{ "id": 3619454, "name": "MIDAMERICA BANK, FSB, Appellant, v. CHARTER ONE BANK, FSB, et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Midamerica Bank, FSB v. Charter One Bank, FSB", "decision_date": "2009-03-19", "docket_number": "No. 106804", "first_page": "560", "last_page": "575", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 560" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3028471 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3478846 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498792 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 P.3d 1209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 11099187 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1212", "parenthetical": "adopting the cash equivalency approach and noting the majority of courts \"hold that a cashier's check is the equivalent of cash\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/23/1209-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 So. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7519209, 7519087 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197", "parenthetical": "recognizing that \" '[n]either the bank nor a purchaser of a cashier's check from the bank has a right to \"stop payment\" on a cashier's check' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/552/0194-02", "/so2d/552/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "982 So. 2d 628", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8243826 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/982/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609713 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3601923 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 A.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.J. Super. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 303645 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/111/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3289508 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381-82" }, { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959222 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" }, { "page": "218" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926983 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450836 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604629 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" }, { "page": "60" }, { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450936 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 Ill. App. 3d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4277370 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/383/0243-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 965, "char_count": 27218, "ocr_confidence": 0.819, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5482592113582763e-07, "percentile": 0.6741761778389397 }, "sha256": "d64359d81211774fee06b4ab608992f2dc433c8a3cc13aec1f1859456234bd76", "simhash": "1:c0cf149700299778", "word_count": 4547 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:24:25.467522+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MIDAMERICA BANK, FSB, Appellant, v. CHARTER ONE BANK, FSB, et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nIn this appeal, we consider: (1) whether a bank may-issue a stop-payment order on a cashier\u2019s check under the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code (810 ILCS 5/1\u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002)); and (2) whether the circuit court of Du Page County erred in denying MidAmerica loss of interest and attorney fee expenses under the UCC. The circuit court held that a cashier\u2019s check is the equivalent of currency and that Charter One must, therefore, honor its cashier\u2019s check but declined to award MidAmerica loss of interest and attorney fees. The appellate court reversed the circuit court\u2019s holding that Charter One must honor its cashier\u2019s check, and affirmed the circuit court\u2019s decision not to award loss of interest and attorney fee expenses to MidAmerica. 383 Ill. App. 3d 243. We allowed MidAmerica\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315). We reverse the appellate court\u2019s judgment and remand the cause to the appellate court with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn 2002, Mary Christelle, the mother of David Hernandez (president of Essential Technologies of Illinois (ETI)), purchased a $50,000 cashier\u2019s check from Charter One payable to ETI with funds from her Charter One account. ETI deposited the check in its MidAmerica account. Four days later, Christelle asked Charter One to stop payment on the check. Charter One issued a stop-payment order on the cashier\u2019s check, and it then refused to honor the check when MidAmerica presented it for payment, returning it to MidAmerica stamped \u201cstop payment.