{ "id": 5706410, "name": "In re LEONA W., a Minor, Appellant (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Oscar H., Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Oscar H.", "decision_date": "2008-04-03", "docket_number": "Nos. 103620, 103639 cons.", "first_page": "439", "last_page": "462", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 439" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 1106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4260990 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1115-16" }, { "page": "1115-16" }, { "page": "1120" }, { "page": "1120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/1106-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444184 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where a permissive interlocutory appeal has not been sought or allowed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "supervisory order" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 844", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265946 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854-55" }, { "page": "858-59" }, { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0844-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060246 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374-75" }, { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2592875 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351233 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984315 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828321 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 993", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3571184 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "996" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0993-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 883", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266134 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/0883-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450528 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43-44" }, { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 800", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411565 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0800-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451541 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833806 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483571 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609707 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706466 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451048 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58949 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0483-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1212, "char_count": 40412, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2559657179290758e-07, "percentile": 0.7820876815598129 }, "sha256": "b7cf8e2be56149e00911ee0437a07dfa94e44a6036a58eadecea2e7c9b8d93c2", "simhash": "1:e3aa38360c01dbd2", "word_count": 6858 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:03:00.610033+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re LEONA W., a Minor, Appellant (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Oscar H., Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Carman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nThis appeal arises from a judgment of the circuit court of Cook County that found Oscar H. to be unfit and terminated his parental rights to Leona W (L.W), his biological daughter. The appellate court reversed and remanded with directions. In re L.W., 362 Ill. App. 3d 1106 (2005). We denied leave to appeal, but in the exercise of our supervisory authority, we directed the appellate court to vacate its judgment and reconsider the cause in light of our decision in In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004). In re L.W., 218 Ill. 2d 540 (2006) (supervisory order). Following remand, the appellate court reached the same conclusion it had initially and once again reversed and remanded to the circuit court. 367 Ill. App. 3d 844. The State and the office of the Cook County public guardian, representing the interests of L.W, then petitioned our court for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315. We allowed those petitions and consolidated them. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the appellate court\u2019s judgment and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings.\nL.W, the biological daughter of Oscar H., was born in October of 1996 to Sandra W, a drug addict. At the time of her birth, L.W tested positive for intrauterine cocaine exposure and syphilis. She was subsequently found to be suffering from mental deficits, a seizure disorder and asthma.\nWithin weeks of her birth, L.W was taken into protective custody by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Although this was originally intended to be a temporary measure, L.W. has never lived with either of her biological parents. She is now 11 years old.\nIn early November 1996, less than three weeks after L.W\u2019s birth, DCFS filed a petition under section 2 \u2014 13 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13 (West 1996)) asking that the child be made a ward of the court. That request was predicated on DCFS\u2019s allegation that L.W. was neglected within the meaning of section 2 \u2014 3(l)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2\u2014 3(l)(b) (West 1996)) because her environment was injurious to her welfare. More specifically, the petition alleged that the whereabouts of L.W.\u2019s mother were currently unknown, that the mother had admitted to cocaine use three weeks before L.W was born, and that the mother had failed to utilize support services which had been offered to her.