{ "id": 3629439, "name": "DAVID CWIK, Successor Independent Adm'r of the Estate of Genowefa Bogdanowicz, et al., Appellants, v. ALEXI GIANNOULIAS, Treasurer of the State of Illinois, et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Cwik v. Giannoulias", "decision_date": "2010-05-20", "docket_number": "No. 108313", "first_page": "409", "last_page": "424", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "237 Ill. 2d 409" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4285155 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" }, { "page": "28" }, { "page": "30-31" }, { "page": "31" }, { "page": "31-32" }, { "page": "32" }, { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 U.S. 516", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6189832 ], "weight": 24, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" }, { "page": "748" }, { "page": "790" }, { "page": "529" }, { "page": "750-51" }, { "page": "792" }, { "page": "530" }, { "page": "751-52" }, { "page": "792-93" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "753" }, { "page": "794" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "753-54" }, { "page": "794" }, { "page": "535" }, { "page": "754" }, { "page": "795" }, { "page": "530" }, { "page": "752" }, { "page": "792-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/454/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444417 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" }, { "page": "325" }, { "page": "323-24" }, { "page": "331-33" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "333" }, { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 216", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9030620 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. 2d 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3598232 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" }, { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/219/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3615201 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060496 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588", "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that all citizens are charged with knowledge of the law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 U.S. 306", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 362818 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "establishing requirements of notice and an opportunity to present objections" }, { "parenthetical": "establishing requirements of notice and an opportunity to present objections" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/339/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 L. Ed. 865", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "establishing requirements of notice and an opportunity to present objections" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 F.3d 870", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11624039 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872" }, { "page": "872" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/174/0870-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 409", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Wm. & Mary L. Rev.", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419-20", "parenthetical": "noting three dual policies of the uniform law including the protection of owners in order to reunite them with their property while providing adopting states with a method for raising revenue" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2906157 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5470216 ], "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/222/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444676 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346", "parenthetical": "\"A party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it adversely impacts his or her own rights\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4271581 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060183 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0283-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1133, "char_count": 26841, "ocr_confidence": 0.819, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4300904753693216e-07, "percentile": 0.8019357499220997 }, "sha256": "0c0576dabecf148ef1fad891de8de626fbb3f3994fe5938d9cd9cc5b23765a73", "simhash": "1:e13d4749fe3e27b9", "word_count": 4422 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:19:30.118365+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DAVID CWIK, Successor Independent Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Genowefa Bogdanowicz, et al., Appellants, v. ALEXI GIANNOULIAS, Treasurer of the State of Illinois, et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nIn this appeal, plaintiffs challenge the state\u2019s retention of interest earned on property held by the state pursuant to section 15 of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (765 ILCS 1025/15 (West 2004)). In proceedings below, the circuit court of Cook County denied the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint, which sought recovery of interest on plaintiffs property (money) previously held by the state under the Act; however, the circuit court certified dispositive questions to the appellate court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). In the course of answering those questions, the appellate court ultimately determined that the retention of interest by the state \u201cmay\u201d be a \u201ctaking\u201d under section 15 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a715) and the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. V XIV), but given the allegations in this case, the court concluded it is not a taking for which just compensation is due. 389 Ill. App. 3d 21. This appeal followed. 