{ "id": 5706009, "name": "JOHN BUENZ, as Special Adm'r of the Estate of Olga L. Buenz, Deceased, v. FRONTLINE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY et al. (Frontline Transportation Company, Appellant; China Ocean Shipping Company Americas, Inc., Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Buenz v. Frontline Transportation Co.", "decision_date": "2008-01-25", "docket_number": "No. 103562", "first_page": "302", "last_page": "321", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 302" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604994 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122", "parenthetical": "\"the failure to raise an issue in a petition for leave to appeal results in the forfeiture of that issue before this court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060088 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610710 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 1043", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3617614 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1045" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/171/1043-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5462131 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 F. Supp. 2d 1115", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9118547 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/263/1115-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 2d 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5269498 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341, 346-47" }, { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/47/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 2d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2534825, 2535772 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/132/0519-01", "/ill-app-2d/132/0519-02" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35334 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 1088", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208108 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1089" }, { "page": "1093" }, { "page": "1093" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/1088-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 1077", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266348 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1078" }, { "page": "1078" }, { "page": "1079" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/1077-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 1074", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511397 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1076" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/1074-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209191 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" }, { "page": "475" }, { "page": "475" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "477" }, { "page": "477" }, { "page": "477" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "477" }, { "page": "477" }, { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2848905 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" }, { "page": "363-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959032 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "no indemnity for indemnitee's own negligence where language referred to \"claims 'arising out of any such work' - 'such work' being that performed by [indemnitor's] employees under the contract\"" }, { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933558 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "no indemnity for indemnitee's own negligence where indemnity clause covered \" 'all expenses, claims, suits, or judgments *** by reason of, arising out of, or connected with, accidents, injuries, or damages, which may occur upon or about the Subcontractor's work' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 Ill. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2468703 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" }, { "page": "432" }, { "page": "432" }, { "page": "433" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "432" }, { "page": "433" }, { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/395/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607023 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607075 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266769 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/0010-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1016, "char_count": 33261, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.999467420520748e-07, "percentile": 0.8522875271878785 }, "sha256": "5c8898d868316eb7d9b2673a3943a17d079340c180d710b396d7cf47300e0e06", "simhash": "1:a1fdbbeba9dabaad", "word_count": 5160 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:56.048909+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JOHN BUENZ, as Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Olga L. Buenz, Deceased, v. FRONTLINE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY et al. (Frontline Transportation Company, Appellant; China Ocean Shipping Company Americas, Inc., Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CARMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Fitzgerald, Karmeier and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman and Kil-bride took no part in the decision.