranties, and Problems of Interpretation in Article Two of the UCC, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 67, 105 (1983). Such a result is contrary to the very purpose of the Magnuson-Moss Act: \u201cto improve the adequacy of information available to consumers\u201d and \u201cprevent deception.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a72302(a) (1994).\nDefendant also argues that unless the tender-of-delivery rule in section 2 \u2014 725 is given effect, the limitations period for breach of limited warranty actions will be \u201climitless\u201d and \u201cuncertain.\u201d This argument is without merit. Because the promise to repair or replace defective parts is only good during the warranty period, the latest a breach of warranty can occur is at the very end of that period. Accordingly, the statute of limitations will expire, at the latest, four years after the warranty period has run. If breach of a repair warranty occurs earlier in the warranty period, the limitations period for that breach will expire sooner, but in no event will the warrantor\u2019s exposure extend beyond the warranty period, plus four years. Thus, contrary to defendant\u2019s argument, commencing the four-year limitations period from the date the warrantor fails or refuses to repair the vehicle does not result in a limitless limitations period.\nWe recognize, of course, that a fact question may arise as to the date on which a repair warranty was breached which, in turn, would create some uncertainty as to when the four-year limitations period should commence. Fact questions of this nature, however, frequently arise in cases where the statute of limitations has been pled in defense. Resolution of this type of uncertainty is a classic function of the trier of fact. See, e.g., County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 143, 153-54 (1985) (remanding the matter to the circuit court for a factual determination as to when the statute of limitations began to run against the county on its claims for defective design and construction of the county\u2019s administration building); Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 417 (1981) (holding that trier of fact must determine when the plaintiff had sufficient information as to the roof defect to start the running of the limitations period); Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill. 2d 146, 156 (1981) (\u201cIn many, if not most, cases the time at which an injured party knows or reasonably should have known both of his injury and that it was wrongfully caused will be a disputed question to be resolved by the finder of fact\u201d). We therefore reject defendant\u2019s argument that commencing the limitations period when the warrantor fails or refuses to repair the defect \u2014 rather than at tender of delivery \u2014 will create unacceptable uncertainty in the limitations period.\nTurning to the facts of this case, the record indicates that plaintiff brought her vehicle to McGrath and another authorized dealer on several occasions beginning in July 1998. At that point, assuming the alleged defects were covered defects, defendant was obligated (through its authorized dealer) to make good on its repair promise. Plaintiffs lawsuit, filed in May 2001, is therefore timely. Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the judgment of the appellate court which reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant as to count I of the complaint.\nIV\nDefendant next argues that plaintiff cannot seek revocation of acceptance (count III of the complaint) if the underlying breach of warranty claim is time-barred. Because we have already held that plaintiffs breach of warranty claim was timely filed, we necessarily reject defendant\u2019s argument. Defendant further argues, however, that plaintiff is not entitled to revocation of acceptance because no privity of contract exists between the parties, and the relief sought by revocation \u2014 the unwinding of the sales contract \u2014 is nonsensical against a manufacturer who is not a party to the sales transaction. Plaintiff responds that revocation is an equitable form of relief available under section 2310(d) of the MagnusonMoss Act and that the existence of a manufacturer\u2019s written warranty creates sufficient privity to seek revocation against the manufacturer.\nSection 2310(d) of the Act states that \u201ca consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under *** a written warranty *** may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 15 U.S.C. \u00a72310(d)(l) (1994). Revocation of acceptance is a form of equitable relief. See Mrugala v. Fairfield Ford, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 484, 492 (2001). Whether this form of relief should be available against a nonselling manufacturer is an issue on which Illinois state courts have not spoken. Courts in our sister states are divided. Compare, e.g., Hardy v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 120 Md. App. 261, 270-71, 706 A.2d 1086, 1091 (1998), and Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 125, 374 A.2d 144, 150 (1976) (where the Maryland and Connecticut courts held that the remedy of revocation is only available against a seller of goods), with Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 65-66, 433 A.2d 801, 812 (1981), and Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Novak, 418 So. 2d 801, 804 (Miss. 1982) (where the New Jersey and Mississippi courts allowed revocation of acceptance against the remote manufacturer).