210 Ill. 2d Rs. 315, 317. For the reasons set forth hereafter, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nSTATUTE INVOLVED\nThe Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (the Act) (765 ILCS 1025/1 et seq. (West 2004)) was enacted by our General Assembly in 1961. The Act creates a \u201cpresumption of abandonment\u201d pertaining to various forms of neglected or unclaimed property held for the owners by, inter alia, financial organizations (765 ILCS 1025/2 (West 2004)), business associations (765 ILCS 1025/2a (West 2004)), insurance companies (765 ILCS 1025/3 (West 2004)), utilities (765 ILCS 1025/4 (West 2004)), and governmental entities or authorities (765 ILCS 1025/8, 8.1 (West 2004)), where the owners have failed to claim or otherwise indicate an interest in the property through statutorily specified acts for a period of time generally ranging from five to seven years, depending upon the applicable provision.\nPursuant to section 11(a) of the Act (765 ILCS 1025/ 11(a) (West 2004)), a holder of \u201cfunds or other property, tangible or intangible, presumed abandoned under this Act, shall report and remit all abandoned property specified in the report to the State Treasurer.\u201d Section 11(b) specifies information that must be provided to the Treasurer, information that might help to identify or locate the owner and verify that the property does fall under the statutory presumption of abandonment. See 765 ILCS 1025/11(b) (West 2004). With that information, the state is required, by section 12 of the Act (765 ILCS 1025/12 (West 2004)), to attempt to notify the owner by publishing a notice in a newspaper of general circulation. The notice must list the last known addresses of persons listed in the report, describe the property in question, provide contact information concerning the holder of the property, and include a \u201cstatement that the abandoned property has been placed in the custody of the State Treasurer to whom all further claims must thereafter be directed.\u201d 765 ILCS 1025/12 (West 2004).\nThe Act provides that \u201c[e]very person who has filed a report as provided by Section 11 shall deliver to the State Treasurer all abandoned property specified in the annual report on the same date that the annual report is filed.\u201d 765 ILCS 1025/13 (West 2004). \u201cUpon the payment or delivery of abandoned property to the State Treasurer, the state shall assume custody and shall be responsible for the safekeeping thereof.\u201d 765 ILCS 1025/14 (West 2004). Significantly, for purposes of this appeal, the Act states:\n\u201cWhen property is paid or delivered to the State Treasurer under this Act, the owner is not entitled to receive income or other increments accruing thereafter, except that income accruing on unliquidated stock and mutual funds after July 1,1993, may be paid to the owner.\u201d 765 ILCS 1025/15 (West 2004).\nAs to disposition of the \u201cabandoned property,\u201d the Act, in its applicable 2004 form, provided:\n\u201cAll abandoned property, other than money and that property exempted by paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subsection, delivered to the State Treasurer under this Act shall be sold within a reasonable time to the highest bidder at public sale ***.\u201d 765 ILCS 1025/17(a) (West 2004).\nSection 18 of the Act stated that the \u201cTreasurer shall retain all funds received under this Act, including the proceeds from the sale of abandoned property under section 17, in a trust fund ***.\u201d 765 ILCS 1025/18 (West 2004). Under the 2004 version of the Act, amounts in that trust fund in excess of $2.5 million were to be deposited in the State Pension Fund on dates certain twice annually. 765 ILCS 1025/18 (West 2004). Payment for claims allowed under the Act was to be paid out of the trust fund. 765 ILCS 1025/18 (West 2004).\nBACKGROUND\nThe plaintiffs, David Cwik, successor independent administrator of the estate of Genowefa Bodganowicz, and Anita White, filed a lawsuit against the defendants, Judy Barr Topinka, Treasurer of the State of Illinois, and Alissa Camp, director of the Unclaimed Property Division of the office of the Illinois Treasurer (collectively the Treasurer), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, seeking payment of interest on their property \u2014 money in the case of each of the representative plaintiffs \u2014 held by the State of Illinois under the Act prior to their claims of reclamation. The plaintiffs also sought certification of the suit as a class action.\nThe circuit court denied the Treasurer\u2019s motion to dismiss the amended complaint, but certified two questions to the appellate court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(8) (210 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(8)), the Treasurer also sought review of the circuit court\u2019s order certifying the class. The appellate court granted review in both instances and consolidated the appeals.