\u201d MidAmerica sent the check to ETI after removing $50,000 from ETI\u2019s account. Within two weeks, ETI\u2019s account dropped to approximately a negative $52,000.\nIn 2006, MidAmerica filed suit against Charter One to recover the value of the check. MidAmerica alleged that Charter One wrongfully stopped payment on the cashier\u2019s check in violation of section 3 \u2014 411 of the UCC (810 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 411 (West 2002)). MidAmerica sought $50,000 plus interest from January 24, 2002, attorney fees, and costs of suit.\nCharter One answered the complaint, admitting that it issued a stop-payment order on the cashier\u2019s check and that MidAmerica made demands for payment. Charter One also filed affirmative defenses, alleging the cashier\u2019s check was issued in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme or by mistake. Charter One then filed a third-party complaint seeking damages against Christelle, Hernandez and his wife, and ETI.\nAt trial, a MidAmerica employee testified that she first learned of the ETI account in January 2002, when a $50,000 personal check was deposited to ETI\u2019s Mid-America account and returned for insufficient funds. Subsequently, $50,000 was redeposited to ETI\u2019s account by the cashier\u2019s check issued by Charter One payable to ETI. The cashier\u2019s check was then processed through Charter One for payment. On January 24, 2002, the cashier\u2019s check was returned to MidAmerica with a stop-payment order placed on it. MidAmerica debited ETI\u2019s bank account $50,000 and held the cashier\u2019s check until the account reached a positive balance, when the cashier\u2019s check was returned to ETI as the payee. Ultimately, ETI\u2019s account was closed due to a negative balance after additional deposited checks were returned for insufficient funds. During the investigation of ETI\u2019s bank account, MidAmerica found no evidence of any fraudulent ETI scheme.\nA security officer for Charter One testified that she investigated the cashier\u2019s check in April or May 2002. She stated that Charter One permits stop-payment orders to issue on a cashier\u2019s check only if the check is lost, destroyed or stolen, and that bank policy permits it to seek indemnification from the person who placed the stop-payment order. The bank also requires an affidavit to support the stop-payment order, but Charter One could not locate an affidavit in this case. According to the security officer, Christelle\u2019s account contained sufficient funds to cover the cashier\u2019s check upon issuance. She was unable to determine that ETI was directly involved in the issuance of the cashier\u2019s check or that ETI caused Christelle to purchase the cashier\u2019s check. Christelle\u2019s request was the only basis for the stop-payment order. At the time of the stop-payment order, there was no shortage in Christelle\u2019s account, nor was there any evidence of fraud.\nAt the conclusion of trial, MidAmerica submitted an affidavit supporting its claimed attorney fees of $33,731.25, plus the costs of suit. In its written closing argument, MidAmerica also sought interest from January 22, 2002.\nThe circuit court ruled in favor of MidAmerica, awarding it $50,000 plus costs. The circuit court, however, denied MidAmerica\u2019s request for loss of interest and attorney fee expenses.\nThe appellate court affirmed the circuit court\u2019s decision not to award attorney fees to MidAmerica but reversed its holding that MidAmerica could enforce the cashier\u2019s check against Charter One. We allowed MidAmerica\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R 315).\nII. ANALYSIS\nIn this appeal, we consider: (1) whether a bank may issue a stop-payment order on a cashier\u2019s check under the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code (810 ILCS 5/1\u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002)); and (2) whether the circuit court erred in denying MidAmerica loss of interest and attorney fees. We first consider the stop-payment issue.\nA. Stop-payment Orders on Cashier\u2019s Checks\nMidAmerica asserts that the UCC does not permit stop-payment orders on cashier\u2019s checks. Charter One counters that the UCC entitled it to dishonor the cashier\u2019s check because the check was procured by fraud. The parties agree that the pertinent facts of this case are uncontroverted. Accordingly, the issue on appeal is limited to application of the law to the undisputed facts and, thus, our standard of review is de novo. City of Champaign v. Torres, 214 Ill. 2d 234, 241 (2005).