\nOPINION\nOn October 1, 2003, Olga Buenz was involved in a multiple-vehicle traffic accident that resulted in her death. Twelve separate actions were filed by various plaintiffs and later consolidated. Each action named China Ocean Shipping Company Americas, Inc. (COSCO), and Frontline Transportation Company (Frontline) as defendants. Plaintiff John Buenz, Olga\u2019s husband, filed a wrongful-death action alleging negligence on the part of defendants COSCO, Frontline, and Vincente A. Zepeda, Frontline\u2019s alleged employee and the driver of the tractor-trailer that Buenz alleges caused the accident.\nIn June 2004, COSCO filed a counterclaim against Frontline and Zepeda. Count IV of this counterclaim sought a declaration that Frontline be obligated, pursuant to express contractual terms set forth in an equipment interchange agreement, to indemnify COSCO for \u201cany and all costs, expenses, damages, and liability *** in the Buenz litigation.\u201d COSCO moved for and was granted summary judgment on this count by the circuit court of Cook County.\nIn addition to granting the motion for summary judgment, the court entered a written finding pursuant to Rule 304(a) that there was no just reason to delay appeal or enforcement of the judgment. 210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). Subsequently, the court specified that its order applied to all pending consolidated cases. It is undisputed that the meaning and legal effect of the equipment interchange agreement is identical in each case.\nAfter its motion to reconsider was denied, Frontline appealed. The appellate court affirmed and remanded. 368 Ill. App. 3d 10. Frontline then petitioned for and was allowed leave to appeal to this court pursuant to Rule 315 (210 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nBACKGROUND\nJohn Buenz\u2019s complaint alleged that a tractor-trailer operated by Zepeda, a Frontline employee, struck a minibus in which his wife Olga was a passenger, causing her death. The complaint further alleged that COSCO \u201cowned and/or owned a leasehold on, maintained, and/or controlled the trailer and/or container which were part of the tractor trailer\u201d driven by Zepeda. While the complaint alleged that Frontline committed various negligent acts which caused the accident and the death of Olga Buenz, it also alleged that COSCO committed several negligent acts that contributed to the accident. These acts and omissions included COSCO\u2019s permitting the tractor and/or container to be used and operated when it knew or should have known that it was not in safe operating condition; permitting the trailer to be used and operated when it knew or should have known that it was not equipped with proper brakes; and failing to inspect and repair the trailer.\nTo defend against these claims, COSCO relied on an equipment interchange agreement. This agreement dealt with the relationship between COSCO and Frontline regarding the use and/or interchange of equipment. In relevant part, the agreement provided:\n\u201c3. ACQUIRING CARRIER [defined as Frontline] Responsibility and Liability:\n* * *\nD. The ACQUIRING CARRIER shall be responsible to The Line [defined as COSCO] for the performance of this agreement whether such equipment may be in the possession of itself or others, until return of the equipment to The Line.\nF. INDEMNITY \u2014 The ACQUIRING CARRIER shall indemnify The Line against, and hold The Line harmless for any and all claims, demands, actions, suits, proceedings, costs, expenses, damages, and liability, including without limitation attorney\u2019s fees, arising out of, [in] connection with, or resulting from the possession, use, operation or returning of the equipment during all periods when the equipment shall be out of the possession of The Line.\u201d\nThe parties agree that the interchange agreement described above was in full force and effect at the time of the collision at issue in this case. Moreover, there is no dispute that Frontline is in the business of providing freight transportation by interstate trucks, including tractor-trailers. Additionally, Frontline has admitted that it had a contractual relationship with Zepeda, the driver of the tractor-trailer involved in the accident.\nFrontline contends that COSCO is not entitled to indemnification based upon the interchange agreement. Specifically, Frontline asserts that the phrase \u201cany and all,\u201d as used in the interchange agreement, is neither explicit nor clear enough to signify the parties\u2019 intention that Frontline indemnify COSCO for claims resulting from COSCO\u2019s own negligence. Additionally, Frontline argues that the negligence claims filed against COSCO do not fall within the scope of the indemnity provision because they relate to periods in which the equipment was in, rather than out, of the possession of COSCO.