{ "id": 5706027, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. CLARENCE DELTON, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Delton", "decision_date": "2008-01-25", "docket_number": "No. 103420", "first_page": "247", "last_page": "259", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 247" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131035 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060088 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 F.3d 459", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11810060 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/146/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5312521 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" }, { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4821172 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442048 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" }, { "page": "66" }, { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "affirming summary stage dismissal on the basis of noncompliance with section 122 - 2" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3875495 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" }, { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "noting that section 122 - 2 noncompliance can be excused when absence of additional documentation can easily be inferred from the allegations of the complaint and the petitioner's affidavit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223616 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549473 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 847, "char_count": 19106, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8333998699625948e-07, "percentile": 0.7210464779992964 }, "sha256": "be17d18a27f315b53b364c375288e933e565abe6912546bdc82228bbad2e1489", "simhash": "1:e3fa975220b7a9fd", "word_count": 3083 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:56.048909+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appel-lee, v. CLARENCE DELTON, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Fitzgerald, Kil-bride, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nAfter a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, petitioner, Clarence Delton, was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery to a police officer (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 4(b)(6) (West 2000)) and received two concurrent 10-year prison sentences. The appellate court affirmed Delton\u2019s conviction and sentence. People v. Delton, No. 1\u201402\u20141835 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Delton thereafter filed a pro se petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. See 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 (West 2004). The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition, and the appellate court affirmed. No. 1 \u2014 04\u2014 3729 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted Delton\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nBackground\nDelton\u2019s convictions stemmed from a traffic stop, which occurred around 4 a.m. on October 20, 2001. At trial, Chicago Police Officers Heubaum and Miller testified that they observed a Cadillac, driven by Delton, drive through a stop sign at the intersection of Princeton Street and China Place. The officers attempted to pull the car over, but Delton drove for another quarter of a block before stopping in a parking lot. Delton emerged from the car, shouting angrily that he was tired of the police harassing him. Although both officers instructed Delton to return to his car, Delton began to approach them. As he did so, he swung a silver chain with keys attached to the end in a menacing fashion.\nThe officers yelled to Delton to drop the chain and return to his car. Delton, however, continued to approach them. When Delton was within arm\u2019s reach of Officer Heubaum, Heubaum reached forward and grabbed his arm. Heubaum was able to rip the chain from Delton\u2019s grasp and throw it to the ground. Heubaum explained to Delton that the officers had pulled him over because he had failed to stop at the stop sign. Heubaum asked that Delton produce his driver\u2019s licence and insurance card. Delton replied that he had stopped at \u201cthat fucking sign and *** didn\u2019t have that shit\u201d with him. Heubaum characterized Delton\u2019s demeanor as angry, loud, and profane.\nHeubaum told Delton that he was being placed under arrest for driving without a driver\u2019s license and proof of insurance. When Heubaum began to instruct Delton to place his hands behind his back, Delton started to punch and kick both him and his partner. Heubaum was hit in the right elbow and the left shin. The scuffle continued for several minutes, and the officers eventually placed Delton under arrest with the help of additional officers who came to the scene. Once Delton was under control, Heubaum informed him of his rights. At that time, Heubaum noticed the smell of alcohol on Delton\u2019s breath. He also observed that Delton spoke with slurred speech and had bloodshot eyes. Heubaum had never seen Delton before that night.\nOfficer Miller\u2019s testimony corroborated that of his partner\u2019s in most material respects. Miller stated that several of Delton\u2019s punches hit him on the underneath of his lip and on the right side of his face, above the cheek. He was also kicked in the right leg. Photographs of Miller were introduced into evidence during Miller\u2019s testimony. The photographs, which were taken after Delton had been brought to the station, showed Miller with a cut beneath his lower lip and with a red welt on his right cheek.