\nWe begin our review by addressing MidAmerica\u2019s argument that stop-payment orders on cashier\u2019s checks are not permitted under the UCC. Our \u201cprimary objective *** when construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.\u201d DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006). We look to the plain language of the statute as \u201cthe most rehable indication of the legislature\u2019s objectives *** and when the language of the statute is clear, it must be applied as written without resort to aids or tools of interpretation.\u201d DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d at 60. When the language of a statute is ambiguous, we must construe the statute to avoid rendering any part meaningless or superfluous. People v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 193 (2005). We do not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the legislature\u2019s expressed intent. People v. Martinez, 184 Ill. 2d 547, 550 (1998).\nSection 4 \u2014 403(a) of the UCC addresses a customer\u2019s right to stop payment on checks, as follows:\n\u201c(a) A customer or any person authorized to draw on the account if there is more than one person may stop payment of any item drawn on the customer\u2019s account or close the account by an order to the bank describing the item or account with reasonable certainty received at a time and in a manner that affords the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it before any action by the bank with respect to the item described in Section 4 \u2014 303.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 810 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 403(a) (West 2002).\nA cashier\u2019s check is an item drawn on the issuing bank. See 810 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 104(g) (West 2002) (\u201c \u2018Cashier\u2019s check\u2019 means a draft with respect to which the drawer and drawee are the same bank or branches of the same bank\u201d). Thus, a cashier\u2019s check is not an item drawn on the customer\u2019s account. The plain language of section 4 \u2014 403 permits a customer to stop payment only on items drawn \u201con the customer\u2019s account.\u201d It does not authorize a bank to stop payment on a cashier\u2019s check at a customer\u2019s request because cashier\u2019s checks are not drawn \u201con the customer\u2019s account.\u201d\nOur interpretation of section 4 \u2014 403 is supported by UCC comment 4 to section 4 \u2014 403, stating:\n\u201c4. A cashier\u2019s check or teller\u2019s check purchased by a customer whose account is debited in payment for the check is not a check drawn on the customer\u2019s account within the meaning of subsection (a); hence, a customer purchasing a cashier\u2019s check or teller\u2019s check has no right to stop payment of such a check under subsection (a). If a bank issuing a cashier\u2019s check or teller\u2019s check refuses to pay the check as an accommodation to its customer or for other reasons, its liability on the check is governed by Section 3 \u2014 411. There is no right to stop payment after certification of a check or other acceptance of a draft, and this is true no matter who procures the certification. See Sections 3 \u2014 411 and 4 \u2014 303. The acceptance is the drawee\u2019s own engagement to pay, and is not required to impair its credit by refusing payment for the convenience of the drawer.\u201d 810 ILCS Ann. 5/4 \u2014 403, Uniform Commercial Code Comment 4, at 413 (Smith-Hurd 1993).\nAs indicated by UCC comment 4 to section 4 \u2014 403, by refusing to pay the cashier\u2019s check as an accommodation to Christelle, Charter One\u2019s liability on the check is governed by section 3 \u2014 411 of the UCC.\nSection 3 \u2014 411 of the UCC, in turn, provides for liability of a bank that refuses to pay its issued cashier\u2019s check:\n\u201c(a) In this Section, \u2018obligated bank\u2019 means the acceptor of a certified check or the issuer of a cashier\u2019s check or teller\u2019s check bought from the issuer.\n(b) If the obligated bank wrongfully (i) refuses to pay a cashier\u2019s check or certified check, (ii) stops payment of a teller\u2019s check, or (iii) refuses to pay a dishonored teller\u2019s check, the person asserting the right to enforce the check is entitled to compensation for expenses and loss of interest resulting from the nonpayment and may recover consequential damages if the obligated bank refuses to pay after receiving notice of particular circumstances giving rise to the damages.