{ "id": 3623897, "name": "MARIA KOUZOUKAS, Appellee, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund", "decision_date": "2009-09-24", "docket_number": "No. 106976", "first_page": "446", "last_page": "478", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 446" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "383 Ill. App. 3d 942", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4278669 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "952" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/383/0942-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610828 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704396 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" }, { "page": "53233" }, { "page": "534, 543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619580 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738801 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29956 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828104 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621523 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706718 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821407 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3827812 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621455 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2934533 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980665 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274-75" }, { "page": "274-76", "parenthetical": "\"it is a firm offer of a limited duty position that could be performed by an individual with the applicant's physical limitations that renders the applicant not disabled within the meaning of the Code despite his inability to perform the duties of an active police officer\"" }, { "page": "276-77", "parenthetical": "\"Under the Code, there are a number of future events that could impact the plaintiff's right to receive duty disability benefits,\" including attaining the age of 63 (40 ILCS 5/5 - 154 (West 2006)), felony conviction (40 ILCS 5/5 - 227 (West 2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2580910 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 749", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4135214 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/357/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 975", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209183 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "First District, sixth division" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0975-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 814", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5385223 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "First District, fourth division" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0814-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4261041 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3601786 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564596 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524980 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 845", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5305933 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "853" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0845-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 N.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5501054 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 982", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563451 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0982-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3568033 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499141 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 N.E.2d 1170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475708 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706738 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419", "parenthetical": "statutes in derogation of common law are to be strictly construed and nothing is to be read into such statutes by intendment or implication" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222672 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" }, { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0701-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1603, "char_count": 57107, "ocr_confidence": 0.851, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.933872960685489e-07, "percentile": 0.7345584626748509 }, "sha256": "f8fe5b4544ccdbe78c84a1cef130267aac4367a3a3b6218155281e2fdf00e79b", "simhash": "1:53ed0146440714eb", "word_count": 9230 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:50.922370+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MARIA KOUZOUKAS, Appellee, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nThe Retirement Board of the Policemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (the Board) denied the application of Maria Kouzoukas (Kouzoukas) for duty disability benefits. On administrative review, the circuit court of Cook County reversed the Board\u2019s decision and awarded Kouzoukas prejudgment interest. After the appellate court affirmed the circuit court\u2019s judgment (383 Ill. App. 3d 942), the Board petitioned for review by this court and we allowed the petition.\nFor reasons that follow, we now affirm the appellate court\u2019s judgment that the Board\u2019s decision to deny Kouzoukas\u2019 application for duty disability benefits should be set aside. However, we reverse the award of prejudgment interest.\nBACKGROUND\nMaria Kouzoukas became a Chicago police officer in 1995. On July 25, 2004, while on patrol, she injured her back when she attempted to move an intoxicated man off the sidewalk and he resisted. After the incident, Kouzoukas immediately sought treatment at the emergency room of Resurrection Medical Center and went on medical leave the following day. Kouzoukas returned to work on September 17, 2004, but due to recurring back pain stemming from her injury, she went back on medical leave on October 23, 2004. Over the next 14 months, Kouzoukas was able to work restricted duty for brief periods of time, but otherwise remained on medical leave due to lower-back pain. On December 15, 2005, when her medical leave was exhausted, Kouzoukas applied to the Board for duty disability benefits.\nUpon application for benefits, Kouzoukas was required to be examined by the Board\u2019s physician, Dr. S. David Demorest. That occurred on December 29, 2005. Subsequently, on March 30, 2006, and April 25, 2006, the Board held hearings on Kouzoukas\u2019 application. At these hearings, Kouzoukas presented documentary evidence and witness testimony regarding her disability and the medical treatment she received since her injury in July 2004. Because our review requires us to determine whether the manifest weight of the evidence supports the Board\u2019s decision to deny Kouzoukas disability benefits (Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill. 2d 485, 505 (2007), quoting Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d 497, 534 (2006)), we set forth this evidence in detail.\nThe documentary evidence reveals the following. After being treated and discharged by Resurrection Medical Center on July 25, 2004, Kouzoukas was evaluated at MercyWorks Occupational Medicine Center on July 27, 2004. There she was diagnosed with acute lumbar strain, given a muscle relaxant, and told to perform certain exercises at home. MercyWorks reported to the Chicago police department that Kouzoukas would be unable to return to work for two to three weeks, but that no permanent disability was anticipated.