{ "id": 3630553, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ZACHARY BOECKMANN, Appellee; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CHELSEY MASCHHOFF, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Boeckmann", "decision_date": "2010-06-24", "docket_number": "Nos. 108289, 108290 cons.", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "32", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "238 Ill. 2d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5563871 ], "weight": 14, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "181-82" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "180-81" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "182-83" }, { "page": "183" }, { "page": "182-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3625213 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/235/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621558 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" }, { "page": "206-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619580 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3615201 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705697 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451129 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" }, { "page": "126" }, { "page": "126" }, { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604511 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" }, { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 181", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6679 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609692 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592803 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5731163 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "852-53", "parenthetical": "distinguishing Lindner and holding suspension of driver's license for possession of another's identification card is rationally related to the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles, particularly when the identification card reflected a legal drinking age" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0844-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Idaho 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 3676790 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171-72", "parenthetical": "rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring driver's license suspension for underage purchase, possession, or consumption of alcohol" }, { "page": "527-28", "parenthetical": "rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring driver's license suspension for underage purchase, possession, or consumption of alcohol" }, { "page": "172" }, { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/142/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 P.3d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 11168346 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268", "parenthetical": "rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring revocation of driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol" }, { "page": "267-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/14/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. Supp. 4th", "case_ids": [ 6035518 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring suspension of driving privileges for underage possession of alcohol" }, { "page": "9-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/3/Supp. 6-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494", "parenthetical": "rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring suspension of driving privileges for underage possession of alcohol" }, { "page": "493-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "400 Pa. Super. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 888201 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33-34", "parenthetical": "rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring driver's license suspension for underage possession or consumption of alcohol" }, { "page": "1330", "parenthetical": "rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring driver's license suspension for underage possession or consumption of alcohol" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/400/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780287 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Ill. 2d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2726387 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704722 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3623855 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/234/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621474 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619470 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3625334 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311", "parenthetical": "when the issue is whether the statutory language has the force of a command, the word \"shall\" generally indicates the legislature intended to impose a mandatory obligation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/235/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604920 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201594 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5563871 ], "weight": 16, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" }, { "page": "181-82" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "181-82" }, { "page": "190-91", "parenthetical": "Miller, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "Miller, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "181-82" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "190", "parenthetical": "Miller, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3615201 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307", "parenthetical": "\"a legitimate legislative purpose\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609692 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592803 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390", "parenthetical": "\"a public interest to be served\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. Supp. 4th", "case_ids": [ 6035518 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9-10" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/3/Supp. 6-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607173 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" }, { "page": "505-06" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706081 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" }, { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3134711 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65-66" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/107/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2991283 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3167435 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448502 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203-04" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704857 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" }, { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704044 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450", "parenthetical": "\"a legitimate state interest\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451048 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "\"a legitimate state interest\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096297 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24", "parenthetical": "\"a public interest to be served\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5703639 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 U.S. 483", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6931894 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "487-88" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "48" }, { "page": "464-65" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/348/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 L. 