{ "id": 3623874, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. WALTER KLEPPER, Appellee and Cross-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Klepper", "decision_date": "2009-03-19", "docket_number": "No. 105719", "first_page": "337", "last_page": "359", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 337" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462585 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448", "parenthetical": "holding that a jurisdictional challenge previously addressed by this court in a supervisory order had become the law of the case on a subsequent jurisdictional challenge" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578232 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610746 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" }, { "page": "83" }, { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828618 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687-88, 694" }, { "page": "693, 698" }, { "page": "2064, 2068" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780271 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261329 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4059996 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "because charging instrument was not defective, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge it" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 308", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174956 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096300 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550782 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 U.S. 474", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8871 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/360/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 U.S. 673", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6207521 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" }, { "page": "683" }, { "page": "1435" }, { "page": "679" }, { "page": "683" }, { "page": "1435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/475/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 15", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6196542 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" }, { "page": "19" }, { "page": "294" }, { "page": "20" }, { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 F.2d 821", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 281525 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "827" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/475/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415421 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" }, { "page": "498" }, { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619166 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0179-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1222, "char_count": 34966, "ocr_confidence": 0.849, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0620610345012543e-07, "percentile": 0.5573531507049253 }, "sha256": "d695b07ba41b9edcd19e70ed7ef007c11d554e0ab609c471098e67b6c1578f8d", "simhash": "1:8bf2debe23b456fa", "word_count": 5666 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:50.922370+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. WALTER KLEPPER, Appellee and Cross-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE FITZGERALD\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nThis matter arises out of a conversation that defendant, Walter Klepper, had with a police officer. According to the police officer, defendant falsely told the officer that defendant\u2019s neighbor had tried to run him over with a truck. The State charged defendant with felony disorderly conduct (720 ILCS 5/26 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 2006)). After a bench trial, the circuit court of Kendall County found defendant guilty. The trial court declined to impose a felony sentence after finding a violation of the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711) and instead imposed a misdemeanor sentence. The State appealed the constitutional ruling directly to this court. Defendant filed a cross-appeal. We find in favor of the State and reverse.\nBACKGROUND\nOn February 17, 2006, defendant called the Kendall County \u201c911\u201d line to relate an incident involving Edward Boone, a neighbor. He stated that Boone had attempted to run him over with a truck on Willow Springs Lane, in the town of Plano. An officer arrived at the scene and was told by defendant that Boone had attempted to run him over and Boone had missed defendant by a distance of IV2 feet. As the officer stood with defendant in the spot of the incident, the officer observed a surveillance camera in a window of defendant\u2019s other nearby property. The officer requested defendant to show him the video, and, according to the officer, defendant reluctantly agreed. The officer testified that the video showed defendant walking to and from the roadway. After defendant had disappeared from the video, Boone\u2019s vehicle drove past.\nThe officer interviewed Boone, as well as another neighbor, Deanna Berard, who stated she was watching from her kitchen window and heard defendant\u2019s call to 911 on her police scanner. Both confirmed the events as seen by the officer on the video and denied the accuracy of defendant\u2019s statements.