{ "id": 3627496, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. MILES SMITH, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Smith", "decision_date": "2010-01-22", "docket_number": "No. 108297", "first_page": "162", "last_page": "174", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "236 Ill. 2d 162" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "383 Ill. App. 3d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4277956 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" }, { "page": "147-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/383/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4283847 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112-14" }, { "page": "113" }, { "page": "113" }, { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/388/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621474 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" }, { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3606828 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725359 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619558 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290", "parenthetical": "holding that the term \"search\" has a settled meaning in the realm of criminal procedure" }, { "page": "290" }, { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3624949 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" }, { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/235/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448796 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 U.S. 393", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3680974 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1920, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/251/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 U.S. 191", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3677266 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"The preliminary examination is a preindictment stage at which the defendant is allowed to test the prosecution's evidence against him, and to try to dissuade the prosecutor from seeking an indictment\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The preliminary examination is a preindictment stage at which the defendant is allowed to test the prosecution's evidence against him, and to try to dissuade the prosecutor from seeking an indictment\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The preliminary examination is a preindictment stage at which the defendant is allowed to test the prosecution's evidence against him, and to try to dissuade the prosecutor from seeking an indictment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/554/0191-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 752, "char_count": 20605, "ocr_confidence": 0.82, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.413578374167077e-07, "percentile": 0.6474475925044278 }, "sha256": "534056babd4972acffd7a8a60d85bb4b9328410cd2548849a16a4878cf97961d", "simhash": "1:eaf76d08e33d0191", "word_count": 3358 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:48:59.065132+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. MILES SMITH, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THOMAS\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nAt issue is whether a State\u2019s Attorney may recover a statutory preliminary examination fee (55 ILCS 5/4\u2014 2002.1(a) (West 2008)) when a defendant receives a bail hearing but not a hearing to determine probable cause. We hold that the preliminary examination fee is available only when there has been a probable cause hearing.\nBACKGROUND\nThe State charged defendant, Miles Smith, with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2006)). Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County convicted defendant and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment. The court also assessed various fines and fees against defendant, including a $20 \u201cpreliminary hearing\u201d State\u2019s Attorney fee pursuant to section 4 \u2014 2002.1(a) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4\u2014 2002.1(a) (West 2006)).\nDefendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that he could not be assessed the $20 fee because no preliminary examination was held. According to defendant, it is well settled that a \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d is a probable cause hearing, and no such hearing was held in this case because he was indicted by a grand jury.\nThe Appellate Court, First District, Fifth Division, held that the fee was properly assessed because there had been a bail hearing. No. 1 \u2014 07\u20140282 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The court noted a split of authority on this issue in the First District. In People v. Ellison, 383 Ill. App. 3d 146 (2008), the Fourth Division held that the preliminary examination fee is properly assessed for bail hearings rather than for probable cause hearings. The relevant statute provides that the fee is assessed for \u201cpreliminary examinations for each defendant held to bail or recognizance.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 2002.1(a) (West 2006). The Ellison court determined that, if the statute were read as applying to probable cause hearings, that would render the language \u201cbail or recognizance\u201d superfluous. Thus, Ellison concluded that \u201cas used in section 4 \u2014 2002.1(a), a \u2018preliminary examination\u2019 means the proceedings at which a trial court examines relevant factors for the purpose of determining whether or not to hold defendant on bail or recognizance.\u201d Ellison, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 147. The Ellison court found irrelevant the definition of \u201cprehminary examination\u201d in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/100 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2006)), because section 4 \u2014 2002.1(a) of the Counties Code did not refer to that definition. Ellison, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 147-48.