{ "id": 3619558, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. GEORGE K. BAILEY, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bailey", "decision_date": "2009-02-05", "docket_number": "No. 105457", "first_page": "285", "last_page": "301", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 285" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799393 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" }, { "page": "33-34" }, { "page": "36-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "879 F.2d 1501", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10540563 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1505-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/879/1501-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 978", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5439255 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0978-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411678 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2552929 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "\" 'under Belton, a search of the vehicle is allowed even after the defendant was removed from it, handcuffed, and placed in the squad car' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 N.J. Super. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 307169 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" }, { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/250/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781340 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" }, { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S. Ct. 1443", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 L. Ed. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "552 U.S. 1230", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ariz. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 5544078 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/216/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 615", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5878891 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "2132" }, { "page": "625" }, { "page": "916" }, { "page": "2133", "parenthetical": "Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J." }, { "page": "632" }, { "page": "920" }, { "page": "2137", "parenthetical": "Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 U.S. 454", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11722898 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" }, { "page": "775" }, { "page": "2864" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/453/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 752", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1772077 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "2040" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453253 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" }, { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 935", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3382963 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "939", "parenthetical": "section 108- 1(1) \"authorizes the search of an arrestee for a variety of reasons\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0935-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 936", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2868728, 2865417 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "941" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0936-01", "/ill-app-3d/27/0936-02" ] }, { "cite": "125 S. Ct. 1292", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 L. Ed. 2d 94", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "543 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5928962, 5929252, 3437957, 5889897, 5948596, 5944959 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/543/1135-04", "/us/543/1135-05", "/us/543/1135-06", "/us/543/1135-01", "/us/543/1135-03", "/us/543/1135-02" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975003 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Harris I" }, { "page": "517-18" }, { "page": "526-27" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609689 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738895 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265784 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706523 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" }, { "parenthetical": "Harris II" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260367 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 U.S. 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11339173 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/389/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 U.S. 106", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6137690 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115", "parenthetical": "\"we adhere to the familiar rule that where words are employed in an act which had at the time a well known meaning in the law, they are used in that sense unless the context requires the contrary\"" }, { "page": "119", "parenthetical": "\"we adhere to the familiar rule that where words are employed in an act which had at the time a well known meaning in the law, they are used in that sense unless the context requires the contrary\"" }, { "page": "7", "parenthetical": "\"we adhere to the familiar rule that where words are employed in an act which had at the time a well known meaning in the law, they are used in that sense unless the context requires the contrary\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/308/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 U.S. 393", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3680974 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1920, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/251/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57334 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 U.S. 365", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6208511 