\nOn August 10, 2004, Kouzoukas was evaluated by Dr. Michael Lewis, an orthopedic surgeon. His examination revealed paravertebral muscle spasm in the dorsal and lumbar spine area and his initial diagnosis was \u201cacute dorsal and lumbar myofascitis\u201d (inflamation of the tissue surrounding the muscle). Although Kouzoukas had suffered a back injury on two prior occasions \u2014 the first in May 2002 with 113 days medical leave taken between May 1 and September 19, 2002, and the second in June 2003 with 45 days medical leave taken between June 29 and August 12, 2003 \u2014 Dr. Lewis indicated in his report that he believed Kouzoukas\u2019 current back pain was due to her recent injury and was unrelated to her previous injuries. He prescribed pain medication and ordered Kouzoukas to remain on medical leave.\nDr. Lewis saw Kouzoukas for follow-up on August 23, September 7, and September 14. On September 14, 2004, Dr. Lewis released Kouzoukas to return to work on September 17, 2004, for a restricted or \u201clight duty\u201d assignment. On October 12, 2004, Dr. Lewis saw Kouzoukas, who still complained of having constant and persistent back pain. Dr. Lewis noted muscle spasm in the lumbosacral spine and ordered an MRI scan for further evaluation. He recommended that Kouzoukas continue working a light duty assignment and suggested that she begin a course of physical therapy. Kouzoukas began therapy on October 15, 2004, and continued to work restricted duty until October 23, 2004, when she went back on medical leave due to increased back pain.\nOn October 27, 2004, the MRI scan was performed. It revealed some mild disc protrusion at L4-L5 and L5-S-1, as well as some minimal scoliosis at the lumbar joint. As a result, when Dr. Lewis saw Kouzoukas on October 28, he recommended that Kouzoukas remain off work and that she continue physical therapy.\nAfter a November 8, 2004, examination, Dr. Lewis reported to the Chicago police department that Kouzoukas was still experiencing moderate to severe back pain that was being helped somewhat by physical therapy. Dr. Lewis released Kouzoukas to return to restricted duty on November 12, 2004, with an anticipated return to full active duty on November 29, 2004. Dr. Lewis also recommended Kouzoukas continue with physical therapy. Kouzoukas returned to work on November 11, 2004, but worked only five days before going back on medical leave.\nIn a report dated November 30, 2004, AthletiCo Therapy advised Dr. Lewis that Kouzoukas had attended five sessions, missed one session, and cancelled two sessions. Under the heading of \u201cassessment\u201d the report stated that Kouzoukas made \u201climited progress\u201d with physical therapy, that she continued to complain of lower back pain, and that the radiating symptoms did not resolve. Her prognosis for recovery was listed as \u201cfair.\u201d Although Kouzoukas was authorized to receive additional therapy, she was discharged because she failed to keep scheduled appointments or return phone calls to reschedule after November 1, 2004.\nKouzoukas went back on medical leave on November 15, 2004, and remained there until January 16, 2005. She returned to restricted duty on January 16, 2005, and worked until March 29, 2005. She then went back on medical leave due to recurring back pain.\nOn April 5, 2005, Kouzoukas\u2019s general physician sent her for an MRI scan of her cervical spine. The MRI showed no abnormality or infirmity. Kouzoukas then consulted with Dr. Gary Magee on May 2, 2005. He reviewed Kouzoukas\u2019 MRI scans and confirmed that they showed no abnormality except for a slight stenosis at the L4-L5 level of the spine. Because Kouzoukas reported that she had not obtained relief with physical therapy or oral medication, Dr. Magee recommended epidural injections.\nOn May 19, 2005, Kouzoukas returned to Dr. Lewis, informing him that her pain had returned in March 2005. Dr. Lewis noted severe muscle spasm and reduced forward flexion. He, too, recommended that Kouzoukas receive lumbar steroid injections. As a result, Kouzoukas received an injection on June 7, 2005. However, after this initial injection, the treatment was discontinued because Kouzoukas reported that she had a headache and increased pain radiating down her leg as a result of the injection. Dr. Lewis then referred Kouzoukas to a spine surgery specialist for an evaluation for possible surgical intervention.\nIn July 2005, Kouzoukas saw Dr. Spencer, a spine surgery specialist. After his initial examination, Dr. Spencer\u2019s diagnosis was \u201cchronic low back pain and right-sided sciatica.\u201d He opined that Kouzoukas\u2019 back pain was \u201caggravating, but not incapacitating.\u201d However, he sent Kouzoukas for a new MRI scan of her spine and recommended that she continue her light duty work assignment.\nOn August 8, 2005, Kouzoukas returned to Dr. Spencer\u2019s office. He advised Kouzoukas that her MRI was \u201ctotally normal\u201d and stated that, in his view, there was nothing wrong with her back. He recommended that she see a gynecologist or internist to determine the source of her pain. Dr. Spencer released Kouzoukas to return to work with a temporary 20-pound lifting limit. In his report to the Chicago police department, Dr. Spencer stated, \u201cI believe that her pain is not coming from an identifiable injury in her lumbar spine based on the pristine appearance on the MRI scan.\u201d\nIn September 2005, Kouzoukas began treatment with Dr. Yapor, a neurosurgeon at Northwestern Memorial Hospital. He sent Kouzoukas to have EMG/NCV testing to determine whether she had neurological damage. He also ordered a CT scan and X-rays of the sacroiliac (SI) joint. The testing revealed no neurological damage or other pathology. Unable to locate the source of Kouzoukas\u2019 pain, Dr. Yapor suggested that Kouzoukas start a pain management program with Dr. Konowitz for her \u201cchronic low back pain syndrome.\u201d Accordingly, Kouzoukas saw Dr. Konowitz for an evaluation on November 17, 2005. Dr. Konowitz initially recommended that Kouzoukas see her gastroenterologist for treatment of her gastric infection.\nIn a report to the Chicago police department dated December 13, 2005, Dr. Yapor opined that Kouzoukas was \u201cpermanently disabled as a police officer\u201d because she could not perform the duties of an active police officer. On December 19, after receiving results of Kouzoukas\u2019 cervical spine MRI which revealed no pathology, Dr. Yapor determined that, as a surgeon, he could do nothing to help Kouzoukas and discharged her from his care.\nOn December 20, 2005, Dr. Konowitz gave Kouzoukas an injection directed at her SI joint, but she reported no significant improvement. Oral medications were given for pain management, including Protonix, Skelaxin, and Mobic. Once again, Kouzoukas was referred for physical therapy.\nKouzoukas was seen by Integrity Physical Therapy for an initial evaluation on January 22, 2006. The evaluation form described Kouzoukas\u2019 functional capabilities as follows:\n\u201cThe patient is currently unable to work due to injury. *** She reports pain with sitting, standing, and driving in her car for more than 5-10 minutes.\u201d\nProgress notes from Integrity indicate that Kouzoukas was \u201ctotally noncompliant\u201d with therapy \u2014 she left her first appointment early because she \u201chad to babysit\u201d and in March 2006 she missed her appointments altogether. When Kouzoukas called to cancel her March appointments, she explained that she was \u201cgoing out of town.\u201d\nDr. Konowitz, in a progress letter to Dr. Yapor dated March 23, 2006, stated:\n\u201cPatient requested clarification on work disability. Her severe SI joint pain is provoked with prolonged sitting and prolonged standing approximately 45 minutes. This difficulty in completing her work as a police officer is the issue relating to her disability. Due to the significant subjective pain complaints over her SI joint and pain scores of 8 and 10,1 am unable to return her to duty.\u201d\nAfter receiving this letter, Dr. Yapor sent a letter on April 17, 2006, to Kouzoukas\u2019 attorney, Mr. Geiger, stating the following:\n\u201cBased on my evaluation of Ms. Kouzoukas, as well as Dr. Konowitz\u2019s last report, she is to limit her sitting, standing and continuous walking to no more than 30-45 minutes at any one time. She is not to wear her gun belt, indefinitely.