{ "id": 3624949, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JOEL WILLIAMS, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "2009-11-19", "docket_number": "No. 107140", "first_page": "286", "last_page": "298", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 286" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619642 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706381 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55979 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451632 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515594 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56-58", "parenthetical": "citing rule of strict construction and refusing to award a fee request in a juvenile case because such cases are not criminal and do not result in convictions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3641026 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 975", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3595007 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "978-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0975-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138793 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537-38" }, { "page": "531-32" }, { "page": "538" }, { "page": "537-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146004 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122697 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 284", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 327837 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295-96" }, { "page": "719-20" }, { "page": "769" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 808", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108176 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" }, { "page": "737" }, { "page": "2609-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974986 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3617192 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704722 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" }, { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2780333 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "explaining that \"[w]hen a statute has been judicially construed by the highest court having jurisdiction to pass on it, such a construction is as much a part of the statute as if plainly written into it originally\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Ill. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5109800 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/310/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725131 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4279921 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/385/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 Ill. App. 3d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4286506 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/391/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3606828 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621474 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" }, { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3528495 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619-20", "parenthetical": "expressly rejecting Second District's position as contrary to Nicholls" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448796 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" }, { "page": "179", "parenthetical": "\"[i]n light of present-day county budgeting and accounting procedures, the provisions of section 8 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 53, par. 8) relating to State's Attorneys' fees may appear to be a relic of another era which might well merit the attention of the legislature\"" }, { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 Ill. App. 3d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4279083 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/384/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 917", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3625150 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0917-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3559603 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5679422 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0307-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 838, "char_count": 20276, "ocr_confidence": 0.838, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8258386695366344e-07, "percentile": 0.7200186188461181 }, "sha256": "99495675bc711bc64603758e4c87c80009f24839d6a646cc73b4ff6fe3dd8b98", "simhash": "1:992efc42f250a4f1", "word_count": 3384 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:02:11.455849+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JOEL WILLIAMS, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THOMAS\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nAt issue is whether a State\u2019s Attorney may recover a statutory $50 appeal fee (55 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 2002(a) (West 2008)) when the defendant is partially successful on appeal.\nBACKGROUND\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of McLean County, defendant, Joel Williams, was convicted of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(1) (West 2006)) and domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3.2(a)(2) (West 2006)). The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of five years\u2019 imprisonment plus two years\u2019 mandatory supervised release (MSR) for aggravated battery and three years\u2019 imprisonment plus one year of MSR for domestic battery.\nDefendant appealed, raising four issues. One of defendant\u2019s arguments was that the trial court erred in sentencing him to two years\u2019 MSR on his aggravated battery conviction. In its response brief, the State confessed error on this point, conceding that, because defendant\u2019s aggravated battery conviction was for a Class 3 felony, the MSR term should have been one year (see 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(d)(3) (West 2008)). As part of its prayer for relief, the State asked that costs be assessed pursuant to section 4 \u2014 2002(a) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4\u2014 2002(a) (West 2008)).