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "2582-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/477/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864531 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687-89" }, { "page": "693-94" }, { "page": "2064-65" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "2065" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "2065" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 1055", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4272301 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1061" }, { "page": "1062-64" }, { "page": "1063" }, { "page": "1069-70" }, { "page": "1076" }, { "page": "1059-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/1055-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1117, "char_count": 28086, "ocr_confidence": 0.823, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1965881147836662e-07, "percentile": 0.5925669797737243 }, "sha256": "67f81de6ca2fa271d006aad732587dd1113c287546ece280ebc31d5b7fb5d887", "simhash": "1:badf3d5e7ebc4987", "word_count": 4727 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:24:25.467522+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. GEORGE K. BAILEY, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nSection 12 \u2014 603.1(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 603.1(f) (West 2004)) and section 108 \u2014 1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108 \u2014 1(3) (West 2004)) both provide that a law enforcement officer may not \u201csearch or inspect\u201d a passenger in a motor vehicle solely because the passenger has failed to comply with the seat-belt statute (625 ILCS 5/12\u2014 603.1(a) (West 2004)). The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether these provisions were violated when a warrant check was run on the defendant, George K. Bailey, a passenger in a vehicle stopped because both the driver and defendant were not wearing seat belts. For the reasons that follow, we conclude they were not.\nBACKGROUND\nAt approximately noon on July 2, 2005, Officer John Parry of the Winnebago County sheriffs office stopped a car after observing that both the driver and front seat passenger, defendant George K. Bailey, were not wearing seatbelts. After obtaining identification from the driver and defendant, Parry returned to his squad car \u201cto listen to the license information and check for warrants.\u201d The warrant check revealed that defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant for misdemeanor domestic battery. Officer Parry arrested defendant, handcuffed him, and placed him in the backseat of the squad car. He then searched the interior of the stopped car. The search uncovered cocaine. Defendant was subsequently convicted, in the circuit court of Winnebago County, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentenced to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nOn appeal, defendant contended that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because she failed to file a motion to quash his arrest and suppress the cocaine found in the car. Defendant contended that such a motion would have succeeded because the warrant check conducted by Officer Parry was impermissible under section 12 \u2014 603.1(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 603.1(f) (West 2004)) and section 108 \u2014 1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108\u2014 1(3) (West 2004)) and, without the results of the warrant check and the ensuing arrest, there would have been no legal justification for the search of the car. Further, according to defendant, a motion to suppress would have succeeded because the search incident to arrest violated section 108 \u2014 1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/108 \u2014 1(1) (West 2004)), as well as the federal and state constitutions. The appellate court rejected these contentions and affirmed defendant\u2019s conviction. 375 Ill. App. 3d 1055. We thereafter granted defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.\nANALYSIS\nDefendant\u2019s sole contention on appeal is that he was denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to file a motion to quash arrest and suppress the drug evidence found in the car. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted from that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). An attorney\u2019s performance must be evaluated from counsel\u2019s perspective at the time the contested action was taken and will be considered constitutionally deficient only if it is objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693-94, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65. In order to prove prejudice with regard to the failure to seek the suppression of evidence, the defendant must \u201cshow that the unargued suppression motion was meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different without the excludable evidence.\u201d People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 146 (1998), citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305, 319, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 2582-83 (1986); People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 108 (1996).\nAs he did before the appellate court, defendant contends that there are four arguments which counsel should have raised in a motion to suppress. We address these arguments in turn.\nSection 12 \u2014 603.1(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code and\nSection 108 \u2014 1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure\nSection 12 \u2014 603.1(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 603.1(f) (West 2004)) provides:\n\u201cA law enforcement officer may not search or inspect a motor vehicle, its contents, the driver, or a passenger solely because of a [seat-belt violation].\u201d\nSection 108 \u2014 1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/108 \u2014 1(3) (West 2004)) contains identical language:\n\u201cA law enforcement officer may not search or inspect a motor vehicle, its contents, the driver, or a passenger solely because of a violation of Section 12 \u2014 603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.