{ "id": 5705724, "name": "THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES, Appellant, v. EVERETT WARNER, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Illinois Department of Healthcare & Family Services v. Warner", "decision_date": "2008-01-25", "docket_number": "No. 103289", "first_page": "223", "last_page": "247", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 223" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 520926 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453273 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22", "parenthetical": "Harrison, C.J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5794724 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576828 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3564244 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "\"an adoption will not relinquish a natural parent's obligation to support the child if the adoptive parent is unable to do so\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725351 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461360 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602377 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461199 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450902 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783186 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451063 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736057 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" }, { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477020 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "307" }, { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777553 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "observing that, \"[wjith the exception of the biological parents' residual duty to support their children [citation] *** adoption constitutes a complete and permanent severance of all legal and natural rights between such parents and children\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 1178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265565 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1180" }, { "page": "1180" }, { "page": "1182" }, { "page": "1180" }, { "page": "1182", "parenthetical": "a termination of parental rights ends all parental responsibility, including the obligation to pay child support" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/366/1178-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 Ill. 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2578934 ], "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/366/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604994 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133", "parenthetical": "\"Under the doctrine of in pari materia, two statutes dealing with the same subject will be considered with reference to one another to give them harmonious effect\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060027 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134", "parenthetical": "\"we must presume that when the legislature enacted a law, it did not intend to produce absurd, inconvenient or unjust results\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596066 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220", "parenthetical": "\"The reasons assigned by the [court below] for its judgment are immaterial if the decision is correct. *** An appellee may raise any argument or basis supported by the record to show the correctness of the judgment, even though he had not previously advanced such an argument\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3827903 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "441-42", "parenthetical": "\"Where two statutes are allegedly in conflict, a court has a duty to interpret the statutes in a manner that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes, where such an interpretation is reasonably possible\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5434877 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" }, { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5794724 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576828 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274-75" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736057 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777553 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "\"we consider the Juvenile Court Act in concert with the Adoption Act\"" }, { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "\"we consider the Juvenile Court Act in concert with the Adoption Act\"" }, { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "\"With the exception of the biological parents' residual duty to support their children *** adoption constitutes a complete and permanent severance of all legal and natural rights between such parents and children\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0053-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1280, "char_count": 44294, "ocr_confidence": 0.787, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1009978881569888e-07, "percentile": 0.7617851465471539 }, "sha256": "1e2d200abd222b73de980331d0abb9b48a5845dfddbac0adab3dee2b72b307ea", "simhash": "1:993eac40ea2ff89e", "word_count": 7257 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:56.048909+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES, Appellant, v. EVERETT WARNER, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Garman and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Kilbride dissented, with opinion, joined by Justices Fitzgerald and Karmeier.\nOPINION\nIn February 1996 the Illinois Department of Public Aid, now known as the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services (the Department), filed a petition in the circuit court of Adams County to establish Everett Warner (respondent) as the father of C.S. and B.S. Respondent entered into an agreed judgment of parentage, and the court ordered him to pay child support. In October 2002, in a separate proceeding, respondent\u2019s parental rights were terminated. More than two years later \u2014 in March 2005 \u2014 respondent petitioned the circuit court to vacate the child support order. Relying on section 17 of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004)), respondent argued that the termination of his parental rights had also ended his parental responsibilities, including the obligation to pay child support. The circuit court denied the petition, and respondent appealed. The appellate court reversed. 