\nThe State charged defendant by information with disorderly conduct (720 ILCS 5/26 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 2006)), a Class 4 felony, for falsely reporting to an officer than an offense had been committed. Defendant rejected the State\u2019s offer to plead to a misdemeanor despite his counsel\u2019s warning that a felony conviction could negatively affect his chiropractor\u2019s license. At trial, the court heard the tape of defendant\u2019s 911 call. On the recording, defendant states that he was a pedestrian placing his vehicle into his garage when Edward Boone aimed his truck at him and tried to run him down. He stated that he previously had multiple incidents with Boone. The trial court also heard the testimony of the officer, Boone, Berard, and defendant. This testimony was consistent with their previous statements. The court received from these and other witnesses\u2019 testimony of the \u201cbad blood\u201d between these residents of Willow Springs Lane, particularly as to Boone and defendant. Further, the ongoing feud among the neighbors was well known among the officers of Kendall County. The trial court permitted brief testimony as to certain specific incidents of the feud, but declined to allow defense counsel to explore the matter extensively on cross-examination.\nThe trial court found defendant guilty of disorderly conduct (720 ILCS 5/26 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 2006)) on March 6, 2007. Defendant filed a posttrial motion, which, inter alia, challenged the constitutionality of subsection 26\u2014 1(a)(4). Defendant claimed that section 26 \u2014 1(a)(4), which punishes a false report to a police officer as a felony, applied to the same conduct as section 26\u2014 l(a)(12), which punishes a false complaint to 911 as a misdemeanor. 720 ILCS 5/26 \u2014 1(b) (West 2006). According to counsel, the elements of subsections (a)(4) and (a) (12) are virtually identical. On August 14, 2007, the court held section 26 \u2014 1(a)(4) (720 ILCS 5/26 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 2006)) unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711) when compared with section 26\u2014 l(a)(12) (720 ILCS 5/26 \u2014 l(a)(12) (West 2006)). Consequently, the court found defendant guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. 720 ILCS 5/26 \u2014 1(a)(12), (b) (West 2006). The court continued the matter for a sentencing hearing. On September 13, 2007, the court sentenced defendant to a term of one year\u2019s probation.\nThe State filed a notice of appeal. After the clerk of this court rejected the State\u2019s notice of leave to appeal for lack of compliance with Rule 18, the circuit court entered a Rule 18 compliant order on November 30. Defendant filed a motion with this court arguing that the appeal should be dismissed because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the November 30 order. We denied this motion.\nANALYSIS\nThe parties have presented us with the following issues: (1) whether this court may retain jurisdiction over this case; (2) whether the State waived its challenge to the trial court\u2019s constitutional ruling by proceeding to sentencing; (3) whether section 26 \u2014 1(a)(4) (a Class 4 felony) violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970; (4) whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the information before trial; and (5) whether defendant was deprived of the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses for potential bias against him.\nJurisdiction\nBefore considering the merits of the appeal, we must initially consider defendant\u2019s renewed challenge to this court\u2019s jurisdiction. As previously stated, defendant was found guilty on March 7, 2007. The case was continued, and the trial court found subsection (a)(4) unconstitutional on August 14, 2007. At an August 31 court date, the State filed a motion to reconsider the court\u2019s August 14 order. On September 13, the trial court denied this motion and sentenced defendant to a term of one year\u2019s probation. The trial court explained that it found defendant guilty under section 26 \u2014 1(a)(4)\u2014the offense with which he was charged \u2014 but given the proportionate penalties violation, imposed a Class A misdemeanor. However, the August 14 and September 13 orders made no further findings in order to comply with Supreme Court Rule 18 (210 Ill. 2d R. 18). The State filed its first Notice of Appeal from this ruling on October 11, 2007, and defendant filed his Notice of Cross-Appeal on October 19, 2007.\nOn October 24, 2007, the clerk of this court issued a letter stating that the notice of appeal would not be filed and docketed in the supreme court for want of compliance with Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(3) (210 Ill. 2d R. 303(b)(3)) or Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603) and Supreme Court Rule 606(d)(8) (210 Ill. 2d R. 606(d)(8)). These rules direct that the notices of appeal from orders finding statutes unconstitutional shall conform with the directives of Supreme Court Rule 18 (210 Ill. 2d R. 18). On November 5, 2007, the State filed a motion to amend the order of September 13.\nThe circuit court granted this motion and filed an order on November 30, 2007, in compliance with Rule 18 (210 Ill. 2d R. 18).\nOn December 3, 2007, the State filed a notice of appeal which referenced the November 30, 2007, September 13, 2007, and August 13, 2007, orders. The State attached the November 30 order granting the motion to amend and declaring section 26 \u2014 1(a)(4) unconstitutional in compliance with Rule 18. Defendant filed a notice of cross-appeal on December 11, 2007. Defendant\u2019s notice of cross-appeal referenced defendant\u2019s conviction on March 6, 2007, the initial finding of unconstitutionality on August 13, 2007, his sentence on September 13, 2007, and the supplemental order of statutory unconstitutionality entered on November 30, 2007.