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ZACHARY BOECKMANN, Appellee. \u2014 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CHELSEY MASCHHOFF, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Carman specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justice Thomas.\nJustice Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Burke.\nJustice Karmeier took no part in the decision.\nOPINION\nThe circuit court of Clinton County declared unconstitutional section 6 \u2014 206(a) (43) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(43) (West 2008)) on due process grounds. As applied in this case, section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) requires suspension of driving privileges if a person receives court supervision for unlawful consumption of alcohol under 21 years of age. Illinois Secretary of State Jesse White (Secretary) appealed the circuit court\u2019s judgment directly to this court under Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 111. 2d R. 603). For the following reasons, we reverse the circuit court\u2019s judgment declaring section 6 \u2014 206(a) (43) unconstitutional.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe defendants in this consolidated appeal, Zachary R. Boeckmann and Chelsey M. Maschhoff, were each charged with unlawful consumption of alcohol by a person under 21 years of age (235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 20(e) (West 2008)). The defendants filed motions to declare unconstitutional sections 6 \u2014 206(a)(38) and (a)(43) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(38), (a)(43) (West 2008)). Those sections generally authorize the Secretary of State to suspend or revoke a defendant\u2019s driving privileges upon conviction or disposition of court supervision for the charged offenses.\nDefendants alleged sections 6 \u2014 206(a) (38) and (a) (43) violated their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. Defendants pled guilty to unlawful consumption of alcohol as charged. The trial court placed them on court supervision for 90 days and, the following day, declared sections 6 \u2014 206(a)(38) and (a) (43) unconstitutional.\nAfter those orders were filed, the Secretary entered an appearance and the trial court granted him leave to file petitions to vacate the findings of unconstitutionality. In his petitions, the Secretary asserted he did not receive notice of the defendants\u2019 motions seeking a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional. In response to the petitions, the trial court vacated its orders declaring sections 6 \u2014 206(a) (38) and (a) (43) unconstitutional and allowed the defendants to file supplemental motions challenging the constitutionality of the statute.\nDefendants then filed motions alleging sections 6 \u2014 206(a)(38) and (a)(43), as applied, violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions as well as the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The Secretary stipulated that under section 6 \u2014 206(a) (43) of the Vehicle Code, he was required to suspend for three months the driving privileges of any person receiving court supervision for a violation of section 6 \u2014 20 of the Liquor Control Act (235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 20 (West 2008)).\nThe trial court subsequently found section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) unconstitutional on due process grounds as applied to the defendants. The trial court held this court\u2019s decision in People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174 (1989), controlled because a vehicle was not involved in the commission of the offenses. The defendants\u2019 other constitutional challenges based on the equal protection and proportionate penalties clauses were rejected by the trial court. The trial court made the additional findings mandated by Supreme Court Rule 18 (210 111. 2d R. 18), when a statute is declared unconstitutional.\nThe Secretary appealed the trial court\u2019s orders declaring section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) unconstitutional directly to this court as permitted by Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603).\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe Secretary contends the trial court erred in finding section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) violates due process as applied to the defendants. According to the Secretary, suspension of the defendants\u2019 driving privileges for unlawful consumption of alcohol bears a rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest in highway safety. The Secretary maintains that preventing young people who consume alcohol from driving is a reasonable means of furthering the interest in highway safety. The Secretary also argues the suspension of defendants\u2019 driving privileges under section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) is a reasonable means of promoting the legitimate public interest in deterring underage consumption of alcohol.\nCiting this court\u2019s decision in Lindner, defendants contend that suspending their driving privileges does not bear a rational relationship to the public interest in the safe operation of motor vehicles because no vehicle was involved in the commission of their offenses. Defendants further argue suspension of driving privileges in all cases of underage consumption of alcohol is not a reasonable means of promoting the public interest in highway safety.\nWe begin by noting that statutes are presumed constitutional. People v. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d 178, 199 (2009). To rebut the presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish a constitutional violation. People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 200 (2009). This court must construe a statute in a manner upholding its constitutionality if reasonably possible. Cook County Republican Party v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 232 Ill. 2d 231, 239 (2009). Accordingly, we will resolve any doubt on the construction of a statute in favor of its validity. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 307 (2008). The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo. In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 263 (2008).\nThis court has held a driver\u2019s license is a nonfundamental property interest. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 179. When a statute does not impact a fundamental constitutional right, the applicable standard for reviewing whether it conforms with substantive due process is the rational basis test. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d at 205. Generally, a statute violates the constitutional guarantee of due process under the rational basis test if it does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose, or is arbitrary or discriminatory. Napleton, 229 Ill. 2d at 307; Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106, 122 (2004); Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180. In applying the rational basis test, we must identify the public interest the statute is intended to protect, determine whether the statute bears a rational relationship to that interest, and examine whether the method chosen to protect or further that interest is reasonable. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180.\nRational basis review is highly deferential, but it is not \u201ctoothless.\u201d People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 596 (2006), quoting Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185, 50 L. Ed. 2d 389, 394, 97 S. Ct. 431, 434 (1976). Legislation must be upheld if there is a conceivable basis for finding it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d at 126. The legislature\u2019s judgments in drafting a statute are not subject to judicial fact finding and \u201cmay be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.\u201d Arangold v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003).\nWe must first determine the public interest section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) is intended to protect. In examining the public interest of similar Vehicle Code provisions in Lind ner, this court considered the Vehicle Code as a whole, the substantive provisions of the challenged sections, and the Vehicle Code\u2019s statement of purpose. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82. We observed that the stated purpose of the Vehicle Code contained in section 6 \u2014 204(a) is preventing people from driving if they demonstrate an unfitness to operate a motor vehicle safely. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. Further, the challenged statute sections generally enumerate offenses connected to operating or owning a vehicle safely and legally. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. We concluded, therefore, that the challenged provisions were intended to protect the public interest in \u201cthe safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles.\u201d Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182.\nThe statement of purpose in section 6 \u2014 204 is still directed at preventing people from driving after they have shown an unfitness to operate a vehicle safely. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 204(a) (West 2008). Additionally, the statute section challenged here describes offenses and behavior largely connected to operating a motor vehicle safely and legally. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206 (West 2008). Accordingly, as in Lindner, we conclude section 6 \u2014 206 is intended to promote the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles.\nWe must, therefore, determine whether section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) bears a reasonable relationship to the public interest in the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles. As applied in this case, section 6 \u2014 206(a) (43) provides for suspension of driving privileges when a person has received court supervision for underage consumption of alcohol. 625 ILCS 5/6\u2014 206(a)(43) (West 2008). The statute will be upheld if a conceivable basis exists for finding it rationally related to the identified legitimate public interest. See Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d at 126.\nHere, the General Assembly may have believed that a young person who has a driver\u2019s license and consumes alcohol illegally may take the additional step of driving after consuming alcohol. It is reasonable to believe a young person disobeying the law against underage consumption of alcohol may also lack the judgment to decline to drive after drinking. Preventing young people from driving after consuming alcohol unquestionably furthers the public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles.\nDefendants, nonetheless, contend this court\u2019s decision in Lindner compels a finding that section 6 \u2014 206(a) (43) violates due process. According to defendants, Lindner held that suspending driving privileges violates the constitutional guarantee of due process if a vehicle was not involved in the commission of the offense.\nIn Lindner, the dispute focused on identifying the public interest the challenged statute was intended to protect. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180. This court noted that the State apparently conceded the unconstitutionality of the statute if the defendant\u2019s argument on the statute\u2019s purpose were accepted. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180-81. We agreed with the defendant\u2019s argument that the statute served the public interest in the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. Without any argument from the State on the point, we then concluded revocation of the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license did not bear a reasonable relationship to that public interest because a vehicle was not involved in the commission of the defendant\u2019s sex offenses. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182-83.\nDefendants assert this court should follow \u201c[t]he principle in Lindner that if no car is involved, like here, then to suspend driving privileges would violate due process.\u201d Defendants, however, rely on a narrow reading of Lindner. We have subsequently explained the rationale in Lindner, stating \u201c[tjhere was no rational relationship between sex offenders and safe driving, and on that basis the statute was found unconstitutional.\u201d People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 391 (1991), citing Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 183. We have further explained that in Lindner, the revocation of the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license did not bear a rational relationship to the public interest to be served because the defendant\u2019s crimes \u201cneither involved a motor vehicle nor bore any rational relationship to his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.\u201d Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 604, citing Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182-83. Accordingly, the rationale in Lindner is broader than simply determining whether a vehicle was involved in the offense. Rather, the critical determination is whether the revocation of driving privileges bears a rational relationship to the public interest in the safe operation of motor vehicles.\nIn Lindner, there was no connection between the defendant\u2019s sex offenses and his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. In contrast, defendants\u2019 underage consumption of alcohol would certainly impact their ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. The legislature could have rationally believed young people who have a driver\u2019s license and consume alcohol illegally may also drive after consuming alcohol, regardless of whether a motor vehicle is involved in the charged offense. On this point, we note that the appellate court has held suspension of driving privileges for the use of false identification in an attempt to obtain alcohol is rationally related to the safe and legal operation of a motor vehicle. Freed v. Ryan, 301 Ill. App. 3d 952, 957 (1998). The appellate court held the legislature could rationally speculate that licensees under 21 years of age may use false identification to obtain alcohol, leading on balance to an increase in driving under the influence or driving after consuming alcohol. Freed, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 957. See also Horvath v. White, 358 Ill. App. 3d 844, 852-53 (2005) (distinguishing Lindner and holding suspension of driver\u2019s license for possession of another\u2019s identification card is rationally related to the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles, particularly when the identification card reflected a legal drinking age). We likewise conclude that suspension of defendants\u2019 driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol bears a rational relationship to the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles.\nDefendants also contend that suspending their driving privileges is not a reasonable method of protecting the public interest because they had no plans to drive after consuming alcohol. As we have found, there is a rational relationship between suspending a person\u2019s driver\u2019s license for underage consumption of alcohol and the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles, regardless of whether a motor vehicle is involved in the particular offense. The legislature may reasonably determine a young person consuming alcohol under the legal age may also drive after drinking. Preventing young people from driving after consuming alcohol furthers the public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles. We, therefore, conclude that suspension of defendants\u2019 driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol is a reasonable method of promoting the public interest despite the absence of a motor vehicle or plans to drive in these circumstances.\nWe further note that courts from other jurisdictions have upheld similar statutes against substantive due process challenges. See State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 171-72, 125 P.3d 522, 527-28 (2005) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring driver\u2019s license suspension for underage purchase, possession, or consumption of alcohol); State v. Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d 264, 268 (Alaska 2000) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring revocation of driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol); People v. Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 6, 10, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492, 494 (1991) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring suspension of driving privileges for underage possession of alcohol); Commonwealth v. Strunk, 400 Pa. Super. 25, 33-34, 582 A.2d 1326, 1330 (1990) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring driver\u2019s license suspension for underage possession or consumption of alcohol). Those courts have generally recognized a rational relationship between suspending a person\u2019s driver\u2019s license for underage possession or consumption of alcohol and the governmental interest in highway safety. See Bennett, 142 Idaho at 172, 125 P.3d at 528; Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d at 267-68; Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. at 9-10, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493-94. While these decisions are not binding on this court, they may be considered as persuasive authority. See People ex rel. O\u2019Malley v. 6323 North LaCrosse Avenue, 158 Ill. 2d 453, 458-59 (1994); Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill. 2d 269, 275 (1957).\nThe special concurrence asserts Lindner was wrongly decided and should be overruled because it defined the public purpose of the statute too narrowly. The parties do not ask this court to overrule Lindner or present any argument on that issue, however. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, this court\u2019s prior decisions should not be overturned absent \u201cgood cause\u201d or \u201ccompelling reasons.\u201d People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 146 (2007). Lindner engaged in a detailed analysis of the statute\u2019s purpose that has been accepted for more than 21 years. Lindner should not be overruled without the benefit of a developed argument by the parties on the issue.\nWe need not overrule Lindner to conclude that the license suspensions in this case do not offend due process. We need only apply the highly deferential rational basis standard to decide that the license suspensions do not violate defendants\u2019 constitutional rights to due process. The rational basis test is satisfied if there is a conceivable basis for finding a statute rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d at 126. As discussed above, the weight of authority from our appellate court and other jurisdictions supports a finding that suspension of driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol bears a rational relationship to the legitimate state interest in highway safety.\nAccordingly, without any argument from the parties on the issue, we should not reach Lindner. Moreover, overruling Lindner will not affect the result in this case. Of course, parties in a future case may argue that Lindner should be overruled and this court may properly consider the issue at that time. We only conclude that it is not appropriate to address the issue in this case where the parties have not raised or argued it.\nIn sum, we conclude that suspending defendants\u2019 driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol is rationally related to the legitimate public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles. Section 6 \u2014 206(a) (43), as applied in this case, provides a reasonable method of furthering that interest. Accordingly, section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) does not violate defendants\u2019 constitutional rights to substantive due process.\nDefendants also argue section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) is unconstitutionally arbitrary as applied because the Secretary does not exercise the discretion granted by the statute in determining whether to suspend a person\u2019s driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol. Rather, the Secretary issues a suspension in every case. Defendants contend the Secretary\u2019s failure to exercise discretion is arbitrary and results in a due process violation.\nIn his reply to this argument, the Secretary contends he does not have discretion in determining whether to suspend a person\u2019s driving privileges under section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43). The Secretary maintains section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) requires a three-month suspension when a person receives court supervision for underage consumption of alcohol.\nDefendants\u2019 argument is premised on the construction of section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) as granting the Secretary discretion in determining whether to suspend a person\u2019s driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol. Accordingly, this argument presents a question of statutory construction subject to de novo review. See People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 44 (2009). The fundamental objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Davison, 233 Ill. 2d 30, 40 (2009). The best indication of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Cardamone, 232 Ill. 2d 504, 512 (2009).\nSection 6 \u2014 206 of the Vehicle Code is entitled, \u201cDiscretionary authority to suspend or revoke license or permit; Right to a hearing.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206 (West 2008). Section 6 \u2014 206 generally authorizes the Secretary to issue a suspension or revocation of driving privileges in 45 enumerated circumstances. In many of those circumstances, the statutory language is purely discretionary. For instance, subsection (a)(3) allows the Secretary to suspend or revoke driving privileges upon a showing that a person has been repeatedly involved in collisions or has repeated traffic offenses indicating an inability to operate a motor vehicle safely or disrespect for traffic laws. See 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(3) (West 2008).