\nWe note that federal courts sitting in Illinois that have considered this issue have also reached contrary results. Compare Larry J. Soldinger Associates, Ltd. v. Aston Martin Lagonda of North America, Inc., No. 97 C 7792 (N.D. Ill. September 13, 1999) (holding that the plaintiff could pursue revocation against the defendant manufacturer based on breach of the written warranty), with Kutzler v. Thor Industries, Inc., No. 03 C 2389 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2003) (rejecting Soldinger and holding that revocation of acceptance is unavailable against a manufacturer who is not a party to the sales contract). The appellate court in the present case followed the Soldinger line of cases. 364 Ill. App. 3d at 158. After carefully considering the matter, we find Kutzler to be more persuasive, and thus reverse the appellate court\u2019s judgment as to count III of the complaint.\nIn Kutzler, the plaintiff asserted a claim for revocation of acceptance under section 2310(d) of the Magnuson-Moss Act based on an alleged breach of a written limited warranty by Thor Industries, the manufacturer of a motor home which the plaintiff had purchased from Bernard Chevrolet. In holding that the plaintiff could not seek revocation of acceptance against the non-selling manufacturer, the Kutzler court first consulted Illinois law, turning to section 2 \u2014 608 of the UCC. Section 2 \u2014 608, which has not been amended since Kutzler was decided, provides as follows:\n\u201cRevocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part. (1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it\n(a) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or\n(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller\u2019s assurances.\n(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.\n(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.\u201d 820 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 608 (West 2006).\nThe Kutzler court observed that \u201c[t]he language of Section 2 \u2014 608 on its face contemplates that the remedy of revocation would be available against the seller, and not against a non-seller who manufactured the goods.\u201d The Kutzler court also noted, however, that no Illinois state court had yet ruled on whether the remedy of revocation should be so limited, and that courts in other jurisdictions were not in agreement. Ultimately, Kutzler found instructive the analysis in Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., 227 Va. 154, 162, 313 S.E.2d 384, 390 (1984), where the Virginia Supreme Court explained:\n\u201cThe remedy of revocation of acceptance *** lies only against a seller of goods, not against a remote manufacturer. This is so because the remedy, where successful, cancels a contract of sale, restores both title to and possession of the goods to the seller, restores the purchase price to the buyer, and as fairly as possible, returns the contracting parties to the status quo ante. The remote manufacturer, having no part in the sale transaction, has no role to play in such a restoration of former positions.\u201d\nThe Virginia Supreme Court thus held that the remedy of revocation of acceptance \u201cis conceptually inapplicable to any persons other than the parties to the contract sought to be rescinded.\u201d Gasque, 227 Va. at 163, 313 S.E.2d at 390.\nKutzler concluded that the Gasque opinion comports with the language of section 2 \u2014 608 of the UCC and with the underlying purpose of the remedy of revocation. Thus, the court dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s revocation claim against the non-selling manufacturer. See also Smith v. Monaco Coach Corp., 334 E Supp. 2d 1065, 1070 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (following Kutzler and holding that the plaintiff could not pursue revocation of acceptance against the manufacturer).\nThe Kutzler opinion expressly declined to follow Soldinger. In Soldinger, the plaintiff sued the vehicle manufacturer, Aston Martin Lagonda of North America, for breach of warranty and revocation of acceptance under both the Magnuson-Moss Act and the UCC. The defendant manufacturer argued that revocation of acceptance, based on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, must fail for the same reason the implied warranty claim failed: a lack of privity. The federal court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument, stating:\n\u201cSection 2310(d)(1) provides that \u2018a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier ... to comply with any obligation ... under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief.\u2019 In other words, Plaintiffs request for revocation of acceptance may be based on Aston Martin\u2019s failure to comply with either a written warranty or an implied warranty. Clearly, the latter alternative is not available, as the court is dismissing Count II [the implied warranty count]. But nothing in Count III [the revocation count] suggests that it requests relief solely on the basis of the breach of implied warranty claim, or that it is otherwise limited to Count II. *** Defendant\u2019s argument that Count III must be dismissed for lack of contractual privity is unavailing.\u201d Soldinger, No. 97 C 7792. Soldinger also considered whether revocation of ac-\nceptance against the defendant manufacturer was available under section 2 \u2014 608 of the UCC. Relying on Lytle v. Roto Lincoln Mercury & Subaru, Inc., 167 Ill. App. 3d 508 (1988), and Blankenship v. Northtown Ford, Inc., 95 Ill. App. 3d 303 (1981), the federal court ruled that revocation of acceptance was available against the defendant manufacturer even where the plaintiff had no viable UCC breach of warranty claims.