{ "id": 5706686, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. WILLIAM A. HUDSON, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hudson", "decision_date": "2008-03-20", "docket_number": "No. 104470", "first_page": "181", "last_page": "199", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 181" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302611 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453260 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704197 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060183 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2463141 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" }, { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704702 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909174 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604578 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224793 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646-47" }, { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597043 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Mich. L. Rev. 307", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Mich. L. Rev.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "487 So. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7595802 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69-70" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/487/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 So. 2d 1142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7584782 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/516/1142-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 So. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7572627 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/509/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 So. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7587886 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/494/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "881 So. 2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9184321 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/881/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ohio App. 3d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 6713778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/48/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 1210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1220" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ohio App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1065965 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6", "parenthetical": "expert medical testimony is not indispensable to a claim of serious emotional distress" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/148/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "771 N.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878", "parenthetical": "expert medical testimony is not indispensable to a claim of serious emotional distress" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1440, "char_count": 35144, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5966286578240815e-07, "percentile": 0.8191205355987936 }, "sha256": "1664e0244f326022e9dfccdffcd967837c37380bc562da3dd46b1cc6fe22cc39", "simhash": "1:0271e35a227d3561", "word_count": 5776 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:03:00.610033+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. WILLIAM A. HUDSON, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nThe defendant, William Hudson, was charged in the circuit court of Adams County with home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(a)(2) (West 2004)) (count I) and attempt (kidnapping) (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4(a), 10 \u2014 1(a)(2) (West 2004)) (count II). A jury found defendant guilty of home invasion, but was unable to reach a verdict on attempt (kidnapping). Defendant was subsequently sentenced to 20 years in prison. He appealed, arguing that (1) psychological injury does not satisfy the \u201cinjury\u201d element of the offense of home invasion; (2) the evidence was insufficient to show that he intended to harm the victim, Megan Walker; (3) the evidence was insufficient to prove that Walker suffered psychological harm; and (4) the circuit court denied him a fair hearing on his posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The appellate court rejected defendant\u2019s first three contentions, affirming the judgment of the circuit court in part. However, the appellate court vacated the circuit court\u2019s judgment insofar as it denied defendant\u2019s post-trial motions, and the appellate court ordered the cause remanded for further proceedings in that regard. No. 4 \u2014 06\u20140181 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to present evidence of psychological trauma and instructing the jury that evidence of psychological trauma could satisfy the injury element of the offense of home invasion, and (2) assuming, arguendo, proof of psychological trauma can be so used, the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient to prove psychological harm where no expert testimony was presented. We will set forth those facts relevant to our disposition.\nBACKGROUND\nAn amended information was filed in this case on April 27, 2005, charging defendant with home invasion and attempt (kidnapping). Count I, charging home invasion, alleged that defendant, who was not a police officer acting in the line of duty, knowingly and without authority entered the dwelling place of Megan Walker, that he remained there until he knew or had reason to know that Walker was present, and he intentionally caused injury to her. Defendant was tried before a jury on August 10, 2005.