{ "id": 5706168, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. MIGUEL DELEON, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Deleon", "decision_date": "2008-01-25", "docket_number": "No. 103777", "first_page": "322", "last_page": "343", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 322" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974994 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963712 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3125819 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" }, { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599350 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "2069" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295778 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599955 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128-29, 159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1476994 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" }, { "page": "498-99" }, { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799372 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 535990 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0500-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1227, "char_count": 36034, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6762830380883754e-07, "percentile": 0.8262593687894545 }, "sha256": "490198776e9444b223e59e5f50381bfe6d5d15149fdc36462d9b598dcfc8d910", "simhash": "1:17ad17a65bae9cf5", "word_count": 5816 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:56.048909+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appel-lee, v. MIGUEL DELEON, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant, Miguel Deleon, was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9\u2014 1(a)(1) (West 1996)) and attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4, 9 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West 1996)). The trial court sentenced him to a mandatory life term for the first degree murder and a consecutive 30-year term for the attempted first degree murder. Defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed both the convictions and the sentences. People v. Deleon, No. 1\u201499\u20140028 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Later, defendant filed a postconviction petition arguing that the mandatory life term must be vacated because the statute authorizing it was invalidated in People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500 (1999). The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. Defendant appealed, and the appellate court vacated defendant\u2019s life sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. People v. Deleon, No. 1\u201401\u20142469 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). At the resentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a 100-year extended-term sentence for the first degree murder and again imposed a consecutive 30-year sentence for the attempted first degree murder. Defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the sentences. No. 1\u201404\u20142934 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).\nBACKGROUND\nDefendant was a member of the Imperial Gangsters, a rival gang of the Latin Kings. On the afternoon of April 4, 1997, defendant met with some of his fellow gang members in \u201cthe Jungle,\u201d a neighborhood located near the intersection of Mannheim Road and Crown Road in Franklin Park. Defendant was providing \u201csecurity\u201d for the Imperial Gangsters that day, which means he carried a gun in the event of an altercation with the Latin Kings. At some point, defendant and his cohorts noticed a red Ford Mustang driving westward on Crown Road. Because the car bore a Stone Park registration sticker and contained a \u201ccrown air freshener,\u201d the Imperial Gangsters surmised that it belonged to a Latin King. When someone yelled \u201cflakes,\u201d a term meaning \u201crival gang member,\u201d defendant and another Imperial Gangster ran through an apartment complex to intercept the Mustang on Schiller Street. When the Mustang appeared on Schiller Street, defendant and one of his fellow gang members stepped into the street and stopped the car. An altercation ensued, and, from a distance of three feet, defendant fired two shots through the driver\u2019s side windshield. One of those shots hit the driver, Jose Sanchez, in the chest. Sanchez sped away toward Mannheim Road, passing an ice cream truck surrounded by children. Defendant continued firing at Sanchez, and seven-year-old Juana Nieto, who was standing beside the ice cream truck, was shot and killed. A three-year-old boy and the ice cream truck driver also sustained injuries.\nAt trial, Sanchez testified that, after hearing the initial gunshots, he felt a \u201cburning in [his] chest.\u201d As he sped toward Mannheim Road, Sanchez noticed an ice cream truck that was parked on Schiller Street and surrounded by children. When he reached Mannheim Road, Sanchez drove to a gas station located at the corner of Mannheim Road and Grand Avenue, a distance of approximately 1,500 feet from the scene of the shooting. At the gas station, Sanchez continued to feel the burning in his chest and \u201cfelt something running in the back.\u201d As he exited the Mustang, Sanchez recovered the bullet \u201cfrom [his] back.\u201d When asked directly whether the bullet \u201cwent through\u201d his body, Sanchez answered \u201cyes.