366 Ill. App. 3d 1178. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.\nBACKGROUND\nDebbie Stover is the mother of C.S., born December 12, 1993, and B.S., born August 18, 1995. In February 1996, the Department petitioned the circuit court, on Stover\u2019s behalf, to establish respondent as the father of the two children, and to order him to pay child support. On March 28, 1996, the court entered a judgment of parentage, pursuant to the parties\u2019 stipulation, finding that respondent was the father of C.S. and B.S. The court ordered respondent to pay child support in the amount of $46.13 per week. In September 1999 the Department petitioned the court for a modification of the child support order. The petition, which alleged that the mother had custody of the children, claimed that there had been a \u201csignificant change in circumstances\u201d since the initial child support order was entered. According to the Department, there was a need for health insurance or some other means of providing for the children\u2019s health care. The Department asked that respondent be ordered to carry dependent health insurance and to pay any uninsured health-care costs. On October 7, 1999, the court increased respondent\u2019s support obligation to $120 every two weeks. However, the court denied the Department\u2019s health insurance request \u201cdue to [the] prohibitive cost to obtain such insurance for the dependents.\u201d The court added: \u201cRespondent agrees to [the] increase in the support obligation.\u201d\nOn October 24, 2002, in a separate proceeding in juvenile court, respondent\u2019s and Stover\u2019s parental rights were terminated. The record in the case at bar contains no copies of the termination orders.\nOn February 2, 2005, respondent filed a pro se motion to end his child support obligation. In support of this motion, respondent noted that both his and Stover\u2019s parental rights had been terminated. At the hearing that followed, the Department informed the court that respondent\u2019s support payments were being used by the state to help pay for the children\u2019s foster care. The Department indicated it would oppose any motion to end respondent\u2019s support obligation. According to the Department, a parent\u2019s obligation to support a child does not end with the termination of parental rights. That obligation would cease, the Department asserted, only if the child were adopted. The circuit court continued respondent\u2019s motion in order to allow him time to consult with an attorney.\nRespondent retained an attorney, and filed a petition to vacate the child support order. The petition was based on section 17 of the Adoption Act, which provides that, after either a termination of parental rights or a judgment of adoption, the natural parents of a child sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all parental responsibility for the child. 750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004).\nOn March 31, 2005, at a hearing on the petition, respondent and the Department stipulated, in relevant part, that (1) respondent had continued to pay child support of $120 every two weeks even after his parental rights were terminated, (2) the children had been in the custody and guardianship of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) since before the date of termination, and (3) the state had received respondent\u2019s child support payments since the date of termination. The circuit court took judicial notice of the juvenile court orders in cases 00 \u2014 JA\u201441 and 00\u2014 JA \u2014 42 terminating respondent\u2019s and Stover\u2019s parental rights, as well as the most recent order in those cases showing that the goal for the children remained adoption.\nDuring the March 31 hearing, respondent argued that, under section 17 of the Adoption Act, he was relieved of all parental responsibility, including any obligation to pay child support. In response, the Department argued that, under In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53 (1993), the termination of parental rights does not effect a complete severance between a child and its natural parents. The parent still has a residual, common law duty to support the child, and this residual duty stands as an exception to section 17 of the Adoption Act. According to the Department, respondent in the case at bar retained a residual obligation to pay child support, even though his parental rights had been terminated.\nOn May 6, 2005, the circuit court entered an order denying respondent\u2019s petition to vacate the child support order. The court stated:\n\u201cPursuant to the clear language of In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 619 N.E.2d 702, 708 (1993), termination of the respondent\u2019s parental rights did not extinguish his obligation to support his children, notwithstanding the language of 750 ILCS 50/17, which was in effect at the time of the holding in In re M.M.\u201d\nRespondent appealed, and the appellate court reversed. 366 Ill. App. 3d 1178. The appellate court held that, under section 17 of the Adoption Act, a termination of parental rights ends all parental responsibility, including the obligation to pay child support. In reaching this decision, the court rejected the Department\u2019s arguments that (1) section 17 did not apply to the case at bar because neither C.S. nor B.S. was in the process of being adopted, and, alternatively (2) even if section 17 did apply, the termination of parental rights did not eliminate a natural parent\u2019s common law, residual duty to support a child. With regard to the first argument, the appellate court acknowledged that section 17, by its terms, applies to \u201c \u2018the natural parents of a child sought to be adopted.\u2019 \u201d 366 Ill. App. 3d at 1180, quoting 750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004). The court also noted the Department\u2019s assertion that there was no evidence before the trial court suggesting that anyone was seeking to adopt C.S. or B.S. Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded: \u201ca fair reading of the statute includes situations where a child is available for adoption, whether or not someone is actively seeking to adopt that child, and where a child has been adopted.\u201d 366 Ill. App. 3d at 1180. The appellate court noted that respondent\u2019s parental rights had been terminated and that the goal for C.S. and B.S. was adoption. According to the appellate court, C.S. and B.S. therefore were available for adoption, and section 17 applied.