{ "id": 3614947, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JESSE GALAN, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Galan", "decision_date": "2008-07-24", "docket_number": "No. 103845", "first_page": "484", "last_page": "544", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 484" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "319 Ill. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5156630 ], "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/319/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265538 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "881" }, { "page": "879" }, { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ind. Code Ann.", "weight": 18, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604994 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146699 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 586", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3276422 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591", "parenthetical": "explaining that the exclusionary rule should only be applied where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs" }, { "page": "64", "parenthetical": "explaining that the exclusionary rule should only be applied where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs" }, { "page": "2163", "parenthetical": "explaining that the exclusionary rule should only be applied where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "2163" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "2163" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "2163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/547/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705873 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3605045 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156739 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 103", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11642843 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" }, { "page": "63" }, { "page": "861" }, { "page": "114" }, { "page": "65" }, { "page": "863" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278549 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" }, { "page": "387" }, { "page": "382" }, { "page": "382, 386-87" }, { "page": "386-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 Ill. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5374188 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1884, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" }, { "page": "637" }, { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/110/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8299948 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1886, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/119/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 S. Ct. 225", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 8299948, 8299741 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1886, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"For the past 100 years, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the manner in which a defendant is brought to trial does not affect the ability of the government to try him\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/119/0436-01", "/us/119/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 U.S. 519", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 641476 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"For the past 100 years, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the manner in which a defendant is brought to trial does not affect the ability of the government to try him\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"For the past 100 years, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the manner in which a defendant is brought to trial does not affect the ability of the government to try him\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/342/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 L. Ed. 541", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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App. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va. App.", "case_ids": [ 1713930 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va-app/29/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1338655 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" }, { "page": "43" }, { "page": "1191" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/514/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 338", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11715874 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" }, { "page": "571" }, { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 741", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6188710 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "considering a violation of IRS regulations which did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and noting that \"our precedents enforcing the exclusionary rule to deter constitutional violations provide no support for the rule's application\"" }, { "parenthetical": "considering a violation of IRS regulations which did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and noting that \"our precedents enforcing the exclusionary rule to deter constitutional violations provide no support for the rule's application\"" }, { "parenthetical": "considering a violation of IRS regulations which did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and noting that \"our precedents enforcing the exclusionary rule to deter constitutional violations provide no support for the rule's application\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 35", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6209906 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44-45" }, { "page": "39-40" }, { "page": "1631" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958938 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060309 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532", "parenthetical": "exclusionary rule not applied where detention ran afoul of Gerstein, but confession voluntary" }, { "page": "531-32" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385570 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "exclusionary rule not applied because of violation of clergy/penitent evidentiary privilege" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864531 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "exclusionary rule not applied where defendant was transferred from jail in violation of Illinois Habeas Corpus Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2910030 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "742 P.2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10408621 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/742/0922-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 A.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7861035 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/642/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ohio St. 2d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6712287 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st-2d/64/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 N.E.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Va. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 2068020 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va/231/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Wash. 2d 915", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 425244 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/143/0915-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 P.3d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 U.S. 206", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6165005 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" }, { "page": "1677" }, { "page": "1444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/364/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 U.S. 581", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 365313 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" }, { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/332/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 L. Ed. 210", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 295", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11133135 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299-300" }, { "page": "414" }, { "page": "1300" }, { "page": "299-300" }, { "page": "414" }, { "page": "1300" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ind. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "case_ids": [ 1510039 ], "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "\"a warrant issued by a court in Illinois could not have any extraterritorial effect, and conferred no authority to arrest and imprison the petitioner in Indiana, without a warrant issued by a court or other proper officer of the State of Indiana\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind/196/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 N.E. 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "\"a warrant issued by a court in Illinois could not have any extraterritorial effect, and conferred no authority to arrest and imprison the petitioner in Indiana, without a warrant issued by a court or other proper officer of the State of Indiana\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799407 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" }, { "page": "14-15" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 Pa. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 93817 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598-99" }, { "page": "588" }, { "page": "598-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/561/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 P.2d 1024", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1032", "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "752 A.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 93817, 11509630 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" }, { "page": "399" }, { "page": "398-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/561/0588-01", "/a2d/752/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3315099 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" }, { "page": "449-50" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 A.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8001939 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" }, { "page": "600" }, { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/380/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 897", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340969 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "914" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "3416" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0897-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477552 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746960 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813", "parenthetical": "\"Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis\"" }, { "page": "98", "parenthetical": "\"Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis\"" }, { "page": "1774", "parenthetical": "\"Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "742 N.W.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8361610 ], "weight": 15, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" }, { "page": "87-88" }, { "page": "89" }, { "page": "89" }, { "page": "89" }, { "page": "89" }, { "page": "89" }, { "page": "89", "parenthetical": "\"To the extent an ox is being gored in this case, it belongs to Missouri, not Dentler. *** Ordinarily, a party seeking to invoke the exclusionary rule may not vicariously assert the rights of another\"" }, { "page": "89" }, { "page": "90" }, { "page": "90" }, { "page": "89" }, { "page": "89" }, { "page": "90" }, { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/742/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Neb. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 5461842 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" }, { "page": "871" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "872" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/218/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Wash. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1151191 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14", "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/98/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604511 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580-81", "parenthetical": "\"The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. [Citation.] *** The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "896 F.2d 255", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10529603 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "\"For the past 100 years, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the manner in which a defendant is brought to trial does not affect the ability of the government to try him\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/896/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 U.S. 128", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11329017 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148", "parenthetical": "a party generally may not vicariously assert the rights of another when seeking to invoke the exclusionary rule" }, { "page": "404", "parenthetical": "a party generally may not vicariously assert the rights of another when seeking to invoke the exclusionary rule" }, { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "a party generally may not vicariously assert the rights of another when seeking to invoke the exclusionary rule" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/439/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 U.S. 165", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6169225 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "187", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "966-67", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/394/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 U.S. 331", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3500432 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349", "parenthetical": "statutory violations only remotely related to the gathering of evidence do not ordinarily trigger application of the exclusionary rule" }, { "page": "577", "parenthetical": "statutory violations only remotely related to the gathering of evidence do not ordinarily trigger application of the exclusionary rule" }, { "page": "2681", "parenthetical": "statutory violations only remotely related to the gathering of evidence do not ordinarily trigger application of the exclusionary rule" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/548/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 U.S. 727", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6189085 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "2445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/447/0727-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3315099 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Neb. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 5461842 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/neb/218/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 Mass. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 1157270 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "invoking the exclusionary rule when an out-of-state officer effected an extraterritorial arrest without statutory or common law authority" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/430/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "719 N.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "invoking the exclusionary rule when an out-of-state officer effected an extraterritorial arrest without statutory or common law authority" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926983 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Misc. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1246242 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "describing the condition-precedent argument as an \"exotic assertion\" that would impose absolute liability on all inadvertent violations of the presentment requirement" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/70/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 N.Y.S.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "describing the condition-precedent argument as an \"exotic assertion\" that would impose absolute liability on all inadvertent violations of the presentment requirement" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "35 N.Y.2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "case_ids": [ 2314527 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ny-2d/35/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 N.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "363 N.Y.S.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ind. Code Ann.", "weight": 9, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278549 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799407 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 Pa. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 93817 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "593" }, { "page": "593" }, { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598-99" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/pa/561/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 A.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 93817, 11509630 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "395" }, { "page": "396" }, { "page": "396" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "398-99" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/pa/561/0588-01", "/a2d/752/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3315099 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" }, { "page": "449-50" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 A.