{ "id": 3623819, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANDRE RICHARDSON, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Richardson", "decision_date": "2009-09-24", "docket_number": "No. 105530", "first_page": "233", "last_page": "266", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 233" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "219 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3598075 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116", "parenthetical": "declining to consider whether admission of the defendant's statements into evidence at trial was harmless error because trial court properly admitted them" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/219/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273948 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" }, { "page": "544" }, { "page": "543" }, { "page": "543" }, { "page": "543" }, { "page": "543-44" }, { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543054 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41-42" }, { "page": "38" }, { "page": "40", "parenthetical": "collecting cases" }, { "page": "40" }, { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3875396 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" }, { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451115 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706257 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "149" }, { "page": "149" }, { "page": "160" }, { "page": "160" }, { "page": "160" }, { "page": "160", "parenthetical": "failing to discern from videotaped statement outward indication that defendant has mental disability" }, { "page": "151" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451664 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736047 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229707 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" }, { "page": "54-55" }, { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55985 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" }, { "page": "500" }, { "page": "500-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126394 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" }, { "page": "525" }, { "page": "525", "parenthetical": "observing that on review of circuit court's suppression ruling reviewing court may consider evidence adduced at trial as well as at suppression hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 104", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6199234 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" }, { "page": "410" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "109" }, { "page": "410" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "410" }, { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5380309 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "\"The constitutional test for the admission of a confession in evidence is whether the confession was made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort\"" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6164855 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" }, { "page": "658" }, { "page": "1492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 428", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413869 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "413" }, { "page": "2331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172008 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" }, { "page": "861-62" }, { "page": "2047" }, { "page": "225-26" }, { "page": "862" }, { "page": "2047" }, { "page": "226" }, { "page": "862" }, { "page": "2047" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/412/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 U.S. 568", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1785545 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" }, { "page": "1057-58" }, { "page": "1879" }, { "page": "602" }, { "page": "1057-58" }, { "page": "1879" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/367/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599731 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820340 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" }, { "page": "445" }, { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 1018", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3592108 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1024", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" }, { "page": "1024" }, { "page": "1024" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/1018-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3358125 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" }, { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2700180 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/4/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 Ill. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5306977 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/400/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926967 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" }, { "page": "146" }, { "page": "149-50" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "147-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. App. 3d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498428 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" }, { "page": "159", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/218/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2443992 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2480426 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/197/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567291 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557", "parenthetical": "collecting cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 S.W.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9944874 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/605/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 So. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9528950 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "collecting cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/410/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 F.3d 394", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 4070883 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/512/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "895 F.2d 378", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10530628 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/895/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Haw. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Haw.", "case_ids": [ 12263026 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143-45" }, { "page": "208-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/haw/92/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Mich. App. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 141035 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/238/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 N.W.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 Md. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 220651 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/346/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "696 A.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 220674, 220651 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/346/0252-01", "/md/346/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5539912 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198-200", "parenthetical": "upholding denial of motion to suppress inculpatory statements; observing that defendant's admission that injury was not result of police brutality can be \"key evidence\" supporting State's explanation for injury" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3525394 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "noting that \"manner in which a defendant answers questions can also be a factor in the totality of the circumstances test\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5379169 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" }, { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857193 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497-502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404417 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3614913 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "finding no error, \"we need not consider the State's harmless-error argument\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450872 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448182 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0069-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1789, "char_count": 60331, "ocr_confidence": 0.852, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2081553424493238e-07, "percentile": 0.5952684886261709 }, "sha256": "da13421ce06a9b358a7aa1af2d0c9f6ef5c17128a556de5d61cfbaf331587e0a", "simhash": "1:bbae88a05f02849b", "word_count": 9717 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:50.922370+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANDRE RICHARDSON, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nDefendant, Andre Richardson, was charged in the circuit court of Cook County with first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000)). Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to a prison term of 40 years. The appellate court reversed defendant\u2019s conviction and remanded for a new trial. 376 Ill. App. 3d 537. We allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings.\nI. BACKGROUND\nDefendant\u2019s conviction arose from events occurring on February 9, 2001. At 2:20 p.m., Chicago Police Officer Michael Hayes and paramedics responded to a call of an injured child at defendant\u2019s home. Defendant told Officer Hayes that the victim, his 11-month-old daughter, Diamond Clark, had fallen in the bathtub. However, the victim exhibited wounds, including human bite marks, that were inconsistent with a fall in a bathtub. Officer Hayes, accompanied by defendant, went to the hospital where the victim was receiving treatment. Upon ascertaining the victim\u2019s condition, Officer Hayes arrested defendant for child abuse or aggravated battery of a child. Officer Hayes brought defendant to the 2nd District police station at 3:35 p.m. At that time, defendant had no marks on his face. Officer Hayes processed the arrest report, and turned defendant and the paperwork over to the lockup keeper. At some point after being brought to the 2nd District police station, defendant received a black eye in the lockup. Sometime after 9:08 p.m., defendant gave an inculpatory statement to police, which he repeated in the presence of a Cook County assistant State\u2019s Attorney sometime after 12:30 a.m. on February 10.\nPrior to trial, defendant sought to suppress the statement he gave to police. His amended motion alleged that defendant had been interrogated by Chicago Police Detectives O\u2019Connell and Zalatoris, Youth Investigator Nolan, and Assistant State\u2019s Attorney John Heil. The motion further alleged that defendant had not been advised of his Miranda rights prior to the interrogation, but rather that he had been informed of his rights only after Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Heil had arrived. The amended motion further alleged that defendant\u2019s \u201cphysical, physiological, mental, educational and/or psychological state, capacity and condition\u201d rendered him unable to appreciate and understand the full meaning of his Miranda rights. The amended motion also alleged:\n\u201cThat the statements sought to be suppressed were obtained as a result of physical coercion illegally directed against the defendant and that such statements were, therefore, involuntary in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Defendant] was grabbed by one of the detectives and pushed onto a stool. The detectives handcuffed [defendant] to the wall. The detectives repeatedly called [defendant\u2019s] mother a bitch, told her to shut up and repeatedly yelled at her. There were two big detectives, one detective was O\u2019Connell. [Defendant] was choked in the lockup where he passed out and hit his face and head and he told [defendant] he would be raped in prison.\u201d\nThe motion alleged additional mental coercion, in that defendant \u201cwas told by the detectives if he made a statement, he would go home\u201d and, prior to questioning, \u201cseveral members of the police department approached and told him that he would never go home.\u201d The circuit court held a hearing on the motion.\nA. Suppression Hearing\nThe State presented the following pertinent testimony from several witnesses. Michael Nolan testified that, on February 9, 2001, he was a youth investigator assigned to Area 1 headquarters of the Chicago police department. His duties included investigating offenses against children and processing juvenile arrests. At approximately 5 p.m., Nolan was assigned to the investigation of defendant\u2019s alleged abuse of his baby daughter. Nolan was also advised that defendant was already in custody at the 2nd District police station, located at 5101 S. Wentworth Avenue. Area 1 of the Chicago police department includes the 2nd District, and Area 1 headquarters is located in the same building as the 2nd District police station. The first floor of the building is known as \u201cthe 2nd District,\u201d while the second floor is known as \u201cArea 1.\u201d Nolan went downstairs to the 2nd District, where he found defendant and the arresting officer, Michael Hayes, in an interview room near the station lockup. Defendant, then 16 years old, was held separated from adult detainees. Nolan spoke with Officer Hayes for a few minutes. Nolan did not notice any facial injuries to defendant.\nNolan then traveled to Wyler Children\u2019s Hospital to ascertain the victim\u2019s condition. He next went to the crime scene at 4837 S. St. Lawrence Avenue, where he met Chicago Police Detectives John Zalatoris and Edward O\u2019Connell. They returned to Area 1 headquarters between 7:30 and 8 p.m. Nolan again found Officer Hayes with defendant in the same interview room in the 2nd District. This time, however, Nolan observed that defendant\u2019s left eye was swollen. Nolan, \u201cvery surprised,\u201d asked Hayes what had happened, but defendant personally answered the question. Defendant told Nolan that \u201cwhile he was being processed in the lockup that one of the lockup personnel struck him in the face,\u201d or \u201csomebody in the lockup punched him in the eye.\u201d Defendant did not ask to go to the hospital and did not complain of any pain. Nolan asked Officer Hayes whether he had contacted his superiors. Hayes informed Nolan that the desk sergeant and the watch commander had been notified, that the incident had been reported to the police department Office of Professional Standards, and that Professional Standards \u201cwas already involved.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s mother, Ellen Gaston Bronaugh, had arrived at the 2nd District. Nolan then had defendant and defendant\u2019s mother brought upstairs to an interview room at Area 1 for questioning. At 9:08 p.m., Nolan and Detectives Zalatoris and O\u2019Connell had a conversation with defendant, who was not handcuffed, in the presence of his mother. Nolan first gave defendant Miranda warnings, and also warned defendant that he could be tried as an adult. Defendant responded that he understood his rights and agreed to give a statement. After defendant gave an innocent explanation, Nolan and the detectives confronted defendant with the several bruises and bite marks on the victim\u2019s body. Defendant then gave an inculpatory statement. This interview lasted between 45 minutes and one hour. A Cook County assistant State\u2019s Attorney was called.\nNolan testified that neither he nor anyone in his presence pushed defendant onto a stool or punched defendant. At no time did defendant fall or hit his head while attempting to avoid the punches of Nolan or anyone in Nolan\u2019s presence. Neither Nolan nor anyone in Nolan\u2019s presence cursed or shouted at defendant\u2019s mother, told defendant that he would never go home or that he would be raped in prison, or told defendant that if he made a statement he could go home.\nDetective Zalatoris testified that on February 9, 2001, at approximately 6 p.m., he and his partner, Detective O\u2019Connell, were assigned to investigate the aggravated battery of a child. They traveled to the crime scene and met Youth Investigator Nolan. Zalatoris learned that defendant was in custody. He, O\u2019Connell, and Nolan returned to Area 1 \u201cmaybe a little bit after\u201d 7 p.m.\nZalatoris first saw defendant as he was being led to an Area 1 interview room. Defendant\u2019s eye was injured. Prior to meeting defendant, Zalatoris already was informed that defendant received a black eye in the lockup. Zalatoris also learned that the 2nd District had already notified the Office of Professional Standards of defendant\u2019s injury. Zalatoris explained that he did not personally document defendant\u2019s injury because Professional Standards was going to investigate and would require 2nd District personnel to explain the injury as opposed to any Area 1 personnel. Office of Professional Standards personnel did arrive at Area 1, but Zalatoris did not recall at what time they tried to speak with defendant. In any event, Zalatoris explained that the criminal investigation superseded the Professional Standards administrative investigation and Professional Standards investigators would have to wait to interview defendant until after the criminal investigation was complete.