\nDefendant then filed a motion to dismiss the State\u2019s appeal, arguing the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter its November 30, 2007, order. According to defendant, because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter this order, this court similarly lacked jurisdiction to review it. On January 16, 2008, this court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nWe reject defendant\u2019s renewed challenge to this court\u2019s jurisdiction. Defendant\u2019s current arguments to this court repeat the same essential argument in his earlier motion to this court, namely, that the circuit court\u2019s November 30 order was not valid. We first note that the factual basis for this assertion appears to be mistaken. In his brief and at oral argument, defendant asserted that the October 24 letter issued by the clerk of this court was premised upon the mere failure of the State to attach copies of the August 14 or September 13 orders to the notice of appeal. This is simply not the case. Both the August 14 and September 13 orders failed to comply with Rule 18. However, the clerk\u2019s letter of October 24 called the parties\u2019 and the circuit court\u2019s attention to the deficiency in conforming with the specific requirements of Rule 18, not any deficiency in the notice of appeal in merely failing to attach the pieces of paper. As to the merits of defendant\u2019s renewed challenge, we note that defendant is again challenging the validity of the November 30 order and this court\u2019s jurisdiction. On January 16, 2008, this court rejected defendant\u2019s motion challenging this court\u2019s jurisdiction premised on the invalidity of the November 30 order. Thus, our earlier decision is now the law of the case. See Weiss v. Waterhouse Securities, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 439, 448 (2004) (holding that a jurisdictional challenge previously addressed by this court in a supervisory order had become the law of the case on a subsequent jurisdictional challenge), citing People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 395 (2002).\nForfeiture\nDefendant next argues that the State forfeited its right to appeal the constitutional issue when it declined the trial court\u2019s invitation to file a notice of appeal after entry of the September 13 ruling. According to defendant, the State instead requested an imposition of a misdemeaner sentence. We disagree with this reading of the record. The record shows that the State maintained its position that the statute was constitutional and that the court should impose a felony sentence. The assistant State\u2019s Attorney agreed \u2014 perhaps mistakenly thinking that the State could not appeal an interlocutory order\u2014 that a sentence should be imposed to create a final judgment from which it could appeal. In its brief before this court, the State reiterates that it is challenging the constitutional finding, not the sentencing. In fact, according to defense counsel, defendant had already completed his probation in September 2008. Therefore, because the State has forfeited its challenge to the sentence, we consider only the constitutional ruling.\nProportionate Penalties\nThe information in this case charged defendant with a violation of section 26 \u2014 1(a)(4) of the Code for the false statement he made to the police officer on Willow Springs Lane. The State did not charge defendant for his statement to the 911 dispatcher. The trial court initially found defendant guilty of disorderly conduct under section 26\u2014 1(a)(4). This section provides:\n\u201c(a) A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly:\n* * *\n(4) Transmits or causes to be transmitted in any manner to any peace officer, public officer or public employee a report to the effect that an offense will be committed, is being committed, or has been committed, knowing at the time of such transmission that there is no reasonable ground for believing that such an offense will be committed, is being committed, or has been committed!!.]\u201d 720 ILCS 5/26 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 2006).\nSection 26 \u2014 1(a) (12) provides that disorderly conduct occurs when a defendant:\n\u201c(12) Calls the number \u2018911\u2019 for the purpose of making or transmitting a false alarm or complaint and reporting information when, at the time the call or transmission is made, the person knows there is no reasonable ground for making the call or transmission and further knows that the call or transmission could result in the emergency response of any public safety agency.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/26\u2014 l(a)(12) (West 2006).\nAccording to section 26 \u2014 1(b), a violation of section 26\u2014 1(a)(4) is a Class 4 felony and a violation of section 26\u2014 l(a)(12) is a Class A misdemeanor.\nUnder the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, \u201c[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711. In analyzing a proportionate penalties challenge, our ultimate inquiry is whether the legislature has set the sentence in accord with the seriousness of the offense. People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63, 83 (2007). As the constitutionality of a statute is purely a matter of law, we review the question de novo. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d at 83.\nTo succeed on a proportionate penalties claim, a defendant must show either that the penalty imposed is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community; or that it differs from the penalty imposed for an offense containing the same elements. People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 521 (2005). The latter method is commonly known as the \u201cidentical elements\u201d test. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d at 83. The parties\u2019 arguments to this court are straightforward. The State argues that section 26\u20141(a)(12) contains elements that 26\u20141(a)(4) does not such that the two statutory provisions are not identical. The defendant argues that they are identical. We therefore set out the elements of the statutory provisions listed above to determine if their elements are identical.\nThe elements of subsection (a)(4) are: (1) transmission in any manner, (2) to a peace officer, public officer, or public employee, (3) report of an offense, (4) without reasonable ground. The elements of subsection (a) (12) are: (1) a phone call to 911, (2) report of a false alarm or a complaint, (3) no reasonable ground, and (4) knowledge that it could result in an emergency response. At the very least, subsection (a) (12) has an extra element in that it requires the State to prove the element of knowledge that the transmission could result in an emergency response. Moreover, a violation of subsection (a)(4) requires no proof that a person called \u201c911.\u201d\nThe lack of identity between the statutory provisions is apparent when applied to the facts of this case. Defendant made statements which implicated the disorderly conduct statute during his call to \u201c911\u201d and during his conversation with Officer Hanks. While the State may have chosen to prosecute both statements, the State only charged defendant with his statement as he stood on the street speaking with Officer Hanks. Defendant was not charged with his statement on the telephone with the 911 operator. As such, the charging instrument made no reference to a 911 call or an emergency response. Further, it was not necessary for the State to prove that defendant had called 911 or that defendant expected an emergency response.\nTherefore, we agree with the State that the \u201cidentical elements\u201d test does not demonstrate the statute is unconstitutional. We reverse the trial court on this issue. Because subsections (a)(4) and (a)(12) do not share identical elements, their differing sentencing classifications for a Class 4 felony and a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/26 \u2014 1(b) (West 2006)) do not offend the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711). We turn to the other issues raised by defendant in challenging his conviction.\nIneffective Assistance/Sufficiency of Information\nDefendant contends that trial counsel was deficient in failing to file a pretrial motion to challenge the sufficiency of the information. Defendant claims that the charging document failed to specify which of the three or four separate statements made by defendant contained specific comments made to police or 911 that were false. According to defendant, this has resulted in prejudice to defendant because he cannot utilize his conviction as a double jeopardy bar.\nTo demonstrate the ineffectiveness of counsel, the accused must satisfy the two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984). First, the defendant must show that counsel\u2019s performance was so seriously deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under the prevailing professional norms. Second, counsel\u2019s deficient performance must have prejudiced the defendant so as to deny him a fair trial. To satisfy the second prong of the test, there must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Here, the question is whether trial counsel\u2019s failure to file a pretrial motion to dismiss the information fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and whether it is reasonably probable that, but for this failure, defendant would not have been convicted.\nUnder section 111 \u2014 3(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/111 \u2014 3(a) (West 2006)), a charging instrument must include: (1) the name of the offense, (2) the statutory provision (3) the nature and elements of the charged offense, (4) the date and county, and (5) the name of the accused. When evaluating the sufficiency of a charging instrument, the question is not whether additional particularity could have been added but instead whether there was sufficient particularity to allow the accused to prepare a defense. People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 54 (1994). The State must plead specific, articulable facts when charging disorderly conduct. People v. Swanson, 308 Ill. App. 3d 708, 712 (1999).\nThe information in this case stated:\n\u201cOn or about the 17th day of February, 2006, WALTER IRVIN KLEPPER committed the offense of DISORDERLY CONDUCT, in violation of Chapter 720, Section 5/26\u2014 1(a)(4), of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, as amended, a Class 4 Felony in that said Defendant knowingly transmitted to Kevin Hanks, a Police Officer for Kendall County, Illinois, a report that Edward Boone had committed the offense of Reckless Driving and that Edward Boone attempted to hit the Defendant with his vehicle, knowing at the time of such transmission, that there was no reasonable ground for believing that such offense had been committed.\u201d\nWe find the information here contained sufficient particularity to allow defendant to prepare a defense. It stated that Walter Klepper told a public officer that Edward Boone had committed the offense of reckless driving and that Boone attempted to hit Klepper with his vehicle. This specifically alleged the substance of the statement to enable the defendant to prepare a defense. People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d at 54. This information complied with the requirements of section 111 \u2014 3(a). Counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge it. People v. Phillips, 215 Ill. 2d 554, 565 (2005) (because charging instrument was not defective, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge it). Because of this finding, we need not consider the second prong of the Strickland analysis. We therefore reject defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.