\nOther subsections require specific action by the Secretary, however. In particular, several subsections call for suspension of driving privileges for a certain length of time. See 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(15) (West 2008) (\u201cthe suspension shall be for one year\u201d upon conviction of criminal trespass to a vehicle); 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(21) (West 2008) (\u201cthe suspension shall be for one year\u201d upon conviction of leaving the scene of an accident involving vehicle damage over $1,000); 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(29) (West 2008) (\u201cdriving privileges shall be suspended for one year\u201d upon conviction of certain Usted offenses committed while operating a vehicle); 625 ILCS 5/6\u2014 206(a)(30) (West 2008) (\u201cdriving privileges shall be suspended for 5 years\u201d upon second or subsequent conviction of offenses Usted in paragraph 29); 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(32) (West 2008) (\u201cthe suspension shall be for 3 years\u201d upon conviction of aggravated discharge of a firearm while inside a motor vehicle).\nThe provision involved in this case, section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43), states:\n\u201cThe Secretary of State is authorized to suspend or revoke the driving privileges of any person without preliminary hearing upon a showing of the person\u2019s records or other sufficient evidence that the person:\n$ \u00cd $\n[h]as received a disposition of court supervision for a violation of subsection (a), (d), or (e) of Section 6 \u2014 20 of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 or a similar provision of a local ordinance, in which case the suspension shall be for a period of 3 months[J\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(43) (West 2008).\nSimilar to the other subsections described above, subsection (a) (43) requires specific action when a person receives court supervision for the underage consumption of alcohol offenses involved here. The statute provides \u201cin which case the suspension shall be for a period of 3 months.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(43) (West 2008). Subsection (a) (43) provides for suspension as the only possible action as shown by the phrase \u201cthe suspension shall be.\u201d The legislature used \u201cthe suspension\u201d rather than a less specific reference such as \u201cany suspension.\u201d Moreover, the use of \u201cshall be\u201d indicates suspension is the mandatory action. See People v. Ousley, 235 Ill. 2d 299, 311 (2009) (when the issue is whether the statutory language has the force of a command, the word \u201cshall\u201d generally indicates the legislature intended to impose a mandatory obligation). The mandatory nature of the suspension is also shown by the provision of a specific period of three months. The statutory language, therefore, provides for a mandatory consequence of a three-month suspension in these circumstances.\nThus, we conclude the Secretary does not have discretion in determining whether to issue a suspension of defendants\u2019 driving privileges under section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43). Rather, section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) provides for mandatory suspension. We note that our interpretation of section 6 \u2014 206(a) (43) is consistent with our duty to construe statutes in a manner upholding their constitutionality when reasonably possible. See Cook County Republican Party, 232 Ill. 2d at 239. Given our conclusion that section 6 \u2014 206(a) (43) does not allow for exercise of discretion by the Secretary, we must reject defendants\u2019 claim that the statute is arbitrary as applied and, therefore, results in a due process violation.\nFinally, defendants renew their argument that suspension of their driving privileges under section 6 \u2014 206(a) (43) violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711). Defendants argue that suspension of their driver\u2019s licenses, in addition to the criminal penalties imposed for underage consumption of alcohol, results in cruel and degrading punishment.\nThe proportionate penalties clause in the Illinois Constitution is coextensive with the federal constitution\u2019s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d at 206-07. Both provisions apply only to the criminal process involving a direct action by the government to inflict punishment. In re Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d 510, 518 (2006). The critical determination, therefore, is whether suspension of the defendants\u2019 driving privileges is a direct action by the government to inflict punishment.\nWe have determined that section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43)\u2019s purpose is to promote the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles. Section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) is, therefore, intended to provide for safe highways, not to punish licensees for underage consumption of alcohol. Indeed, we have previously stated statutory summary suspension of a driver\u2019s license is not penal in nature because it is intended to protect the public rather than punish a licensee. People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491, 501 (1988). Accordingly, we conclude the proportionate penalties clause does not apply here because suspension of defendants\u2019 driving privileges under section 6 \u2014 206(a) (43) is not a direct action by the government to inflict punishment.\nIn sum, we conclude that suspension of defendants\u2019 driving privileges under section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) does not violate their constitutional rights to due process or the proportionate penalties clause. The trial court\u2019s orders declaring section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) unconstitutional must, therefore, be reversed.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court declaring section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) of the Vehicle Code unconstitutional and remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nCircuit court judgment reversed; cause remanded.\nJUSTICE KARMEIER\ntook no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE JUSTICE KARMEIER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE CARMAN,\nspecially concurring:\nAlthough I agree with the lead opinion that section 6 \u2014 206(a) (43) of the Vehicle Code is constitutional, I believe that People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174 (1989), was wrongly decided to the extent that it requires any statutory provision that mandates or permits the revocation or suspension of a driver\u2019s license to directly serve the public interest in ensuring that \u201cdrivers who have demonstrated they are unfit to safely operate vehicles are not allowed to drive\u201d (Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182) by tying revocation or suspension \u201cto offenses involving the use of a motor vehicle\u201d (Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82).\nIn Lindner, this court found the public purpose of section 6 \u2014 205 of the Vehicle Code by examining \u201cthe statement of purpose in section 6 \u2014 204(a)\u201d and \u201cthe substantive provisions of section 6 \u2014 205.