\nThe questions certified for review were stated as follows:\n\u201cWhether the retention for state purposes of the interest earned on property held pursuant to the Illinois Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act during the time it was in the possession of the State Treasurer\u2019s Office and/or the State\u2019s Retirement Systems is a taking for which just compensation is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution or Article II, [sic] \u00a715, of the Illinois Constitution[.]\nIf so, whether just compensation should be measured by the interest earned by the State on the property taken[.]\u201d\nIn addressing the certified questions, the appellate court observed that the majority of courts in other jurisdictions, considering a property owner\u2019s entitlement to interest under virtually identical statutes, have relied upon the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 70 L. Ed. 2d 738, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982), in concluding that \u201cthe retention of earned interest by a state under an unclaimed property statute is not a \u2018taking\u2019 requiring the payment of compensation.\u201d 389 Ill. App. 3d at 29. The appellate court noted that the circumstances in Texaco were distinguishable insofar as the property in that case was considered abandoned under the applicable statute, whereas this court, in Canel v. Topinka, 212 Ill. 2d 311 (2004), adopted the view that, under Illinois\u2019 Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, the state does not acquire title to the property in question, but merely holds the neglected property for the owner. 389 Ill. App. 3d at 28, citing Canel, 212 Ill. 2d at 331. Following a brief discussion of Brown v. Legal Foundation, 538 U.S. 216, 155 L. Ed. 2d 376, 123 S. Ct. 1406 (2003) \u2014 a case initiated by vigilant property owners who sought the interest on their funds held in lawyers\u2019 trust accounts \u2014 the appellate court concluded the initial portion of its analysis with this ambivalent statement: \u201cThus, while the retention of interest [in the case at bar] may be a \u2018taking,\u2019 the question is whether the named plaintiffs here have lost anything of value.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 389 Ill. App. 3d at 30-31.\nIn addressing that question, the appellate court observed: \u201cNowhere in the [plaintiffs\u2019] allegations do the plaintiffs plead that their respective funds were earning interest at the time the State took custody of them. When questioned at oral argument, the attorneys for the parties acknowledged that they were unaware whether the plaintiffs\u2019 funds had been earning interest prior to the time they were placed in state custody.\u201d 389 Ill. App. 3d at 31. Assuming there had been a \u201ctaking\u201d for purposes of our state and federal constitutions, the appellate court found the dearth of said allegations or claims dispositive on the question of just compensation:\n\u201cUnlike the stock in Canel, which continued to produce dividends even though \u2018neglected\u2019 by the owner, there is no evidence that the plaintiffs\u2019 property in this case was producing any interest until the Treasurer took possession of it under the Act. While the State may have gained the interest income, the plaintiffs failed to plead that they were receiving interest or expected to receive interest on the funds remitted to the State under the Act. Simply put, the State\u2019s gain did not establish a loss on the part of the plaintiffs. As such, the plaintiffs have no claim for a taking for which compensation is due.\u201d 389 Ill. App. 3d at 31-32.\nApplying that rationale, the appellate court answered both questions \u201cin the negative as they apply to this particular case.\u201d 389 Ill. App. 3d at 32. The court concluded: \u201cAs we have determined that the named plaintiffs do not have a claim for a taking for which compensation is due, they have no cause of action and may not seek relief on behalf of the other class members. [Citation.] Therefore, the circuit court\u2019s order granting class certification is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.\u201d 389 Ill. App. 3d at 32.\nANALYSIS\nPlaintiffs raise numerous issues on appeal. We need address only one: \u201cwhether the defendants\u2019 retention of the interest accrued on unclaimed property pursuant to \u00a715 of the Act is an unconstitutional taking of private property without compensation.\u201d\nStatutes are presumed constitutional, and we have the duty to construe statutes so as to uphold their constitutionality if there is any reasonable way to do so. O\u2019Brien v. White, 219 Ill. 2d 86, 98 (2006). The party challenging the validity of the statute has the burden of rebutting the presumption of constitutionality by clearly demonstrating a constitutional violation. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 306 (2008). The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. O\u2019Brien, 219 Ill. 2d at 98.\nWe note at the outset that no interpretation of the statute itself is necessary. The language of the statute is plain; its meaning is clear. With two exceptions not applicable here (for \u201cunliquidated stock and mutual funds\u201d), the statute provides that the owner of property \u201cpaid or delivered to the State Treasurer\u201d pursuant to the provisions of the Act \u201cis not entitled to receive income\u201d thereon. 765 ILCS 1025/15 (West 2004). Thus, the Act clearly divests the property owner of any right to interest earned on property held by the state pursuant to the authority of the Act. The question before us is whether the legislature can, without running afoul of our state and federal constitutions, enact a statute that divests neglectful property owners of interest earned on their property while it is committed to the custody of the state for safekeeping. Applying the precedent and reasoning of the Supreme Court in Texaco, we hold that it can.