\nSixteen-year-old Megan Walker testified that, in April of 2005, she lived at 913 Chestnut Street in Quincy, Illinois, with her mother, Theresa Glowers, and her stepfather. In the early morning hours of April 26, 2005, the family\u2019s pet bird started making a lot of noise and Megan went to the kitchen to investigate. When she turned on the light, she saw a man (later identified as defendant) standing in the kitchen, close to the back door. He was wearing a shirt, but was not wearing pants. Megan had never seen him before.\nMegan asked him who he was and what he was doing there, but defendant did not respond. Instead, defendant advanced toward her, grabbed her wrists and her face, and pushed her against the basement door. He said, \u201cHelp me. I just got fucked.\u201d Megan testified she was scared and was yelling for her mother. Defendant then grabbed the back of her hair and, with her hair wrapped around his hand, he began to pull her toward the back door. As defendant pulled her toward the door, Megan continued to scream for her mother. When they reached the doorway, Megan held onto the doorknob in an attempt to keep defendant from dragging her outside. Defendant took off running when Megan\u2019s mother appeared in the kitchen.\nMegan testified that she sustained various physical injuries in the course of the assault. She said defendant hurt her when he pulled her by the hair. Afterward, she had \u201creally big bumps\u201d on the back of her head, which \u201cjust kept *** throbbing.\u201d Her shoulder was also injured in the course of the struggle. Megan described it as \u201creally bruised.\u201d Her little finger was jammed and \u201cfelt like it was broken.\u201d In addition to her physical injuries, Megan testified that she does not sleep much since the incident and feels uneasy in her own home. She said she is afraid to go into the kitchen by herself when it is dark. She thinks about that night and is still bothered by it.\nMegan identified the defendant at trial. She testified she did not give defendant permission to come into her home, and he did not leave when she encountered him. To the contrary, he assaulted her.\nMegan\u2019s mother, Theresa Glowers, testified that she, her husband, and her 16-year-old daughter, Megan Walker, lived at 913 Chestnut Street in Quincy, Illinois, in April of 2005. In the early morning hours of April 26, 2005, Glowers heard a \u201crukus\u201d in her kitchen followed by \u201ca scream of terror\u201d from Megan. Glowers ran to the kitchen and found the back door standing open and Megan holding her head and crying. Glowers called 911, reporting that someone had broken into her house and had assaulted her daughter.\nAfter the police arrived, and she and Megan had spoken with responding officers, dowers took Megan to the emergency room. Although she was eventually released to go home, Megan was very upset and wanted Glowers to hold her while they were at the hospital. Megan cried the rest of the morning. At the time of the assault, Glowers noticed that Megan\u2019s face and cheeks were \u201cred like *** fingers had been squeezing her.\u201d Megan\u2019s right shoulder was red and the little finger on her right hand was swollen.\nGlowers testified that, at the time of trial, three months after the assault, Megan still was not sleeping much. According to Glowers, at times, for \u201cthree or four days she won\u2019t sleep at all.\u201d Glowers stated that Megan was not like that before the assault. After the assault, Megan was afraid to go into, or stay in, the kitchen by herself. She now tends to isolate herself in her bedroom. As of the time of trial, Megan was not eating well, she seemed sad, and was \u201cteary-eyed a lot.\u201d Again, that was not indicative of her behavior before she was assaulted.\nGlowers testified that she never gave permission to defendant to enter her home. She stated, at the time of the incident, she had a large doghouse outside her backdoor, a doghouse large enough that \u201ctwo adult people can get in it.\u201d\nQuincy police officers, who responded to Walker\u2019s residence, testified at trial, substantially corroborating the testimony of Megan and her mother. Officers found defendant behind the house next door to the Glowers residence. Defendant was wearing a blue shirt, but was not wearing pants.\nOne officer, who observed Megan immediately after the assault, testified that she was crying and \u201cextremely upset\u201d when he arrived on the scene. It was \u201cseveral minutes\u201d before she was able to carry on a conversation. He observed some redness on Megan\u2019s arm, and he noted that she complained of a finger injury. He accompanied Megan to the hospital, where he learned that she had a large abrasion on her shoulder.\nAnother officer searched the doghouse located in the backyard of the Glowers residence. In that doghouse, he found a pair of jeans, boots, and a hat. In the jeans, he found a wallet containing defendant\u2019s Arizona driver\u2019s license.\nThe arresting officer interviewed defendant around 2 a.m. on April 26, 2005. The officer smelled the odor of alcohol emanating from defendant; however, he noted that defendant was cooperative and responsive, and he did not appear to be confused. Because defendant appeared to be intoxicated, officers administered a portable breath test, the result of which was a reading of 0.19.\nIn the course of the interview, defendant told the officer he was a truck driver from Arizona. While traveling from Ohio to Arizona, defendant said he \u201cgot dumped off in St. Louis.