{ "id": 3625372, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ANDRE HOLMES, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Holmes", "decision_date": "2009-10-08", "docket_number": "No. 106934", "first_page": "59", "last_page": "72", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 59" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4059981 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "arguments made without citation to authority are forfeited" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462782 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141", "parenthetical": "referring to Rule 604(a)(1) as creating a jurisdictional barrier" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473354 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5384104 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" }, { "page": "706" }, { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25343 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" }, { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448282 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461-62" }, { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475193 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "242-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096298 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "489-90" }, { "page": "485" }, { "page": "489-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3617082 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 Ill. App. 3d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4278748 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" }, { "page": "519", "parenthetical": "Cunningham, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "514" }, { "page": "514" }, { "page": "514" }, { "page": "515-19" }, { "page": "519-20", "parenthetical": "Cunningham, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/383/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5577248 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "392" }, { "page": "391" }, { "page": "392" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "391", "parenthetical": "as with res judicata, the Taylor rule applies to any issues that could have been raised in earlier proceedings" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2912891 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" }, { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0136-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 816, "char_count": 22245, "ocr_confidence": 0.845, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.339701094470699e-08, "percentile": 0.2728871451578837 }, "sha256": "3ba66758074b834fad70eb099bbffefdafe2a4c8c646e233df98e3d495392452", "simhash": "1:ebbf935ad27e5ce0", "word_count": 3563 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:02:11.455849+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ANDRE HOLMES, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nThis appeal involves the procedural framework governing interlocutory appeals under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), first recognized by this court in People v. Taylor, 50 Ill. 2d 136 (1971). This framework, commonly referred to as the Taylor rule, requires a party seeking review of an order appealable under Rule 604(a)(1) to appeal or file a motion to reconsider within 30 days. People v. Williams, 138 Ill. 2d 377, 394 (1990). An exception to the Taylor rule permits review beyond that time frame only when there is a material change in the facts that could not have been presented earlier with due diligence. Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 394. Defendant was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault. The circuit court of Cook County denied the State\u2019s motion in limine seeking to admit evidence of defendant\u2019s prior sex-crime convictions, and the State filed an interlocutory appeal under Rule 604(a)(1).\nRejecting defendant\u2019s jurisdictional challenge based on the Taylor rule, the appellate court majority applied the exception to the rule, reviewed the merits of the State\u2019s appeal, and reversed the trial court\u2019s exclusion of one of defendant\u2019s convictions. 383 Ill. App. 3d 506, 507. The dissenting justice argued the exception to the Taylor rule did not apply and, therefore, the State\u2019s appeal should have been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 383 Ill. App. 3d at 519 (Cunningham, J., dissenting).\nDefendant appeals, challenging the majority\u2019s interpretation and application of the Taylor rule and its exception. Alternatively, defendant argues the appellate court erred when it reversed the trial court\u2019s order excluding evidence of one of his convictions. We hold the State\u2019s interlocutory appeal was barred by the Taylor rule and the appellate court therefore lacked jurisdiction. We vacate the appellate court\u2019s judgment and dismiss the appeal.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe State alleged that on December 28, 2002, the victim, J.B., and defendant, who were high school acquaintances, talked inside J.B.\u2019s parked Ford Expedition. After J.B. told defendant she did not want to have a romantic relationship with him, defendant became \u201cenraged,\u201d grabbed her neck, and choked her. Defendant told J.B. he had a knife and ordered her to remove her clothes. Defendant then forced J.B. to the backseat of his vehicle and sexually assaulted her.