\nAs an additional basis for requesting that L.W. be made a ward of the court, the petition also alleged that the child was abused within the meaning of section 2 \u2014 3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2\u2014 3(2)(ii) (West 1996)). The grounds for that allegation were that the mother or other person responsible for the child\u2019s welfare presented a substantial risk of physical injury to her because (1) the mother had a documented history of inadequate supervision of the child\u2019s siblings and (2) one of those siblings had been sexually molested and sustained a fractured arm due to physical abuse.\nWhen DCFS initially filed its petition for adjudication of wardship, the identity of L.W.\u2019s father was unknown. Oscar H. subsequently came forward and admitted paternity. In January of 1997, the circuit court entered an order memorializing Oscar H.\u2019s admission. By separate order the court appointed the public defender to represent him. The petition for adjudication of wardship was then amended to name Oscar H. as L.W\u2019s biological father.\nA hearing on the petition for adjudication of wardship was convened February 25, 1997. In connection with that hearing, the parties stipulated that Sandra W. and Oscar H. are L.W\u2019s biological parents; that L.W. was born on Oct. 21, 1996; that at the time of L.W\u2019s birth, Oscar H. was \u201cnoncustodial\u201d; and that if called as a witness, Judith Kilpatrick, a social worker with Cook County Hospital, would testify that Sandra W had admitted using cocaine three weeks prior to L.W\u2019s birth and wished to give up the child. The parties further stipulated that Pam Rowlands, a caseworker with Catholic Charities, would testify that at the time L.W was born, Sandra W had eight other children, all of whom were in DCFS custody, and that Sandra W had not completed any drug rehabilitation services.\nThe circuit court reviewed the parties\u2019 stipulations, which were read into the record at the February 25, 1997, hearing. At the conclusion of that hearing, the circuit court entered an order which found, based on the stipulated facts, that L.W was abused within the meaning of the Juvenile Court Act because she was at substantial risk of physical injury as set forth in section 2 \u2014 3(2)(ii) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(2)(ii) (West 1996)). The matter was then set for a dispositional hearing.\nBy consent of all the parties and with approval of the court, the normal 30-day deadline for the dispositional hearing was waived. See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21(3) (West 1996). The dispositional hearing was ultimately conducted on April 29, 1997. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court entered a dispositional order in accordance with section 2 \u2014 23 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23 (West 1996)). That order made L.W a ward of the court; found both parents \u201cunable for some reason other than financial circumstances alone to care for, protect, train or discipline the minor\u201d; held that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the minor from the home, but that appropriate services aimed at family preservation and family unification had been unsuccessful; determined that it was in the best interests of L.W. to remove her from her parents\u2019 custody and care; and placed L.W. in the custody of the DCFS Guardianship Administrator with the right to place the minor. See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 27 (West 1996).\nAs authorized by section 2 \u2014 23(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23(2) (West 1996)), the court also entered an order of protection pursuant to section 2 \u2014 25 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 25 (West 1996)). The order prohibited any unsupervised contact between L.W and Sandra W, but allowed Oscar H. to have unsupervised day visits with the child subject to various conditions. Finally, the court scheduled a progress report and permanency hearing for June 9, 1997.\nNumerous proceedings ensued. On May 13, 1997, Oscar H. moved to vacate the prior placement orders and to have custody of L.W be given to him. This was styled \u201cemergency motion to return home\u201d and was submitted on Oscar H.\u2019s behalf by the public defender. A hearing on that motion was held June 9, 1997, the same date set for the permanency hearing and progress report. The result of that hearing was entry of an agreed order which set as a permanency goal L.W\u2019s \u201creturn home,\u201d meaning her return to Oscar H.\u2019s home.\nShortly thereafter, on June 19, 1997, a second agreed permanency order was entered. The new permanency order set as a goal L.W.\u2019s return home to Oscar H. within 12 months. Both Sandra W. and Oscar H. were present in court when this was done and both were represented by counsel.\nSection 2 \u2014 28 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 28(2) (West 1996)) provides that permanency hearings are to be conducted every 12 months following the initial permanency hearing, more frequently if necessary, until the permanency plan and goal have been achieved. In accordance with that requirement, four additional permanency hearings were conducted by the circuit court between 1998 and 2001. Throughout these proceedings, the goal remained returning L.W to Oscar H.\nAnother permanency hearing was held in February of 2002. Following that hearing, a hearing officer recommended a new goal: substitute care pending a determination by the court as to whether the biological parents\u2019 parental rights should be terminated and a guardian appointed with authority to consent to L.W.