\u201d He said he hitched a ride to Quincy and had been drinking at a Quincy tavern on the night of the incident. He left the tavern with a man who was supposed to give him a ride to a hotel and \u201chook him up with a female [who] would eventually perform oral sex on him.\u201d According to defendant, he later got out of the man\u2019s car and into another car occupied by a woman. He said she helped him take his pants and boots off; however, he could not remember exactly what happened after that.\nDefendant said he did recall walking into the residence at 913 Chestnut and being startled when a young female turned on the light. He conceded that he did not have permission to enter the residence; however, he said he thought he was entering his apartment in Arizona. Defendant admitted that the young girl asked him several times what he was doing there and told him to get out of the house. He acknowledged that he responded by walking toward her, grabbing her by the shoulder and/or the hair, and attempting to drag her out of the residence as she was screaming. Defendant offered no explanation for his actions. He did not tell the girl that he had been robbed, nor did he ask her to call the police.\nYet another officer testified to a subsequent statement defendant gave to police. In that version of events, defendant said he left a local bar with a man who was supposed to find him a place to stay. They ended up at a house near the Glowers residence. Defendant said he purchased crack cocaine while at that location, and the individuals with whom he was associating subsequently offered to \u201cset him up\u201d with a girl who would perform oral sex on him. To that end, he walked to the back of the residence where he was supposed to meet a black female. Defendant said the next thing he knew he was stripped of his pants, his money was taken from him, and the girl took off running. Defendant stated he ended up in the residence at 913 Chestnut because that was where he thought the girl had gone. He admitted, when he saw Megan Walker, a white female, he knew she was not the girl he was pursuing. He claimed he only touched Megan to calm her down. Defendant said he left on his own after Megan started screaming. He said he felt someone had set him up, but he acknowledged that he knew Megan was not involved in that plan as soon as he encountered her.\nDefendant\u2019s testimony was similar in some respects to the statements he gave to police, but there were significant differences as well, particularly between defendant\u2019s initial statement and his trial testimony.\nAt trial, defendant testified that the girl who was supposed to perform oral sex on him had taken him from a nearby house to what he thought at the time was a shed, but turned out to be the doghouse in back of the residence at 913 Chestnut. Defendant stated this \u201cblack female\u201d helped him remove his pants and boots, and when she got his pants off, she reached into his pocket, grabbed his cash, and ran. He said he began chasing her and then heard a door slam \u201cright in front of\u201d him. Defendant testified that he \u201cran in right behind her inside the house.\u201d He said it was \u201cpitch black\u201d inside, but a light came on \u201cimmediately\u201d as he entered the house. Defendant testified he then saw Megan Walker \u201ccoming at me as I was going at her.\u201d He then testified as to his version of subsequent events:\n\u201cI put my hand up to stop us from colliding and put it on her shoulder and *** as I put my hand on her shoulder her hair was strung down over her shoulder so my hand went onto her hair and shoulder and I told her I said, \u2018I just got, I just got fucked. Where\u2019s this girl that just came in ahead of me?\u2019 And she was screaming so loud and not listening to me that I just pulled my hand off and turned around, ran and I believe my hand got caught in her hair.\u201d\nDefendant said he left the house immediately. He denied any intent to harm Megan Walker.\nUnder cross-examination, defendant took issue with the prosecutor\u2019s assertion \u2014 derived from testimony regarding defendant\u2019s first statement to authorities\u2014 that he was \u201cso messed up\u201d when he entered the Walker residence that he thought he was going into his own residence in Arizona. Defendant stated: \u201cI did not say that. *** I am claiming that they misunderstood what I said.\u201d Defendant also denied that he ever told police he had tried to drag Megan from her residence.\nFollowing closing arguments, the jury was instructed in the applicable law. Pertinent to issues raised in this appeal, the jury was instructed as follows, without objection from defense counsel:\n\u201cA person commits the offense of home invasion when he, not being a police officer acting in the line of duty, without authority, knowingly enters the dwelling place of another and remains in such dwelling until when [sic] he knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present, and intentionally causes any injury to any person within the dwelling place.\u201d See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 11.53 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th).\n\u201cThe term \u2018injury\u2019 in the definition of home invasion may include physical injury. It also includes psychological or emotional trauma if that trauma was the result of some physical contact.\u201d See IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.53B.