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8001939 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/380/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "742 N.W.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8361610 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" }, { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/742/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Neb. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 5461842 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" }, { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/neb/218/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 Mass. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 1157270 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/mass/430/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "719 N.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2972922 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 DePaul L. Rev. 1347", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "DePaul L. Rev.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1358-59", "parenthetical": "Spring 2004" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503-04" }, { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725349 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477020 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3875619 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29935 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910248 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3148432 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29953 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5703875 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 816470 ], "year": 1869, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409", "parenthetical": "at common law, municipal peace officers had no authority to make a warrantless arrest outside of the political entity in which they held office" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill/51/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544910 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0054-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2538, "char_count": 117944, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.635282271667657e-08, "percentile": 0.4909631797066161 }, "sha256": "4b60701307163e001458d5b428f0d7ab399fd0263115a3815c4d15fe5d49b70e", "simhash": "1:ffb1b29af75891cc", "word_count": 19080 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:24:05.743057+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JESSE GALAN, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Thomas and Justices Fitzgerald and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Burke specially concurred, with opinion.\nJustices Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Kilbride.\nOPINION\nIn November 2001, defendant, Jesse Galan, was indicted for possession with intent to deliver 900 or more grams of cocaine and more than 5,000 grams of cannabis. The evidence against him was suppressed by the circuit court of Cook County and the State filed a \u201cCertificate of Substantial Impairment\u201d and brought an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). The appellate court affirmed. 367 Ill. App. 3d 876. After its petition for rehearing was denied, the State filed and was granted leave to appeal to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (210 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nThere are two issues in this case: first, whether Illinois courts must inquire into extradition irregularities for crimes committed within Illinois\u2019 borders; and, second, whether exclusion is the appropriate remedy when Illinois police violate a postarrest provision of another state\u2019s fresh pursuit statute. We reverse.\nBACKGROUND\nOn October 11, 2001, defendant drove his truck onto the Chicago Skyway, entering the Skyway from an Illinois on-ramp. After continuing onto a tollbooth 0.8 miles into Indiana, defendant was stopped by several Chicago police officers. Defendant\u2019s vehicle was searched, and police recovered two boxes filled with marijuana. Defendant was arrested and taken to his mother\u2019s house at 8521 South Burley Avenue in Chicago, where he sometimes resided. Police conducted a search of the house in the presence of defendant and his mother and stepfather, eventually recovering two pistols, approximately $10,000 in cash, and cocaine. A probable cause hearing was held and defendant was eventually indicted by a Cook County grand jury, as indicated above.\nPrior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The motion was filed on July 23, 2002, and requested the trial court to \u201c[qjuash [defendant\u2019s] arrest, because of the absence of authority of probable cause to effect it, and to suppress from introduction into evidence in this cause, the following: (a) Physical evidence discovered and as a result of arrest and detention; (b) Statements, utterances, reports of gestures and responses by petitioner during the detention following the arrest[ ] i.e. oral statements of defendant^] (c) All other knowledge and fruits thereof, witnesses statements, whether written, or oral or gestural and products of the arrest.\u201d Defendant asserted that during his arrest and subsequent detention, the State \u201cbecame aware of the existence of physical evidence all the direct and indirect fruits of the arrest and detention, which connect petitioner with the instant offense.\u201d The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on September 17, 2003.\nDefendant testified that he was driving his truck toward Indiana when he was stopped at the tollbooth, past the \u201cmile 1\u201d marker located in Indiana. He stated that several men dressed in plain clothes, who it soon became apparent were Chicago police officers, approached him at the tollbooth with guns drawn and ordered him out of his truck, placed him in handcuffs, and forced him onto the ground. Defendant testified that he did not give the men permission to search his truck. Defendant acknowledged that when the truck was searched, police recovered two boxes of marijuana and told him he was under arrest.\nDefendant testified that the police then took him back to his mother\u2019s house in Illinois. He stated that he occasionally resided at his mother\u2019s house and had come from that address when he was stopped at the tollbooth. Defendant testified that officers knocked on the door of his mother\u2019s house and asked him if they could search the house. Defendant testified that he told the officers they could not search the house. He also testified, though, that his mother eventually opened the door and, upon learning that the police had \u201cbusted [defendant] with some marijuana,\u201d agreed, after being asked, to allow the officers to search the home. Defendant maintained that while he later signed a consent to search, he only did so after officers threatened to arrest his mother and stepfather. Defendant acknowledged that in searching the house, police found other contraband. He asserted, however, that this contraband was found before he signed the consent to search.\nOn cross-examination, defendant testified that after he was removed from his truck by the police, the officers moved him away from traffic and told him he was under arrest. Defendant stated that at this point officers began searching his truck and found the two boxes containing marijuana in the truck\u2019s backseat. Defendant testified that the officers eventually informed him that he was in trouble and they were planning to take him back to the house he had come from, which he understood to be his mother\u2019s house. Following this testimony, defendant answered several more questions regarding the circumstances surrounding the search of his mother\u2019s home.\nThe State called Officer Brian Luce, one of the Chicago police officers involved in arresting defendant. Luce testified that he was part of the Chicago police department\u2019s narcotics and gangs investigation section. Luce stated that after obtaining information from a confidential informant, police became interested in defendant. This informant indicated that defendant lived at 8521 South Burley Avenue and 9735 Avenue M in Chicago. Moreover, the informant stated that defendant was storing, selling, and manufacturing large quantities of marijuana. Based on this information, the Chicago police department began an investigation, in which Luce took part.\nLuce testified that on October 11, 2001, he was conducting surveillance on the Avenue M address as part of the ongoing investigation. Luce indicated that other officers were conducting surveillance on the Burley Avenue address. Luce observed defendant and another individual, Jose Mojica, leave the Avenue M address and drive to the Burley Avenue address in defendant\u2019s truck. Luce saw defendant and Mojica get out of the truck and enter the house at 8521 South Burley. At this point, Luce picked a surveillance spot around the block while another officer set up surveillance on the front door. Luce then received a radio communication from the other officer that defendant and Mojica, who was carrying a white bag, left the house, got back in the truck, and headed back to the Avenue M address.\nLuce followed the men back to the Avenue M address and observed Mojica, still carrying the white bag, exit the truck and get into a Nissan Maxima by himself. At this point, part of the surveillance team, including Luce, followed the Nissan, while another part of the surveillance team remained at the Avenue M address. Eventually, a marked police car pulled Mojica over and Luce was informed by radio that Mojica did not have a valid driver\u2019s license and was going to be taken to a police station for a traffic violator bond. Luce further testified that the beige Maxima was taken to the police station, where a custodial search was performed and the white bag, the same bag that was observed going into the car, was found to contain a large amount of currency.\nAfter being informed that Mojica was in custody and a large amount of currency was found, Luce was told to go back to Avenue M and continue surveillance. Luce observed defendant again leave the Avenue M address and return to the Burley Avenue address. Luce testified that another officer saw defendant enter the house and then exit, carrying a brown box. Luce testified that the other officer told him that while taking the box to his truck, defendant was looking up and down the street. Defendant then repeated this action, entering the house, leaving with a second brown box, and taking it to his truck, nervously looking up and down the street.\nLuce stated that after defendant entered the truck he pulled away, only to stop approximately 50 to 100 feet from the Burley Avenue address and look up and down the street, watching the cars as they passed. Luce, who was then following defendant, had to drive by in his unmarked vehicle. In driving by, Luce observed defendant looking out his driver\u2019s side window in several different directions. Luce testified that based upon his experience as a Chicago police officer, defendant\u2019s actions constituted countersurveillance or tactics used to see if police are in the area.\nAfter driving by defendant, Luce drove around the block and was informed over the radio that defendant made an illegal U-turn, crossing two lanes. Luce was eventually able to reposition himself behind defendant\u2019s truck. Luce testified that officers continued \u201cmoving surveillance\u201d and observed defendant travel from Burley Avenue to Indianapolis Boulevard and then onto 106th Street, where he veered from the far left to the far right lane, without signaling, across three or four lanes of traffic, traveling to the Skyway on-ramp. Luce stated that defendant\u2019s \u201cerratic move from the left [lane] all the way to the right [lane]\u201d led police to believe that their surveillance was compromised. Again, Luce and other officers believed that defendant\u2019s conduct indicated that he was either trying to get away or utilizing countersurveillance tactics to see if he was being followed. At that point, Luce and the other officers agreed to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle to investigate.\nLuce testified that officers stopped defendant\u2019s truck \u201cright at the tollbooth\u201d and quickly ran up to the car with guns drawn. Once it was safe, the officers bolstered their guns. Luce stated that when he approached the vehicle and opened the passenger door, he smelled a strong odor of cannabis. Luce testified that he had smelled this odor before while carrying out his duties as a Chicago police officer and it was not easily confused with any other smell. Luce testified that officers asked defendant what was in the boxes and he answered that it was \u201cweed,\u201d a street term for cannabis, and asked if he was in trouble. Moreover, defendant stated that he believed there was 20 pounds of cannabis in the boxes. Luce stated that officers then took defendant out of the truck, pulled it to the side of the highway, and began talking to defendant. During that conversation, officers told defendant what they had seen that day, informed him that he was under arrest, and advised him of his rights.\nAfter reading defendant his rights, Luce continued speaking with defendant, informing him of the ongoing investigation, noting that they had found the cannabis and indicating that they wished to search defendant\u2019s home. Officers then brought defendant back to the Burley Avenue address and, Luce testified, defendant agreed to sign a consent-to-search form. Luce testified that he did not physically threaten defendant or act abusive toward him and defendant simply signed the form in the presence of another officer. Luce further testified that he signed the consent-to-search form. Moreover, he stated that the form was signed before the house was searched. Luce testified that defendant was cooperative, appeared to be nervous, and wanted to work with police.\nLuce testified that officers then conducted a search of the residence, in the presence of defendant\u2019s mother and stepfather. As already noted, they recovered two pistols, approximately $10,000 in cash, and cocaine. Additionally, Luce testified that police found an envelope addressed to defendant at 8521 South Burley Avenue. Moreover, Luce stated that he did not make any threats to defendant regarding his parents, nor did he threaten defendant\u2019s parents with arrest in order to gain more cooperation from defendant.\nBefore the State finished its questioning, Luce testified to one last matter regarding Mojica. Luce testified that he was informed by other officers that when Mojica was stopped and police found him in possession of around $80,000, Mojica lied regarding its origins. Mojica stated that the money was brought to him at a location that officers, based upon their surveillance, knew not to be true. Luce testified, as he had previously, that officers observed Mojica retrieve a white bag from the Burley Avenue address, take that bag to the Avenue M address, exit defendant\u2019s truck with the bag, and then get into the Nissan Maxima with the bag. Surveillance never lost sight of the vehicle or Mojica, and when Mojica was stopped, the bag containing the currency was recovered.\nOn cross-examination, Luce acknowledged that the informant police relied upon in this case was unknown to him. Additionally, Luce did not know and his report did not indicate that the informant ever saw narcotics inside 8521 South Burley Avenue. Moreover, Luce did not know if the informant, described as a confidential informant, had ever been used in prior cases and Luce\u2019s report did not indicate that the informant was reliable. Luce testified, though, that surveillance was set up based upon the information from this informant.\nLuce acknowledged that no one saw where the bag containing currency came from or who gave it to Mojica, merely that Mojica came out of the South Burley Avenue address carrying it. Additionally, Luce admitted that neither he nor any other officers could see through the bag. Moreover, Luce testified that when Mojica was stopped while driving the Nissan Maxima, he was stopped not for any traffic violation or the commission of any crime, but because officers believed that he had something to do with their narcotics surveillance. Essentially, Mojica was stopped solely to see if there were drugs in the bag. While money was eventually found, no narcotics were found in the car, nor was it known, at the time of the stop, that Mojica was operating the car without a valid driver\u2019s license. Additionally, Luce testified that Mojica never told officers that there were narcotics inside the Burley Avenue address, never told officers that he got the money from the Burley Avenue address or from defendant, and never told officers that the money constituted the proceeds of narcotics.\nLuce testified further on cross-examination that he could not see what was in the boxes defendant brought from 8521 South Burley Avenue to his truck. Moreover, Luce acknowledged that defendant\u2019s activity of pulling his truck over and looking in his mirrors could be construed as normal activity. Regarding the eventual stop of defendant at the tollbooth, Luce stated that while he believed it occurred in Illinois, he was not certain and it could have been in Indiana. He also stated that the stop was not carried out to give defendant a traffic ticket but was actually carried out because of Luce\u2019s belief that surveillance was compromised and officers were conducting a drug investigation.