\nAfter the assault, defendant threatened to kill J.B. if she refused to meet his father. Defendant took control of J.B.\u2019s vehicle and drove her to his father\u2019s house, introduced her to his father, and told his father they planned to marry. Defendant then allowed J.B. to leave in her vehicle. J.B. immediately drove to a police station and reported the assault. After speaking to police officers, J.B. was taken to a hospital where she was examined and a sexual assault kit was completed. J.B. sustained vaginal tears consistent with a sexual assault and contusions and abrasions consistent with a physical assault. The following day defendant was arrested and J.B. identified him as her attacker in a police lineup. An analysis of J.B.\u2019s sexual assault kit revealed DNA evidence matching defendant\u2019s DNA profile.\nDuring pretrial proceedings, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of defendant\u2019s 1996 conviction for attempted forcible rape and his 1994 conviction for sexual battery. At a hearing on the motion, defendant argued that evidence of his prior convictions would unfairly prejudice his case and its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value. Defendant further argued J.B. \u201chad a previous false outcry of rape against a Cleveland Browns NFL football player\u201d and was receiving child support payments from that individual.\nResponding to the trial court\u2019s questioning, the State denied any knowledge of J.B. making a prior rape allegation because defendant had not yet provided his discovery. Defendant explained \u201c[t]here\u2019s some sort of civil settlement for child support through this NFL player.\u201d Following the hearing, the trial court denied the State\u2019s motion and excluded the evidence of defendant\u2019s prior convictions.\nDefendant later requested supplemental discovery from the State on the approximate dates and locations of any previous reports of assault, battery, sexual assault, or rape involving J.B., including any incident in Illinois or Ohio. In the State\u2019s answer to defendant\u2019s request, J.B. indicated the only report or case occurred in Ohio sometime between 1989 and 1992, and involved her then-boyfriend, D.C., who had punched J.B. in the face. J.B. reported the incident to police officers, and her boyfriend was arrested, but J.B. did not pursue a complaint.\nSometime after J.B. denied making a prior rape allegation, defendant obtained a police report showing J.B. claimed she had been raped in 1995. J.B. became pregnant as a result of the incident and gave birth to the child. J.B. also received child support payments from the man she accused of raping her. Defendant indicated he intended to cross-examine J.B. with this information.\nAfter learning of J.B.\u2019s prior rape allegation and defendant\u2019s intentions to impeach J.B. with that information, the State filed a motion to reconsider the trial court\u2019s earlier order excluding evidence of defendant\u2019s other crimes. The State\u2019s motion to reconsider was filed approximately 23 months after the original exclusion order. The State argued the trial court should reconsider its original order in light of the \u201cnewly tendered discovery\u201d of J.B.\u2019s prior rape allegation. Alternatively, the State argued if the trial court denied the motion to reconsider, it should also bar defendant from introducing evidence of J.B.\u2019s prior rape allegation.\nThe trial court denied both the State\u2019s motion to reconsider and its request to bar evidence of J.B.\u2019s prior rape allegation. The State then filed a certificate of substantial impairment and an interlocutory appeal under Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)).\nOn appeal, the State argued the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it refused to admit evidence of defendant\u2019s other sex-crime convictions. Defendant responded the appellate court should dismiss the State\u2019s appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the Taylor rule because the State failed to appeal or seek reconsideration of the trial court\u2019s exclusion order within 30 days. Defendant alternatively asserted the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded his prior convictions.\nThe appellate majority first found that a material change in the facts warranted application of the Taylor rule\u2019s exception to consider the State\u2019s interlocutory appeal. 383 Ill. App. 3d at 514. Although the majority rejected the State\u2019s position that evidence of J.B.\u2019s prior rape allegation constituted a material factual change, it nevertheless sua sponte found that J.B.\u2019s \u201cdenial\u201d of her prior rape allegation constituted a material change in the facts sufficient to invoke the exception. 383 Ill. App. 3d at 514. In making this determination, the majority concluded J.B.\u2019s \u201cfailure to disclose a prior report of sexual assault, even after defendant filed supplemental discovery to uncover it, is relevant to her motive and bias in making the current allegation against defendant.\u201d 383 Ill. App. 3d at 514.