\nThe jury found the defendant guilty of home invasion, but was unable to reach a verdict on attempt (kidnapping). The court subsequently sentenced defendant to 20 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nThereafter, defendant filed a pro se motion for reduction of sentence and a pro se document alleging numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. Among defendant\u2019s allegations was a complaint that counsel: \u201cDid not object to alleged emotional injury to victim when there was no psycological [sic] evidence by a proffessional [sic] or expert witness.\u201d Defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence on behalf of defendant and a motion for new trial as well. In the latter motion, counsel argued only that the State failed to prove defendant guilty of home invasion beyond a reasonable doubt. On February 24, 2006, the circuit court conducted a hearing on defendant\u2019s posttrial motions, ultimately denying defendant\u2019s motion for new trial and his motions pertaining to sentence. Although the court initially agreed with the State\u2019s assertion that defendant\u2019s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel could be addressed \u201cat a different time and different forum,\u201d the court concluded the hearing by making mention of those allegations nonetheless, stating that the court \u201cdid not take those allegations lightly,\u201d and \u201cdid look at them in substantial detail.\u201d With respect to those allegations, the court noted they were either \u201cconclusory with no evidence as to *** relevancy,\u201d they were \u201cspeculative,\u201d they were \u201cnot supported by the evidence,\u201d and \u201ceven if true or relevant, the reasonable probability of the outcome of the trial being different was basically nil.\u201d\nANALYSIS\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to present evidence of psychological trauma and instructing the jury that evidence of psychological trauma could satisfy the injury element of the offense of home invasion. We note, initially, that defendant did not object to the introduction of evidence of psychological harm at trial. Moreover, he did not object to the correlative instruction, he offered no alternative instruction, and he did not raise the instructional issue in a posttrial motion.\nThe failure to object to allegedly improper evidence when it is introduced at trial results in forfeiture of the issue for purposes of appeal. See People v. Ramsey, 205 Ill. 2d 287, 293 (2002); People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 502 (2000). Furthermore, a defendant generally forfeits review of any instructional issue if he does not object to the instruction or offer an alternative at trial, and he does not raise the issue in a posttrial motion. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564 (2007). \u201cThis principle encourages a defendant to raise issues before the trial court, thereby allowing the court to correct its errors before the instructions are given, and consequently precluding a defendant from obtaining a reversal through inaction.\u201d Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 564.\nAcknowledging the procedural default, defendant argues that this court should consider his allegations of error under our plain-error rule. Our plain-error rule is set forth in Supreme Court Rule 615(a), which states as follows:\n\u201cAny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).\nThis court construes, \u201cidentically,\u201d Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)), enunciating general principles of plain-error review, and Supreme Court Rule 451(c) (177 Ill. 2d R. 451(c)), which specifically addresses review of alleged instructional error. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 564; People v. Durr, 215 Ill. 2d 283, 296 (2005). Our prior decisions make clear that this court may invoke the plain-error rule to review alleged errors not properly preserved when (1) the evidence in a criminal case is closely balanced, or (2) the error is so fundamental, and of such magnitude, that the accused is denied the right to a fair trial and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (2003).\nIn addressing a defendant\u2019s plain-error argument, we first consider whether error occurred at all. People v. Urdiales, 225 Ill. 2d 354, 415 (2007). In order \u201c \u2018[t]o determine whether a purported error is \u201cplain\u201d requires a substantive look at it.\u2019 \u201d Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 64, quoting People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995). Thus, we first consider whether the introduction of evidence of psychological harm at trial, and the utilization of IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.53B when instructing the jury, were errors.\nWe begin our analysis with the language of the statute in question, which is the surest and most reliable indicator of the legislature\u2019s intent. See In re Jaime P, 223 Ill. 2d 526, 532 (2006). The statute defining the offense of home invasion provides in part:\n\u201c(a) A person who is not a peace officer acting in the line of duty commits home invasion when without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present or he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another and remains in such dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present and\n(1) While armed with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury occurs, or\n(2) Intentionally causes any injury, except as provided in subsection (a)(5), to any person or persons within such dwelling place, or\n(3) While armed with a firearm uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury occurs, or\n(4) Uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury occurs and during the commission of the offense personally discharges a firearm, or\n(5) Personally discharges a firearm that proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person within such dwelling placet.]