\u201d\nDefendant contends that a warrant check is both a \u201csearch\u201d and \u201cinspection\u201d within the meaning of sections 12 \u2014 603.1(f) and 108 \u2014 1(3) and therefore prohibited under these provisions when the sole offense committed is a seat-belt violation. Thus, according to defendant, the warrant check run by Officer Parry in this case was illegal and his trial counsel could have filed a successful motion to suppress the fruits of the warrant check, including the cocaine, on this basis. We disagree.\n\u201cThe law uses familiar legal expressions in their familiar legal sense.\u201d Henry v. United States, 251 U.S. 393, 395, 64 L. Ed. 322, 323, 40 S. Ct. 185, 186 (1920). See also Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115, 84 L. Ed. 110, 119, 60 S. Ct. 1, 7 (1939) (\u201cwe adhere to the familiar rule that where words are employed in an act which had at the time a well known meaning in the law, they are used in that sense unless the context requires the contrary\u201d); 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction \u00a746:04, at 152-53 (6th ed. 2000) (\u201cif the term utilized has a settled legal meaning, the courts will normally infer that the legislature intended to incorporate the established meaning\u201d). The prohibition against conducting a \u201csearch\u201d was included in sections 12 \u2014 603.1(f) and 108 \u2014 1(3) when they were enacted in 2003. See Pub. Act 93 \u2014 99, eff. July 3, 2003; 375 Ill. App. 3d at 1061. Then, as now, the term \u201csearch\u201d had a settled meaning in the realm of criminal procedure which was derived from fourth amendment law: an examination of a person\u2019s body, property or other area in which the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967); Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1351 (7th ed. 1999).\nIt has long been held that the existence of an arrest warrant is a matter of public record. Gist v. Macon County Sheriffs Department, 284 Ill. App. 3d 367, 377 (1996). Recent decisions continue to adhere to this principle. See People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222, 233 (2008); People v. Roberson, 367 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (2006). By definition, a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in public matters. Because a warrant check does not implicate any area of privacy, it is not a search under sections 12 \u2014 603.1(f) and 108 \u2014 1(3), and it is not prohibited by those provisions. Accordingly, a motion to suppress filed on this ground would not have been successful.\nDefendant maintains, however, that even if a warrant check is not a search, it is an inspection within the meaning of sections 12 \u2014 603.1(f) and 108 \u2014 1(3) and thus is impermissible. According to defendant, the plain meaning of the term \u201cinspect\u201d is not limited to \u201cphysical or corporeal inspections\u201d but may also include the investigation of a passenger\u2019s past wrongdoing that occurs during a warrant check. The State, in response, maintains that sections 12 \u2014 603.1(f) and 108 \u2014 1(3) say nothing about prohibiting an inspection of a passenger\u2019s public records. Thus, in the view of the State, the plain meaning of the statutory provisions is that only the physical inspection of a passenger is prohibited.\nThe appellate court below concluded that the word \u201cinspect\u201d is ambiguous in the context of sections 12\u2014 603.1(f) and 108 \u2014 1(3). See 375 Ill. App. 3d at 1062-64. The appellate court noted that several dictionaries offer definitions of the term which can be used to support either party\u2019s position. Moreover, as the appellate court explained, various intrinsic aids to construction do not resolve the word\u2019s meaning but, instead, only add ambiguity. 375 Ill. App. 3d at 1063. We agree with the appellate court that the word \u201cinspect\u201d is ambiguous in the context of this case. Unlike the term \u201csearch,\u201d the word \u201cinspect\u201d does not have a settled meaning in the law of criminal procedure and may reasonably be read in more than one way.\nBecause the meaning of the word \u201cinspect\u201d is unclear, it is appropriate to consider legislative history in order to determine the legislature\u2019s intent in adopting this term. People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 203 (1992). Senator Cullerton, the sponsor of Public Act 93 \u2014 99, stated during the debates on the bill that the prohibition against a search or inspection was included to \u201creassure people\u201d that a police stop for a seat-belt violation \u201cdoesn\u2019t give [law enforcement] any extra right to go in and search someone\u2019s car.\u201d The Senator explained that\n\u201cfor the purposes of legislative intent, to make it clear. Whatever the current practice is, whatever the current law is, as set by case law or by *** statute, as to allowing police officers to search vehicles, that\u2019s not changed by *** this bill.\u201d 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 3, 2003, at 27-28 (statements of Senator Cullerton).\nAdditional debate in the Senate further clarifies the legislative intent:\n\u201cSENATOR OBAMA:\nA second question, because I\u2019ve heard a couple of concerns. I just want to make sure. With respect to search and seizure rules and regulations, I want to *** clarify this. Under current law, if you are pulled over for a taillight being out *** what are the rules currently governing whether a search can take place, based on an ordinary traffic stop?\nSENATOR CULLERTON:\nWell, *** I assume it\u2019s probably more case law than statute, but *** the Supreme Court has kind of set out through their decisions situations where police officers have the right to go in and search in someone\u2019s car, in the trunk or whatever. That *** remains the same. Whatever those laws are, whatever that case law is, that remains the same with this bill. We only wanted to make sure people knew that this particular bill doesn\u2019t give one any extra right to go into a search where they otherwise could not.