\u2019s adoption. Oscar H., through his attorney, objected to this recommendation, arguing that the other children he had fathered with Sandra W reside with him, he had proven his ability to care for those children and for L.W, and it would be in L.W.\u2019s best interests for her to come live with him as well. In Oscar H.\u2019s view, the appropriate permanency goal should have been return of L.W. to him within five months.\nThe circuit court rejected Oscar H.\u2019s arguments and entered a permanency order setting as a goal the placement of L.W. with a private guardian. The intended guardian was a nonrelative foster parent with whom L.W had been living since shortly after her birth. The reasons stated in the order for selecting this goal and rejecting previous goals were that L.W., who was then five, had lived with the foster parent nearly her entire life; LW\u2019s mother was not working toward reunification; L.W.\u2019s father, Oscar H., had not made reasonable progress toward reunification; and the foster parent would allow continued contact with L.W.\u2019s biological family. The planned date for achievement of the goal was the following October.\nIn the months which followed, the public guardian sought and was granted approval to allow L.W. to move out of state with her foster parent. At the end of the year, the court entered a new permanency order setting as a goal substitute care pending a determination as to whether the biological parents\u2019 parental rights should be terminated. The reasons given for this goal were that L.W., then six, had lived in \u201ca non-relation, specialized home\u201d since 1996; she had special needs; and her parents had \u201cparticipated in services but *** not made substantial progress toward reunification.\u201d The deadline for achieving this goal was March of 2003.\nWhen March 2003 arrived, the State filed a petition under section 2 \u2014 29 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 29 (West 1996)) seeking appointment of a guardian with authorization to consent to L.W.\u2019s adoption under the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 1996)). The petition alleged that in February of 1997, L.W. was found by the court to have been abused, and that both of L.W\u2019s parents were unfit because they had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the child\u2019s welfare (see 750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(b) (West 1996)) and had not made reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from them or made reasonable progress toward return of the child to them (see 750 ILCS 50/l(D)(m) (West 1996)). The petition further alleged that L.W\u2019s mother was also unfit for the additional reasons that she had failed to protect L.W. from conditions in the child\u2019s environment injurious to her welfare (see 750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(g) (West 1996)) and that she was an habitual drunk or a drug addict (see 750 ILCS 50/ 1(D)(k) (West 1996)). Finally, the petition asserted that it would be in the child\u2019s best interests if a guardian were appointed with the right to consent to her adoption.\nA hearing on the State\u2019s petition was convened on August 15, 2003. At the outset of that hearing, the public guardian filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding Oscar H.\u2019s custody and parenting of the other children he had fathered with Sandra W, L.W\u2019s mother. Oscar H. opposed the motion, asserting that such evidence was relevant to the issue of his parental fitness in this case. The court then decided to continue the hearing for four days, until August 19, 2003. In anticipation of the new hearing, the State advised the court that it was dropping its claims that the mother was unfit under subsections (g) and (k) of section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(g), (D)(k) (West 1996)).\nWhen the hearing resumed on August 19, the court granted the public guardian\u2019s in limine motion, holding that it would exclude evidence regarding Oscar H.\u2019s fitness as a parent with respect to his other children. The court then proceeded to hear evidence on whether Oscar H. and Sandra W. were unfit under subsection (b) or (m) of section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(b), (D)(m) (West 1996)), and, if unfit, whether it was in the best interests of L.W that a guardian be appointed with the power to consent to her adoption.\nTo support its claim of unfitness, the State called as a witness Mary Henderson, a case supervisor for Catholic Charities who had been working on L.W.\u2019s case since 1997. Henderson reviewed in detail the history of the case, the details of L.W.\u2019s condition, education, and developmental progress; the parents\u2019 circumstances; their relationship with L.W; the steps they had taken to correct the conditions which were the basis for removal of the child from them; and the progress they had made toward the return of the child to them. Based on Henderson\u2019s testimony and the documentary evidence in the record, the court found that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the allegation that Oscar H. and Sandra W. were unfit under subsection (m) of section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(m) (West 1996)) because they had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of L.W. from them and had not made reasonable progress toward her return to them.\nAfter making this finding, the court immediately proceeded to consideration of the child\u2019s best interests. On that question the court heard testimony from the woman who had been serving as L.W.\u2019s foster mother. The foster mother described L.W.