{ "id": 3619470, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. MICHAEL P. CARDAMONE, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cardamone", "decision_date": "2009-03-19", "docket_number": "No. 106200", "first_page": "504", "last_page": "522", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 504" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381907 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926983 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3606828 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 973", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3437838 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "975" }, { "page": "975" }, { "page": "975" }, { "page": "974" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0973-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2882340 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" }, { "page": "512" }, { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490754 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257-58" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "257-58" }, { "page": "257-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3614755 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 859", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5252784 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863", "parenthetical": "noting the two bases of liability under the statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0859-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4272252 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" }, { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604511 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3616880 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" }, { "page": "454-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58928 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060246 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3614913 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444253 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318-19" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "2788-89" }, { "page": "318-19" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "2788-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451082 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" }, { "page": "326" }, { "page": "326" }, { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4276726 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" }, { "page": "667-68" }, { "page": "669" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/379/0656-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1093, "char_count": 29940, "ocr_confidence": 0.819, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5926377576830695e-07, "percentile": 0.6823266530210834 }, "sha256": "7b9d555e1546ae2c2a09d1b0ee5b90d684daeafd2a114e1a1abc495607982cdf", "simhash": "1:3e62b9967a06e47e", "word_count": 4936 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:24:25.467522+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. MICHAEL P. CARDAMONE, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nDefendant, Michael Cardamone, was convicted of harassment of a witness in violation of section 32 \u2014 4a of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 4a (West 2004)). The appellate court affirmed defendant\u2019s conviction (379 Ill. App. 3d 656), and defendant appealed to this court. Before this court, defendant argues that the State failed to prove he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because it failed to establish that the target of his harassment experienced a level of distress akin to a threat of physical damage to person or property. Defendant also asserts that the State failed to establish defendant\u2019s intent to communicate with his target. We granted defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (210 Ill. 2d R. 315). We now affirm defendant\u2019s conviction.\nBACKGROUND\nDefendant was charged with and convicted of two counts of harassment of a witness in violation of section 32 \u2014 4a of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 4a (West 2004)). The first count of harassment of a witness was based on the target, Teresa Eason, being a witness in another criminal proceeding against defendant. The second count of harassment was based upon Eason\u2019s familial relationship with a victim in the other criminal proceeding. Defendant was also charged with and convicted of three counts of disorderly conduct in violation of section 26 \u2014 1(a)(4) of the Criminal Code for filing a false police report. 720 ILCS 5/26 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 2004). The first count of disorderly conduct was predicated upon defendant\u2019s reporting Eason was committing the offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol. The second count was based on defendant\u2019s simultaneous report that Eason was illegally transporting alcoholic liquor. The third count was based on defendant\u2019s accusation that Eason was guilty of improper lane usage. Before this court, defendant contests only his conviction for harassment of a witness. Defendant has not appealed his conviction for disorderly conduct. All of the charges were based upon the same act that defendant committed on July 7, 2004.\nOn the morning of July 7, 2004, defendant and Ea-son both attended a hearing in another criminal proceeding where defendant was accused of wrongdoing. Eason was both a potential witness and the mother of an alleged victim in this other case.