\nIn his reply brief, defendant noted the State\u2019s confession of error on the MSR issue and argued that, if the appellate court accepted the State\u2019s confession of error, then it should deny the State\u2019s request for costs. Defendant argued that the relevant statute provided that costs for the appeal could not be collected from the defendant \u201cwhere judgment is in favor of the accused\u201d (55 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 2002(a) (West 2008)). Defendant relied on a series of cases from the Appellate Court, Second District, holding that the State was not permitted to recover costs from the defendant when the defendant had been partially successful on appeal. See People v. Brownell, 123 Ill. App. 3d 307 (1984); People v. Merrero, 121 Ill. App. 3d 716 (1984); People v. Smith, 113 Ill. App. 3d 917 (1983).\nThe Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed as modified and remanded. 384 Ill. App. 3d 327. The appellate court agreed with the parties that defendant\u2019s MSR term for aggravated battery should be one year rather than two years. The court, however, rejected all of defendant\u2019s other arguments and otherwise affirmed his convictions and sentences. The court also awarded the State costs pursuant to section 4 \u2014 2002(a), and rejected defendant\u2019s contention that costs could not be awarded if he obtained any relief on appeal. Citing People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166 (1978), and People v. Smith, 133 Ill. App. 3d 613 (1985), the court held that the State is entitled to costs if it successfully defends any part of a criminal judgment challenged on appeal. 384 Ill. App. 3d at 341-42.\nWe allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal to resolve a conflict in the appellate court over whether the State may recover costs on appeal when a defendant is partially successful. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.\nANALYSIS\nThe principal issue is one of statutory construction. Thus, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the drafters\u2019 intention, and the most reliable indicator of intent is the language used, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Davison, 233 Ill. 2d 30, 40 (2009). In determining the plain meaning of a statute\u2019s terms, we consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323 (2007). The construction of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Davison, 233 Ill. 2d at 40.\nThe governing provision is section 4 \u2014 2002(a) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 2002(a) (West 2008)), which sets forth a schedule of fees for State\u2019s Attorneys in counties of fewer than 3 million persons. Section 4 \u2014 2002(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows:\n\u201cFor each case of appeal taken from his county or from the county to which a change of venue is taken to his county to the Supreme or Appellate Court when prosecuted or defended by him, $50.\n* * *\nAll the foregoing fees shall be taxed as costs to be collected from the defendant, if possible, upon conviction. But in cases of inquiry into the mental illness of any person alleged to be mentally ill, in cases on a charge of paternity and in cases of appeal in the Supreme or Appellate Court, where judgment is in favor of the accused, the fees allowed the State\u2019s attorney therein shall be retained out of the fines and forfeitures collected by them in other cases.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 55 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 2002(a) (West 2008).\nDefendant first contends that, because he obtained partial relief on appeal, the State must seek its fee from other sources. According to defendant, \u201cwhere judgment is in favor of the accused\u201d means any situation in which part of the appellate court\u2019s judgment is for the defendant. Decisions from the Second District of our appellate court, as well as from the fifth division of the First District, have refused to award the State fees when the defendant is successful on any part of an appeal. See People v. Bonds, 391 Ill. App. 3d 182, 202 (1st Dist. 2009); Merrero, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 723-24; Smith, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 926. By contrast, the State argues that the meaning of the above language is that the State\u2019s Attorney must seek its fee from other sources only when the defendant obtains complete relief on appeal, such that he is no longer a convicted defendant following entry of the appellate court\u2019s judgment. The State draws support from section 124A \u2014 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/124A \u2014 5 (West 2008)), which provides in relevant part that \u201c[wjhen a person is convicted of an offense under a statute, or at common law, the court shall enter judgment that the offender pay the costs of the prosecution.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The State reads this provision in concert with section 4 \u2014 2002(a), which provides that the fees set forth in the statute are collected from the defendant upon conviction. Section 4 \u2014 2002(a) then provides three exceptions to the rule that fees are collected from the defendant: (1) inquiry into mental illness of a person alleged to be mentally ill; (2) paternity cases; and (3) appeals where the judgment is in favor of the accused. 55 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 2002(a) (West 2008). The State notes that the first two exceptions to the rule that the fees are collected from the defendant are for situations in which there is not a convicted defendant: inquiry into mental illness and a charge of paternity. Reading these provisions together, the State argues that it is clear that the third exception \u2014 in cases of appeal where the judgment is in favor of the accused\u2014 must refer to a situation in which the accused is no longer a convicted defendant following the appeal. The third division of the First District, as well as the Fourth and Fifth Districts, have routinely awarded costs in cases where the defendant is only partially successful on appeal. See, e.g., People v. Leach, 385 Ill. App. 3d 215, 223 (4th Dist. 2008); People v. Moreland, 292 Ill. App. 3d 616, 624 (1st Dist. 1997); People v. Smith, 133 Ill. App. 3d 613, 619-20 (5th Dist. 1985) (expressly rejecting Second District\u2019s position as contrary to Nicholls).