\u2019s condition; the conditions in the foster home; L.W.\u2019s relationship with the foster mother\u2019s adopted son; L.W.\u2019s involvement with the neighborhood, school and community; and the foster mother\u2019s desire to ultimately adopt L.W\nThe court also heard testimony from Gina Barrios, a social worker from Catholic Charities currently assigned to L.W.\u2019s case. Barrios testified about her familiarity with L.W.\u2019s case and detailed L.W.\u2019s current living conditions and relationship with her foster family. Barrios reported that a neighbor boy was alleged to have touched L.W. inappropriately, an incident reported to authorities by LW\u2019s foster mother. Barrios also spoke of L.W\u2019s medical and developmental needs and how they were being addressed by the foster mother. Barrios thought the foster mother should be permitted to adopt L.W.\nBased upon the foregoing evidence and after hearing closing arguments, the circuit court concluded that it was in L.W.\u2019s best interests to terminate the parental rights of both Oscar H. and Sandra W. and to appoint a guardian with the right to consent to L.W.\u2019s adoption. The court entered its termination order on August 20, 2003. In that order, the court granted both parents the right to appeal. Termination of parental rights is immediately appealable under Rule 307(a)(6) (188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(6)), and Sandra W. and Oscar H. each filed separate notices of appeal within the time and in the manner required by that rule.\nSandra W.\u2019s appeal was ultimately found to be without merit, and the appellate court affirmed the circuit court\u2019s judgment terminating her parental rights. That decision has not been challenged. This appeal concerns only the challenge to the circuit court\u2019s judgment asserted by Oscar H.\nAs grounds for his appeal, Oscar H. raised two issues in the appellate court: (1) whether the trial court erred when it granted the motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding his custody of the four other children he had fathered with Sandra W; and (2) whether the trial court\u2019s finding of parental unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence in light of the fact that Oscar H. was found fit to care for the other four children, some of whom suffer from the same or similar medical problems as L.W The public guardian cross-appealed, arguing that the circuit court had erred in rejecting his claim that Sandra W. and Oscar H. were unfit for the additional reason that they had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the child\u2019s welfare within the meaning of section 1(D) (b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(b) (West 1996)).\nThe appellate court reversed and remanded. It held that the circuit court\u2019s judgment terminating Oscar H.\u2019s parental rights could not stand because compliance with section 2 \u2014 21 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/ 2 \u2014 21 (West 1996)) was a precondition to a termination hearing and, in its view, the circuit court\u2019s February 25, 1997, determination that L.W. was abused did not meet the requirements of that statute. L.W., 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1115-16.\nWhether the circuit court\u2019s decision comported with section 2 \u2014 21 was not questioned by any of the parties to the case. It was raised by the appellate court sua sponte. In the appellate court\u2019s view, the circuit court\u2019s determination failed to comply with section 2 \u2014 21 for two reasons. First, while Sandra W.\u2019s culpability for the circumstances leading to the court\u2019s finding of abuse were apparent, the circuit court had failed to identify any facts which would support a determination that Oscar H., himself, was in any way responsible for those circumstances. Second, the appellate court thought the written order entered by the circuit court was technically deficient because it did not comport with section 2 \u2014 21\u2019s requirement that a court\u2019s determination of abuse \u201cshall be stated in writing with the factual basis supporting that determination\u201d (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21(1) (West 1996)). L.W., 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1115-16.\nAfter reaching this conclusion, the appellate court went on to address whether evidence of Oscar H.\u2019s success in gaining custody of four of L.W.\u2019s siblings should have been admitted. After rejecting an argument by the public guardian that considerations of waiver should bar consideration of the issue, the appellate court opined \u201cthat evidence that Oscar H. has been found fit and given custody of four of L.W\u2019s siblings is material and relevant and is one factor that should be considered by a court making a determination on the issue of Oscar H.\u2019s parental fitness and ability to parent and care for L.W., the child who is the subject of these proceedings.\u201d L.W., 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1120. Accordingly, the appellate court held that should the State elect to begin these proceedings anew in the circuit court, the circuit court should not bar Oscar H. from presenting this evidence. The court did not reach any of the other issues in the case.