\nDelton\u2019s wife, Carrie, testified that she was with her husband at the time of the incident. Delton tried to stop at the stop sign, but went partly past it. A police car was at the corner and stopped them. Delton pulled his car into the parking lot of the couple\u2019s apartment complex. According to Carrie, Delton got out of his car and told police that he was tired of them harassing him all the time. Carrie stated that Delton was tired of the police \u201cbothering him, the same policemen that he had made a complaint about.\u201d Carrie said that the officers were the initial aggressors and that Delton never hit either officer.\nThe trial judge found Delton not guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol and guilty of two counts of aggravated battery to a police officer. Based on Delton\u2019s extensive criminal history, the court found him eligible for extended-term sentences. Delton received two concurrent 10-year terms.\nDelton\u2019s pro se postconviction petition alleged, inter alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate Delton\u2019s claims involving long-term harassment by Heubaum and Miller. Delton alleged that, prior to trial, he and Carrie spoke to his attorney, with both \u201cexpressing how the complaining officers were the aggressors and that patterns of harassment had been initiated over the past by the very same officers.\u201d Delton further alleged that his trial counsel\u2019s failure \u201cto request within discovery any records of Officer Heubaum and Miller regarding Office of Professional Standards files, and/or possible Disciplinary files of said Officers, prevented [him] from presenting a possible defense of self-defense, and from corroborating his story of harassment.\u201d Delton also alleged that because the incident took place at 4 a.m. in the parking lot of a condominium complex, \u201csomeone living within ear shot surely could have been awakened by all the commotion and either looked outside their window to see what went on or, overhead the conversations of the incident.\u201d In that respect, Delton claimed that his trial counsel\u2019s \u201cfailure to investigate all possible witnesses to the incident\u201d violated his right to receive effective assistance of counsel. Attached to the petition were excerpts from the trial transcript. Delton also attached a four-line affidavit in which he swore that the \u201ccontents\u201d of the petitions \u201care true and correct to the best of his knowledge.\u201d\nThe circuit court summarily dismissed the petition in a written order. With respect to the allegations regarding counsel\u2019s purported ineffectiveness, the circuit court found that Delton did not make the requisite factual showing in his petition. Specifically, Delton claimed that counsel should have contacted residents of the apartment complex where the incident occurred as potential witnesses. Delton, however, did not identify any witnesses, nor did he submit any affidavits from the potential witnesses indicating what their testimony would be. Further the court found that Delton\u2019s petition was \u201cdevoid of any facts supporting his contentions\u201d regarding his complaints about the police.\nIn affirming the circuit court\u2019s judgment, the appellate court agreed that Delton failed to provide the required factual support for his claims and upheld the circuit court\u2019s summary dismissal on that basis. No. 1\u201404\u20143729 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court then went on to note that even assuming that Delton had provided adequate support for his allegations, his petition failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced under the test formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). No. 1\u201404\u20143729 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nAnalysis\nThe Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a mechanism by which those under criminal sentence in this state can assert that their convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under either the federal or the state constitution. See 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2004). Proceedings under the Act are commenced by the filing of a petition in the circuit court in which the original proceeding took place. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(b) (West 2004). Section 122 \u2014 2 of the Act requires that the petition must, among other things, \u201cclearly set forth the respects in which petitioner\u2019s constitutional rights were violated.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2 (West 2004). Moreover, the Act requires that the petition \u201cshall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2 (West 2004). Section 122\u2014 2.1 directs, in noncapital cases, that \u201c[i]f the [circuit] court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a written order ***. *** If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to this Section, the court shall order the petition to be docketed for further consideration in accordance with Sections 122 \u2014 4 through 122 \u2014 6.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122\u2014 2.1(a)(2), (b) (West 2004).\nThis court has stated that a petitioner, under section 122 \u2014 2.1, must \u201cset forth the specific manner in which his rights were violated.