\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(a)(1) through (a)(5) (West 2004).\nDefendant, who was charged under subsection (a)(2) of the home invasion statute, argues that the phrase \u201cany injury,\u201d as used in that subsection, does not include psychological injury or trauma. He contends his position is \u201cbolstered by the fact that the offense of home invasion is contained in that portion of the Illinois Criminal Code entitled \u2018Bodily Harm.\u2019 \u201d He also cites the isolated comments of four legislators \u2014 comments regarding an offense that can be committed in at least five different ways, as the quoted portions of the statute indicate \u2014 to support his contention that \u201cany injury\u201d must be construed as \u201cbodily injury.\u201d\nAs a preliminary matter, we note the pitfalls of relying upon such \u201csnippet[s] of legislative history.\u201d See People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 646-47 (2000). In Falbe, a case in which the comments of four state representatives were offered to establish the purpose of legislation, this court noted: \u201cDefendants do not offer us any insight into the thoughts of the 114 remaining representatives, or the 59 members of the senate, all of whom had a vote to cast when this legislation was passed and enacted into law.\u201d Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d at 647. We believe that observation applies in this instance as well, particularly where the statute under discussion provides for so many different modes of commission.\nBeyond that observation, we reject the defendant\u2019s argument on the merits. The internal language of the home invasion statute itself indicates that legislators were familiar with the word \u201cbodily,\u201d as they use that word in subsection (a)(5) of the same statute, referring to \u201cbodily harm.\u201d \u201cHarm\u201d is a synonym of \u201cinjury.\u201d As defined by Webster\u2019s, \u201charm\u201d means \u201cphysical or mental damage: INJURY.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1034 (1976). \u201cInjury\u201d means \u201can act that damages, harms, or hurts: an unjust or undeserved infliction of suffering or harm.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1164 (1976). If, as defendant suggests, the legislators intended to limit the otherwise expansive phrase \u201cany injury,\u201d they could have simply used the phrase \u201cbodily injury\u201d or \u201cbodily harm,\u201d as they did in subsection (a)(5) of section 12 \u2014 11, and as they have done in myriad other instances throughout the Criminal Code. When the legislature uses certain language in one part of a statute and different language in another, we may assume different meanings were intended. Carver v. Bond/Fayette/Effingham Regional Board of School Trustees, 146 Ill. 2d 347, 353 (1992). We assume there was significance to the use of the broader term \u201cany injury.\u201d Use of the more inclusive term in this context could only mean that the phrase refers to both physical and psychological injury or harm.\nAs some commentators have noted, it is common for the law to recognize that some crimes \u2014 such as those involving an intrusion into the victim\u2019s living quarters\u2014 cause psychological as well as physical harm. \u201cHence, many crimes associated with a high degree of psychological harm, such as *** residential burglary ***, are graded and punished more sternly than other crimes that can inflict comparable physical or pecuniary injuries, such as *** commercial burglary ***.\u201d R. Mikos, \u201cEggshell\u201d Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal Benefits of Shifting Crime, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 335 (2006). Federal sentencing guidelines take into account increased risks for both physical and psychological injury when a residence is the target of a burglary, increasing the base offense level for residential burglary over other forms of burglary. See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a72B2.1, Commentary (West 2007). Indeed, it seems to us little more than a matter of common sense that a perpetrator\u2019s violation of the sanctity of one\u2019s living space, with the intent to cause injury, carries with it the potential for psychological injury or trauma. The legislature\u2019s use of the broad term \u201cany injury\u201d in subsection (a)(2) of the home invasion statute appears to recognize that potential.\nThe fact that the home invasion statute is contained in that portion of the Criminal Code entitled \u201cBodily Harm\u201d does not persuade us that the phraseology chosen by the legislature should be interpreted restrictively, as defendant suggests. As the State points out, other crimes falling under the heading of \u201cBodily Harm\u201d similarly concern themselves with the psychological response of the victim. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 1 (West 2004) (the crime of assault occurs when \u201c[a] person *** places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery\u201d); 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 6(a) (West 2004) (the crime of intimidation is committed by 6 \u2018 communicat [ing] to another *** a threat to perform\u201d certain acts); 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 7.3(a)(2) (West 2004) (crime of \u201cstalking\u201d is complete when the perpetrator \u201cplaces [a person being followed] in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm\u201d). As the State concludes, \u201c[t]he fact that these other crimes can be committed in the absence of physical injury, or in many cases even physical contact, defeats defendant\u2019s *** argument that the heading \u2018bodily harm\u2019 means the offenses described therein are concerned only with physical injury.