\n(c) Expenses or consequential damages under subsection (b) are not recoverable if the refusal of the obligated bank to pay occurs because (i) the bank suspends payments, (ii) the obligated bank asserts a claim or defense of the bank that it has reasonable grounds to believe is available against the person entitled to enforce the instrument, (iii) the obligated bank has a reasonable doubt whether the person demanding payment is the person entitled to enforce the instrument, or (iv) payment is prohibited by law.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 411 (West 2002).\nReading the plain language of sections 4 \u2014 403 and 3 \u2014 411 together leads us to one unmistakable conclusion: a bank\u2019s refusal to pay a cashier\u2019s check based on its customer\u2019s request to stop payment is \u201cwrongful\u201d under section 3 \u2014 411 because a customer has no right to stop payment on a cashier\u2019s check under section 4 \u2014 403. Further, UCC comment 1 to section 3 \u2014 411 states:\n\u201cA [customer] using [cashier\u2019s checks or teller\u2019s checks] has no right to stop payment. Nevertheless, some banks will refuse payment as an accommodation to a customer. Section 3 \u2014 411 is designed to discourage this practice.\u201d 810 ILCS Ann. 5/3 \u2014 411, Uniform Commercial Code Comment 1, at 238-39 (Smith-Hurd 1993).\nUCC comment 1 to section 3 \u2014 411 explains that the dishonor of a cashier\u2019s check at a customer\u2019s request to stop payment is a wrongful refusal to pay subject to liability under section 3 \u2014 411. Thus, we agree with MidAmerica that by accepting Christelle\u2019s request to stop payment on the cashier\u2019s check issued by Charter One, and then refusing payment based solely on that request, Charter One wrongfully dishonored the cashier\u2019s check and is, therefore, liable under section 3 \u2014 411.\nOur interpretation of the UCC is also consistent with this court\u2019s prior holding in Gillespie v. Riley Management Corp., 59 Ill. 2d 211 (1974). In Gillespie, this court determined that the purchaser of a cashier\u2019s check retains the right to cancel the cashier\u2019s check until the purchaser delivers or negotiates the check to the payee. Gillespie, 59 Ill. 2d at 217. We explained that \u201c[o]ne acquires a cashier\u2019s check for the purpose of assuring the payee that there are the necessary funds contemplated by a transaction, and that the check, like the money it represents, cannot be countermanded or revoked after the payee has received it.\u201d Gillespie, 59 Ill. 2d at 218. Thus, we held that the purchaser of a cashier\u2019s check has the right to cancel the check by surrendering it to the issuing bank until the check enters the stream of commerce. Gillespie, 59 Ill. 2d at 218.\nHere, Charter One issued the cashier\u2019s check at the request of Christelle. Christelle then delivered the cashier\u2019s check to ETI, who deposited the cashier\u2019s check in its MidAmerica account. The cashier\u2019s check entered the stream of commerce when Christelle delivered it to ETI. Applying the holding in Gillespie to the facts of this case, Christelle had no right to stop payment on the cashier\u2019s check after she delivered the check to ETI.\nOur appellate court has similarly held that a stop-payment order is ineffective based on the express language of the UCC. See Able & Associates, Inc. v. Orchard Hill Farms of Illinois, Inc., 77 Ill. App. 3d 375 (1979). Relying in part on this court\u2019s holding in Gillespie, Able held that a bank has no right to stop payment on cashier\u2019s checks because they are the equivalent of cash. Able, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 381-82. Particularly persuasive is Abie\u2019s explanation of the \u201cpolicy considerations\u201d requiring a rule prohibiting banks from refusing to honor their cashier\u2019s checks:\n\u201c \u2018A cashier\u2019s check circulates in the commercial world as the equivalent of cash. [Citation.] People accept a cashier\u2019s check as a substitute for cash because the bank stands behind it, rather than an individual. In effect, the bank becomes a guarantor of the value of the check and pledges its resources to the payment of the amount represented upon presentation. To allow the bank to stop payment on such an instrument would be inconsistent with the representation it makes in issuing the check. Such a rule would undermine the public confidence in the bank and its checks and thereby deprive the cashier\u2019s check of the essential incident which makes it useful. People would no longer be willing to accept it as a substitute for cash if they could not be sure that there would be no difficulty in converting it into cash.