\nCOSCO responds that the facts, viewed in conjunction with the explicit language of the interchange agreement, establish as a matter of law that in the underlying litigation Frontline is obligated to indemnify and hold COSCO harmless for any and all costs, expenses, damages, and liability, including attorney fees. COSCO argues that the phrase \u201cany and all\u201d contained in the interchange agreement establishes the parties\u2019 intent that COSCO be indemnified even against claims arising out of its own negligence. COSCO asserts that Frontline\u2019s argument that the negligence claims filed against it do not fall within the scope of the indemnity provision has been forfeited, as it was not raised in Frontline\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. Barring forfeiture, COSCO asserts that the negligence claims against it do fall within the scope of the conduct described in the indemnity provision.\nANALYSIS\nAs noted, Frontline asserts that the appellate court improperly affirmed the circuit court\u2019s grant of COSCO\u2019s motion for summary judgment and subsequent denial of Frontline\u2019s motion to reconsider. This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2007). Reviewing a summary judgment disposition, this court construes all evidence strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Forsythe, 224 Ill. 2d at 280.\nAn indemnity agreement is a contract and is subject to contract interpretation rules. Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 224 Ill. 2d 550, 556 (2007). The cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to discern the parties\u2019 intent from the contract language. Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 556. Where the contract language is unambiguous, it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 556.\nI. Construction of the Equipment Interchange Agreement\nThis court has previously considered whether an indemnity agreement provided indemnification for an indemnitee\u2019s own negligence. In Westinghouse Electric Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe Building Corp., 395 Ill. 429, 430 (1946), an elevator repair company employee was hit by a falling elevator and died. It was conceded that the injury and death were due to the negligence of the building owner\u2019s employee\u2019s negligence. The elevator repair company made payments pursuant to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and then sued the building owner to recover the amount paid based on the owner\u2019s negligence. The parties\u2019 indemnity contract provided:\n\u201c \u2018The contractor [repair company/indemnitor] further agrees to indemnify and hold the owner, the owner\u2019s employees and agents, the Architects and Engineers, and the City of Chicago, wholly harmless from any damages, claims, demands or suit by any person or persons arising out of any acts or omissions by the Contractor, his agents, servants or employees in the course of any work done in connection with any of the matters set out in these specifications, and the contractor shall carry at his own expense insurance in a company satisfactory to the owner to cover the aforesaid liabilities.\u2019 \u201d Westinghouse Electric, 395 Ill. at 432.\nConstruing the above language, both the trial and appellate courts found in favor of the elevator repair company. This court affirmed, holding that the contract language was insufficient to indemnify the owner/ indemnitee for the owner/indemnitee\u2019s own negligence.\nThe language of the contract at issue in Westinghouse supports this conclusion. The repair company/indemnitor \u201cagrees to indemnify and hold the owners *** wholly harmless from any damages *** arising out of any acts or omissions by the Contractor [repair company/ indemnitor].\u201d Westinghouse Electric, 395 Ill. at 432. This clearly refers to and provides indemnity for acts or omissions by the repair company/indemnitor. Because the negligence at issue in Westinghouse was that of the owner, then, it could not be considered an act or omission by the repair company and the indemnity contract could not apply.\nThis court recognized, however, that in certain circumstances a contract could indemnify a person for that person\u2019s own negligence. We stated that \u201c[i]t is quite generally held that an indemnity contract will not be construed as indemnifying one against his own negligence, unless such a construction is required by clear and explicit language of the contract [citations] or such intention is expressed in unequivocal terms.\u201d Westinghouse Electric, 395 Ill. at 433. We then held that, under the facts of Westinghouse, to adopt a construction of the contract that would provide indemnity for the owner/ indemnitee \u201cwould impose on the contractor [repair company] the duty to indemnify against injuries entirely without his control, and such should not be adopted in the absence of clear language in the contract including injuries arising from the negligence of [the owner\u2019s] own servants.\u201d Westinghouse Electric, 395 Ill. at 434.