{ "id": 3610849, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ANTONIO D. PIERCE, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Pierce", "decision_date": "2007-10-18", "docket_number": "No. 103272", "first_page": "470", "last_page": "485", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 470" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265520 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "page": "207-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2642295 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/42/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 904", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472930 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0904-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5384608 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578045 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5462052 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821396 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3605030 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607139 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" }, { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604907 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704636 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Nev. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Nev.", "case_ids": [ 4886725 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413-14" }, { "page": "465-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/84/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 N.W.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10655133 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832-33" }, { "page": "832-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/396/0831-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 A.2d 1138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11595174 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1140-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/726/1138-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 A.L.R.3d 271", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3178476 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1898, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" }, { "page": "543-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/171/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Ill. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5109434 ], "year": 1923, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/310/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 255", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413657 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79", "parenthetical": "Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ." }, { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ." }, { "page": "2174", "parenthetical": "Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Ill. 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5247071 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" }, { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/340/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5212816 ], "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "\"But if property was taken feloniously, with force and violence or by putting in fear, in the presence of the owner, it was in legal contemplation a taking from his person (1 Hale's EC. 532; Rex v. Francis, 2 Strange, 1015." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/332/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3334345 ], "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225", "parenthetical": "\"But the taking from the person is not understood to mean that the goods are actually on the person, in a strict sense\"; \"It is not necessary that the taking should be immediately from the person\" (emphasis omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/224/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.E. 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1930, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 904", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472930 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "909" }, { "page": "909" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0904-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5384608 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578045 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0394-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 967, "char_count": 23894, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2451268760457416e-07, "percentile": 0.6088333721386845 }, "sha256": "8e7c10d63900df76080a6750e04e54a2b76235a4f4d2abc6881bdb22700e018f", "simhash": "1:32b24955474cecbf", "word_count": 3954 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:47:26.463284+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ANTONIO D. PIERCE, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Kilbride specially concurred, with opinion.\nOPINION\nIn this case, we must determine whether the modified jury instructions given at defendant\u2019s trial accurately stated the law when they defined the offense of theft from the person to include a taking from the \u201cpresence\u201d of the person. To make this determination, we must decide whether one commits the offense of theft \u201cfrom the person\u201d in Illinois when he steals property that is not in physical contact with the person. The appellate court held that one commits the offense of theft from the person even if the property is not in physical contact with the person from whom it is taken. 367 Ill. App. 3d 203. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nBackground\nOn September 13, 2004, Robert Gallaher was sitting at the bar in the Silver Moon Tavern in Quincy, Illinois, drinking beer. Gallaher had placed $50 on the bar in front of him and, after he paid for his drinks, several bills remained on the bar. Gallaher testified he had his hand on the money while he sat at the bar.