{ "id": 3627368, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOSE J. SANDOVAL, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sandoval", "decision_date": "2010-01-22", "docket_number": "No. 106496", "first_page": "57", "last_page": "69", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "236 Ill. 2d 57" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "381 Ill. App. 3d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3626822 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148-52" }, { "page": "154", "parenthetical": "McLaren, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/381/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619184 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3597995 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" }, { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/219/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781318 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424, 430" }, { "page": "427" }, { "page": "428" }, { "page": "428" }, { "page": "429-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224803 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725333 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" }, { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 514", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9139028 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "2188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0514-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 887, "char_count": 20768, "ocr_confidence": 0.824, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.722862155385194e-08, "percentile": 0.4081207051067456 }, "sha256": "a86f30ec8bcfdc6b7f68113bb5657e3460d96defb463ab8ea4df58cd6a5223d1", "simhash": "1:ca3845f6c0ded721", "word_count": 3431 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:48:59.065132+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOSE J. SANDOVAL, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Carman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nDefendant, Jose J. Sandoval, was charged in the Du Page County circuit court under two separate case numbers with multiple traffic offenses arising out of three separate traffic stops. The charges included three counts of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). After he was incarcerated in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) for a Cook County DUI, defendant filed a form document entitled \u201cDemand for Speedy Trial and/or Quash Warrant,\u201d citing section 103 \u2014 5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103\u2014 5(b) (West 2004)) and section 3 \u2014 8\u201410 of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 8\u201410 (West 2004)), and noting as charge pending, \u201cDu Page County D.U.I.\u201d Defendant did not specify the case to which the demand was intended to apply. When defendant was not brought to trial on any charge within 160 days thereafter, defendant filed a motion to dismiss in one of the pending cases. After gaining dismissal of those charges, he filed a second motion to dismiss in the other case, succeeding in having those charges dismissed as well. The State appealed. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the dismissal of all DUI charges, but reversed as to non-DUI charges arising from the same incidents. 381 Ill. App. 3d 142. We reverse the appellate court as to the dismissal of the DUI charges, and otherwise affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nOn June 14, 2003, defendant was arrested in Du Page County and charged by uniform traffic citations with separate violations of the DUI statute (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014 501(a)(2) (West 2002); 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(1) (West 2002)), driving while license revoked (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303 (West 2002)), and improper lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014 709 (West 2002)). Defendant ultimately posted a $300 cash bond and signed a bail bond form directing him to appear to answer charges on July 11, 2003. Defendant failed to appear on the appointed date, his bond was ordered forfeited, and a bench warrant was issued. On July 15, 2003, a notice of forfeiture was generated by the circuit clerk and mailed to the address defendant had supplied on his bail bond. The notice of forfeiture bore Du Page County case No. 03 \u2014 DT\u20142937. A subsequent notice of forfeiture \u2014 bearing the same case number \u2014 was sent to that address on June 21, 2005.\nOn December 27, 2004, a five-count criminal complaint was filed in the circuit court of Du Page County, under case No. 04 \u2014 CF\u20143607, charging defendant with multiple traffic offenses arising from two separate traffic stops: one on March 25, 2004; the other on December 16, 2004. It was alleged that defendant, on the first date, committed the offenses of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(d)(1)(A) (West 2004)) and obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 4(a) (West 2004)). On the latter date, defendant allegedly committed three traffic violations: improper lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 709 (West 2004)), failure to signal (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 804 (West 2004)), and driving while license revoked (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(a) (West 2004)). On February 3, 2005, indictments were filed under case Nos. 04 \u2014 CF\u20143607\u2014 01, 04 \u2014 CF\u20143607\u201402, and 04 \u2014 CF\u20143607\u201406, charging defendant with obstructing justice and two counts of felony DUI (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(2), (c \u2014 1)(1) (West 2004)). The separate indictments superseded counts I and II of the complaint.\nOn October 3, 2005, defendant mailed to the State\u2019s Attorney in Du Page County, and to the Du Page County circuit clerk, pro se form documents entitled \u201cMotion to Dismiss\u201d and \u201cDemand for Speedy Trial and/or Quash Warrant.