{ "id": 5706738, "name": "MICHELLE WILLIAMS, Indiv. and as Special Adm'r of the Estate of Baby Doe, Deceased, Appellee, v. JOHN C. MANCHESTER, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Williams v. Manchester", "decision_date": "2008-04-03", "docket_number": "No. 104524", "first_page": "404", "last_page": "427", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 404" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "233 Ill. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3379941 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" }, { "page": "262" }, { "page": "262" }, { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/233/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269738 ], "weight": 17, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" }, { "page": "223" }, { "page": "234" }, { "page": "246-47" }, { "page": "248" }, { "page": "248" }, { "page": "249", "parenthetical": "Cahill, J, dissenting" }, { "page": "249-50", "parenthetical": "Cahill, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "223" }, { "page": "245" }, { "page": "223" }, { "page": "250-51", "parenthetical": "Cahill, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "248" }, { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607118 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" }, { "page": "163" }, { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777551 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451063 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448810 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451693 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 Ill. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2617357 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/402/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2533082 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" }, { "page": "513-14" }, { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/374/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "1853 Ill. Laws 97", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260487 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538270 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2952941 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 Ill. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2562924 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/370/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2855841 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ill. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 438586 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1857, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" }, { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/18/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198922 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "collecting cases" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 Ill. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5307678 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" }, { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/404/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 Ill. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2419093 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86-87" }, { "page": "86-87" }, { "page": "86-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/290/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 980", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2958253 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "983", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "987-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0980-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222757 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454-55" }, { "page": "460" }, { "page": "457-58" }, { "page": "454-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 Ill. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5311001 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/410/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569667 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" }, { "page": "415" }, { "page": "410", "parenthetical": "observing that a \"survival action allows for recovery of damages for injury sustained by the deceased up to the time of death\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58949 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487-88" }, { "page": "496-507" }, { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3506565 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636", "parenthetical": "applying Wrongful Death Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2975702 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766", "parenthetical": "observing that proof of damages \"is essential for recovery in a suit for negligence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2533977, 2536950 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/132/0367-01", "/ill-app-2d/132/0367-02" ] }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 2d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1588387 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65", "parenthetical": "\"An action cannot be maintained for an injury without damage\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/115/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Ill. 2d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2773437 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/13/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Ill. 2d 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2712058 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/7/0608-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1521, "char_count": 41638, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.800117078394744e-07, "percentile": 0.9778931126872648 }, "sha256": "df5c06dbbd078f4a5c9ca266e0f4fe5f0ff7b84841034086cf30703206b78c3c", "simhash": "1:32e8eb6e025e76a1", "word_count": 6791 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:03:00.610033+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MICHELLE WILLIAMS, Indiv. and as Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Baby Doe, Deceased, Appellee, v. JOHN C. MANCHESTER, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Burke took no part in the decision.