\u201d People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 74 (1988). A postconviction petition is considered frivolous or patently without merit if the petition\u2019s allegations, taken as true, fail to present the \u201cgist of a constitutional claim.\u201d People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). Owing to the fact that most petitions are drafted at this stage by petitioners with little legal knowledge or training, this court has viewed the threshold at this stage of the proceedings to be low. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418. Thus, a petitioner \u201cneed only present a limited amount of detail\u201d in the petition (Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418) and need not make legal arguments or cite to legal authority (Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 74).\nHowever a \u201climited amount of detail\u201d does not mean that a pro se petitioner is excused from providing any factual detail at all surrounding the alleged constitutional deprivation. Such a position would contravene the language of the Act that requires some factual documentation which supports the allegations to be attached to the petition or the absence of such documentation to be explained. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2 (West 2004). This court has held that the purpose of section 122 \u2014 2 is to establish that a petition\u2019s allegations are capable of \u201cobjective or independent corroboration.\u201d People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 333 (2005), citing People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 67 (2002). We have also held that the affidavits and exhibits which accompany a petition must identify with reasonable certainty the sources, character, and availability of the alleged evidence supporting the petition\u2019s allegations. People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993). Thus, while a pro se petition is not expected to set forth a complete and detailed factual recitation, it must set forth some facts which can be corroborated and are objective in nature or contain some explanation as to why those facts are absent. As a result, the failure to either attach the necessary \u201c \u2018affidavits, records, or other evidence\u2019 or explain their absence is \u2018fatal\u2019 to a post-conviction petition [citation] and by itself justifies the petition\u2019s summary dismissal.\u201d Collins, 202 Ill. 2d at 66, citing People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380 (1998), quoting People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 26 (1952). Our review of the dismissal of a postconviction petition is de novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 389.\nThe circuit court believed that Delton\u2019s claim was waived because it covered matters which could have been raised on direct appeal. The court, however, proceeded to note that even if the matter was not subject to waiver, the petition failed to satisfy the supporting evidence requirements of section 122 \u2014 2. The appellate court concluded that waiver was not a bar to the claims but agreed that Delton failed to support his allegations with the requisite affidavits or other documents as required under section 122 \u2014 2. The appellate court then noted, in dicta, that even if Delton had satisfied section 122 \u2014 2, his petition failed to state the gist of a constitutional claim. No. 1\u201404\u20143729 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nThus, the case presents two questions: (i) Did Delton properly support his petition under section 122 \u2014 2? And if so (ii) did his petition set forth the gist of a constitutional claim so as to survive the first-stage postconviction scrutiny? If this court answers the first question in the negative, it need not reach the second.\nDelton argues his allegations regarding police harassment are supported by the excerpts from the trial transcript that he attached to his petition. Delton attached a copy of a portion of his wife\u2019s cross-examination testimony in which she stated that when Delton exited his car \u201che was saying he was tired of them harassing him, bothering him, the same policemen that he had made a complaint about.\u201d Delton also attached a portion of his trial counsel\u2019s closing argument in which the following exchange occurred:\n\u201c[Defense Counsel]: The Court has heard two types of testimony, one from the State\u2019s witnesses who were saying that Mr. Delton approached them. Carrie Delton tells you on the stand she didn\u2019t recall him approaching them. He was loud and angry.\nTHE COURT: He was what?\n[Defense Counsel]: Loud and angry because he at that point felt like he was being harassed by the police. That\u2019s the testimony from Miss Delton.\nTHE COURT: He was being harassed for not stopping? You think he had sufficient grounds to be angry with the police?\n[Defense Counsel]: Apparently it stressed him from having a familiarity with those police on prior occasions. I believe that\u2019s what he was getting at when he said why do you people keep harassing me. He was angry at that point. The only question is did he hit any of those officers.\u201d\nDelton also maintains that these transcript excerpts, coupled with the details in his petition concerning his consultations with his attorney regarding police harassment, satisfy section 122 \u2014 2.