\nTurning to the Department\u2019s alternative argument regarding the residual duty of support, the court pointed to M.M., upon which the circuit court relied in concluding that respondent\u2019s obligation to support his children survived the termination of his parental rights. The appellate court asserted that M.M.\u2019s mentioning of the residual duty of support was part of a general discussion dealing with historical context. According to the appellate court, M.M. \u201cdid not attempt to address the current viability of any residual duty of support.\u201d 366 Ill. App. 3d at 1182. The appellate court added that M.M. made no specific mention of section 17 of the Adoption Act.\nWe allowed the Department\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315. We also allowed the Cook County public guardian to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the Department. 210 Ill. 2d R. 345.\nANALYSIS\nBefore this court, the Department advances the same two arguments it raised below. First, the Department contends that section 17 is inapplicable to the case at bar because neither C.S. nor B.S. is \u201ca child sought to be adopted\u201d (750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004)). Alternatively, the Department argues that even if section 17 does apply, it does not eliminate a natural parent\u2019s common law, residual duty of support, which survives a termination of parental rights.\nTo address the Department\u2019s first argument, we are required to construe section 17 of the Adoption Act. Our review is therefore de novo. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 307 (2002). The primary objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Harshman v. DePhillips, 218 Ill. 2d 482, 493 (2006); Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 307. The most reliable indicator of the legislature\u2019s intent is the language of the statute, which is given its plain, ordinary and popularly understood meaning. Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 308. \u201cWe read the statute as a whole, considering all relevant parts.\u201d Harshman, 218 Ill. 2d at 493.\nSection 17 provides:\n\u201cAfter either the entry of an order terminating parental rights or the entry of a judgment of adoption, the natural parents of a child sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all parental responsibility for such child and shall be deprived of all legal rights as respects the child, and the child shall be free from all obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects such natural parents.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004).\nAccording to its plain language, section 17 applies to the natural parents of a child \u201csought to be adopted.\u201d The term \u201cseek\u201d is defined as \u201cto make an attempt: TRY.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 2055 (2002). Under this definition, a child \u201csought to be adopted\u201d is one whom someone is attempting or trying to adopt.\nSection 17 does not identify who may seek to adopt a child. This section could reasonably, although erroneously, be construed in isolation to mean that merely by making a child available for adoption the state \u201cseeks\u201d to have the child adopted. This is not the case. Section 2 of the Adoption Act provides that only individuals who meet certain requirements may institute an adoption proceeding. 750 ILCS 50/2 (West 2004). When section 17 is read in conjunction with section 2, it is clear that the state cannot seek the adoption of a child.\nIn the case at bar, there is no indication in the record that C.S. and B.S. \u2014 who are 13 and 12 years old, respectively \u2014 are now, or ever were, in the process of being adopted. Accordingly, under the plain meaning of the relevant statutory terms, neither of them is \u201ca child sought to be adopted\u201d (750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004)).\nNotwithstanding the foregoing, respondent argues that section 17 should not be interpreted as applying only where the child is \u201csought to be adopted.\u201d According to respondent, construing the statute in this manner would lead to an absurd result: \u201cthe statute would not apply to a child who is adopted and therefore no longer sought to be adopted.\u201d Respondent appears to argue that, because of this absurd result, the \u201csought to be adopted\u201d language should not apply after the entry of a judgment of adoption. According to respondent, this language also should not apply after the termination of parental rights. Respondent\u2019s argument, in essence, is that in construing section 17, we should ignore the \u201csought to be adopted\u201d language.\nSection 17 deals with the effect on parental rights and responsibilities of two distinct judicial actions: an order terminating parental rights and a judgment of adoption. In the latter of these two \u2014 the entry of a judgment of adoption \u2014 the result is that the child is adopted. In such situations, where section 17 applies \u201cafter the entry of a judgment of adoption\u201d and the child is adopted, it would be illogical to limit the statute\u2019s application to instances where the child is \u201csought to be adopted.\u201d By definition, a child who is adopted cannot simultaneously be \u201csought to be adopted.\u201d The two terms cancel each other out. However, the same cannot be said of an order terminating parental rights, which does not necessarily result in the adoption of the child. Where the child is not adopted, there is no contradiction in terms \u2014 as there is in the judgment-of-adoption situation \u2014 that would prevent the application of the \u201csought to be adopted\u201d language. Moreover, where the child is not adopted, there is a sound policy reason for limiting the termination of parental responsibilities to situations where the child is \u201csought to be adopted.\u201d Section 17 contemplates that, once a prospective adoptive parent steps forward, the transition to an adoptive parent\u2019s taking financial responsibility for the child can begin to take place. However, where no prospective adoptive parent has come forward, the termination of the natural parent\u2019s support obligation would leave the child with only the state to look to for sustenance. By limiting the application of section 17 to situations where the child is \u201csought to be adopted,\u201d the General Assembly clearly intended to avoid such a result.