\u201d The documents in the circuit court\u2019s file are file stamped October 20, 2005, and the circuit clerk generated a responsive letter acknowledging receipt and filing of both documents as of that date. The motion to dismiss \u2014 which was ineffectual at that point, as it was filed contemporaneously with a demand intended to commence the speedy-trial term \u2014 bore no case number at all. In the caption of the demand, in a space designated \u201cCase No._,\u201d defendant had written \u201cW05A48844\u201d \u2014 the relevance of which is not clear. In different handwriting, in the margins of both documents in the circuit clerk\u2019s file, someone wrote \u201c04 CF 3607.\u201d The record suggests that someone in the clerk\u2019s office wrote that case number on the documents the clerk received. However, there is no indication in the record that the documents mailed to the State\u2019s Attorney bore any identifiable case number, other than the one defendant assigned to the demand: \u201cW05A48844.\u201d\nIn his October 3, 2005, motion to dismiss \u2014 the first of three defendant ultimately filed \u2014 defendant referenced his accompanying \u201cDemand for Speedy Trial and/or Quash Warrant pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 5 (2001),\u201d acknowledging that he filed that document on October 3, 2005. Defendant moved to \u201cdismiss the following charges: D.U.I.,\u201d averring that 160 days had elapsed \u201csince Petitioner\u2019s Demand For A Speedy Trial And/Or Quash Warrant was filed.\u201d Obviously, no time had passed as the documents were filed contemporaneously.\nIn his \u201cDemand for Speedy Trial and/or Quash Warrant\u201d defendant invoked both section 103 \u2014 5(b) of the speedy-trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 5(b) (West 2004)) and section 3 \u2014 8\u201410 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 8\u2019\u201410 (West 2004)). In the spaces provided, defendant indicated that he was incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, that he had been convicted of a DUI in Cook County on June 15, 2005, and that he had been sentenced to five years\u2019 incarceration thereon. According to defendant, he had 2Va years remaining to serve on that sentence. Under a section addressing \u201ccharges *** pending against Defendant in your county,\u201d defendant wrote \u201cDuPage County D.U.I.\u201d Finally, defendant demanded that the State\u2019s Attorney of Du Page County bring him to trial \u201con the above stated charge(s) within 160 days as allowed by law.\u201d As noted, defendant filled in a blank for the case number with the numerical/letter combination: \u201cWC5A48844.\u201d\nThe record indicates that the circuit clerk of Du Page County, subsequent to the first acknowledgment of filing on October 20, 2005, generated a second acknowledgment, under the same case number, to reflect the filing of defendant\u2019s second motion to dismiss on May 19, 2006. That motion is similar to the one defendant had previously filed with the exception that \u201cCase No. 04 CF 3607\u201d is written in the caption, apparently in defendant\u2019s hand, and defendant does not indicate what charges he is moving to dismiss.\nOn August 9, 2006, counsel appeared for defendant in case No. 04 \u2014 CF\u20143607, submitted a supporting memorandum, and moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that defendant was not brought to trial within the time required by the speedy-trial statute. In his memorandum, defendant alleged that an assistant State\u2019s Attorney had \u201cadmitted in argument before [the court] that the State was not disputing that the Notice and Demand most likely were received by \u2018some secretary\u2019 at the DuPage County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office in October of 2005.\u201d According to defendant, the State\u2019s \u201cchief disputation\u201d with regard to defendant\u2019s filing was that it did not include a correct case number in the caption of the pleading, and that the omission constituted a violation of Rule 30.06 of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit. 18th Jud. Cir. Ct. R. 30.06(b) (eff. July 15, 2003).\nThe circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion. With respect to the applicability of the circuit court rule, the court referenced an apparent concession by the State that it had received notice of a demand some time in October of 2005. Based upon that concession, the court found that the requirements of the local rule were met, assuming, arguendo, that they were enforceable at all, insofar as the State had \u201cactual notice and the interest of justice requires recognition of the demand.\u201d The court identified the critical issue to be whether the demand was in proper form. In that regard, the court acknowledged that defendant had multiple DUIs pending, but rejected the State\u2019s argument that defendant\u2019s demand was insufficient for lack of a case number. The court excused the lack of specificity in defendant\u2019s demand with the following observations:\n\u201cIt is entirely possible that the defendant imprisoned will not have the information regarding a case number assigned his case. He only knows he has been arrested previously on charges, and they are still pending.\u201d\nThe circuit court expressed its view as to the State\u2019s obligation in the matter:\n\u201cOnce the State receives a demand for speedy trial, it is a simple matter to put the defendant\u2019s name into our DUCT system and retrieve his pending cases; it should take less than a minute. If such a search reveals more than one pending case, the defendant should be immediately writted in to determine whether he is demanding trial on those cases and if he is, which case the State elects to proceed on.\u201d\nConcluding that the defendant\u2019s demand was in proper form, the circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss in case No. 04 \u2014 CF\u20143607.