\nAccording to Zalatoris, defendant and his mother had an opportunity to be alone together prior to the 9:08 p.m. interview. In addition to Zalatoris, defendant and his mother, O\u2019Connell, and Nolan were present. Zalatoris asked defendant how he received his injury, and defendant replied that \u201cone of the guys downstairs hit him in the lockup.\u201d Defendant, or his mother, never complained of any pain regarding his eye and did not want to go to a hospital. Neither Zalatoris nor O\u2019Connell nor Nolan physically assaulted defendant in any way, including punching him, or causing him to fall and hit his head, or pushing him onto a stool. Zalatoris stated that no one threatened defendant in any way, including telling him that he would never go home again, or that he would be raped in prison. No one offered any inducements to defendant, including promises that if he made a statement he could go home. Zalatoris denied that anyone cursed at defendant\u2019s mother or shouted at her. At the conclusion of this interview, all three officers left the room to call a Cook County assistant State\u2019s Attorney. Zalatoris had no further interaction with defendant. That was the extent of Detective Zalatoris\u2019 interaction with defendant.\nDetective O\u2019Connell\u2019s testimony was similar to that of Zalatoris in all material respects. Further, on cross-examination, O\u2019Connell testified that the lockup keeper fingerprints arrestees. Defense counsel asked O\u2019Connell whether defendant told him \u201cthat the person who was fingerprinting him choked him, and that he finally passed out and bang[ed] his head.\u201d O\u2019Connell answered that defendant \u201csaid he just got hit\u201d by the lockup keeper. O\u2019Connell denied that he or any of the officers grabbed or pushed defendant onto a stool, or cursed and shouted at defendant\u2019s mother, or otherwise threatened or coerced defendant to make a statement.\nCook County Assistant State\u2019s Attorney John Heil arrived at Chicago police department Area 1 headquarters at approximately 10 p.m. Heil spoke with Detectives O\u2019Connell and Zalatoris and Youth Investigator Nolan. They told Heil that defendant had a swollen left eye, that the injury occurred in the police station lockup, and that a Professional Standards investigation was under way. Heil, Zalatoris, and Nolan then traveled to Wyler Children\u2019s Hospital to ascertain the victim\u2019s condition. Heil learned that the victim died either when he was leaving the hospital or upon his return to Area 1.\nThey returned to Area 1 at approximately 12:30 a.m. on February 10. Heil, along with O\u2019Connell and Nolan, entered an interview room where defendant was sitting, not handcuffed, beside his mother, Ellen Bronaugh. Heil immediately observed that defendant\u2019s left eye was swollen. Heil introduced himself to defendant and Bronaugh and explained his role as a prosecutor. Heil next gave defendant Miranda warnings, warned defendant that he would be tried as an adult and, according to Nolan\u2019s testimony, informed defendant that the victim had died. Defendant then agreed to speak with Heil. Initially, Heil asked defendant how he received the eye injury. Defendant answered that his eye was injured \u201cwhile he was in the lockup.\u201d Defendant then repeated his oral inculpatory statement. After listening to defendant\u2019s oral statement, Heil asked O\u2019Connell and Nolan to leave the room. With only himself, defendant, and Bronaugh present, Heil then questioned defendant regarding his treatment at Area 1. According to Heil: \u201cDefendant told me he had been treated fine. He indicated to me that what he had been telling me was the truth and had nothing to do with what happened earlier with regard to his eye.\u201d Defendant acknowledged that the detectives provided him with food and drink, restroom access when needed, and time to sleep. Defendant again told Heil that his eye injury \u201chappened while he was in the lockup.\u201d Defendant stated that he was not in pain and did not need medical attention. Heil then asked O\u2019Connell and Nolan back into the interview room. Heil next explained to defendant his options for memorializing his statement. Defendant chose to make a videotaped statement. This session lasted between 30 and 45 minutes.\nAt approximately 9:27 a.m. on February 10, 2001, defendant made a videotaped statement, which was played in open court. The video shows defendant sitting at the head of a small conference table. Sitting on either side of defendant were Heil, O\u2019Connell, Nolan, and defendant\u2019s mother. In the video, defendant received Miranda warnings and stated that his eye injury occurred in the police lockup. It was not caused by the arresting officer or any Area 1 detective. Further, defendant maintained that his statement had nothing to do with his eye injury.\nAnswering Heil\u2019s questions, defendant concluded the statement as follows. Heil and the Area 1 detectives had treated defendant fairly. Defendant\u2019s mother was present during questioning, and the detectives allowed defendant and his mother time alone. Defendant slept, ate, drank, and had restroom access. Defendant denied being under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Neither Heil, Nolan, nor the detectives made any threats or promises to defendant or his mother in exchange for defendant\u2019s statement.\nAt the conclusion of the State\u2019s evidence, the circuit court denied defendant\u2019s motion for a directed finding of suppression. The court reviewed the evidence, including the undisputed evidence of defendant\u2019s injured left eye, his accusation that a police department employee had punched him in the eye in the lockup, and that the Office of Professional Standards was investigating the incident. The court found that defendant did not complain of any pain; he was not handcuffed; he understood and waived his rights; he was never questioned outside the presence of the youth investigator or his mother; and both defendant and his mother appeared \u201ccool, calm, and collected throughout the statement.\u201d The circuit court observed that the motion to suppress alleged that police detectives cursed at defendant\u2019s mother. However, the court found: \u201cI\u2019ve reviewed the statement, watched his mother throughout the 20 minutes, she shakes her head in agreement a few times during the defendant\u2019s statement. At no time [does she] appear[ ] in the least bit agitated, nor does the defendant.\u201d The circuit court then found that the evidence was \u201coverwhelming that he [defendant] was advised of his rights, understood his rights, was not threatened or coerced in any manner to give a statement implicating himself regarding the death of his daughter.\u201d Based on \u201cthe totality of the circumstances,\u201d including \u201call of those involved with the taping of the defendant\u2019s statement, the Court finds it was given freely and voluntarily and not in violation of any of the defendant\u2019s constitutional rights.\u201d The circuit court ruled: \u201cYour motion to grant a motion to suppress at the close of the State\u2019s case is respectfully denied.\u201d The hearing proceeded with the defense presenting its evidence in support of the motion to suppress.\nDefendant\u2019s mother, Ellen Gaston Bronaugh, was the sole defense witness at the suppression hearing. She testified that at approximately 5 p.m. on February 9, 2001, she received a telephone call from police requesting her presence at the 2nd District police station because defendant \u201cwas in trouble.\u201d Upon her arrival, she was taken to a room where she encountered two detectives, two uniformed officers, and defendant, who was handcuffed to a pole. She did not have an opportunity to speak with defendant at that time, but he appeared to have no injuries. A question arose concerning defendant\u2019s age: defendant had told officers that he was 17 years old, but Bronaugh claimed that he was 16 years old. Officers drove Bronaugh to her home to obtain proof of defendant\u2019s age. She returned to the police station in about 20 minutes.\nAt approximately 5:30 p.m., Bronaugh was standing in a hallway speaking with an officer when she heard defendant \u201cscreaming and hollering\u201d from the same room where she had last seen him. Through the open door, she heard defendant shout, \u201cThat mother fucker hit me, put me in a choke hold and I passed out.\u201d Bronaugh entered the room and saw defendant sitting with a single officer. Defendant told Bronaugh that a uniformed guard in the lockup injured him. He complained that the guard \u201cput him in a full Nelson and he passed out.\u201d Bronaugh noticed that defendant \u201chad a big old knot over his eye.\u201d Bronaugh asked defendant how his eye was injured. Defendant responded that he hit his face when he passed out. Upon hearing defendant\u2019s accusation, Bronaugh began complaining to officers and demanding \u201cto talk to somebody.