\nWe conclude that, after the entry of an order terminating parental rights, where the child is not adopted, section 17 applies, as its plain language indicates, only where the child is \u201csought to be adopted.\u201d Conversely, after the entry of a judgment of adoption, where the child is adopted, the \u201csought to be adopted\u201d language cannot logically apply. In so holding, we adhere to the principle that a statute must be given a sensible construction, \u201c \u2018even though such construction qualifies the universality of its language.\u2019 \u201d Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 64 (2004), quoting In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d 233, 246 (1994). We emphasize the limited scope of our interpretation. We are qualifying the reach of the \u201csought to be adopted\u201d language, not eliminating it from the statute altogether. To hold that this language is of no effect, as respondent urges, would render the language superfluous or meaningless. Such a construction is to be avoided, if possible. People ex rel. Ryan v. Agpro, Inc., 214 Ill. 2d 222, 227 (2005).\nWhile respondent in the case at bar argues that the phrase \u201csought to be adopted\u201d in section 17 should simply be ignored, the appellate court below followed a different path to reach essentially the same conclusion. According to the appellate court, \u201ca fair reading of [section 17] includes situations where a child is available for adoption, whether or not someone is actively seeking to adopt that child.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 366 Ill. App. 3d at 1180. In the appellate court\u2019s view, C.S. and B.S. were available for adoption, and section 17 therefore applied, regardless of whether C.S. and B.S. were sought to be adopted. We find this analysis unpersuasive.\nWe initially note that the phrase \u201cavailable for adoption\u201d does not appear in section 17. Rather, the appellate court, without any citation to authority, construed the phrase \u201csought to be adopted\u201d to include children \u201cavailable for adoption.\u201d The appellate court\u2019s analysis ignores the fact that the phrase \u201cavailable for adoption\u201d has a precise meaning in the Adoption Act. See 750 ILCS 50/ 1(F) (West 2004) (defining a person \u201cavailable for adoption\u201d). Had the General Assembly intended to include children \u201cavailable for adoption\u201d within the ambit of section 17, it could have specifically done so. It did not. We cannot depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature. In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 437 (2004).\nFinally, we note respondent\u2019s reference, in his appellee brief, to section 2 \u2014 29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 29(2) (West 2004)). This provision was not raised by respondent in either the circuit court or the appellate court as the basis for his claim that the child support order should be vacated. Respondent has therefore forfeited any argument based on section 2 \u2014 29(2). See Vine Street Clinic v. HealthLink, Inc., 222 Ill. 2d 276, 301 (2006). In addition, before this court, respondent provides no argument with regard to section 2 \u2014 29(2), nor does he explain how this provision relates to his claim. His reference to section 2 \u2014 29(2) in his brief consists solely of the quotation of the statute. Without more, we are unable to review any contentions that might have been made with regard to this issue. 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7). We faced a similar situation in Zaabel v. Konetski, 209 Ill. 2d 127 (2004), where the petitioner raised a point in his reply brief but offered no argument. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Garman, we held that the point therefore was waived. We noted that a forfeited issue may sometimes be addressed in the interest of justice, but stated: \u201c[I]n this case the interest of justice does not require that we search for arguments that [the petitioner] himself has made no attempt whatsoever to provide.\u201d Zaabel, 209 Ill. 2d at 137.\nMoreover, as previously noted, the record in this case contains no copies of the juvenile court orders terminating respondent\u2019s and Stover\u2019s parental rights. It was the responsibility of respondent, as the appellant below, to present a sufficiently complete record to support a claim of error. Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001). The absence of the orders makes it difficult for us to discuss with any certainty the impact, if any, that section 2 \u2014 29(2) has on this case. Under section 2 \u2014 29(2), the termination of parental responsibility occurs in the context of the naming of a guardian. Section 2 \u2014 29(2) provides that, in terminating parental rights, the juvenile court may authorize the guardian of the person of the minor to consent to adoption. An order so empowering the guardian to consent to adoption relieves the parents of all parental responsibility. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 29(2) (West 2004). In the case at bar, because the orders terminating parental rights are not in the record, we do not know if the juvenile court authorized the guardian to consent to adoption and thereby, under section 2 \u2014 29(2), relieved the parents of all parental responsibility. Under these circumstances, we cannot determine if section 2 \u2014 29(2) is relevant to the instant case. Thus, given respondent\u2019s failure to properly raise the applicability of section 2 \u2014 29(2) below, his failure to properly brief the statute before this court, and his failure to provide a sufficient record, we decline to engage in discussion which, of necessity, would be mere speculation.\nWe express no opinion as to whether section 2 \u2014 29(2) could be considered in a case where the record contained support for the claim. We leave for another day the resolution of that question, when we are confronted with an appropriate case.\nNotwithstanding the foregoing, the dissent argues that section 2 \u2014 29(2) should have been included in our analysis, regardless of any forfeiture of the issue or deficiency in the record. According to the dissent, this provision of the Juvenile Court Act \u201cis clearly relevant to construction of section 17 of the Adoption Act.