\nDefendant entered the Silver Moon and walked up to Gallaher, the only patron in the tavern. Gallaher testified that defendant offered to sell him cigarettes, but he declined. The two then engaged in conversation for several minutes. At one point, Gallaher removed his hand from the money to light a cigarette. Defendant then grabbed the money and ran out of the tavern. The bartender, Linda Sheehan, essentially confirmed Gallaher\u2019s testimony. A surveillance tape from the bar also confirmed the events.\nAt trial, in the circuit court of Adams County, defendant denied taking Gallaher\u2019s money. He testified that he had never seen Gallaher or Sheehan before and that he had never been in the Silver Moon Tavern. Defendant claimed to have been in Joliet at the time of the theft.\nAt the jury instruction conference, the State proffered modified versions of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 13.09 and 13.10 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th). The State\u2019s proffered modification added the phrase \u201cor presence\u201d to the two instructions. The modified version of IPI Criminal 4th No. 13.09 read:\n\u201cA person commits the offense of theft from the person when he knowingly obtains unauthorized control over the property by taking said property from the person or presence of another and intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe modified version of IPI Criminal 4th No. 13.10 read:\n\u201cTo sustain the charge of theft from the person, the state must prove the following propositions: First proposition, that Robert Gallaher was the owner of the property in question, and second proposition, that the defendant knowingly obtained unauthorized control over the property in question, and third proposition, that the defendant intended to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property in question, and fourth proposition, that the defendant took the property in question from the person or presence of Robert Gallaher.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The court gave the modified instructions to the jury\nover defendant\u2019s objection. Also, the trial court refused defendant\u2019s request to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of misdemeanor theft, i.e., theft not from the person. The jury found defendant guilty of theft from the person and he was sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment.\nThe appellate court affirmed. 367 Ill. App. 3d 203. Looking to the plain language of the statute, the court found that \u201c[a] reasonable reading of the statute applies to the situation here. The money was directly in front of the victim, and the money was snatched just after the victim removed his hands from it.\u201d 367 Ill. App. 3d at 206.\nThe appellate court rejected defendant\u2019s argument that, pursuant to People v. Williams, 42 Ill. App. 3d 134 (1976), property must be taken from the victim\u2019s body or clothing in order to be theft from the person. Instead, the court relied on three cases decided after Williams: People v. Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d 904 (2003), People v. Sims, 245 Ill. App. 3d 221 (1993), and People v. Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 3d 394 (1987). 367 Ill. App. 3d at 207-09. Each of these cases held that the property need not be in contact with the victim to constitute theft from the person.\nThe appellate court concluded that theft from the person includes the taking of property from the person \u201cor presence\u201d of another and, consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury using the modified IPI instructions. We thereafter granted defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R 315.\nAnalysis\nThe function of jury instructions is to provide the jury with accurate legal principles to apply to the evidence so it can reach a correct conclusion. People v. Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2004). In a criminal case, fundamental fairness requires that the trial court fully and properly instruct the jury on the elements of the offense, the burden of proof, and the presumption of innocence. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 318 (1998).\nThis case requires us to determine whether the modified jury instructions defining theft from the person to include a taking from the \u201cpresence\u201d of another accurately stated the law. Although the giving of jury instructions is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, when the question is whether the jury instructions accurately conveyed to the jury the law applicable to the case, our review is de novo. People v. Parker, 223 Ill. 2d 494, 501 (2006).\nThe fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. People v. Pack, 224 Ill. 2d 144, 147 (2007). The language of the statute is the best indication of legislative intent, and we give that language its plain and ordinary meaning. Pack, 224 Ill. 2d at 147. In addition, we must consider the entire statute and interpret relevant provisions together. People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 389 (2006). We should not construe words and phrases in isolation. Town & Country Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 225 Ill. 2d 103, 117 (2007).\nThe Criminal Code of 1961, under the heading of \u201cOffenses Directed Against Property,\u201d defines theft as follows:\n\u201c(a) A person commits theft when he knowingly:\n(1) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner; [and]\n^ ^ $\n(A) intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the propertyL]\n?-4 * ;\u00a1;\n(b) Sentence.\n* * *\n(4) Theft of property from the person not exceeding $300 in value, or theft of property exceeding $300 and not exceeding $10,000 in value, is a Class 3 felony.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 1 (West 2004).\nInitially, defendant contends that the trial court erred in giving the modified jury instructions, which included the phrase \u201cor presence,\u201d because theft requires a taking from the actual person of the victim. According to defendant, because the theft statute does not include the phrase \u201cor presence,\u201d it must be construed to exclude takings from a person\u2019s presence.