\nThis court has already resolved this issue in favor of the State\u2019s position. In Nicholls, the defendant argued that the State\u2019s Attorney is not entitled to a fee when a convicted defendant is partially successful on appeal. The governing statutory language was identical to that which we consider today, but at the time was codified as section 8 of \u201cAN ACT concerning fees and salaries ***\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 53, par. 8). In response to the defendant\u2019s argument, this court held as follows:\n\u201cAnother issue raised in this appeal is whether the State\u2019s Attorney is entitled to his fee when a convicted defendant is partially successful on appeal. Section 8 of \u2018An Act concerning fees and salaries ***\u2019 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 53, par. 8) provides that the State\u2019s Attorney shall receive a fee for each conviction and further provides that no fees shall be charged on more than 10 counts in any one indictment or information on trial and conviction. Thus in the trial court the State\u2019s Attorney would be entitled to a fee taxed as costs for each count on which a conviction is obtained (see People v. Kawoleski (1923), 310 Ill. 498). However, section 8 also provides that, \u2018[f]or each case of appeal\u2019 to the supreme or appellate court when prosecuted or defended by him the State\u2019s Attorney shall receive a fee of $50. Section 8 also provides that \u2018where judgment is in favor of the accused\u2019 the fees allowed the State\u2019s Attorney shall be retained out of the fines and forfeitures collected in other cases. Thus the State\u2019s Attorney is entitled to his one fee of $50 regardless of how many counts are included in the one case on appeal. Unless judgment in that case is entered in favor of the accused the appeal fee will be taxed as costs against the defendant even if convictions as to one or more counts but not as to all counts are reversed on appeal.\u201d (Emphases added and in original.) Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d at 178.\nThis court\u2019s interpretation is now part of the statute. See Ray Schools-Chicago-Inc. v. Cummins, 12 Ill. 2d 376, 380 (1957) (explaining that \u201c[w]hen a statute has been judicially construed by the highest court having jurisdiction to pass on it, such a construction is as much a part of the statute as if plainly written into it originally\u201d). In the 31 years since Nicholls was decided, the legislature has not amended the relevant statutory language. Moreover, the legislature\u2019s failure to amend the relevant statutory language followed an express invitation from this court to revisit the entire issue of State\u2019s Attorney fees. See Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d at 179 (\u201c[i]n light of present-day county budgeting and accounting procedures, the provisions of section 8 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 53, par. 8) relating to State\u2019s Attorneys\u2019 fees may appear to be a relic of another era which might well merit the attention of the legislature\u201d). Thus, stare decicis concerns are clearly implicated.\n\u201cThe doctrine of stare decisis \u2018 \u201cexpresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 145 (2007). When a question has been deliberately examined and decided, it should be considered settled and closed to further argument. People v. Hernandez, 231 Ill. 2d 134, 144 (2008). However, stare decisis is not an \u201cinexorable command.\u201d People v. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d 122, 134 (2003), quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 737, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609-10 (1991). As this court explained in Colon:\n\u201cIf it is clear a court has made a mistake, it will not decline to correct it, even if the mistake has been reasserted and acquiesced in for many years. [Citation.] That said, this court will not depart from precedent merely because it might have decided otherwise if the question were a new one. [Citation.] As we recently reiterated, any departure from stare decisis must be \u2018 \u201cspecially justified.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.] Thus, prior decisions should not be overruled absent \u2018good cause\u2019 or \u2018compelling reasons.\u2019 [Citation.] In general, a settled rule of law that does not contravene a statute or constitutional principle should be followed unless doing so is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests. [Citation.] Good cause to depart from stare decisis also exists when governing decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned.\u201d Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 146.\nThe present case involves statutory construction, and in this context stare decisis considerations are at their apex. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295-96, 133 L. Ed. 2d 709, 719-20, 116 S. Ct. 763, 769 (1996). In Froud v. Celotex Corp., 98 Ill. 2d 324, 336 (1983), this court explained that \u201c[c]onsiderations of stare decisis weigh more heavily in the area of statutory construction *** because such a departure *** amounts to an amendment of the statute itself rather than simply a change in the thinking of the judiciary with respect to common law concepts which are properly under its control.\u201d\nDefendant has fallen far short of demonstrating the sort of good cause that would be required to overturn such \u00e1 longstanding statutory construction. Defendant makes two arguments why this court should no longer follow Nicholls. First, he argues that subsequent decisions of this court have weakened Nicholls\u2019 holding. Second, he argues that the Nicholls court did not apply the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed. Defendant is incorrect on both of these points.\nDefendant contends that Nicholls was called into question by People v. Thurman, 104 Ill. 2d 326, 332 (1984), and People v. Locascio, 106 Ill. 2d 529, 537-38 (1985) . Defendant argues that in Thurman this court denied the State\u2019s request for fees and costs where the defendant was partially successful on appeal. In Thurman, the appellate court did not agree with every one of the defendant\u2019s arguments. The appellate court did, however, reverse both of his convictions and remand for a new trial. People v. Thurman, 120 Ill. App. 3d 975, 978-82 (1983). When the State appealed to this court, this court upheld the appellate court\u2019s decision to reverse and remand for a new trial on defendant\u2019s involuntary manslaughter conviction. The appellate court had also remanded for a new trial on armed violence, but this court held that defendant could not be retried on that charge because armed violence cannot be predicated on involuntary manslaughter. Thurman, 104 Ill. 2d at 332. The State correctly argues that Thurman supports its position rather than defendant\u2019s. A defendant may be assessed costs of prosecution when he is a \u201cconvicted\u201d defendant, and a fee was inappropriate in Thurman because the defendant\u2019s convictions were reversed and the cause was remanded for a new trial.