\u201d Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181. In my opinion, Lindner defined the public purpose of section 6 \u2014 205 of the Vehicle Code too narrowly and failed to recognize that different public purposes might be served by different statutory provisions that mandate or permit the revocation or suspension of a driver\u2019s license, whether those provisions are contained in section 6 \u2014 205, section 6 \u2014 206, or elsewhere in the Vehicle Code.\nChapter 6 of the Vehicle Code is the Driver Licensing Law. Article II of chapter 6 governs the \u201cCancellation, Suspension, or Revocation of Licenses and Permits.\u201d This article does not contain a provision expressly stating an overarching purpose. Rather, it enumerates the circumstances in which the Secretary of State is required to cancel a driver\u2019s license (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 201 (West 2008)), required to impose a mandatory revocation (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 205 (West 2008)), and permitted to suspend or revoke a driver\u2019s license as a matter of discretion (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206 (West 2008)).\nIn addition, article II contains procedural provisions, including section 6 \u2014 204, which is entitled \u201cWhen Court to forward License and Reports.\u201d Section 6 \u2014 204 directs that when a person is convicted of one of the offenses enumerated elsewhere in article II, the judge shall require the person to surrender his driver\u2019s license or permit to the clerk of the court, who shall forward the license or permit and a report of conviction to the Secretary of State. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 204(a)(1) (West 2008).\nIn Lindner, this court first considered \u201cthe statement of purpose in section 6 \u2014 204(a).\u201d Lindner, 127 111. 2d at 181. Yet this section does not contain language that can be identified as an express statement of the purpose of article II as a whole. Rather, section 6 \u2014 204 sets out procedures \u201c[f]or the purpose of providing to the Secretary of State the records essential to the performance of the Secretary\u2019s duties\u201d under article II. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 204(a) (West 2008). This section further provides that the Vehicle Code recognizes that convictions of certain offenses or traffic violations and adjudications of delinquency are \u201cevidence relating to unfitness to safely operate motor vehicles.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 204(a) (West 2008). This is the language that Lindner found to be a \u201cstatement of purpose.\u201d Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181.\nIn my opinion, this court in Lindner gave entirely too much weight to this single phrase in section 6 \u2014 204(a). While a conviction of a certain offense or traffic violation or an adjudication of delinquency may be evidence revealing unfitness to safely operate a motor vehicle, a conviction or adjudication having nothing to do with the individual\u2019s operation of a vehicle may also be a reasonable basis for the revocation or suspension of the individual\u2019s driver\u2019s license. Thus, one\u2019s license may be revoked or suspended for permitting \u201can unlawful or fraudulent use of a driver\u2019s license\u201d (625 ILCS 5/6\u2014 206(a)(5) (West 2008)); for making a false statement or knowingly concealing a material fact in an application for a driver\u2019s license (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(9) (West 2008)); for possessing, displaying or attempting to fraudulently use the license of another person (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(10) (West 2008)); or for altering or attempting to alter a license or possessing an altered license (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(26) (West 2008)). None of these offenses relate to the individual\u2019s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. In each instance, however, the legislature has determined that the individual who commits such an offense may forfeit his right to drive, at least temporarily.\nSection 6 \u2014 204\u2019s mention of \u201cunfitness to safely operate motor vehicles,\u201d therefore, cannot be viewed as the legislature\u2019s expression of a single overarching purpose for all of the provisions of article II, chapter 6, of the Vehicle Code. It is entirely possible that sections 6 \u2014 201, 6 \u2014 205, and 6 \u2014 206 are intended to serve different purposes, or that some of the 43 subsections of section 6 \u2014 206 are intended to serve different or multiple purposes. Lindner should be overruled to the extent that it so narrowly defines the public purpose of this article and, thereby, limits consideration of other public purposes that may be served by a challenged provision.\nIn addition to relying on section 6 \u2014 204, Lindner inferred the public purpose of section 6 \u2014 205 as a whole from the fact that with the exception of the challenged section, \u201cevery subsection of sections 6 \u2014 205(a) and (b) has some affinity with a motor vehicle \u2014 either the operation or ownership of the vehicle, or the paperwork connected to such operation or ownership.\u201d Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181. Thus, even while acknowledging that section 6 \u2014 205(b)(2) provided for revocation of a driver\u2019s license \u201cregardless of whether a vehicle was used in their commission\u201d of the crime, the court nevertheless concluded that \u201csection 6 \u2014 205(a)(3) clearly reflects the legislature\u2019s intent that revocation be tied to offenses involving the use of a motor vehicle.\u201d Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82. That is, this court determined that when two sections of the same statute reflected different legislative intents, one section was a true expression of purpose and the other section was not a true expression of purpose.\nAs the dissenting justice pointed out, this conclusion defies logic. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 190-91 (Miller, J., dissenting) (the presence in section 6 \u2014 205 of subsection (b)(2), which requires revocation for offenses not related to the operation of a motor vehicle, demonstrates that \u201cthe statutory scheme must actually serve at least one additional purpose not specified in the general statement of intent\u201d that the majority found in section 6 \u2014 204). Thus, by including a provision within section 6 \u2014 205 that required license revocation on some basis other than an offense involving the use of a motor vehicle, the legislature clearly had another purpose in mind.\nIn my opinion, the Lindner court\u2019s \u201cunnecessarily crimped view of the purpose of the legislation and the interests served by it\u201d (Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 188 (Miller, J., dissenting)) led directly and inevitably to its finding the challenged provision unconstitutional. Had the legislative purpose been viewed more broadly, as the plain language of the statute required, the court could then have determined whether that purpose was a legitimate legislative purpose and whether the challenged provision was rationally related to that purpose. Instead, that analysis was short-circuited by the court\u2019s answer to the threshold question.\nI have no opinion on whether the Lindner court reached the correct result in that case. It is possible that section 6 \u2014 205(b)(2) may have been found unconstitutional even if the legislative purpose had been properly defined. This court might have found that the legislative purpose was not legitimate or that the provision was not rationally related to that purpose.