\nThe State petitioned our court for leave to appeal. It contended that the appellate court\u2019s decision conflicted with this court\u2019s opinion in In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004), because it was premised on the erroneous view that salient inquiry at the adjudicatory hearing was whether parents were at fault. According to the State, the critical inquiry under Arthur H. is simply whether the child has been abused or neglected, not who is responsible. The State next argued that the appellate court\u2019s decision conflicted with this court\u2019s opinion in In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364 (2005), and various appellate court opinions because it failed to consider whether transcribed oral findings or other sources in the record were sufficient to allow the reviewing court to overlook the trial court\u2019s failure to make the written findings required by section 2 \u2014 21(1) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21(1) (West 1996)). The State also contended that the appellate court\u2019s decision misinterpreted section 2 \u2014 21(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21(2) (West 1996)) by concluding that without the written findings required by section 2 \u2014 21(1), a hearing on termination of parental rights cannot occur. Finally, the State asserted that by addressing the propriety of the motion in limine and considering what evidence would be admissible at a possible future hearing, the appellate court exceeded the proper boundaries of judicial review and issued an improper advisory opinion.\nA petition for leave to appeal was also filed by the public guardian. As had the State, the public guardian asserted that the appellate court was wrong to overturn the judgment terminating Oscar H.\u2019s parental rights based on the failure of the circuit court\u2019s February 1997 determination to specify what acts of Oscar H. caused the child to be abused. It agreed with the State\u2019s contention that the appellate court\u2019s ruling conflicted with this court\u2019s decision in In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004), but it also challenged the appellate court\u2019s decision on the additional grounds that the time for appealing the initial determination of abuse or neglect had passed and the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to revisit that determination. Even if the court\u2019s determination were subject to reexamination, the public guardian contended, any deficiencies in the written findings entered by the court were not necessarily fatal. The public guardian argued that under this court\u2019s decision in In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364 (2005), deficiencies in the court\u2019s written order could be overcome by transcribed oral findings or other sources in the record, and that when the appellate court ruled as it did here, it did so without reviewing the transcript of the February 1997 hearing on the petition for adjudication of wardship. Because the appellate court did not have the full basis for the circuit court\u2019s adjudicatory ruling before it, the public guardian asserted, that court did not know and could not have known whether there was, in fact, a sufficient basis for the circuit court\u2019s ruling notwithstanding the absence of the written findings required by statute.\nThe public guardian next took issue with the appellate court\u2019s judgment on the grounds that it appeared to have been predicated on the mistaken belief that L.W. had actually been physically abused prior to the February 1997 hearing, when she had not been. Finally, the public guardian asserted that the appellate court\u2019s resolution of the motion in limine question conflicted with its prior holding in In re M.C., 201 Ill. App. 3d 792, 798 (1990), that a parent\u2019s ability to care for another child is not relevant to the question of whether he is fit to care for the child presently before the court.\nThis court denied both the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal and the petition for leave to appeal filed by the public guardian. At the same time, however, we entered supervisory orders directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment and to reconsider the cause in light of our opinion in In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004). In accordance with our supervisory orders, entered at the end of March 2006, the appellate court filed orders vacating its judgment and indicating that it would reconsider the case. The State and the public guardian were granted leave to file supplemental briefs, and a reply brief was filed by Oscar H.\nSeveral months later, in September of 2006, the appellate court filed a new opinion in the case. The new version was largely unchanged from the prior version. The opinion revised the court\u2019s discussion of the requirements of section 2 \u2014 21 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21 (West 1996)) to include a reference to our opinion in In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004), but the overall analysis remained unchanged. The court concluded that the circuit court\u2019s determination of abuse or neglect was not supported by the requisite written findings and did not provide Oscar H. with notice of the reasons supporting the determination of abuse or neglect. Because the finding of abuse or neglect was deficient, the court opined that the matter should not have proceeded to a hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights. The court therefore reversed and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 854-55. In so doing, the court held, as it had originally, that evidence that Oscar H. had been found fit and given custody of L.W\u2019s siblings was material and relevant and should not have been excluded. Correspondingly, the court continued to adhere to the position that the evidence could be considered by the circuit court in assessing Oscar H.\u2019s fitness to parent L.W should the State elect to proceed with termination proceedings following remand. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 858-59.