\nThe majority then reviewed the trial court\u2019s exclusion of defendant\u2019s prior convictions and affirmed the exclusion of his 1996 conviction for attempted forcible rape, but reversed the exclusion of his 1994 conviction for sexual battery. 383 Ill. App. 3d at 515-19. The dissenting justice asserted the exception to the Taylor rule was inapplicable because J.B.\u2019s denial of a prior rape allegation did not constitute a material change in the facts and the State failed to show due diligence. 383 Ill. App. 3d at 519-20 (Cunningham, J., dissenting).\nWe allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.\nII. ANALYSIS\nDefendant contends the appellate court improperly considered the State\u2019s interlocutory appeal because it was barred by the Taylor rule. Specifically, defendant asserts the State\u2019s motion to reconsider the exclusion order, filed almost two years after the order, was untimely, contravening the Taylor rule. Defendant further asserts the State failed to establish the necessary showing of due diligence and a material change in facts required to invoke the exception to the Taylor rule. Alternatively, defendant argues the appellate court erred when it reversed the trial court\u2019s exclusion of his 1994 conviction.\nWe first address defendant\u2019s jurisdictional challenge based on the Taylor rule and Rule 604(a)(1). As a preliminary matter, we reject defendant\u2019s position that the State forfeited its arguments supporting the majority\u2019s finding of jurisdiction by not raising them in the underlying proceedings. Forfeiture has no application here because the issue involves a jurisdictional question and we have an independent obligation to review it. People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 231 Ill. 2d 370, 387 (2008). Thus, we will review the merits of the parties\u2019 respective claims.\nThe 1970 Illinois Constitution grants this court the exclusive and final authority to prescribe the scope of interlocutory appeals from any order or ruling that is not a final judgment. People v. Drum, 194 Ill. 2d 485, 488 (2000). Thus, \u201c \u2018whether a particular order may be appealed [in an interlocutory appeal] depends solely upon our construction of our Rule 604(a)(1).\u2019 \u201d Drum, 194 Ill. 2d at 488, quoting People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 239 (1980). We review de novo the interpretation of a supreme court rule because it is a question of law. Drum, 194 Ill. 2d at 488. Rule 604(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that the State in a criminal case may file an interlocutory appeal only from an order or judgment that has the substantive effect of suppressing evidence. 210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1).\nAt issue in this appeal is the Taylor rule, relating to interlocutory appeals under Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). In Taylor, this court recognized Rule 604 provides for appeals that have the substantive effect of dismissal of a charge. Taylor, 50 Ill. 2d at 140. Consequently, we concluded that the State is barred from retrying issues previously considered by the trial court in a suppression order when the State did not timely appeal from that order. Taylor, 50 Ill. 2d at 140. The Taylor rule has been consistently applied to bar relitigation of appealable pretrial orders when no timely appeal or reconsideration is sought. See, e.g., Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 392 (citing cases).\nIn Williams, this court explained that the Taylor rule resembles the doctrine of res judicata, but the rule is nonetheless \u201ca discrete rule of Illinois procedure.\u201d Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 392. Similar to res judicata, the Taylor rule is applicable only when the parties and the action are identical, and an appealable order was previously entered. Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 391. Based on the similarity to res judicata, the Taylor rule applies to prior orders per se and is therefore not limited to issues actually considered, but also covers any issues that could have been raised in the earlier proceeding. Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 392.\nTo avoid application of the Taylor rule\u2019s bar, a party seeking review of an order appealable under Rule 604(a)(1) must timely appeal or file a motion to reconsider within 30 days. Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 394, quoting People v. Heil, 71 Ill. 2d 458, 461-62 (1978). This court has emphasized that the Taylor rule does not prevent a party from seeking correction of any alleged error through a timely filed motion. Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 394, citing Heil, 71 Ill. 2d at 461.\nAn exception to the Taylor rule, however, allows review outside those parameters when there is a material change in the facts. Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 394. Specifically, the exception requires a showing of a material change in the facts that, with due diligence, could not have been presented during previous proceedings. Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 394.