{ "id": 3625265, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. WILLIE GRAVES, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Graves", "decision_date": "2009-09-24", "docket_number": "No. 106541", "first_page": "244", "last_page": "256", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 244" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3778382 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273238 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42-43" }, { "page": "40, 42-43", "parenthetical": "$5 youth diversion/peer court charge was a fine and not excessive for the offense of possession of a controlled substance" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/377/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487123 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725379 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604511 ], "weight": 21, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" }, { "page": "595-96" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "598" }, { "page": "582" }, { "page": "581" }, { "page": "599, 600" }, { "page": "600" }, { "page": "600" }, { "page": "600" }, { "page": "600" }, { "page": "600, 605" }, { "page": "600" }, { "page": "600" }, { "page": "602" }, { "page": "602" }, { "page": "605" }, { "page": "605" }, { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4272590 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699-701" }, { "page": "700-01" }, { "page": "700" }, { "page": "700" }, { "page": "701", "parenthetical": "$10 mental health court fine and $5 youth diversion/peer court fine not excessive for a Class 4 felony" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 Ill. App. 3d 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4274335 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100-04" }, { "page": "102-03" }, { "page": "102" }, { "page": "103" }, { "page": "103-04", "parenthetical": "$10 mental health court fine and $5 youth diversion/peer court fine not excessive for the offense of possession of a controlled substance" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/378/0095-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 770, "char_count": 19986, "ocr_confidence": 0.834, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.080039328012452e-07, "percentile": 0.7589425097756665 }, "sha256": "3b0d5af98827d3cfd0cb757cba6757729c51987b3e8d592ba028431411635038", "simhash": "1:e7af8c921413dca7", "word_count": 3392 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:02:11.455849+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. WILLIE GRAVES, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nAfter a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Willie Graves was convicted of the Class 2 offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 103(a)(1), (b) (West 2006)). The court sentenced defendant to a Class X term of nine years based on his prior criminal convictions. The court also imposed several monetary charges, including, as stated on a form in the record, \u201cCosts and Fees\u201d of $10 for the \u201cMental Health Court\u201d pursuant to section 5 \u2014 1101(d\u20145) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1101(d\u20145) (West 2006)), and $5 for the \u201cYouth Diversion/Peer Court\u201d pursuant to section 5 \u2014 1101(e) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5\u2014 1101(e) (West 2006)). On appeal, defendant argued that these two assessments should be vacated as unconstitutional where there was no rational relationship between the legislative purpose underlying the fees and his offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The appellate court, relying on People v. Paige, 378 Ill. App. 3d 95 (2007), and People v. Price, 375 Ill. App. 3d 684 (2007), held that both the $10 mental health court fee and the $5 youth diversion/peer court fee were fines, and thus affirmed their imposition by the trial court, finding no impropriety in these \u201cpecuniary penalties.\u201d No. 1 \u2014 06\u2014 2504 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). We granted defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.\nBACKGROUND\nDefendant did not, on direct appeal, raise any issue concerning the validity of his conviction or sentence and, thus, this appeal involves the sole question of whether the appellate court correctly found that the monetary charges imposed by the circuit court herein are fines and not fees. Therefore, we note only briefly the facts underlying defendant\u2019s conviction.\nSeveral hours after Evelyn Vilchis reported to police that the 2002 Pontiac she had parked near her place of work was stolen, Officer Toutman curbed the Pontiac after observing it go through a red light. A computer check of the license plate revealed that the vehicle had been reported stolen, and when Toutman asked defendant whose car he was driving, defendant stated that he did not know who owned the car. After being handcuffed and receiving the Miranda warnings, defendant told Toutman that \u201che didn\u2019t steal the car his friend Mark did.\u201d Although Graves had the keys to the Pontiac in his possession, neither Vilchis nor her husband Eduardo Rivera, the vehicle\u2019s owner, gave Graves the keys or permission to drive the Pontiac. The trial court found defendant guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle.\nAt sentencing, defendant received a nine-year term of imprisonment. The court also imposed several charges in a written order, the stated purpose of which was \u201cthe assessment of fines, fees, costs, reimbursements and other monetary penalties.\u201d As previously mentioned, the two charges of interest here, in addition to several others, were listed under the category of \u201cCosts and Fees.\u201d The only other category under which charges were imposed was \u201cTrial Fees.\u201d On appeal, the First District of the Appellate Court found \u201cno basis for departing from the reasoning expressed and conclusions drawn\u201d in its previous opinions in Paige and Price, and accordingly held that the mental health court and youth diversion/peer court charges were \u201cfines,\u201d that neither fine was excessive where defendant was convicted of a Class 2 felony, and that no impropriety existed in the imposition of these \u201cpecuniary penalties\u201d on defendant. No. 1 \u2014 06\u20142504 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).