\u201d A sergeant passed by and asked what was wrong. Bronaugh informed him of defendant\u2019s injury. The sergeant spoke with defendant and reported the incident. According to Bronaugh, at no time while she was in the 2nd District police station did anyone question defendant regarding the Diamond Clark investigation.\nSometime later defendant and Bronaugh were moved to a room in Area 1, on the second floor of the building. Defendant was not handcuffed at that time. Three detectives entered the room. Defendant received Miranda warnings, and then the detectives left the room. Alone, defendant told Bronaugh that \u201chis eye was hurting.\u201d The three detectives reentered the room and began questioning defendant regarding the victim\u2019s injuries. Bronaugh repeatedly advised defendant that he was not required to speak with the detectives. According to Bronaugh, this angered one of the detectives: \u201cAnd he got mad at me, he was like, this bitch. I\u2019m like, your mama a bitch.\u201d Bronaugh did not request medical treatment for defendant because they were frightened by the detectives\u2019 rude conduct. Also, Bronaugh repeatedly asked to leave the room to telephone her home because, according to her testimony: \u201cI wanted somebody to know where I was and what was going on.\u201d The detectives told her she had to stay with defendant because he was underage. Bronaugh was allowed to leave the room and make a telephone call subsequent to defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement to Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Heil and prior to his videotaped statement. Further, according to Bronaugh, the detectives told defendant that \u201cif he told what happened on the tape, he could go home with me.\u201d\nHaving heard all of the testimony, the circuit court found: \u201c[T]he defendant\u2019s mother has borne out what the officers said. They advised defendant of his rights. He acknowledged that he understood his rights. He never requested a lawyer. His mother never requested a lawyer. She never requested medical assistance. He never requested medical assistance.\u201d The court ruled: \u201cThe statement was freely and voluntarily given and not depriving the defendant at any time of his constitutional rights. Your motion to suppress the statement is respectfully denied.\u201d Further, prior to jury selection, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the court\u2019s denial of the suppression motion. The court again recounted the evidence adduced at the hearing. The court found that neither defendant nor his mother sought to invoke his rights or seek medical treatment for his eye injury. The court found that none of the arresting officers or the interrogating detectives were involved in the lockup incident, and that the detectives did not question defendant outside the presence of his mother. The court stated that it observed the witnesses and assessed their credibility. The court noted Bronaugh\u2019s testimony that one of the detectives cursed her, but the court observed the cool, calm, and collected demeanor of defendant and Bronaugh as defendant detailed each and every injury to the victim. The court denied the motion to reconsider, finding: \u201cThe State has proven that the statements were not the result of any physical or mental coercion illegally directed against you and they were in fact given voluntarily.\u201d\nB. Trial\nAt the February 2005 trial, the circuit court admitted into evidence defendant\u2019s videotaped inculpatory statement and forensic evidence. The State\u2019s evidence at trial also included the testimony of Cyntoria Clark, the victim\u2019s mother; James Franklin, an eyewitness to some of the beating; Monica Smith, the neighbor who telephoned \u201c911\u201d; Michael Hayes, the arresting officer; and Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Heil.\nDefendant\u2019s inculpatory statement was as follows. On February 8, 2001, the victim, Diamond Clark, was 11 months old and lived with her mother, Cyntoria Clark. Defendant was 16 years old and the victim\u2019s father. That night, defendant picked up the victim for an overnight visit. He returned with the victim to the third-floor apartment where he had stayed for the past three months, located at 4837 S. St. Lawrence Avenue. In the process of giving her a bath, the victim fell in the bathtub and hit the back of her head. Defendant dried and dressed the victim and put her to bed.\nDefendant awoke between 11:45 a.m. and noon on February 9. The victim was still asleep, but Dion Nelson and James Franklin, then 10 years old, were also present. Defendant prepared a bowl of Fruit Loops cereal for Dion and instructed Franklin to prepare a bowl for himself. Defendant then prepared an adult-sized bowl of cereal for the victim. Initially, defendant was feeding the victim on the bed, but defendant then placed the bowl on the floor so the cereal would soften. The victim climbed down and attempted to eat pieces of cereal that had fallen onto the floor. Defendant struck the victim\u2019s hand. The victim continued to eat cereal off of the floor, so defendant bit the victim twice: once on the front shoulder and once on the back shoulder. The victim did not cry and defendant again proceeded to feed her. However, the victim again attempted to eat more pieces of cereal that fell on the floor. This time defendant bit the victim on the stomach. Defendant saw that he left three marks on the victim.\nAfter the victim finished eating the adult-sized bowl of cereal, her stomach was \u201cpoking out,\u201d so defendant \u201cstarted messing with her stomach *** started pushing on her stomach like this, trying to push it in. See how far it gonna go in.\u201d Consequently, the victim threw up, all over the bed, her clothes, and defendant\u2019s leg. Angry, defendant \u201ckarate chopped\u201d the victim\u2019s ribs. Defendant then obtained a plastic clothes hanger and \u201cwhooped her on her butt four times with the hanger.\u201d After defendant \u201cthought about it,\u201d he obtained a belt and hit the victim with that about eight times. Defendant washed the victim and dressed her in fresh clothes. However, the victim again threw up on her clothes. Defendant \u201cwas real angry.\u201d He removed the victim\u2019s jacket, left her shirt on, wiped her with a towel, and then \u201csmacked\u201d her hard in the face.\nDefendant placed the victim in a corner and ordered her to stand facing the wall. The victim kept moving and turning to look at defendant, so he \u201cspanked her on her pamper\u201d about four times. Defendant then placed the victim against a wall facing him and ordered her to stand in place. When she would walk toward defendant, he would return her to the wall ordering her not to move. At one point the victim \u201cstarted getting sleepy or something.\u201d She fell back against the wall, hitting her head, and bounced back on her feet. According to defendant, the victim \u201cjust started acting drunk and sleepy,\u201d and then fainted. Defendant then picked up the victim, called her name, and shook her \u201cpretty hard,\u201d without supporting her head. While he was shaking the victim, her head hit a window casement and a windowsill. The victim stopped breathing. Defendant ran to the kitchen and threw water on the victim\u2019s face, but to no avail. He then sent Franklin to his downstairs neighbor, Monica Smith, for help. Defendant attempted CPR while Smith telephoned 911. Defendant revived the victim.\nThe State presented the following forensic evidence. Dr. Lawrence Cogan performed the autopsy on the victim. Dr. Cogan distinguished the marks on the victim\u2019s body related to hospital treatment from the victim\u2019s injuries that occurred prior to hospitalization. The autopsy revealed 61 injuries, both external and internal. The injuries included several bite marks on the chest and head, with some superimposed over each other, and a probable bite mark on the shoulder. Multiple bruises and slap marks were on the head and face; the sides and top of the head had bruising, abrasions, and general swelling. There were abrasions and contusions on the Ups and chin, and hemorrhages in the right eyelid and eye. Injuries further included contusions on the back of the head, parallel contusions across the face matching the imprint of a hand, and small oval contusions on the cheek, jaw, and back of the head indicative of finger impressions. Injuries further included abrasions on the right hand; a right-side rib fracture; defensive bruises on the left forearm; multiple elongated marks, quarter-inch wide, horizontal and criscrossed on the buttocks, consistent with being struck with a rod-like instrument; hemorrhage in the brain, cervical spine, diaphragm, lung, liver, and thigh. The back of the heart was bruised and the Ever was torn and bleeding into the abdomen.\nDr. Cogan opined that the cause of death was multiple injuries due to assault. Dr. Cogan explained that the manner of death is classified in five categories: natural, accidental, suicide, homicide, and undetermined. Dr. Cogan classified the victim\u2019s death as homicide because her injuries were inflicted by someone and were not self-inflicted, and they did not occur naturally or accidentally.