\nOPINION\nThis appeal focuses on a wrongful-death claim that plaintiff, Michelle Williams, brought in the circuit court of Cook County against defendant, John Manchester. Plaintiff sought damages for the death of her unborn child, Baby Doe. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant on that claim, but a divided panel of the appellate court reversed. 372 Ill. App. 3d 211. We allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now vacate in part the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe record, which includes plaintiff\u2019s deposition testimony, contains the following pertinent evidence. In October 2002, plaintiff was IOV2 weeks pregnant with Baby Doe, and she had been aware of her pregnancy for approximately one month. Plaintiff had planned to carry Baby Doe to term, and plaintiff and the child\u2019s father had been preparing for the birth.\nOn the night of October 15, 2002, plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile (hereafter, plaintiffs automobile) proceeding east on Montrose Avenue in Chicago. Defendant was driving west on Montrose. As plaintiff\u2019s automobile was proceeding through the intersection of Montrose and Western Avenues, defendant turned left, attempting to proceed south on Western Avenue. The two vehicles collided, with the driver\u2019s side of defendant\u2019s vehicle crashing into that of plaintiffs automobile. According to plaintiff, \u201c[i]t was almost like a head-on\u201d collision. Plaintiffs forehead broke through the windshield. When plaintiff regained consciousness, a firefighter was beside her in the automobile, and he extricated her from the windshield. Plaintiff felt pain not only in her head, but also in her hip.\nAn ambulance took plaintiff to Advocate Illinois Masonic Medical Center. According to plaintiff, she and Baby Doe\u2019s father met with a team of physicians and discussed her condition and treatment options. The physicians informed plaintiff that she did not suffer a spontaneous abortion and that the baby itself was not injured in the collision; rather, \u201cthe baby was fine.\u201d\nHowever, the physicians informed plaintiff that she, herself, suffered a broken hip and pelvis. As a result, according to plaintiff:\n\u201c[The physicians] told me that because my pelvic bone was broke, they couldn\u2019t be certain that I would hold the baby. If I did choose to stay pregnant, I\u2019d have to be bedridden and then the bones would heal themselves and then they might have to go back in and break them again. They couldn\u2019t promise that I would ever walk right. Pretty much everything they were saying is, they couldn\u2019t promise anything.\u201d\nPlaintiff further described the meeting as follows:\n\u201cThey said that if the bones healed on their own, they might have to go back in and rebreak them to set them again and I\u2019d still have to have surgery but it would be afterwards; and they couldn\u2019t promise with x-rays and all that that [sic] the baby would even be okay.\u201d\nDr. Joanne Kirby, plaintiffs emergency room physician, told plaintiff that an X-ray had been taken of her, which, according to plaintiff, \u201ccould cause disabilities in the child and mental problems.\u201d According to her deposition, plaintiff understood these physicians to share the opinion that it would be best for plaintiff to terminate her pregnancy. Further, when plaintiff ultimately decided to terminate her pregnancy, no physician told her that it was a bad decision or that her decision was not in the best interest of her health. Plaintiffs hospital record indicated: \u201cPatient desires consultation with high-risk OB/fetal specialist.\u201d\nDr. James Keller, a high-risk obstetrician-gynecologist, testified in a deposition, relying on several notes in plaintiffs hospital record. At the time of the accident, Dr. Keller was the director of high-risk obstetrics at Illinois Masonic. On October 17 and 18, 2002, he met plaintiff and consulted on her care, but did not actually provide any treatment. He explained that, as a consulting physician, his role was \u201c[t]o make sure that [plaintiff] had as much information as possible, to make sure that the orthopedic surgeon understood the relevant issues, so that they could make a decision as to what the best course of action would be.\u201d The counseling that physicians at Illinois Masonic give to patients is \u201cnonjudgmental.\u201d Dr. Keller explained that physicians there \u201cjust make sure that the patient has the information to make a decision. *** [0]ur overall goal is to be as nonguiding as possible.\u201d\nIn terms of plaintiff specifically, Dr. Keller needed plaintiff to understand the following issues: plaintiff\u2019s optimal therapy and the attendant risks of that therapy on the fetus; the best course of treatment for the fetus and the negative effects it would have on plaintiff; and possible \u201cintermediate scenarios.\u201d At the time of Dr. Keller\u2019s consultation, plaintiff had a viable pregnancy that could have gone to term. However:\n\u201cTo the fetus there\u2019s the risk of her [plaintiffs] drug and radiation exposure prior to this point; to the mother there\u2019s an increase of prolonged immobilization with a pelvic fracture, which carried short-term and long-term risks. The short-term risks would be mainly an increased risk of embolic phenomenon, thrombosis and embolism, blood clots. The long-term risks I would sort of defer to orthopedics, but they said that the longer that she waited to repair the hip the worse her outcome would be.\u201d\nThus, Dr. Keller opined that there were \u201crisks involved to the mother and the fetus of continuing the pregnancy.