\nIn keeping with the doctrine of stare decisis, this court does not overrule a prior decision absent good cause or a compelling reason. Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 505 (2006). We do not depart from established precedent, such as our decision in Lindner, merely because we might have decided otherwise if we were writing on a blank slate. However, good cause to depart from stare decisis exists when \u201cserious detriment prejudicial to public interests is likely to result\u201d and when a governing decision is \u201cunworkable or [is] badly reasoned.\u201d Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 505-06.\nThis court is now faced with the precise situation envisioned by the dissenting justice in that case. By continuing to adhere to Lindner\u2019s \u201cunnecessarily crimped view\u201d of the purpose of section 6 \u2014 205, we find ourselves constrained in our consideration of the constitutionality of a provision in section 6 \u2014 206. We must either acknowledge that Lindner was badly reasoned on this point, producing a result that is detrimental to the public interest, or affirm the trial court, which found section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) unconstitutional.\nRather than expressly overruling Lindner, the lead opinion applies its rule in such a way as to render it almost meaningless.\nLindner contains four statements in which this court identified the purpose of the statute. First,\n\u201cWe think section 6 \u2014 205(a)(3) clearly reflects the legislature\u2019s intent that revocation be tied to offenses involving the use of a motor vehicle.\u201d Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82. Second,\n\u201cThe stated purpose is to ensure that drivers who have demonstrated they are unfit to safely operate vehicles are not allowed to drive.\u201d Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182.\nThird,\n\u201c[W]e conclude that the public interest the statute was intended to protect is the interest in keeping the roads free of two kinds of drivers: those who threaten the safety of others, and those who have abused the privilege to drive by doing so illegally ***.\u201d Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182.\nAnd fourth,\n\u201cIn short, the public interest is the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles.\u201d Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182.\nThe lead opinion finds that section 206(a)(43) \u201cunquestionably furthers the public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles\u201d (238 111. 2d at 9), but does not acknowledge that the offense of possession of alcohol by a person under the age of 21 (235 ILCS 6/6 \u2014 20 (West 2008)) is not tied to an offense involving the use of a vehicle, or that individuals who commit this offense have not demonstrated that they are unfit to safely operate a vehicle, or that such persons have not threatened the safety of others or abused the privilege of driving by doing so illegally. In effect, the lead opinion chooses the broadest and most expansive statement of purpose from Lindner, while ignoring the substance of Lindner. The trial court, however, properly applied Lindner and found that the very narrow purpose expressed in the first three of the four passages quoted above was not met.\nThe lead opinion then finds this broader public purpose served based on the legislature\u2019s possible belief \u201cthat a young person who has a driver\u2019s license and consumes alcohol illegally may take the additional step of driving after consuming alcohol. It is reasonable to believe a young person disobeying the law against underage consumption of alcohol may also lack the judgment to decline to drive after drinking.\u201d 238 Ill. 2d at 9.\nThis conclusion may reflect the lead opinion\u2019s effort to resolve all doubts in favor of finding the provision constitutional and to give effect to the strong presumption of constitutionality. In re Marriage of Miller, 227 Ill. 2d 185, 195 (2007). However, by reaching so far to find a rational relationship between the now more broadly defined legislative purpose and the challenged statute, the lead opinion has saved Lindner by rendering it meaningless. In essence, the lead opinion concludes that because an individual may commit one crime, he may lack the judgment to decline to commit another crime. Under this reasoning, the legislature could provide that a conviction of domestic battery is grounds for the suspension of the offender\u2019s driver\u2019s license because his anger issues make him likely to succumb to road rage; or that a person who has been found liable in a civil action for negligence causing the death or injury of another person, even if no motor vehicle was involved, should have his license suspended or revoked because he has demonstrated that he cannot be counted upon to exercise ordinary care. Indeed, the statute at issue in Lindner would likely survive this analysis because an individual who would commit acts of sexual assault against his minor stepdaughters cannot be trusted to resist the temptation to lure a child into his car.\nIn addition, if this court were to overrule Lindner to the extent I suggest, it could also correct an imprecise statement in that case. In defining the rational basis test, this court stated that the legislative enactment must bear a \u201c \u2018 \u201creasonable relationship to the public interest intended to be protected.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180, quoting People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62, 65-66 (1985), quoting Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Ass\u2019n v. Block, 75 Ill. 2d 443, 453 (1979). Immediately thereafter, this court cited Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368 (1986), for the proposition that a \u201cstatute will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe Lindner court improperly shifted its focus from discerning whether there might have been a legitimate legislative purpose for the challenged provision to the question of whether the provision served the public interest the statute as a whole was intended to protect and then set about finding that purpose. The difference is subtle, but significant. In People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 203-04 (2004), we stated that the \u201crational basis test is satisfied where the challenged statute bears a rational relationship to the purpose the legislature intended to achieve in enacting the statute.\u201d Thus, if the legislature has identified a purpose for its enactment of a statute, and if that purpose is legitimate, the rational basis test is satisfied if the statute bears a rational relationship to that purpose.\nHowever a challenged statute will still satisfy the rational basis test if it bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. Thus, we said in People v. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573, 584 (2007), that \u201c[u]nder the rational basis test, our inquiry is twofold: we must determine whether there is a legitimate state interest behind the legislation, and if so, whether there is a reasonable relationship between that interest and the means the legislature has chosen to pursue it.\u201d Further, \u201c[t]he rational basis test is highly deferential; its focus is not on the wisdom of the statute. [Citation.] If there is any conceivable set of facts to show a rational basis for the statute, it will be upheld.