\nThere being no significant change in the appellate court\u2019s judgment, the public guardian once again petitioned our court for leave to appeal based on the arguments it asserted in its original petition for leave to appeal. The State did likewise. We granted both petitions and consolidated them for briefing, argument and decision.\nBefore turning to the merits of these consolidated appeals, there is one preliminary matter we must address. Oscar H. contends that because our court denied the prior petitions for leave to appeal filed by the State and the public guardian, principles of res judicata should bar those entities from raising any of the same arguments now that the matter is before us again. This argument is without merit. For res judicata to apply, there must have been a final judgment on the merits of the case. Denials of petitions for leave to appeal are not decisions on the merits. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 257 (2001). They cannot be interpreted as reflecting approval or disapproval of a lower court\u2019s action. They signify only that four members of the court, for reasons satisfactory to them, have not voted to grant leave to appeal. See People v. Vance, 76 Ill. 2d 171, 183 (1979). The merits of the arguments asserted by the State and public guardian are therefore properly before us.\nWe turn then to the question of whether the appellate court erred in setting aside the circuit court\u2019s judgment terminating Oscar H.\u2019s parental rights to L.W. based on what it perceived as defects in the circuit court\u2019s order of February 25, 1997, finding L.W. to be abused. The answer to this question is yes. The appellate court did so err. Had Oscar H. wished to challenge the validity of the February 1997 order, he had two opportunities to do so. First, he could have filed a petition for leave to appeal from that order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) (155 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5)), governing appeals from interlocutory orders affecting the care and custody of unemancipated minors, if the appeal of such orders is not otherwise specifically provided for elsewhere in these rules. Second, he could have challenged the finding of abuse by taking an appeal from the April 29, 1997, order adjudging L.W a ward of the court, finding both parents \u201cunable for some reason other than financial circumstances alone to care for, protect, train or discipline the minor,\u201d and determining that it was in L.W.\u2019s best interests to remove her from her parents\u2019 custody and care and placing her in DCFS custody. Dispositional orders of this kind are regarded as final and appealable as of right. See In re Faith B., 216 Ill. 2d 1, 3 (2005). Appealing a dispositional order is the proper vehicle for challenging a finding of abuse or neglect. See In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004) (where a permissive interlocutory appeal has not been sought or allowed).\nAppeals from final judgments entered in proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, other than delinquent minor proceedings, are governed by the rules applicable to civil cases. 134 Ill. 2d R. 660(b). The rule pertaining to appeals from final judgments is Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301). Where an appeal is appropriate under Rule 301, notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the final judgment from which the appeal is being taken or 30 days after entry of the order disposing of any posttrial motions which may have been filed. 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). No such notice of appeal was filed here. Any error pertaining to the dispositional order has therefore been forfeited. See In re R.A.B., 146 Ill. App. 3d 993, 996 (1986). More than that, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to go back and reconsider whether it was proper when made. See In re Janira T., 368 Ill. App. 3d 883, 891 (2006).\nIn challenging this conclusion, Oscar H. contends that it would be anomalous to bar parties from seeking review of dispositional orders after time for appeal has passed given that we have held that dispositional orders may normally be modified at any time up to final closing and discharge of the proceedings if the court finds that it would be in the best interests of the child to make the modification. See In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d 31, 43-44 (2005); 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23 (West 1996). What Oscar H. fails to appreciate is that asking an appellate court to review an order of the circuit court on appeal is fundamentally different from asking the circuit court itself to alter its own judgment, and the two avenues of recourse are subject to entirely different sets of rules and standards. Modifications, for example, must be carried out in a way not inconsistent with section 2 \u2014 28 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 28 (West 1996)). 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23(2) (West 1996). That statute does not control review by the appellate court. We note, moreover, that, unlike appeals, modifications do not normally challenge the validity of the original order. Rather, they are typically directed to considerations that arise after the original dispositional order was entered. In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d at 45.\nEven if there had been some basis for the appellate court to reach back and address the validity of the circuit court\u2019s prior order, its decision to reverse the circuit court\u2019s judgment terminating Oscar H.