\nCross-Examination\nDefendant next claims that he was deprived of his constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses about bias. Before we address those specific claims, we review the trial testimony in more detail.\nThree witnesses testified for the State. Officer Hanks testified that he responded to the dispatch which took defendant\u2019s 911 call. At the scene, defendant told Hanks that Edward Boone tried to run him over with his truck. Defendant was standing near his garage, approximately V-h feet from the roadway. Hanks watched the surveillance video from cameras on defendant\u2019s property. The video showed a vehicle proceeding from the direction of Boone\u2019s house that did not leave the roadway or attempt to approach defendant. There were no indications from the gravel or grass next to the roadway that a vehicle had swerved off the road. Upon cross-examination by defense counsel, Hanks testified that he was aware of a history of \u201cbad blood\u201d between defendant and Boone which led to involvement by the sheriffs office.\nEdward Boone also testified. He stated that he never left the roadway. When passing defendant\u2019s house, defendant stood 70 to 80 feet from the roadway and waved. On cross-examination, Boone acknowledged a \u201cvery long-running feud.\u201d The trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection to defense counsel\u2019s attempts to ask questions about specific incidents of feuding.\nDeanna Berard lived across the street from defendant. She testified that she had a police scanner because she was a member of the Yorkville Citizen\u2019s Police Association. According to Berard\u2019s testimony, she heard a vehicle skidding on ice, so she looked out her kitchen window. She soon saw Boone drive past in a normal fashion while defendant was far from the roadway. She was listening to her police scanner, when she heard a dispatch to defendant\u2019s house. She picked up the phone herself to call 911 but her husband told her to stay out of the situation. However, she called Boone and told him that after he talked to the police, he should send them to her so she could make a statement about her observations. She was cross-examined about whether a tree in her yard obstructed her view. After Berard testified, the State rested.\nDefense counsel called two witnesses: defendant\u2019s civil attorney and defendant. Attorney Robert Sandner stated that on that day in question, defendant, his client in a civil case, called asking for legal advice. Sandner told him to call the sheriff. Sandner also testified that there was a civil lawsuit between defendant and Boone. Defendant testified that after he parked his vehicle in his freestanding garage, Boone\u2019s truck passed him \u201cgetting too close to [him] and crowding [him.]\u201d Defendant was standing 1 to IV2 feet from the edge of the roadway; Boone\u2019s truck came within inches of the edge of the pavement.\nIn support of the court\u2019s finding of guilt the court cited the \u201c911\u201d tape, and characterized defendant\u2019s voice as having a \u201csing-song\u201d nature to it. The court observed that there was no need to assess witness credibility because while defendant\u2019s complaint claimed Boone tried to run him over with his truck, defendant\u2019s testimony was that Boone never left the roadway and defendant was not in the roadway, so defendant\u2019s allegations \u201cma[de] absolutely no sense.\u201d The court characterized witness Berard as \u201cindependent\u201d and explained that her testimony contradicted defendant\u2019s statements.\nAt the posttrial hearing, defendant and his wife both testified concerning several incidents occurring between themselves and Boone and Berard. They blamed Boone for several incidents on their property, and accused him of religious bigotry. In rejecting the claim about improper limitations on cross-examination, the trial court noted that it was aware that defendant and Boone were enemies with a \u201clong-running feud.\u201d The court found such information unavailing to defendant because defendant\u2019s testimony only described that Boone\u2019s car came close to him but not that Boone tried to hit him, so there was no prejudice. Defense counsel then noted that the court had described Berard as an independent witness, but that her bias was shown. The court reaffirmed that bias by Berard, like bias by Boone, would not change the outcome given the testimony of defendant and Hanks.\nBased on this testimony, defendant asserts to this court that the trial court erred in prohibiting additional cross-examination of Boone concerning possible bias against defendant. Defendant also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide an offer of proof regarding Boone\u2019s anticipated testimony about bias, and failing to cross-examine Berard concerning her potential bias. Defendant\u2019s claims fail.\nDefendant asserts in his brief that the proof of his guilt rested mainly on eyewitness testimony which was directly contradicted by his version of events. The record belies this assertion. Rather, it shows the trial judge based his ruling on his characterization of defendant\u2019s voice on the 911 call as \u201csing song,\u201d Hank\u2019s testimony regarding the contents of defendant\u2019s surveillance video, and defendant\u2019s testimony that Boone never exited the roadway. Further, the court noted that defendant\u2019s own testimony was nonsensical because he testified that Boone never left the road and that defendant was not on the road.