\u201d 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 3, 2003, at 30-31 (statements of Senators Obama and Cullerton).\nA discussion between Representatives Franks and Beaubien in the Illinois House reveals the same understanding:\n\u201cFranks: \u2018Okay. I\u2019m not sure I understand... I guess my analysis here says that this would say that they can... that a police officer may not search or inspect a motor vehicle that was stopped solely because of a seatbelt violation.\u2019\nBeaubien: \u2018That\u2019s correct, that\u2019s part of the law... part of the Act, yes.\u2019\n%\nFranks: \u2018But isn\u2019t it the law right now that you can\u2019t search a vehicle unless there\u2019s probable cause?\u2019\nBeaubien: T believe that\u2019s correct, but there seemed to be some need to put this in the Bill so it was very specific to all parties involved this would not be used for a method of stopping cars and searching vehicles with the normal exceptions for open view and so forth.\u2019\n^ ^\nFranks: \u2018Okay. \u2019Cause I\u2019m just trying to figure out what we\u2019re *** doing here and I\u2019m not trying ... no offense, I\u2019m just not sure I understand this. Because right now, I know the law has probable cause and I\u2019m not sure what this Bill does any differently than maybe just codifying case law?\u2019\nBeaubien: \u2018Representative Franks, *** this is not an area that I am familiar with. I put the language in there because I believe it sets forth what\u2019s already in the law.\u2019 \u201d 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 20, 2003, at 26-27 (statements of Representatives Franks and Beaubien).\nWe think it abundantly clear, based on the legislative debates, that the General Assembly did not intend for sections 12 \u2014 603.1(f) and 108 \u2014 1(3) to provide any additional rights above and beyond those guaranteed by the search provision of the federal constitution. Stated otherwise, the term \u201cinspect\u201d in the statutory provisions provides no protection beyond that provided by the term \u201csearch.\u201d And, as previously noted, a warrant check is not a prohibited search.\nIn a further argument, however, defendant contends that statements made during the legislative debates show that the meaning of sections 12 \u2014 603.1(f) and 108 \u2014 1(3) is controlled by the fourth amendment case law which was in effect at the time the statutes were enacted. See 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 3, 2003, at 28 (statements of Senator Cullerton) (\u201cWhatever the current practice is, whatever the current law is, as set by case law or by *** statute, as to allowing police officers to search vehicles, that\u2019s not changed by *** this bill\u201d). Defendant notes that, when sections 12 \u2014 603.1(f) and 108 \u2014 1(3) were enacted in 2003, this court\u2019s opinion in People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003), was the law. Gonzalez held that for a traffic stop to comport with the fourth amendment, the scope of the stop must not be fundamentally altered. Defendant further notes that, in People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515 (2003) (Harris I), this court applied the Gonzalez scope analysis and held that a warrant check run on a passenger after the driver had been stopped for a traffic violation impermissibly changed the fundamental nature of the stop to a criminal investigation. Defendant acknowledges that Harris I was subsequently vacated by the United States Supreme Court (see Illinois v. Harris, 543 U.S. 1135, 161 L. Ed. 2d 94, 125 S. Ct. 1292 (2005)), and that the Gonzalez scope analysis was overruled by this court in People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222 (2008) (Harris II). Nevertheless, defendant argues that Harris I should govern our interpretation of sections 12 \u2014 603.1(f) and 108 \u2014 1(3) because that decision reflected the legislature\u2019s intent at the time the provisions were enacted. And, according to defendant, under the reasoning of Harris I, the warrant check run in this case was impermissible.\nDefendant misconstrues the scope of Harris I. In Harris I the warrant check was run on the passenger after the driver had been stopped for making an illegal left turn. Harris I, 207 Ill. 2d at 517-18. The warrant check altered the scope of the stop because the passenger had nothing to do with the traffic violation. Harris I, 207 Ill. 2d at 526-27. In this case, in contrast, the stop of the car was based on defendant\u2019s own failure to comply with the seat-belt law. Indeed, Harris I specifically excluded from its holding those situations where the passenger himself has violated a traffic law. Harris I, 207 Ill. 2d at 531. See also 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure \u00a79.3(c), at 389 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing Harris I with approval and noting that warrant checks on passengers should be permissible when \u201c \u2018the passenger has violated a traffic law\u2019 \u201d), quoting Harris I, 207 Ill. 2d at 531. Harris 1 thus provides no support for defendant\u2019s contention that a warrant check was impermissible in this case.\nA motion to suppress filed on the ground that a warrant check was prohibited under sections 12 \u2014 603.1(f) and 108 \u2014 1(3) would not have been successful. Defendant therefore suffered no prejudice from counsel\u2019s decision not to file a motion to suppress on this basis. Accordingly, this portion of defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.\nSection 108 \u2014 1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure\nDefendant also maintains that a motion to suppress would have succeeded had it alleged that the search of the car violated section 108 \u2014 1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/108 \u2014 1(1) (West 2004)). Section 108 \u2014 1(1) provides:\n\u201cSearch without warrant. (1) When a lawful arrest is effected a peace officer may reasonably search the person arrested and the area within such person\u2019s immediate presence for the purpose of:\n(a) Protecting the officer from attack; or\n(b) Preventing the person from escaping; or\n(c) Discovering the fruits of the crime; or\n(d) Discovering any instruments, articles, or things which may have been used in the commission of, or which may constitute evidence of, an offense.