\u201d In addition to the documentary evidence, witness\ntestimony was presented at the hearings before the Board. On March 30, 2006, when the Board held its first hearing on Kouzoukas\u2019 application for duty disability benefits, Kouzoukas testified that she filed the claim for duty disability benefits because her July 2004 injury prevented her from returning to the Chicago police department as a police officer. She then called her treating physician, Dr. Yapor, to testify in support of her claim.\nDr. Yapor testified that he is a neurological surgeon and that he first saw Kouzoukas in 2005, after she was referred to him by the Information on Demand Unit of the Chicago police department. Dr. Yapor admitted that Kouzoukas\u2019 MRI scans and X-rays revealed nothing of \u201csurgical significance.\u201d Nonetheless, he testified that there was objective evidence of pain \u2014 his physical examination which revealed localized tenderness in her lower back around the right sacroiliac (SI) joint. He stated further that, based on his observations, he believed Kouzoukas suffered from lower back pain which generated from her SI joint and that her pain caused her to have difficulty sitting or standing for any period of time. Dr. Yapor testified that he did not believe that Kouzoukas was malingering or faking her pain. He explained that he discontinued his care of Kouzoukas in December 2005 because she was not a surgical candidate, but that he referred her to Dr. Konowitz for pain management.\nDr. Yapor was asked whether he believed Kouzoukas could work as a Chicago police officer. He responded \u201cno\u201d and explained his reasons:\n\u201cSeveral factors. One is her physical condition and the fact that she does get exacerbations, and number two is her medications. From a physical factor standpoint, I believe that any prolonged sitting or prolonged standing in one area, prolonged walking, tends to cause her to have flareups.\u201d\nAsked to define \u201cprolonged,\u201d Dr. Yapor stated, \u201cwithin an hour, half an hour to forty-five minutes.\u201d Based on his assessment of Kouzoukas\u2019 physical restrictions, Dr. Yapor testified that, in his opinion, Kouzoukas could not even perform desk duty, primarily because the weight of the gun belt police officers are required to wear exacerbated her symptoms.\nDr. Yapor further testified that his opinion that Kouzoukas could not be a police officer was based on his concern, not only for Kouzoukas, but for any partner she might have, because her physical deficits would prevent her from performing her duties fully. Also, Dr. Yapor explained, some of the medications Kouzoukas was taking would prevent her from operating machinery, such as an automobile, while others might affect her judgment or reflexes.\nWhen asked to give his prognosis for Kouzoukas, Dr. Yapor stated that, due to the chronicity of her pain, \u201cthe issue at this time is pain control as opposed to pain elimination. And it is the means by which we are trying to control the pain which I think is my biggest concern with her working as a police officer.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Yapor was asked about Dr. Spencer\u2019s report, in which Dr. Spencer had indicated his belief that Kouzoukas \u201cdoes not really have a back problem or injury.\u201d Dr. Yapor responded that he agreed with Dr. Spencer that there was nothing \u201csurgically wrong\u201d with her back and that he, too, did not believe Kouzoukas\u2019 pain generated from her spine. Dr. Yapor explained that \u201cthe back\u201d is an anatomical area of the body, while the spine is a specific organ system. He stated that a person can have low back pain for any number of reasons, many having nothing to do with the spine. He testified that low back pain may result from problems with the kidneys, the ovaries, the uterus, or the intestines. In this case, however, Dr. Yapor believed that Kouzoukas suffered from lower back pain which generated from the SI joint and that the cause of the pain was the injury which occurred on July 25, 2004.\nDr. Yapor was asked what objective findings supported his belief that Kouzoukas had a problem with her SI joint. He responded: \u201cThere was no anatomical disruption of the joint; however, if someone steps on your foot and your foot hurts, you can do an x-ray and it\u2019s normal. The problem is not always able to be diagnosed radiologically.\u201d Further, Dr. Yapor explained that Kouzoukas\u2019 condition \u2014 myofascial pain syndrome \u2014 is a condition where all of the tests are negative, but the patient still suffers from pain. In other words, the fact that tests show no injury or abnormality, or the fact that no surgical intervention is needed, does not mean that the patient is not experiencing actual pain.\nThe next witness to testify was the Board\u2019s physician, Dr. Demorest. He testified that when he examined Kouzoukas on December 29, 2005, he noticed \u201can abnormal and marked spasm (or tightening) of the paraspinal muscles on the left from T7 to the lower lumbar.\u201d He also noted that Kouzoukas exhibited decreased ability in her flexion and lateral bending. As a result, Dr. Demorest concluded (as did Dr. Yapor) that Kouzoukas suffered from \u201cmyofascial pain syndrome,\u201d which he defined as \u201ca dysfunction of her muscles, ligaments, and tendons of her lower back.\u201d Dr. Demorest also agreed with Dr. Yapor that Kouzoukas showed no signs that she was malingering or exaggerating her pain.\nDr. Demorest was asked why he had not included in his report to the Board an opinion on whether Kouzoukas could return to work. He explained that, typically, he will advise the Board if the person is clearly unable to return to work, i.e., when the person cannot ambulate independently or is unable to hold a gun. However, he stated that when the disability is not as clear cut, he believed his role was to provide the facts to the Board and allow the Board to decide whether or not the person could return to work. Nevertheless, Dr. Demorest also testified that he \u201chad reservations\u201d about returning Kouzoukas to full, unrestricted duty and added that, in his opinion, returning Kouzoukas to full duty \u201cwould not be prudent.\u201d Dr. Demorest further testified that he had not recommended in his report that Kouzoukas return to restricted duty because he had no knowledge regarding the availability of positions within the Chicago police department which could accommodate Kouzoukas\u2019 restrictions. Dr. Demorest then testified that Kouzoukas could work under the following conditions:\n\u201cIf she is able to sit and change positions frequently and doesn\u2019t have to stand for prolonged periods of time, if they can accommodate her, then she could be employed.\u201d\nDr. Demorest was then questioned about Kouzoukas\u2019 ability to function while taking her medications. He testified that Kouzoukas\u2019 medications did not overly concern him because the types of medications Kouzoukas was taking generally did not pose a problem once the patient had adjusted to them. He testified that, in his view, the medications should not prevent her return to work.\nKouzoukas was then called to testify regarding her present condition. She testified that her pain is constant, though exacerbated by activity. Describing her pain, she said it was \u201cexcruciating,\u201d \u201cshooting pains\u201d that are \u201chot and searing, going down my leg, sometimes to the bottom of my foot to my big toe.\u201d She testified that the pain does not allow her to do many of the activities she routinely did before her injury. Also, Kouzoukas noted that since the injury, whenever she attempted to return to work, one of the main problems was wearing her gun belt because it added a lot of pressure to her back and hips.