\nThe confrontation clause of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VI) guarantees a defendant the right to cross-examine a witness against him for the purpose of showing the witness\u2019 bias, interest or motive to testify falsely. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974); People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 536 (2000); People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 144 (1988). The exposure of a witness\u2019 motivation is an important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377, 79 S. Ct. 1400 (1959); Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 144. However, a trial judge may impose limits on a defense counsel\u2019s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness without offending defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 683, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 (1986); Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 144. A trial judge retains wide latitude to impose reasonable limits based on concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness\u2019 safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or of little relevance. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 683, 106 S. Ct. at 1435; Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 144. As the United States Supreme Court observed in Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15, 19, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294 (1985), \u201c \u2018the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 144, quoting Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 20, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 19, 106 S. Ct. at 294.\nOn review, we are not required to isolate the particular limitation on cross-examination to determine whether reversible error has occurred. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 145. Rather, \u201c \u2018the question in each case must finally be whether defendant\u2019s inability to make the inquiry created a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving him of the ability to test the truth of the witness\u2019s direct testimony.\u2019 \u201d Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 145, quoting United States v. Rogers, 475 F.2d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 1973). We look to the record in its entirety and the alternative means open to the defendant to impeach the witness. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 145. Thus, if a review of the entire record reveals that the fact-finder has been made aware of adequate factors concerning relevant areas of impeachment of a witness, no constitutional question arises merely because the defendant has been prohibited on cross-examination from pursuing other areas of inquiry. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 145.\nOur review of the entire record reveals that the fact-finder was aware of relevant areas of bias concerning Boone and Berard. Boone\u2019s potential bias was explored during cross-examination. He testified that he and defendant had a \u201clong-running feud\u201d and the two were opposing parties in a lawsuit. Additionally, Officer Hanks testified that there was \u201ca history\u201d of \u201cincidents\u201d between the two. The sheriffs department responded to that scene \u201ca number of times\u201d due to \u201cbad blood\u201d between them and due to \u201cnumerous complaints.\u201d Hanks testified that their lot line fence had been burned; accusations had been made about one putting garbage, beer bottles, and clutter over the other\u2019s lot line; and there had been trespass allegations. Also, during the probable cause hearing, Hanks testified that there is \u201cneighborhood trouble\u201d between Boone and defendant, including \u201cnumerous police reports or incidents\u201d connected to a property line dispute. During closing argument, defense counsel highlighted the \u201cHatfield and McCoy\u201d situation, an \u201congoing, long-standing feud\u201d that was so \u201cpalpable\u201d that the whole sheriff\u2019s department was aware of it due to numerous dispatches.\nAlthough cross-examination was limited concerning specific incidents, the animosity between the parties is well noted in the record. Under these circumstances, the trial court acted within its wide latitude in limiting cross-examination.\nWe find defendant\u2019s citation of People v. Averhart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 492 (1999), does not advance his argument. In Averhart, defendant\u2019s theory of defense was that a police officer, Officer Smith, framed Averhart by planting drugs on him. Averhart, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 496. Averhart had filed a complaint with the Office of Professional Standards of the Chicago police department against Smith over a prior arrest that alleged false arrest and physical and verbal abuse. Averhart, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 498. During cross-examination, defense counsel was allowed to note only that the Office of Professional Standards complaint involved \u201cserious charges\u201d without describing what had happened beyond that it was an \u201cencounter.\u201d The trial was essentially a credibility contest between the two. The court found that there was improper restriction on cross-examination because these facts provided the foundation for Averhart\u2019s defense. As such, the limitation of cross-examination \u201ccreated a substantial danger of prejudice by denying defendant his right to test the truth of Smith\u2019s testimony.