\nAfter the hearing, defendant and Eason both took the same road to get from the courthouse to their respective homes. Defendant found himself immediately behind Eason as they drove. Eason testified that she noticed defendant in the car behind her and that this made her uncomfortable. Defendant and his wife testified that Ea-son cut them off several times as they tried to pass her. However, Eason testified that she drove steadily and did not speed or swerve.\nShortly after Eason and defendant turned south onto Eola Road, defendant phoned 911 to report Eason as a drunk driver. Defendant told the 911 operator that he was calling because he believed someone was drinking and driving. Defendant gave the operator his location as well as a description of Eason\u2019s vehicle and license plate number. The operator asked defendant, \u201cDid you see them drinking or you just suspect it?\u201d Defendant replied, \u201cYeah, I saw a bottle in their car actually, it was that was so weird [sic], half covered up.\u201d\nShortly thereafter, Eason was stopped by Officer Michael Auld of the Aurora police department. Eason testified that her \u201cheart dropped\u201d when she was pulled over, \u201clike it always does when a police officer \u2014 even when you know you didn\u2019t do anything wrong, you think what did I do?\u201d Eason testified that it was \u201cnerve wracking.\u201d\nAuld explained to Eason that she had been stopped because 911 had received a report that she was intoxicated. Upon hearing this explanation, Eason stated that she felt \u201cquite a bit of anger that this was happening.\u201d Eason also told Auld that defendant had made the call to 911 as he was \u201cthe only one who would have called the police.\u201d Eason offered to let the officer search her entire car. Though Auld declined to search the vehicle, Eason did open the sliding door of her minivan to allow the officer to look inside.\nAt trial, Auld testified that after he received the dispatch from 911, he moved to intercept Eason\u2019s minivan. The officer testified that based on the license plate number given to the 911 operator, he was able to see Ea-son\u2019s address. Because Eason was heading toward her home, he positioned himself such that Eason would have to pass him on her way to her home. When Eason passed Auld, he took time to observe Eason\u2019s driving. He did not notice any traffic violation or erratic driving. However, based upon the 911 call, he stopped Eason.\nAuld further testified that when he spoke with Ea-son, he did not notice any signs of intoxication or drinking. Her speech was not slurred, her eyes were not glassy, and she did not smell of alcohol. When invited to search the vehicle, the officer declined, but testified that he leaned through the sliding door and looked between the driver\u2019s and front passenger\u2019s bucket seats and under the seats from the rear to try and find the container defendant alleged he had seen. Auld stated that he saw no beverage container of any kind, let alone one that was \u201chalf covered up.\u201d Thereafter, Auld released Eason without citation or further incident.\nFollowing a bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of all counts. In reaching its verdict on the disorderly conduct charges, the trial court stated that the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant \u201cmade a false report as outlined in counts 2, 3 and 4 knowing there was no reasonable grounds for doing so.\u201d\nIn finding the defendant guilty of harassment of a witness, the trial court noted that Eason \u201cwas expected to be a witness or was the family member of a potential witness in the case against defendant.\u201d The court found that defendant indirectly communicated with Eason \u201cthrough the use of police authority.\u201d The trial court further found that defendant specifically intended to annoy Eason. The trial court summarized its findings when it stated that \u201cdefendant made a false report as to the driving and that he did so knowing [Eason] was a witness or a family member of a witness, no other purpose other than to harass or annoy [Eason] can be concluded.\u201d Finally, in determining whether Eason suffered emotional distress, the court adopted the definition of harassment found in the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (750 ILCS 60/101 et seq. (West 2004)). The Domestic Violence Act defines harassment as \u201cknowing conduct which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose that is reasonable under the circumstances; would cause a reasonable person emotional distress; and does cause emotional distress to the petitioner.\u201d 750 ILCS 60/103(7) (West 2004). Under this standard, the court held that\n\u201cdefendant\u2019s conduct was deliberate and with the intent to harass or annoy [Eason], She certainly suffered some emotional distress by his conduct; being stopped by the police without cause, being detained even for a short time without any reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal conduct, having her car searched, all are actions which would make a person upset, anxious and certainly uncomfortable.\u201d\nThus, the trial court concluded that there was \u201csufficient evidence to establish defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d on the witness harassment counts.\nDefendant appealed his conviction on the witness harassment counts. 379 Ill. App. 3d 656. In the appellate court, defendant asserted two reasons why the trial court erred in finding him guilty. First, defendant asserted that \u201cthe State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the traffic stop produced in Eason\u2019s mind the requisite mental anguish or emotional distress.\u201d 379 Ill. App. 3d at 663. Second, defendant asserted that \u201cthe evidence was insufficient to establish that he communicated with Eason.