\u201d Similarly, Sanchez answered \u201cyes\u201d when asked whether the bullet \u201cexited\u201d his body and when asked whether the bullet \u201c[came] out of\u2019 his back. After recovering the bullet, Sanchez went inside the gas station and asked for help. When the police arrived, Sanchez handed the bullet to an officer. Sanchez was then taken by ambulance to Loyola University Hospital. Photographs taken at the hospital depict a bullet wound in the left center of Sanchez\u2019s chest.\nThe trial court found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Juana Nieto and the attempted first degree murder of Jose Sanchez. At the same time, the trial court acquitted defendant of the attempted first degree murders of the three-year-old boy and the ice cream truck driver, both of whom sustained wounds during the shooting. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a mandatory life term for the first degree murder conviction, based on the fact that defendant was 17 years old at the time of the offense and the victim was under the age of 12. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 l(a)(l)(c)(ii) (West 1996). For the attempted first degree murder conviction, the trial court imposed a consecutive sentence of 30 years in prison. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 4(a) (West 1996). In the course of imposing these sentences, the trial court specifically found that Sanchez \u201cwas struck through the chest\u201d and that \u201cthe bullet went through his chest and in fact exited his back.\u201d The court also noted that, as a result of defendant\u2019s conduct, \u201cthe individual who was driving the ice cream truck was struck and injured\u201d and \u201canother child on the street was struck in the neck and injured.\u201d\nDefendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed both the convictions and the sentences. Deleon, No. 1\u201499\u20140028 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Later, defendant filed a postconviction petition arguing that his mandatory life term must be vacated because Public Act 89 \u2014 203, which enacted the relevant mandatory sentencing provision, was invalidated in People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500 (1999). The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, and defendant appealed. Citing Wooters, the appellate court vacated defendant\u2019s life sentence and remanded for resentencing under the law that was in effect prior to the enactment of Public Act 89 \u2014 203. Deleon, No. 1\u201401\u20142469 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nFollowing the remand, defendant was appointed new counsel. In hopes of ascertaining new mitigation evidence, defense counsel subpoenaed defendant\u2019s records from the Illinois Department of Corrections (hereinafter, Corree-tions). Because such records \u201cshall be confidential\u201d (730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 5\u20141(b) (West 1996)), the trial court examined defendant\u2019s Corrections file in camera. Following the examination, the trial court offered the following summary in open court:\n\u201cThe positive part of the documents is one page which would show that Mr. Deleon passed his G.E.D. test. The other documents I think, unfortunately, well, I won\u2019t go any further. That\u2019s the only document.\u201d\nThe trial court then offered to make that single page available to defense counsel, and defense, counsel responded, \u201cThat would be sufficient, Judge.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s resentencing hearing was held several weeks later. At the start, defense counsel acknowledged that he had received a copy of defendant\u2019s new presen-tencing investigation (PSI) report and that he had reviewed that report with defendant. Among other things, the PSI report noted that defendant had obtained his G.E.D. while incarcerated, had been working steadily since arriving in prison and even received a promotion, and was housed in the \u201cvery low aggressive cell house.\u201d The report also included a long statement of remorse from defendant, in which he explained that he was \u201cyoung at the time,\u201d that he \u201cnever intended to hurt her,\u201d and that he \u201cwish[ed] he could take it all back.\u201d Defendant also stated that Juana Nieto\u2019s murder \u201chaunts me every day\u201d and \u201cis something I have to live with for the rest of my life.\u201d Elsewhere in the PSI report, defendant asks the court to understand that he \u201cdidn\u2019t do it,\u201d that he\u2019s \u201cstill young,\u201d and that all he wants is the \u201cchance to be young and free and with my family.\u201d\nIn aggravation, the State recounted the facts of the case. At one point, the trial court interjected that it recalled the case well and offered the following summary of the relevant facts:\n\u201cAs I remember it, we had a [gang member] who was over in Franklin Park who saw an individual who is driving through what is called *** the jungle of Franklin Park. And he chased the car, shot the individual. That individual received a shot in the chest. And he drove to an emergency facility where the bullet fell out of his back and he survived. But during that same shooting, there were some children over by an ice cream truck. And it was the shooting as he ran around the car [that] affected the children there, killing the twelve year old [sic], wounding the three-year-old, and, in fact, I believe, striking the driver of the ice cream truck.