\nThis court has had occasion to review other contracts that were purported to indemnify an indemnitee for its own negligence. Tatar v. Maxon Construction Co., 54 Ill. 2d 64, 66 (1973) (no indemnity for indemnitee\u2019s own negligence where indemnity clause covered \u201c \u2018all expenses, claims, suits, or judgments *** by reason of, arising out of, or connected with, accidents, injuries, or damages, which may occur upon or about the Subcontractor\u2019s work\u2019 \u201d); Zadak v. Cannon, 59 Ill. 2d 118, 121 (1974) (no indemnity for indemnitee\u2019s own negligence where language referred to \u201cclaims \u2018arising out of any such work\u2019 \u2014 \u2018such work\u2019 being that performed by [indemnitor\u2019s] employees under the contract\u201d); Schek v. Chicago Transit Authority, 42 Ill. 2d 362, 363 (1969) (providing indemnity for indemnitee\u2019s own negligence where language stated that indemnitor \u201c \u2018shall indemnify and save harmless *** Chicago Transit Authority [indemnitee] from all claims for any such loss, damage, injury or death, whether caused by the negligence of Licensor, Chicago Transit Authority, their agents or employees, or otherwise\u2019 \u2019\u2019j. We have also noted, however, that it \u201cserve[s] no useful purpose to attempt to analyze or reconcile the numerous cases interpreting indemnity-clauses\u201d since each individual case \u201cdepends upon the particular language used and the factual setting of the case.\u201d Zadak, 59 Ill. 2d at 121. While these cases, and the others cited below, do not involve the precise language in this case, they do provide guidance for our analysis of the similar language at issue here.\nFrontline asserts that a review of case law from various appellate districts establishes that the interchange agreement between COSCO and Frontline does not provide COSCO indemnity from its own negligence. Chiefly, Frontline relies upon Karsner v. Lechters Illinois, Inc., 331 Ill. App. 3d 474 (2002). Frontline acknowledges that the appellate court in this case declined to follow Karsner, but Frontline contends that the language of the indemnification provision in Karsner is similar to the language of the indemnification provision at issue in this case.\nIn Karsner, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendants for injuries he sustained while unloading a trailer containing the defendants\u2019 merchandise. Karsner, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 475. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants had negligently loaded the trailer such that when he delivered and unloaded the trailer he was injured. Karsner, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 475. The defendants filed a third-party indemnity action against the plaintiffs employer and its parent company (collectively, the employer). Karsner, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 475. The defendants and the employer had a contract which contained the following provision:\n\u201c \u2018Carrier [the employer] shall indemnify and hold Lechters [a defendant] harmless from and against any and all claims, actions [sic] damages, liability and expense, including attorneys fees, in connection with loss of life, personal injury, and/or damage to property arising from or out of the pickup, transportation and delivery of the property of Lechters by carrier, and the use of any motor vehicle or other equipment by Carrier in connection therewith.\u2019 \u201d Karsner, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 476.\nLike the agreement in this case, the agreement in Kars-ner broadly provided indemnity from and against \u201cany and all claims.\u201d\nThe Karsner court, construing the provision quoted above, found that even though \u201cthe contract states that Navajo [the employer] shall indemnify and \u2018hold Lechters harmless from and against any and all claims, actions [sic] damages, liability and expense,\u2019 this language is insufficient to give Lechters indemnity for its own negligence.\u201d Karsner, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 477. Supporting its position, the Karsner court pointed to this court\u2019s decision in Westinghouse as well as another appellate decision, McNiff v. Millard Maintenance Service Co., 303 Ill. App. 3d 1074 (1999). Additionally, the Karsner court indicated a concern that any interpretation which required the employer to indemnify the defendants for the defendants\u2019 own negligence would contravene established public policy.\nIn citing Westinghouse, the Karsner court pointed out that Westinghouse \u201cprovid[ed] that the language \u2018hold *** harmless from any damages, claims, demands or suit by any person, arising out of any acts or omissions\u2019 was not clear and specific language rendering the subcontractor liable for the general contractor\u2019s own negligence.\u201d Karsner, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 477. What the Karsner court did not point out, however, was that the indemnity agreement in Westinghouse contained language in addition to that expressed directly above. The agreement in Westinghouse, more fully expressed, stated that the indemnitor \u201c \u2018agrees to indemnify and hold the owner *** wholly harmless from any damages *** arising out of any acts or omissions by the Contractor [indemnitor].