\nPaige and Price, which contain the analytical underpinnings of the appellate court\u2019s analysis in this case, relied, in turn, on the framework for considering constitutional challenges to statutorily imposed fines and fees set forth by this court in People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569 (2006). See Paige, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 100-04; Price, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 699-701. Therefore, the propriety of the appellate court\u2019s finding herein that the charges were constitutionally imposed fines must necessarily involve an examination of the reasoning set forth in Jones, Paige, and Price.\nANALYSIS\nIn connection with finding defendant guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, the court, inter alia, ordered defendant to pay a total of $615 in \u201cfees.\u201d The fees included a $10 mental health court fee, which is used to finance \u201cthe mental health court, the county drug court, or both\u201d pursuant to section 5 \u2014 1101(d\u20145) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1101(d\u20145) (West 2006)). Also included was a $5 youth diversion/peer court fee, which is deposited into \u201can account specifically for the operation and administration of a teen court, peer court, peer jury, youth court, or other youth diversion program\u201d pursuant to section 5 \u2014 1101(e) (55 ILCS 5/5\u2014 1101(e) (West 2006)). Defendant asks this court to vacate these two fees and reduce the total assessment by $15 because they violate his federal and state due process rights. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a72. He contends that the assessment of these fees was unconstitutional because neither charge bears a rational relationship to the offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle.\nWhether a statute is constitutional is reviewed under a de novo standard. People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 596 (2006). Statutes are presumed constitutional, and this court must construe a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality if there is any reasonable way to do so. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 595-96. The party challenging the validity of a statute has the burden of clearly demonstrating a constitutional violation. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 596; In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 296 (2001). The statute at issue provides, in relevant part, as follows:\n\u201cAdditional fees to finance court system. A county board may enact by ordinance or resolution the following fees:\n* * *\n(d \u2014 5) A $10 fee to be paid by the defendant on judgment of guilty or a grant of supervision under Section 5 \u2014 9\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections [730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 9 \u2014 1] to be placed in the county general fund and used to finance the county mental health court, the county dmg court, or both.\n(e) In each county in which a teen court, peer court, peer jury, youth court, or other youth diversion program has been created, a county may adopt a mandatory fee of up to $5 to be assessed as provided in this subsection. Assessments collected by the clerk of the circuit court pursuant to this subsection must be deposited into an account specifically for the operation and administration of a teen court, peer court, peer jury, youth court, or other youth diversion program. The clerk of the circuit court shall collect the fees established in this subsection and must remit the fees to the teen court, peer court, peer jury, youth court, or other youth diversion program monthly, less 5%, which is to be retained as fee income to the office of the clerk of the circuit court. The fees are to be paid as follows:\n***\n(2) a fee of up to $5 paid by the defendant on a judgment of guilty or grant of supervision under Section 5 \u2014 9\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections for a felony; for a Class A, Class B, or Class C misdemeanor; for a petty offense; and for a business offense.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1101(d\u2014 5), (e)(2) (West 2006).\nIn Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 598, we identified the initial question in considering a constitutional challenge to a statutorily imposed charge to be whether that charge \u201cis a fee or a fine.\u201d A \u201cfee\u201d is defined as a charge that \u201cseeks to recoup expenses incurred by the state,\u201d or to compensate the state for some expenditure incurred in prosecuting the defendant. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 582. A \u201cfine,\u201d however, is \u201c \u2018punitive in nature\u2019 \u201d and is \u201c \u2018a pecuniary punishment imposed as part of a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal offense.\u2019 \u201d Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 581, quoting People v. White, 333 Ill. App. 3d 777, 781 (2002). We further found that a charge labeled a fee by the legislature may be a fine, notwithstanding the words actually used by the legislature. See Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 599, 600. Indeed, when determining whether a charge enumerated in a statute is a fee or a fine, \u201c[t]he legislature\u2019s label is strong evidence, but it cannot overcome the actual attributes of the charge at issue.\u201d Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 599-600 (citing cases). Rather, under Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 600, the most important factor is whether the charge seeks to compensate the state for any costs incurred as the result of prosecuting the defendant. \u201cThis is the central characteristic which separates a fee from a fine. A charge is a fee if and only if it is intended to reimburse the state for some cost incurred in defendant\u2019s prosecution. [Citations.]