\u201d\nThe State then asked the trial court once again to impose a consecutive 30-year sentence for the attempted murder conviction. In so doing, the State reminded the trial court of its previous finding that the gunshot wound to Sanchez\u2019s chest was a severe bodily injury. For the first degree murder conviction, the State requested an extended-term sentence of 100 years, based upon the victim\u2019s age. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b) (4) (i), 5 \u2014 8\u2014 2(a)(1) (West 1996).\nIn response, defense counsel focused primarily on the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Defense counsel argued strenuously that Apprendi precluded the imposition of an extended-term sentence for defendant\u2019s first degree murder conviction because the relevant statutory aggravating factor \u2014 that Juana Nieto was under the age of 12 at the time of the offense \u2014 was neither pled in the indictment nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, defense counsel asked the court to consider the information contained in the PSI report, including \u201cdefendant\u2019s statement in that report of some remorse.\u201d\nBefore imposing sentence, the trial court stated that it had reviewed \u201cthe transcripts and the facts of the case,\u201d as well as the PSI report. The trial court then imposed an extended-term sentence of 100 years in prison for the first degree murder conviction and a consecutive sentence of 30 years in prison for the attempted first degree murder conviction. Three weeks later, defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider the sentence in which he reiterated his Apprendi argument. Specifically, defense counsel argued that \u201cthe Court did not, at the time of trial, specifically find that the age of the victim was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Defense counsel also acknowledged, however, that he was \u201cworking without the benefit of a transcript of the Court\u2019s original finding.\u201d The trial court denied the motion to reconsider sentence, and defendant appealed.\nOn appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that (1) his new defense counsel was ineffective because he neither obtained nor reviewed the trial transcripts prior to the resentencing hearing; (2) the trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to examine the nonconfidential portions of defendant\u2019s Corrections records; and (3) the evidence did not support the trial court\u2019s finding that, for consecutive sentencing purposes, Sanchez\u2019s gunshot wound was a \u201csevere bodily injury.\u201d The appellate court rejected each of these arguments and affirmed defendant\u2019s sentences. No. 1\u201404\u20142934 (unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nIn addition to his brief, defendant filed a motion asking the appellate court to conduct an independent review of defendant\u2019s Corrections file \u201cto ascertain the correctness of the trial court\u2019s ruling regarding the existence of mitigation evidence.\u201d At the conclusion of that motion, defendant informed the court that, \u201c[b]ecause the [Corrections] file is in the hands of [Corrections], defendant cannot obtain the record himself and have it certified as a supplemental record.\u201d Although the State advised the appellate court that it had no objection to defendant\u2019s request, the appellate court entered an order denying defendant\u2019s motion without comment.\nWe allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).\nDISCUSSION\nSevere Bodily Injury\nDefendant\u2019s first argument is that the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence for the attempted first degree murder conviction. The governing statute on this point is section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which at the relevant time stated:\n\u201cThe court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury *** in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 8 \u2014 4(a) (West 1996).\nAccording to defendant, the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case is unwarranted because, although attempted first degree murder is undeniably a Class X felony, the record does not support the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant inflicted \u201csevere bodily injury\u201d upon Jose Sanchez.\nAs a preliminary matter, we must determine the appropriate standard of review for a trial court\u2019s determination that, for consecutive sentencing purposes, a bodily injury is \u201csevere.\u201d Defendant argues that such review requires interpreting the statutory phrase \u201csevere bodily injury\u201d and that a de novo standard is therefore warranted. The State responds that whether a particular injury is \u201csevere\u201d is a question of fact and that a manifest weight standard is therefore warranted. We agree with the State. In People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 344 (2001), this court held that what constitutes \u201cgreat bodily harm\u201d under the aggravated battery statute (see 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(a) (West 2006)) is a question properly left to the fact finder. We see no reason to treat the question of what constitutes \u201csevere bodily injury\u201d any differently. If the fact finder can be trusted to sort out which bodily harms are \u201cgreat,\u201d it can certainly be trusted to sort out which bodily injuries are \u201csevere.