\nLuce testified that while he could smell cannabis when he approached defendant\u2019s truck, he did not actually see the cannabis until he opened the boxes inside the truck. Luce testified that the boxes were opened without obtaining defendant\u2019s consent. Moreover, Luce stated that before he opened the boxes, and even before he read defendant his rights, he asked defendant what was inside. Luce also testified, though, that before asking defendant what was in the boxes he told defendant that the police were pulling him over because they believed that a narcotics transaction occurred.\nOn cross-examination, the defense asked several questions and Luce testified extensively regarding the eventual search of the Burley Avenue address. This testimony was unaltered from Luce\u2019s testimony regarding the home search on direct examination. Luce stated that officers brought defendant back to the Burley Avenue address, explained the consent-to-search form to defendant, one of the officers read the form to defendant, Officer Luce filled out the form, and then defendant signed it. Luce testified that he and the officers did not immediately knock on the front door of 8521 South Burley Avenue upon arriving, instead waiting until after defendant had already signed the consent-to-search form.\nThe parties stipulated to the testimony of another officer who took part in the investigation. Detective Schnoor would have testified that he saw the boxes that were eventually found to contain cannabis being taken out of 8521 South Burley Avenue one at a time by defendant. Moreover, he would have testified that in taking those boxes out defendant looked up and down the street, conduct which he believed indicative of people transporting narcotics. It was also stipulated, however, that this type of behavior could be seen in law-abiding citizens as well.\nOn October 1, 2003, the motion to quash and suppress came up for argument. Before argument was heard, though, the parties additionally stipulated that private investigator Joe Carone would testify he photographed the tollbooth where defendant was arrested, which was 0.8 miles from the Illinois border, inside Indiana. Defendant argued not only that the arrest at the tollbooth was improper, but also that defendant\u2019s later consent to search was involuntarily given. Defendant contended, while arguing before the trial court, that \u201c[i]f the initial stop is bad everything that happens after that stop is bad, including the consent form, the alleged smell and the stop in the other state, all of that falls.\u201d The State, by contrast, argued that the anonymous tip, the suspicious driving between two houses multiple times in one day, the fact that $80,000 was recovered from Mojica, and defendant\u2019s conduct which officers believed to be countersurveillance, taken together, amounted to probable cause. Considering these arguments, and after making specific factual findings, the trial court agreed with the State that officers had probable cause to arrest defendant and denied defendant\u2019s motion.\nOn October 28, 2003, defendant filed another motion to suppress, this time specifically referring only to the evidence seized as a result of the search at defendant\u2019s residence at 8521 South Burley Avenue. No hearing was held on this motion. The motion was again presented, however, on March 8, 2004, in tandem with defendant\u2019s motion to vacate the trial court\u2019s earlier denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. The March 8 motion, presented in a single document, asked the trial court to enter orders: \u201cA. Vacating the order entered October 01, 2003, denying the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress; B. Holding an evidentiary hearing on the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the items seized from his home on October 11; C. Granting the motion to suppress the items seized from the defendant\u2019s home at 8521 South Burley, Chicago, Illinois on October 11, 2001.\u201d\nOn June 8, 2004, the trial court heard argument regarding defendant\u2019s March 8 motion to vacate and motion to suppress. Defendant asserted that the original motion to suppress, filed on July 23, 2002, and denied by the trial court on October 1, 2003, \u201cconcerned itself only solely and exclusively with the search of the car and [defendant\u2019s] arrest and probable cause for his arrest. It did not concern itself in any way with the search *** later that day of defendant\u2019s home.\u201d Defendant contended that the issue of the search at defendant\u2019s home had never been litigated or ruled upon. Defendant acknowledged, though, that the trial court previously denied the motion to quash and suppress with respect to the search of defendant\u2019s car and his arrest.\nSupporting the new motion, defendant asserted that the arrest was illegal because it took place in Indiana. Defendant asserted that pursuant to Indiana statutory law, after Chicago police officers arrested defendant, they were required to take defendant before a judge of the Indiana county in which the arrest was made for a bond hearing. Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998). Because that was not done in this case, defendant contended his arrest was invalid. Based on this argument, defendant asked the trial court to vacate the original denial of the motion to suppress and grant the motion to suppress.\nIn response, the State acknowledged that defendant should have been brought before an Indiana judge for a bond hearing. The State argued, though, that the failure to do so was harmless and for the trial court \u201cto suppress any evidence recovered by the police officers including a consent to search, including all the cannabis that was found in defendant\u2019s vehicle, including all of the evidence that was found at the address [in] Illinois is too harsh for the circumstances in this case.\u201d The State asserted that the trial court already heard all of the arguments defendant made in this motion in the previous motion, specifically noting that the trial court heard arguments about the legality of defendant\u2019s arrest in Indiana when it considered defendant\u2019s first motion to suppress. Accordingly, the State requested the trial court to again deny defendant\u2019s motion.\nThe trial court noted that it was undisputed that the arrest in this case took place in Indiana. The court then pointed out that Indiana was not afforded, as required by Indiana statute, the opportunity to determine whether there was probable cause for defendant\u2019s arrest. Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998). Moreover, extradition procedures required by Indiana statute were not followed. Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998). In light of the above, the trial court vacated its denial of the original motion to quash and suppress and granted defendant\u2019s new motion to quash and suppress the evidence in Indiana. Having done this, the court set a future date for a hearing on the motion regarding the search of the Burley Avenue address. This hearing was never held, though, as the trial court went back on the record the same day, June 8, 2004, and granted the motion to suppress with regards to the evidence obtained at the Burley Avenue address. The trial court noted that the information retrieved at 8521 South Burley Avenue resulted from the \u201cwrongful detention in bringing [defendant] back across the state line,\u201d which was the same basis the court utilized in granting defendant\u2019s motion to vacate.\nWith this factual and procedural background in mind, we turn to our analysis.\nANALYSIS\nIn its petition for leave to appeal, the State presents two arguments. First, the State asserts that an Illinois court need not inquire into extradition irregularities for crimes committed within Illinois\u2019 borders, as such irregularities affect neither the guilt nor the innocence of the accused, nor the jurisdiction of the Illinois court to try a defendant. Second, the State contends that exclusion is not the appropriate remedy in this case. As the facts are not in dispute and these arguments present questions of law, review is de novo. People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 148 (2006).\nA. Procedural Issues\nBefore addressing the State\u2019s arguments, we first address several procedural arguments. Defendant asserts that the State\u2019s position is essentially that an individual arrestee may not contest the validity of the arrest and postarrest procedures visited upon him. Defendant contends that this argument was not presented to the trial court by the State and thus is forfeited. People v. O\u2019Neal, 104 Ill. 2d 399, 407 (1984). In a similar vein, defendant argues that the State never presented argument regarding the law of extradition in the trial court, and thus any reliance on such law is also forfeited. Additionally, defendant asserts that the State failed to argue the good-faith doctrine before the trial court or the appellate court, and, accordingly, argument on that point is forfeited as well.\nThe State asserts that it has sufficiently preserved its claims to survive forfeiture. First, the State argues that defendant mischaracterizes its argument. The State contends that its argument is not premised upon standing, but on the position that irregularities in extradition affect neither the guilt nor the innocence of a defendant, nor the jurisdiction of the court to try him. Defendant, in arguing before the trial court, specifically referenced the extradition clause of the United States Constitution and asserted that in this case, Chicago police officers essentially acted as \u201ckidnappers when they took [defendant] from Indiana back in Illinois.\u201d The State also specifically referred to the extradition clause before the trial court and argued that the officers\u2019 failure to adhere to Indiana\u2019s postarrest statutory procedures was harmless and did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the case. Like the parties, the trial court referred to the extradition clause, noting that \u201cwhat was skipped in this case was the fact that there was no extradition hearing *** we have skipped the extradition proceedings in Indiana and I feel that that is determinative in this case of the law that should be applied.\u201d\nLikewise, the State claims that defendant mischaracterizes its argument regarding good faith. The State asserts that it is not arguing for a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Instead, it is the State\u2019s position that the officers in this case did not intentionally ignore Indiana\u2019s statutory scheme and thus the exclusionary rule should never even be invoked. According to the State, exclusion is unwarranted in this case based upon the deterrent effect/detriment to society considerations necessary to deciding if the rule should be invoked in the first place. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56, 64, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163 (2006) (explaining that the exclusionary rule should only be applied where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs); People v. Coleman, 227 Ill. 2d 426 (2008) (where this court noted that if the main purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct the interests of justice are not served by suppressing electronic surveillance gathered pursuant to federal law in contravention of state law, unless there is evidence of collusion to avoid the state law requirements). The State points out that arguments regarding good faith were presented in the trial court, the appellate court, and in the petition for leave to appeal in this court. Indeed, both the trial and appellate court referenced good faith in their decisions, with the trial court making its decision \u201cregardless of the good faith of the officers\u201d and the appellate court asserting that \u201cChicago police officers blatantly disregarded\u201d portions of Indiana\u2019s fresh pursuit statute. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 881.\nThis court has considered the purpose of the forfeiture rule repeatedly, noting:\n\u201c 1 \u201cFailure to raise issues in the trial court denies that court the opportunity to grant a new trial, if warranted. This casts a needless burden of preparing and processing appeals upon appellate counsel for the defense, the prosecution, and upon the court of review. Without a post-trial motion limiting the consideration to errors considered significant, the appeal is open-ended. Appellate counsel may comb the record for every semblance of error and raise issues on appeal whether or not trial counsel considered them of any importance.\u201d \u2019 \u201d People v. Lewis, 223 Ill. 2d 393, 400 (2006), quoting People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988), quoting People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 31-32 (1984).\nIt is apparent in this case that while the State\u2019s arguments regarding extradition and good faith were not as extensively made or fully developed in the lower courts as they are before this court, they were raised and considered. As such, it would not serve the purposes of the forfeiture rule to apply it under these circumstances and we will not do so.\nDefendant also contends that this case involves two separate and independent searches, one of defendant\u2019s truck and one of the Burley Avenue address. Defendant asserts that the State\u2019s notice of appeal was limited to the quashing of defendant\u2019s arrest and the search of his car, and thus this court lacks the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the search of the Burley Avenue address. Defendant points out that Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) provides that the State has the right to appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress and Supreme Court Rule 606 (210 Ill. 2d R. 606) provides that the filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional.\nThis case does involve two separate searches. However, this does not establish that the validity of the search at the Burley Avenue address presents a question beyond this court\u2019s jurisdiction. The record establishes that the trial court was presented with extensive evidence and testimony regarding the search at 8521 South Burley Avenue. Both parties discussed the search of the home at the evidentiary hearing and both parties referenced it in making arguments. Defendant\u2019s original motion to quash and suppress was broadly written and specifically asked that all \u201cknowledge and fruits *** and products\u201d of his arrest and detention be suppressed. Moreover, defendant argued that during his arrest and subsequent detention, the State \u201cbecame aware of the existence of physical evidence all the direct and indirect fruits of the arrest and detention, which connect petitioner with the instant offense.\u201d The evidence found at the Burley Avenue address constitutes the fruits and products of defendant\u2019s arrest, just as it connects petitioner with the offenses charged.\nThe fact that defendant later filed a second motion to suppress, this time only referencing the home search, does not alter that fact that the home search was at issue and considered in the first motion to suppress. Considering this, it is not surprising that the trial court did not hold another evidentiary hearing and did not specifically consider the second motion to suppress filed on October 28, 2003, as it seems merely to constitute an attempt to revive a portion of the previously ruled upon motion. The trial court\u2019s discussion of defendant\u2019s later motion to vacate and motion to suppress, filed on March 8, 2004, supports this position. After granting the motion to vacate on June 8, 2004, the trial court initially set a later date to argue the motion to suppress. Instead of waiting until a later date, however, the trial court went back on the record that same day and granted the motion to suppress the evidence seized at 8521 South Burley Avenue. In so doing, the trial court pointed out that the information retrieved at 8521 South Burley Avenue resulted from the \u201cwrongful detention in bringing [defendant] back across the state line,\u201d which was the same basis the court utilized in granting defendant\u2019s motion to vacate.\nOur conclusion that this court has jurisdiction to consider the validity of the house search is further supported by the State\u2019s notice of appeal. The notice of appeal referenced two dates of judgment or order: June 8, 2004, and July 21, 2004. As already discussed, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to vacate, thus granting defendant\u2019s first filed motion to suppress (which we find included the evidence seized at the house search), on June 8, 2004. On the same date, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence seized at 8521 South Burley Avenue. The July 21, 2004, date references the trial court\u2019s denial of the State\u2019s motion to reconsider the June 8 ruling. In its motion to reconsider, the State specifically asked the trial court to \u201creconsider its rulings on June 8, 2004, to reinstate its findings that there was probable cause to arrest Defendant and that the cannabis from Defendant\u2019s vehicle was properly seized, and to find that the evidence seized from the Burley address resulted from a voluntary and properly obtained consent to search.\u201d Accordingly, the State\u2019s notice of appeal adequately referred to the home search.\nIn light of the above, we find that the State complied with this court\u2019s rules and we will consider the validity of the search of the Burley Avenue address. As already noted, we do not find any of the State\u2019s argument forfeited and will consider the State\u2019s arguments concerning extradition and good faith. Finding that the State has adequately preserved its arguments, we turn to the merits.