\u201d 379 Ill. App. 3d at 667-68. The appellate court affirmed defendant\u2019s conviction. 379 Ill. App. 3d at 669.\nDefendant appealed to this court raising the same two issues he presented to the appellate court. We granted defendant\u2019s petition and for the reasons that follow affirm the judgment of the trial and appellate courts.\nANALYSIS\nI. The Requisite Level of Emotional Distress\nDefendant\u2019s first argument is that his conviction should be overturned because the State did not present any evidence that the level of distress experienced by Ea-son was akin to \u201ca threat of injury or damage to her person or property.\u201d\nIn assessing whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict, a reviewing court\u2019s inquiry is \u201c \u2018whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 (Emphasis in original.)\u201d People v. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d 318, 326 (2005), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89 (1979); People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). Under this standard, \u201ca reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution.\u201d Bush, 214 Ill. 2d at 326, citing People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004).\nHowever, in this case, before this court can determine whether the evidence is sufficient to uphold defendant\u2019s conviction, we must first determine what level of distress the witness harassment statute requires. This presents a question of statutory interpretation. Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. People v. Brown, 229 Ill. 2d 374, 382 (2008).\nThe witness harassment statute provides that a\n\u201cperson who, with the intent to harass or annoy one who *** is serving or who is a family member of a person who *** is serving *** as a witness, or who may be expected to serve as a witness in a pending legal proceeding, *** because of the testimony or potential testimony of the witness or person who may be expected *** to serve as a witness, communicates directly or indirectly with the *** witness or person who may be expected *** to serve as a witness, or family member of a *** witness or person who may be expected *** to serve as a witness in such manner as to produce mental anguish or emotional distress or who conveys a threat of injury or damage to the property or person of any *** witness or person who may be expected *** to serve as a witness commits a Class 2 felony.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 4a(a) (West 2004).\nThe principles of statutory interpretation are familiar. The reviewing court\u2019s objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364, 372 (2005). Accordingly, we consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature\u2019s apparent objective in enacting it. People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135 (2002). \u201cThe best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.\u201d People v. Christopherson, 231 Ill. 2d 449, 454 (2008), citing People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 581 (2006). When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect without resort to other tools of interpretation. Christopher son, 231 Ill. 2d at 454-55.\nIn People v. Butler, the appellate court, in the course of rejecting a defendant\u2019s challenge to the witness harassment statute\u2019s constitutionality, had the opportunity to address the purpose of the statute. People v. Butler, 375 Ill. App. 3d 269 (2007). The appellate court noted that the purpose of the statute was \u201cprotecting witnesses and jurors from being hassled because of their assistance with daily courtroom proceedings.\u201d Butler, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 274.\nWith that purpose in mind, the statute provides two bases of liability for the offense of witness harassment. First, a defendant is guilty of witness harassment if, having the requisite intent, he communicates with the witness \u201cin such manner as to produce mental anguish or emotional distress.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 4a(a) (West 2004). Second, the statute provides that a defendant is guilty of witness harassment if the defendant \u201cconveys a threat of injury or damage to the property or person\u201d of any witness. 720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 4a(a) (West 2004). See also People v. Berg, 224 Ill. App. 3d 859, 863 (1991) (noting the two bases of liability under the statute). It is uncontested that defendant was convicted on the first of these two bases of liability.\nThe statutory language makes no reference to a requisite level of emotional distress. Instead, the statute states that when a defendant with the \u201cintent to harass or annoy\u201d a person protected by the statute communicates with this person \u2014 directly or indirectly \u2014 \u201cin such manner as to produce mental anguish or emotional distress,\u201d the defendant is guilty of a Class 2 felony. 720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 4a(a) (West 2004). Thus, the statute does not include any adjectives, such as \u201csevere\u201d or \u201cextreme,\u201d that would qualify or quantify what kind or level of distress or anguish is required.\nBecause the statute does not provide a definition for \u201cemotional distress\u201d or \u201cmental anguish,\u201d we assume that the legislature intended the terms to have their ordinary and popularly understood meanings. It is appropriate to employ the dictionary as a resource to ascertain the meaning of undefined terms. See People v. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d 237, 244-45 (2008).