{ "id": 3614967, "name": "EDWARD HENNINGS, Appellant, v. NEDRA CHANDLER, Appellee; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. VINCENT PATTERSON, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Hennings v. Chandler", "decision_date": "2008-05-22", "docket_number": "Nos. 102694, 103405 cons.", "first_page": "18", "last_page": "34", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 18" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610490 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5, 13" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "9-10, 13" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "6, 10-11" }, { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706340 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" }, { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477020 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 1068", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79316 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1070", "parenthetical": "de novo review applied to question of whether a trial court's order falls within the authority the legislature has granted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/1068-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4059655 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "words and phrases of a statutory section must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute and must not be construed in isolation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5641146 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" }, { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/234/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ohio St. 3d 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1149394 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st-3d/91/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "744 N.E.2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "440 So. 2d 1222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7649080 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1223-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/440/1222-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 U.S.C. \u00a72254", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "998 F.2d 411", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10511439 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413, 414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/998/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 U.S.C. \u00a72243", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the writ shall be awarded or an order to show cause issued, \"unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "376 Ill. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2541693 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/376/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302610 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926971 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" }, { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2860785 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "813 F.2d 986", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1689738 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "991" }, { "page": "991" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/813/0986-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 987", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3949814 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "989" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0987-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637050 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3738830 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828632 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 938", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273890 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/377/0938-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 Ill. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2512557 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422-23", "parenthetical": "a habeas corpus proceeding is a civil action, separate and distinct from the underlying criminal proceeding, and is brought to enforce a civil right of personal liberty, which the plaintiff claims, as against those who are holding him in custody, under the criminal process" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/391/0419-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1085, "char_count": 30219, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.325058012416379e-08, "percentile": 0.4803395873659043 }, "sha256": "164294ccba71783502d4a5d3a889d7fdc3413fa627f703451162605a689cab2d", "simhash": "1:9ba0e60fe7ac6c1a", "word_count": 4962 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:24:05.743057+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EDWARD HENNINGS, Appellant, v. NEDRA CHANDLER, Appellee.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. VINCENT PATTERSON, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nThese consolidated appeals present the question of whether a trial court has the authority to sua sponte deny a state habeas corpus complaint without notice to the plaintiff, leave to amend the complaint, or a hearing. We conclude that a trial court has such authority, and therefore affirm the appellate court in both cases.\nBACKGROUND\nContained within the Code of Civil Procedure (Code or Act) (735 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002)) is article X, which codifies the laws of this state governing complaints for habeas corpus relief (735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002)). Article X includes specific procedural provisions regulating habeas corpus actions, and these sections control over the general procedural provisions contained in article II, known as the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 101(b), 2 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002)). 735 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 108(a) (West 2002) (\u201cThe provisions of Article II of this Act apply to all proceedings covered by Articles III through XIX of this Act except as otherwise provided in each of the Articles III through XIX, respectively\u201d). Both appellants herein, Edward Hennings and Vincent Patterson, filed complaints for habeas corpus relief under article X. We turn to the specifics of each case.