\nAt issue in Texaco was an Indiana statute that automatically divested the owner of a severed mineral interest of his or her right thereto \u2014 returning it to the surface owner \u2014 where the subsurface owner, for a period of 20 years, failed to use the interest or at least file a statement of claim with the local recorder of deeds. After examining its pertinent precedent, the Supreme Court rejected appellants\u2019 contention that the State of Indiana lacked \u201cthe power to provide that property rights of this character shall be extinguished if their owners do not take the affirmative action required by the State.\u201d Texaco, 454 U.S. at 525, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 748, 102 S. Ct. at 790. Referring to that precedent, the Supreme Court noted:\n\u201cIn each case, the Court upheld the power of the State to condition retention of a property right upon the performance of an act within a limited period of time. In each instance, as a result of the failure of the property owner to perform the statutory condition, an interest in fee was deemed as a matter of law to be abandoned and to lapse.\u201d Texaco, 454 U.S. at 529, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 750-51, 102 S. Ct. at 792.\nHaving established that the states may enact statutes resulting in the lapse or divestment of a neglectful owner\u2019s rights in property, the Court went on to hold that the state was not required to pay compensation to such an owner:\n\u201cIn ruling that private property may he deemed to be abandoned and to lapse upon the failure of its owner to take reasonable actions imposed by law, this Court has never required the State to compensate the owner for the consequences of his own neglect. *** It is the owner\u2019s failure to make any use of the property \u2014 and not the action of the State \u2014 that causes the lapse of the property right; there is no \u2018taking\u2019 that requires compensation.\u201d Texaco, 454 U.S. at 530, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 751-52, 102 S. Ct. at 792-93.\nThe Court went on to address appellants\u2019 due process concerns, observing, first, that appellants, like all other citizens, \u201cmay be presumed to have had knowledge of the terms\u201d of the Indiana statute. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 533, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 753, 102 S. Ct. at 794. See generally People v. Lander, 215 Ill. 2d 577, 588 (2005) (\u201cIt is well settled that all citizens are charged with knowledge of the law\u201d). The Court pointed out that it was \u201cessential to recognize the difference between the self-executing feature of the statute and a subsequent judicial determination that a particular lapse did in fact occur.\u201d Texaco, 454 U.S. at 533, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 753-54, 102 S. Ct. at 794. In that respect, the Supreme Court rejected appellants\u2019 reliance upon the seminal due process decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950) (establishing requirements of notice and an opportunity to present objections), concluding: \u201cThe reasoning in Mullane is applicable to a judicial proceeding brought to determine whether a lapse of a mineral estate did or did not occur, but not to the self-executing feature of the Mineral Lapse Act. *** The Court in Mullane itself distinguished the situation in which a State enacted a general rule of law governing the abandonment of property.\u201d Texaco, 454 U.S. at 535, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 754, 102 S. Ct. at 795.\nWe find the reasoning of Texaco dispositive in the matter before us, for if a state legislature can constitutionally enact a statute that divests a neglectful owner of all rights in certain property absent the performance of specified activities evincing a continued and possessory interest in the property over the prescribed statutory period, then it logically follows that the legislature can, constitutionally, take the less drastic measure of enacting a statute that operates to divest those owners of only certain incidents of ownership, without mandating divestiture of all rights in the property. That is what the Illinois legislature has done here. As in Texaco, \u201c[i]t is the owner\u2019s failure to make any use of the property \u2014 and not the action of the State \u2014 that causes the lapse of the property right; there is no \u2018taking\u2019 that requires compensation.\u201d Texaco, 454 U.S. at 530, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 752, 102 S. Ct. at 792-93. The fact that the Illinois legislature has taken a more benevolent attitude toward those who neglect their property than it might have does not render its enactment unconstitutional.