\u2019 \u201d Able, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 382, quoting National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 351-52, 268 A.2d 327, 329 (1970).\nThus, prior court precedent supports our interpretation of the UCC\u2019s treatment of cashier\u2019s checks as the equivalent of cash.\nCharter One, however, points out that article 3 of the UCC was revised by Public Act 87 \u2014 582 in 1992. See Pub. Act 87 \u2014 582, \u00a71, eff. January 1, 1992. Charter One submits that the 1992 revisions changed the law from treating cashier\u2019s checks as \u201ccash equivalents\u201d to treating them as \u201cdemand notes.\u201d Charter One argues that all defenses to the enforcement of a note now apply to cashier\u2019s checks. Specifically, Charter One relies on the language of section 3 \u2014 412 of the UCC (810 ILCS 5/3\u2014 412 (West 2002)). MidAmerica, on the other hand, argues that although section 3 \u2014 412 was rewritten in 1992, the changes were not intended to change the treatment of cashier\u2019s checks as \u201ccash equivalents.\u201d Rather, the revision merely allows a bank to dishonor a cashier\u2019s check under very limited circumstances, and none of those circumstances apply here.\nSection 3 \u2014 412 states:\n\u201cObligation of issuer of note or cashier\u2019s check. The issuer of a note or cashier\u2019s check or other draft drawn on the drawer is obligated to pay the instrument (i) according to its terms at the time it was issued or, if not issued, at the time it first came into possession of a holder, or (ii) if the issuer signed an incomplete instrument, according to its terms when completed, to the extent stated in Sections 3 \u2014 115 and 3 \u2014 104. The obligation is owed to a person entitled to enforce the instrument or to an indorser who paid the instrument under Section 3 \u2014 415.\u201d 810 ILCS 3 \u2014 412 (West 2002).\nGiven the plain language of the statute, we are unable to ascertain whether the legislature intended cashier\u2019s checks to be treated as \u201ccash equivalents\u201d or \u201cdemand notes.\u201d Again, our primary objective in construing section 3 \u2014 412 is to give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d at 59. This court has looked to the UCC comment explanations in discerning legislative intent. See Razor v. Hyundai Motor America, 222 Ill. 2d 75, 87 (2006); Brandt v. Boston Scientific Corp., 204 Ill. 2d 640, 647 (2003). In determining the legislative intent of section 3 \u2014 412, we find UCC comment 1 instructive:\n\u201c1. The obligations of the maker, acceptor, drawer, and indorser are stated in four separate sections. Section 3 \u2014 412 states the obligation of the maker of a note and is consistent with former Section 3 \u2014 413(1). Section 3 \u2014 412 also applies to the issuer of a cashier\u2019s check or other draft drawn on the drawer. Under former Section 3 \u2014 118(a), since a cashier\u2019s check or other draft drawn on the drawer was \u2018effective as a note,\u2019 the drawer was liable under former Section 3 \u2014 413(1) as a maker. Under Sections 3 \u2014 103(a)(6) and 3 \u2014 104(f) a cashier\u2019s check or other draft drawn on the drawer is treated as a draft to reflect common commercial usage, but the liability of the drawer is stated by Section 3 \u2014 412 as being the same as that of the maker of a note rather than that of the drawer of a draft. Thus, Section 3 \u2014 412 does not in substance change former law.\u201d 810 ILCS Ann. 5/3 \u2014 412, Uniform Commercial Code Comment 1, at 240 (Smith-Hurd 1993).\nUCC comment 1 to section 3 \u2014 412 indicates that cashier\u2019s checks are treated as drafts to reflect common commercial usage, but that liability of the \u201cdrawer\u201d is the same as the \u201cmaker\u201d of a note. This is because a bank issuing a cashier\u2019s check is both the drawer and drawee of the check. See 810 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 104(g) (West 2002) (\u201c \u2018Cashier\u2019s check\u2019 means a draft with respect to which the drawer and drawee are the same bank or branches of the same bank\u201d). The UCC provides that cashier\u2019s checks are drafts, not notes. Section 3 \u2014 412 simply addresses the liability of the bank. The liability of a bank is that of the maker of a note because issuance of a cashier\u2019s check establishes the bank as both drawer and drawee, representing that it will honor the draft when presented. Thus the 1992 revisions to section 3 \u2014 412 do not represent a change in the former law.