\nWith regard to medications, Kouzoukas testified that she currently takes Neurotin, Valium, Vicodin (as needed), Mobic, Ultram (an anti-inflammatory), and Lidocaine patches. Kouzoukas then testified that she loves her job, wants to return to work, and that she is currently attending rehabilitation three times per week in an attempt to do so.\nOn cross-examination, Kouzoukas was asked about her missed therapy appointments. Kouzoukas explained that she missed some appointments when she went out of town for a wedding and when she went on a vacation to Mexico. Kouzoukas testified that when she went on these trips she was able to fly only because she was heavily medicated. Kouzoukas further explained that she missed other therapy appointments because there had been a mix-up on the location and because the clinic scheduled appointments without checking with her. She testified that the problems were now resolved and her attendance was no longer an issue.\nKouzoukas testified that she is able to drive, but only for short distances around her neighborhood. Also, she said that she never drives when she has taken certain medications. When asked whether she had gone to the gun range to requalify, Kouzoukas admitted that she had not.\nAfter Kouzoukas testified, the hearing was continued so that someone from the Chicago police department\u2019s medical section could be brought in for questioning. The hearing reconvened at the next regular Board meeting on April 26, 2006. Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the Board noted that it had received the March 26, 2006, report by Dr. Konowitz and the April 17, 2006, report by Dr. Yapor. The Board agreed to take these two documents into consideration. Michael Schaedel, the commanding officer of the Chicago police department\u2019s medical services was then called to testify.\nOfficer Schaedel testified that a person who has been on medical leave may return to full duty if the person can fire a weapon, ambulate independently, and otherwise perform the functions of a police officer. Officer Schaedel also testified that the Chicago police department has a number of restricted duty positions, some of which do not require the officer to wear a gun belt. In addition, he testified that, with regard to the gun belt, accommodations could be made \u2014 such as having the officer wear a smaller, lighter gun, or having them wear a shoulder holster, ankle holster, or \u201ccrossdraw holster.\u201d According to Officer Schaedel, an officer did not necessarily have to requalify on the gun range before being permitted to return to certain light duty work. Further, he testified that accommodations could be made for any standing and sitting restrictions.\nAs to medications, Officer Schaedel testified that he was not qualified to determine whether an officer could return to duty while taking a particular medication. However, he agreed that an officer taking mind-altering drugs should not be permitted to return to work in any capacity.\nOfficer Schaedel then testified that he had read Dr. Yapor\u2019s April 17, 2006, report and that nothing in the report indicated to him that Kouzoukas could not return to a restricted duty assignment. He suggested that an appropriate assignment might be in the Alternate Response Section where the officers wear headsets and can move around their desks while taking calls. He admitted that such a position was never offered to Kouzoukas, but explained the reason was that Kouzoukas did not have a release from a doctor directing her to return to work for a light duty assignment.\nOn cross-examination, Officer Schaedel testified that he had been appointed commander of medical services only two weeks prior to his testifying. He admitted that he had no prior experience with medical services and had received no specialized training upon being appointed commander. Accordingly, his testimony regarding an officer\u2019s ability to work without a utility/gun belt or \u201cduty belt\u201d was based only on his observations and a phone call he made to the Alternate Response Section. In fact, Officer Schaedel admitted that he was aware of no Chicago police department general order or other written policy which permitted an officer to deviate from the prescribed regulation uniform of a Chicago police officer.\nOfficer Schaedel also testified that his opinion that Kouzoukas\u2019 medications did not prevent her from returning to work was based on information he received from the medical services administrator, who is a nurse. He said that, based on what the administrator told him, he did not believe that the medications Kouzoukas was currently taking were \u201cmind-altering.\u201d Accordingly, he believed the only obstacle to having Kouzoukas return to work for light duty was the fact that, to date, no doctor had given her a release.\nAfter Officer Schaedel testified, Dr. Demorest was recalled to explain briefly the nature and purpose of certain medications Kouzoukas was presently taking. The hearing was then closed and the matter taken under advisement.\nOn May 26, the Board issued a written decision denying Kouzoukas\u2019 claim for duty disability benefits. The Board based its decision on its findings, which we quote verbatim:\n\u201c(C) Kouzoukas, from the medical records and testimony offered does not have any objective findings of a back, spine or SI joint injury; Kouzoukas\u2019 complaints of pain are subjective and do not prevent her full duty return to the [Chicago police department]. The [Chicago police department], at their election, can assign Kouzoukas to a full duty position with or without restrictions if they believe such is appropriate. Full duty [Chicago police department] employment is available for an officer with the subjective complaints of pain as expressed by Kouzoukas.\nDr. Spencer reporting that her symptoms, \u2018are aggravating, but not incapacitating.\u2019\n(D) Dr. Yapor was not a credible witness. The Board finding his testimony to be evasive and inconsistent. In part, and without limitation Dr. Yapor\u2019s reluctance to acknowledge there were no objective findings as to Kouzoukas\u2019 complaints of pain. Dr. Yapor then opining Kouzoukas unable to return to work because of the medication she was taking, none of which he prescribed, completely ignoring the medication issue in his final report, issued after he testified.\nDr. Yapor testified Kouzoukas did not have a back problem, (agreeing with Dr. Spencer) Dr. Yapor suggesting her problem was limited to her SI joint, but in December 13, 2005 report, Dr. Yapor stated \u2018the patient in my opinion should be considered to have a chronic low back syndrome.\u2019\n(E) Kouzoukas in addressing her claim of pain and disability was not a credible witness. The Board without limitation references, 1) her testimony as to her inability to maintain, following the accident, her 5 or 6 day daily work. A medical report in November 2004, approximately 4 months after the incident indicated \u2018she is currently unable to run or work out.\u2019 (Emphasis in original) 2) Kouzoukas\u2019 failure to keep therapy appointments and her plane trips all raise questions as to her injury and the extent of her complaints of disabling pain.\u201d\nThe Board concluded that Kouzoukas was not disabled and that she did not meet her burden of proving that her injury was causally connected to the July 2004 incident.\nKouzoukas filed an action in the circuit court of Cook County seeking administrative review of the Board\u2019s decision pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2006)). She also sought an award of prejudgment interest pursuant to section 2 of the Interest Act (815 ILCS 205/2 (West 2006)). On November 1, 2006, the circuit court entered an order reversing the Board\u2019s denial of Kouzoukas\u2019 claim for duty disability benefits and, on November 15, 2006, the Board filed a notice of appeal. On June 26, 2007, the appellate court dismissed the appeal because the issue of prejudgment interest had not been resolved by the circuit court and the court\u2019s order did not contain Supreme Court Rule 304(a) language. On remand, the circuit court entered an order on September 8, 2007, awarding Kouzoukas prejudgment interest. Again, the matter was appealed and, on June 24, 2008, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court\u2019s rulings.