\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) Westinghouse Electric, 395 Ill. at 432. This limiting language clearly indicates that the agreement provided indemnity only for acts or omissions by the indemnitor.\nIn citing McNiff, the Karsner court pointed out that McNiff \u201cprovid[ed] that the phrase, \u2018indemnify *** from and against any and all *** liabilities\u2019 was insufficient to provide indemnification for the indemnitee\u2019s own negligence.\u201d Karsner, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 477. The indemnification agreement in McNiff also provided, however, that the indemnification covered any and all claims \u201c \u2018relating to *** allegedly or actually arising out of or incidental to the Work, including, without limiting the foregoing, all acts and omissions of the officers, employees and agents of Contractor [the indemnitor] or any of its subcontractors. \u2019 \u201d McNiff, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 1076. The McNiff court\u2019s finding, then, is specifically supported by limiting language within the contract.\nThe above analysis makes evident that the Karsner court\u2019s reliance on Westinghouse and McNiff is misplaced. The indemnification language in Westinghouse is specifically limited to \u201cany and all\u201d claims arising out of or in connection with the acts or omissions of the indemnitor just as the indemnification language in McNiff is specifically limited to \u201cany and all\u201d claims arising out of what the McNiff court considered to be the indemnitor\u2019s work. In Karsner, by contrast, no limiting language is evident, as the contract at issue provided that the \u201c \u2018[the indemnitor] shall indemnify and hold [the indemnitee] harmless from and against any and all claims *** arising from or out of the pick-up, transportation and delivery of the property of [the indemnitee] by [the indemnitor], and the use of any motor vehicle or other equipment by [the indemnitor] in connection therewith.\u2019 \u201d Karsner, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 476. Focusing on this language alone, the indemnitee in Karsner was entitled to indemnification, even for its own negligence, as the injury at issue arose from the delivery of the indemnitee\u2019s property by the indemnitor. This was not, however, the Karsner court\u2019s holding.\nFrontline points to other cases which it claims have held, like Karsner, that the inclusion of the phrase \u201cany and all\u201d within an indemnification clause is insufficient to indemnify an indemnitee for its own negligence. See, e.g., Blackshare v. Banfield, 367 Ill. App. 3d 1077 (2006); Hankins v. Pekin Insurance Co., 305 Ill. App. 3d 1088 (1999). A closer inspection of Blackshare and Hankins reveals, however, just as a closer inspection of Westinghouse and McNiff revealed, that these cases do not stand for that proposition. As in Westinghouse and McNiff, the language of the indemnification agreements in Black-share and Hankins contained limiting language expressly restricting indemnification liability.\nIn Blackshare, a power cooperative brought an indemnification action against an electrical contractor based upon a written contract. Blackshare, 367 Ill. App. 3d 1077. The contract provided that the \u201c[contractor shall defend and indemnify and save Owner and all of Owner\u2019s employees harmless from any and all claims *** arising or alleged to arise from personal injuries, including death, or damage to property, occurring during the performance of the work and due to the negligent acts or omissions of the Contractor.\u201d See Blackshare, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 1078. The Blackshare court found critical the limiting language of the above provision that promised indemnity for damages that were \u201cdue to the negligent acts or omissions of the Contractor\u201d and held that the contract limited the electrical contractor\u2019s indemnity-obligation to a percentage equal to that of the contractor\u2019s negligence, not extending to indemnification for the power cooperative\u2019s own negligence. Blackshare, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 1078.\nIn Hankins, a cartage carrier sought indemnification coverage for its own negligence against a cartage operator based upon a written contract. Hankins, 305 Ill. App. 3d 1088. The agreement provided that the cartage operator would indemnify and hold harmless the cartage carrier \u201c \u2018from and against all claims, damages, losses[,] and expenses *** which might arise out of the performance of any work to be performed hereunder by CARTAGE OPERATOR *** caused in whole or in part by CARTAGE OPERATOR\u2019S negligent act or omission.