\nThe defense never contended that police extracted defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement through physical and mental coercion. Rather, defendant\u2019s theory of the case, as indicated by his opening statement and closing argument, was that the victim\u2019s death was a tragic accident. Defendant had no idea of the harm he was doing to the victim. In her opening statement, defense counsel merely explained to the jury that, when it viewed defendant\u2019s videotaped statement, defendant would exhibit a black eye because a poEce department employee assaulted him at the poEce station. Defendant was the sole witness for the defense. He testified that his videotaped statement was true, except for hitting the victim with a belt, which defendant testified that he did not do. Further, during the State\u2019s cross-examination of defendant, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cQ. [Prosecutor] But you\u2019re saying today that you never went and got a belt and whipped her [the victim] with a belt.\nA. No.\nQ. So that part of the video is not true.\nA. Yes.\nQ. But everything else on the video is true.\nA. Yes.\nQ. Well, you had an opportunity at the video to say whatever you wanted, right?\nA. Yes.\nQ. They let you tell what happened, right? Isn\u2019t that correct?\nA. Yes.\nQ. You told them what happened.\nA. Yeah.\u201d\nLastly, in closing argument, defense counsel argued:\n\u201cHe [defendant] says to you today \u2014 he could have gotten up here and minimized and said no. The cops beat me up and I just made up that whole lie because they coerced me into saying that and you can even see this black eye but he didn\u2019t. He told you what happened and he also told you that he didn\u2019t mean for it to happen. He didn\u2019t intend for it to happen.\u201d\nDefense counsel argued to the jury: \u201cHe [defendant] is telling you the truth.\u201d\nAt the close of the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict of guilty of first degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the circuit court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 40 years.\nOn appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the circuit court erred in denying the pretrial motion to suppress his inculpatory statement. The appellate court was not convinced that the injury defendant suffered did not ultimately result in his inculpatory statement and, consequently, concluded that defendant\u2019s statement should have been suppressed. 376 Ill. App. 3d at 544. Viewing its conclusion as dispositive, the court held: \u201cDefendant\u2019s conviction must be reversed and remanded for a new trial because the use of a coerced confession is never harmless error.\u201d 376 Ill. App. 3d at 544, citing People v. Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d 29, 41-42 (1987).\nThe State appeals. Additional pertinent facts will be discussed in the context of the issues raised on appeal.\nII. ANALYSIS\nBefore this court, the State first contends that defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement was voluntary and not coerced. The State alternatively contends that if we conclude that defendant\u2019s statement was involuntary, then its admission into evidence at trial was harmless error. We agree with the State\u2019s first contention.\nA. Controlling Principles\nReview of a circuit court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress presents both questions of law and fact. In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 373 (2005); People v. Smith, 214 Ill. 2d 338, 347 (2005). Findings of fact and credibility determinations made by the circuit court are accorded great deference and will be reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008); Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d at 373. This deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that the circuit court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe the witnesses\u2019 demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 151; People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 512 (2004). However, a court reviews de novo the ultimate legal question posed by the challenge to the circuit court\u2019s ruling on the suppression motion. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 149; People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 116 (2005); In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50 (2000). Further, the reviewing court may consider evidence adduced at trial as well as at the suppression hearing. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 149; People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 501 (1996); People v. King, 109 Ill. 2d 514, 525 (1986).\nThe amended motion to suppress alleged that defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement was involuntary under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees that no state shall \u201cdeprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. XIV, \u00a71. The United States Supreme Court \u201chas long held that certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause.\u201d Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109, 88 L. Ed. 2d 405, 410, 106 S. Ct. 445, 449 (1985). Courts frame the legal inquiry usually through asking whether the defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary. Miller, 474 U.S. at 109, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 410, 106 S. Ct. at 449; People v. Davis, 35 Ill. 2d 202, 205 (1966) (\u201cThe constitutional test for the admission of a confession in evidence is whether the confession was made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort\u201d). Also, the fifth amendment commands in pertinent part that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself. U.S. Const., amend. V The fifth amendment\u2019s self-incrimination clause applies to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653, 658, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1492 (1964). However, the Court continues to measure confessions against the requirements of due process and to exclude involuntary confessions. Dicker son v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405, 413, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2331 (2000); Miller, 474 U.S. at 110, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 410, 106 S. Ct. at 449.\nThe \u201cCourt\u2019s decisions reflect a frank recognition that the Constitution requires the sacrifice of neither security nor liberty. The Due Process Clause does not mandate that the police forgo all questioning, or that they be given carte blanche to extract what they can from a suspect.\u201d Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 861-62, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047 (1973). Rather:\n\u201c \u2018The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.\u2019 \u201d Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 862, 93 S. Ct. at 2047, quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037, 1057-58, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 1879 (1961).\nThis court has likewise stated: \u201cThe test of voluntariness is \u2018whether the defendant made the statement freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the defendant\u2019s will was overcome at the time he or she confessed.\u2019 \u201d Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 160, quoting Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 500; see G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54.\nIn determining whether a statement is voluntary, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances of the particular case; no single factor is dispositive. Factors to consider include the defendant\u2019s age, intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity, education, and physical condition at the time of questioning; the legality and duration of the detention; the presence of Miranda warnings; the duration of the questioning; and any physical or mental abuse by police, including the existence of threats or promises. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 160; Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 500-01; People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 447-48 (1992); accord Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 862, 93 S. Ct. at 2047.\nAlso, where the defendant is a juvenile, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the statement was not coerced or suggested, and that the statement was not the result of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54 (and cases cited therein). Therefore the determination of voluntariness must include the \u201cconcerned adult\u201d factor, which considers whether the juvenile, either before or during the interrogation, had an opportunity to consult with an adult interested in the juvenile\u2019s welfare. This factor also considers whether the police prevented the juvenile from conferring with a concerned adult and whether the police frustrated the parents\u2019 attempt to confer with the juvenile. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54-55.\nWhere a defendant challenges the admissibility of an inculpatory statement through a motion to suppress, the State bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statement was voluntary. 725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 11(d) (West 2000); Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 160; Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d at 38; King, 109 Ill. 2d at 525. The State carries the initial burden of making a prima facie case that the statement was voluntary. Once the State makes its prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defense to produce some evidence that the confession was involuntary (People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 445 (1992)), and the burden reverts to the State only upon such production by the defense. See People v. Lopez, 114 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1024 (1983) (and cases cited therein); People v. Slaughter, 59 Ill. App. 3d 159, 161 (1978). However: \u201cThis court has held that when it is evident that a defendant has been injured while in police custody, the State must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the injuries were not inflicted as a means of producing the confession.\u201d Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d at 40 (collecting cases). In People v. La Frana, 4 Ill. 2d 261, 267 (1954), this court explained:\n\u201cWhere the only evidence of coercion is the defendant\u2019s own testimony, and where this is contradicted by witnesses for the People, then of course the trial court may choose to believe the latter, and our recognition of the superior position of the trial court to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses before it makes us reluctant to reverse its determination. [Citations.] But where it is conceded, or clearly established, that the defendant received injuries while in police custody, and the only issue is how and why they were inflicted, we have held that something more than a mere denial by the police of coercion is required. Under such circumstances the burden of establishing that the injuries were not administered in order to obtain the confession, can be met only by clear and convincing testimony as to the manner of their occurrence.\u201d\nAccord People v. Thomlison, 400 Ill. 555, 561-62 (1948). Also, where it is established or conceded that the defendant\u2019s injury occurred while in police custody, the focus is not on the credibility of the defendant\u2019s account of the injury, but rather on \u201cwhether the State satisfied its burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant\u2019s injuries were not inflicted as a means of producing defendant\u2019s confession.\u201d People v. Woods, 184 Ill. 2d 130, 149 (1998).\nPursuant to the \u201cWilson\u201d rule, the clear and convincing standard applies to factual situations where it is established or conceded that the defendant was assaulted after coming into police custody, but the sole witnesses to the custody, usually police officers, deny any knowledge of how the defendant was injured. Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, such passive denials could allow the State to prevail without establishing the actual circumstances surrounding the confession. The Wilson rule deems the preponderance standard to be inadequate and replaces it with the clear and convincing evidence standard. See People v. Case, 218 Ill. App. 3d 146, 155 (1991). It must be remembered that a standard of proof is concerned only with the quantum and quality of evidence that a party must present to prevail on an issue. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 355 (2004). Ultimately, the constitutional test for the admission of a confession into evidence remains whether the confession was voluntary. See Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 1057-58, 81 S. Ct. at 1879; Davis, 35 Ill. 2d at 205.\nB. Application: Defendant\u2019s Eye Injury\nIn the present case, absent defendant\u2019s black eye, the State would have been required to prove the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement by a preponderance of the evidence. Where the only evidence of coercion would have been Bronaugh\u2019s testimony, which was contradicted by the State\u2019s witnesses, the circuit court would have been presented solely with an issue of witness credibility, and a reviewing court would have been reluctant to reverse such a determination. However, because it is undisputed that defendant was injured in police custody, the State was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant\u2019s eye injury was not inflicted as a means of producing his inculpatory statement. For example: \u201cIf the defendant were injured in the lock up, the State could have one of its officers testify to that effect.\u201d (Emphasis added.) People v. Smith, 197 Ill. App. 3d 226, 231 (1989). Unlike Smith, where the State \u201cdid not produce any evidence of how defendant was injured\u201d (Smith, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 231), in the present case, this is exactly how defendant was injured and the State proved it by undisputed evidence.\nAt the suppression hearing, Nolan, Zalatoris, and O\u2019Connell did not merely deny defendant\u2019s allegations that they assaulted him, or deny any knowledge of how defendant was injured. The State\u2019s clear and convincing burden of proof required \u201c \u2018more than the mere denial by the State\u2019s witnesses that the confession was coerced.\u2019 \u201d Woods, 184 Ill. 2d at 146, quoting Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d at 40; see Smith, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 231. Rather, the State\u2019s witnesses related defendant\u2019s accusation that the lockup keeper assaulted him. With only Heil, defendant, and Bronaugh in the interview room, defendant stated that his eye injury occurred in the police station lockup, and that he had been \u201ctreated fine\u201d at Area 1. Defendant told Heil that his statement was the truth and had nothing to do with his eye injury. Bronaugh testified that defendant complained of a uniformed guard injuring him in the police station lockup, rather than Area 1 detectives. Also, at the beginning of his videotaped statement, defendant himself explained that: his eye injury occurred in the police station lockup; no Area 1 detective inflicted the injury; and his statement was unrelated to his eye injury.\nIn concluding that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that defendant\u2019s injury was unrelated to his inculpatory statement, the appellate court considered the facts of People v. Woods to be similar to the facts of this case. 376 Ill. App. 3d at 543. In Woods, it was undisputed that the defendant sustained injuries to his face while in police custody. Also, during that time, the defendant was either in the presence of police officers or in a single-person holding cell. The defendant moved to suppress his confession contending that it was involuntary. This court concluded that the State should have been able to prove the cause of the defendant\u2019s injuries and whether they occurred before or after his confession. This court held that the confession should have been suppressed because the State failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence as to when or how the defendant was injured, or that the defendant\u2019s injuries were unrelated to his confession. Woods, 184 Ill. 2d at 149-50.\nWoods is distinguishable from this case. The record before us contains clear and convincing evidence, including defendant\u2019s own testimony, that establishes that defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement was unrelated to his injury. Further, Woods explicitly rejects a per se rule that any unexplained injury suffered by a defendant in police custody renders the defendant\u2019s statement inadmissible. Woods, 184 Ill. 2d at 147. This court has recognized that the taint of earlier coercive circumstances can be attenuated, thereby rendering a subsequent statement voluntary. See People v. Strickland, 129 Ill. 2d 550, 557 (1989) (collecting cases). In Woods, this court adhered to our past decisions holding that where a defendant establishes that he has been injured while in police custody, the State may present \u201cclear and convincing evidence that \u2018the injuries were not inflicted as a means of producing the confession.\u2019 Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d at 40.\u201d Woods, 184 Ill. 2d at 147-48.