\nHere, the record shows the State did not file an appeal from the order excluding evidence of defendant\u2019s other crimes and the State\u2019s motion to reconsider the order was untimely filed almost two years after the original order. Consequently, the Taylor rule operates to bar the State\u2019s interlocutory appeal unless the exception applies. We must, therefore, determine whether the exception applies in this case.\nAfter the trial court entered its order excluding evidence of defendant\u2019s other sex-crime convictions, J.B. submitted supplemental discovery denying a prior rape allegation. Thereafter, defense counsel obtained a police report rebutting J.B.\u2019s denial and indicated defendant\u2019s intention to cross-examine J.B. with it. Only then did the State file its untimely motion to reconsider. In our view, neither J.B.\u2019s denial of the prior rape allegation nor defense counsel\u2019s acquisition of the police report constitute a material change in the facts. To the contrary, both are related to the allegation that J.B. previously accused another man of raping her, an allegation the State was aware of during the original hearing. Simply put, the entire controversy underlying this appeal revolves around J.B.\u2019s prior rape allegation, information unchanged since defense counsel first raised the issue during pretrial proceedings. See Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 391 (as with res judicata, the Taylor rule applies to any issues that could have been raised in earlier proceedings).\nFurthermore, even assuming there was a material change of facts in this case, the Taylor rule\u2019s exception is still inapplicable because the State failed to demonstrate due diligence. The State was put on notice of J.B.\u2019s prior rape allegation at the original pretrial hearing when defense counsel claimed J.B. had previously accused an NFL football player of raping her. Thus, the State was aware of a prior allegation from the outset of the proceedings. Despite this early notice, the State apparently did not investigate the matter further, even though the State now claims the information is material to its case. Considering defendant\u2019s success in obtaining the police report detailing J.B.\u2019s prior allegation, and the State\u2019s lack of investigation into it, the State has not demonstrated due diligence in attempting to verify defendant\u2019s claim.\nFor these reasons, we conclude the State failed to show a material change in facts that could not have been presented earlier with due diligence. Accordingly, we necessarily find the Taylor rule\u2019s exception does not apply and the Taylor rule barred the State\u2019s interlocutory appeal.\nNonetheless, the State urges this court to \u201cadopt a more flexible standard than that of the limited Taylor procedural framework when pretrial discovery is ongoing in a criminal case.\u201d The State argues the rule should be limited to instances when a suppression order has been entered based on the State\u2019s wrongful conduct but not when, as here, evidence is excluded based on evidentiary considerations. According to the State, because the Taylor rule\u2019s 30-day window for reconsideration is unreasonably narrow when evidence is excluded on a probative or prejudicial basis during pretrial proceedings, a trial court should be permitted to reconsider such evidentiary rulings at any time prior to trial. In support of its argument, the State cites the appellate court\u2019s decisions in People v. Childress, 338 Ill. App. 3d 540 (2003), and People v. McGee, 245 Ill. App. 3d 703 (1993). Alternatively, the State argues the appellate court properly reviewed its appeal under the revestment doctrine or Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5)).\nThis court has previously held that the term \u201csuppressed evidence,\u201d as used in Rule 604(a)(1), means more than just wrongfully obtained evidence. People v. Phipps, 83 Ill. 2d 87, 90-91 (1980), citing People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 242-43 (1980); see also Drum, 194 Ill. 2d at 489-90 (citing Young and Phipps for same proposition). Significantly, in Drum, this court rejected any distinction between suppression orders and exclusion orders in the context of Rule 604(a)(1), noting our repeated emphasis that \u201cthe substantive effect of a trial court\u2019s pretrial order, not the label of the order or its underlying motion, controls appealability under Rule 604(a)(1).\u201d Drum, 194 Ill. 2d at 489-90. Accordingly, we determined there is no substantive difference between excluded evidence and suppressed evidence for purposes of Rule 604(a)(1). Drum, 194 Ill. 2d at 485.\nConsistent with these decisions, we find no distinction, in the context of the Taylor rule, between exclusionary rulings based on evidentiary considerations and suppression rulings based on the State\u2019s wrongful conduct. Moreover, contrary to the State\u2019s characterization of the rule as \u201cdraconian,\u201d we believe trial courts and litigants are afforded the appropriate level of flexibility through the Taylor rule\u2019s exception, permitting review outside the ordinary parameters.