\nDefendant\u2019s second example of a case in which this court denied the State\u2019s request for fees when a defendant was partially successful is Locascio. Defendant argues that in that case this court found that a request for fees was premature where several issues were remanded to the appellate court for resolution. In that case, the appellate court reversed the defendants\u2019 convictions, finding that the defendants had not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Locascio, 106 Ill. 2d at 531-32. This court granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal and reversed. Because the appellate court had reversed on sufficiency of the evidence grounds, it did not address other questions raised by the defendants. Accordingly, this court remanded the cause to the appellate court to resolve the defendants\u2019 other issues. Locascio, 106 Ill. 2d at 538. This court denied the State\u2019s request for fees, finding that it was premature because fees are awarded upon conviction. Locascio, 106 Ill. 2d at 537-38. On remand, the appellate court rejected the defendants\u2019 other arguments, affirmed the convictions, and granted the State\u2019s fee request. People v. Locascio, 137 Ill. App. 3d 201, 207 (1985). As the State points out, this court\u2019s opinion was entirely consistent with Nicholls. The defendants\u2019 convictions were no longer in place following the appellate court\u2019s reversal. Although this court reversed the appellate court, it remanded the cause to the appellate court for resolution of other issues. Thus, the convictions were still not in place until after the appellate court resolved the remainder of the appeal on remand. Once the convictions were again in place, the appellate court awarded fees. Thus, far from demonstrating that this court weakened its position after Nicholls, Thurman and Locascio show that this court has been entirely consistent.\nDefendant\u2019s other argument why this court should abandon Nicholls is that Nicholls failed to follow the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. See In re W.W., 97 Ill. 2d 53, 56-58 (1983) (citing rule of strict construction and refusing to award a fee request in a juvenile case because such cases are not criminal and do not result in convictions). However, the very first thing that this court said in analyzing the fee statute in Nicholls was that \u201cthe allowance and recovery of costs, being unknown at common law, rests entirely upon the statutory provisions, which must be strictly construed.\u201d Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d at 173.\nDefendant has thus demonstrated no cause why stare decisis should not apply here, let alone good cause. Accordingly, because defendant remained a convicted defendant following the appellate court\u2019s resolution of his appeal, the court properly allowed the State\u2019s fee request. Those appellate court decisions that denied fee requests in cases in which defendants were only partially successful are overruled. See Bonds, 391 Ill. App. 3d 182; Merrero, 121 Ill. App. 3d 716; Smith, 133 Ill. App. 3d 613.\nFor the first time in this court, defendant raises a second argument why the State should have not been entitled to the fee. Pursuant to section 4 \u2014 2002(a), a State\u2019s Attorney is entitled to a fee when the appeal is \u201cprosecuted or defended by him.\u201d In this case, the State\u2019s Attorney of McLean County was the first party listed on the State\u2019s appellate court brief. However, defendant notes that an attorney for the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Appellate Prosecutor is also Usted on the appellate court brief. Defendant contends that the statute does not apply if the appeal was handled by the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Appellate Prosecutor.\nThis argument is twice forfeited. First, defendant did not raise it in the appellate court. The State requested a fee in its response brief in the appellate court, and defendant argued in his reply brief that the State was not entitled to the fee. The sole argument that defendant made was that, assuming that this court accepted the State\u2019s confession of error on the MSR issue, a fee would be inappropriate because defendant would have prevailed on at least one issue. Where the appeUant in the appellate court fails to raise an issue in that court, this court will not address it. City of Urbana v. Andrew N.B., 211 Ill. 2d 456, 464 (2004); Garza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 383 (1996). Defendant forfeited the argument a second time when he failed to raise it in his petition for leave to appeal. See People v. Whitfield, 228 Ill. 2d 502, 509 (2007). Defendant notes that in In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 37 (2008), this court stated that it would not hesitate to consider issues not raised in petitions for leave to appeal when they are \u201cinextricably intertwined\u201d with other issues being considered. Defendant\u2019s arguments, however, are not inextricably intertwined. They are separate bases why he believes the State is not entitled to a fee, and he did not raise one of them below or in his petition for leave to appeal. Accordingly, we will not address this argument.\nFor all of the above reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDefendant erroneously relied on Brownell, which construed different statutory language. We will not discuss Brownell further in this opinion.\nThis court\u2019s decision in Nicholls is not discussed in any of these opinions.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THOMAS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Gary R. Peterson, Deputy Defender, and Ryan R. Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and William A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Charles Redfern, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 107140.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JOEL WILLIAMS, Appellant.\nOpinion filed November 19, 2009.\nMichael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Gary R. Peterson, Deputy Defender, and Ryan R. Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and William A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Charles Redfern, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0286-01", "first_page_order": 296, "last_page_order": 308 }