\nHaving succeeded in gaining dismissal of the charges in case No. 04 \u2014 CF\u20143607, defendant, on September 1, 2006, filed a motion to dismiss in case No. 03 \u2014 DT\u2014 2937. He attached thereto, as an exhibit, the demand he had mailed on October 3, 2005, the demand that he had designated as pertinent to \u201cCase No. W05A48844,\u201d the demand upon which someone else had written \u201c04 CF 3607.\u201d A hearing was held on September 29, 2006, during which defense counsel noted, inter alia, a different judge\u2019s ruling in case No. 04 \u2014 CF\u20143607, \u201cthe other case that [defendant] intended this demand to apply to.\u201d The prosecutor objected to the relevancy of the ruling in that case and to defense counsel\u2019s reference to what defendant intended:\n\u201cI think defense counsel\u2019s words are poignant. She said what he intended. I think the point is no one knows what the Defendant intends unless he clearly places that on the speedy trial demand. *** State statute requires as well as case law supports clear and unequivocal demand. That\u2019s not what we have here.\u201d\nThe circuit court disagreed, stating: \u201cI think the Defendant in this case did, in fact, comply with the statute and effectively asserted his right to a speedy trial demand and based upon that the Court will dismiss this case.\u201d\nThe State separately appealed in both cases, and the appellate court consolidated the appeals for disposition. As noted, the appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the dismissal of all DUI charges, but reversed as to non-DUI charges arising from the same incidents. 381 Ill. App. 3d 142. The appellate majority concluded that defendant\u2019s reference to a \u201cDuPage County DUI\u201d was, under the circumstances, a sufficient speedy-trial demand for purposes of all pending DUI charges in that county, and determined that defendant\u2019s demand was not invalid for failing to comply with the local rule\u2019s requirements. 381 Ill. App. 3d at 148-52. The dissent rejected the majority\u2019s view that \u201ca demand identifying an unspecified and single \u2018Du Page DUI\u2019 was sufficient under section 3 \u2014 8\u201410 to demand speedy trial for multiple DUI charges in multiple cases,\u201d suggesting that such a result relieved the defendant of his burden of making a clear and unequivocal speedy-trial demand. 381 Ill. App. 3d at 154 (McLaren, J., dissenting).\nANALYSIS\nGiven our disposition, as will be made clear hereafter, we find it unnecessary to discuss the enforceability of Rule 30.06 of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit. 18th Jud. Cir. Ct. R. 30.06(b) (eff. July 15, 2003). Our discussion will focus primarily upon the requirements of section 3 \u2014 8\u201410 of the Code. As we are concerned here with the construction of a statute, and there are no controverted facts, our review is de novo. People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 335 (2009); People v. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d 166, 171 (2006).\nWith respect to speedy-trial statutes, the legislature has seen fit to provide different time periods and demand requirements for offenders who are differently situated. People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 424, 430 (1994). We assume that differentiation is the result of reasoned consideration and is not without consequence. Generally, section 103 \u2014 5(b) of the speedy-trial statute provides that \u201c[e]very person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 5(b) (West 2004). However, we are concerned here with the additional demand requirements of section 3 \u2014 8\u201410 of the Code, which applies to those, like defendant, who have been committed to a DOC facility and who have charges pending in any county. Section 3 \u2014 8\u201410 provides:\n\u201c[The person demanding speedy trial] shall include in the demand under subsection (b) [of section 103 \u2014 5], a statement of the place of present commitment, the term, and length of the remaining term, the charges pending against him or her to be tried and the county of the charges, and the demand shall be addressed to the state\u2019s attorney of the county where he or she is charged with a copy to the clerk of that court and a copy to the chief administrative officer of the Department of Corrections institution or facility to which he or she is committed.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 8\u201410 (West 2004).\nAs this court observed in Staten, although our \u201ccases subscribe to the principle that speedy-trial statutes implement constitutional rights and are to be liberally construed,\u201d as a threshold inquiry, we must always consider whether a demand, or attempted demand, is sufficient to start the running of the 160-day time period set forth in section 3 \u2014 8\u201410. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 427.\nThis court has repeatedly recognized that \u201c \u2018defendants *** serving prison terms for existing convictions at the time they face trial on additional charges *** do not suffer a loss of liberty while awaiting trial on the pending charges.\u2019 \u201d Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d at 175, quoting Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 428. The legislature has chosen to impose additional demand requirements on those individuals not applicable to others. In Staten, this court rejected the notion that the additional conditions imposed by the legislature in section 3 \u2014 8\u201410 are \u201cmeaningless\u201d or mere technicalities, finding that the information required was properly mandated \u201cfor the administrative convenience of the State\u201d and that the legislature intended to place the burden of compliance on the demanding defendant who, as noted, is already incarcerated and thus suffers no additional loss of liberty. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 428. In Staten, this court insisted that a demand under section 3 \u2014 8\u201410 be unambiguous. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 428-29 (citing, approvingly, appellate court cases that put the demand burden upon the defendant and require a \u201cclear and unequivocal\u201d demand).