\u2019 \u201d Hankins, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1089. Interpreting this language, the Hankins court found that the indemnification provided was limited to indemnity for injury caused in whole or in part by the cartage operator\u2019s negligence, not extending to that of the cartage carrier\u2019s negligence. Hankins, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1093.\nFocusing on the language used in Blackshare and Hankins, then, it is apparent that they do not stand, as Frontline asserts, for the proposition that the inclusion of the phrase \u201cany and all\u201d within an indemnification clause is insufficient to indemnify an indemnitee for its own negligence. To be sure, Blackshare and Hankins contain similar \u201cany and all\u201d language to that used in this case. Like Westinghouse and McNiff, however, they also contained express clauses limiting indemnification to negligence occasioned by the indemnitor. Accordingly, both cases merely stand for the proposition that when an indemnity contract expressly limits itself to the negligence of the indemnitor, courts will not strain, simply because the contract also contains \u201cany and all\u201d language, to read into that contract indemnification for an indemnitee\u2019s own negligence. Indeed, to do so would violate this court\u2019s recognition in Westinghouse that \u201c[i]t is quite generally held that an indemnity contract will not be construed as indemnifying one against his own negligence, unless such a construction is required by clear and explicit language of the contract [citations] or such intention is expressed in unequivocal terms.\u201d Westinghouse Electric, 395 Ill. at 433.\nThe indemnification agreement in Karsner, unlike the agreements found in Westinghouse, McNiff, Black-share, and Hankins, included clear and explicit contract language providing indemnification for the indemnitee\u2019s own negligence in exactly the type of situation presented in that case \u2014 where the injury arose from the delivery of the indemnitee\u2019s property by the indemnitor. This makes clear, then, that Karsner stands alone for the proposition that the inclusion of the phrase \u201cany and all\u201d within an indemnification clause is insufficient to indemnify an indemnitee for its own negligence.\nIt is not simply the use of the phrase \u201cany and all\u201d that determines whether a particular contract provides indemnification for an indemnitee\u2019s own negligence. The phrase must be read in the context of the entire contract. If the contract warrants it, though, the use of the phrase \u201cany and all\u201d may indicate, as COSCO contends, that the parties intended an indemnitee be indemnified, even for the indemnitee\u2019s own negligence. See, e.g., Economy Mechanical Industries, Inc. v. T.J. Higgins Co., 294 Ill. App. 3d 150, 155 (1997) (interpreting contract language which provided that \u201c[indemnitor] will at all times protect, indemnify and save and keep harmless the [indemnitee] against and from any and all loss, cost, damage or expense, arising out of or from any accident or other occurrence\u201d to provide indemnification for an indemnitee\u2019s own negligence (emphasis omitted)); Rios v. Field, 132 Ill. App. 2d 519, 522 (1971) (holding that the use of the phrase \u201cany and all,\u201d even if it is \u201cthe sole descriptive reference to the cause of the injury, claim or loss indemnified,\u201d can render an agreement \u201csufficiently broad to include indemnification for claims or injuries caused by indemnitee\u2019s own negligence\u201d subject to any limitations in the agreement); Haynes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 47 Ill. App. 2d 340, 341, 346-47 (1964) (where contract provided that \u201c[the indemnitor] holds the [indemnitee] harmless for any and all injuries or accident sustained by [the indemnitor\u2019s] employees while on the premises of [the indemnitee] or while en route to perform any services for [the indemnitee],\u201d the court held that \u201c[t]he words \u2018any and all\u2019 are all inclusive; their conciseness does not limit their scope; their coverage would not have been extended by making them more specific. If the words \u2018any and all\u2019 are to have their commonly accepted meaning, they cover the accident in this case\u201d); Washington Group International, Inc. v. Mason Manufacturing, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (utilizing Illinois law, rejecting Karsner, and finding that \u201c[t]he current contract states that [the indemnitor] will indemnify [the indemnitee] for \u2018any and all\u2019 loss arising from the inspections\u201d and \u201cmost cases dealing with similar \u2018any and all\u2019 language have determined that this is sufficient to provide coverage for the indemnitee\u2019s own negligence\u201d). Karsner\u2019s analysis to the contrary is thus overruled.\nConsidering the above, we turn to the indemnity agreement at issue in this case. Of crucial importance, the agreement between Frontline and COSCO provides that \u201c[Frontline] shall indemnify [COSCO] against, and hold [COSCO] harmless for any and all claims *** arising out of, [in] connection with, or resulting from the possession, use, operation or returning of the equipment during all periods when the equipment shall be out of the possession of COSCO.