\nNo. 102694 \u2014 Edward Hennings\nOn August 8, 2001, Edward Hennings was charged with burglary, a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 1(a), (b) (West 2000)), and criminal damage to property, a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/21 \u2014 l(l)(a), (2) (West 2000)) in the circuit court of Will County. The indictment alleged that Hennings had two previous Class 2 felony convictions in Will County. On September 18, 2001, Hennings entered into a fully negotiated plea agreement whereby he agreed to plead guilty to burglary in exchange for the State entering a nolle prosequi on the criminal damage to property count and recommending a sentence of 12 years\u2019 imprisonment for the burglary offense. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Hennings as a Class X offender to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nOn November 22, 2004, Hennings filed a pro se \u201cPetition for Habeas Corpus Relief\u2019 in the circuit court, alleging, inter alia, that his 12-year sentence exceeded the maximum nonextended term of 7 years\u2019 imprisonment for a Class 2 felony, that the sentencing court exceeded its jurisdiction in sentencing him to an \u201cenhanced sentence of 12 years imprisonment pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8),\u201d and that the time for which he could legally be confined, seven years, had expired. The record shows that on December 9, 2004, the trial court reported that Hennings had filed \u201ca written petition of habeas corpus,\u201d and that the court would \u201cmake initial review of it and set the matter over for status on my review of the petition.\u201d The following day, December 10, 2004, the court held further proceedings on the habeas corpus complaint. After summarizing Hennings\u2019 allegations, the court stated that it had reviewed the mittimus, which showed a \u201cClass X mandatory\u201d sentence was imposed, noting the language of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8), which required sentencing Hennings as a Class X offender due to his criminal history, and concluded:\n\u201cThe Class X sentencing category is between six and 30 years in the Department of Corrections. He received a sentence of 12 years in the Department of Corrections, which is not beyond the appropriate sentence for the crime committed, given his criminal history. So, the petition for habeas corpus relief is denied.\u201d\nHennings appealed, arguing the trial court lacked statutory authority to \u201csummarily dismiss\u201d his complaint for habeas corpus relief. No. 3 \u2014 05\u20140016 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court disagreed, citing section 10 \u2014 106 of the Act, and holding that because it was apparent from the face of the habeas corpus complaint and the record that Hennings was not entitled to relief, the trial court properly dismissed the complaint. Hennings\u2019 petition for leave to appeal was granted by this court. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).\nNo. 103405 \u2014 Vincent Patterson\nFollowing a 1983 jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, Vincent Patterson was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of armed robbery. On August 4, 1983, Patterson was sentenced to natural life imprisonment and a concurrent 30-year term for armed robbery. The record shows that, on direct appeal, the appellate court vacated one murder conviction, but otherwise affirmed Patterson\u2019s convictions and sentences. No. 1 \u2014 83\u20141877 (1985) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nOn October 14, 2003, Patterson filed a pro se \u201cPetition for Writ Habeas Corpus\u201d in the circuit court, alleging an ex post facto violation in that certain statutory aggravating factors used to impose an \u201cextended-term\u201d for murder were not in effect at the time he was charged with the offense in 1981. Patterson\u2019s habeas corpus complaint further alleged that he had \u201cserved out the maximum sentence allowed by law under the statutory provision of 1981 when *** the penalty was 20 to 40 years for \u2018Murder.\u2019 \u201d The complaint concluded: \u201cWHEREFOER, [sic] Petitioner VINCENT PATTERSON, Prays that a Writ of Habeas Corpus issue [to] bring Petitioner immediately *** to open court pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 114, at a designated time and date to plead such valid and meritorious argument in view that Petitioner is now entitle [sic] to \u2018Immediate Release\u2019 From Prison.\u201d On October 17, 2003, the trial court denied the complaint sua sponte, stating: \u201cVincent Patterson, petition for writ of hab[ea]s corpus and appointment of counsel denied.\u201d\nPatterson appealed, contending, as did Hennings, that the circuit court did not have statutory authority to deny his habeas corpus complaint and, further, that due process entitled him to notice and a hearing prior to any disposition of the complaint. The appellate court affirmed, first noting that \u201cthe law in this district is unsettled as to whether the summary dismissal procedure is restricted solely to stage one postconviction petitions where the procedure is explicitly authorized by statute,\u201d but holding that even if it is unavailable, \u201cthe erroneous deployment of the summary dismissal procedure is still subject to harmless error analysis.\u201d No. 1 \u2014 04\u20140077 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Because Patterson \u201c[did] not even attempt to defend the merits of his underlying bases for seeking habeas corpus relief,\u201d the panel concluded his habeas corpus action was \u201cdoomed to failure\u201d and affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment denying the complaint. On September 26, 2007, we granted Patterson\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and consolidated these cases.