\u201d\nRegarding Baby Doe\u2019s exposure to radiation, Dr. Keller opined: Dr. Keller explained that, generally, radiation exposure may cause organs to develop incorrectly, existing organs to grow and mature incorrectly, and an increased risk of childhood and adult malignancies. Dr. Keller based his opinion on \u201cgeneral medical knowledge\u201d and an unidentified \u201cwhole body of literature talking about the damages caused by radiation.\u201d He explained that \u201cit\u2019s sort of part of the general obstetric literature *** that radiation is a known teratogen or cause of birth defects.\u201d\n\u201cWith any individual fetus you won\u2019t be able to say, well, this is what would happen with this fetus; but in a general term, if you want to know what\u2019s the risk, there is no safe threshold for radiation to a fetus, meaning that once she\u2019s radiated there is an increased risk of problems related to radiation.\u201d\nHowever, Dr. Keller recognized that Baby Doe would not inevitably have had problems because of the radiation to which it was exposed up to the time of his consultation. Also, Dr. Keller could not opine whether Baby Doe would have had problems even with additional radiation exposure throughout the pregnancy. Indeed, Dr. Keller answered in the affirmative the question: \u201cThere is no way with absolute certainty to conclude what the ultimate effects of radiation exposure is to a fetus?\u201d Dr. Keller actually \u201chad plenty of patients who have had exposure to radiation who have delivered perfectly healthy babies.\u201d Dr. Keller would defer to radiology specialists as to quantifying the amount of radiation to which Baby Doe was exposed and the corresponding risk. Dr. Keller did not consider himself an expert in medical radiation exposure so as to render an opinion in this case. Although he stated that he could so qualify himself through personal research and consultation with radiology specialists, he did not plan to do so in this case.\nDr. Keller read his consultation notes into the deposition record. When he first met plaintiff, he discussed plaintiff\u2019s case only generally. He needed to know the impact of continuing the pregnancy on her orthopedic treatment and what the alteration of such treatment to benefit the fetus would mean to plaintiff\u2019s long-term outcome. His notes indicated: \u201cPatient would like to continue pregnancy but not at risk to her long-term outcome.\u201d Dr. Keller\u2019s notes indicated that he would speak with plaintiffs orthopedist \u201cto get better idea of drug/radiation exposure, risk of waiting, and then revisit with patient.\u201d\nDr. Keller also read into the record a note from plaintiff\u2019s orthopedist, Dr. David Beigler, which stated: \u201cIf child is desired, then nonoperative care is recommended.\u201d However, the note continued: \u201cIf the fetus is not wanted,\u201d termination of pregnancy \u201cis suggested such that ORIF or open reduction, internal fixation could be performed. Similarly, if spontaneous abortion occurs, ORIF may be contemplated.\u201d Remembering his conversation with Dr. Beigler, Dr. Keller testified: \u201cit seems the gist of the conversation was that the longer we waited the worse the long-term outcome for the mother is going to be.\u201d\nAfter consulting with plaintiff\u2019s orthopedist, Dr. Keller had a second meeting with plaintiff. Baby Doe\u2019s father was also present. Dr. Keller discerned four options: (1) immediate pelvis surgery without termination of pregnancy; (2) immediate termination of pregnancy and, postrecovery, pelvis surgery; (3) delayed pelvis surgery until second trimester of pregnancy; and (4) delayed pelvis surgery until plaintiff gave birth. The first option put the fetus at risk for loss as a result of the pelvis surgery itself, \u201cas well as long-term problems due to radiation/medicine which would be difficult to quantify.\u201d The third option would decrease the risk to the fetus of drug and radiation exposure. However, the second option offered plaintiff the \u201cbest chance\u201d for a \u201cgood long-term outcome.\u201d Essentially, the longer plaintiff delayed pelvis surgery, the worse her long-term outcome would have been.\nDr. Keller\u2019s notes indicated: \u201cLong discussion with patient and father of the baby. They understand all issues. I will put through PEC papers.\u201d Dr. Keller explained that \u201cPEC\u201d referred to the hospital\u2019s perinatal ethics committee. The health-care system of which Illinois Masonic is a member has a policy not to terminate a pregnancy unless, as Dr. Keller paraphrased, there is a significant risk to the mother or the fetus. His last note, dated October 18, 2002, stated: \u201cPatient opts for termination of pregnancy. Paperwork forwarded. Awaiting PEC results. Risk of D & C[] discussed.\u201d Dr. Keller had no subsequent contact with plaintiff.\nAccording to plaintiffs deposition, the pregnancy was terminated within one week after the accident. The pelvis surgery was performed approximately two weeks subsequent to the accident.\nPlaintiff timely filed a three-count complaint in the circuit court, alleging that defendant\u2019s negligence proximately caused the automobile collision. In addition to seeking damages for her own injuries, plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Baby Doe, brought an action pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 (West 2002)). Plaintiff alleged that she was pregnant with Baby Doe, and that defendant\u2019s negligence proximately caused the collision, \u201cultimately causing\u201d Baby Doe\u2019s death. Plaintiff sought damages for injuries to herself and Baby Doe\u2019s father as next of kin. In her third claim, plaintiff sought damages for defendant\u2019s alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendant filed an answer denying all material allegations.\nDiscovery adduced the above-recited evidence. Defendant moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs claims for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Regarding the wrongful-death claim, defendant argued that the accident, X-ray, or any other potential risk to the fetus was not the proximate cause of the fetus\u2019 death. Rather, Baby Doe\u2019s death was the result of plaintiffs voluntary decision to terminate the pregnancy. Plaintiff voluntarily chose to terminate the pregnancy so that she could proceed with the pelvis surgery, \u201cdespite being provided options that would have allowed her to postpone surgery and forego termination of the pregnancy.