\u201d Accordingly, we hold that a trial court\u2019s determination that a bodily injury is \u201csevere\u201d for purposes of consecutive sentencing may be reversed only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nA finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498 (2002). Under the manifest weight standard, we give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses. D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 498-99. A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn. D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 499.\nHere, the evidence is more than sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s finding that Sanchez sustained a \u201csevere bodily injury.\u201d One of defendant\u2019s fellow gang members testified that defendant shot Sanchez in the chest from a distance of approximately three feet. The photographs introduced by the State reveal a bullet wound to the left center of Sanchez\u2019s chest. Sanchez testified that, after being shot, he felt a \u201cburning in [his] chest.\u201d And while the photographs do not depict an exit wound, the State asked Sanchez three different times, and in three different ways, whether the bullet passed through his body and exited through his back. Each time, he responded \u201cyes.\u201d Given this evidence, the trial court was entirely justified in concluding that Sanchez \u201cwas struck through the chest,\u201d that \u201cthe bullet went through his chest and in fact exited his back,\u201d and that such an injury is sufficiently \u201csevere\u201d to justify a consecutive sentence.\nIn opposition to this result, defendant makes two arguments. First, defendant points to the following exchange between the prosecutor and Sanchez:\n\u201cQ. Where did the bullet go through your body? At what point did it come out?\nA. It came out \u2014 it didn\u2019t go all the way through because I had a sweater. When I got out on the street, it started running down. I got it in my hand when I got out of the car.\u201d\nAccording to defendant, Sanchez\u2019s statement that \u201cit didn\u2019t go all the way through because I had a sweater\u201d confirms that the bullet did not pass through Sanchez\u2019s body but instead only \u201cgraz[ed] his chest.\u201d Consequently, defendant argues, the trial court\u2019s findings that Sanchez \u201cwas struck through the chest\u201d and that \u201cthe bullet went through his chest and in fact exited his back\u201d are not supported by the evidence.\nDefendant reads too much into this isolated, and at best ambiguous, piece of testimony. According to defendant, when Sanchez stated that \u201cit didn\u2019t go all the way through because I had a sweater,\u201d Sanchez must have meant that the bullet did not go all the way through his body. But it is also possible that Sanchez meant that the bullet did not pass through his sweater. Indeed, Sanchez was asked not only where the bullet had passed through his body, but also where the bullet had \u201ccome out.\u201d Sanchez\u2019s response begins with the statement \u201cIt came out.\u201d Only then does Sanchez add that \u201cit didn\u2019t go all the way through because I had a sweater.\u201d It is certainly reasonable to read this answer as saying \u201cit came out of my body but was caught by my sweater,\u201d which, after all, comports with Sanchez\u2019s three unequivocal affirmations that the bullet did in fact pass through his body and exit his back. At the very least, we cannot say that the foregoing exchange renders the trial court\u2019s understanding of Sanchez\u2019s testimony \u201cunreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.\u201d\nSecond, defendant argues that Sanchez\u2019s behavior after being shot confirms that he did not sustain a \u201csevere bodily injury.\u201d Specifically, defendant points out that, despite his gunshot wound, Sanchez was able to drive away from the scene, notice an ice cream truck surrounded by children, get himself to a nearby gas station, collect the bullet from his sweater, enter the gas station and ask for help, and wait for the police to arrive. Moreover, defendant notes that, although Sanchez was taken to the hospital for the treatment of his gunshot wound, the State presented no evidence concerning the length of his hospital stay, the nature of his treatment, or the intensity of his pain. According to defendant, these facts confirm that Sanchez\u2019s injury was \u201cnot the type of debilitating or extreme injury contemplated by the legislature that warrants the mandatory imposition of consecutive sentences.\u201d\nWe disagree. We have already concluded that the evidence adequately supports the trial court\u2019s findings that Sanchez \u201cwas struck through the chest\u201d and that \u201cthe bullet went through his chest and in fact exited his back.\u201d Irrespective of the victim\u2019s postshooting behavior, we would have no difficulty affirming that a wound of that nature constitutes \u201csevere bodily injury.\u201d That said, defendant\u2019s argument on this point is severely undermined by this court\u2019s decision in People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118 (1992), which the State cites and defendant does not address. In Johnson, this court found that \u201csevere bodily injury\u201d was sufficiently proven where, after being shot once in the shoulder, the victim walked out of the apartment where the shooting occurred, flagged down a passing motorist, told the driver there had been a robbery and a shooting, and had the motorist drive him to a hospital. See Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d at 128-29, 159. Sanchez\u2019s postshooting behavior is not materially different from the Johnson victim\u2019s, and there is no reason to believe that Sanchez\u2019s gunshot wound was any less \u201csevere\u201d than the Johnson victim\u2019s gunshot wound. Accordingly, we reject any suggestion that Sanchez\u2019s post-shooting conduct renders benign his through-and-through gunshot wound to the chest.