\nWhile the circumstances here might not qualify as \u201cabandonment\u201d under a common law definition, there appears to be no question, under Texaco, that the state could enact statutory provisions mandating the status of abandonment in appropriate circumstances or declaring the property interest lapsed in toto. Instead, using the phrase \u201cpresumed abandoned\u201d sparingly, more commonly simply \u201cabandoned,\u201d the legislature has effectively declared only an incident of ownership lapsed\u2014 the right to income earned \u2014 and has set up a system that at least allows errant property owners a reasonable period of time in which to recover their tangible property, and an unlimited period in which to recover its monetary equivalent. Pursuant to this system \u2014 triggered at the outset by the owner\u2019s neglect rather than proactive state action aimed at seizing property from the vigilant \u2014 the Treasurer is to receive custody of the neglected property and then is required to assume, in apparent perpetuity, the responsibility of safekeeping the property, or the proceeds from the sale thereof, for any owners who may wish to reclaim their \u201cabandoned\u201d property. In return for this seemingly advantageous, long-term reclamation service, the state receives the benefit of retaining the interest earned from its management of the property after it is placed in state custody.\nQuoting in part from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals\u2019 decision in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Vega, 174 F.3d 870, 872 (7th Cir. 1999), this court, in Canel, described the state\u2019s role and attendant benefit under the Act as follows:\n\u201c \u2018[N]ot only does the state have free use of the property unless and until the owner reclaims it; the state is not required to (and Illinois does not) pay any interest to a reclaiming owner. [Citations.] In effect, the property is an interest-free loan to the state \u2014 in perpetuity if the owner never shows up to claim it.\u2019 Vega, 174 F.3d at 872.\nSee also Note, Virginia\u2019s Acquisition of Unclaimed and Abandoned Personal Property, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 409, 419-20 (1986) (noting three dual policies of the uniform law including the protection of owners in order to reunite them with their property while providing adopting states with a method for raising revenue).\u201d Canel, 212 Ill. 2d at 325.\nIn Canel, we held that the state did not have the right to dividends issued on plaintiff\u2019s shares of unliquidated stock while the stock was in the possession of the state. We reached that result after a thorough examination of the unique features of corporate ownership:\n\u201cThe shares of a corporation are the units into which the proprietary interests in a corporation are divided. 805 ILCS 5/1.80 (West 2000). The proprietary interests represented by the shares of stock consist of management or control rights, rights to earnings, and rights to assets. Stroh v. Blackhawk Holding Corp., 48 Ill. 2d 471, 479 (1971); 11 Fletcher\u2019s Cyclopedia of Private Corporations \u00a75081 (rev. vol. 2003).\nOnce a dividend is declared, it becomes a corporate debt owed to the shareholders in proportion to their shares in the corporation, and, if the corporation refuses to pay, the shareholders may sue to recover the unpaid dividend. 11 Fletcher\u2019s Cyclopedia of Private Corporations \u00a75322 (rev. vol. 2003). A lawfully declared dividend is the separate property of the shareholders, wholly disconnected from their shares. Ford v. Ford Manufacturing Co., 222 Ill. App. 76, 83 (1921). Stated simply, a dividend belongs to the owner of the shares. In this case that owner remained, at all times, the plaintiff, James Canel.\u201d Canel, 212 Ill. 2d at 323-24.\nGiven the attributes of stock ownership, and the circumstances of that case, we held that the dividends issued to Canel by the corporation while Canel\u2019s stock was in the custody of the state remained Canel\u2019s separate property and the state had no right to retain it. The retention thereof constituted a \u201ctaking\u201d for which just compensation was due. We thus remanded the cause to the circuit court for a determination of just compensation. Canel, 212 Ill. 2d at 331-33.\nHowever, we repeatedly and pointedly limited our analysis and holding to the retention of dividends by the state:\n\u201cBecause this case involves dividends accruing on unliquidated stock, we conf\u00edne our analysis of section 15 to only dividends earned on shares of unliquidated stock held by the state pursuant to the Act.\u201d Canel, 212 Ill. 2d at 323.\n\u201cWe stress that our opinion today is limited only to dividends accruing on stock held by the state under the Act.\u201d Canel, 212 Ill. 2d at 333.\nAs our quotation of Vega suggested (see Canel, 212 Ill. 2d at 325), and our cautionary comments on the reach of the decision portended, we believe interest earned via state action on a corpus of money or other forms of property in the custody of the state can and should be treated differently from dividends automatically issued to the record holder of stock while the latter is in the state\u2019s possession prior to liquidation.\nFirst, section 15 of the Act specifies different treatment for \u201cincome or other increments accruing *** on unliquidated stock and mutual funds.\u201d 765 ILCS 1025/15 (West 2004). This legislative distinction recognizes \u2014 as did the limitation of our holding in Canel \u2014 the unique attributes and nature of those forms of corporate ownership and investment. Second, as our analysis in Canel acknowledges, dividends are separate property issued to the owner of stock, as the owner, irrespective of any action on his or her part. While stocks are in the Treasurer\u2019s custody, prior to liquidation, stocks remain the property of their owners, and any dividends issued are issued to them as owners of record \u2014 automatically. No action is required of either the owner or the state. The same is not true of interest earned on sums of money coming into the Treasurer\u2019s possession pursuant to the provisions of the Act. Without state action, the corpus earns nothing. Thus, there is a reasoned basis for treating dividends and interest differently.