\u201d 227 Ill. 2d at 241 (Kilbride, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald and Karmeier, JJ.). We agree that the interpretation of section 17 \u2014 specifically, the \u201csought to be adopted\u201d language \u2014 is at the heart of this appeal. However, we find unpersuasive the dissent\u2019s argument that section 2 \u2014 29(2) is essential to our analysis.\nUnder section 2 \u2014 29(2), as noted, the juvenile court, upon the satisfaction of certain conditions, \u201cmay terminate parental rights and empower the guardian of the person of the minor, in the order appointing him or her as such guardian, *** to consent to the adoption.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 29(2) (West 2004). Section 2 \u2014 29(2) provides further that \u201c[a]n order so empowering the guardian to. consent to adoption deprives the parents of the minor of all legal rights as respects the minor and relieves them of all parental responsibility for him or her ***.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 29(2) (West 2004). In section 2 \u2014 29(2), it is the order authorizing the guardian to consent to adoption that triggers the termination of parental responsibility. This contrasts with section 17 of the Adoption Act, which provides that, after the entry of an order terminating parental rights, \u201cthe natural parents of a child sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all parental responsibility for such child.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004). Here, the question of the termination of parental responsibility turns on whether the child is \u201csought to be adopted.\u201d\nIn the case at bar, even if we were to consider section 2 \u2014 29(2), as the dissent urges, the statute would provide no help in construing section 17. Section 2 \u2014 29(2) simply has nothing to say about the interpretation of the term \u201csought to be adopted\u201d in section 17. For this reason, we reject the dissent\u2019s contention that section 2 \u2014 29(2) should have been included in our analysis.\nIn sum, neither C.S. nor B.S. is \u201ca child sought to be adopted\u201d under section 17 of the Adoption Act. Contrary to the conclusion of the appellate court below, section 17 does not apply to the situation in the case at bar.\nBecause of our decision with regard to this issue, we need not address the Department\u2019s alternative argument that a natural parent\u2019s common law, residual duty of support survives the termination of his parental rights. We recognize the importance of this residual-duty issue. In addition, we acknowledge that there is disagreement within our appellate court on this question. Compare Bodine v. Bodine, 127 Ill. App. 3d 492, 496 (1984) (\u201can adoption will not relinquish a natural parent\u2019s obligation to support the child if the adoptive parent is unable to do so\u201d), with 366 Ill. App. 3d at 1182 (a termination of parental rights ends all parental responsibility, including the obligation to pay child support). Nevertheless, as we have already held, section 17 of the Adoption Act does not apply to C.S. and B.S. This decision disposes of the appeal in the case at bar.\nThe dissent takes a different view, arguing that section 17 applies in this case and that, under section 17, respondent\u2019s parental responsibilities ended with the termination of his parental rights. In support, the dissent points to In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255 (1990), and In re C.B., 221 Ill. App. 3d 686 (1991). According to the dissent, these cases articulate a \u201cbright-line event\u201d that the termination of parental rights \u201cforever sever[s] all relations between parent and child.\u201d 227 Ill. 2d at 245 (Kilbride, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald and Karmeier, JJ.). The dissent notes that Syck and C.B. were cited by respondent. 227 Ill. 2d at 245 (Kilbride, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald and Karmeier, JJ.).\nThere are three reasons why our analysis does not include Syck and C.B., which appear to support respondent\u2019s claim that, under section 17, the termination of his parental rights ended his parental responsibilities as well. 'First, regardless of whether Syck and C.B. support respondent\u2019s position with regard to section 17, they are irrelevant to our opinion, which holds that section 17 does not apply. A second, related reason for not incorporating these cases in our analysis is that, in his brief to this court, respondent cited Syck and C.B. solely in opposition to the Department\u2019s alternative, \u201cresidual duty of support\u201d argument, a claim which we expressly do not reach. Under the Department\u2019s argument, a natural parent has a residual, common law duty of support which survives a termination of parental rights, and this residual obligation stands as an exception to section 17. See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 62 (1993) (observing that, \u201c[wjith the exception of the biological parents\u2019 residual duty to support their children [citation] *** adoption constitutes a complete and permanent severance of all legal and natural rights between such parents and children\u201d). Syck and C.B. appear to contradict this residual-duty contention. However, it is irrelevant whether Syck and C.B. support or contradict this claim. As previously indicated, because of our holding that section 17 does not apply to this case, it is unnecessary to address the Department\u2019s alternative argument regarding a residual-duty exception to section 17.\nA third reason why Syck and C.B. are not incorporated in our analysis is that, while each of these opinions quotes section 17, neither deals with the central issue in the case at bar: whether, under section 17, a termination of parental rights ends all parental responsibilities, including the duty to pay child support. In addition, neither Syck nor C.B. expressly analyzes the \u201csought to be adopted\u201d language in section 17.\nFor these reasons, Syck and C.B. are not helpful in resolving the question of whether section 17 applies to this case.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the judgment of the circuit court, and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.\nIn his brief to this court, respondent does not argue that C.S. and B.S. were sought to be adopted.