\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201cmental anguish\u201d and \u201cemotional distress\u201d as synonymous phrases. See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1007 (8th ed. 2004) (directing the reader to see \u201cemotional distress\u201d for a definition of \u201cmental anguish\u201d). \u201cEmotional Distress\u201d is defined as a \u201chighly unpleasant mental reaction (such as anguish, grief, fright, humiliation, or fury) that results from another person\u2019s conduct.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 563 (8th ed. 2004). Thus, the reaction Eason testified as having suffered \u2014 stomach dropping, nerve-racking, wondering what she had done wrong, knowing that she had not done anything wrong, and anger \u2014 are included within the scope of this definition.\nHowever, despite the plain language of the statute, defendant encourages this court to adopt a narrower definition of mental anguish and emotional distress. Defendant cites People v. Parkins, 77 Ill. 2d 253 (1979), and its progeny to support this position. Under this line of cases the phrase \u201cmental anguish or emotional distress\u201d takes on a more restrictive meaning in light of the \u201cthreat of injury\u201d language that follows the emotional distress clause. Defendant asserts that this court should adopt the rationale of the Parkins Une and, thereby, find that Eason did not suffer sufficient emotional distress under the statute.\nIn Parkins, this court considered the meaning of the terms \u201cabuse\u201d and \u201charass\u201d as they were used in the telephone harassment statute. Parkins, 77 Ill. 2d at 257-58. The telephone harassment statute criminalized the making of \u201c \u2018a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues, with intent to abuse, threaten or harass any person at the called number.\u2019 \u201d Parkins, 77 Ill. 2d at 255, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 134, par. 16.4 \u2014 1(2). Thus, in Parkins, the prohibited conduct was criminalized regardless of who placed the call or who received the call. In Parkins, this court was particularly concerned about the effect that a broad interpretation of the terms \u201cabuse\u201d and \u201charass\u201d could have on otherwise protected speech. Parkins, 77 Ill. 2d at 255. Therefore, to avoid finding the telephone harassment statute unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds, the court invoked the maxim noscitur a sociis and held that the terms \u201cabuse\u201d and \u201charass\u201d took \u201ccolor from the word \u2018threaten\u2019 \u201d and acquired a more restricted meaning. Parkins, 77 Ill. 2d at 257-58.\nDespite the limited nature of the holding in Parkins, the logic of that case was extended by the appellate court to the present statute in People v. Calvert, 258 Ill. App. 3d 504 (1994).\nIn People v. Calvert, the appellate court cited to Par-kins to conclude that the witness harassment statute was valid as it was not unconstitutionally vague. People v. Calvert, 258 Ill. App. 3d 504, 512 (1994). The Calvert court noted that the prohibited conduct is \u201ccouched in language which is as precise as possible, albeit lacking mathematical precision.\u201d Calvert, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 512. The court went on to reason that the \u201cintent to harass or annoy is lent further meaning by the use of the term \u2018threat.\u2019 \u201d Calvert, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 512, citing Parkins, 77 Ill. 2d at 257-58.\nSignificantly, the appellate court in Calvert adopted and incorporated the Parkins decision \u2014 which dealt with an unrelated statute \u2014 without discussion or comment as to either the limited nature of Parkins or the similarities and differences between the telephone harassment statute and the present statute.\nDefendant also cites People v. Nix, to support his narrow interpretation of the statute. People v. Nix, 131 Ill. App. 3d 973 (1985). In Nix, the appellate court held that a defendant\u2019s grabbing a witness\u2019s arm twice and asking her \u201c[h]ow is it going\u201d and saying \u201cI want to talk to you\u201d was not sufficient to support a conviction for witness harassment. Nix, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 975. The court in Nix specifically held that given the\n\u201cinnocuous nature of the defendant\u2019s statements; the fact that the encounter *** occurred by chance; the fact that the encounter occurred in a public place; and the evidence that [the victim] at no time called out for help, we find the evidence establishing intent was so unsatisfactory as to cause reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.\u201d Nix, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 975.\nDefendant analogizes Nix and the present case, noting that defendant\u2019s presence on the road at the same time as Eason was a chance encounter in a public place.\nHowever, Nix is distinguishable from the present issue, as the question in Nix was whether the defendant\u2019s conduct was sufficient to prove that he had the intention to harass or annoy the victim, not the level of anguish that he was required to inflict. Nix, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 975. Furthermore, unlike in the present case, the defendant\u2019s conduct in Nix could only be described as innocuous because the defendant had been acquitted of the underlying charges of battery and aggravated battery of the victim. Nix, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 974. In the present case, defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct in filing a false police report and this conviction has not been appealed. Therefore, defendant\u2019s underlying conduct cannot be described as \u201cinnocuous\u201d in the present case.