\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 600. Other factors to consider are whether the charge is only imposed after conviction and to whom the payment is made. See Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 600.\nIn the case at bar, each of the charges is delineated as a \u201cfee\u201d in the statute, and the general statute authorizing the imposition of the charge is entitled, \u201cAdditional fees to finance court system.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1101 (West 2006). However, the appellate court in both Paige and Price found that the attributes of the same mental health court and youth diversion/peer court fees imposed herein reflect that these charges are properly characterized as fines, despite their label as \u201cfees.\u201d See Paige, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 102-03; Price, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 700-01. Like the $5 charge designated for the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund in Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 600, the charges imposed herein do not seek to compensate the state for any costs incurred as the result of prosecuting the defendant. Although the statutory language involved in Jones was more ambiguous than the language in the statute at issue here, Jones establishes that the statutory labels applied to a charge do not control where the purpose of the charge contradicts that label. See People v. Gildart, 377 Ill. App. 3d 39, 42 (2007). Thus, the appellate court in Paige and Price determined that the $10 mental health court fee and the $5 youth diversion/peer court fee may each properly be viewed as a criminal penalty or pecuniary punishment. See Paige, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 102; Price, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 700.\nDefendant, as did the defendant in Paige, argues that the statute at issue \u201cviolates the constitutional guarantee of due process because it is an unreasonable and arbitrary method of furthering the State\u2019s legitimate interest in financing the court system.\u201d In support of that contention, he relies on the fact that there is no nexus between his conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle and the charges imposed, arguing that neither his criminal offense nor his prosecution involved the resources of the programs financed by the mental health court and youth diversion/peer court fees. We agree that there is no relevant connection between the offense committed and mental health or juvenile justice. See Price, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 700. However, under Jones, the fact that the proceeds of the fines are earmarked for a specific purpose, unrelated to the offense upon which defendant was convicted, is irrelevant to their constitutionality; rather it is because the charges in no way compensate the state for the cost of prosecuting defendant that they are fines, and not fees. See Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 600, 605.\nAdditionally, the $10 and $5 charges imposed here pursuant to section 5 \u2014 1101 of the Counties Code possess other attributes of a fine mentioned in Jones, i.e., they were exacted only after conviction for a criminal offense and, while payable to a county fund rather than the state treasury, it is undisputed that they further the state\u2019s interest in financing the court system. See Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 600. Defendant contends that the charges in this case cannot be deemed fines or punishment because the county board has no authority to sentence or punish under the Counties Code. Thus, according to defendant, Jones is distinguishable, because there the spinal-cord-injuiy fee was authorized under the \u201cCriminal Code.\u201d We note that the charge for the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Fund at issue in Jones was not authorized under the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2006)), but rather by section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c) (West 2006)). Regardless, we do not agree with defendant\u2019s contention that any monetary charge authorized by the Counties Code can only be deemed a fee, and not a fine.\nThe clear language of the Counties Code shows that the legislature intended to grant county boards the limited authority to set fines as punishment for various violations. Section 5 \u2014 1113 of the Code (55 ILCS 5/5\u2014 1113 (West 2006)), entitled \u201cOrdinance and rules to execute powers; limitations on punishments,\u201d provides:\n\u201cThe county board may pass all ordinances and make all rules and regulations proper or necessary, to carry into effect the powers granted to counties, with such fines or penalties as may be deemed proper except where a specific provision for a fine or penalty is provided by law. No fine or penalty, however, except civil penalties provided for failure to make returns or to pay any taxes levied by the county shall exceed $1,000.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1113 (West 2006).\nSome fines authorized under the Counties Code are clearly labeled as such. For example, pursuant to \u201cDivision 5 \u2014 12. Zoning,\u201d of the Code (55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 12001 et seq. (West 2006)), the abandonment of a vehicle on a county highway in counties of a certain size is \u201cunlawful and a petty offense punishable by a fine not to exceed $500\u201d (55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 12004(a) (West 2006)), and any person who violates the terms of any ordinance adopted under the authority of that Division is \u201cpunishable by a fine not to exceed $500\u201d (55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 12017 (West 2006)). We find that section 5 \u2014 1101 of the Counties Code also sets forth \u201cfines and penalties,\u201d although they are labeled \u201cfees to finance court system.