\nB. Merits\nThe two Indiana statutory sections primarily at issue in this case comprise portions of Indiana\u2019s Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. The first section (Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735\u2014 33 \u2014 3\u20141 (Michie 1998)), entitled \u201cFresh pursuit \u2014 Peace officers of other states \u2014 Authority to arrest in Indiana,\u201d provides:\n\u201cAny member of a duly organized state, county, or municipal peace unit of another state who enters this state in fresh pursuit, and continues within this state in such fresh pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in the other state, shall have the same authority to arrest and hold such person in custody as has any law enforcement officer of this state to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in this state.\u201d\nThe second section, Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (LexisNexis 1998), entitled \u201cArrest \u2014 Hearing\u2014Commitment or discharge,\u201d provides:\n\u201cIf an arrest is made in this state by an officer of another state in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of this chapter, he shall, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a judge of the county in which the arrest was made. The judge shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the judge determines that the arrest was lawful, he shall commit the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor of this state. If the judge determines that the arrest was unlawful, he shall discharge the person arrested.\u201d\nThe trial and appellate courts found that because the Chicago police officers did not comply with the second statutory section, Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Lexis-Nexis 1998), they were not authorized to arrest defendant and thus the evidence against him must be suppressed.\nI. The State\u2019s Position\nThe State points out that in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 63, 95 S. Ct. 854, 861 (1975), the United States Supreme Court found that \u201cthe standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents.\u201d Moreover, this court has recognized that at common law police officers had the authority to arrest a defendant outside the territorial limits of the political entity which appointed them to their office when the officers were in fresh pursuit of a felon or a suspected felon fleeing that jurisdiction. People v. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d 379, 382 (1992). According to the State, Indiana\u2019s Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit merely codifies the common law principle authorizing felony fresh pursuit extraterritorial arrest which has already been codified in the fourth amendment.\nThe State asserts that it complied with the fourth amendment in this case. The State points out that the trial court initially denied defendant\u2019s motion to quash and suppress after a full evidentiary hearing, considering extensive testimony regarding defendant\u2019s arrest, the search of his car, and the search of the Burley Avenue address. Upon reconsidering its rulings, the trial court never questioned the court\u2019s initial findings, this time only altering its ultimate legal conclusion based upon defendant\u2019s statutory argument. Likewise, the appellate court limited its consideration to the legal questions revolving around noncompliance with Indiana\u2019s fresh pursuit statute and whether the proper remedy is suppression. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 879. According to the State, then, while Chicago police may not have complied with Indiana\u2019s postarrest statutory procedures, their actions arresting defendant and seizing evidence against him clearly comport with the fourth amendment and its common law antecedents.\nThe State further points out that the arrest was substantively authorized by Indiana statute. In fact, the appellate court specifically noted that \u201c[t]he parties agree that, in compliance with section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20141 of Indiana\u2019s fresh pursuit statute, the Chicago police were properly in fresh pursuit of defendant, whom the Chicago police believed had committed a felony.\u201d 367 Ill. App. 3d at 880. Even in his brief before this court, defendant acknowledges the same, stating that he agrees \u201cChicago police officers had the authority to follow the defendant into the State of Indiana, and Indiana having adopted the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, arrest him.\u201d\nAccording to the State, only section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 of Indiana\u2019s fresh pursuit statute was violated, and unless that provision is mandated by a component of the federal Constitution, noncompliance with the section has no bearing on the legitimacy of the arrest or the subsequent actions of the Chicago police and State of Illinois. The State asserts that because this is an Illinois prosecution, in an Illinois court, for offenses committed wholly within Illinois\u2019 borders, and because the arrest complies with the fourth amendment, whether Illinois evaluates the matter with respect to Indiana\u2019s statutory scheme presents a discretionary question premised upon principles of comity. Put simply, the State asserts that the Chicago police officers\u2019 noncompliance with Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (LexisNexis 1998) did not make defendant\u2019s arrest unlawful.\nThe State points out that section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 of Indiana\u2019s fresh pursuit statute not only provides an arrestee with a probable cause hearing, but also serves to set forth the initial step in the extradition process which typically takes place in an interstate fresh pursuit scenario. In this case, the State acknowledges that by summarily removing defendant from Indiana and bringing him to Illinois to face prosecution, the Chicago officers bypassed the procedural mechanisms set forth in section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142, and indeed the entirety of the statute\u2019s extradition proceedings. Nevertheless, the State argues that this did not offend the extradition clause or the prompt presentment requirements of the federal Constitution.\nThe extradition clause provides that \u201c[a] Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.\u201d U.S. Const., art. iy \u00a72. The State points out, though, that a long line of United States Supreme Court precedent, known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, has established that irregularities in the extradition of a fugitive from justice for an otherwise constitutional prosecution \u201caffects neither the guilt nor innocence of the accused, nor the jurisdiction of the court to try him.\u201d Ker v. People, 110 Ill. 627, 637 (1884), aff\u2019d, 119 U.S. 436, 30 L. Ed. 421, 7 S. Ct. 225 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 96 L. Ed. 541, 72 S. Ct. 509 (1952); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 119 L. Ed. 2d 441, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). In Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 712, 32 L. Ed. 283, 287, 8 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (1888), the Supreme Court held that \u201cthe offender against the law of the State is not relieved from liability *** because of indignities committed against another state.\u201d More recently, the Supreme Court, considering principles of federalism, noted that \u201can accused \u2018should not be permitted to use the machinery of one sovereignty to obstruct his trial in the courts of the other, unless the necessary operation of such machinery prevents his having a fair trial.\u2019 \u201d Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 385, 5 L. Ed. 2d 620, 624, 81 S. Ct. 632, 635 (1961), quoting Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260, 66 L. Ed. 607, 611, 42 S. Ct. 309, 310 (1922).\nIn the State\u2019s view, the above makes clear that Illinois courts are not required to measure defendant\u2019s arrest by the statutory overlays of Indiana\u2019s postarrest procedural provision. The State asserts that if there is any affront in this case, it is to Indiana and not to defendant. Considering this, the State acknowledges that this court could elect to decline to exercise jurisdiction as a discretionary matter premised upon comity. The State argues, though, that this court should not do so in view of its longstanding adherence to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, as well as the Supreme Court of Indiana\u2019s adherence to the same. Ker, 110 Ill. 627; People v. Klinger, 319 Ill. 275, 278 (1925); People ex rel. Lehman v. Frye, 35 Ill. 2d 343 (1966); Massey v. State, 267 Ind. 504, 507, 371 N.E.2d 703, 705 (1978) (\u201cA trial court\u2019s jurisdiction does not depend upon the legality of [defendant\u2019s] arrest or return to the wanting state\u201d). Indeed, the State points out that the Supreme Court of Indiana has recognized that comity, in certain circumstances, should not be utilized so as to effect the release of a defendant based upon mere technicalities. Cozart v. Wolf, 185 Ind. 505, 512-13, 112 N.E. 241, 243 (1916).\nCorollary to the above, the State points out that while defendant was not afforded a Gerstein hearing in Indiana as required by Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (LexisNexis 1998), he was afforded a proper Gerstein hearing in Illinois. Such a hearing, mandated by the fourth amendment, affords a defendant arrested without a warrant prompt \u201cjudicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.\u201d Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 65, 95 S. Ct. at 863. Since a Gerstein hearing was held, then, the State contends that the fact that the hearing did not take place in Indiana should render defendant\u2019s arrest unlawful only if this court chooses to acknowledge and give effect to Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (LexisNexis 1998) based upon principles of comity. For the reasons already discussed, the State argues against this. Moreover, the State points out that courts in other states have held that as long as a Gerstein hearing is properly held, what state it is held in is constitutionally insignificant. See Six Feathers v. State, 611 P.2d 857, 862 (Wyo. 1980); Weaver v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 487, 513 S.E.2d 423 (1999).\nIn addition to the above arguments, the State asserts that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to the facts of this case. The State notes that by its plain language, the fourth amendment \u201ccontains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands.\u201d Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34, 43, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1191 (1995). The Supreme Court crafted the exclusionary rule as a \u201cjudicially created remedy\u201d to \u201csafeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.\u201d United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 571, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620 (1974). The exclusionary rule is not reflexively applied. The Supreme Court has even stated that \u201c[suppression of evidence *** has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.\u201d Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 64, 126 S. Ct. at 2163. Indeed, the rule is only applied where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial societal costs. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 64, 126 S. Ct. at 2163.\nThe State asserts that the exclusionary rule was designed to police federal constitutional violations rather than nonconstitutionally compelled state statutory violations, particularly where the arrest itself was constitutionally legitimate. See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 59 L. Ed. 2d 733, 99 S. Ct. 1465 (1979) (considering a violation of IRS regulations which did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and noting that \u201cour precedents enforcing the exclusionary rule to deter constitutional violations provide no support for the rule\u2019s application\u201d). Additionally, the State points out that outside the mandatory reach of the federal constitutional exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has found that \u201c[t]he States are not foreclosed by the Due Process Clause from using a similar [cost/benefit] balancing approach to delineate the scope of their own exclusionary rules.\u201d California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 44-45, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30, 39-40, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1631 (1988). This court has recognized this principle and utilized it in numerous instances. See, e.g., People v. DeMorrow, 59 Ill. 2d 352, 354 (1974) (\u201cwhether or not any given search and seizure is unconstitutional, as violative of the fourth *** amendment ], as a matter of substantive law, is to be decided by the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court. *** The decision of what State courts may deem to be admissible in their systems according to their laws of evidence is an entirely separate question\u201d); People v. Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517, 532 (2005) (exclusionary rule not applied where detention ran afoul of Gerstein, but confession voluntary); People v. Burnidge, 178 Ill. 2d 429 (1997) (exclusionary rule not applied because of violation of clergy/penitent evidentiary privilege); People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114 (1998) (exclusionary rule not applied where defendant was transferred from jail in violation of Illinois Habeas Corpus Act).\nConsidering the above, the State argues that not only is the application of the exclusionary rule not compelled by the federal Constitution, it is also not compelled by this state\u2019s own exclusionary principles. The State points out that this court has noted that \u201cthere is no constitutional barrier, other than the fourth amendment, which precludes one jurisdiction from refusing to honor the standards of another relative to the validity of an arrest or search.\u201d People v. Saiken, 49 Ill. 2d 504, 510 (1971). Moreover, precedent establishes a trend on the part of courts in other states not to invoke their exclusionary rules as a per se remedy in situations involving a constitutional extraterritorial arrest that also violated a statutory provision of a nonconstitutional dimension. See, e.g., People v. Porter, 742 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1987); State v. Pike, 642 A.2d 145 (Me. 1994); City of Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St. 2d 232, 416 N.E.2d 598 (1980); Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 345 S.E.2d 267 (1986); State v. Barker, 143 Wash. 2d 915, 25 P.3d 423 (2001).\nApplying the deterrence benefits/societal costs analysis of the exclusionary rule specifically, the State points out that the officers involved in this case were not even aware that they were in Indiana when they arrested defendant. Accordingly, the police officers did not violate Indiana\u2019s statutory procedure for extradition out of disrespect for Indiana\u2019s laws or territorial borders, but because defendant ran for the border. The State notes that the exclusionary rule is \u201ccalculated to prevent, not to repair.\u201d Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1677, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1444 (1960). As such, the State argues that applying the exclusionary rule in this situation, involving inadvertent police action, would not act as a deterrent, as the officers would not even be aware of their error. Further, the State argues that applying the exclusionary rule would have substantial societal cost.\nII. Defendant\u2019s Position\nDefendant agrees that Chicago police had the authority to follow defendant into Indiana and arrest him, citing Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20141 (Michie 1998). However, defendant disagrees with the State that officers were free to disregard Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998). Supporting his position, defendant notes that in United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589, 92 L. Ed. 210, 217, 68 S. Ct. 222, 226 (1948), the Supreme Court stated that \u201cin the absence of an applicable federal statute the law of the state where an arrest without warrant takes place determines its validity.\u201d\nDefendant points out that in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408, 414, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300 (1999), the Supreme Court stated that to determine whether a governmental action violates the fourth amendment, courts must \u201cinquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the [fourth] Amendment was framed.\u201d Defendant argues that examining the common law of arrest as it existed in Indiana before the adoption of the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, it is clear that Chicago police would not have been able even to make an arrest pursuant to a lawful warrant in Indiana. Martin v. Newland, 196 Ind. 58, 61, 147 N.E. 141, 142 (1925) (\u201ca warrant issued by a court in Illinois could not have any extraterritorial effect, and conferred no authority to arrest and imprison the petitioner in Indiana, without a warrant issued by a court or other proper officer of the State of Indiana\u201d).\nDefendant further argues that this court has rejected the position that Illinois police officers are free to disregard the statutes limiting their jurisdiction. Defendant points to People v. Lahr, where this court considered a situation where a defendant was arrested by a Sleepy Hollow, Illinois, police officer outside of Sleepy Hollow\u2019s boundaries and held that the arrest powers of a law enforcement officer operating \u201c \u2018outside of the respective police authorities\u2019 area of jurisdiction\u2019 \u201d are circumscribed and limited to those possessed by a citizen. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at 387.\nSimilarly, defendant points to People v. Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d 1 (2002), where this court considered a situation where Chicago police officers, after conducting surveillance, arrested a defendant in Franklin Park, Illinois. The defendant in Carrera asserted that Chicago police officers did not have the authority to arrest him outside the territorial limits of the City of Chicago. This court agreed, holding that \u201cIllinois law is settled that the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory authority.\u201d Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d at 11.\nAccording to defendant, Lahr and Carrera refute the State\u2019s argument that the existence of probable cause to arrest is the only requirement for a valid arrest. In defendant\u2019s view, it is illogical to contend that a Sleepy Hollow, Illinois, police officer may not use his police arrest powers to arrest outside Sleepy Hollow, Illinois, and that a Chicago, Illinois, police officer may not make a valid arrest supported by probable cause in Franklin Park, Illinois, absent statutory authority, but that the same Chicago police officer has the authority to enter and make an arrest in Indiana and remove the arrestee to Illinois.\nConsidering the exclusionary rule and its application to the facts of this case, defendant points to Commonwealth v. Sadvari, 561 Pa. 588, 752 A.2d 393 (2000). In Sadvari, Pennsylvania state troopers stopped a speeding defendant less than a mile inside the State of Delaware, performed sobriety tests on the defendant which he failed, and then transported him back to Pennsylvania for chemical testing. The defendant moved to suppress the results of the chemical test, asserting that his arrest did not conform to the Delaware fresh pursuit statute, as a Delaware magistrate was not afforded the opportunity to consider the lawfulness of the arrest. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that because the Pennsylvania state troopers ignored Delaware\u2019s statutory requirement that the defendant be brought before a Delaware court, \u201cthe arrest was illegal.\u201d Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398. Additionally, in considering the remedy, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that \u201capplication of the exclusionary rule will serve primarily as a demonstration of comity to vindicate Delaware\u2019s sovereignty in light of Pennsylvania\u2019s incursion upon this important state interest. Suppression is also appropriate to encourage future compliance with Delaware\u2019s procedures and, in a more general sense, to safeguard the individual right to be free from unlawful seizures.\u201d Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598-99, 752 A.2d at 399.\nAdditionally, defendant points to People v. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 447 (1979), where our appellate court considered a situation where Illinois police obtained a warrant for a defendant\u2019s arrest, pursued him into the State of Iowa, arrested him, and brought him back to Illinois, where he was extensively interrogated and eventually confessed. The Jacobs court held that the Illinois police officers had no authority to arrest the defendant, except that granted them by the uniform fresh pursuit law of the State of Iowa. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 449. That law, similar to Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998), required out-of-state police officers, after effecting an arrest, to take the person arrested before an in-state magistrate for a Gerstein hearing, among other things. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 449-50. The Jacobs court held that because the mandates of Iowa\u2019s fresh pursuit law were \u201cblithely and summarily ignored,\u201d the defendant\u2019s later confessions stemmed from an illegal arrest and were inadmissible.\nFurther supporting his position, defendant cites United States v. Holmes, 380 A.2d 598 (D.C. App. 1977), where the District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered a situation where Maryland police officers arrested a defendant in the District of Colombia as he got off a bus from Maryland. While the defendant consented to return to Maryland, the court held that the consent was illegally procured and noted that \u201cthis court has heretofore made clear that such an arrest is valid only under authority of the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Holmes, 380 A.2d at 600.\nSubstantively addressing the State\u2019s argument concerning good faith, defendant asserts that the good-faith doctrine is limited to arrests and searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. Defendant\u2019s argument on this point is brief. Defendant points out that the Supreme Court has stated that \u201c [reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according \u2018great deference\u2019 to a magistrate\u2019s determination.\u201d United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 693, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3416 (1984). Moreover, citing to People v. Turnage, 162 Ill. 2d 299, 308 (1994), defendant points out that this court has stated that \u201c[t]he Leon Court was careful to limit the contours of its ruling.\u201d Additionally, defendant asserts that the subjective beliefs of an arresting officer are irrelevant with regard to establishing probable cause for a warrantless arrest. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 98, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996) (\u201cSubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis\u201d).\nIII. Extradition Irregularities, the Exclusionary Rule, and the Facts of This Case\nWe agree with the State that defendant\u2019s arrest should not be quashed nor the evidence against him suppressed. The Supreme Court has stated that to determine whether a governmental action violates the fourth amendment, courts must \u201cinquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the [fourth] Amendment was framed.\u201d Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299-300, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 414, 119 S. Ct. at 1300. This does not mean, as defendant suggests, however, that we must examine the common law of arrest as it existed in Indiana before the adoption of the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. Instead, as the State suggests, it means that we must examine the common law in place at the time of the enactment of the fourth amendment. As noted above, this court has already done this, stating, \u00a3\u00a3[a]t common law, municipal and county police officers had no authority to arrest a defendant outside the territorial limits of the political entity which appointed them to their office. The sole exception to this rule at common law was when the officers were in \u2018fresh pursuit\u2019 of a suspected felon fleeing that jurisdiction.\u201d Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at 382.\nHere, the evidence clearly indicates that the Chicago police officers who eventually stopped defendant did so believing that he was engaged in drug trafficking and was attempting to escape. The Chicago police officers were thus in fresh pursuit of a person they suspected to be a fleeing felon. Pursuant to our analysis in Lahr, then, they had the common law authority to effect an arrest of that person outside the territorial limits of the political entity that appointed them. Additionally, there is no question, and defendant has even agreed, that the arrest that occurred in this case was substantively authorized by Indiana statute. See Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20141 (Michie 1998).\nIt is also worth noting that defendant\u2019s sole fourth amendment argument before this court revolves around his contention that Chicago police violated Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998). This is not surprising considering the procedural posture of this case. As already detailed, defendant\u2019s first filed motion to suppress was very broad, requesting the trial court quash his arrest and suppress, among other things, the \u201c [physical evidence discovered and as a result of arrest and detention\u201d and \u201c[a]ll other knowledge and fruits *** and products of the arrest.\u201d After holding a detailed evidentiary hearing and considering extensive argument on this motion, including evidence and argument regarding the home search, the trial court denied the motion to quash and suppress. Before this court, defendant advances no fourth amendment argument other than that based upon Indiana statute. Accordingly, if we find no fourth amendment violation based upon Indiana statute, there is no other basis argued for us to find such a violation. Defendant already advanced a variety of other fourth amendment based arguments in the trial court, lost those arguments, and no longer advances them on appeal.\nThe Illinois cases defendant cites do not settle this case as a matter of law. Lahr, Carrera, and Jacobs all involved situations distinguishable from this case. In Lahr, the defendant was not a fleeing felon and he was arrested by a police officer using his police authority outside of the territorial limits of the political entity which appointed him. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at 382, 386-87. This arrest was thus invalid. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at 386-87. In Carrera, the defendant was arrested by police officers utilizing a statute that was later declared void ab initio. Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d at 14-15. Accordingly, this court held that the defendant\u2019s arrest was unlawful. Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d at 17. In Jacobs, it appears that police were not in fresh pursuit of the defendant, as he was arrested in Iowa a day after police had already interrogated and released him. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 448. Accordingly, the actual arrest at issue in the Jacobs case may have been invalid even without considering postarrest irregularities. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 449. Additionally, the appellate court in Jacobs noted that its decision in that case may well have been based upon entirely different reasoning. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 449 (\u201cIt may well be that in spite of having received Miranda warnings the totality of the circumstances, to-wit, the defendant\u2019s age, I.Q., reading level, circumstances of his arrest, the deprecatory advice as to need of counsel, the minimization as to the seriousness of the crime of murder by a minor, and the police officer\u2019s offer to help the defendant in any way he could, when considered in their entirety, might well require the suppression of all statements made by the defendant during his interrogation session with the law enforcement authorities of Rock Island County\u201d). Unlike the present case, then, Lahr, Carrera and Jacobs, all involved situations where defendant\u2019s arrest occurred under very different circumstances than those present here.\nDefendant\u2019s citation to the Holmes decision is similarly distinguishable. While the District of Columbia Court of Appeals touched upon the magistrate provision of Maryland\u2019s fresh pursuit statute similar to the statutory provision at issue in this case, it was also questionable whether the defendant\u2019s arrest was valid. Holmes, 380 A.2d at 600 (noting that the trial court\u2019s basis for suppressing evidence included the fact that \u201cHolmes was arrested without probable cause ***. Police failed to present Holmes to a District of Columbia court in accord with statutory provisions. There was ineffective inquiry into Holmes\u2019 understanding of his rights. Holmes was intensively interrogated for some four hours in the middle of the night ***. In sum, the police created and exploited circumstances which resulted in legally inadmissible statements\u201d). Moreover, the court\u2019s ultimate conclusion in the case was based upon its finding that the trial court properly found that the defendant\u2019s consent to leave the District without a hearing and extradition was involuntary. Holmes, 380 A.2d at 602. As such, none of the cases defendant cites settle the question at issue in this case, that being whether one state\u2019s noncompliance with another state\u2019s postarrest procedural statute makes a defendant\u2019s arrest unlawful where it would otherwise be completely lawful.\nWhile this court has held that \u201cIllinois law is settled that the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory authority\u201d (Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d at 11), it has never considered the situation involved here, where Illinois authorities validly arrested a defendant but failed to comply with another state\u2019s statutory postarrest procedural requirements by failing to present that defendant to a magistrate in the other state for the determination of probable cause and a formal beginning of the extradition process. Courts in other states have considered this question and come to different conclusions.\nSome courts have considered situations involving constitutional extraterritorial arrests that also violated a nonconstitutional statutory provision of a foreign state and been unwilling to invoke the exclusionary rule as a remedy. See State v. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d 84, 90 (Iowa 2007) (considering the magistrate provision of Missouri\u2019s version of the uniform fresh pursuit statute almost identical to that at issue in this case and refusing to apply the exclusionary rule, characterizing the violation as \u201ca statutory violation that does not involve fundamental rights, constitutional overtones, or false representations of law or other similar police misconduct\u201d); State v. Ferrell, 218 Neb. 463, 468, 356 N.W.2d 868, 871 (1984) (considering the magistrate provision of Iowa\u2019s version of the uniform fresh pursuit statute almost identical to that at issue in this case and refusing to apply the exclusionary rule finding that the statutory violation did not affect the validity of the arrest or amount to a due process violation); State v. Bond, 98 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 653 P.2d 1024, 1032 (1982) (en banc) (refusing to exclude evidence in a situation where a defendant was arrested by Washington officers in Oregon and removed to Washington without presentation to an Oregon magistrate as statutorily required and noting that \u201c[t]he improper interstate rendition was merely incidental to the arrest and represented no new intrusion into defendant\u2019s privacy. It represented more of an affront to the rights of the State of Oregon than of the defendant\u201d).\nBy contrast, as defendant describes in detail, other courts have applied the exclusionary rule in situations involving constitutional extraterritorial arrests that also violated a nonconstitutional statutory provision of a foreign state. See Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 588, 752 A.2d 393; Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 447; Holmes, 380 A.2d 598.\nWe find the analysis in Dentler, Ferrel, and Bond more persuasive than that found in Sadvari, Jacobs, and Holmes. We find particularly instructive the analysis utilized in Dentler, the most recent case to address this particular issue. After discussing Sadvari and Jacobs, as well as Ferrell and Bond, the Dentler court noted its commitment to the exclusionary rule. Dentler, 742 N.W2d at 87-88. Next, the Dentler court considered the probable cause for the defendant\u2019s arrest and pointed out that while he was not brought before a Missouri magistrate, he was promptly taken before an Iowa judge and thus \u201cafforded the opportunity to test the validity of his arrest before a neutral magistrate promptly after his arrest.\u201d Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89. Accordingly, the Dentler court found that the defendant\u2019s due process rights were not violated. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89. The court thus found that the main issue in the case was \u201cwhether a violation of Missouri statutory law warrants exclusion of evidence\u201d in Iowa. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89.\nConsidering that issue, the Dentler court first asked whether the Missouri statute specifically required the exclusion of evidence and found that it did not. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89. Next, the court asked whether the Missouri statute involved a fundamental right of the defendant. Dentler, 742 N.W2d at 89. Likewise, the court found that it did not, pointing out that the main purpose of the magistrate provision was to vindicate the rights of Missouri not the rights of an individual defendant. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89 (\u201cTo the extent an ox is being gored in this case, it belongs to Missouri, not Dentler. *** Ordinarily, a party seeking to invoke the exclusionary rule may not vicariously assert the rights of another\u201d). Following this, and perhaps in a nod to principles of comity, the court noted that the defendant made no argument that there existed a fundamental public policy difference between Missouri and Iowa which militated in favor of exclusion. Dentler, 742 N.W2d at 89. Finally, the court considered and rejected the concern that without applying the exclusionary rule to the situation at issue there would be insufficient deterrence to avoid future similar violations by Iowa police of Missouri statutory law. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 90. In so doing, the court stated:\n\u201cBecause the benefits of violating the magistrate provision are so small, however, the incentive for future violations is not very high. If we are proven wrong in this assessment, the Missouri legislature may withdraw its authorization of Iowa peace officers to engage in fresh pursuit. Further, because this opinion is narrowly based on the unique facts of this case, law enforcement officials have no certainty that the exclusionary rule will be held inapplicable under a different state of facts, particularly where the record demonstrates willful misconduct. Finally, in the unlikely event that such violations become a recurrent problem, this court reserves the right to exercise its supervisory powers to exclude the evidence in future cases. [Citations.]\u201d Dentler, 742 N.W2d at 90.\nAs in Dentler, aside from the fact that Chicago police failed to comply with the magistrate provision of Indiana\u2019s fresh pursuit statute, defendant\u2019s arrest was valid. Defendant\u2019s arrest complied with the fourth amendment, its common law antecedents, and Indiana statute. Likewise, while defendant was not brought before an Indiana magistrate, he was promptly taken before an Illinois judge and thus afforded the opportunity to promptly test the validity of his arrest before a neutral magistrate. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s due process rights were not violated. See Six Feathers, 611 P.2d at 862; Weaver, 29 Va. App. 487, 513 S.E.2d 423. The main issue, then, is whether the Chicago police officer\u2019s noncompliance with Indiana\u2019s postarrest procedural statute makes defendant\u2019s arrest unlawful when it would otherwise be completely lawful. In other words, we must consider whether a violation of Indiana statutory law, particularly Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998), mandates the exclusion of evidence in Illinois.\nWe do not believe that the violation of Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998) mandates the exclusion of the evidence arrayed against defendant. First, the statutory language itself does not mandate exclusion or even mention it. People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 580-81 (2006) (\u201cThe fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. [Citation.] *** The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning\u201d). Next, the Indiana statute, under the facts of this case, does not involve a fundamental right of defendant.\nInd. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998) appears to have two main purposes. First, the statute provides an arrestee with a probable cause hearing in Indiana. The fact that defendant had the hearing in Illinois rather than Indiana does not constitute a constitutional violation, however. See Dentler, 742 N.W2d at 89; Six Feathers, 611 P.2d at 862; Weaver, 29 Va. App. 487, 513 S.E.2d 423. Second, the statute sets forth the initial step in the extradition process. Again, that Chicago police ignored the extradition process in this case does not constitute a constitutional violation. The Ker-Frisbie doctrine has established that irregularities in the extradition of a fugitive from justice for an otherwise constitutional prosecution \u201caffects neither the guilt nor innocence of the accused, nor the jurisdiction of the court to try him.\u201d Ker, 110 Ill. at 637, aff\u2019d, 119 U.S. 436, 30 L. Ed. 421, 7 S. Ct. 225; Frisbie, 342 U.S. 519, 96 L. Ed. 541, 72 S. Ct. 509; Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 1990) (\u201cFor the past 100 years, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the manner in which a defendant is brought to trial does not affect the ability of the government to try him\u201d). In addition to the above, we note that to the extent that any fundamental rights are implicated by Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (LexisNexis 1998), they are not the rights of defendant but the rights of Indiana. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 89; Ferrell, 218 Neb. at 468, 356 N.W2d at 872; see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 404, 99 S. Ct. 421, 433 (1978) (a party generally may not vicariously assert the rights of another when seeking to invoke the exclusionary rule); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176, 187, 89 S. Ct. 961, 966-67 (1969) (same).\nConsidering the exclusionary rule itself, we note that the Supreme Court has stated that \u201c [suppression of evidence *** has always been our last resort, not our first impulse,\u201d and applied the rule only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial societal costs. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 64, 126 S. Ct. at 2163. This court, in discussing the rule, has stated:\n\u201c[T]he exclusionary rule that accompanies the fourth amendment has no constitutional footing. Instead, it is a judicially created, prudential remedy that prospectively protects fourth amendment rights by deterring future police misconduct. [Citations.] Its application has been trimmed to instances where its remedial objectives will be most effectively served. [Citation.] That is, it applies only where its deterrent benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.\u201d Willis, 215 Ill. 2d at 531-32.\nIndeed, we have recognized that \u201c[t]he State does not violate the fourth amendment when it introduces evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. [Citation.] Rather, a fourth amendment violation is \u2018fully accomplished\u2019 by the illegal search or seizure, and excluding evidence cannot undo the invasion of the defendant\u2019s rights.\u201d Willis, 215 Ill. 2d at 531. As such, in Willis this court refused to apply the exclusionary rule in a situation where the fourth amendment was actually violated. See Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517. By contrast, in this case, there was no constitutional violation and exclusion is even less warranted. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 349, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557, 577, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2681 (2006) (statutory violations only remotely related to the gathering of evidence do not ordinarily trigger application of the exclusionary rule).\nThe deterrence benefits/societal costs analysis supports this position. Here, the Chicago police officers involved were not even aware that they were in Indiana when they arrested defendant. Accordingly, the arrest did not involve any police misconduct, willful disregard for the laws of Indiana or its territorial borders, or false representations of law designed to improperly obtain evidence. Additionally, as the Iowa Supreme Court recognized in Dentler, the benefits of violating another state\u2019s statutory magistrate provision are so small, any incentive for future violations is low. Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 90. While applying the exclusionary rule under the facts of this case would thus have little deterrent effect, it would have significant societal costs, as the State has already acknowledged that without the evidence against defendant, its case against him would be substantially impaired. As we have stated in the past, the exclusionary rule laudably secures constitutional rights through its deterrent effect but \u201calso deflects criminal trials from their basic focus by erecting barriers between the jury and truthful, probative evidence.\u201d Willis, 215 Ill. 2d at 532. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized the same, pointing out that its cases have \u201cconsistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.\u201d United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734, 65 L. Ed. 2d 468, 476, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2445 (1980).\nWhile we choose not to apply the exclusionary rule in this case, we could elect to utilize it based upon principles of comity. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598-99, 752 A.2d at 398-99 (\u201cWe find, however, that the Delaware statute, with its directive that an out-of-state officer present the arrestee to a Delaware judicial tribunal for review of the lawfulness of an arrest conducted in Delaware, functions as more than merely an extradition statute, and that a contrary interpretation would render empty the mandate of the Delaware law. *** In this instance, application of the exclusionary rule will serve primarily as a demonstration of comity to vindicate Delaware\u2019s sovereignty in light of Pennsylvania\u2019s incursion upon this important state interest\u201d). Not only has this court long adhered to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, however, but so has the Indiana Supreme Court. In fact, in Massey v. Indiana, the Indiana Supreme Court specifically cited both Ker and Frisbie and stated that \u201c[a] trial court\u2019s jurisdiction does not depend upon the legality of [defendant\u2019s] arrest or return to the wanting state.\u201d Massey, 267 Ind. at 507, 371 N.E.2d at 705. Accordingly, we do not believe principles of comity require the application of the exclusionary rule in this case. Moreover, in light of its long adherence to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, we believe it unlikely that the Indiana Supreme Court would find any differently were it faced with this situation in reverse.\nWith this opinion, we reaffirm our adherence to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. Ker, 110 Ill. at 637, aff\u2019d, 119 U.S. 436, 30 L. Ed. 421, 7 S. Ct. 225; Frisbie, 342 U.S. 519, 96 L. Ed. 541, 72 S. Ct. 509. This is not to say, however, that Illinois courts may completely ignore another state\u2019s statutory scheme providing postarrest procedures for defendants who committed crimes within Illinois\u2019 borders. To the contrary, in such situations courts should inquire into the facts of each case as well as the extraterritorial statutory provisions at issue. Indeed, that is exactly what we have done in this case. Based upon the particular facts and statutory provisions at issue in this case, then, we will not apply the exclusionary rule. We feel it important to point out, however, that law enforcement officials should not consider it a certainty that we will find the exclusionary rule inappropriate under a different set of facts, particularly in situations involving willful misconduct. Dentler, 742 N.W2d at 90.\nCONCLUSION\nWe reverse the judgment of the appellate court affirming the decision of the trial court. We thus reinstate the trial court\u2019s original determination that defendant\u2019s motion to quash and suppress be denied and remand the cause to the circuit court for trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nIn discussing the exclusionary rule, we feel it worth mentioning that apart from his reference to Sadvari, 561 Pa. 588, 752 A.2d 393, defendant advances little substantive argument regarding the application of the exclusionary rule. Defendant does advance an argument concerning the good-faith doctrine and its application in situations where police are operating without a warrant. As we discussed when considering defendant\u2019s procedural arguments, however, the State is not advocating the application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Rather, the State merely discusses the good faith of the Chicago police officers involved in this case in order to show that the exclusionary rule should never even apply. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s argument on this point does not address the State\u2019s position or affect our analysis.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE,\nspecially concurring:\nWhile the majority correctly reverses the judgment of the appellate court, it omits any discussion of the appellate court\u2019s reasoning and fails to explain why that reasoning was in error. I write separately to do so.\nThe appellate court provided a straightforward analysis in support of its decision to affirm the circuit court\u2019s granting of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. At the outset, the appellate court noted that there was no dispute in this case that the Chicago police officers who arrested defendant in Indiana were in fresh pursuit when they crossed the state line. The appellate court further noted that section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20141 of Indiana\u2019s fresh pursuit statute (Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20141 (Michie 1998)) provides the statutory authority for an out-of-state officer to effect an arrest in Indiana when the officer is in fresh pursuit. Section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20141 states:\n\u201cAny member of a duly organized state, county or municipal peace unit of another state who enters this state in fresh pursuit, and continues within [Indiana] in such fresh pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in the other state, shall have the same authority to arrest and hold such person in custody as has any law enforcement officer of this state to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in this state.\u201d Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20141 (Michie 1998).\nThe appellate court then observed, however, that the Chicago officers, in violation of section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 of the Indiana statute (Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998)), failed to bring defendant before an Indiana judge before returning him to Illinois. Section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 provides:\n\u201cIf an arrest is made in this state by an officer of another state in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of this chapter, he shall, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a judge of the county in which the arrest was made. The judge shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the judge determines that the arrest was lawful, he shall commit the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor of this state. If the judge determines that the arrest was unlawful, he shall discharge the person arrested.\u201d Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998).\nThe appellate court concluded, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the police officers\u2019 failure to comply with the presentment requirements of section 35 \u2014 33\u2014 3 \u2014 2 rendered defendant\u2019s arrest statutorily invalid. The court explained:\n\u201cChicago police officers had no inherent authority to effect an arrest in Indiana; rather, the Chicago police officers\u2019 authority to make an arrest in Indiana was derived from Indiana\u2019s fresh pursuit statute and the authority provided by the Indiana statute is conditioned by the requirement that an accused shall be brought before an Indiana judge for a determination of the lawfulness of the arrest. Accordingly, under the rationale of People v. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 447, which we endorse, defendant\u2019s arrest was unlawful.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 367 Ill. App. 3d at 881.\nAccording to the appellate court, the presentment requirement in section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 was a condition precedent to the authority granted in section 35 \u2014 33\u2014 3 \u2014 1. The failure to comply with the presentment requirement meant that the officers had no statutory authority to arrest defendant.\nThe appellate court then pointed to this court\u2019s decision in People v. Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2002), which holds that a police officer\u2019s right to arrest a person outside his jurisdiction is no greater than that of a private citizen and \u201cthat the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory authority.\u201d See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Savage, 430 Mass. 341, 719 N.E.2d 473 (1999) (invoking the exclusionary rule when an out-of-state officer effected an extraterritorial arrest without statutory or common law authority). Because the appellate court had determined that defendant\u2019s arrest was made without statutory authority, the court applied the rule of Carrera and affirmed the circuit court\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nIn my view, the appellate court erred in its reading of the Indiana fresh pursuit statute and in its conclusion that defendant\u2019s arrest was statutorily unauthorized. It is a well-settled rule that we may not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions. People v. Martinez, 184 Ill. 2d 547, 550 (1998). Nothing in the Indiana fresh-pursuit statute states that the presentment requirement of section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 conditions the authority to arrest provided in section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20141. Nor does the statute state that the failure to present a defendant before an Indiana judge negates the authority to arrest a defendant in fresh pursuit. The presentment requirement is a procedure to be followed after a statutorily authorized arrest has been made. See, e.g., State v. Ferrell, 218 Neb. 463, 356 N.W.2d 868 (1984); see also People v. Junco, 70 Misc. 2d 73, 333 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (describing the condition-precedent argument as an \u201cexotic assertion\u201d that would impose absolute liability on all inadvertent violations of the presentment requirement), aff\u2019d, People v. Walls, 35 N.Y.2d 419, 321 N.E.2d 875, 363 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1974).\nOf course, having determined that the Chicago police officers were authorized to arrest defendant, there still remains the entirely separate question as to whether the exclusionary rule should be applied when police officers inadvertently fail to comply with the presentment requirement of section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142. For the reasons stated by the majority (see 229 Ill. 2d at 518-24), I agree that it should not. Accordingly, I join in the judgment of the majority.