\nThere is a split in Illinois, as well as other jurisdictions, as to whether the phrase \u201cfrom the person,\u201d when used with respect to the offense of theft, includes a taking from the \u201cpresence\u201d of that person. One line of cases holds that, with respect to theft or larceny from the person, the property taken must be in contact with the victim. These cases rely on the purpose behind the original larceny from the person statute, Statutes of 8 Elizabeth (8 Eliz. c.4 \u00a72 (1565)), which was to prevent pickpocketing and purse snatching. This meant the property had to be connected to or in contact with the victim at the time of the theft. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 42 Ill. App. 3d 134 (1st Dist. 1976); Terral v. State, 84 Nev. 412, 413-14, 442 P.2d 465, 465-66 (1968).\nAnother line of cases holds that, as long as the property is in the person\u2019s possession or within the immediate custody and control of the person, a taking is sufficient to constitute theft from the person. These cases reason that, at common law, the phrase \u201cfrom the person,\u201d when used with respect to robbery, included the presence of the person from whom the property was taken. In addition, at common law, theft or larceny was considered a lesser-included offense of robbery. Thus, because the phrase \u201cfrom the person\u201d in the context of robbery included a taking from the presence of another, the phrase must have had the same meaning in connection with theft. See, e.g., People v. Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d 904 (2d Dist. 2003); People v. Sims, 245 Ill. App. 3d 221 (3d Dist. 1993); People v. Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 3d 394 (5th Dist. 1978); In re D.D.S., 396 N.W.2d 831, 832-33 (Minn. 1986); State v. Shepard, 726 A.2d 1138, 1140-41 (R.I. 1999). In both lines of cases, the courts look to the common law, yet draw different conclusions from it. See generally J. Pearson, Annotation, What Constitutes Larceny \u201cFrom a Person,\u201d 74 A.L.R.3d 271 (1976).\nThis court has long held the view that, at common law, theft or larceny was a lesser-included offense of robbery. In Hall v. People, 171 Ill. 540, 542 (1898), we stated: \u201cThe only difference between private stealing from the person of another [larceny or theft] and robbery lies in the force or intimation used.\u201d We further noted that \u201c[t]he two crimes approach each other so closely that cases may arise where it may be doubtful upon which side of the line they should fall.\u201d Hall, 171 Ill. at 543-44. See also People v. O\u2019Connor, 310 Ill. 403, 407 (1923).\nThe view that larceny from the person is a lesser-included offense of robbery finds support among numerous historical scholars. See William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *241 (robbery is \u201c[o]pen and violent larceny from the person\u201d); 5 Tucker, Blackstone\u2019s Commentaries With Notes *241 (1803) (the only recognized difference between robbery and theft from the person is the use of force); 2 E. East, Pleas of the Crown \u00a7124, at 707 (1803) (robbery is a species of \u201caggravated larceny\u201d); 2 W Russell & C. Greaves, Crimes and Misdemeanors (1845) (\u201crobbery is an aggravated species of larceny\u201d).\nMore recent authorities have expressed the same view. See 3 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law \u00a720.3(a), at 172-73 (2d ed. 2003) (\u201cRobbery, a common-law felony, and today everywhere a statutory felony regardless of the amount taken, may be thought of as aggravated larceny\u201d); 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure \u00a7515, at 22 (2d ed. 1982) (\u201cRobbery necessarily includes larceny\u201d). See also Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 278-79, 147 L. Ed. 2d 203, 222, 120 S. Ct. 2159, 2174 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.) (\u201cLarceny was therefore a lesser included offense of robbery at common law\u201d; \u201cThe elements of common-law larceny were also elements of robbery. *** Unlike larceny, however, robbery included one further essential component: an element of force, violence, or intimidation. See 4 Blackstone 242 (\u2018[P]utting in fear is the criterion that distinguishes robbery from other larcenies.\u2019)\u201d).\nHaving determined that, at common law, theft from the person was a lesser-included offense of robbery, the relevant question becomes, What did the term \u201cfrom the person\u201d mean at common law? We answered this question in People v. Braverman, 340 Ill. 525 (1930). In Braverman, this court held:\n\u201c[The terms] \u2018taking from the person of another,\u2019 as used in the common-law definition of robbery, were not restricted in their application to those cases in which the property stolen was in actual contact with the person of the one from whom it was taken, but included within their meaning the taking, by force or intimidation from the presence of the person assaulted, of property which either belonged to him or was under his personal control and protection.\u201d Braverman, 340 Ill. at 530.\nThis court then interpreted the robbery statute in conformity with the common law definition, finding that a taking \u201cfrom the person\u201d included a taking from the presence of another when the property either belonged to that person or was under his control and protection. Braverman, 340 Ill. at 530. See also People v. O\u2019Hara, 332 Ill. 436, 440 (1928) (\u201cBut if property was taken feloniously, with force and violence or by putting in fear, in the presence of the owner, it was in legal contemplation a taking from his person (1 Hale\u2019s EC. 532; Rex v. Francis, 2 Strange, 1015.) \u2018And so it is whether the taking be strictly from the person of another or in his presence only ***.\u2019 (4 Blackstone\u2019s Com. 243.)