\nANALYSIS\nIn this court, neither appellant argues the merits of his respective habeas corpus complaint. Rather, appellants contend only that the trial courts that dismissed their complaints \u201cexceeded their statutory authority by summarily dismissing the petitions sua sponte without notice to the petitioners or leave to amend,\u201d and that such proceedings should be governed by the rules applicable to civil proceedings under the Act. Appellees respond that section 10 \u2014 106 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 106 (West 2002)) provides for initial review of a habeas corpus complaint and requires that the circuit court deny the complaint sua sponte if it fails to state a claim entitling plaintiff to relief. Appellees further argue that, as this court recently discussed in People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1 (2007), sua sponte denial of patently non-meritorious complaints is permitted under the Act. The issue before us is thus one of statutory construction, which we review de novo. See Orlak v. Loyola University Health System, 228 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2007); In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 307 (2002); see also In re Keri B., 327 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1070 (2000) (de novo review applied to question of whether a trial court\u2019s order falls within the authority the legislature has granted).\nThis court recently set forth the well-settled principles of statutory construction in Orlak, stating:\n\u201cThe cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. [Citation.] That intent is best gleaned from the words of the statute itself, and where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect. [Citation.] A court should interpret a statute, where possible, according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used. [Citation.] In determining the plain meaning of a statute\u2019s terms, we consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. [Citation.]\u201d Orlak, 228 Ill. 2d at 8.\nWe also afford the statutory language the fullest, rather than narrowest, possible meaning to which it is susceptible. Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 308.\n\u201cHabeas corpus,\u201d which literally translated from Latin means \u201c \u2018that you have the body,\u2019 \u201d is a writ employed to bring a person before a court, \u201cmost frequently to ensure that the party\u2019s imprisonment or detention is not illegal (habeas corpus ad subjiciendum).\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 728 (8th ed. 2004). In Illinois, article X provides a comprehensive procedural framework that governs orders of habeas corpus. 735 ILCS 5/10\u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002). Thus, determining whether section 10 \u2014 106 permits a trial court to conduct an initial review of the sufficiency of a habeas corpus complaint necessarily involves an examination of other sections within article X. See Alternate Fuels, Inc. v. Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 215 Ill. 2d 219, 238 (2004) (words and phrases of a statutory section must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute and must not be construed in isolation).\nSection 10 \u2014 102 provides: \u201cEvery person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his or her liberty, except as herein otherwise provided, may apply for habeas corpus in the manner provided in Article X of this Act, to obtain relief from such imprisonment or restraint, if it proved to be unlawful.\u201d (Emphases added.) 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 102 (West 2002). In other words, a prisoner may apply for an order requiring the person detaining him to produce the body of the prisoner to test the legality of the detention and, \u201cif it proved to be unlawful,\u201d \u201cto obtain relief from such imprisonment.\u201d Section 10 \u2014 103 explains to which courts application for the relief shall be made and, inter alia, that application \u201cshall be made by complaint signed by the person for whose relief it is intended.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 103 (West 2002). Section 10 \u2014 104 provides what the complaint shall state in substance, including: (1) that the person in whose behalf the relief is applied for is imprisoned; (2) \u201c[t]he cause or pretense of the restraint\u201d; and (3) that a copy of any warrant or process by virtue of which the prisoner is restrained be \u201cannexed.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 104 (West 2002).\nWith these preliminary provisions in mind, we consider section 10 \u2014 106, which states, in pertinent part: \u201cUnless it shall appear from the complaint itself, or from the documents thereto annexed, that the party can neither be discharged, admitted to bail nor otherwise relieved, the court shall forthwith award relief by habeas corpus.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 106 (West 2002). Given that we have found that the plain language of section 10 \u2014 102 allows a prisoner to apply for an order requiring the person detaining him to produce the body of the prisoner so that the legality of the detention may be determined, it is clear that the \u201crelief by habeas corpus\u201d referred to in section 10 \u2014 106 is the grant of the order by which the habeas corpus complainant, or plaintiff, is brought before the court. Therefore, unless, upon inspection of the complaint and any documents affixed to it, the court can conclude that the plaintiff \u201ccan neither be discharged, admitted to bail nor otherwise relieved,\u201d it shall grant the order for the plaintiff to be brought to court so that such determination may be made. (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 106 (West 2002). The plain language of section 10 \u2014 106 accordingly requires the trial court to conduct an initial review of the sufficiency of the complaint and to grant an order of habeas corpus if the complaint, with its attached documentation, establishes a question as to the legality of the plaintiffs detention or imprisonment. Conversely, if it is clear from a review of the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of habeas corpus, the order shall be denied. See 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus \u00a7166 (1999) (while habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course; judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and the petition must present facts showing entitlement to the writ; unless it appears from the petition and supporting documents that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the court must issue the writ).