\nThe UCC comment preceding article 3 supports our interpretation:\n\u201cSection 3 \u2014 411 and related provisions considerably improve the acceptability of bank obligations like cashier\u2019s checks as cash equivalents by providing disincentives to wrongful dishonor, such as the possible recovery of consequential damages.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 810 ILCS Ann. art. 3, Comment B, at 8 (Smith-Hurd 1993).\nThe UCC comment preceding article 3 explains that cashier\u2019s checks are to be treated as \u201ccash equivalents.\u201d See 810 ILCS Ann. art. 3, Comment B, at 8 (Smith-Hurd 1993). We therefore reject Charter One\u2019s argument that the 1992 revisions to the UCC changed the law to treat cashier\u2019s checks as \u201cdemand notes.\u201d\nCourts of other states have also held that stop-payment orders are ineffective for cashier\u2019s checks under the UCC. See Arnold, Matheny & Eagan, P.A. v. First American Holdings, Inc., 982 So. 2d 628, 639 n.10 (Fla. 2008), quoting Warren Finance, Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, N.A., 552 So. 2d 194, 197 (Fla. 1989) (recognizing that \u201c \u2018[n]either the bank nor a purchaser of a cashier\u2019s check from the bank has a right to \u201cstop payment\u201d on a cashier\u2019s check\u2019 \u201d). See also Flatiron Linen, Inc. v. First American State Bank, 23 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Colo. 2001) (adopting the cash equivalency approach and noting the majority of courts \u201chold that a cashier\u2019s check is the equivalent of cash\u201d).\nWe determine that the express language of the UCC prohibits stop-payment orders on cashier\u2019s checks. Christelle\u2019s request to stop payment on the cashier\u2019s check was the only reason Charter One refused to honor payment on it. When Charter One issued the cashier\u2019s check, Christelle\u2019s account had sufficient funds. Thus, Charter One\u2019s dishonor of the cashier\u2019s check was wrongful.\nCharter One, nonetheless, attempts to assert defenses to support its dishonor of the cashier\u2019s check, arguing that the cashier\u2019s check was procured by fraud. To the contrary, the record does not show that Charter One had knowledge of any fraud when it dishonored the cashier\u2019s check. Charter One simply dishonored the cashier\u2019s check based on Christelle\u2019s stop-payment request. Thus, Charter One cannot assert fraud as a defense to its wrongful dishonor of the cashier\u2019s check.\nCharter One also submits that MidAmerica has no standing to enforce the cashier\u2019s check because it does not have possession of the original check. MidAmerica admits that the original cashier\u2019s check is missing. Section 3 \u2014 309 of the UCC provides that the holder of a lost, destroyed, or stolen instrument may seek to enforce the instrument. 810 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 309 (West 2002). Section 3 \u2014 309 states:\n\u201c(a) A person not in possession of an instrument is entitled to enforce the instrument if (i) the person was in possession of the instrument and entitled to enforce it when loss of possession occurred, (ii) the loss of possession was not the result of a transfer by the person or a lawful seizure, and (iii) the person cannot reasonably obtain possession of the instrument because the instrument was destroyed, its whereabouts cannot be determined, or it is in the wrongful possession of an unknown person or a person that cannot be found or is not amenable to service of process.\n(b) A person seeking enforcement of an instrument under subsection (a) must prove the terms of the instrument and the person\u2019s right to enforce the instrument. If that proof is made, Section 3 \u2014 308 applies to the case as if the person seeking enforcement had produced the instrument. The court may not enter judgment in favor of the person seeking enforcement unless it finds that the person required to pay the instrument is adequately protected against loss that might occur by reason of a claim by another person to enforce the instrument. Adequate protection may be provided by any reasonable means.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 309 (West 2002).\nMidAmerica contends section 3 \u2014 309 does not impact its standing to recover the proceeds of the cashier\u2019s check because the check only became missing after it was dishonored by Charter One and returned to MidAmerica. We agree.