\nThis court granted the Board\u2019s petition for leave to appeal on November 26, 2008. We also permitted the Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago to submit a brief amicus curiae in support of the Board on the matter of prejudgment interest.\nANALYSIS\nStandard of Review\nThis cause comes before us on administrative review. See 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 228 (West 2008) (all final decisions of the Retirement Board are subject to review under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law). Section 3 \u2014 110 of the Administrative Review Law provides that in any administrative review action, review \u201cshall extend to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record before the court. No new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to any finding, order, determination or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2006). The statute also mandates that the \u201cfindings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2006). Accordingly, it is not a court\u2019s function on administrative review to reweigh evidence or to make an independent determination of the facts. Cook County Republican Party v. Ulinois State Board of Elections, 232 Ill. 2d 231, 244 (2009); Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992).\nThe applicable standard of review depends upon whether the question is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed question of fact and law. AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 390 (2001). Although the Board\u2019s findings of fact are given considerable deference, they are, nonetheless, subject to reversal if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc. v. Rockford School District No. 205, 216 Ill. 2d 455, 471-72 (2005). Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo, while mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Outcom, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 233 Ill. 2d 324 (2009); Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200 (2008); City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998). An administrative decision is clearly erroneous where the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, State Panel, 216 Ill. 2d 569, 577-78 (2005). Of course, the plaintiff in an administrative hearing bears the burden of proof and relief will be denied if the plaintiff fails to sustain that burden. Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill. 2d 485, 505 (2007); Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d at 53233.\nThis court has held that \u201c \u2018the question of whether the evidence of record supports the Board\u2019s denial of plaintiff\u2019s application for a disability pension\u2019 \u201d is a question of fact and, as such, the manifest weight standard of review applies. See Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill. 2d at 505, quoting Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d at 534, 543. In the case at bar, however, the Board questions whether Kouzoukas is disabled within the meaning of the Pension Code. To the extent that this issue requires us to interpret the meaning of the Code provision, it is a mixed question of law and fact, subject to the clearly erroneous standard.\nKouzoukas\u2019 Claim for Duty Disability Benefits\nIn the case at bar, the Board concluded that Kouzoukas was not disabled, that she could return to full active duty, and that the Chicago police department could assign Kouzoukas to \u201ca full duty position with or without restrictions.\u201d One reason for this determination was the Board\u2019s finding that Kouzoukas\u2019 complaints of pain were \u201csubjective\u201d and that she was unable to produce \u201cany objective findings of a back, spine or SI joint injury.\u201d The Board\u2019s conclusions also rested on its findings that Kouzoukas and her physician, Dr. Yapor, lacked credibility.\nThe Board argues that its factual findings are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the lower courts erred in reversing the Board\u2019s decision because the courts reweighed the evidence and substituted their own judgments for that of the Board. The Board also contends that, because it had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, its credibility determinations \u201care not subject to review and [this] Court should decline any invitation to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact.\u201d\nAlthough it is true that the Board\u2019s credibility determinations should be afforded considerable weight, they are not immune from review. As we said in Wade, \u201c[e]ven under the manifest weight standard applicable in this instance, the deference we afford the administrative agency\u2019s decision is not boundless.\u201d Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill. 2d at 507. When reviewing an administrative agency\u2019s decision, we may put aside any findings which are clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence. Sangamon County Sheriff's Department v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 233 Ill. 2d 125 (2009). That is the case here.\nAlthough no medical test, X-ray or MRI scan revealed a deformity or abnormality which would explain the reason for Kouzoukas\u2019 pain, this does not mean that Kouzoukas failed to present objective evidence of her pain, nor does it mean that Kouzoukas did not prove that she is disabled. The Board\u2019s determination that Kouzoukas\u2019 pain was \u201csubjective\u201d and \u201cnot demonstrated by objective proof\u2019 ignores the fact that every doctor who examined Kouzoukas believed that she was, indeed, experiencing pain. Moreover, the doctors\u2019 examinations revealed that Kouzoukas had back spasms, point tenderness, and decreased range of motion. These doctors diagnosed Kouzoukas\u2019 condition as lumbar myofasciitis and chronic lower back pain. The doctors\u2019 observations and diagnoses are, themselves, objective evidence of Kouzoukas\u2019 pain.\nIn denying Kouzoukas disability benefits, the Board relied heavily on the brief reports submitted by Dr. Spencer after he examined Kouzoukas in 2005. Having seen Kouzoukas only twice, Dr. Spencer opined, based on the \u201cpristine appearance\u201d of her MRI, that Kouzoukas\u2019 pain did not stem from \u201can identifiable injury to her lumbar spine\u201d and that her pain was not \u201cincapacitating.\u201d Of course, Dr. Spencer did not testify at the hearings and, therefore, the exact meaning of his reports could not be explored.\nAt the March Board hearing, the Board asked Dr. Yapor to provide his understanding of Dr. Spencer\u2019s reports. Dr. Yapor explained that Dr. Spencer had used the terms \u201cback\u201d and \u201cspine\u201d interchangeably, although he sometimes meant different things. Dr. Yapor further stated that he agreed with Dr. Spencer that Kouzoukas did not have an injury to her spine and that there was nothing surgically wrong with her back, that is, there was no injury which required the intervention of a spine surgeon such as Dr. Spencer. Dr. Yapor then stated his belief that Kouzoukas had sustained an injury to the muscles and tendons of her back, particularly at the SI joint. He did not believe this diagnosis was in conflict with Dr. Spencer\u2019s reports.\nEven if we discount Dr. Yapor\u2019s interpretation of Dr. Spencer\u2019s reports, as the Board apparently did, what the Board fails to acknowledge is that even Dr. Spencer agreed that Kouzoukas was actually experiencing pain, although he could not identify its source. Furthermore, Dr. Spencer\u2019s opinion that Kouzoukas\u2019 pain was not \u201cincapacitating\u201d stands alone in opposition to the opinions of the several other doctors who treated Kouzoukas since her injury on July 25, 2004.