\nThe requirements set forth in subsequent sections of article X support this reading of section 10 \u2014 106. Under section 10 \u2014 107, if habeas corpus relief is allowed by an order of the court, that order shall be directed to the person having custody of the prisoner, in substantially the following form:\n\u201cYou are hereby commanded to have the body of C D, imprisoned and detained by you, together with the time and cause of such imprisonment and detention!,] *** before .... court of... . County (or before E F, judge of, etc.), at, etc., immediately after being served with a certified copy of this order, to be dealt with according to law; and you are to deliver a certified copy of this order with a return thereon of your performance in carrying out this order.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 107 (West 2002).\nSaid order shall be served pursuant to section 10 \u2014 110 and in the manner specified in section 10 \u2014 111. 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 110, 10 \u2014 111 (West 2002). It is evident from these sections that the relief available at this point is an order to produce the body of the prisoner before the court \u2014 not an order to release the prisoner.\nAfter an order of habeas corpus has been entered, the officer or person upon whom the order is served then files a return in accord with section 10 \u2014 113, stating whether he has the plaintiff in his custody and, if so, \u201cthe authority and true cause of such imprisonment or restraint.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 113(1), (2) (West 2002). If the plaintiff is detained \u201cby virtue of any order, warrant or other written authority, a copy thereof shall be attached to the return.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 113(3) (West 2002). \u201cUpon the return of an order of habeas corpus, the court shall, without delay, proceed to examine the cause of the imprisonment or restraint.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 119 (West 2002). It is only then that adversarial proceedings begin.\nThis court, in construing an early predecessor to section 10 \u2014 106, instructed:\n\u201cThe issuance of the writ upon the filing of the petition is not a mere matter of course. The writ should never issue unless a petition is presented which is in substantial accord and compliance with the provisions of the statute, and which shows upon its face that the petitioner is entitled to his discharge.\u201d People ex rel. Stead v. Superior Court, 234 Ill. 186, 198 (1908).\nIn People ex rel. Stead, this court held that, because it was apparent from the face of the petition for writ of habeas corpus that the question raised in it had, as a matter of law, been adjudicated against the plaintiff, it therefore appeared from the petition that he could not be discharged, admitted to bail, or otherwise relieved, \u201cand for that reason, the writ should not have issued.\u201d People ex rel. Stead, 234 Ill. at 198; see also 39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus \u00a7297, at 55 (2003) (\u201cIt is generally held that the court, before actually issuing the writ, may determine whether the facts alleged in the petition warrant the discharge of the prisoner\u201d).\nThe procedure detailed above is in accord with that of other states which, in construing similar provisions, have held that sua sponte denial of a complaint for order or writ of habeas corpus is appropriate where it is apparent that the applicant is not entitled to that relief. See, e.g., Chari v. Vore, 91 Ohio St. 3d 323, 327, 744 N.E.2d 763, 768-69 (2001) (where petitioner had not satisfied the pleading requirements for a petition for writ of habeas corpus, court of appeals should never have allowed the writ, ordered a return, and held a hearing on the petition; statute prescribes that application is by petition which contains certain information and if the court decides that the petition states a facially valid claim, it must allow the writ; conversely, if the petition states a claim for which habeas corpus relief cannot be granted, the court should not allow the writ and should dismiss the petition); Smith v. State, 440 So. 2d 1222, 1223-24 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (trial court did not err in denying petition for writ of habeas corpus that wholly failed to state facts entitling petitioner to issuance of such writ, where statute provides that the judge to whom an application for writ of habeas corpus is made must grant the same without delay, unless it appears from the petition itself or from the documents thereto annexed that the person imprisoned or restrained is not entitled to the benefits of the writ; when a petition for writ of habeas corpus shows on its face that if all statements of fact contained in the petition were true, the petitioner would not be entitled to the writ, it is not error to deny the petition). A similar procedure applies in federal habeas corpus proceedings filed by state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. \u00a72254 (2000). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts authorizes a district court to conduct an initial screening of petitions and to dismiss unworthy requests for habeas corpus relief. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, R. 4; Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 413, 414 (7th Cir. 1993). \u201cWhen the face of the petition plus any annexed exhibits plainly show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the district court can summarily dispose of the matter without either examining the transcripts and record of the state court proceedings or ordering the state to respond.\u201d Small, 998 F.2d at 414 (citing Rules 4 and 28 U.S.C. \u00a72243 (1988) (the writ shall be awarded or an order to show cause issued, \u201cunless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto\u201d)).\nIn the matter before us, we agree with appellees that appellants have cited no authority to support their contention that section 10 \u2014 106 \u201cappears to go to the ultimate question of whether relief should be granted.