\u201d\nIn response, plaintiff contended that defendant\u2019s negligence was the \u201ccause in fact\u201d of Baby Doe\u2019s wrongful death because \u201cbut for the defendant\u2019s negligence the termination [of the pregnancy] would not have occurred.\u201d Plaintiff further contended that defendant\u2019s negligence was the proximate cause of Baby Doe\u2019s death because plaintiffs decision to terminate the pregnancy \u201cwas a foreseeable result of the defendant\u2019s negligence.\u201d Both defendant and plaintiff relied on the depositions of plaintiff and Dr. Keller to support their respective positions.\nThe circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant on the wrongful-death claim.\n\u201cThe Court finds that based on the express language of the Wrongful Death Act, Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action on behalf of her fetus. In establishing proximate cause, the Act does not take into consideration the reasonable foreseeability of an injury or death, but, rather, focuses primarily on whether a defendant\u2019s conduct actually caused the injury or death. Here, the evidence establishes that, subsequent to the car accident, Plaintiff\u2019s fetus was uninjured and viable. Thus, Plaintiff could have continued with the pregnancy. However, rather than continue with the pregnancy and wait until later to address her own injuries, Plaintiff chose to receive medical treatment at the sacrifice of her fetus, thereby, terminating her pregnancy.\u201d\nThe circuit court concluded that plaintiffs termination of her pregnancy was the actual cause of Baby Doe\u2019s death, and defendant\u2019s alleged negligence did not cause any injury or death to Baby Doe, as required by the Wrongful Death Act.* 12*\nWe observe that plaintiff shortly thereafter added a survival claim (count IV), in which plaintiff, as administrator of Baby Doe\u2019s estate, sought damages for injuries to Baby Doe, \u201cincluding radiation and medication exposure,\u201d as a result of defendant\u2019s negligence. Defendant moved for summary judgment. In her response, plaintiff not only relied on Dr. Keller\u2019s testimony, but also attached an affidavit by Dr. Mark Edelman, a board-certified radiologist. Having reviewed plaintiffs hospital record, Dr. Edelman stated that plaintiff received a CAT scan and pelvic X-rays and, consequently, was exposed to radiation. \u201cBased on a reasonable degree of radiological certainty,\u201d Dr. Edelman opined that Baby Doe\u2019s radiation exposure \u201cprior to the pregnancy termination *** produced an increased risk of future injury to the fetus, specifically neural tube deformity.\u201d Dr. Edelman opined that \u201cthe fetus was damaged in that it sustained with a reasonable degree of radiological certainty an increased risk of future neural tube deformity.\u201d\nThe circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on this claim. The court found, inter alia, that the record did not contain any \u201cquantifiable evidence that the fetus was actually damaged from the radiation exposure. *** Evidence that the fetus may have been at risk for future deformities is purely speculative. A risk of injury does not equate to an actual injury.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nThe circuit court found that these summary judgment orders were final and that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).\nA divided panel of the appellate court reversed the summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff\u2019s wrongful-death claim. 372 Ill. App. 3d 211. The appellate court began its analysis of that claim by observing that \u201c[a]side from the additional element of the occurrence of death, the elements of a wrongful death claim are identical to those of a common law negligence claim.\u201d 372 Ill. App. 3d at 223. According to the appellate court, the dispositive issue in the appeal was \u201cgrounded in established tort principles surrounding proximate cause.\u201d 372 Ill. App. 3d at 223. The court concluded: \u201c[W]e cannot agree that, as a matter of law, it would be unforeseeable that a pregnant woman, injured through a person\u2019s negligence, would agree to endure the medical consequences to herself, or the fetus for that matter, regardless of their severity, simply for the sake of maintaining the pregnancy.\u201d 372 Ill. App. 3d at 234. The court held: \u201cGiven the risks and alternatives communicated to her [plaintiff] by her physicians, and the legality and availability of the choice she made, the foreseeability of that choice must be determined by a jury and not by a judge as a matter of law.\u201d 372 Ill. App. 3d at 246-47.\nWe observe that the appellate court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of defendant on the survival count. The court found that, even if the increased risk of future harm can legally constitute a present injury, plaintiff \u201cdid not make below and does not presently make any attempt to show what antemortem damages Doe may have incurred therefrom.\u201d 372 Ill. App. 3d at 248. Recognizing that a valid cause of action must generally include both injury and damages, the appellate court concluded: \u201cThus, by declining to even address Baby Doe\u2019s antemortem damages, [plaintiff] has given us no basis on which to find error in the circuit court\u2019s order granting summary judgment on her survival count.\u201d 372 Ill. App. 3d at 248.\nJustice Cahill dissented from both the reasoning and result of the court on the wrongful-death claim. He disagreed that the controlling analysis should be grounded in general tort principles surrounding proximate cause. Rather, he opined that the court \u201cmust decide, as a matter of law, whether the language of the Wrongful Death Act permits a cause of action based on the facts of this case.