\nWe reiterate, pursuant to the holding in Texaco, the Illinois legislature has the authority \u2014 without violating our state or federal constitutions \u2014 to declare property statutorily \u201cabandoned\u201d where the owners have failed to show interest in the property through the performance of specified acts over a prescribed period of time. By such a declaration, our statute \u2014 self-executing as in Texaco\u2014 divests the owner of only certain incidents of ownership \u2014 unlike the Indiana statute at issue in Texaco\u2014 while the state provides safekeeping of the corpus and reclamation services. Our statute effects what may be described as limited lapse or divestment. There is no taking that would require compensation.\nWe emphasize that this situation differs from those extant in cases cited by plaintiffs in that this property was not wrested from a vigilant and reluctant property owner, who was actively involved with its oversight or management, and who disputed the appropriation at the time of the alleged taking.\nWe also note in passing plaintiffs\u2019 suggestion, in their reply brief, that application of the principles accepted in Texaco might result in a denial of due process in some case. Plaintiffs contend, \u201cif the [third-party] holder is later determined to have turned the property over to the State by mistake\u201d the Act \u201cprovides the owner with no mechanism to challenge the loss of his property right, nor does it require the State to prove the facts necessary to support the forfeiture.\u201d Plaintiffs do not argue that the third-party holders of their property turned it over to the state by mistake, or that the facts would not support limited lapse of their property rights under the statute. Those observations, considered in conjunction with the Texaco Court\u2019s approval of the \u201cself-executing\u201d feature of the Indiana statute there at issue, suggest to us that plaintiffs lack standing to make that type of challenge to the statute. See People v. Funches, 212 Ill. 2d 334, 346 (2004) (\u201cA party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it adversely impacts his or her own rights\u201d). Even if this were not the case, plaintiffs fail to address notification (765 ILCS 1025/12 (West 2004)), claims (765 ILCS 1025/19, 20 (West 2004)), and review (765 ILCS 1025/21 (West 2004)) provisions of the Act itself, and of the Code of Civil Procedure generally, to explain why those provisions are inadequate to provide procedural due process to those who fall within the purview of the Act. As our appellate court has aptly observed, a court of review is entitled to have the issues on appeal clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and reasoned, cohesive legal argument. First National Bank of LaGrange v. Lowrey, 375 Ill. App. 3d 181, 208 (2007). An issue not clearly defined and sufficiently presented fails to satisfy the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7)).\nFor the foregoing reasons, given the facts of this case, we find that no \u201ctaking\u201d occurred when the state retained interest earned on plaintiffs\u2019 property held in its custody pursuant to the provisions of the Act. In this respect, our holding is not entirely consistent with the analysis of the appellate court, which was ambivalent on that point. Nonetheless, we may affirm on any basis supported by the record (People v. Durr, 215 Ill. 2d 283, 296 (2005)), and we agree with the result reached by the appellate court. Thus, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nAlexi Giannoulias succeeded Judy Barr Topinka as Treasurer.\nJoshua Joyce succeeded Alissa Camp as director of the Unclaimed Property Division.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "John R. Wylie, of Donaldson Guin LLC, Charles R. Watkins, of Futterman Howard Ashley Watkins & Welt-man, Chtrd., Arthur T. Susman, Matthew T. Hurst and Glenn L. Hara, of Susman Heffner & Hurst LLt^ and William J. Harte and Walter Piecewicz, all of Chicago, for appellants.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Brett E. Legner and Christopher M.R. Turner, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), and Steven M. Puiszis and Robert T. Shannon, of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLF? of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 108313.\nDAVID CWIK, Successor Independent Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Genowefa Bogdanowicz, et al., Appellants, v. ALEXI GIANNOULIAS, Treasurer of the State of Illinois, et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed May 20, 2010.\nJohn R. Wylie, of Donaldson Guin LLC, Charles R. Watkins, of Futterman Howard Ashley Watkins & Welt-man, Chtrd., Arthur T. Susman, Matthew T. Hurst and Glenn L. Hara, of Susman Heffner & Hurst LLt^ and William J. Harte and Walter Piecewicz, all of Chicago, for appellants.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Brett E. Legner and Christopher M.R. Turner, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), and Steven M. Puiszis and Robert T. Shannon, of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLF? of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0409-01", "first_page_order": 421, "last_page_order": 436 }