\nWe, like the Kutzler court, are not persuaded by Soldinger that revocation of acceptance should lie against a nonselling manufacturer. The Soldinger opinion did not consider the nature of the remedy or the divergence of opinion on this issue, and its rejection of the defendant\u2019s privity argument is not entirely clear. Moreover, as Kutzler observed, the two Illinois state cases to which Soldinger cites \u2014 Lytle and Blankenship \u2014 did not involve revocation claims against a nonselling manufacturer. Rather, they involved revocation claims against the direct sellers.\nNonetheless, Soldinger has been cited with approval by other federal district courts in Illinois. See Jones v. Fleetwood Motor Homes, No. 98 C 3061 (N.D. Ill. October 29, 1999); Schimmer v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., No. 03 C 1884 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2003), vacated on other grounds, 384 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2004); Hamdan v. Land Rover North America, Inc., No. 03 C 2051 (N.D. Ill. August 8, 2003). We remain unpersuaded, however, that simply because the Act allows an action for equitable relief, revocation must be available for all breaches of warranty, irrespective of the status of the defendant or the relationship between the parties. Rather, we agree with Kutzler and Gasque that revocation of acceptance is \u201cconceptually inapplicable\u201d to a nonseller. As one commentator observed: \u201cManufacturers do not tender goods to consumers; consumers do not accept (or reject) goods tendered by manufacturers. Vis-a-vis manufacturers there is no acceptance to revoke.\u201d C. Reitz, Manufacturers\u2019 Warranties of Consumer Goods, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 357, 362 n.17 (1997).\nCiting Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 294 (1986), and Rothe v. Maloney Cadillac, Inc., 119 Ill. 2d 288, 295 (1988), plaintiff argues that, by virtue of defendant\u2019s written warranty, privity is established and revocation should be permitted. Under Szajna and Rothe, a manufacturer\u2019s extension of a Magnuson-Moss written warranty to the consumer establishes privity which, although limited in nature, is sufficient to support a claim for breach of an implied warranty under section 2310(d) of the Act. Szajna, 115 Ill. 2d at 315-16; Rothe, 119 Ill. 2d at 294-95. The limited privity we recognized in Szajna does not change the nature of the remedy plaintiff seeks. Revocation of acceptance contemplates a buyer-seller relationship that is absent here. We are not inclined to extend our holding in Szajna to permit revocation against DaimlerChrysler where plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle \u2014 a used Dodge Neon \u2014 from a Buick-Nissan dealership.\nWe recognize that under the New Vehicle Buyer Protection Act (815 ILCS 380/1 et seq. (West 2006)), a manufacturer may be required to accept return of a new vehicle and make a full refund to the consumer where, after a reasonable number of attempts, the seller is unable to conform the new vehicle to any of its applicable express warranties. 815 ILCS 380/3 (West 2006). The fact that our state legislature has provided this type of remedy to new-vehicle buyers does not persuade us that this type of relief is necessarily available to used-car buyers seeking relief under the Magnuson-Moss Act.\nOur holding does not leave plaintiff without a remedy for defendant\u2019s alleged breach of its repair warranty. Plaintiff may still seek money damages, as well as attorney fees, should she prevail in the trial court on her breach of written warranty claim.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons discussed above, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court reversing the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant as to count I of the complaint, and reverse the judgment of the appellate court reversing the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant as to count III of the complaint. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part;\ncause remanded.\nThe same divergence of opinion on the limitations issue that is exemplified by Nowalski and Cosman exists among our sister states. See generally L. Garvin, Uncertainty and Error in the Law of Sales: The Article Two Statute of Limitations, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 345, 377-81 (2003) (discussing the split among state courts in their approach to repair or replacement promises).\nTangentially, we note that federal courts are not in agreement with Szajna\u2019s interpretation of the Magnuson-Moss Act\u2019s implied warranty provisions. See Smith, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1068-69; Mekertichian v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A., L.L.C., 347 Ill. App. 3d 828, 833 (2004).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sanchez Daniels & Hoffman, LLE of Chicago (Timothy V Hoffman, Heather D. Erickson and Julie Vlaming, of counsel), for appellant.", "Scott M. Cohen and Heidi I. Schmid, of Krohn & Moss, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 102588.\nLUCY MYDLACH, Appellee, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Appellant.\nOpinion filed September 20, 2007.\nSanchez Daniels & Hoffman, LLE of Chicago (Timothy V Hoffman, Heather D. Erickson and Julie Vlaming, of counsel), for appellant.\nScott M. Cohen and Heidi I. Schmid, of Krohn & Moss, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0307-01", "first_page_order": 319, "last_page_order": 345 }