\u201d 372 Ill. App. 3d at 249 (Cahill, J, dissenting). Accepting that Baby Doe was a \u201cperson\u201d within the meaning of the Wrongful Death Act, Justice Cahill reasoned that \u201cthere can be no cause of action for wrongful death. Had the fetus not been aborted, there is no way of knowing under the facts of this case whether the fetus had suffered an actionable injury before death.\u201d 372 Ill. App. 3d at 249-50 (Cahill, J., dissenting).\nII. ANALYSIS\nThis matter is before us on the appellate court\u2019s reversal of the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff\u2019s wrongful-death claim. The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact, but rather to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 154, 162 (2007); Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d 511, 517 (1993). Summary judgment is appropriate only where \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2002).\nIn determining whether a genuine issue as to any material fact exists, a court must construe the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent. A triable issue precluding summary judgment exists where the material facts are disputed or where, the material facts being undisputed, reasonable persons might draw different inferences from the undisputed facts. Although summary judgment can aid in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit, it remains a drastic means of disposing of litigation and, therefore, should be allowed only where the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2004) (and cases cited therein). If the plaintiff fails to establish any element of the cause of action, summary judgment for the defendant is proper. Bagent, 224 Ill. 2d at 163; Dardeen v. Kuehling, 213 Ill. 2d 329, 335 (2004). In appeals from summary judgment rulings, review is de novo. Bagent, 224 Ill. 2d at 163; Roth v. Opiela, 211 Ill. 2d 536, 542 (2004).\nA. Controlling Principles\nPlaintiff brings her wrongful-death claim pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 (West 2002)). Even when prompted by the dissent, the appellate court majority failed to apprehend the statutory nature of a wrongful-death action. The conflicting analyses of the appellate court in this case, and the arguments of counsel before this court, indicate that a thorough discussion of the Wrongful Death Act is necessary.\nAt common law, a cause of action died concurrently with the death of the injured party, and there was no right of recovery after the injured person\u2019s death. Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 319 (1949). Also at common law, there was no cause of action to recover damages for the death of another by wrongful act, negligence, or default. Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Service, 374 Ill. 506, 513 (1940); see generally W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7125A, at 940 (5th ed. 1984) (\u201cIf the tortfeasor caused a victim\u2019s death, relatives and dependents of the victim who were deprived of financial support or who suffered emotional loss, had no cause of action of their own\u201d). Therefore, at common law: \u201cThe result was that it was cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him, and that the most grievous of all injuries left the bereaved family of the victim, who frequently were destitute, without a remedy.\u201d W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984).\nIn 1853, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the Injuries Act (1853 Ill. Laws 97), now known as the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 2002)). Section 1 of our Wrongful Death Act currently reads exactly as it did when first enacted 155 years ago:\n\u201cWhenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who or company or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.\u201d 740 ILCS 180/1 (West 2002).\nIn subsequent sections, the Act specifies in whose name and for whose benefit the action shall be brought. It also establishes the time limit in which the suit shall be commenced, the maximum amount that can be recovered, and the manner in which proceeds are distributed. 740 ILCS 180/2 et seq. (West 2002).\nThe primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. We look to the language of the statute itself as the best indication of legislative intent. Kirwan v. Welch, 133 Ill. 2d 163, 165 (1989); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Washburn, 112 Ill. 2d 486, 492 (1986). Further, a statute in derogation of the common law cannot be construed as changing the common law beyond what the statutory language expresses or is necessarily implied from what is expressed. In construing such a statute, a court will not presume that the legislature intended an innovation of the common law further than that which the statutory language specifies or clearly implies. Russell v. Klein, 58 Ill. 2d 220, 225 (1974), citing Walter v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 370 Ill. 283, 288-89 (1938). Indeed, \u201cstatutes in derogation of common law are to be strictly construed and nothing is to be read into such statutes by intendment or implication.\u201d Summers v. Summers, 40 Ill. 2d 338, 342 (1968).\nIn accord with these principles, this court has consistently expressed its understanding of the Wrongful Death Act. Only four years subsequent to its enactment, this court first construed the new Injuries Act, observing that the statute created a new cause of action \u201cunknown to the common law, and should not be extended beyond the fair import of the language used.\u201d City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349, 356 (1857). This understanding of the Act continues to the present day:\n\u201cThe Wrongful Death Act permits a recovery for the death of an individual by wrongful act, neglect, or default, where none existed at common law. *** [T]he Act is viewed, traditionally, as creating the cause of action, which must be brought in the name of the representative, for the pecuniary losses which a surviving spouse and next of kin may have sustained by reason of the death of the injured person.