\u201d); O\u2019Donnell v. People, 224 Ill. 218, 225 (1906) (\u201cBut the taking from the person is not understood to mean that the goods are actually on the person, in a strict sense\u201d; \u201cIt is not necessary that the taking should be immediately from the person\u201d (emphasis omitted)).\nBraverman held that, at common law, the phrase \u201cfrom the person of another\u201d included \u201cpresence.\u201d As noted, this court has also held that, at common law, larceny was a lesser-included offense of robbery. It follows, therefore, that at common law the meaning of the phrase \u201cfrom the person\u201d included \u201cpresence\u201d with respect to both larceny and robbery. See also J. May, Law of Crimes \u00a7294, at 288 (3d ed. 1905) (discussing the offense of \u201cLarceny from the Person\u201d and stating, \u201cAnd a thing is said to be on the person if it is attached *** or is otherwise so related to the person as to partake of its protection\u201d); R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law, ch. 4, at 342 (3d ed. 1982) (discussing the offense of \u201cLarceny from the Person\u201d and stating, \u201cproperty may be under the protection of the person although not actually \u2018attached\u2019 to him,\u201d citing 2 Bishop, New Criminal Law \u00a7898 (8th ed. 1892) (\u201cThe thing taken must be under the protection of the person, but it need not be attached thereto\u201d)). See also 2 W Burdick, Law of Crime \u00a7557, at 332 (1946) (\u201cUnder the statutes, the larceny must be \u2018from the person\u2019, yet this is construed to include from one\u2019s presence providing the property is at the time under one\u2019s protection\u201d).\nDefendant contends, however, that because the Criminal Code of 1961 superseded all common law definitions, we can no longer look to common law to interpret the meaning of \u201cfrom the person\u201d in the current theft statute. In support of his position, defendant points to section 1 \u2014 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, which provides: \u201cNo conduct constitutes an offense unless it is described as an offense in this Code or in another statute of this State.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 3 (West 2004). Defendant also points to the committee comments to this provision, which state: \u201cThe purpose of this section is to complete the process of replacing the common-law definitions of offenses with statutory definitions ***.\u201d 720 ILCS Ann. 5/1 \u2014 3, Committee Comments \u2014 1961, at 12 (Smith-Hurd 2002).\nWe are unpersuaded by defendant\u2019s argument. Defendant ignores other comments to section 1 \u2014 3 that specifically state:\n\u201cHowever, the supersession of all common-law definitions of particular offenses does not mean that the large mass of interpretative rules developed under the common law is superseded: these rules are a highly valuable part of our criminal law, and their effective replacement by statutory law would be exceedingly difficult.\u201d 720 ILCS Ann. 5/1 \u2014 3, Committee Comments \u2014 1961, at 13 (Smith-Hurd 2002).\nDefendant\u2019s conduct \u2014 the taking of another\u2019s property with intent to deprive the owner of permanent use\u2014 constitutes the offense of theft as described in section 16 \u2014 1 of our Criminal Code. The question here is the meaning of a particular phrase in the definition of that statutory offense, i.e., \u201cfrom the person.\u201d As the committee comments acknowledge, the vast array of case law and legal authorities that have considered the common law need not be discarded when interpreting the meaning and scope of statutory offenses. As a result, we hold that the common law definition of \u201cfrom the person,\u201d whether considered in connection with the statutory offense of theft or of robbery, is still relevant. Thus, our discussion in Braverman, defining the phrase \u201cfrom the person\u201d to include the \u201cpresence\u201d of the person, remains viable law and is applicable to the theft statute today.\nDefendant next argues that Braverman\u2019s definition of \u201cfrom the person\u201d is no longer applicable because the legislature amended the robbery statute in 1961 to include the phrase \u201cor presence\u201d but did not similarly amend the theft statute. Defendant contends that, by adding the phrase \u201cor presence\u201d to the robbery statute, the legislature intended that the phrase \u201cfrom the person\u201d no longer have the meaning described in Braver-man. Defendant argues that the phrase \u201cfrom the person\u201d must have a narrower meaning, which no longer includes \u201cor presence.\u201d Otherwise, defendant maintains, there would have been no reason for the legislature to add \u201cor presence.\u201d Moreover, defendant contends that, because the legislature did not similarly amend the theft statute, the phrase \u201cfrom the person\u201d must have the narrower meaning. We reject this argument.\nThe Criminal Code of 1961 provides: \u201cA person commits robbery when he or she takes property *** from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 1 (West 2004). The committee comments to the 1961 amendment, which added \u201cor presence\u201d to the robbery statute, noted: \u201c \u2018... or presence\u2019 is added to incorporate the court\u2019s holding in People v. Braverman, 340 Ill. 525, 173 N.E. 55 (1930).\u201d 720 ILCS Ann. 5/18 \u2014 1, Committee Comments \u2014 1961, at 6 (Smith-Hurd 2003).\nAs noted by the committee comments, the legislature did not intend to make any change in the law when it amended the robbery statute. It was merely incorporating the holding of Braverman. 720 ILCS Ann. 5/18 \u2014 1, Committee Comments \u2014 1961, at 6 (Smith-Hurd 2003) (\u201cNo change is intended\u201d). Although it is a canon of statutory construction to avoid rendering words in a statute superfluous, here the legislature itself admitted that \u201cor presence\u201d was added to the robbery statute simply to underscore that the meaning of the phrase \u201cfrom the person\u201d included the taking of property that is in the possession of or under the control and protection of the victim. The legislature did not change the meaning of the phrase \u201cfrom the person\u201d adopted by Braverman.