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/108\u2014 1(1) (West 2004).\nDefendant contends that because Officer Parry lacked reasonable cause to search the car for one of the purposes set forth in section 108 \u2014 1(1), and because the car was not within defendant\u2019s \u201cimmediate presence\u201d when it was searched, the search violated the statute. According to defendant, trial counsel could have filed a successful motion to dismiss on this basis.\nThe appellate court below rejected this argument, in part, based on People v. Hering, 27 Ill. App. 3d 936 (1975). See 375 Ill. App. 3d at 1069-70. Hering explained that nothing in the language of section 108 \u2014 1(1), or the committee comments thereto, suggests that the statute \u201cis to be exclusive. Rather, it authorizes searches incident to arrest within prescribed bounds as to area and purpose.\u201d Hering, 27 Ill. App. 3d at 941. In other words, according to Hering, section 108 \u2014 1(1) is permissive, not restrictive. The statute lists several instances in which police \u201cmay\u201d conduct a search incident to arrest. See also People v. Zeller, 51 Ill. App. 3d 935, 939 (1977) (section 108\u2014 1(1) \u201cauthorizes the search of an arrestee for a variety of reasons\u201d). But, according to Hering, the statute does not state that an officer\u2019s authority to search is limited solely to those instances and that any other search is impermissible.\nIn determining whether an attorney\u2019s performance is deficient, every effort must \u201cbe made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel\u2019s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel\u2019s perspective at the time.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Hering, which was decided in 1975, was controlling authority at the time of defendant\u2019s trial in 2005. Hering foreclosed any argument that the search at issue in this case was illegal under section 108 \u2014 1(1). \u201cConduct of a lawyer will not be deemed deficient for his or her failure to make an argument that has no basis in the law.\u201d People v. King, 192 Ill. 2d 189, 197 (2000). Defendant\u2019s trial counsel was not deficient for declining to pursue the argument advanced here. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard fails.\nFederal Constitution\nDefendant also contends that the search incident to his arrest violated his rights under the fourth amendment. To understand defendant\u2019s argument, it is necessary to place it in context.\nIn 1969, the United States Supreme Court held, in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969), that police may conduct a search incident to arrest of the arrestee\u2019s person and an area within his \u201cimmediate control\u201d in order to protect the safety of the officers and prevent the destruction of incriminating evidence. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 89 S. Ct. at 2040. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981), the Supreme Court applied Chimel to automobile searches and created a bright-line rule to guide police in determining the permissible area of an automobile search incident to arrest: \u201c[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.\u201d Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 775, 101 S. Ct. at 2864.\nThereafter, in Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 158 L. Ed. 2d 905, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004), the Court applied Belton and upheld a search of a suspect\u2019s car incident to arrest when the officer\u2019s initial contact with the suspect was outside the vehicle. The Court held that so long as the arrestee was a \u201crecent occupant\u201d of a motor vehicle, the police may search the car as an incident to a lawful arrest. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 623, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 915, 124 S. Ct. at 2132.\nIn an opinion concurring in the judgment in Thornton, Justice Scalia concluded that where a defendant is handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a squad car, the Chimel rationales cannot logically apply because the risk that the defendant would grab a weapon or evidentiary item from his car is \u201cremote in the extreme.\u201d Thornton, 541 U.S. at 625, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 916, 124 S. Ct. at 2133 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J.). Nevertheless, Justice Scalia did not advocate overruling Belton. Instead, he contended that the Belton bright-line rule should be applied \u201cto cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.\u201d Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 124 S. Ct. at 2137 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J.).\nNoting the foregoing, defendant now \u201casks this court to adopt as a matter of federal constitutional law an analytical approach which encompasses Justice Scalia\u2019s restrictive approach to Belton and supports ChimeVs narrow construction of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, authorizing searches unsupported by probable cause only where necessary to protect officer safety and preserve incriminating evidence.\u201d Defendant points out that the United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in People v. Gant, 216 Ariz. 1, 162 P.3d 640 (2007), cert. granted, 552 U.S. 1230, 170 L. Ed. 2d 274, 128 S. Ct. 1443 (2008), wherein the Arizona Supreme Court held that once an arrestee is handcuffed, placed in the back of a patrol car, and under the supervision of an officer, the warrantless search of the arrestee\u2019s car cannot be justified under Bel ton or Chimel. Defendant contends that we should apply the reasoning of Justice Scalia, as well as the Arizona Supreme Court in Gant, to the facts of this case and \u201cdetermine that the warrantless search of [defendant\u2019s] car violated the Fourth Amendment\u201d because neither officer safety nor the preservation of evidence was at risk once defendant was placed in the squad car.