\u201d Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 360 (1995) (collecting cases).\nThe Act alone is the source of the right to sue. The legislature, having conferred a cause of action for wrongful death, has determined who shall sue and the conditions under which the suit may be brought. Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307, 310 (1949); accord Hall, 13 Ill. 2d at 29 (observing that the legislature \u201ccreated both the right and the remedy\u201d). Because this is a statutory action, where the right is conditional, the plaintiff must bring the case clearly within the prescribed requirements necessary to confer the right of action. Hartray v. Chicago Rys. Co., 290 Ill. 85, 86-87 (1919). Also, this court has repeatedly held that the Act \u201c \u2018should be strictly construed.\u2019 \u201d Pasquale, 166 Ill. 2d at 360, quoting Wilson, 404 Ill. at 310; Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 251 Ill. App. 3d 980, 983 (1993) (same). This appeal turns on one such statutory requirement.\nAn injury resulting from the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another gives the victim, if she survives the injury, a right of action; if the victim dies, the Act transfers the right of action to the victim\u2019s personal representative. \u201cIn either case the cause of action is the same.\u201d Crane v. Chicago & Western Indiana R.R. Co., 233 Ill. 259, 262 (1908). Based on the plain language of section 1:\n\u201c[0]ur cases have consistently interpreted the Wrongful Death Act to require, as a condition for maintaining a wrongful death action, that the decedent have been able to bring, at the time of his death, an action for damages resulting from the occurrence. Thus, in a variety of contexts, our court has referred to the rule that a wrongful death action is barred if the decedent, at the time of death, would not have been able to pursue an action for personal injuries. [Citations.] In this sense an action under the Wrongful Death Act may be said to be derivative of the decedent\u2019s rights, for the ability to bring the wrongful death action \u2018depends upon the condition that the deceased, at the time of his death, had he continued to live, would have had a right of action against the same person or persons for the injuries sustained.\u2019 Biddy, 374 Ill. at 513-14.\u201d Varelis v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 167 Ill. 2d 449, 454-55 (1995).\nIf the decedent had no right of action at the time of his or her death, the personal representative has none under the Wrongful Death Act. Thus, the \u201cinjury\u201d that the personal representative alleges caused the decedent\u2019s death must be the same \u201cinjury\u201d that the decedent suffered prior to his or her death. Biddy, 374 Ill. at 514; Crane, 233 Ill. at 262. Further: \u201cIn disallowing wrongful death actions when the decedent could not have maintained a claim for personal injuries at the time of death, the Act attaches no significance to the particular reason why the decedent\u2019s claim would have been barred.\u201d Varelis, 167 Ill. 2d at 460.\nIn the present case, the appellate court did not recognize this requirement of section 1 of the Wrongful Death Act; indeed, the court failed to cite to even one of the many decisions of this court so holding, only some of which we cited above. The appellate court began its analysis of the Wrongful Death Act by observing: \u201cAside from the additional element of the occurrence of death, the elements of a wrongful death claim are identical to those of a common law negligence claim.\u201d 372 Ill. App. 3d at 223. Responding to the dissent, the court further observed that \u201cthe standards surrounding proximate causation in ordinary negligence cases have always applied in wrongful death cases, including the standards surrounding multiple and intervening causes.\u201d 372 Ill. App. 3d at 245.\nThese observations are correct \u2014 when viewed in isolation. As earlier stated, based on the plain language of section 1 of the Act, the representative\u2019s wrongful-death action is derived from the decedent\u2019s cause of action and is limited to what the decedent\u2019s cause of action against the defendant would have been had the decedent lived. \u201cObviously, this provision of the statute prevents automatic recovery for every death. It incorporates into the statutory right of action the familiar concepts of tort liability, \u2014 negligence, contributory negligence, and the like.\u201d Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 132 (1951). However: \u201cBecause the action is viewed as a creature of statute, its conditions of liability proscribe the right of action itself and not merely the remedy alone.\u201d Pasquale, 166 Ill. 2d at 361. The statutory requirement of an injury to the decedent is a mandatory prerequisite to confer the right of action on the representative. In other words, general tort principles shape the decedent\u2019s and, derivatively, the representative\u2019s remedy in the form of a cause of action. However, the statutory requirement of an injury to decedent confers the right of action in the first place. See Hartray, 290 Ill. at 86-87; Crane, 233 Ill. at 262. We next consider what was \u2014 and was not \u2014 the actionable injury in this case.\nB. Baby Doe\u2019s \u201cInjury\u201d Pursuant to Wrongful Death Act\nThe appellate court misapprehended the injury in this case for which the Wrongful Death Act provides a right of action. The court framed its analysis as follows:\n\u201cThe parties concur that the primary issue in the case before us is grounded in established tort principles surrounding proximate cause. Specifically, the parties agree that the primary issue presented in this case is whether a party\u2019s negligence causing injury to a pregnant woman may make it foreseeable that she will decide to undergo an abortion to facilitate her own medical treatment, so that the original tortfeasor will be the proximate cause of the fetus\u2019 death, or if the woman\u2019s decision to abort becomes a superceding cause of the fetus\u2019 death thereby relieving the original tortfeasor of liability for the fetus\u2019 death.