\u201d\nWe conclude neither placement of the home invasion statute under a broad statutory heading, nor the language of the pertinent subsection of the statute, dictates the restricted construction that the defendant would have us impose. To the contrary, use of the phrase \u201cany injury\u201d clearly suggests an application beyond mere bodily injury. Thus, we hold that proof of psychological injury or trauma satisfies the injury element of section 12\u2014 11(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961. Consequently, we find that the trial court did not err when it allowed evidence of psychological harm and it instructed the jury with IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.53B.\nWe now turn to defendant\u2019s second argument, i.e., that expert testimony is necessary to prove psychological harm and, because there was no such testimony in this case, the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant. We note, initially, that defendant cites no cases \u2014 from this jurisdiction or any other \u2014 holding that expert testimony is necessary to prove psychological harm. Moreover, we take note of the following statement in defendant\u2019s reply brief: \u201cBecause of the uncontradicted evidence about Ms. Walker\u2019s emotional status following her encounter with Mr. Hudson the jury could have easily found that Ms. Walker suffered psychological harm and concluded that it did not have to determine whether Mr. Hudson intentionally caused physical harm to Ms. Walker.\u201d Indeed, the jury could have easily concluded that Megan Walker suffered psychological harm.\nThere was uncontradicted testimony from Megan and her mother evincing a marked change in Megan\u2019s behavior and emotional status after she was assaulted by defendant. After she was assaulted, Megan suffered from sleep deprivation, she tended to isolate herself from the rest of her family, she was afraid to go into or stay in her own kitchen, she was not eating well, and she continued to be very emotional or \u201cteary-eyed.\u201d Megan\u2019s mother testified that those problems did not exist prior to the night of the home invasion, i.e., the night that defendant rushed into Megan\u2019s home, grabbed her, and allegedly tried to drag her from her residence. We find the circumstances of the offense were such that a victim, such as Megan, certainly could suffer psychological trauma, and the uncontradicted evidence indicates that she did.\nIt is uncontested that defendant, a stranger who was naked from the waist down, entered the victim\u2019s residence without authority, late at night, and advanced toward a startled, distraught and screaming 16-year-old girl, grabbing hold of her. The parties may differ as to whether defendant intended to hurt Megan, or drag her out of the house, but that much is undisputed. Under the circumstances of this case, we do not believe expert testimony was necessary to establish that the 16-year-old female victim suffered psychological trauma.\nAlthough the defendant has not supplied relevant authority on this point, our own research has revealed pertinent decisions, in analogous contexts, from other jurisdictions that support our conclusion that expert testimony is not always necessary to establish psychological trauma.\nFor example, in Brooks v. State, 487 So. 2d 68, 69-70 (Fla. App. 1986), the appellate court found lay testimony sufficient proof of psychological harm to justify a departure from recommended sentencing guidelines where defendant\u2019s \u201cpresence within the respective dwelling was discovered by the occupants \u2014 thereby inflicting psychological harm to them.\u201d The appellate court rejected defendant\u2019s contention that the record did not support a finding that the victims suffered \u201cgreat psychological harm,\u201d stating:\n\u201cOn two occasions, Brooks was observed fleeing from the dwelling by the occupants, and in one case the sixteen year old daughter of the household awakened and observed Brooks sitting on the floor of her room rifling her purse. Although there was no victim injury or threat of injury in any of the incidents, the victims expressed surprise and a lasting sense of distress and fear due to Brooks\u2019s intrusion. We conclude that this particular form of psychological trauma constitutes a valid basis for departure [from sentencing guidelines] ***.\u201d Brooks, 487 So. 2d at 70.\nAlthough another appellate court panel, citing an intervening decision by the Florida Supreme Court, has questioned Brooks\u2019s sanctioning of the use of psychological trauma as a valid basis for departure from Florida sentencing guidelines, absent extraordinary circumstances or discernible physical manifestation resulting from the trauma (see Carter v. State, 516 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Fla. App. 1987), citing State v. Rousseau, 509 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1987)), Brooks still stands for the proposition that lay testimony may suffice to establish \u201cgreat psychological harm\u201d in a sentencing proceeding. We recognize that the standard of proof at the guilt phase of a criminal proceeding is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the standard applicable to sentencing at the time of the Brooks decision may have been something less; however, we also note that the issue in Brooks was whether the evidence established great psychological harm \u2014 a requirement beyond mere psychological injury\u2014 and the circumstances giving rise to a finding of great psychological harm were something less than what we have here. Notably, the 16-year-old girl in Brooks was not involved in a physical confrontation with a half-naked man who tried to drag her out of her home.