\nIneffective Assistance\nDefendant next argues that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance at the resentencing hearing. This argument takes two basic forms, and we will address each in turn.\nFailure to Read the Record and Transcripts\nDefendant first argues that his resentencing counsel was per se ineffective because the record establishes that counsel, who did not represent defendant at the original trial and sentencing hearing, never read the original trial and sentencing transcripts. In support of this argument, defendant points to the following statement, which appeared in the motion to reconsider sentence that counsel filed on defendant\u2019s behalf:\n\u201cCounsel for defendant maintains, that the Court did not, at the time of trial, specifically find that the age of the victim was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, while acknowledging that counsel is working without the benefit of a transcript of the Court\u2019s original finding.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nAccording to defendant, this statement makes it \u201capparent that [counsel] never read Deleon\u2019s trial transcripts in preparation for the [resentencing] hearing.\u201d Moreover, given the gravity of such an omission, defendant insists that he \u201cshould not be required to prove the prejudicial effect of this error.\u201d\nThe State responds that defendant\u2019s argument rests on a faulty factual premise. According to the State, the above statement in no way proves that counsel \u201cnever read Deleon\u2019s trial transcripts in preparation for the [resentencing] hearing.\u201d On the contrary, the above statement appeared in counsel\u2019s motion for reconsideration of sentence, which was filed three weeks after both the resentencing hearing and the imposition of sentence. Thus, the State maintains, the most it proves is that counsel prepared that motion without the benefit of a trial transcript. The State also notes that the original trial and sentencing transcripts were available to counsel prior to the resentencing hearing, and there are other comments from counsel that suggest a working familiarity with the trial record.\nWe agree with the State. The record simply does not support defendant\u2019s claim. In relation to one of the factual assertions contained in the motion to reconsider sentence, counsel conceded that he was \u201cworking without the benefit of a transcript.\u201d From this concession, defendant asks this court to infer that counsel had been \u201cworking without the benefit of a transcript\u201d all along, even prior to the resentencing hearing itself. Like the appellate court, we are unwilling to draw such an inference, as it dramatically exceeds the scope of counsel\u2019s concession. All that reasonably can be inferred from counsel\u2019s concession is that he was \u201cworking without the benefit of a transcript\u201d at the time he prepared the motion to reconsider sentence. The concession appears exclusively in that motion, and nothing about it implicates counsel\u2019s performance at or before the resentenc-ing hearing itself. Of course, this in no way proves that counsel actually read the original trial and sentencing transcripts prior to the resentencing hearing. On the record before us, as with most appellate records, we have no way of knowing one way or the other. But that is sufficient to defeat defendant\u2019s claim, as \u201c[a] defendant cannot rely on speculation or conjecture to justify his claim of incompetent representation.\u201d People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 324 (1997).\nOther Ineffectiveness Claims\nDefendant\u2019s second ineffectiveness claim is different but related. Essentially, defendant argues that counsel\u2019s failure to review the original trial and sentencing transcripts caused counsel to commit a series of prejudicial errors at the resentencing hearing. As we will discuss more fully below, these alleged \u201cerrors\u201d were not in fact errors. Before getting to that, however, we wish to reiterate that the record in no way supports defendant\u2019s repeated assertion that counsel failed to review the original trial record. Consequently, to the extent that defendant attributes counsel\u2019s alleged failings to a lack of familiarity with the record, we reject his argument out of hand.\nIn determining whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, we apply the familiar two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), and adopted by this court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064 (1984). More specifically, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel\u2019s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that there is a \u201creasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. The failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.