\nThe cases cited by defendant are not compelling in light of the purpose and plain meaning of the statute. The statute does not contain any limiting language or exceptions, and the court does \u201cnot depart from the plain language of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent.\u201d People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323-24 (2007), citing People v. Martinez, 184 Ill. 2d 547, 550 (1998). The statute was designed to protect witnesses and jurors from being mistreated because of their involvement in courtroom proceedings. See Butler, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 274. Therefore, we reject defendant\u2019s argument and find that the statutory language encompasses negative emotional states that are not necessarily linked to fear of harm to either the person or property of a person protected under the statute.\nHaving found that the statute incorporates a more expansive definition of \u201cemotional distress\u201d than defendant contends, we likewise find that the State has met its burden of proof.\nII. The Intent to Communicate\nDefendant also contends that his conviction should be overturned because the State failed to establish that he \u201cintended his 911 call to communicate with [Eason], for any purpose.\u201d\nThis argument presents a question of fact. As stated above, a question of fact is reviewed to determine \u201c \u2018whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 (Emphasis in original.)\u201d Bush, 214 Ill. 2d at 326, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573, 99 S. Ct. at 2788-89. Under this standard, \u201ca reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution.\u201d Bush, 214 Ill. 2d at 326, citing People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004).\nDefendant offers three arguments to show that his 911 call lacked communicative intent. First, he asserts that nothing in the record \u201cindicates that [he] wanted [Eason] to know that he planned to call the police, or that it was he who had called.\u201d Second, defendant asserts that his report was not sufficient to indicate that he was \u201ctrying to get the police to conduct a stop,\u201d but merely reporting what he saw \u201cwith the intent that police should scrutinize [Eason\u2019s] driving.\u201d Finally, defendant asserts that police are not \u201chenchmen who can be dispatched by anonymous callers\u201d but are professionals who must use independent judgment and discretion. Therefore, defendant asserts that the officer\u2019s stopping Eason without first corroborating the report was not a \u201cnatural and probable consequence of [defendant\u2019s] 911 call.\u201d All three of defendant\u2019s arguments fail.\nThe trial court found defendant guilty of disorderly conduct for filing a false police report. Defendant has not challenged this conviction. Therefore, we base our analysis of defendant\u2019s communicative intent on the trial court\u2019s unchallenged finding that \u201cdefendant at some point prior to making the 911 call determined that the van driver was [Eason] and made a false report as outlined in counts 2, 3, and 4 knowing there was no reasonable grounds for doing so.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s first argument is that the State has failed to meet its burden because there is no evidence that defendant intended Eason to know that it was he who called the police. This argument is unpersuasive.\nDefendant cites no case law to suggest that a defendant must intend that the target of his harassment know that it was he who sent a message in order for there to be communicative intent. To the contrary, the one case defendant cites to support this argument includes a communication where the defendant threatened the victim by putting a photograph of a tombstone under a rock outside the victim\u2019s place of business. See People v. Libbra, 268 Ill. App. 3d 194 (1994). The only identifying information on the photograph was the phone number of a relative of the defendant which was printed on the back of the photo. Libbra, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 200.\nMoreover, the position advocated by defendant is contrary to the purpose of the statute, as it would prohibit the prosecution of an individual who harasses or threatens a witness so long as he takes steps to keep his identity a secret. This result runs afoul of the statute\u2019s purpose of protecting witnesses from harassment.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is that his report was not sufficient to indicate that he wanted Eason to be stopped, but was merely an indication that he wanted her driving to be subject to greater scrutiny. At oral argument, defendant\u2019s attorney noted that defendant did not say that he saw Eason drinking alcohol and that if defendant \u201chad reported that he saw her drinking from a bottle of Jack Daniels, we would have a different case.\u201d Therefore, it is defendant\u2019s contention that Eason\u2019s being stopped was not a reasonable and foreseeable result of the report he gave to the 911 operator. Thus, he asserts, there could be no communicative intent because he never intended Eason to actually be stopped as a result of his report. Defendant\u2019s argument is flawed in two ways.\nFirst, defendant\u2019s argument is factually flawed. Defendant did not simply state that he suspected a drunk driver or that he thought he saw a bottle. The 911 operator directly asked defendant, \u201cDid you see them drinking or you just suspect it?\u201d Defendant replied, \u201cYeah, I saw a bottle in their car actually, it was that was so weird [sic], half covered up.