\nFrom the outset, every medical professional who examined Kouzoukas found that she suffered pain as a result of a lower back strain that occurred on July 25, 2004, and that the pain, in turn, prevented her from returning to work as a full duty police officer. Beginning with the emergency room of Resurrection Medical Center and MercyWorks Occupational Medical Center, Kouzoukas was diagnosed as having lower back or \u201cacute lumbar\u201d strain due to her July 25, 2004, work-related injury, and was told that she should not return to work at that time. When her pain did not resolve, Kouzoukas was then treated for an extended period of time by Chicago police department authorized physician, Dr. Lewis, who diagnosed Kouzoukas\u2019 condition as \u201cacute dorsal and lumbar myofasciitis\u201d \u2014 an inflamation of the muscle and its fascia. Despite many consultations with Dr. Lewis, Kouzoukas\u2019 pain still did not completely abate. Kouzoukas sometimes returned to work, at her doctor\u2019s direction, for a restricted duty assignment. But even her limited duty assignments exacerbated her back pain.\nKouzoukas was then treated by Dr. Yapor, who referred her to Dr. Konowitz for pain management. Dr. Yapor and the Board\u2019s own physician, Dr. Demorest, agreed that Kouzoukas suffered from chronic lower back pain that was neither faked nor exaggerated and which prevented Kouzoukas from returning to a full duty position in the Chicago police department.\nBased on all of the evidence that was before the Board, Dr. Spencer\u2019s reports do not provide sufficient support for the Board\u2019s decision to deny Kouzoukas disability benefits. Other than Dr. Spencer, every doctor to have examined Kouzoukas believed that Kouzoukas sustained a work-related injury that resulted in a persistence of disabling lower back pain. As a result, we find the Board\u2019s determination that Kouzoukas is not disabled and can return to a full duty position to be against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nWe also reject the Board\u2019s finding that Dr. Yapor was not a credible witness. Our review of Dr. Yapor\u2019s testimony reveals no evasiveness or inconsistency. Moreover, the Board\u2019s own physician, Dr. Demorest, agreed with Dr. Yapor that Kouzoukas\u2019 pain was real, that she was not malingering or faking her pain, and that her pain prevented her from returning to full active duty. Although Dr. Demorest had not included in his report a finding that Kouzoukas was disabled, he testified at the hearings that he did not believe returning Kouzoukas to full duty would be appropriate or prudent.\nFinally, we reject the Board\u2019s finding that Kouzoukas was not credible and that she failed to sustain her burden of proof. The overwhelming majority of the documentary evidence and expert testimony presented by Kouzoukas\u2014 including the testimony of the Board\u2019s own physician\u2014 supported her claim that she suffered from debilitating pain which prevented her return to full active duty in the Chicago police department. The fact that Kouzoukas missed some of her physical therapy sessions and took two trips within the two years after her injury does not change the fact that she presented abundant proof of her inability to perform as a full duty police officer. Therefore, we agree with the circuit and appellate courts below that the Board\u2019s decision to deny Kouzoukas disability benefits because she could return to \u201ca full duty position with or without restrictions\u201d is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\n\u201cAny Assigned Duty\u201d\nWhen the Board issued its decision denying Kouzoukas disability benefits, it held that Kouzoukas was not disabled and could be returned to a full duty position as an active police officer. The Board now contends that we should uphold its decision to deny Kouzoukas disability benefits \u2014 even if we find that she cannot be returned to full, active duty \u2014 because the evidence supports the finding that Kouzoukas is not disabled within the meaning of the Code.\nSection 5 \u2014 115 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 115 (West 2006)) defines the term \u201cdisability\u201d as: \u201cA condition of physical or mental incapacity to perform any assigned duty or duties in the police service.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The Board argues that Kouzoukas is not disabled within the meaning of the Pension Code because she is not incapable of performing \u201cany assigned duty.\u201d To support this contention, the Board points to Officer Schaedel\u2019s testimony that there are positions within the Chicago police department which would be able to accommodate Kouzoukas\u2019 restrictions.\nLike the appellate court below, we recognize that a person, such as Kouzoukas, who cannot return to full police duties, still may not be disabled within the meaning of the Code \u201cif a position is made available to her which can be performed by a person with her physical disability.\u201d 383 Ill. App. 3d at 952. See also Peterson v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen\u2019s Pension Fund, 54 Ill. 2d 260, 263-65 (1973); Terrano v. Retirement Board of the Policemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 315 Ill. App. 3d 270, 274-75 (2000). The flaw in the Board\u2019s reasoning, however, is that the position within the Chicago police department which Officer Schaedel testified might accommodate Kouzoukas\u2019 restrictions, was \u2014 as Officer Schaedel admitted \u2014 never actually offered to Kouzoukas. Thus, for Kouzoukas, the position proposed by Officer Schaedel was never an \u201cassigned duty\u201d and, therefore, there is no way to know whether Kouzoukas is qualified for and capable of performing this duty, whether the position is open and available to her, or whether the position would, in fact, accommodate Kouzoukas\u2019 restrictions.\nAt the hearings on Kouzoukas\u2019 application for duty disability benefits, she presented evidence that she was unable to perform \u201cany assigned duty.\u201d In other words, Kouzoukas proved that, since her injury on July 25, 2004, whenever she returned to work and was given an assignment \u2014 whether it be full, active duty or \u201crestricted duty\u201d \u2014 her back pain prevented her from performing the duties assigned to her. Thus, the manifest weight of the evidence shows that Kouzoukas carried her burden of proving that she was disabled, that is, that she had a physical condition which made her incapable of performing any assigned duty and that no position within her limitations was offered to her. See Terrano v. Retirement Board of the Policemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 274-76 (\u201cit is a firm offer of a limited duty position that could be performed by an individual with the applicant\u2019s physical limitations that renders the applicant not disabled within the meaning of the Code despite his inability to perform the duties of an active police officer\u201d).\nThe Board argues that its decision to grant or reject a claimant\u2019s application for duty disability benefits should not be dependent on the availability of an assignment in the Chicago police department within the claimant\u2019s restrictions. According to the Board, such a holding encroaches on the \u201cexclusive original jurisdiction\u201d bestowed upon it by the Pension Code. See 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 189 (West 2006). We disagree.