\nDefendant\u2019s first claim is that counsel failed to correct the trial court\u2019s mistaken belief that an extended-term sentence was mandatory in this case. In support of this claim, defendant points to the trial court\u2019s statement at the resentencing hearing that defendant was \u201centitled to\u201d an extended-term sentence. According to defendant, the use of the phrase \u201centitled to\u201d suggests that the trial court \u201cwas not aware that the imposition of an extended term was discretionary.\u201d In fact, the phrase \u201centitled to\u201d suggests no such thing. As defined by Webster\u2019s, \u201centitle\u201d means \u201cto qualify (one) for something.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 758 (1993). Similarly, Black\u2019s defines \u201centitle\u201d as \u201cto *** qualify for.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 573 (8th ed. 2004). Clearly, defendant was \u201cqualified for\u201d an extended-term sentence, as he stood convicted of murdering a seven-year-old girl. The trial court\u2019s statement merely reflects this obvious reality, and counsel therefore was under no obligation to say otherwise.\nDefendant\u2019s second claim is that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue defendant\u2019s youth, remorse, and good prison behavior as mitigating factors. Again, this claim is contradicted by the record. The record shows that counsel specifically argued defendant\u2019s remorse as a mitigating factor, and defendant personally expressed his remorse to the trial court just prior to sentencing. As for defendant\u2019s age and positive prison record, all of that was set forth in the PSI report, which the trial court read and which counsel specifically asked the trial court to take into account when arguing against an extended-term sentence.\nDefendant\u2019s third claim is that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Jose Sanchez did not suffer a severe bodily injury and that consecutive sentences were therefore impermissible. On this point, there is an obvious lack of prejudice, as we have already determined that the evidence more than supports the trial court\u2019s severe bodily injury finding. Moreover, counsel reasonably could have concluded that any such argument was futile. The trial court determined at the original sentencing hearing that Jose Sanchez sustained a severe bodily injury, and the only reason for the remand was that defendant\u2019s other sentence was invalid. Under these circumstances, counsel had little reason to expect that the trial court would reverse itself, and his decision not to contest the severe bodily injury finding therefore was reasonable.\nDefendant\u2019s final claim is that counsel was ineffective for failing to correct the trial court\u2019s \u201cimplication\u201d that defendant was \u201cadjudged responsible for\u201d shooting and wounding the three-year-old boy and the ice cream truck driver. In support, defendant points to the trial court\u2019s observation at the resentencing hearing that, after shooting Sanchez in the chest, defendant continued firing, \u201ckilling the twelve year old [sic], wounding the three-year-old, and, in fact, I believe, striking the driver of the ice cream truck.\u201d According to defendant, counsel should have reminded the trial court that defendant was actually acquitted of the attempted murder charges that arose from those two shootings, thereby ensuring that the trial court \u201cdid not consider these findings in resentencing Deleon.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s argument is without merit. It is well established that \u201cevidence of criminal conduct can be considered at sentencing even if the defendant previously had been acquitted of that conduct.\u201d People v. Jackson, 149 Ill. 2d 540, 549-50 (1992). Here, there is no dispute that the trial court acquitted defendant of the attempted murder charges arising from the shooting and wounding of the three-year-old boy and the ice cream truck driver. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the trial court remained convinced that defendant did in fact shoot and wound both the boy and the driver. At defendant\u2019s original sentencing hearing, which was held just 30 days after the trial court acquitted defendant of the two attempted murder counts, the trial court specifically found that, as a result of defendant\u2019s conduct, \u201cthe individual who was driving the ice cream truck was struck and injured\u201d and \u201canother child on the street was struck in the neck and injured.\u201d The trial court then repeated these findings at the resentencing hearing. Under Jackson, these findings were perfectly proper, and the trial court was fully entitled to take them into account when fashioning defendant\u2019s sentences. Counsel had nothing to correct and no basis to object.\nDefendant\u2019s Corrections File\nDefendant\u2019s final argument is that the appellate court erred in refusing to conduct an independent review of defendant\u2019s Corrections file and \u201cascertain the correctness of the trial court\u2019s ruling regarding the existence of mitigation evidence.\u201d According to defendant, that refusal \u201ceffectively denied Deleon review of the trial court\u2019s ruling, thereby infringing his *** constitutional right to appeal.\u201d By way of remedy, defendant asks this court to conduct its own review of defendant\u2019s Corrections records and to remand the cause for a new sentencing hearing if the file contains additional potentially mitigating evidence.