\nAt the time ETI sought payment, the cashier\u2019s check was not lost, destroyed or stolen. MidAmerica introduced evidence that: (1) ETI possessed the cashier\u2019s check, entitling it to enforce the check when the loss occurred; (2) ETI did not transfer the cashier\u2019s check, nor was it lawfully seized; (3) MidAmerica cannot locate the cashier\u2019s check; (4) MidAmerica returned the cashier\u2019s check to ETI when its account attained a positive balance; (5) ETI cannot locate the cashier\u2019s check; and (6) ETI\u2019s interest in the cashier\u2019s check was assigned to MidAmerica. MidAmerica therefore introduced sufficient evidence to establish a viable reason for its failure to produce the cashier\u2019s check at trial, meeting the requirements of section 3 \u2014 309. Accordingly, MidAmerica is entitled to enforce the cashier\u2019s check.\nAlternatively, Charter One contends that if we determine it wrongfully refused to pay the cashier\u2019s check, it is entitled to a setoff against MidAmerica for any liability imposed upon it for payment of the cashier\u2019s check. Charter One contends that, as assignee of the cashier\u2019s check, MidAmerica stands in the shoes of ETI and is precluded from collecting it. The trial court denied Charter One a right to a setoff, finding that Charter One did not assert its right to a setoff in the trial proceedings.\nSection 2 \u2014 608 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:\n\u201c(a) Any claim by one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs, or against one or more codefendants, whether in the nature of setoff, recoupment, cross claim or otherwise, and whether in tort or contract, for liquidated or unliquidated damages, or for other relief, may be pleaded as a cross claim in any action, and when so pleaded shall be called a counterclaim.\n(b) the counterclaim shall be a part of the answer, and shall be designated as a counterclaim. Service of process on parties already before the court is not necessary.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 608 (West 2002).\nOur appellate court has held that although the pleading requirements of section 2 \u2014 608 are framed as permissive, a party cannot be afforded relief without a corresponding pleading. Bartsch v. Gordon N. Plumb, Inc., 138 Ill. App. 3d 188, 200 (1985). A defendant is required to raise a claim for a setoff in the pleadings to give the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to defend against the claim. See Vieweg v. Friedman, 173 Ill. App. 3d 471, 474 (1988), citing Mayfield v. Swafford, 106 Ill. App. 3d 610, 612 (1982).\nAn examination of Charter One\u2019s pleadings reveals that it did not claim any right to a setoff. The first mention of a setoff appears in Charter One\u2019s written closing argument to the trial court. MidAmerica did not have notice or opportunity to defend against Charter One\u2019s setoff claim. Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Charter One\u2019s late request for a setoff. Next we examine whether Mid-America is entitled to loss of interest and attorney fees.\nB. Loss of Interest and Attorney Fees\nMidAmerica contends that the circuit court erred in denying its request to collect loss of interest and attorney fees under section 3 \u2014 411 of the UCC (810 ILCS 5/3\u2014 411(b) (West 2002)). Charter One\u2019s brief before this court did not address this issue.\nThe appellate court did not reach this issue because it held that MidAmerica could not enforce the cashier\u2019s check against Charter One. We therefore remand this cause with directions for the appellate court to address whether the circuit court erred in denying MidAmerica loss of interest and attorney fees under section 3 \u2014 411(b).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nWe hold that Charter One wrongfully dishonored the cashier\u2019s check it issued at Christelle\u2019s request. We therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand this cause to the appellate court to address whether the circuit court erred in denying MidAmerica\u2019s request for loss of interest and attorney fees.\nReversed and remanded with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Patrick J. Williams and Vincent C. Mancini, of Ekl Williams, PLLC, of Lisle, for appellant.", "Richard J. Nogal and Christopher J. Novak, of Gold-stein, Skrodzki, Russian, Nemec & Hoff, Ltd., of Burr Ridge, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 106804.\nMIDAMERICA BANK, FSB, Appellant, v. CHARTER ONE BANK, FSB, et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed March 19, 2009.\nPatrick J. Williams and Vincent C. Mancini, of Ekl Williams, PLLC, of Lisle, for appellant.\nRichard J. Nogal and Christopher J. Novak, of Gold-stein, Skrodzki, Russian, Nemec & Hoff, Ltd., of Burr Ridge, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0560-01", "first_page_order": 570, "last_page_order": 585 }