\nFor example, such discussion would require us to speculate as to the nature of the arguments regarding section 2 \u2014 29(2) that respondent could have made, but did not. We would, in effect, be acting as an advocate. A reviewing court should not assume such a role. See People v. Jung, 192 Ill. 2d 1, 22 (2000) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting); Vernon Hills III Limited Partnership v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d 303, 311 (1997).\nIndeed, the term \u201csought to be adopted\u201d does not appear in section 2 \u2014 29(2).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent for two reasons. First, the majority\u2019s narrow interpretation of section 17\u2019s \u201csought to be adopted\u201d language, as meaning exclusively the filing of a petition for adoption, creates untenable inconsistencies between section 17 of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004)), and section 2 \u2014 29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 29(2) (West 2004)), addressing parental obligations after the termination of parental rights. See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 61 (1993) (\u201cwe consider the Juvenile Court Act in concert with the Adoption Act\u201d). Second, the majority\u2019s holding is also inconsistent with prior judicial holdings on the effect of the termination of parental rights. The majority avoids these issues by inappropriately finding that Warner procedurally forfeited the argument. A proper analysis of section 17 requires the construction of \u201csought to be adopted\u201d to include DCFS\u2019s efforts to place C.S. and B.S. with an adoptive family. Under a proper construction of the statute, Warner\u2019s duty of support to C.S. and B.S. ended with the order terminating his parental rights and DCFS setting a goal of an adoptive placement for the children. Therefore, I disagree with the majority\u2019s analysis and result.\nTo begin, section 2.1 of the Adoption Act specifically mandates: \u201cThis Act shall be construed in concert with the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.\u201d 750 ILCS 50/2.1 (West 2006). The majority\u2019s construction of section 17 of the Adoption Act conflicts with section 2 \u2014 29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act. The majority acknowledges that we are required to \u201c \u2018read the statute as a whole, considering all relevant parts.\u2019 \u201d 227 Ill. 2d at 229, quoting Harshman v. DePhillips, 218 Ill. 2d 482, 493 (2006). Nevertheless, the majority ignores that section 2.1 mandates that the Adoption Act be construed in concert with the Juvenile Court Act and, instead, declines to address this argument because it contends that Warner forfeited our review by raising pertinent sections of the Juvenile Court Act for the first time on appeal here, by not expounding on its significance to the present case, and by failing to include any termination orders in the record demonstrating that his parental rights were terminated pursuant to section 2 \u2014 29(2). 227 Ill. 2d at 233.\nThe majority bypasses section 2 \u2014 29(2) because the juvenile orders are not in the record. The record in this case indicates that the parties stipulated to the termination proceedings and orders. Those proceedings and the most recent review order were presented to the court as evidence, and the court took judicial notice of the termination proceedings.\nSupreme Court Rule 321 (155 Ill. 2d R. 321) provides that \u201c[t]he record on appeal shall consist of *** the entire original common law record ***. The common law record includes every document filed and judgment and order entered in the cause and any documentary exhibits offered and filed by any party.\u201d Thus, under Rule 321, the juvenile proceedings offered in evidence should be part of the common law record in this case. It may have been a clerical error in omitting these orders from the record on appeal. Even though the record does not contain a copy of the orders terminating Warner\u2019s parental rights, this court is required to take judicial notice of the juvenile proceedings.\nIn People v. Davis, 65 Ill. 2d 157, 161 (1976), this court noted:\n\u201cIn McCormick on Evidence, section 330, at 766 (2d ed. 1972), it is said to be \u2018settled, of course, that the courts, trial and appellate, take notice of their own respective records in the present litigation, both as to matters occurring in the immediate trial, and in previous trials or hearings. The principle seemingly is equally applicable to matters of record in the proceedings in other cases in the same court, and some decisions have recognized this, but many courts still adhere to the needless requirement of formal proof, rather than informal presentation, of recorded proceedings in other suits in the same court.\u2019 *** Taking judicial notice of matters of record in other cases in the same court is simply an application of the increasingly recognized principle that matters susceptible of judicial notice include facts \u2018capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Davis, 65 Ill. 2d at 161, quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence \u00a7330, at 763 (2d ed. 1972).\nHere, the circuit court properly took judicial notice of the proceedings in the juvenile cases, and this court must also take judicial notice of those proceedings. Section 8 \u2014 1002 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:\n\u201cIn case of the review by the Supreme Court of a judgment or order of the appellate court, the Supreme Court shall take judicial notice of all matters of which the circuit court was required to take judicial notice ***.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/8\u2014 1002 (West 2004).\nUnder section 8 \u2014 1002, therefore, this court is required to take judicial notice of the termination proceedings and orders judicially noticed by the circuit court. It is improper for the majority to avoid the issue by finding that respondent has forfeited the issue.\nOn the issue of statutory construction, \u201c[o]ur primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature.\u201d Barragan v. Casco Design Corp., 216 Ill. 2d 435, 441 (2005). We must, therefore, consider all authorities that weigh upon the legislature\u2019s intended meaning of section 17, regardless of whether they were specifically cited by the parties. Indeed, it would be improper to construe a statute in a manner that the legislature did not intend based merely on a party\u2019s shortcomings in argument. This court has never confined itself to the research and argument of the parties, or even of the courts below, in affirming a correct result in the appellate court. See, e.g., People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 220 (1991) (\u201cThe reasons assigned by the [court below] for its judgment are immaterial if the decision is correct. *** An appellee may raise any argument or basis supported by the record to show the correctness of the judgment, even though he had not previously advanced such an argument\u201d). Most importantly, the legislature calls on us to interpret the Adoption Act and Juvenile Court Act harmoniously. Accordingly, section 2 \u2014 29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act should be considered because it is clearly relevant to construction of section 17 of the Adoption Act.\nSection 2 \u2014 29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act states:\n\u201cIf a petition or motion alleges and the court finds that it is in the best interest of the minor that parental rights be terminated and the petition or motion requests that a guardian of the person be appointed and authorized to consent to the adoption of the minor, the court, with the consent of the parents, if living, or after finding, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that a parent is an unfit person as defined in Section 1 of the Adoption Act, may terminate parental rights and empower the guardian of the person of the minor, in the order appointing him or her as such guardian, to appear in court where any proceedings for the adoption of the minor may at any time be pending and to consent to the adoption. Such consent is sufficient to authorize the court in the adoption proceedings to enter a proper order or judgment of adoption without further notice to, or consent by, the parents of the minor. An order so empowering the guardian to consent to adoption deprives the parents of the minor of all legal rights as respects the minor and relieves them of all parental responsibility for him or her, and frees the minor from all obligations of maintenance and obedience to his or her natural parents.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2\u2014 29(2) (West 2004).\nSection 2 \u2014 29(2) specifically provides that an appointed guardian empowered to consent to adoption may give consent when an adoption \u201cmay at any time be pending.\u201d The section\u2019s employment of \u201cmay\u201d and \u201cany time\u201d indicates the termination of parental rights accompanied by an order appointing a guardian with power to consent to adoption strips the natural parent of all rights and relieves him or her of all responsibilities toward the child even though no adoption action may be pending at that time.\nThe majority\u2019s interpretation of section 17 of the Adoption Act creates disharmony between that section and section 2 \u2014 29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act. Both statutes address the rights and responsibilities of natural parents upon termination of parental rights. Both statutes also address a context where adoption is encouraged, either through a judicial order appointing a guardian with power to consent to an adoption at some time, or through DCFS\u2019s promotion of an adoptive placement. Yet, under the majority\u2019s construction of section 17, the statutes resolve natural parents\u2019 subsequent responsibilities differently. Under the Adoption Act, the natural parent\u2019s duty of support continues unless, fortuitously, a third party seeks an adoption. Under the Juvenile Court Act, however, the natural parent\u2019s duty of support ends irrespective of whether any party actually seeks an adoption.\nTo allow this disparity invites absurdity into the overall statutory scheme surrounding the termination of parental rights. I can conceive of no reason why the legislature would treat similarly situated natural parents differently under the Adoption Act and the Juvenile Court Act. See Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 134 (2005) (\u201cwe must presume that when the legislature enacted a law, it did not intend to produce absurd, inconvenient or unjust results\u201d). Moreover, allowing an inconsistency between the statutes violates standard principles of statutory construction requiring us to harmonize the effect of different statutes addressing the same subject matter. See People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 133 (2006) (\u201cUnder the doctrine of in pari materia, two statutes dealing with the same subject will be considered with reference to one another to give them harmonious effect\u201d). Embracing a construction of section 17 of the Adoption Act that allows this disparity violates the legislature\u2019s specific instruction to the courts to harmonize the Adoption Act with the Juvenile Court Act. See 750 ILCS 50/2.1 (West 2004) (\u201cThis Act shall be construed in concert with the Juvenile Court Act of 1987\u201d); see also In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 61 (\u201cwe consider the Juvenile Court Act in concert with the Adoption Act\u201d).\nTo create harmony, both statutes must operate to relieve natural parents of their ongoing responsibilities when their parental rights have been terminated and when DCFS or the circuit court takes some action to promote the child\u2019s adoption. This goal is achieved by construing \u201csought to be adopted\u201d to include DCFS\u2019s seeking an adoptive placement for C.S. and B.S. In fact, the majority concedes that this construction is reasonable. 227 Ill. 2d at 230; see also Barragan, 216 Ill. 2d at 441-42 (\u201cWhere two statutes are allegedly in conflict, a court has a duty to interpret the statutes in a manner that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes, where such an interpretation is reasonably possible\u201d).\nThe reasonableness of this interpretation is demonstrated by the legislature\u2019s repeated instructions to DCFS to facilitate adoptive placements, and DCFS\u2019s extensive efforts to adhere to the legislature\u2019s commands. See 20 ILCS 505/5(r) (West 2006) (\u201cThe Department [DCFS] shall promulgate regulations encouraging all adoption agencies to voluntarily forward to the Department or its agent names and addresses of all persons who have applied for and have been approved for adoption of a hard-to-place or handicapped child and the names of such children who have not been placed for adoption. [A list of such persons] shall be made available, without charge, to every adoption agency in the State to assist the agencies in placing such children for adoption\u201d); 20 ILCS 505/7.1 (West 2006) (\u201cThere is created the One Church One Child Advisory Board to advise the Department [DCFS] in the placement of children by encouraging black churches to help find permanent homes for black children waiting to be adopted\u201d); http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/ adoption/index.shtml (last visited December 12, 2007) (\u201cThe Department helps thousands of adoptable children to find a new home each year. *** DCFS provides and funds a variety of financial and non-financial benefits after adoption or guardianship, including subsidies for families who adopt waiting children or become guardians of children in DCFS care\u201d). These legislative commands and executive undertakings by DCFS contradict the majority\u2019s assertion that \u201cit is clear that the state cannot seek the adoption of a child.