\u201d This contract contains no limiting language to suggest that the indemnity provided is not intended to cover claims resulting from COSCO\u2019s own negligence. Accordingly, we find that the express language of the interchange agreement entered into between Frontline and COSCO clearly and explicitly provides indemnification for COSCO\u2019s own negligence pursuant to the rest of the contract terms.\nAs our appellate court aptly put it in the past, \u201c[t]he words \u2018any and all\u2019 are all inclusive; their conciseness does not limit their scope; their coverage would not have been extended by making them more specific.\u201d Haynes, 47 Ill. App. 2d at 346. Frontline did not agree to indemnify COSCO for \u201cany and all\u201d claims arising out of Frontline\u2019s negligence. Instead, Frontline agreed to indemnify COSCO for \u201cany and all claims *** arising out of *** the possession, use, operation or returning of the equipment during all periods when the equipment shall be out of the possession of COSCO.\u201d This agreement is very broad and, considering its common unambiguous meaning, encompasses even claims which arise out of COSCO\u2019s negligence.\nAgain pointing to Karsner, Frontline contends that it might contravene public policy to hold, as we do, that a contract can provide indemnification for an indemnitee\u2019s own negligence in a circumstance such as at issue in this case. In Karsner, the appellate court noted that the Construction Contract Indemnification for Negligence Act specifically provided that no construction contract shall allow for the indemnification of a person\u2019s own negligence because such a provision is \u201c \u2018void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable. \u2019 \u201d Karsner, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 477, quoting 740 ILCS 35/1 (West 2000). Additionally, the court pointed to the Managed Care Reform and Patient Rights Act, which provided that no person or health-care provider may be indemnified for its own negligence in the performance of his, her, or its duties. Karsner, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 477, citing 215 ILCS 134/95 (West 2000). Based on these statutes, the Karsner court found that \u201cin the absence of an express agreement, it is against Illinois public policy to require indemnification for a person\u2019s own negligence.\u201d Karsner, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 477.\nOur finding does not contradict public policy, however. As we recognized in Westinghouse, when an agreement clearly and explicitly provides indemnification for an indemnitee\u2019s own negligence, it should be construed accordingly. Westinghouse Electric, 395 Ill. at 433. The agreement at issue in this case is specific and clear enough to provide indemnification for claims arising out of COSCO\u2019s negligence. Moreover, while certain statutes specifically prohibit the enforcement of agreements that indemnify an indemnitee for its own negligence, there is no such statute at play in this case. Had the General Assembly wanted to prohibit the enforcement of indemnification agreements that indemnify an indemnitee for its own negligence in circumstances such as these, it could have, just as it has in other situations. See, e.g., 740 ILCS 35/1 (West 2006); 215 ILCS 134/95 (West 2006). The General Assembly chose not to create such a prohibition in such circumstances, however, and we will not judicially create one.\nII. The Scope of the Indemnification Clause\nHaving determined that the agreement at issue in this case is explicit and clear enough to signify the parties\u2019 intention that Frontline indemnify COSCO for claims resulting from COSCO\u2019s own negligence, we turn to the scope of the agreement. Frontline contends that the negligence claims asserted against COSCO in the underlying litigation do not fall within the scope of the agreement\u2019s indemnification clause. In response, COSCO asserts that this issue has been forfeited, as it was not raised in Frontline\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. Notwithstanding forfeiture, COSCO asserts that substantively-analyzing the issue reveals that the negligence claims alleged against COSCO do fall within the scope of the indemnification agreement.\nWhile Frontline raised the scope issue in the appellate court, it did not include it in its petition for leave to appeal. Supreme Court Rule 315(c)(3) provides that a petition for leave to appeal must contain \u201ca statement of the points relied upon in asking the Supreme Court to review the judgment of the Appellate Court.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 315(c)(3). In its petition for leave to appeal under a \u201cPoints Relied Upon For Reversal\u201d heading, Frontline argued that \u201c[t]he Appellate Court erred because it improperly treated the language of the interchange agreement, containing an indemnification provision, as including language which would indemnify defendants/ respondents, [COSCO], for claims resulting from COSCO\u2019s own negligence.