\nOur admonition in Woods reflects the general understanding that \u201c[a] confession is not rendered inadmissible as a matter of law because of an assault upon the defendant which occurred prior to, disconnected with, and apparently unrelated to the subsequent confession.\u201d Barton v. State, 605 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); accord Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. App. 1982) (collecting cases). Although physical force is certainly a defining circumstance, and possibly a dispositive one, its incidental use can sometimes be excused where the other circumstances surrounding the interview show a voluntary confession. The relevant inquiry is the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2008). Courts look to factors such as gaps in time between the use of force and the confession, changed interrogators or location, and renewed Miranda warnings. See, e.g., Upton, 512 F.3d at 399; Wilson v. O\u2019Leary, 895 F.2d 378, 384-85 (7th Cir. 1990); State v. Gella, 92 Haw. 135, 143-45, 988 P.2d 200, 208-10 (1999); People v. Wells, 238 Mich. App. 383, 389, 605 N.W.2d 374, 378 (1999); Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 261-68, 696 A.2d 443, 447-51 (1997).\nIn the present case, our review of the entire record supports the circuit court\u2019s finding of voluntariness. Defendant arrived at the 2nd District police station at 3:35 p.m. on February 9, 2001. Between 5 and 5:30 p.m., defendant received a black eye in the police station lockup from someone who did not receive defendant\u2019s statement. Although Youth Investigator Nolan saw defendant prior to his injury, Nolan did not question defendant regarding the investigation at that time. Further, defendant was already injured when Detectives Zalatoris and O\u2019Connell first met defendant and his mother.\nAlso, defendant was interviewed at Area 1, which was a different location from where he was injured. Nolan, Zalatoris, and O\u2019Connell first interviewed defendant at 9:08 p.m., which was between SVa and 4 hours after the injury. This interview lasted only between 45 minutes and one hour. At approximately 12:30 a.m. on February 10, defendant repeated his inculpatory statement to Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Heil, Nolan, and O\u2019Connell in a session lasting only between 30 and 45 minutes. At approximately 9:27 a.m., defendant made a videotaped statement. Significantly, defendant\u2019s statement was taken in the presence of his mother and Youth Investigator Nolan. Further, according to Bronaugh\u2019s testimony, she repeatedly told defendant that he did not have to speak to the detectives.\nAt every opportunity to speak, defendant repeatedly: identified his assailant as the lockup keeper, rather than the detectives as alleged in the amended motion to suppress; and asserted that his black eye had nothing to do with his statement. Further, defendant never indicated that he gave his statement because of the fact of being hit, or any fear based on being hit. Defendant repeatedly acknowledged that Area 1 detectives provided him with food and drink, restroom access when needed, and time to sleep. See, e.g., People v. Moats, 89 Ill. App. 3d 194, 198-200 (1980) (upholding denial of motion to suppress inculpatory statements; observing that defendant\u2019s admission that injury was not result of police brutality can be \u201ckey evidence\u201d supporting State\u2019s explanation for injury). Indeed, at defendant\u2019s first interview, which occurred after the incident in the lockup, defendant initially did not admit culpability. It was only after being confronted with the victim\u2019s bruises and bite marks did defendant give his inculpatory statement, which supports the conclusion that the incident in the lockup was unrelated to the inculpatory statement. See People v. Williams, 128 Ill. App. 3d 384, 392 (1984) (noting that \u201cmanner in which a defendant answers questions can also be a factor in the totality of the circumstances test\u201d). The circuit court found that defendant and his mother appeared \u201ccool, calm, and collected\u201d throughout his videotaped statement as defendant detailed the injuries he inflicted on the victim. Further, our own review of defendant\u2019s videotaped statement confirms this credibility finding. See Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 160 (failing to discern from videotaped statement outward indication that defendant has mental disability).\nLastly, at trial, defendant could have recanted the voluntariness of his inculpatory statement, as he recanted a minor factual detail in the statement, but he did not. Indeed, during his trial testimony, defendant expressly conceded that his inculpatory statement was voluntary. See, e.g., King, 109 Ill. 2d at 525 (observing that on review of circuit court\u2019s suppression ruling reviewing court may consider evidence adduced at trial as well as at suppression hearing).\nWe note that the appellate court, in contrast, concluded that \u201cthe State failed to meet its burden to show that defendant\u2019s injuries were unrelated to his confession. *** There simply was no evidence presented by the State at the hearing on the motion that explained how or why defendant was injured in police custody.\u201d 376 Ill. App. 3d at 543. We disagree, based on the above-discussed uncontradicted evidence in the entire record.\nNoting that defendant told Nolan, Zalatoris, and O\u2019Connell that a lockup keeper punched him in the face, the appellate court opined: \u201cNot one of them attempted to elicit additional information from defendant regarding his injury, nor did any notation of the injury appear in any reports.\u201d 376 Ill. App. 3d at 543. However, this was not necessary for the State to meet its dual burden of going forward with the evidence and proving the inculpatory statement voluntary. It was necessary only for the prosecution to make a prima facie case before defendant was required to present some evidence. See Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d at 445; People v. Strayhorn, 35 Ill. 2d 41, 46 (1965). That said, we observe that while defendant was being interviewed, the Office of Professional Standards was investigating the lockup incident. The detectives did not document defendant\u2019s eye injury because: Professional Standards was doing so; and, by defendant\u2019s own accusation, the incident involved 2nd District personnel and not Area 1 personnel. Indeed, early in the suppression hearing, defense counsel received a copy of the Professional Standards file.\nFurther, we note that the appellate court improperly rejected defendant\u2019s own testimony that the lockup incident was unrelated to his inculpatory statement:\n\u201cAssuming that defendant was injured while in the lockup, here, we have a somewhat unintelligent, unsophisticated juvenile who has been injured while in police custody after being arrested on suspicion of murder. After being arrested, defendant was not free to leave and was therefore at the mercy of the police personnel involved in this case. We are not convinced that, given the facts of this case, defendant would be able to separate the fear associated with being punched by police personnel from any subsequent interactions with police officers or detectives involved in this case. In addition, it is particularly troubling that personnel from the Office of Professional Standards were prevented from speaking with defendant regarding his injury until after defendant gave the videotaped statement. Consequently, we are not convinced that the injury defendant suffered did not ultimately result in the statement wherein he inculpated himself in the death of his daughter.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) 376 Ill. App. 3d at 543-44.\nThis reasoning does not accord with the record.\nFirst, defendant was not \u201carrested on suspicion of murder.\u201d Defendant arrived at the 2nd District police station on February 9, 2001, at 3:35 p.m. He was under arrest for child abuse or aggravated battery of a child. The appellate court itself so recognized. 376 Ill. App. 3d at 539 n.1. When defendant was questioned beginning at 9:08 p.m., the victim was still alive. Heil had already been summoned to receive defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement when the victim died at 11:45 p.m.\nSecond, defendant presented no evidence of residual fear resulting from the lockup incident. Further, if defendant did harbor such residual fear, the record shows that it was dispelled by the 9:08 p.m. interview. There, defendant did not behave as if his will was overborne due to residual fear. Rather, defendant initially denied his culpability until he was confronted with the victim\u2019s bruises and bite marks.\nThird, the appellate court vaguely characterized defendant as \u201ca somewhat unintelligent, unsophisticated juvenile.\u201d Also, before this court, defendant\u2019s brief opens with a fleeting reference to defendant as \u201cmentally retarded.