\nDiscussing a similar situation, the Minnesota Supreme Court held:\n\u201cWhile the legislature added the phrase \u2018or in the presence\u2019 in the robbery statute in order to make it clear that a robbery was committed if property was taken by the use or threat of force from the person of another or in his presence, the legislature\u2019s failure to use the phrase \u2018or in the presence\u2019 in [the theft from a person statute], does not mean that the legislature intended to exclude theft of property under the immediate control of the victim from the offense of theft from the person. There was simply no need to add the phrase \u2018or in his presence\u2019 in the theft statute because this court had already ruled that theft \u2018from the person\u2019 extended \u2018to every case of stealing, where the property stolen is on the person, or in the immediate charge and custody of the person from whom the theft is made.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d In re D.D.S., 396 N.W2d at 832-33.\nWe agree with the reasoning of the Minnesota court. While our legislature could have included the phrase \u201cor presence\u201d in the theft statute, it was not necessary to do so because, in Illinois, the well-defined meaning of \u201cfrom the person\u201d includes a taking from the presence of another.\nConclusion\nWe hold that the offense of theft from the person includes the taking of property that is in the possession of or under the control and protection of the victim. Thus, the trial court did not err in giving the modified jury instructions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nAffirmed.\nThis statute was passed in the sixteenth century and was the first statute that provided for a greater punishment for larceny from a person. J. Pearson, Annotation, What Constitutes Larceny \u201cFrom a Person,\u201d 74 A.L.R.3d 271, 276 (1976).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE" }, { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE,\nspecially concurring:\nI specially concur because the majority opinion tacitly overlooks critical limitations expressed in People v. Sims, 245 Ill. App. 3d 221 (3d Dist. 1993), and People v. Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d 904 (2d Dist. 2003). See 226 Ill. 2d at 477. Sims and Harrell narrowly apply the statutory phrase \u201cfrom the person\u201d in limited situations. Although ostensibly agreeing with Sims and Harrell, the majority adopts a broader interpretation without addressing its implicit expansion of the scope of that phrase.\nSims expressly held that, in addition to property taken from the victim\u2019s person, theft from the person included takings \u201cwhen the victim has been detained or searched *** or when the victim\u2019s privacy has been directly invaded at the time the property is taken [citation].\u201d (Emphases added.) Sims, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 224. Applying that rule, the Sims court reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction, finding that theft from the person did not include the taking of the victim\u2019s purse from her shopping cart while she was standing a few feet away, unaware of the theft. In reaching this conclusion, the court factually distinguished People v. Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 3d 394 (5th Dist. 1987), where the victim was pushed against his car and searched before the defendant removed a wallet and other property from inside the car.\nExpressly relying on the rationale in Sims, the Harrell court reached a different result, upholding the defendant\u2019s conviction. Harrell concluded that the facts were closer to those in Jackson than to Sims, because \u201cthe victim\u2019s privacy was directly invaded\u201d in Harrell. Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 909. The court concluded the victim \u201cwas obviously aware of the theft\u201d when defendant reached around her to take her purse from the shopping cart. Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 909.\nAccordingly, in both Sims and Harrell, when the taking is not from the victim\u2019s actual person the key to the analysis is whether the victim had been detained or searched or suffered an invasion of privacy. Unfortunately, without discussing these analytical limitations, the majority adopts a broader interpretation of the victim\u2019s \u201cpresence,\u201d including all takings of property under the victim\u2019s \u201ccontrol and protection.\u201d 226 Ill. 2d at 479. Although that interpretation could presumably produce a different outcome in Sims, the majority does not broach this possibility, nor does it expressly reject the limitations adopted in Sims and Harrell. Therefore, because I believe these considerations merit examination by this court, I cannot fully join the majority opinion.\nNonetheless, I agree with the majority that defendant was properly convicted of theft from the person even under the analysis in Sims and Harrell. Defendant directly invaded the victim\u2019s privacy by taking money from the bar when the seated victim removed his hand to light a cigarette. Thus, I specially concur in the majority opinion.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and John M. McCarthy, Rosalee Dodson and Jennifer S. Walsh, Assistant Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Jon Barnard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Retha Stotts, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 103272.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ANTONIO D. PIERCE, Appellant.\nOpinion filed October 18, 2007.\nDaniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and John M. McCarthy, Rosalee Dodson and Jennifer S. Walsh, Assistant Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Jon Barnard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Retha Stotts, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0470-01", "first_page_order": 482, "last_page_order": 497 }