\nIn People v. Brown, 388 Ill. App. 3d 104, 112-14 (2009), the Third Division rejected Ellison\u2019s holding. The Brown court held that the plain meaning of \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d is a hearing to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute the accused. The court noted that the term is defined that way both in Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1199 (7th ed. 1999)) and in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/109 \u2014 3 (West 2006)). Brown, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 113. The court further rejected Ellison\u2019s conclusion that it is improper to look to the Code of Criminal Procedure to define the term because the relevant section of the Counties Code provides a schedule of fees for State\u2019s Attorneys for various criminal procedures. The court thus found that \u201cany explanation of the fees due for \u2018preliminary examinations\u2019 necessarily requires us to examine the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which is the relevant statute from which those proceedings are specifically derived.\u201d Brown, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 113. Because the defendant in Brown was indicted by a grand jury, no preliminary examination within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure was held. Accordingly, the court vacated the preliminary examination fee. Brown, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 114.\nHere, the Fifth Division considered the reasoning of both Ellison and Brown and found Ellison more persuasive. The court believed that Brown was improperly ignoring the language referring to \u201cbail or recognizance.\u201d Accordingly, the court held that defendant was properly assessed the fee, as it was undisputed that he had received a bail hearing. The court also addressed other issues not presented here.\nWe allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal to resolve this conflict between the various divisions of the First District. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.\nANALYSIS\nThe issue is one of statutory construction. Thus, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the drafters\u2019 intention, and the most reliable indicator of intent is the language used, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Davison, 233 Ill. 2d 30, 40 (2009). In determining the plain meaning of a statute\u2019s terms, we consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323 (2007). When statutory terms are undefined, we presume that the legislature intended the terms to have their popularly understood meaning. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 349 (2001). Moreover, if a term has a settled legal meaning, the courts will normally infer that the legislature intended to incorporate the established meaning. People v. Bailey, 232 Ill. 2d 285, 290 (2009) (holding that the term \u201csearch\u201d has a settled meaning in the realm of criminal procedure). Statutes such as this, which are in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed. People v. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d 286, 297 (2009), citing People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 173 (1978). The construction of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Davison, 233 Ill. 2d at 40.\nDefendant argues that this court should follow Brown. Defendant points out that \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d is a legal term of art that means a hearing to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute an accused person. Defendant cites treatises and both Illinois and out-of-state decisions. Defendant points out that every state to use the term \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d or \u201cpreliminary hearing\u201d uses it to describe a probable cause hearing. Ellison, by contrast, cited no authority defining \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d as a bail hearing. Defendant agrees with Brown\u2019s conclusion that, because the fee schedule in the Counties Code relates to criminal proceedings, a court should necessarily look to the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Section 109 \u2014 3 of the Code is entitled \u201cPrehminary Examination\u201d and describes a probable cause hearing. See 725 ILCS 5/109 \u2014 3 (West 2006).\nAlthough the State argues that the Ellison court\u2019s reasoning was correct, it does not, in fact, rely on Ellison\u2019s reasoning. As we noted above, Ellison held that looking to the Code of Criminal Procedure to define \u201cprehminary examination\u201d was improper. Moreover, the Ellison court determined that the $20 fee could not be awarded for a probable cause hearing because that would render the \u201cbail or recognizance\u201d language superfluous. By contrast, the State has come up with an argument that not only requires looking at the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also would allow the fee to be imposed for both bail hearings and probable cause hearings. The State points out that the Code of Criminal Procedure uses the term \u201cprehminary examination\u201d twice: first, as an article header for article 109, and then again for section 109 \u2014 3, a specific section of article 109. There are five sections under article 109. One of them, section 109 \u2014 1 (725 ILCS 5/109 \u2014 1 (West 2006)), covers the first appearance when an arrested person is taken before a judge. One of the things that happens at this initial hearing is that the court shall \u201c[a]dmit the defendant to bail in accordance with the provisions of Article 110 of this Code.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/109 \u2014 1(b)(4) (West 2006). The State contends that when the legislature used the term \u201cprehminary examination\u201d in the Counties Code, it must have been referring to the article heading for article 109, not just to section 109 \u2014 3. Thus, both the hearings held pursuant to section 109 \u2014 1 and section 109 \u2014 3 are covered by the reference in the Counties Code to \u201cpreliminary examinations.\u201d According to the State, this reading gives effect to the language \u201cheld to bail or recognizance.\u201d\nNone of the possible constructions of section 4 \u2014 2002.1(a) are entirely satisfactory. We begin, however, with the presumption that, when the legislature uses a term that has a settled legal meaning, the legislature intended it to have that settled meaning. Bailey, 232 Ill. 2d at 290. As we explained in Bailey, \u201c \u2018The law uses familiar legal expressions in their familiar legal sense.\u2019 \u201d Bailey, 232 Ill. 2d at 290, quoting Henry v. United States, 251 U.S. 393, 395, 64 L. Ed. 322, 323, 40 S. Ct. 185, 186 (1920). The term \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d is a familiar legal expression that has a settled meaning. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 202 n.12, 171 L. Ed. 2d 366, 376 n.12, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2585 n.12 (2008) (\u201cThe preliminary examination is a preindictment stage at which the defendant is allowed to test the prosecution\u2019s evidence against him, and to try to dissuade the prosecutor from seeking an indictment\u201d); Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1299 (9th ed. 2009) (referring to a \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d as synonymous with \u201cpreliminary hearing,\u201d and defining \u201cpreliminary hearing\u201d as \u201c[a] criminal hearing *** to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute an accused person\u201d); Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1062 (5th ed. 1979) (referring to a \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d as a \u201cpreliminary hearing\u201d and defining \u201cpreliminary hearing\u201d as \u201c[t]he hearing by a judge to determine whether a person charged with a crime should be held for trial,\u201d and also as a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the defendant committed it); Ballentine\u2019s Law Dictionary 978 (3d ed. 1969) (defining \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d as \u201ca judicial inquiry to determine whether there is \u2018probable cause\u2019 for an accusation of crime\u201d); Barron\u2019s Law Dictionary 365 (3d ed. 1991) (defining \u201cpreliminary hearing\u201d as a hearing to determine whether probable cause existed); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law \u00a7453, at 576-78 (2006) (under heading \u201cPreliminary Hearing or Examination,\u201d explains that such a hearing \u201cserves a limited purpose: to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime charged, so as to warrant further proceedings\u201d); 4 W LaFave, J. Israel, N. King & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure \u00a714.1(a), at 273-74 (3d ed. 2007) (\u201cThe preliminary hearing (also referred to as the \u2018preliminary examination,\u2019 the \u2018probable cause\u2019 hearing, the \u2018commitment hearing,\u2019 the \u2018examining trial,\u2019 and the \u2018bindover hearing\u2019) is a judicial proceeding, which commonly is conducted by the magistrate and limited to felony prosecutions. At that proceeding, the prosecution in an open and adversary hearing must establish that there is sufficient evidence supporting its charge to \u2018bind the case over\u2019 to the next stage in the process\u201d); 5 L. Piczynski, Illinois Practice \u00a78:1, at 294, 293-94 (2d ed. 2005) (\u201cA preliminary hearing or examination is held on a felony if there has not been an indictment against the defendant,\u201d and the purpose of the hearing is to \u201cdetermine whether there is probable cause to believe a felony has been committed and that the defendant committed it\u201d).\nThe authorities are consistent that a \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d is a probable cause hearing, and this is also the way that the legislature uses the term in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. See 725 ILCS 5/102 \u2014 17, 109 \u2014 3 (West 2008). Thus, we presume that when the legislature authorized State\u2019s Attorney fees for \u201cpreliminary examinations,\u201d it intended the fee to be available only when there has been a probable cause hearing. The relevant portion of section 4 \u2014 2002.1(a) can therefore be read as, \u201cFor probable cause hearings for each defendant held to bail or recognizance, $20.\u201d\nThe approach taken by the appellate court below and in Ellison improperly rewrites the statute. The Ellison court ignored the fact that \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d is a legal term of art in criminal procedure. Moreover, although Ellison focused on the phrase \u201cbail or recognizance,\u201d it did not give effect to that language as written. The statute provides that the fee is available for preliminary examinations \u201cfor each defendant held to bail or recognizance.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 2002.1(a) (West 2008). The statute does not state that the fee is available for hearings to determine or set bail. As the defendant points out, it is difficult to imagine why the legislature would word the statute this way if it simply wanted the fee to apply to hearings to determine whether the defendant should be admitted to bail. Moreover, although Ellison was primarily concerned with ensuring that it gave effect to the statutory language \u201cbail or recognizance,\u201d its approach did not give effect to the language \u201cFor preliminary examinations for each defendant held to.\u201d The Ellison approach also excludes the fee for probable cause hearings, which is counterintuitive because, as the defendant points out, the State\u2019s Attorney has a clearly defined role at probable cause hearings, and this is a much more substantial role than at bail hearings. Adopting Ellison\u2019s construction \u2014 which both ignores legal terms of art and rewrites the statute \u2014 would not be faithful to the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. See Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d at 173.\nLikely sensing the problems with the Ellison approach, the State argues for a different interpretation. As we explained above, the State contends that the reference in the Counties Code to \u201cpreliminary examinations\u201d is actually a reference to the article heading for article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. This interpretation would cover both the bail hearing described in section 109 \u2014 1 (entitled \u201cPerson arrested\u201d) (725 ILCS 5/109 \u2014 1 (West 2006)) and the probable cause hearing described in section 109 \u2014 3 (entitled \u201cPreliminary examination\u201d) (725 ILCS 5/109 \u2014 3 (West 2006)). There are at least three major problems with the State\u2019s argument. First, section 109 \u2014 1 expressly provides that one of the purposes of the hearing described therein, in addition to admitting the defendant to bail, is to \u201c[schedule a preliminary hearing in appropriate cases.