\u201d A defendant\u2019s youth and subnormal intelligence do not ipso facto render the defendant\u2019s confession involuntary. People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489, 497-502 (1968). While mental deficiency, by itself, does not render an inculpatory statement involuntary, it is a factor that must be considered in the totality of the circumstances under which the defendant waived Miranda rights or made an inculpatory statement. People v. Turner, 56 Ill. 2d 201, 206 (1973).\nIn the present case, prior to filing a motion to suppress, the defense retained a private expert to examine defendant \u201cas to his ability to waive Miranda and some psychological issues.\u201d At the suppression hearing, once the State made its prima facie case of voluntariness, defendant was required to present some evidence on this issue. See, e.g., Lopez, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 1024; Slaughter, 59 Ill. App. 3d at 161. However, at the suppression hearing, defendant presented no evidence or argument of any mental deficiency that would render his inculpatory statement involuntary, and the circuit court made no findings relating thereto.\nFurther, the constant presence of defendant\u2019s mother and Youth Investigator Nolan cannot be overlooked. The ability to confer with a parent or other concerned adult is a relevant factor to consider in determining the voluntariness of a juvenile\u2019s statement. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 55. In the present case, Bronaugh was with defendant from shortly after the lockup incident between 5 and 5:30 p.m. on February 9. Indeed, Bronaugh complained that the detectives did not allow her to telephone her family to inform them where she was. However, the detectives explained to her that she had to stay with defendant because he was a juvenile. Bronaugh did not leave defendant until he gave his inculpatory statement to Heil in the early morning of February 10. See, e.g., Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 59 (noting presence of defendant\u2019s mother during questioning as circumstance in favor of upholding finding of voluntariness). On this record, we conclude that defendant\u2019s youth and mental capacity did not render his inculpatory statement involuntary.\nDefendant specifically alleged that the detectives physically assaulted him in order to extract his inculpatory statement. However, absent defendant\u2019s undisputed eye injury, none of the evidence of record, even testimony presented by the defense, supports this allegation. \u201cJust as a court may not ignore a defendant\u2019s uncontroverted testimony that a confession was a product of specific acts of physical or mental coercion, so it may not ignore uncontroverted testimony by the State establishing the voluntariness of a confession.\u201d Lopez, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 1024. We conclude that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the manner of defendant\u2019s eye injury, thereby establishing that the injury was not inflicted to obtain his inculpatory statement.\nC. Defendant\u2019s Remaining Allegations\nThe amended motion to suppress additionally alleged that the detectives repeatedly: cursed and shouted at defendant\u2019s mother and \u201ctold her to shut up\u201d; told defendant that \u201che would be raped in prison\u201d; and told defendant that \u201cif he made a statement, he would go home.\u201d The motion also alleged that \u201cseveral members of the police department approached him and told him that he would never go home.\u201d However, in their testimony, Nolan, Zalatoris, and O\u2019Connell each denied that he, or anyone in his presence, committed the alleged acts. In denying the motion to suppress, the circuit court expressly assessed the credibility of the witnesses. Regarding the alleged invective hurled at Bronaugh, her own testimony plainly shows that, rather than being cowed, she simply returned the epithet to the detective. The circuit court specifically found that in defendant\u2019s videotaped statement Bronaugh appeared cool, calm, collected, and not in the least bit agitated.\nAfter reviewing the entire record, we conclude that there is no evidence that defendant\u2019s will was overborne. In rejecting the allegations of the amended motion to suppress, the circuit court plainly found the State\u2019s witnesses to be more credible. As stated, findings of fact and credibility determinations made by the circuit court are accorded great deference because that court is in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses, to assess their credibility, and to give the appropriate weight to the evidence. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 151. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the circuit court that defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement was voluntary, and we uphold the circuit court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his inculpatory statement. Consequently, we decline the State\u2019s invitation to discuss whether the admission of defendant\u2019s statement into evidence at trial was harmless error. See, e.g., People v. Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d 104, 116 (2006) (declining to consider whether admission of the defendant\u2019s statements into evidence at trial was harmless error because trial court properly admitted them); Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d at 447 (same); Case, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 159 (same); accord People v. Brown, 229 Ill. 2d 374, 392 (2008) (finding no error, \u201cwe need not consider the State\u2019s harmless-error argument\u201d).\nFurther, the appellate court did not address all of the issues raised by defendant on appeal because it considered the suppression issue dispositive. 376 Ill. App. 3d at 544. Therefore, we remand the cause to the appellate court for consideration of defendant\u2019s remaining contentions. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 222 (2005); People v. Rosenberg, 213 Ill. 2d 69, 82 (2004).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the cause remanded to the appellate court for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nThe victim later died of her injuries at 11:45 p.m.\nSee 725 ILCS 5/114\u201411(d) (West 2000) (\u201cThe burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of proving that a confession was voluntary shall be on the State\u201d); People v. Strayhorn, 35 Ill. 2d 41, 46 (1965).\nEarly in the course of the State\u2019s presentation of its evidence, the circuit court received the Professional Standards file on the lockup incident pursuant to defense counsel\u2019s subpoena. After an in camera inspection, the court concluded that the Professional Standards file was relevant to whether defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement was voluntary. Accordingly, the court tendered the file to the defense.\nTrial testimony explained that defendant resided in an apartment that belonged to Litrish Nelson, who was the sister of defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s boyfriend. Defendant, who did not attend school, lived with Nelson to babysit her three children, one of whom was three-year-old Dion. On the morning of February 9, 2001, Franklin was brought to Nelson\u2019s apartment by his mother. Franklin was to spend the day there because he had been suspended from school. Nelson and Franklin\u2019s mother left the apartment, leaving defendant, the victim, Dion, and Franklin.\nWilson did not create this long-standing rule, but merely applied it. This heightened burden of proof could be labeled the \u201cWilson/La Frana/Thomlison\u201d rule.\nPerhaps the Professional Standards file prompted the following colloquy at the suppression hearing during defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Nolan:\n\u201cQ. Are you aware that the complaint against the detention aid or the lockup keeper aid was sustained?\n[Prosecutor]: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Sustained.\u201d\nIndeed, the issue of defendant\u2019s mental capacity was not raised until sentencing.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine and Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorneys, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Ashley A. Romito, Annette Collins and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, and Melissa C. Chiang, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 105530.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANDRE RICHARDSON, Appellee.\nOpinion filed September 24, 2009.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine and Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorneys, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Ashley A. Romito, Annette Collins and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, and Melissa C. Chiang, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0233-01", "first_page_order": 245, "last_page_order": 278 }