\nDefendant\u2019s argument is misplaced. Whether or not this court should adopt a particular application of the Belton rule going forward is irrelevant to the question before this court, i.e., whether defendant\u2019s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress. In answering that question, and in particular whether counsel\u2019s performance was deficient, the proper focus of our analysis must be on the facts and law known to counsel at the time of defendant\u2019s trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. At that time, case law uniformly held that a search incident to arrest was permissible under facts similar to the ones at bar.\nFor example, in People v. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498 (1994), this court expressly rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that a vehicle search was impermissible because the defendant was handcuffed and seated in the back of a squad car and, thus, there was no danger that he could reach weapons or evidence. We stated: \u201cit is *** settled that the validity of a Belton search \u2018is not affected by the circumstance that defendant no longer had effective access to his vehicle when the search was conducted.\u2019 \u201d Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d at 506, quoting State v. Grass, 250 N.J. Super. 74, 77, 593 A.2d 379, 381 (1991).\nThe appellate court had held likewise. See, e.g., People v. Kalivas, 207 Ill. App. 3d 415, 418 (1991) (\u201c \u2018under Belton, a search of the vehicle is allowed even after the defendant was removed from it, handcuffed, and placed in the squad car\u2019 \u201d), quoting 3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure \u00a77.1(c), at 15 (2d ed. 1987); People v. Allibalogun, 312 Ill. App. 3d 515 (2000); People v. Loftus, 111 Ill. App. 3d 978 (1983). See also United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1505-06 (7th Cir. 1989).\nAs noted, an attorney\u2019s performance \u201cwill not be deemed deficient for his or her failure to make an argument that has no basis in the law.\u201d King, 192 Ill. 2d at 197. At the time of defendant\u2019s trial, case law was clear that Officer Parry\u2019s search of the stopped car did not violate defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights solely because defendant had been secured in the backseat of the squad car. Trial counsel was therefore not deficient for failing to raise this argument in a motion to suppress. Accordingly, this portion of defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.\nState Constitution\nDefendant also contends that the search of the stopped car violated his rights under article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a76. As with his argument with respect to the federal constitution, defendant contends that the search violated the Illinois Constitution because he was secured in the squad car at the time of the search and neither officer safety nor the preservation of evidence was at risk. Again, we believe this argument is misplaced.\nIn People v. Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d 26 (2002), this court considered \u201cwhether Belton\u2019s bright-line rule extends to a situation where the first contact the defendant has with the officer occurs after [the defendant has exited] the vehicle.\u201d Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d at 36. The issue was addressed under both the fourth amendment and the Illinois Constitution. Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d at 33-34. Although we ultimately concluded that the Belton rule did not apply under the facts presented, our analysis discussed the scope of the Belton rule at length (Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d at 36-42), and necessarily \u201cpresumed that, to the extent Belton allowed the search, Belton was controlling.\u201d See 375 Ill. App. 3d at 1076. Thus, Stehman may reasonably be read for the proposition that the Belton rule applies not only as a matter of fourth amendment law, but as a matter of Illinois constitutional law as well. And, as noted previously, case law at the time of defendant\u2019s trial uniformly held that the Belton bright-line rule applied in situations where the defendant was stopped while in a vehicle, was arrested, and was then secured in a squad car. See, e.g., Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d at 506.\nGiven these facts, we cannot say that trial counsel\u2019s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064), when she failed to file a motion to suppress on state constitutional grounds. Accordingly, this portion of defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel also fails.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we conclude that defendant\u2019s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBefore the appellate court, the State argued that defendant had waived any ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The appellate court rejected this argument (375 Ill. App. 3d at 1059-60) and the State does not renew it here.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, of Elgin, and James K. Leven, of Chicago, both of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Katherine D. Saunders, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 105457.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. GEORGE K. BAILEY, Appellant.\nOpinion filed February 5, 2009.\nThomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, of Elgin, and James K. Leven, of Chicago, both of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Katherine D. Saunders, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0285-01", "first_page_order": 295, "last_page_order": 311 }