\u201d Averhart, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 499, citing Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 145. Here, the trial court\u2019s imposed limits on Boone\u2019s cross-examination only foreclosed questioning about additional, specific examples of an ongoing feud of which the finder of fact was well aware. And, as noted above, the trial court\u2019s findings were not merely the result of a credibility contest. The trial court\u2019s finding of guilt was not based on lack of details of the feud between defendant and Boone or an underestimation of Boone\u2019s potential bias.\nDefendant next claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make an offer of proof about the details of Boone\u2019s potential bias that he wished to explore during cross-examination. To show that he was prejudiced by this failure, defendant must demonstrate that this bias evidence should have been admitted and that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different if it had. In other words, unless evidence of bias were improperly excluded, the offer of proof issue is beside the point. As explained earlier, the trial court acted within its discretion to limit cross-examination as it did, so this alone precludes defendant\u2019s offer-of-proof claim.\nIn any event, defendant cannot show prejudice. Even if the offer of proof had been made, and even if that caused the trial court to permit additional cross-examination, defendant still would have been convicted. The absence of prejudice also defeats defendant\u2019s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not cross-examining Berard about potential bias. Again, the guilty verdict was based on evidence that would not have been affected by additional cross-examination of Berard \u2014 defendant\u2019s own testimony corroborated by Hanks, Hanks\u2019 testimony concerning the video, and the trial court\u2019s characterization of defendant\u2019s voice on the 911 call.\nCONCLUSION\nWe reverse the November 30, 2007, order declaring section 26 \u2014 1(a)(4) unconstitutional because we find that subsections (a)(4) and (a) (12) do not share identical elements. Because they do not share identical elements, their differing sentencing classifications for a Class 4 felony arid a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/26 \u2014 1(b) (West 2006)) do not offend the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711). Therefore, defendant is guilty of a violation of subsection (a)(4) and eligible for any sentence within the appropriate range for a Class 4 felon.\nWe also have found that the State has not contested the punishment of one year\u2019s probation. We note that the sentencing ranges of both a Class 4 felony and a Class A misdemeanor contain the punishment of one-year probation. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20142(b)(2), (b)(3) (West 2006). Therefore, the punishment of one year\u2019s probation will stand based upon a conviction of disorderly conduct as defined by subsection (a)(4).\nReversed.\nRule 18 requires that a court \u201cshall not\u201d find a statute unconstitutional unless the court makes a finding in a written or transcribed oral order; the order clearly identifies which portion of the statute is unconstitutional; the order states the specific grounds of unconstitutionality, including the constitutional provision upon which the finding is based, whether the statute is invalid on its face or as applied, whether the statute can be construed in a manner that could preserve its constitutionality, that the finding cannot rest on an alternate ground, and that proper notice has been served to the State. 210 Ill. 2d R. 18. Pursuant to Rule 18, this court may summarily vacate and remand a circuit court judgment declaring a statute unconstitutional if it fails to comply with Rule 18. 210 Ill. 2d R. 302(c)(2); People ex rel. Madigan v. Kinzer, 232 Ill. 2d 179, 190 (2009).\nThe State\u2019s brief does not challenge the sentence. The State specifically states, \u201cthe People appealed the trial court\u2019s declaration that 26\u20141(a)(4) is unconstitutional as applied ***. Sentencing \u2014 and any comments the People made about how it should proceed \u2014 is separate from whether section 26 \u2014 1(a)(4) violates the Proportionate Penalties Clause, and such comments regarding sentencing should not be deemed a forfeiture of the defense of the statute\u2019s constitutionality.\u201d Therefore, we have an unusual case where the State is apparently not challenging the sentence.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE FITZGERALD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Eric Weis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Yorkville (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Click and Leah Myers Bendik, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.", "Larry Wechter, of Geneva, for appellee and cross-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 105719.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. WALTER KLEPPER, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.\nOpinion filed March 19, 2009.\nModified upon denial of rehearing September 28, 2009.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Eric Weis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Yorkville (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Click and Leah Myers Bendik, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.\nLarry Wechter, of Geneva, for appellee and cross-appellant." }, "file_name": "0337-01", "first_page_order": 349, "last_page_order": 371 }