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE," }, { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN,\ndissenting:\nUnlike the majority, I believe that this case presents a straightforward question of statutory construction. After examining the plain language of the Indiana fresh pursuit statute, the comments of the drafters, and the relevant precedent, I believe that the lower courts correctly held that application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate in the matter before us. I therefore dissent.\nIndiana has enacted a statutory scheme that sets forth procedures to be followed when out-of-state law enforcement officers, who are in \u201cfresh pursuit\u201d of a suspect, arrest that person in Indiana. Ind. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20141 through 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20145 (Michie 1998). As a prefatory note, this statutory scheme abrogated the common law principles relating to extraterritorial arrests. At common law, a limited exception developed to the general rule confining the authority of an officer to a geographic area which allowed an officer who is in \u201cfresh pursuit\u201d of a suspected felon to make a legally binding arrest in a territorial jurisdiction other than the one in which he has been appointed to act. People v. Clark, 46 Ill. App. 3d 240, 242 (1977). The \u201ccritical elements\u201d that characterized a \u201cfresh pursuit\u201d under common law were its \u201ccontinuity and immediacy,\u201d and the term \u201cfresh pursuit\u201d connoted \u201csomething more than mere casual following.\u201d 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest \u00a772, at 720 (2001), see also N. Lopuszynski, Father Constitution, Tell the Police to Stay on Their Own Side: Can Extra-jurisdictional Arrests Made in Direct Violation of State Law Ever Cross the Fourth Amendment \u201cReasonableness\u201d Line?, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 1347, 1358-59 (Spring 2004) (the focus is upon the \u201cimmediacy and continuousness of the pursuit\u201d). Given that the Indiana legislature has enacted specific legislation to deal with extraterritorial fresh pursuit arrests within its borders, the question presented is two-fold: What does the Indiana statute require and what happens when those requirements are not met? Accordingly, the analysis begins with an examination of the language of the statute.\nIn construing the meaning of a statute, the court\u2019s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the drafters (Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000)), the best indicator being the statute\u2019s language (Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001)). The statutory language must be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning (In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (2002)), and, where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction (In re D.S., 217 Ill. 2d 306, 313 (2005)). We will not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent. Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 446 (2002). Moreover, this court is bound to give meaning and effect to all the provisions of a statute, and the court must construe a statute so that no word, clause or sentence, to the extent that it is possible to do so, is rendered superfluous or meaningless. Huskey v. Board of Managers of Condominiums of Edelweiss, Inc., 297 Ill. App. 3d 292, 295 (1998); Walker v. Alton Memorial Hospital Ass\u2019n, 91 Ill. App. 3d 310 (1980). In construing a statute, we presume that the enacting body did not intend absurdity, inconvenience or injustice. Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 40 (2001). In addition, we view all provisions of an enactment as a whole. In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 246 (2006). Accordingly, words and phrases must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute and must not be construed in isolation. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504.\nSection 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20141 of Indiana\u2019s statute bestows limited authority upon the police officer of another state to arrest an individual in Indiana, and specifically sets forth the circumstances under which a non-Indiana officer may enter that state and make an arrest:\n\u201cAny member of a duly organized state, county or municipal peace unit of another state who enters this state in fresh pursuit, and continues within [Indiana] in such fresh pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in the other state, shall have the same authority to arrest and hold such person in custody as has any law enforcement officer of this state to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in this state.\u201d Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20141 (Michie 1998).\nThe plain language of section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20141 reveals that the Indiana statute provides authority to an out-of-state law enforcement officer to make an arrest in Indiana, so long as that officer enters Indiana in \u201cfresh pursuit\u201d of that suspect. The statute defines \u201cfresh pursuit\u201d in three ways: as it was \u201cdefined by the common law,\u201d as \u201cthe pursuit of a person who has committed a felony or who reasonably is suspected of having committed a felony,\u201d or \u201cthe pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony, though no felony actually has been committed, if there is reasonable ground for believing that a felony has been committed.\u201d Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20145 (Michie 1998). The statute further instructs that \u201c[fjresh pursuit shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.\u201d Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20145 (Michie 1998).\nThus, the Indiana law carves out a limited, statutory-exception to the common law general rule that a police officer acting within his official capacity cannot make a warrantless arrest outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction from which his authority is derived. See, e.g., Kindred v. Stitt, 51 Ill. 401, 409 (1869) (at common law, municipal peace officers had no authority to make a warrantless arrest outside of the political entity in which they held office); 2 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure \u00a73.5, at 203 (3d ed. 2007), citing People v. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d 379 (1992). In other words, the authority of an out-of-state officer to make an extraterritorial arrest in Indiana is gained only through the grace of Indiana through operation of its statute.\nThe Indiana statute additionally departs from common law by setting forth with specificity not only the steps that must be taken by an out-of-state police officer after he makes an arrest within Indiana, but also those which must subsequently be taken by the Indiana court. Section 35 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 provides:\n\u201cIf an arrest is made in [Indiana] by an officer of another state in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of this chapter, he shall, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a judge of the county in which the arrest was made. The judge shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the judge determines that the arrest was lawful, he shall commit the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor of [Indiana]. If the judge determines that the arrest was unlawful, he shall discharge the person arrested.\u201d Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998).\nThus, the Indiana legislature conditioned an out-of-state officer\u2019s authority to make an extraterritorial arrest in Indiana upon the officer\u2019s compliance with the dictate that the officer \u201cshall, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a judge of the county in which the arrest was made.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998). The use of the word \u201cshall\u201d generally indicates a mandatory requirement. See, e.g., Village of Winfield v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 176 Ill. 2d 54, 64 (1997). The Indiana statute in no uncertain terms requires the out-of-state officer to take the arrestee before an Indiana judge as soon as possible after the arrest. Once that person is brought before the judge, the statute further requires the judge to conduct a hearing \u201cfor the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest.\u201d Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998). The statute then specifies two subsequent options, based upon the outcome of the judicial hearing. If the judge determines that the arrest was lawful, the judge is required to \u201ccommit the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor of [Indiana].\u201d Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735 \u2014 33\u20143\u20142 (Michie 1998). If, however, the judge determines that the extraterritorial arrest was unlawful, the statute requires that the judge \u201cshall discharge the person arrested.\u201d Ind. Code Ann. \u00a735\u2014 33 \u2014 3\u20142 (Michie 1998).\nUnder the plain language of the Indiana statute, the question of whether the officer has made the arrest in fresh pursuit is only the threshold inquiry. The arrest is dependent upon the subjective belief of the arresting officer that there is probable cause that the person committed a criminal offense. The officer\u2019s subjective belief is then tested when the facts and circumstances of the encounter are presented to an objective, neutral magistrate. It is only when this magistrate determines that the arrest is lawful that the extraterritorial arrest is deemed complete. This \u201cpresentment requirement\u201d is a statutory procedure that did not exist at common law. The requirement advances several important interests. It promotes comity and ensures that the sovereignty of the state entered into by outside officers is preserved; it protects the rights of a person who has been subject to an extraterritorial arrest; and it encourages future compliance with the statutory provisions. Thus, the presentment requirement is an important component of a statutory scheme designed to balance the interests of law enforcement with the rights of the arrestee. It is only by giving meaning to all provisions of the fresh pursuit statute that this balance can be achieved. This interpretation of Indiana\u2019s fresh pursuit statute ensures that no provision is rendered superfluous.\nMy reading of the Indiana statute is supported by an examination of the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit of Criminals Across State Lines (Uniform Act), from which the Indiana statute was derived. The Uniform Act was drafted in the mid-1980s by the Interstate Commission on Crime, with the purpose to \u201cprevent criminals from utilizing state lines to handicap police in their apprehension.\u201d Council of State Governments, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control 147 (1978). In order to advance this goal, the Uniform Act addressed the realities faced by law enforcement officers engaging in the fresh pursuit of suspects across state lines:\n\u201cIn the foreign state, the pursuing officer from the State where the crime is committed is, in general, no longer an officer. This *** is remedied in a simple manner by this act. Thereunder, the moment an officer in fresh pursuit of a criminal crosses a state line, the state he enters will authorize him to catch and arrest such criminal within its bounds. The statute grants this right only when the officer is in fresh pursuit of a criminal, that is, pursuit without unreasonable delay, by a member of a duly organized peace unit, and only in cases of felonies or supposed felonies occurring outside the boundaries of the state adopting the act. It is thus based upon the little-known common-law doctrine of fresh pursuit, from which the statute has derived its name.\u201d Council of State Governments, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control 147 (1978).\nThe drafters of the Uniform Act thus believed that the Act would be of benefit to police officers, because although it was \u201cdeclaratory of the common law,\u201d it also clearly informed the officers \u201cof their right to cross a state boundary and make an arrest in fresh pursuit.\u201d Council of State Governments, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control 147 (1978).\nThe Uniform Act, however, was also intended to be of similar benefit to the person arrested under its provisions. The drafters noted that the Act \u201cprotects the rights of the person taken into custody, by providing that he shall without unnecessary delay be given a hearing before a magistrate, and requires his extradition if the arrest was lawful.\u201d Council of State Governments, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control 150 (1978). In other words, in the Uniform Act \u201c[sjimple provisions are made to safeguard the rights of the arrested person and to provide for his return to the state where he committed the crime.\u201d Council of State Governments, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control 147 (1978). Thus, it is apparent that the drafters of the Uniform Act intended to delicately balance the competing interests of law enforcement in allowing extraterritorial arrests with the rights of the state in which the arrest occurred and the rights of the person taken into custody. Accordingly, based upon a straightforward interpretation of the Indiana fresh pursuit statute, it is my conclusion that because the Chicago officers failed to comply with that statute\u2019s provisions, defendant\u2019s extraterritorial arrest was made without statutory authorization.\nThe majority, however, not only fails to construe Indiana\u2019s fresh pursuit statute, but also fails to answer the question of whether defendant\u2019s arrest was unauthorized due to the Chicago officers\u2019 noncompliance with the Indiana statute. Instead, the majority skips over this necessary analysis and concludes that the exclusionary rule is not an appropriate remedy for the officers\u2019 noncompliance with the fresh pursuit statute. The majority\u2019s treatment of the issue renders the presentment provisions of the Indiana statute superfluous and a nullity. It is only when the Indiana statutory scheme is properly understood that the importance of the need for the application of the exclusionary rule for its violation becomes apparent.\nLike the majority and the special concurrence, I acknowledge that the Indiana statute on fresh pursuit is silent as to the remedy for its violation. However, this question has been addressed by courts in other jurisdictions. Some courts have been unwilling to invoke the exclusionary rule as a remedy to an unlawful extraterritorial arrest. See, e.g., State v. Dentler, 742 N.W2d 84 (Iowa 2007); State v. Ferrell, 218 Neb. 463, 468, 356 N.W.2d 868, 871 (1984). Other courts, however, have found that the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy to apply. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 380 A.2d 598 (D.C. App. 1977); Commonwealth v. Savage, 430 Mass. 341, 719 N.E.2d 473 (1999); Commonwealth v. Sadvari, 561 Pa. 588, 752 A.2d 393 (2000). The leading case adopting this latter position is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Sadvari, which I find to be persuasive.\nIn Sadvari, two Pennsylvania state troopers, while on patrol near the Pennsylvania-Delaware border, observed a vehicle driven by the defendant, a Delaware resident, which was speeding. The troopers pursued the vehicle and, shortly after crossing into Delaware, they activated their emergency lights and stopped the defendant approximately four-tenths of a mile inside the State of Delaware. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 590, 752 A.2d at 394. Subsequently, the defendant was asked to perform field sobriety tests, which he failed. He was then arrested for drunk driving by the Pennsylvania officers and was transported to a Pennsylvania hospital where blood samples were drawn for chemical testing. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 591, 752 A.2d at 394.\nPrior to trial, Sadvari moved to suppress evidence related to the traffic stop as the product of an unlawful arrest. According to the defendant, his arrest was unlawful because it was not conducted in accordance with Delaware\u2019s fresh pursuit statute. The trial court found that the Pennsylvania officers had probable cause to stop Sadvari and that the Delaware statute granted them authority to enter Delaware while in fresh pursuit and conduct an arrest. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 591, 752 A.2d at 395. While the trial court agreed that, under the relevant provisions of the Delaware statute, the defendant should have been taken before a Delaware judge, it viewed this requirement simply as an extradition provision and denied Sadvari\u2019s suppression motion. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 593, 752 A.2d at 396. The Pennsylvania appellate court affirmed. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 593, 752 A.2d at 396.\nThe Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. That court first noted that, as is the case with the Indiana statute in the instant appeal, the Delaware statute also derived from the Uniform Act on the Fresh Pursuit of Criminals Across State Lines. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398. The court held that the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the Delaware statute did not require a justice of the peace to determine whether the arresting officer complied with the Delaware statute was in error. The Delaware statute \u2014 as does the Indiana statute in the case before us \u2014 plainly required the justice of the peace to \u201cdetermine the lawfulness of the arrest,\u201d and the court observed that there was no authority for a uniformed Pennsylvania trooper in a marked police cruiser to effectuate an extraterritorial arrest in Delaware other than the Delaware fresh pursuit statute. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398. Accordingly, to comply with the mandate of the statute to evaluate the lawfulness of an arrest, a Delaware tribunal was required to assess the arresting officers\u2019 compliance with the statute. However, because the officers did not comply with the condition imposed upon their authority under the Delaware statute \u2014 which required them to bring Sadvari before a Delaware justice of the peace \u2014 the court found the arrest to be illegal. Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398.\nThe Sadvari court then considered the appropriate remedy for the statutory violation and concluded that suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful arrest was warranted. The court conceded that not every violation of a statute or rule requires suppression. On the one hand, the court observed that it could be argued that the Delaware statute merely duplicated the framework provided by Pennsylvania law and its procedural rules for safeguarding a defendant\u2019s constitutional rights; therefore, in individual cases a remedy as exacting as suppression should not be deemed necessary. The court found, however, that the Delaware statute, with its directive that an out-of-state officer present the arrestee to a Delaware judicial tribunal for review of the lawfulness of an arrest conducted in Delaware, \u201cfunctions as more than merely an extradition statute, and that a contrary interpretation would render empty the mandate of the Delaware law.\u201d Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598, 752 A.2d at 398-99. The court noted that under its prior state jurisprudence, the exclusionary rule had previously been employed to ensure the orderly administration of justice where a police officer acted without authority, even in cases in which constitutional rights were not at the forefront. In this instance, the court determined that application of the exclusionary rule served several different and important interests: \u201cas a demonstration of comity to vindicate Delaware\u2019s sovereignty in light of Pennsylvania\u2019s incursion upon this important state interest,\u201d as a means \u201cto encourage future compliance with Delaware\u2019s procedures,\u201d and also to \u201csafeguard the individual right to be free of unlawful seizures.\u201d Sadvari, 561 Pa. at 598-99, 752 A.2d at 399.\nAs stated, I find the Pennsylvania Supreme Court\u2019s reasoning and holding in Sadvari to be persuasive. Its analysis most closely mirrors the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act and is true to the language of the statute by giving each provision meaning. The Sadvari decision also highlights the several important interests that are affected by operation of the fresh pursuit statute: a demonstration of comity to vindicate the sovereignty of the state that has experienced the incursion of out-of-state officers; encouragement of future compliance with the provisions of the statute; and the protection of a defendant\u2019s rights to due process and to be free from unlawful seizures. It is my view that Sadvari appropriately balances these important interests against the similarly important interest in furthering legitimate law enforcement objectives in allowing extraterritorial arrests, and arrives at the correct result.\nHowever, although Sadvari is factually analogous to the matter before us, and is relied upon by defendant in his arguments to this court and by the appellate court in its opinion below, neither the majority nor the special concurrence discuss why Sadvari is not persuasive. Instead, the majority states that it finds the analysis in Dentler \u201cparticularly instructive\u201d (229 Ill. 2d at 518), and the special concurrence joins in this assessment. I note, however, that Dentler is factually distinguishable from the matter at bar, and that this factual difference played a significant role in that court\u2019s analysis as to whether the exclusionary rule should be applied. In Dentler, Iowa police officers pursued the defendant into Missouri, but, while in pursuit, also notified the Missouri authorities and requested their assistance in apprehending the suspect. Two Missouri law enforcement officers came to the scene of the arrest and engaged in a discussion with the Iowa officers as to which jurisdiction would retain the defendant. According to the court\u2019s opinion, \u201cThe Missouri deputies advised [the Iowa officers], \u2018Well you can keep [defendant].\u2019 \u201d Dentler, 742 N.W.2d at 86. In addition, the court noted that it was undisputed that Dentler was thereafter promptly taken before an Iowa judge. In holding that the exclusionary rule was not an appropriate remedy under the facts presented, the Dentler court noted that \u201cit [was] undisputed that the Missouri officers on the scene acquiesced to the action. While such acquiescence by state law enforcement officials may not give rise to waiver or estoppel as a matter of law, it is a factor that militates against the need for application of the exclusionary rule.\u201d Dentler, 742 N.W2d at 89. The facts in Dentler are inapposite to those at bar. In the matter before us, the Chicago officers made no contact with Indiana law enforcement officials during the arrest of defendant on Indiana soil. In addition, I note that rather than taking defendant before an Indiana magistrate, as required under the provisions of the statute, the Chicago officers instead transported defendant back across the state line to Illinois, and then took him to his mother\u2019s residence on Burley Avenue. The officers thereupon conducted \u2014 according to their testimony \u2014 a \u201cconsent\u201d search of the home in conjunction with their narcotics investigation of defendant. It was only after the officers conducted a systematic search of these premises and discovered additional evidence to be used in their prosecution of defendant that they transported defendant to the police station and he was brought before an Illinois magistrate. Accordingly, I find Dentler to be unpersuasive for a number of reasons: it is factually distinguishable from the matter at bar, and it does not speak to the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act, from which the statute at issue in that case was derived.\nFurther, and perhaps more importantly, support for my position is found in our own, well-settled, state jurisprudence. Almost 30 years ago, our appellate court in People v. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 447 (1979), addressed a situation factually similar to the matter now before us. In Jacobs, Illinois police officers in fresh pursuit of the defendant arrested him inside the State of Iowa for his alleged commission of robbery and murder. As in the present matter, the Illinois police officers failed to comply with the presentment provisions of Iowa\u2019s fresh pursuit law. Jacobs held that the extraterritorial arrest of defendant was illegal because the Illinois officers \u201chad no authority to arrest him in the State of Iowa except for that authority granted to them by the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Law of the State of Iowa.\u201d Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 449. The court held the arrest to be illegal, and the defendant\u2019s statements were suppressed as the fruits of an illegal arrest. The court reasoned:\n\u201cThe defendant was indeed illegally arrested since the Illinois police officers had no authority to arrest him in the State of Iowa except for that authority granted to them by the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Law of the State of Iowa. [Citations.] ***\n***\n*** [The statute] mandates that an out-of-State police officer, after effecting an arrest, shall without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before a magistrate of the county in which the arrest was made, who shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the magistrate determines that the arrest was lawful, he shall commit the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor. [Citation.]\nNone of the mandates set forth in the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Law of Iowa were complied with by the arresting officers from Illinois. They were both blithely and summarily ignored and the defendant immediately upon his return to Illinois was subjected to intensive interrogation.\u201d Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 449-50.\nI find the reasoning in Jacobs to be persuasive and note that this case has been law in this state for nearly three decades. I also observe that the failure of the officers in Jacobs to bring the defendant before an Iowa magistrate immediately following his arrest allowed the Illinois officers to return the defendant to Illinois and to conduct an immediate and lengthy interrogation in which they were able to gather additional evidence against the defendant prior to taking him before an Illinois judge. This factual scenario mirrors that in the matter at bar, where the officers returned defendant to Illinois and, rather than taking him before an Illinois judge, first took a detour to the home of defendant\u2019s mother and engaged in a \u201cconsent\u201d search of those premises in an effort to gather additional evidence against defendant prior to taking him before an Illinois judge.\nI further note that the fact that it has been nearly three decades since our courts have been presented with an issue similar to that in Jacobs underscores that the reasoning and holding in that case offered a workable and effective procedure to be followed by officers making an extraterritorial, fresh pursuit arrest. To be blunt, to date, interstate extraterritorial arrests have not been a problem in Illinois. Clearly, then, Jacobs has been well understood by law enforcement officers, who have been cognizant of the state boundaries of their authority and of the consequences of attempting to exercise that authority outside the Illinois state line without complying with a sister state\u2019s statutory provisions. One thus could argue that society has already benefitted (see 229 Ill. 2d at 522-23) in Illinois from the uniform, 30-year application of the exclusionary rule to cases such as this. The court does not explain how its result today provides additional societal benefit.\nI note that, although factually not directly on point, this court in People v. Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d 1 (2002), upheld the suppression of evidence obtained by police during the course of an unlawful, extraterritorial arrest. In Carrera, Chicago police officers arrested the defendant in Franklin Park, Illinois, relying upon an Illinois statute that permitted intrastate extraterritorial arrests but which was, subsequent to the defendant\u2019s arrest, held to be unconstitutional on the basis that it was part of a public act that was passed in violation of the single-subject rule. In holding that defendant\u2019s suppression motion had been properly granted, this court first looked to its prior decision in People v. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d 379 (1992), wherein the court suppressed evidence obtained during the course of an extraterritorial arrest. Carrera then held that the statute upon which the police relied to effect the arrest was void ab initio due to its inclusion in a public act that was found to violate the single-subject rule, and, therefore, the police had no statutory authority to arrest the defendant. This court concluded that \u201cIllinois law is settled that the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory authority.\u201d Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d at 11.\nIn support of its holding that defendant\u2019s arrest should not be quashed nor the evidence against him suppressed, the majority engages in a quick and summary disposal of defendant\u2019s reliance upon Jacobs, Lahr, and Carrera. The majority states that the \u201ccases defendant cites do not settle this case as a matter of law\u201d (emphasis added) (229 Ill. 2d at 515), but then attempts to factually distinguish the cases from that at bar. With respect to Carrera the opinion states:\n\u201cIn Carrera, the defendant was arrested by police officers utilizing a statute that was later declared void ah initio. [Citation.] Accordingly, this court held that the defendant\u2019s arrest was unlawful.\u201d 229 Ill. 2d at 515.\nThis is the sum and substance of the majority\u2019s factual distinction of Carrera from the matter at bar. I believe that this is a distinction which fails. The fact that the statute at issue in Carrera was void ab initio was not what animated this court to hold that \u201cIllinois law is settled that the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory authority.\u201d Rather, this court relied on its prior decision in Lahr, which had already established this proposition. In addition, it was the fact that the officers were acting without legal authority \u2014 just as alleged in the case at bar \u2014 that controlled the result in Carrera.\nIn sum, courts of this state have long used the exclusionary rule to protect the rights of defendants outside of the constitutional context. To hold as the majority does today renders the provisions of Indiana\u2019s fresh pursuit statute a nullity. The majority fails to adhere to the familiar tenets of statutory construction: it fails to afford plain meaning to the language of the Indiana statute; it fails to adhere to the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act; it fails to afford appropriate recognition to the principles of comity to vindicate Indiana\u2019s sovereignty; it fails to safeguard the protections intended to be afforded to defendants by the statute; and it fails to follow our own precedent. In rendering the provisions of the Indiana fresh pursuit statute superfluous, the majority leaves the distinct impression that Illinois law enforcement officers may freely disregard statutory limits on their jurisdiction with no adverse consequences. In light of the fact that Illinois has enacted a similar fresh pursuit statute, I question whether out-of-state officers who make an extraterritorial arrest on our own soil would feel compelled to comply with the provisions of the Illinois statute after today\u2019s decision. More importantly, would an Indiana court feel compelled to follow the dictates of the Illinois General Assembly, when this court so freely ignores the will of the Indiana legislature?\nFor all the foregoing reasons, I cannot join the opinion of the majority.\nJUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.\nI note that in the circuit court, defendant raised in his motion to vacate the denial of his motion to suppress the argument that, based upon the testimony of Officer Luce, \u201cprior to the defendant\u2019s arrest at the [Indiana] toll booth the police officers rejected multiple convenient opportunities to arrest the defendant\u201d while he was still in Illinois, and that the \u201cofficers themselves chose both the time and place to arrest defendant.\u201d The circuit court, however, did not have occasion to address defendant\u2019s contention that the officers were not engaged in \u201cfresh pursuit\u201d of him in its factual findings, as the State conceded in the trial court that the arrest took place in Indiana and the Chicago officers did not follow the mandates of the Indiana statute. Having prevailed on the suppression motion in the circuit court, defendant has not pursued this argument on appeal. Although I do not express an opinion as to the merits of defendant\u2019s argument with respect to whether the Chicago officers were actually in \u201cfresh pursuit\u201d of him at the time the arrest was made, I do note that a review of Officer Luce\u2019s testimony at the suppression hearing indicates that the officers may have had ample opportunity to stop defendant in Illinois, including when defendant parked for a minute at the side of the road near the Burley Avenue address and also after he made what Luce described as an \u201cillegal\u201d U-turn in that same area. It would have been interesting to see how the Indiana court would have ruled on this argument, had the officers complied with the statute and the Indiana court had the opportunity to hear the case.\nI note that Illinois also has a \u201cfresh pursuit\u201d statute which is derived from the Uniform Act and which, like Indiana\u2019s statute, allows an out-of-state law enforcement officer who is in fresh pursuit of a suspect to arrest that person in Illinois as long as the officer \u201cwithout unnecessary delay takes[s] the person arrested before the circuit court of the county in which the arrest was made\u201d so that the court can \u201cconduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/107 \u2014 4 (West 2006).", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Veronica Calderon Malavia, Annette N. Collins and Susan R. Schierl Sullivan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "John R. Deleon, Sam Adam and Samuel E. Adam, all of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 103845.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JESSE GALAN, Appellee.\nOpinion filed July 24, 2008.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Veronica Calderon Malavia, Annette N. Collins and Susan R. Schierl Sullivan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nJohn R. Deleon, Sam Adam and Samuel E. Adam, all of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0484-01", "first_page_order": 498, "last_page_order": 558 }