\u201d As has been explained above, when a court orders \u201crelief by habeas corpus\u201d under section 10 \u2014 106, the court is not thereby granting the plaintiff his release or declaring that his detention is illegal, but merely directing the person having custody to make the return and, \u201cat the same time, bring the body of the party.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/10\u2014 106, 10 \u2014 113, 10 \u2014 114 (West 2002); see People ex rel. Day v. Lewis, 376 Ill. 509, 511 (1941). After the return is made, the court, pursuant to the dictates of article X, determines whether an order should be entered either discharging plaintiff, remanding him to custody, or admitting him to bail. See 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 123 through 10\u2014 127 (West 2002).\nOf particular interest here, section 10 \u2014 124 sets forth the seven specific instances in which a plaintiff, \u201cin custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted,\u201d may be discharged. 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 124 (West 2002); see also People v. Gosier, 205 Ill. 2d 198, 205 (2001); Barney v. Prisoner Review Board, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 430 (1998). These seven instances fall into two general categories:\n\u201c[A] writ of habeas corpus is available only to obtain the release of a prisoner who has been incarcerated under a judgment of a court which lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or the person of the petitioner, or where there has been some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner\u2019s conviction which entitled him to release.\u201d Barney, 184 Ill. 2d at 430.\nThus, in People ex rel. Haven v. Macieiski, 38 Ill. 2d 396, 398 (1967), where the habeas corpus complaint did not allege that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, and there was no claim that any event had occurred since the judgment of conviction by which the plaintiff had become entitled to discharge, the trial court\u2019s judgment \u201cdismissing the habeas corpus petition was not erroneous.\u201d Here, neither appellant argues the \u201crelative merit\u201d of the claims set forth in his complaint for habeas corpus relief. Therefore, as in Macieiski, we find that, where the trial courts herein determined that the appellants\u2019 complaints were insufficient on their face to warrant any relief available pursuant to article X, then under the procedures set forth in section 10 \u2014 106, the trial courts could properly deny sua sponte the complaints for order of habeas corpus.\nAppellants further contend that, as this court has recognized that an application for habeas corpus relief is a civil proceeding, \u201cinvolving *** the enforcement of [the plaintiffs] civil right of personal liberty\u201d (Ragen, 391 Ill. at 423), proceedings for habeas corpus relief under article X of the Code of Civil Procedure should be governed by the rules applicable to civil proceedings. Appellees argue that sua sponte denial of the appellants\u2019 complaints was proper, citing our recent decision in Vincent. While there are certainly differences in a proceeding for relief from judgment governed by section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 2002)), which was involved in Vincent, and proceedings under article X following the filing of a complaint for order of habeas corpus, our decision in Vincent supports our holding herein. In Vincent, this court, in answering the question \u201cwhether a trial court may dispose of a properly served section 2 \u2014 1401 petition without benefit of responsive pleadings and without giving the petitioner notice of the impending ruling and the opportunity to address the court prior to the ruling,\u201d held that \u201ca trial court \u2018may dismiss a claim sua sponte *** without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.\u2019 \u201d Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 5, 13, quoting Omar v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987).\nAs initially noted, article X contains specific procedural provisions regulating habeas corpus actions, and these sections control over the general procedural provisions of article II, the Civil Practice Law. See 735 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 108(a) (West 2002). Thus, while a habeas corpus complaint is considered a \u201ccivil proceeding\u201d under the Act, the procedures governing such action are specifically provided within article X, rather than the Civil Practice Law, which governs petitions for relief under section 2 \u2014 1401. However, we have established that, under article X, after the filing of a complaint by the plaintiff, the court shall determine whether, \u201cfrom the complaint itself, or from the documents thereto annexed,\u201d the plaintiff is, or is not, entitled to an order of habeas corpus. 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 106 (West 2002). Thus, as in Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13, the Act provides the court with authority to sua sponte deny a plaintiffs complaint \u201c \u2018without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.\u2019 \u201d Quoting Omar v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987).\nAdditionally, appellants urge this court to follow the appellate court\u2019s decision in People v. Winfrey, 347 Ill. App. 3d 987, 989 (2004), which held that the \u201chabeas corpus statute *** does not authorize the trial court to summarily deny a habeas corpus petition.\u201d However, the holding in Winfrey was based on the reasoning in People v. Gaines, 335 Ill. App. 3d 292 (2002), and People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill. App. 3d 175 (2003), aff\u2019d on other grounds, 216 Ill. 2d 45 (2005), reasoning which has now been effectively overruled by this court. In Gaines, the appellate court held that, under the Code of Civil Procedure, a circuit court commits reversible error by dismissing a section 2 \u2014 1401 petition without giving the defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to the circuit court\u2019s action. However, in Vincent, we held that the Code permits a trial court to sua sponte enter judgment on the pleadings dismissing a section 2 \u2014 1401 petition with prejudice, even if no responsive pleading has been filed, and without prior notice of the court\u2019s ruling to the petitioner. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 9-10, 13; see also People v. Allen, 377 Ill. App. 3d 938, 942-43 (2007). Similarly, Winfrey relied on Shellstrom, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 177, which reversed the \u201csummary dismissal\u201d of a complaint filed pursuant to the mandamus statute, holding, inter alia, that such dismissal contravened section 2 \u2014 612(a) of the Code. However, as we have noted, procedural provisions regulating habeas corpus actions are found within article X of the Act, and these sections control over the general procedural provisions, including section 2 \u2014 612(a), contained in article II. See 735 ILCS 5/1\u2014 108(a) (West 2002). Therefore, as the appellate court\u2019s decision in Gaines has been abrogated by Vincent, and we have found herein that the point for which Winfrey relies on Shellstrom is inapplicable to habeas corpus complaints, the Winfrey court\u2019s reasoning is contrary to this court\u2019s pronouncements, and Winfrey is hereby overruled.\nFinally, appellants contend this court\u2019s reasoning that \u201cadequate procedural safeguards exist to prevent erroneous sua sponte terminations [of section 2 \u2014 1401 petitions]\u201d (Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13), does not hold true for plaintiffs who file complaints for an order of habeas corpus. The \u201ccorrective remedies\u201d of rehearing and appeal noted in Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13, are likewise available to plaintiffs whose habeas corpus complaints are denied sua sponte. Further, in Vincent, this court noted that the trial court should allow a litigant the opportunity to amend his section 2 \u2014 1401 petition in those circumstances when doing so would yield a meritorious claim. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13 & n.3. Article X similarly provides that where the plaintiff has pleaded or established facts which entitle him to relief, but \u201cthe plaintiff has sought the wrong remedy, the court shall permit the pleadings to be amended, on just and reasonable terms, and the court shall grant the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled on the amended pleadings or upon the evidence.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 121 (West 2002). We cannot, therefore, find that sua sponte denial of a plaintiff\u2019s complaint for habeas corpus relief has any potential for preventing full access to the courts to those plaintiffs.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons expressed above, the judgments of the appellate courts, which affirmed the circuit courts\u2019 denials of appellants\u2019 complaints for habeas corpus relief, are affirmed.\nAppellate court judgments affirmed.\nIn People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 6, 10-11 (2007), this court recently noted that use of the term \u201csummary dismissal\u201d is borrowed from the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and has no application to section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 2002)), an entirely different form of statutory collateral relief that does not provide for summary dismissals. Thus, where article X, governing habeas corpus complaints, also provides a form of statutory collateral relief under the Code of Civil Procedure, we refer to the circuit courts\u2019 actions herein as entering judgment sua sponte by denying relief on the complaints. See Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 11.\nAppellees are the defendants in these habeas corpus actions, the persons in whose custody or under whose restraint the appellant prisoners reside. See 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 107 (West 2002); see also People ex rel. Ross v. Ragen, 391 Ill. 419, 422-23 (1945) (a habeas corpus proceeding is a civil action, separate and distinct from the underlying criminal proceeding, and is brought to enforce a civil right of personal liberty, which the plaintiff claims, as against those who are holding him in custody, under the criminal process). Patterson correctly named his custodian Stephen Mote, then warden of Pontiac Correctional Center, as the defendant in his habeas corpus complaint. On appeal, the caption was changed to \u201cPeople v. Patterson.\" Thus, the proper defendant-appellee in Patterson\u2019s case is his current custodian.\nArticle X now refers to \u201corders\u201d of habeas corpus, rather than \u201cwrits.\u201d See 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1501 (West 2002) (\u201cWrits abolished\u201d); see also, e.g., 735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 107 (West 2002) (\u201cForm of orders\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Mark D. Fisher, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Katherine D. Saunders, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and James E. Fitzgerald, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee.", "Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Mark D. Fisher, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellant, and Vincent Patterson, of Pontiac, appellant pro se.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Katherine D. Saunders, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and James E. Fitzgerald, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(Nos. 102694, 103405 cons.\nEDWARD HENNINGS, Appellant, v. NEDRA CHANDLER, Appellee.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. VINCENT PATTERSON, Appellant.\nOpinion filed May 22, 2008.\nRobert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Mark D. Fisher, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Katherine D. Saunders, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and James E. Fitzgerald, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee.\nRobert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Mark D. Fisher, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellant, and Vincent Patterson, of Pontiac, appellant pro se.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Katherine D. Saunders, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and James E. Fitzgerald, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0018-01", "first_page_order": 32, "last_page_order": 48 }