\nThe Board has the duty under the Code to determine whether a claimant is disabled. In the case at bar, Kouzoukas presented evidence which established that she had chronic back pain which severely limited her ability to sit, stand, walk, drive, and wear a gunbelt. Moreover, because of these limitations, Kouzoukas\u2019 doctors did not provide her with a release to return to work. As a result, the Chicago police department would not reassign Kouzoukas to any position. Under these circumstances, Kouzoukas met her burden of proving that she was disabled. To hold otherwise would be to place Kouzoukas in an untenable \u201ccatch 22\u201d situation \u2014 unable to work because the Chicago police department will not assign her to a position in the police service which she can perform, yet unable to obtain disability benefits.\nWe recognize that during the course of the hearings Kouzoukas\u2019 physical limitations were delineated and Drs. Yapor and Demorest agreed that Kouzoukas could return to work under a strictly prescribed set of restrictions. In addition, Officer Schaedel testified that there existed within the Chicago police department a position that might accommodate Kouzoukas\u2019 sitting and standing restrictions, as well as the limitations on her wearing a gunbelt. However, because the Chicago police department never actually offered Kouzoukas a position within her restrictions, the Board could not say that Kouzoukas was no longer disabled within the meaning of the Code.\nIn the case at bar, the Board should have granted Kouzoukas a duty disability benefit and instructed her to present herself to the Chicago police department with a doctor\u2019s release listing her restrictions as determined at the hearing. Then, if the Chicago police department offered Kouzoukas a position which accommodated the restrictions set forth in her doctor\u2019s release, she would no longer be entitled to duty disability benefits. If, however, the Chicago police department was unable to reassign Kouzoukas to a restricted duty position within her limitations, she would remain eligible for duty disability benefits, unless she was found to be ineligible for some other reason or, as a result of a future examination, it was determined that she was no longer disabled. See Terrano, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 276-77 (\u201cUnder the Code, there are a number of future events that could impact the plaintiff\u2019s right to receive duty disability benefits,\u201d including attaining the age of 63 (40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 154 (West 2006)), felony conviction (40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 227 (West 2006)), refusal to be examined by a board physician (40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 157 (West 2006)), or a change in disability status is revealed after a required annual physical examination (40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 156 (West 2006))).\nWork-related\nFinally, we address the Board\u2019s determination that Kouzoukas\u2019 injury was not work-related. A claimant who is found to be disabled may be awarded a duty disability benefit if the disability stemmed from a work-related incident. Otherwise, she may be awarded a nonduty disability benefit. See 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 154, 5 \u2014 155 (West 2006). In the case at bar, the Board concluded that Kouzoukas was not disabled but that, even if she was disabled, she failed to prove her July 25, 2004, injury was the cause of her disability. We find this determination by the Board to be against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nAlthough the record shows that Dr. Spencer opined that the source of Kouzoukas\u2019 pain might be gynecological or gastrointestinal, no other doctor who treated Kouzoukas believed that her pain stemmed from something other than the July 25, 2004, work-related incident. Dr. Konowitz referred Kouzoukas for an evaluation of her gastric infection, but that infection was never determined to be a source of Kouzoukas\u2019 pain. Again, all of the evidence and testimony, including that of the Board\u2019s physician, linked Kouzoukas\u2019 disabling pain to the July 25, 2004, back-strain injury that occurred when she was on patrol as a police officer. Therefore, the Board\u2019s conclusion that Kouzoukas\u2019 disability was not work-related is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nPrejudgment Interest\nIn the case at bar, the circuit court, having found that the Board erred in denying Kouzoukas\u2019 claim for duty disability benefits, ruled that Kouzoukas was entitled to prejudgment interest pursuant to section 2 of the Interest Act (815 ILCS 205/2 (West 2006)). That section provides:\n\u201cCreditors shall be allowed to receive at the rate of five (5) per centum per annum for all moneys after they become due on any bond, bill, promissory note, or other instrument of writing ***.\u201d\nThe appellate court, relying on Fenton v. Board of Trustees, 203 Ill. App. 3d 714 (1990), affirmed the circuit court\u2019s ruling. The Board now challenges the award of prejudgment interest, arguing that the Interest Act is inapplicable to an award of benefits under the Pension Code and the Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago has submitted an amicus brief in support of the Board on this issue.\nWhether prejudgment interest is available on an award of disability benefits from a public pension fund is an issue never before addressed by this court. As the Board acknowledges, our appellate court has considered the issue and there is a split of authority on the matter. Fenton and its progeny, Barry v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 357 Ill. App. 3d 749 (2005), Martino v. Police Pension Board, 331 Ill. App. 3d 975 (2002), and Barber v. Board of Trustees of the Village of South Barrington Police Pension Fund, 256 Ill. App. 3d 814 (1993), have held that prejudgment interest maybe awarded based on their finding that a pension agreement, as prescribed by statute, is an \u201cinstrument of writing\u201d within the meaning of the Interest Act. Bassett v. Pekin Police Pension Board, 362 Ill. App. 3d 235 (2005), however, rejected this holding.\nAs a general rule, prejudgment interest is recoverable only where authorized by the agreement of the parties or by statute. Tri-G, Inc. v. Burke, Bosselman & Weaver, 222 Ill. 2d 218, 255 (2006). An exception exists in proceedings brought in equity. In such cases, a court may be justified in awarding interest based on equitable grounds. See In re Estate of Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d 61 (1989); Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 128 Ill. App. 3d 678 (1984).\nIt is undisputed that the Pension Code, which constitutes the written agreement between the parties, makes no provision for an award of prejudgment interest. The Code defines the term \u201cinterest\u201d in section 5 \u2014 120 (40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 120 (West 2006)), and expressly authorizes the Board to pay interest, or recover interest from a participant, in certain specific instances (40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 149, 5 \u2014 164 (West 2006)). It does not, however, make provision for the payment of prejudgment interest when the Board, in good faith, denies a claim for disability benefits and that decision is later reversed on administrative review.\nWe note, further, that plaintiff does not suggest any purposeful wrongdoing on the part of the Board in denying her claim which would warrant an award of prejudgment interest on equitable grounds. Thus, if prejudgment interest is to be awarded, it must be because a statute authorizes it.\nKouzoukas contends, and the lower courts held, that section 2 of the Interest Act applies to permit the payment of prejudgment interest when, pursuant to the Pension Code, disability benefits are awarded on administrative review. Although the appellate court affirmed the circuit court\u2019s award of prejudgment interest, it, like the courts in Barber v. Board of Trustees of the Village of South Barrington Police Pension Fund, 256 Ill. App. 3d 814 (1993) (First District, fourth division), and Martino v. Police Pension Board, 331 Ill. App. 3d 975 (2002) (First District, sixth division), engaged in no independent analysis, but simply relied on the decision in Fenton v. Board of Trustees, 203 Ill. App. 3d 714 (1990).