\u201d Defendant alleges that his reference to a bottle was innocuous as many beverages come in bottles. Defendant is correct that many types of beverages which are legally consumable in a vehicle are packaged in bottles. However, these legal beverages are rarely consumed when still in a paper bag or otherwise \u201chalf covered up.\u201d This court fails to see a significant difference between defendant\u2019s hypothetical report of drinking from a bottle of Jack Daniels and the actual report of Ea-son drinking from a bottle that was \u201chalf covered up.\u201d\nThe second reason defendant\u2019s argument is flawed is that police involvement is a reasonable and foreseeable consequence of making a 911 call. Police involvement or the involvement of other emergency services is, in fact, the purpose of making a 911 call. Moreover, defendant was aware of this purpose, as he testified that he had made \u201ca lot\u201d of calls to 911 since he turned 16. Defendant testified that he had called 911 at least five times in the previous two years alone. Furthermore, at least one of these calls was made after a reckless driver had left the area and was no longer placing defendant or his family at risk.\nDefendant conceded that, at a minimum, he wanted Eason to be subject to police scrutiny. Further, defense counsel stated at oral argument that defendant \u201choped\u201d that this scrutiny would lead to her being pulled over. The fact that defendant desired or hoped that Eason would be pulled over when added to the uncontested evidence that there was no basis for defendant to call 911 in the first place and defendant\u2019s statement that he saw a half-covered bottle evinces an intent that the police stop Eason.\nDefendant\u2019s final argument that his conviction should be overturned is that Auld had a responsibility to exercise independent judgment in deciding whether to stop Eason, thereby breaking the causal chain. This argument also fails.\nThe question in this case is not whether the officer had a lawful basis to stop Eason on the morning of July 7, 2004. The issue is whether defendant, with the intention to \u201charass or annoy\u201d Eason, \u201ccommunicate[d] directly or indirectly\u201d with Eason \u201cin such manner as to produce mental anguish or emotional distress.\u201d See 720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 4a(a) (West 2004). Even if the officer could have broken the chain of events through electing not to stop Eason, that argument is irrelevant as those are not the facts of this case.\nIn this case, Auld stopped Eason because of defendant\u2019s call to 911. It is undisputed that defendant did not have a good-faith basis to call 911. The uncontested evidence before this court is that defendant lied when he reported Eason was swerving and lied about seeing a bottle half covered up. The fact that defendant\u2019s call was not certain to cause an officer to stop Eason is of no significance because in this case, what defendant hoped would happen did happen. Eason was stopped, without justification, based on defendant\u2019s false report.\nThe evidence produced by the State is sufficient to show that defendant intended to communicate with Ea-son when he called 911. Defendant called 911 without justification alleging that Eason was a drunk driver and claiming that he had seen her drinking from a half-covered bottle. When he made this call, his counsel conceded, he hoped Eason would be stopped. At the point in time that defendant made this false report to 911, with the hope that Eason would be stopped, the intention-to-communicate element of the offense was complete. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nCONCLUSION\nThe evidence shows that defendant called 911 without justification alleging that Eason was a drunk driver and claiming that he had seen her drinking from a half-covered bottle. When he made this call, he hoped Eason would be stopped by the police. Eason was stopped. She described the stop as being nerve-racking. When Eason learned the reason for her being stopped she experienced \u201cquite a lot of anger.\u201d At that moment the chain of events that defendant put in motion with the intent to harass or annoy Eason was complete. Defendant had subtly and indirectly transmitted a message to Eason through the police.\nTherefore, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is clearly sufficient to find that Eason suffered the requisite level of emotional distress as a direct result of defendant\u2019s intentional communication to Eason. The judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed defendant\u2019s conviction, is therefore affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nAll of the cases in this line are based on arguments that the various statutes are unconstitutional for being either vague or over broad. This argument is not presented in the present case.\nThe telephone harassment statute was codified as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 134, par. 16.4 \u2014 1(2). After Illinois recodified the statutes, the statute was codified as 720 ILCS 135/1 \u2014 1 (West 2000).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Mark G. Levine, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Erin M. O\u2019Connell, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 106200.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. MICHAEL P. CARDAMONE, Appellant.\nOpinion filed March 19, 2009.\nMichael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Mark G. Levine, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Erin M. O\u2019Connell, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0504-01", "first_page_order": 514, "last_page_order": 532 }