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/109 \u2014 1(b)(3) (West 2006). Thus, the hearing described in section 109 \u2014 1 cannot itself be the preliminary hearing. Second, the State\u2019s interpretation would directly contradict the definition of \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d from the general definitions section of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See 725 ILCS 5/102 \u2014 17 (West 2008). Third, the statutory language authorizing a fee for \u201cprehminary examinations for each defendant held to bail or recognizance\u201d predates the adoption of the article heading relied on by the State. The article heading relied upon by the State was enacted as part of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. The relevant section of the Counties Code was enacted in 1992. See Pub. Act 87\u2014 669, \u00a72, eff. January 1, 1992. However, as we explained recently in People v. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d 286, 293 (2009), the predecessor statute to this section of the Counties Code was section 8 of \u201cAN ACT concerning fees and salaries ***\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 53, par. 8). If we look at the 1961 Illinois Revised Statutes, for instance, we find the following language in section 8 of chapter 53: \u201cFor preliminary examinations for each defendant held to bail or recognizance, $5.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 53, par. 8. Thus, even before the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1963, with the article heading the State hinges its argument on, the legislature was allowing State\u2019s Attorneys to collect fees \u201cfor preliminary examinations for each defendant held to bail or recognizance.\u201d The legislature therefore could not have been referring to that article heading when it first enacted the provision allowing for preliminary examination fees.\nThere is an oddity with the statute that we need not resolve today, and it is an oddity that arises under either party\u2019s interpretation. The language \u201cfor each defendant held to bail or recognizance\u201d would seem to exclude the fee for a defendant who received a probable cause hearing but was in custody and denied bail. The same issue would arise, however, if we construed \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d to mean a bail hearing. In that case, if the State successfully argued that the defendant should be denied bail, the State would not be entitled to a fee. If the defendant was admitted to bail or released on recognizance, however, the State would be entitled to a fee. The problem may simply be a legislative oversight. The defendant believes that by allowing the fee for \u201cpreliminary examinations for each defendant held to bail or recognizance,\u201d the legislature was merely clarifying that the fee is available only when the State is successful at the probable cause hearing. At a preliminary examination, if probable cause is found to be lacking, the defendant is discharged. 725 ILCS 5/109 \u2014 3(b) (West 2006). If probable cause is found, the \u201cjudge shall hold the defendant to answer to the court having jurisdiction of the offense.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/109 \u2014 3(a) (West 2006). It is possible that the legislature was merely expressing an intent that the defendant should have to pay a preliminary examination fee only where probable cause is found and the defendant is held to bail or recognizance, but overlooked that there was a third option \u2014 probable cause could be found, with the defendant in custody and denied bail. Or, it could be that the legislature had a reason not to allow the fee when the defendant is in custody and denied bail.\nRegardless, these are all questions for another day, when the issue is presented by the case and fully briefed and argued. Or it is a matter for the legislature to address. For our purposes today, it is sufficient to say that defendant did not receive a probable cause hearing, and thus he cannot be assessed a \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d State\u2019s Attorney fee. The judgment of the appellate court is therefore reversed to the extent it upheld the $20 preliminary examination fee, and that portion of the trial court\u2019s judgment that awarded the State the preliminary examination fee is vacated. We also overrule Ellison to the extent that it held that the \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d fee may be awarded when the defendant is given a bail hearing but not a probable cause hearing.\nAppellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court judgment vacated in part.\nAlthough defendant does not mention this, we note that \u201cpreliminary examination\u201d is also defined in the general definitions section of the Code of Criminal Procedure as \u201ca hearing before a judge to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the person accused has committed an offense.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/102 \u2014 17 (West 2008).\nThe fee schedule for State\u2019s Attorneys was originally found in section 8 of \u201cAN ACT concerning fees and salaries ***\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 53, par. 8). The fee schedule was later moved to the Counties Code. See Ill. Rev Stat. 1989, ch. 34, par. 4 \u2014 2002, now codified at 55 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 2002 (West 2008). The legislature later adopted two different State\u2019s Attorney fee schedules \u2014 one for counties with over 3 million persons, and one for counties with fewer than 3 million persons. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 34, pars. 4 \u2014 2002, 4 \u2014 2002a, now codified at 55 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 2002, 2 \u2014 2002.1 (West 2008). The wording of these provisions was virtually identical, but the fees for counties of more than 3 million persons were higher.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THOMAS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, and Caroline Ellis Bourland, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Mary Needham and Janet C. Mahoney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 108297.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. MILES SMITH, Appellant.\nOpinion filed January 22, 2010.\nMichael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, and Caroline Ellis Bourland, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Mary Needham and Janet C. Mahoney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0162-01", "first_page_order": 178, "last_page_order": 190 }