\nThe State\u2019s reliance on Childress and McGee is misplaced. The appellate court\u2019s decision in Childress is readily distinguishable based on its procedural circumstances. In stark contrast to this case, in Childress the State timely filed an interlocutory appeal under Rule 604(a)(1) from a pretrial order excluding evidence of the defendant\u2019s other sex-crime convictions. Childress, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 543. Consequently, neither the appellate court nor the parties even considered the Taylor rule. Childress, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 543. Based on these completely different circumstances, Childress provides no support for the State\u2019s position.\nThe appellate court\u2019s decision in McGee, however, does support the State\u2019s position. In McGee, the appellate court concluded, as the State similarly argues in this case, that the Taylor rule should not apply when evidence is excluded on an evidentiary basis, such as hearsay or relevancy. McGee, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 705. The McGee court reasoned that Taylor was based upon evidence excluded under section 114 \u2014 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, allowing a motion to suppress evidence obtained following an illegal search without a warrant, or a search with a warrant that was illegal because the warrant was insufficient on its face, the evidence seized was not described in the warrant, there was no probable cause, or the warrant was illegally executed. McGee, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 706, citing 725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 12 (West 1992). Thus, the McGee court concluded \u201c[a] Rule 604(a) appeal involving a section 114 \u2014 12 suppression of evidence is based solely on the misconduct of the government in obtaining that evidence.\u201d McGee, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 706.\nCritically, though, McGee did not cite to this court\u2019s contrary prior conclusions in Young and Phipps. Furthermore, after McGee this court reaffirmed that suppressed evidence under Rule 604(a)(1) has a broader meaning than wrongfully obtained evidence. Drum, 194 Ill. 2d at 489-90. Consistent with our prior decisions in Drum, Young, and Phipps, we reiterate that for purposes of the Taylor rule there is no difference between evidence suppressed based on the State\u2019s wrongful conduct and evidence excluded based on evidentiary considerations. We overrule McGee to the extent it contradicts that conclusion.\nWe are also unpersuaded by the State\u2019s position supporting the appellate court\u2019s review under the revestment doctrine or Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5). The State contends Rule 366(a)(5) permits a reviewing court to enter any judgment and make any order that ought to have been made. Noting defendant did not contest the timeliness of the motion to reconsider, but instead argued its merits, the State also contends the trial court was re-vested with authority to review that motion by defendant\u2019s actions.\nThe State, however, cites no authority for its proposition that Rule 366(a)(5) or the revestment doctrine can overcome the jurisdictional barrier created by Rule 604(a)(1) and its related Taylor rule. See People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 141 (2003) (referring to Rule 604(a)(1) as creating a jurisdictional barrier); see also People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 332 (2005) (arguments made without citation to authority are forfeited). Thus, we reject the State\u2019s arguments on Rule 366(a)(5) and the revestment doctrine.\nBecause the Taylor rule operates to bar the State\u2019s interlocutory appeal in this case, we conclude the appellate court lacked jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed. Based on our holding, we do not consider the merits of the parties\u2019 arguments on the exclusion of evidence of defendant\u2019s other sex-crime convictions.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nThe Taylor rule requires a party seeking review of an order appealable under Rule 604(a)(1) to appeal or file a motion to reconsider within 30 days. Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 394. An exception to the rule allows review outside those parameters only when a material change in facts occurs that could not have been presented earlier with due diligence. Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 394. Because the State did not appeal or seek reconsideration of the trial court\u2019s exclusion order within 30 days and failed to show the exception should apply, we hold the Taylor rule operates to bar the State\u2019s interlocutory appeal in this case. We therefore vacate the judgment of the appellate court and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\nAppellate court judgment vacated; appeal dismissed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edwin A. Burnette and Abishi C. Cunningham, Jr., Public Defenders of Cook County, of Chicago (Eileen T. Pahl, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald and Mary L. Boland, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 106934.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ANDRE HOLMES, Appellant.\nOpinion filed October 8, 2009.\nEdwin A. Burnette and Abishi C. Cunningham, Jr., Public Defenders of Cook County, of Chicago (Eileen T. Pahl, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald and Mary L. Boland, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0059-01", "first_page_order": 69, "last_page_order": 82 }