\nIn Fenton, the Fifth District of our appellate court considered, as an issue of first impression, whether a pension agreement under the Pension Code is an \u201cinstrument of writing\u201d within the meaning of section 2 of the Interest Act and, thus, subject to an award of prejudgment interest. The court held:\n\u201cEach of the categories of bonds, bills and promissory notes specified [in section 2] has the legal attribute of creating an indebtedness. The phrase \u2018or other instrument of writing\u2019 should thus be construed under ejusdem generis to refer only to other similar writings possessing this same legal attribute. (Hamilton v. American Gage & Machine Corp. (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 845, 853, 342 N.E.2d 758, 765.) However, the phrase \u2018other instruments of writing\u2019 has been construed to include building or construction contracts (E.M. Melahn Construction Co. v. Village of Carpentersville (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 544, 427 N.E.2d 181), insurance policies (Ervin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 982, 469 N.E.2d 243), real estate listing contracts (Hammel v. Ruby (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 241, 487 N.E.2d 409), and leases (Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Wetzel (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 243, 423 N.E.2d 1170). Our research has not revealed any Illinois case, however, where a pension was sought to be included under the statutory phrase \u2018other instruments of writing.\u2019\nThe police pension fund here is a statutorily mandated creation and is administered according to legislatively prescribed terms and conditions. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. IO8V2, par. 3 \u2014 101 [now 40 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 (West 2006)].) The terms and conditions of the pension fund are written in the Illinois Pension Code. Construction contracts, insurance policies, real estate listing contracts and leases are no more like bonds, bills or promissory notes than is the pension agreement, in that they all are writings creating an indebtedness. We find, therefore, that the pension agreement is an \u2018other instrument of writing\u2019 under the interest statute.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Fenton, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 723.\nIt is clear from the Fenton court\u2019s holding that it found section 2 of the Interest Act applied to an award of benefits under the Pension Code, not because it applied the principles of ejusdem generis and found that the pension agreement shared similar characteristics with a bond, bill or promissory note but, rather, because it found that a pension agreement was written in the Pension Code and created a type of indebtedness. We reject the Fenton court\u2019s construction of the Interest Act and its conclusion that a public pension agreement, as provided by the Pension Code, is an \u201cinstrument of writing\u201d within the meaning of the Act.\nStatutes permitting the recovery of interest are in derogation of common law and, thus, must be strictly construed. City of Springfield v. Allphin, 82 Ill. 2d 571, 577 (1980); see also Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 419 (2008) (statutes in derogation of common law are to be strictly construed and nothing is to be read into such statutes by intendment or implication). Section 2 of the Interest Act permits the recovery of prejudgment interest, despite the lack of express agreement of the parties, whenever moneys come due on any bonds, bills, promissory notes, or other instrument of writing. Our appellate court has long construed the term \u201cother instrument of writing\u201d in section 2 to include a variety of written documents, such as contracts, leases, and insurance policies. See New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Hanover Insurance Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d 701, 708 (1998). However, bonds, bills, and promissory notes, like contracts, leases, and insurance policies, are instruments evincing transactions of a business and commercial nature which create a debtor-creditor relationship. New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Hanover Insurance Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d at 708. We agree with the court in Bassett v. Pekin Police Pension Board, 362 Ill. App. 3d 235, 242 (2005), that \u201cprovisions of the Pension Code have little in common with bonds, bills, promissory notes, or other instruments of indebtedness.\u201d\nIt is true that article III, section 5, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides that \u201cmembership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.\u201d However, we do not interpret article III to mean that a pension agreement under the Pension Code is a contract in the traditional sense of that term. We conclude, therefore, that public pension funds do not share sufficiently similar characteristics with the instruments specified in section 2 and, thus, we find that the Fenton court misapplied the principles of ejusdem generis. We hold that public pension agreements under the Pension Code are not \u201cother instruments of writing\u201d within the meaning of section 2 of the Interest Act. It follows, therefore, that Kouzoukas is not entitled to prejudgment interest. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court judgment to the extent that it affirmed the circuit court\u2019s award of prejudgment interest.\nBecause we find that no statute authorizes an award of prejudgment interest, we need not consider any additional arguments proffered by the Board and the amicus in opposition to the award of prejudgment interest.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the appellate court\u2019s reversal of the Board\u2019s denial of Kouzoukas\u2019 claim for duty disability benefits. However, we reverse the award of prejudgment interest.\nAppellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.\nThis report was admitted into evidence at the beginning of the April hearing. The Board agreed to accept the report, despite the fact that it was prepared after Dr. Yapor had already testified. The report indicated that Kouzoukas was restricted to sitting, standing and continuous walking for no more than 35 to 45 minutes at one time. At the April meeting, the Board also admitted into evidence a report from Dr. Konowitz dated March 23, 2006. In this report, Dr. Konowitz stated that, because of Kouzoukas\u2019 restrictions, he could not release her for duty.\nIt is of particular note that Dr. Lewis had treated Kouzoukas in 2003 for a prior back injury and, in his expert opinion, the pain Kouzoukas was experiencing in 2004-05 was due to her July 25, 2004, injury and was unrelated to her prior injuries.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE" } ], "attorneys": [ "David R. Kugler, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Paul D. Geiger, of Chicago, for appellee.", "Mary Patricia Burns and Vincent D. Pinelli, of Burke Burns & Pinelli, Ltd., of Chicago, for amicus curiae Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 106976. \u2014\nMARIA KOUZOUKAS, Appellee, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant.\nOpinion filed September 24, 2009.\nDavid R. Kugler, of Chicago, for appellant.\nPaul D. Geiger, of Chicago, for appellee.\nMary Patricia Burns and Vincent D. Pinelli, of Burke Burns & Pinelli, Ltd., of Chicago, for amicus curiae Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago." }, "file_name": "0446-01", "first_page_order": 458, "last_page_order": 490 }