\u2019s parental rights could not stand. It is true that the written order of February 25, 1997, finding L.W to be abused did not include a statement of the factual basis supporting that determination, as required by section 2 \u2014 21(1) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21(1) (West 1996)). As noted earlier in this opinion, however, the trial judge\u2019s ruling was predicated on stipulated facts that were read into the record, and the court clearly specified the facts it was taking into account in making its decision. The stipulations and the statements were, in turn, transcribed and included in the report of proceedings. There was nothing speculative about the trial judge\u2019s actions. What she did and why she did it were clearly spelled out. The lack of detail in the actual written order therefore worked no prejudice on any of the parties. It was a purely technical defect.\nThis situation is directly analogous to the one present in In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364 (2005), which concerned a trial court\u2019s failure to comply with a comparable written-explanation requirement set forth in section 2 \u2014 27(1) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 27(1) (West 1996)). Noting that the purpose of the writing requirement was to give the parties notice of the reasons forming the court\u2019s decision and to preserve the reasoning for appellate review, we concluded that those purposes would be served just as well by explicit oral findings stated during the hearing and then transcribed and made part of the record. In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 374-75. Accordingly, we concluded that where an oral pronouncement is explicit and sufficient to advise the parties of the court\u2019s reasoning, the statutory requirement of a written explanation will be satisfied. In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 377. We believe that rationale applies with equal force here. See also In re Z.Z., 312 Ill. App. 3d 800, 803-04 (2000). The appellate court therefore erred when it reversed the circuit court\u2019s termination judgment based on the circuit court\u2019s prior order of February 25, 1997. Rather than revisiting the prior order, the appellate court should, instead, have decided Oscar H.\u2019s challenge to the termination judgment on the merits. Having failed to do so on two prior occasions, it must do so now.\nThe final question raised by the petitions for leave to appeal filed by the State and the public guardian, and the last issue we must resolve, is whether the appellate court erred in holding that the circuit court should not have granted the motion in limine regarding Oscar H.\u2019s custody of L.W\u2019s siblings. In considering this question, we begin by noting that the matter has different significance under our disposition than it did in the appellate court. Because the appellate court reversed the termination judgment based on the defects it perceived in the February 25, 1997, order, its discussion of the in limine motion did not alter the outcome of the case. It merely provided guidance to the circuit court in the event the State should initiate new termination proceedings.\nThe situation is now different. Because we have concluded that the termination judgment should not have been reversed based on the February 25, 1997, order, the issue before us is not whether the guidance given by the appellate court was correct. It is, instead, whether the circuit court\u2019s ruling on the in limine motion provides an alternative basis for reversing that court\u2019s judgment. We hold that it does not.\nGenerally speaking, evidentiary motions, such as motions in limine, are directed to the trial court\u2019s discretion. A trial court\u2019s ruling on such motions will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 392 (2004). The threshold for finding an abuse of discretion is high. A trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion with respect to an evidentiary ruling unless it can be said that no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the court. See Clayton v. County of Cook, 346 Ill. App. 3d 367, 377 (2003). Moreover, even where an abuse of discretion has occurred, it will not warrant reversal of the judgment unless the record indicates the existence of substantial prejudice affecting the outcome of the trial. Holston v. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, 165 Ill. 2d 150, 170-71 (1995).\nNeither of these conditions was satisfied in this case. As we have discussed, the State sought to find Oscar H. unfit on two grounds: that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for L.W\u2019s welfare (see 750 ILCS 50/l(D)(b) (West 1996)) and that he had not made reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for L.W\u2019s removal or made reasonable progress toward her return to him (see 750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(m) (West 1996)). Both of these grounds deal specifically with the steps Oscar H. has taken with respect to L.W How he has handled his parental responsibilities with respect to L.W\u2019s siblings is not germane to that question. We therefore cannot say that no reasonable person would have taken the circuit court\u2019s view in allowing the motion in limine and excluding the evidence.\nWe note, moreover, that while the circuit court granted the motion in limine, it nevertheless did hear testimony later in the proceedings that custody of L.W\u2019s siblings had been returned to Oscar H. The fact that Oscar H. was apparently fit to parent those children was therefore before the circuit court notwithstanding the court\u2019s ruling on the motion in limine. Although Oscar H. may not have been allowed to present the details of the care he provided to those other children, the appropriate course when faced with such a ruling was to make an offer of proof. Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2003). No such offer was made. We therefore have no basis for ascertaining how, if at all, that evidence may have altered the outcome of the case. As a result, we cannot say that allowing the motion in limine resulted in any material prejudice to Oscar H.\nBefore concluding our discussion, there is one final matter we must address. The public guardian, as attorney for L.W., argues that instead of remanding this cause to the appellate court for consideration of the merits of Oscar H.\u2019s challenge to the circuit court\u2019s judgment terminating his parental rights, this court should address that claim directly. We have declined a similar request by the public guardian in In re Mark W., 228 Ill. 2d 365 (2008), a case involving factual and procedural circumstances comparable to those present in this case. After careful deliberation, we have decided to decline direct review here as well. Nevertheless, mindful of the time-sensitive nature of child custody proceedings, we accompany our remand with the same directive we issued in In re Mark W. The appellate court is to file its judgment in this matter within 60 days of the issuance of this court\u2019s mandate.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for review, on the merits, of the circuit court\u2019s judgment terminating Oscar H.\u2019s parental rights. The appellate court is hereby directed to file its judgment in this matter within 60 days of the issuance of this court\u2019s mandate.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nThe court\u2019s opinion alluded to a constitutional challenge Oscar H. had raised, but it provided no details regarding that challenge. It merely stated that if the issue should arise in the trial court on remand, the trial court should consider it in light of our opinion in In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289 (2005). See LM, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1120.\nThe transcript of the February 25, 1997, hearing was not included in the original record on appeal. Until the appellate court sua sponte made the finding of abuse or neglect an issue on appeal, the parties did not know and could not have foreseen that the transcript would be relevant to a review of the judgment terminating Oscar H.\u2019s parental rights. After the appellate court\u2019s ruling made the transcript relevant, the record was supplemented to include it.\nThere is another rule pertaining to adjudications of wardship. Supreme Court Rule 662(a) provides that \u201c[a]n appeal may be taken to the Appellate Court from an adjudication of wardship in the event that an order of disposition has not been entered within 90 days of the adjudication of wardship.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 662(a). In this case, however, there was no such delay. The dispositional order was entered within 90 days of the adjudication of wardship. The rulings were, in fact, entered simultaneously. Rule 662(a) is therefore inapplicable.\nA change in circumstances is not a statutory precondition to a court\u2019s exercise of its authority to modify a dispositional order (In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d at 45), but Oscar H. has not cited and we have not found any authority which would permit any party to challenge a dispositional order after the time for an appeal has passed on grounds which could have been raised on direct review but were not.\nAn offer of proof is, in fact, normally mandatory in order to preserve for review the question of whether a motion in limine was properly granted. That requirement may be relaxed where it is apparent that the trial court clearly understood the nature and character of the evidence sought to be introduced. Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 495 (2002). Although the appellate court believed this to be such a case (see 367 Ill. App. 3d at 857), its analysis appears to have been based on the assumption that the excluded evidence consisted only of the fitness determinations and awards of custody made in the siblings\u2019 cases. Based upon our review of the record, it appears that the evidence Oscar H. sought to admit and which the in limine ruling excluded extended to other details about Oscar H.\u2019s parenting ability, including his success in meeting social service requirements.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert F. Harris, Kass A. Plain and Gwendolyn M. Duffield, of the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, of Chicago, for the minor.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Deborah Ahlstrand, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and James E. Fitzgerald, Annette Collins, Nancy Faulls and Nancy Kisicki, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Edwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, of Chicago (Frotase M. Tinka, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(Nos. 103620, 103639 cons.\nIn re LEONA W., a Minor, Appellant (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Oscar H., Appellee).\nOpinion filed April 3, 2008.\nRobert F. Harris, Kass A. Plain and Gwendolyn M. Duffield, of the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, of Chicago, for the minor.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Deborah Ahlstrand, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and James E. Fitzgerald, Annette Collins, Nancy Faulls and Nancy Kisicki, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nEdwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, of Chicago (Frotase M. Tinka, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0439-01", "first_page_order": 449, "last_page_order": 472 }