\nIn our view, the transcript excerpts do not provide the requisite factual support for Delton\u2019s postconviction allegations that his counsel did not investigate instances of prior police harassment. There is nothing in the transcripts that support Delton\u2019s claim that he had told his attorney prior to trial that he had filed a complaint against the same two officers. The excerpt from Carrie\u2019s testimony was taken from her cross-examination by the assistant State\u2019s Attorney and was the first mention at trial of a complaint against the officers by defendant. By itself, it does nothing to support an inference that defense counsel had been told about the complaint. Defendant suggests that defense counsel\u2019s reference to Delton\u2019s \u201cfamiliarity with those police on prior occasions\u201d during his closing argument reveals that he did know about Del-ton\u2019s previous complaint and only belatedly tried to bring it up. Given that Carrie had just earlier told the assistant State\u2019s Attorney that Delton had made a complaint against the same officers, the excerpt cannot be used to show defense counsel\u2019s knowledge about the incident came from Delton prior to trial. These excerpts, standing alone, do not support Delton\u2019s allegation in the petition that both he and Carrie spoke to his attorney and told him about the complaining officers\u2019 pattern of harassment against him. Delton\u2019s petition does not contain an affidavit from Carrie attesting to the date and nature of the conversation she purportedly had with trial counsel, and Delton\u2019s petition itself lacks any specifics regarding the conversation. Delton included no explanation for the absence of such documentation in his petition, and we can think of no reason why obtaining an affidavit from his wife would be difficult. Accordingly, the excerpts from the trial transcript, coupled with the petition\u2019s allegations, do not satisfy section 122 \u2014 2\u2019s additional-documentation requirements.\nDelton next maintains that his petition contains facts from which the court could easily have inferred the explanation as to why additional evidence was not provided. See People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 333 (2005) (noting that section 122 \u2014 2 noncompliance can be excused when absence of additional documentation can easily be inferred from the allegations of the complaint and the petitioner\u2019s affidavit). Delton suggests that it is unreasonable for a pro se petitioner to expect to receive police disciplinary records without the assistance of counsel. While we acknowledge that obtaining information on police disciplinary proceedings requires a subpoena (Ashafa v. City of Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1998)), Delton, himself, allegedly made the complaint against the officers in question. Delton therefore did not have to rely on the Chicago police department\u2019s answer to a subpoena for documentary support. Because Delton filed the charges, he could easily have supported his petition with a copy of the complaint he filed against Heubaum and Miller or with the specifics about the filing of that complaint if, in fact, he had filed one. Given that such information is within Delton\u2019s personal knowledge, it is neither unreasonable nor unjust to expect his petition to contain supporting documentation of this caliber.\nIn his petition, Delton also alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to interview all possible witnesses to the incident. Specifically, Delton stated that someone \u201cliving within ear shot surely could have been awakened by all the commotion, and either looked outside their window to see what went on or overheard the conversations of the incident.\u201d However, Delton did not allege that someone actually saw or heard the incident, just that his attorney \u201cfailed\u201d to investigate all possible witnesses. This amounts to nothing more than a broad conclusory allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. Such allegations are not allowed under the Act. People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 453 (2005), citing People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418 (1999).\nDelton\u2019s petition does not contain the affidavits, records, or other evidence that support his allegations, as is required by section 122 \u2014 2. Nor does the petition explain why those documents are absent, also required by section 122 \u2014 2. For that reason, the circuit court\u2019s summary dismissal was proper. See Collins, 202 Ill. 2d at 62 (affirming summary stage dismissal on the basis of noncompliance with section 122 \u2014 2).\nConclusion\nThe circuit court properly dismissed Delton\u2019s post-conviction petition for failing to attach the required supporting affidavits and exhibits. The judgment of the appellate court is therefore affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nThis affidavit is the verification affidavit required under section 122 \u2014 1(b) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(b) (West 2004).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Kerry D. Goettsch, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Annette Collins and Peter Maltese, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 103420.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appel-lee, v. CLARENCE DELTON, Appellant.\nOpinion filed January 25, 2008.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Kerry D. Goettsch, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Annette Collins and Peter Maltese, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0247-01", "first_page_order": 259, "last_page_order": 271 }