\nThere is a fatal problem with defendant\u2019s argument, and it relates to the concession that defendant made in his appellate court motion: defendant\u2019s Corrections file is not part of the record on appeal. Rather, the file was returned to the Department of Corrections after the resentencing hearing, and with Corrections it remains. Though the appellate court did not give a reason for denying defendant\u2019s motion, this is almost certainly it. The relevant records were not part of the record, and the appellate court therefore had nothing to review, even if it were so inclined.\nIn this court, the State directs our attention to Supreme Court Rules 415(e) and 415(f) (134 Ill. 2d Rs. 415(e), (f)). In relevant part, Rule 415(e) states that \u201c[mjaterial excised pursuant to judicial order shall be sealed, impounded and preserved in the records of the court, to be made available to the reviewing court in the event of an appeal.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 415(e). Similarly, Rule 415(f) states that, \u201c[i]f the court enters an order granting relief following a showing in camera, the entire record of such showing shall be sealed, impounded, and preserved in the records of the court, to be made available to the reviewing court in the event of an appeal.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 415(f). The State argues that, having failed to ensure that the undisclosed portion of his Corrections file was \u201csealed, impounded, and preserved in the records of the court,\u201d defendant has waived any right to review of the trial court\u2019s reading of that file. Defendant responds that \u201cnothing in the language of these rules puts the burden on the defendant to assure compliance with this procedure.\u201d Rather, \u201c[a]s only the trial court had access to the documents, it was its burden to comply with Supreme Court Rule 415.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s argument is precluded by this court\u2019s decision in People v. Coates, 109 Ill. 2d 431 (1985). In that case, the defendant sought to subpoena certain records from the Department of Children and Family Services for purposes of impeachment. Because such records ordinarily are kept confidential, the trial court conducted an in camera inspection of the records. As in this case, neither the State nor defense counsel was present for the inspection. Following the inspection, the trial court allowed the defendant to use only certain portions of the Department\u2019s records, keeping the remainder under seal. On appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred in failing to comply with Rule 415(f), \u201cin that it made no record of the proceedings in camera and failed to seal, impound and preserve the records involved.\u201d Coates, 109 Ill. 2d at 438. This court rejected that argument, stating that \u201c[t]he record fails to show that defendant requested any such action, and under the circumstances, there is nothing before us for review.\u201d Coates, 109 Ill. 2d at 438. In other words, and contrary to defendant\u2019s argument, the burden \u201cto assure compliance with this procedure\u201d does rest with the complaining party, at least in the first instance. And absent a request for such compliance, any deficiency in the record will be attributable to that party.\nThe bottom line is that it is the appellant\u2019s burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings below to support a claim of error and, in the absence of a complete record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the circuit court was in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis. People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 264 (2000). Here, defendant is asking this court to review the accuracy of the trial court\u2019s reading of defendant\u2019s Corrections file. However, that file is not part of the record, and defendant never requested that it be made part of the record. Consequently, as in Coates, \u201cthere is nothing before us for review.\u201d\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nAltliough this distance is not a part of the record on appeal, this court may take judicial notice of the distances between two locations. See Dawdy v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 177-78 (2003).\nIn his opening brief, defendant maintains that a de novo standard is likewise warranted because \u201cthis case involves application of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) to undisputed facts in the record.\u201d In his reply brief, however, defendant concedes that one of the principal facts relevant to this issue \u2014 whether the bullet fired into Sanchez\u2019s chest exited through Sanchez\u2019s back \u2014 is in dispute.\nAdmittedly, counsel\u2019s sentencing presentation focused far more on Apprendi than it did on the mitigating evidence described above. But that is not defendant\u2019s argument. Defendant\u2019s argument is that counsel \u201cfailed to make any arguments in mitigation,\u201d and that simply is not the case.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Joshua A. Tepfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg and Douglas E Harvath, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 103777.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appel-lee, v. MIGUEL DELEON, Appellant.\nOpinion filed January 25, 2008.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Joshua A. Tepfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg and Douglas E Harvath, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0322-01", "first_page_order": 334, "last_page_order": 355 }