\u201d In the very next sentence, Frontline stated that \u201c[t]he issue in this case is whether the language \u2018any and all\u2019 in the interchange agreement is sufficient to indemnify COSCO for their own negligence.\u201d Frontline failed to argue in its petition, however, that the negligence claims asserted against COSCO in the underlying litigation do not fall within the scope of the agreement\u2019s indemnification clause. This issue was only raised in its brief, which it styled as a \u201cSupplemental Brief to Petition for Leave to Appeal.\u201d\nA party\u2019s failure to raise an issue in its petition for leave to appeal may be deemed a forfeiture of that issue. Sullivan v. Edward Hospital, 209 Ill. 2d 100, 124-25 (2004). By failing to raise the scope issue in its petition for leave to appeal, then, Frontline has forfeited that issue in this court. That Frontline later raised the issue in its brief does not cure the forfeiture. Finding the scope issue forfeited, we will not address the issue on the merits.\nCONCLUSION\nWe find that the interchange agreement entered into between Frontline and COSCO expressly and unambiguously requires Frontline to indemnify COSCO for the negligence that it is alleged to have committed in the underlying litigation. Additionally, we find that Frontline forfeited its argument that the negligence claims alleged against COSCO do not fall within the scope of the indemnification agreement. As such, we affirm the appellate court\u2019s judgment affirming the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment on count IV of COSCO\u2019s counterclaim.\nAffirmed.\nCHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICES FREEMAN and KILBRIDE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nIt is important to note that the Construction Contract Indemnification for Negligence Act currently voids any agreement in a construction contract to indemnify or hold harmless a person from that person\u2019s own negligence. 740 ILCS 35/0.01 et seq. (West 2006). As such, if Westinghouse, Tatar, and Zadak were heard today, there would be no argument concerning whether the language in each case was unequivocal enough to indemnify an indemnitee for that indemnitee\u2019s own negligence because the act described above would specifically void any such construction. This case does not involve a construction contract, however, so the Construction Contract Indemnification for Negligence Act does not apply. The parties do not dispute that barring a statutory provision to the contrary, contracts that clearly and explicitly provide indemnity against one\u2019s own negligence are valid and enforceable. See, e.g., Scheck, 42 Ill. 2d at 363-64; Blackshare v. Banfield, 367 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1079 (2006); Hankins v. Pekin Insurance Co., 305 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1093 (1999); Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Pawnee Motor Service, Inc., 171 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1045 (1988). Accordingly, the general discussion of such contracts found in Westinghouse, Tatar, and Zadak remains good law.\nSullivan expresses the cited rule in terms of waiver. As this court has noted, there is a difference between waiver and forfeiture. While waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right, forfeiture is the failure to timely comply with procedural requirements. Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d 208, 229 (2007); People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 444 n.2 (2005). These characterizations apply equally to criminal and civil matters. Thus, while Sullivan spoke in terms of waiver, a party\u2019s failure to raise an issue in its petition for leave to appeal may equally be deemed a forfeiture of that issue. People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 122 (2006) (\u201cthe failure to raise an issue in a petition for leave to appeal results in the forfeiture of that issue before this court\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CARMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Russell W Hartigan, Patrick H. O\u2019Connor and Victoria R. Benson, of Hartigan & Cuisinier EC., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Thomas M. Grisham, Jean M. Prendergast and Kathleen J. Doyle, of Grisham & Kubes, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 103562.\nJOHN BUENZ, as Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Olga L. Buenz, Deceased, v. FRONTLINE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY et al. (Frontline Transportation Company, Appellant; China Ocean Shipping Company Americas, Inc., Appellee).\nOpinion filed January 25, 2008.\nRussell W Hartigan, Patrick H. O\u2019Connor and Victoria R. Benson, of Hartigan & Cuisinier EC., of Chicago, for appellant.\nThomas M. Grisham, Jean M. Prendergast and Kathleen J. Doyle, of Grisham & Kubes, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0302-01", "first_page_order": 314, "last_page_order": 333 }