\u201d (Emphases added.) 372 Ill. App. 3d at 223.\nThus, the court expressly identified the \u201cinjury\u201d in plaintiffs wrongful-death claim as Baby Doe\u2019s death.\nThe appellate court\u2019s statement of the issue and ensuing proximate cause analysis ignores the plain language of section 1 of the Wrongful Death Act as consistently interpreted by this court. As the appellate court dissent correctly recognized:\n\u201cThe majority\u2019s proximate cause analysis and conclusion that the negligence of [defendant] can be causally linked to the abortion extends the reach of the wrongful death statute beyond its plain language. Put another way, the proximate cause analysis of the majority relies on a theory that the \u2018death\u2019 of the fetus is the \u2018injury\u2019 that supports the wrongful death cause of action. The analysis, I respectfully submit, writes out of the Wrongful Death Act the requirement that there must have been an actionable injury to the fetus with recoverable damages that could have been maintained had death not intervened.\u201d 372 Ill. App. 3d at 250-51 (Cahill, J., dissenting).\nWe agree.\nAlthough the appellate court viewed the dissent\u2019s position as a \u201cnovel \u2018direct injury\u2019 theory\u201d (372 Ill. App. 3d at 244), it is clear from our discussion of the Wrongful Death Act that the dissent was simply applying the Act to the evidence in this case. Of course, on a certain level, any death, by itself, creates a loss to the decedent\u2019s next of kin. However, a wrongful-death action is premised on the deceased\u2019s potential, at the time of death, to bring an action for injury. Varelis, 167 Ill. 2d at 457-58, quoting Wyness v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 403, 411 (1989). In the present case, it was \u201cnot until the death occurred could the court examine whether there was a viable wrongful injury which would permit the case to proceed.\u201d Wyness, 131 Ill. 2d at 415. Having determined that Baby Doe\u2019s death itself is not the actionable injury in this case, this court\u2019s long-standing construction of section 1 of the Act \u201crefers us at once to the inquiry, whether an action could have been maintained by the child, for the injury, had he survived it.\u201d Major, 18 Ill. at 356.\nThe evidence of record discloses that Baby Doe could not have maintained a claim for personal injury against defendant based on the automobile collision itself. Initially, plaintiff\u2019s physicians told plaintiff that Baby Doe was not injured in the collision. Further, Dr. Keller testified positively and unequivocally that Baby Doe did not suffer any injury as a result of the accident itself. According to Dr. Keller, plaintiff had a viable pregnancy that could have gone to term. Indeed, in her brief before this court, plaintiff contends that she \u201chas never claimed that BABY DOE received injuries in the actual crash but rather that they occurred in the hospital following the crash.\u201d\nIn her brief, plaintiff first points to various statements in the record in support of her contention that \u201chad the fetus survived it could have maintained an action against the Defendant for radiation and medication exposure occurring in \u00fatero which was caused by the Defendant\u2019s negligence.\u201d Significantly, however, at oral argument, plaintiff expressly conceded that, for purposes of summary judgment, the record did not contain sufficient evidence that Baby Doe suffered a present, actionable injury as a result of the radiation exposure. Drs. Keller and Edelman did not opine that Baby Doe\u2019s radiation exposure resulted in an actual, present injury, but rather that the fetus incurred an increased risk of future harm.\nPlaintiffs concession leaves us with her remaining contention. Relying on Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483 (2002), plaintiff posits, as a matter of law, that Baby Doe\u2019s radiation exposure is an increased risk of future harm and that \u201can increased risk of future harm is a present injury\u201d for which the fetus could have brought an action for damages against defendant. This contention lacks merit for two reasons.\nFirst, as a matter of law, an increased risk of future harm is an element of damages that can be recovered for a present injury \u2014 it is not the injury itself. In Dillon, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action arising from a broken catheter. Defendant physician inserted a 16-centimeter catheter into a vein under the plaintiffs clavicle. The physician subsequently removed the catheter. However, unbeknownst to the plaintiff or the physician, a nine-centimeter fragment of the catheter broke off and remained in the plaintiff. The fragment migrated to the plaintiffs heart. The tip of the fragment became embedded in a wall of a chamber of the plaintiffs heart, with the rest of the fragment floating therein. Defendants opined that it would be more dangerous to attempt to remove the fragment than to leave it in place. Dillon, 199 Ill. 2d at 487-88. The present injury was the catheter embedded in the plaintiffs heart. At issue in Dillon was the availability and computation of damages for the increased risk of future harm from the plaintiffs present injury. Dillon, 199 Ill. 2d at 496-507. This court held that for a plaintiff to recover damages for an increased risk of future harm in a tort action, the plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that the defendant\u2019s breach of duty caused a present injury that resulted in the increased risk of future harm. Dillon, 199 Ill. 2d at 506, citing Connecticut Civil Jury Instruction No. 2 \u2014 40(c). However, \u201cthe issue we deal with today is not the scope of damages in a wrongful death action, but rather who may sue and under what conditions.\u201d Forthenberry v. Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp., 156 Ill. App. 3d 634, 636 (1987) (applying Wrongful Death Act).\nSecond, even if we were to convert or expand Dillon so as to describe an increased risk of future harm as a present injury, plaintiff, as a matter of fact, has not presented any evidence that Baby Doe was injured as a result of the increased risk. In the context of Baby Doe\u2019s survival claim, the appellate court found that plaintiff failed to present any evidence of damages. 372 Ill. App. 3d at 248; see Wyness, 131 Ill. 2d at 410 (observing that a \u201csurvival action allows for recovery of damages for injury sustained by the deceased up to the time of death\u201d). As the appellate court correctly observed, there can be no legal injury without damages. 372 Ill. App. 3d at 248; see Zapf v. Makridakis, 46 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766 (1977) (observing that proof of damages \u201cis essential for recovery in a suit for negligence\u201d); Kerbeck v. Suchy, 132 Ill. App. 2d 367, 370 (1971) (same); Franks v. North Shore Farms, Inc., 115 Ill. App. 2d 57, 65 (1969) (\u201cAn action cannot be maintained for an injury without damage\u201d).\nIn summary, a wrongful-death action is a statutory, independent cause of action that does not arise until after death. However, the action is derivative of the injury to the decedent and is grounded on the same wrongful act of defendant, whether it was prosecuted by the injured party during his lifetime or by a representative of the estate. The representative\u2019s right of action depends upon the existence, in the decedent, at the time of his or her death, of a right of action to recover for such injury. Varelis, 167 Ill. 2d at 454-55; Crane, 233 Ill. at 262; see Kessinger, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 987-88. Further, it is the representative\u2019s burden to bring the case within the prescribed requirements in order to confer the right of action. Hartray, 290 Ill. at 86-87.\nIn the present case, the record does not establish the threshold requirement under the Wrongful Death Act that Baby Doe, prior to death, had a present injury such that the fetus could have maintained a cause of action against defendant. Any complaint regarding this statutory prerequisite must be taken to the legislature. Plaintiffs sole contention is that Baby Doe suffered an increased risk of future harm from radiation exposure. As a matter of law, such circumstances are not actionable under the Wrongful Death Act and, even if they were, this record is factually insufficient. Accordingly, plaintiffs wrongful-death claim fails and the circuit court properly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we uphold the circuit court\u2019s entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff\u2019s wrongful-death claim. Accordingly, that part of the judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the summary judgment, is vacated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.\nAppellate court judgment vacated in part; circuit court judgment affirmed; cause remanded.\nJUSTICE BURKE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\n\u201cOpen reduction\u201d refers to cutting through soft tissue until a dislocated bone can be reached and manipulated. 4 J. Schmidt, Attorneys\u2019 Dictionary of Medicine O \u2014 57 (2007). \u201cInternal fixation\u201d refers to fastening together a fractured bone by such means as metal plates or screws, applied directly to the bone. 3 J. Schmidt, Attorneys\u2019 Dictionary of Medicine I \u2014 142 (2007).\n\u201cThe abbreviation for dilatation and curettage, an operation in which the cervix of the uterus is dilated by means of an instrument and the interior of the uterus is then scraped out (curetted) by means of a curet (scraping instrument).\u201d 2 J. Schmidt, Attorneys\u2019 Dictionary of Medicine D \u2014 1 (2007).\nDefendant also filed a third-party complaint against Michelle Popec, who was the driver of the automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger. Defendant alleged that Popec\u2019s negligent driving caused the accident. Popec filed an answer denying all material allegations.\nHowever, the circuit court denied defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. According to the court, a jury could find that: (1) \u201cit was reasonably forseeable to expect that a pregnant woman who is injured in a motor vehicle accident would be forced to put her fetus at risk in order to have her own injuries treated\u201d; and (2) \u201cforcing an expectant mother to choose between treating her own injuries and saving the life of her fetus, a decision she would otherwise not be forced to make but for the defendant\u2019s negligence, is a severe and serious emotional injury.\u201d\nIn 1846, the British Parliament enacted what is familiarly known as Lord Campbell\u2019s Act, which served as the model for most state wrongful death statutes. W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7127, at 945-46 (5th ed. 1984). The Illinois Wrongful Death Act is substantially a copy of Lord Campbell\u2019s Act. Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 29 (1958); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 612 (1956); 740 ILCS Ann. 180/0.01, Historical & Statutory Notes, at 158 (Smith-Hurd 2002).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Cremer, Kopon, Shaughnessy & Spina, LLC, of Chicago (Francis A. Spina and Geoffrey ML Waguespack, of counsel), for appellant.", "Paul E Wolf and J.W. Mitchell, of Mitchell Hoffman & Wolf LLC, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 104524.\nMICHELLE WILLIAMS, Indiv. and as Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Baby Doe, Deceased, Appellee, v. JOHN C. MANCHESTER, Appellant.\nOpinion filed April 3, 2008.\nCremer, Kopon, Shaughnessy & Spina, LLC, of Chicago (Francis A. Spina and Geoffrey ML Waguespack, of counsel), for appellant.\nPaul E Wolf and J.W. Mitchell, of Mitchell Hoffman & Wolf LLC, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0404-01", "first_page_order": 414, "last_page_order": 437 }