\nAs this court observed in Staten:\n\u201c[A] defendant who claims a violation of a speedy-trial right cannot prevail if the demand for trial fails to comply with the terms of the governing speedy-trial provision. To treat the informational requirements of section 3 \u2014 8\u201410 as surplusage would be to infringe on the legislative prerogative to set reasonable conditions on an incarcerated defendant\u2019s right to receive a trial within 160 days of the demand.\u201d Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 429-30.\nWe note, too, though they are not coextensive, Illinois\u2019 speedy-trial statutes implement a defendant\u2019s constitutional right to speedy trial. People v. Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d 209, 216-17 (2000). As we observed in People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 47 (2001), in the context of the balancing analysis pertinent to the constitutional right to speedy trial:\n\u201cBecause of the seriousness of the remedy \u2014 \u2018a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without having been tried\u2019 \u2014 the right to a speedy trial should always be in balance, and not inconsistent, with the rights of public justice.\u201d Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 47, quoting in part Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 112, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2188 (1972).\nThe balancing inherent in our speedy-trial statute is the prerogative of the legislature.\nTaking into account the pertinent statutes, authorities, and principles, it is our opinion, given the facts of this case, that the circuit court has reversed the burden of compliance with statutory conditions the legislature intended for the \u201cadministrative convenience of the State,\u201d placing the burden instead on the very party for whose benefit those conditions were enacted. We see the result here as inconsistent with the rights of public justice.\nIt is not unreasonable to require that defendants demanding a speedy trial under the provisions of section 3 \u2014 8\u201410 specify the charges to which their demands pertain. That is not to say that case numbers are necessarily required in the demand; however, if they are not included, other adequate indicia of identification must be provided, such as the name of the charge and the date upon which the offense was allegedly committed. It is not enough to say \u201cDu Page County DUI\u201d if a defendant has 10 such charges pending \u2014 or even three in two different cases. The deficiency here is compounded by defendant\u2019s provision of a case number (\u201cW05A48844\u201d) that had nothing to do with either case, and appears to have initially led the circuit clerk to believe the demand might relate to a municipal prosecution. In any event, such laxity is inconsistent with the additional burden the legislature has seen fit to place upon those already incarcerated for other offenses, those who suffer no additional loss of liberty because of the pending charges. It is also inconsistent with the implementation of statutory conditions enacted for the administrative benefit of the State to require the State to track down defendant\u2019s pending cases or writ him into court to figure out what he means.\nIt is particularly problematic for this defendant to argue that he was unaware of his case number, or other identifying indicia, for the two DUIs charged in Du Page County case No. 03 \u2014 DT\u20142937, because, when he failed to appear to answer charges in that case on July 15, 2003, he was mailed a notice of forfeiture bearing that very case number. We believe routine documentation served on or mailed to defendants in similar circumstances, i.e., charging instruments, notices, and warrants, will adequately apprise defendants of the information they need to comply with section 3 \u2014 8\u201410. If they are not in possession of such documents, how do they know they have charges pending? However, even if that is not the case, we are not aware of, nor have we been apprised of any, practical impediments that would prevent an incarcerated defendant from ascertaining, through communication with the circuit clerk, relevant information identifying his pending charges with specificity.\nIn passing, we note that there may be instances where the application of a too liberal construction to a general, haphazard demand might actually work to a defendant\u2019s disadvantage and thwart his intention. There may be valid strategic reasons why a defendant might not want a speedy trial on all his pending cases: witnesses may become unavailable with the passage of time; their memories fade; for purposes of sentencing, the sequence of convictions might have significant consequences.\nIn any event, we find that this defendant\u2019s demand was insufficient, under the provisions of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014 10, to commence the running of the speedy-trial term. We express no opinion regarding the enforceability of Rule 30.06 of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County, and we reverse that portion of the appellate court\u2019s judgment that upholds the dismissal of DUI charges against this defendant.\nAppellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court judgment reversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Garson S. Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer and Gregory L. Slovacek, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.", "Donald J. Ramsell and Earl A. Vergara, of Wheaton, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 106496.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOSE J. SANDOVAL, Appellee.\nOpinion filed January 22, 2010.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Garson S. Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer and Gregory L. Slovacek, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.\nDonald J. Ramsell and Earl A. Vergara, of Wheaton, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0057-01", "first_page_order": 73, "last_page_order": 85 }