\u201d 227 Ill. 2d at 230. Contrary to the majority\u2019s conclusion, section 2 of the Adoption Act, requiring certain qualifications of individuals seeking to adopt, in no way undermines the fact that the state may seek to facilitate a child\u2019s adoption. See 750 ILCS 50/2 (West 2004).\nAdditionally, the majority\u2019s holding is also inconsistent with prior judicial holdings on the effect of the termination of parental rights. Construing \u201csought to be adopted\u201d to include DCFS\u2019s efforts at facilitating adoption, and relieving a natural parent of the duty to support, is consistent with our prior holding interpreting the termination of parental rights as a bright-line event forever severing all relations between parent and child. This court has stated: \u201cTermination of parental rights destroys the parent-child relationship. The effect of a termination of parental rights is made grimly clear by section 17 of the Adoption Act.\u201d (Emphasis added.) In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 274-75 (1990). Likewise, in In re C.B., 221 Ill. App. 3d 686 (1991), the appellate court observed: \u201cWhen viewed from the perspective of the child, the parent whose parental rights have been terminated no longer exists. To be blunt, the situation is as if the parent had died.\u201d C.B., 221 Ill. App. 3d at 688. Warner, in fact, presented these persuasive authorities to us, yet the majority refuses to acknowledge that these cases support respondent\u2019s claim that termination of his parental rights ended his parental responsibilities.\nThe majority\u2019s interpretation of section 17 blurs the previous bright-line rule and creates potential practical difficulties. For example, if the filing of an adoption petition triggers the effect of section 17, what is the status of a natural parent\u2019s obligations when a petitioner voluntarily withdraws the petition, or is found unqualified to adopt under section 2?\nThe majority\u2019s interpretation of section 17 of the Adoption Act also requires us to overlook whether a residual common law duty of support remains even in the wake of the termination of parental rights. See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 62 (\u201cWith the exception of the biological parents\u2019 residual duty to support their children *** adoption constitutes a complete and permanent severance of all legal and natural rights between such parents and children\u201d). The parties presented this issue, but the majority sidesteps it by its construction of section 17 of the Adoption Act. 227 Ill. 2d at 232-33.\nI believe that we must determine this issue to avoid confusion, and we must hold that the common law residual duty to support is abrogated when section 17 applies. In reviewing the residual duty, M.M. and its predecessors all relied on Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630 (1937). The applicable section of the Adoption Act at the time of Dwyer, unlike section 17 of the current version of the Adoption Act, never addressed the duties of natural parents to their children; rather, it only removed the natural parents\u2019 rights respecting the children and relieved the child of any duties to the natural parents. Compare 750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004) (\u201cAfter either the entry of an order terminating parental rights or the entry of a judgment of adoption, the natural parents of a child sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all parental responsibility for such child and shall be deprived of all legal rights as respects the child, and the child shall be free from all obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects such natural parents\u201d) with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, ch. 4, par. 8 (\u201cThe natural parents of a child so adopted shall be deprived, by the decree, of all legal rights, as respects the child, and the child shall be freed from all obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects such parents\u201d). Given this change in the statutory language, the legislature intended natural parents\u2019 common law residual obligation of support to end with the termination of parental rights under section 17.\nTo conclude, I cannot concur with an interpretation of section 17 creating conflict with another statute on the same subject, when a reasonable construction exists that will both harmonize the overall statutory scheme addressing the termination of parental rights and adoptions, and acknowledge DCFS\u2019s adoptive placement efforts. Today\u2019s opinion is also inconsistent with prior judicial holdings on the effect of the termination of parental rights. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.\nJUSTICES FITZGERALD and KARMEIER join in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Diane M. Potts, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.", "Betsy Bier, of Bier and Bier, of Quincy, for appellee.", "Robert F. Harris, Kass A. Plain and Jean M. Agathen, of the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Public Guardian of Cook County." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 103289.\nTHE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES, Appellant, v. EVERETT WARNER, Appellee.\nOpinion filed January 25, 2008.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Diane M. Potts, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nBetsy Bier, of Bier and Bier, of Quincy, for appellee.\nRobert F. Harris, Kass A. Plain and Jean M. Agathen, of the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Public Guardian of Cook County." }, "file_name": "0223-01", "first_page_order": 235, "last_page_order": 259 }