\nIn other contexts, where proof of psychological injury or harm is at issue, courts have held that expert testimony is not an absolute requirement. Recently, in Austin v. Sneed, No. M2006 \u2014 00083\u2014COA\u2014R3\u2014Cy slip op. at 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. November 13, 2007), a Tennessee appellate court noted: \u201cIn excessive force cases, expert medical testimony is not necessary when the cause of a physical or psychological injury is within the common knowledge of lay persons.\u201d In the context of a workers\u2019 compensation case, an Alabama appellate court, quoting a regional treatise on the subject, stated as follows:\n\u201c \u2018In appropriate circumstances, an award may be made for mental disability even though medical testimony relating to its existence or cause is inconclusive, or even nonexistent. For example, in Federal Mogul Corp. v. Campbell, [494 So. 2d 443 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986),] the court held that the existence of a mental disability and its causal link to the employee\u2019s occupation may be established in the absence of clear expert opinions by lay testimony showing that the employee behaved normally and could perform his job before the accident and exhibited bizarre emotional behavior immediately afterwards that interfered with or precluded him from being able to work.\u2019 \u201d USX Corp. v. Bradley, 881 So. 2d 421, 430 (Ala. App. 2003), quoting 1 T. Moore, Alabama Workers\u2019 Compensation \u00a76:15, at 180-81 (1998).\nSimilarly, in Uebelacker v. Cincom Systems, Inc., 48 Ohio App. 3d 268, 549 N.E.2d 1210 (1988), a case involving an action for false imprisonment, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, an Ohio appellate court addressed the sufficiency of lay testimony in proving \u201cpsychic injury\u201d in that context:\n\u201cIn Paugh v. Hanks, *** the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized an action for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress and established standards for proving the \u2018seriousness\u2019 of a psychic injury. The court in Yeager, *** in setting the standards for a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, recognized the similarities between the two actions and adopted the standard established in Paugh for proving the seriousness of an intentional injury. [Citation.] Thus, an action to recover for emotional distress may not be premised upon mere embarrassment or hurt feelings, but must be predicated upon a psychic injury that is both severe and debilitating. [Citation.] Proof of serious emotional distress may be offered in the form of expert medical testimony, but expert opinion is not indispensable. Lay witnesses acquainted with the plaintiff may also testify to significant changes that they have observed in the emotional or habitual makeup of the plaintiff.\u201d Uebelacker, 48 Ohio App. 3d at 276, 549 N.E.2d at 1220.\nSee also Powell v. Grant Medical Center, 148 Ohio App. 3d 1, 6, 771 N.E.2d 874, 878 (2002) (expert medical testimony is not indispensable to a claim of serious emotional distress).\nIn this case, jurors could reasonably find, without the assistance of expert testimony, that the circumstances of the offense were such as to cause psychological injury to a 16-year-old girl. Moreover, the testimony of the victim and her mother described symptoms and changed behavior following the offense, indicating that the victim had suffered psychological trauma. Although expert testimony may be required in some cases to prove psychological injury, we find it was not necessary given the facts of this case. Therefore, we find no error in convicting defendant based on lay testimony alone.\nIn sum, we reject the defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to present evidence of psychological trauma and instructing the jury that evidence of psychological trauma could satisfy the injury element of the offense of home invasion. We also reject defendant\u2019s claim that the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient to prove psychological harm because no expert testimony was presented. There is no error here; therefore, there can be no plain error. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court as to the issues presented in this appeal. Pursuant to the appellate court\u2019s directive, the matter will be remanded to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with the appellate court\u2019s order.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles M. Schiedel and Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defenders, and Lawrence Bapst and Ryan R. Wilson, Assistant Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Jonathan Bernard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Erin M. O\u2019Connell, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 104470.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. WILLIAM A. HUDSON, Appellant.\nOpinion filed March 20, 2008.\nCharles M. Schiedel and Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defenders, and Lawrence Bapst and Ryan R. Wilson, Assistant Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Jonathan Bernard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Erin M. O\u2019Connell, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0181-01", "first_page_order": 191, "last_page_order": 209 }