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/5\u2014 1101 (West 2006). In addition to the two subsections under which fines were imposed in this case, section 5 \u2014 1101 also authorizes monetary penalties to be paid by a defendant on a judgment of guilty or a grant of supervision for violation of certain sections of the Illinois Vehicle Code or of the Unified Code of Corrections. See 55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1101(a), (c), (d) (West 2006). Thus, contrary to defendant\u2019s claim, the legislature has clearly conferred upon county boards the limited power to enact certain fines or penalties, including the mental health court and youth diversion/peer court fines.\nNext, defendant argues that the First District\u2019s holding in this case, and in Price and Paige, conflicts with the Second District\u2019s opinion in People v. Elizalde, 344 Ill. App. 3d 678 (2003). In Elizalde, following the defendant\u2019s third conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 11 \u2014 501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501 (West 2002)), he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and was assessed $100 under section 5 \u2014 1101(d) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5\u2014 1101(d) (West 2002)), for a second or subsequent violation of section 11 \u2014 501. The appellate court found that the repeated use of the word \u201cfee\u201d in section 5 \u2014 1101(d), \u201cand its description of a nonpunitive purpose,\u201d indicated an intent on the part of the legislature that an assessment made under that section be treated as a fee and not a fine. Elizalde, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 683.\nHowever, Elizalde was decided prior to our holding in Jones that a $5 \u201cfee\u201d to the spinal cord fund was \u201cclearly a fine, the label notwithstanding,\u201d because the charge did not seek to compensate the state for any costs incurred as the result of prosecuting the defendant. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 600. The $100 charge imposed on the defendant in Elizalde for his third violation of section 11 \u2014 501, while related to his offense, was intended to be \u201cused to finance education programs related to driving under the influence of alcohol,\u201d and not to compensate the state for the cost of prosecuting him. 55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1101(d) (West 2002). Accordingly, as the holding in Elizalde is not in conformity with our opinion in Jones, we find that it should no longer be followed.\nHaving examined defendant\u2019s claims on appeal, and given the principles articulated in Jones and recently applied in Price and Paige, we conclude that the charges in the case at bar, although labeled as \u201cfees,\u201d are in fact fines, which are punitive in nature. \u201cA defendant has no basis for protesting the usage to which his criminal fines are put.\u201d Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 602. Therefore, as in Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 602, we reject defendant\u2019s contention that his due process rights have been violated because his fines are unrelated to his offense. Instead, the fine will be upheld under a due process analysis unless the amount is greatly disproportionate to the underlying offense. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 605; Gildart, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 42-43. Thus, here, having determined that the charges at issue were imposed as punishment for a criminal conviction, we consider only whether it is disproportionate to defendant\u2019s crime to impose the punishment of a $10 mental health court fine and a $5 youth diversion/ peer court fine. See Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 605; Paige, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 103.\n\u201cSo far as the defendant who is subject to a monetary fine is concerned, due process requires only that the punishment imposed be rationally related to the offense on which he is being sentenced. In the context of fines, the inquiry is whether the amount of the fine is grossly disproportionate to the offense.\u201d Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 605.\nIn this case, that test is clearly satisfied where the amounts of the fines are in no way grossly disproportionate to defendant\u2019s Class 2 felony offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. See Paige, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 103-04 ($10 mental health court fine and $5 youth diversion/peer court fine not excessive for the offense of possession of a controlled substance); Gildart, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 40, 42-43 ($5 youth diversion/peer court charge was a fine and not excessive for the offense of possession of a controlled substance); Price, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 701 ($10 mental health court fine and $5 youth diversion/peer court fine not excessive for a Class 4 felony). The $15 in fines imposed as punishment in the present case do not violate defendant\u2019s due process rights.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the trial court\u2019s imposition of these fines.\nAppellate court judgment affirmed.\nWe note that while the county board herein authorized the fines at issue under powers expressly granted by the Illinois legislature in the Code, it was the trial court which imposed those fines based upon that statutory authority. Thus, contrary to defendant\u2019s contention, the imposition of these fines was a solely judicial function.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, and Tomas G. Gonzalez, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Mary P. Needham and Miles J. Keleher, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 106541.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. WILLIE GRAVES, Appellant.\nOpinion filed September 24, 2009.\nRehearing denied November 23, 2009.\nMichael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, and Tomas G. Gonzalez, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Mary P. Needham and Miles J. Keleher, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0244-01", "first_page_order": 254, "last_page_order": 266 }