\u201d Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d at 585. See also Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 307 (2008) (\u201ca legitimate legislative purpose\u201d); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 450 (2006) (\u201ca legitimate state interest\u201d); In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289, 310 (2005) (\u201ca legitimate state interest\u201d); People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2000) (\u201ca public interest to be served\u201d); People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1991) (\u201ca public interest to be served\u201d). Taking a broader view of the legislative purpose portion of the inquiry is consistent with due process decisions of the United States Supreme Court.\nDefendants\u2019 constitutional challenge to section 6 \u2014 206(a) (43) invoked the due process clauses of both the United States and the Illinois Constitutions. The lead opinion does not distinguish between the two, treating the due process protections of the state and federal constitutions as coextensive. This is consistent with our past practice when the language of the two constitutions is identical or nearly identical. People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 335 (2006). Thus, in Miller, we discerned \u201cno reason to construe our due process clause differently than the federal due process clause on the specific issue before us,\u201d and therefore treated the two clauses as coextensive and were guided by federal precedent. Miller, 227 Ill. 2d at 196.\nUnder federal precedent, a court will not strike down a statute under the rational basis test even if the reasonable relationship between the statute and a legitimate legislative purpose is hypothetical. It is entirely appropriate for the court to consider what purpose the legislature might have intended to serve or what the legislature \u201cmight have concluded\u201d (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464 (1955)) about the relationship between its intent and the method chosen to effectuate it. \u201c[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.\u201d Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-88, 99 L. Ed. at 572, 75 S. Ct. at 464. A court will not strike down a law on due process grounds merely because the law may be \u201cunwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.\u201d Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488, 99 L. Ed at 572, 75 S. Ct. at 464. In such instances, if the people seek change in the law, they \u201c \u2018must resort to the polls, not to the courts.\u2019 \u201d Williamson, 348 U.S. at 48, 99 L. Ed. at 572, 75 S. Ct. at 464-65, quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134, 24 L. Ed. 77, 87 (1876).\nI note that section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) was enacted in 2007 and took effect on January 1, 2008, decades after the enactment of the provision that is now codified at section 2 \u2014 206. Later additions to section 2 \u2014 206 do not necessarily share the same legislative purpose as earlier enactments or, if they share the same general purpose, they may be intended to serve an additional purpose as well. See Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 190 (Miller, J., dissenting). The decision to codify this provision in section 6 \u2014 206(a) may be a result of the organizational scheme of chapter 6 rather than an expression of identical purpose. With this in mind, and guided by the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Williamson, I would look beyond sections 6 \u2014 204 and 6 \u2014 205 of the Vehicle Code to discern the evil that the legislature might have intended to address by enacting section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43).\nIn 2002, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 92 \u2014 804, which amended section 4 \u2014 4 of the Liquor Control Act and added subsection (a)(38) to section 6 \u2014 206 of the Vehicle Code. The effect of these amendments was to provide discretionary authority to the Secretary of State for the suspension or revocation of the driver\u2019s license of a person \u201cconvicted of a violation of Section 6 \u2014 20 of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 or a similar provision of a local ordinance.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(38) (West 2008). Section 6 \u2014 20 defines the offenses of illegal transfer, possession and consumption of alcoholic liquor by an underage person. 235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 20 (West 2008).\nIn 2007, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 95 \u2014 166, entitled \u201cAN ACT concerning transportation.\u201d Pub. Act 95 \u2014 166, eff. January 1, 2008. Again, the Act amended the Liquor Control Act and the Vehicle Code. The effect of these amendments was to provide discretionary authority to the Secretary of State for the suspension or revocation of the driver\u2019s license of a person who received a disposition of court supervision for a violation of section 6 \u2014 20. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 206(a)(43) (West 2008).\nDuring the third reading of the bill in the House of Representatives, its chief sponsor, Representative Tom Cross, spoke:\n\u201cThis is a Bill that deals with drinking by teenagers, specifically minors. As we all know, the law says if you\u2019re under 21, you cannot drink in the State of Illinois. This Bill provides that in the event of a court supervision, which I think is a good concept *** that you would lose your driver\u2019s license for a period of three (3) months. That has not been the case when someone receives court supervision. We had a rather tragic incident in Oswego, a couple of months ago, where five (5) young children lost their lives. Alcohol was involved. This is an attempt to address that issue and it has unfortunately been a problem around the state.\u201d 95th 111. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 27, 2007, at 22 (statements of Representative Cross).\nRepresentative Cross did not specifically state that the driver who caused this accident was a teenager who was then under court supervision for a violation of section 6 \u2014 20 of the Liquor Control Act, although this fact seems to be implied by his remarks.\nNevertheless, we are not constrained by the language of the statute or by the legislative history (of which there is very little) when discerning what \u201cevil\u201d the legislature might have been addressing. We may ask ourselves, in light of the overall legislative scheme and common sense, what the legislative purpose might have been for the enactment.\nOne purpose of adding subsections (a) (38) and (a) (43) to section 6 \u2014 206 may have been to encourage compliance with section 6 \u2014 20 of the Liquor Control Act, which is specifically referenced in both provisions. The purpose of the Liquor Control Act is that \u201cthe health, safety and welfare of the People of the State of Illinois shall be protected and temperance in the consumption of alcoholic liquors shall be fostered and promoted by sound and careful control and regulation of the manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic liquors.\u201d 235 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 2 (West 2008).\nSections 6 \u2014 206(a) (38) and (a) (43) may be intended to effectuate this legitimate legislative purpose by giving persons under the age of 21 an incentive to resist the peer pressure to drink by conditioning their continued ability to drive on compliance with section 6 \u2014 20 of the Liquor Code.\nIn the absence of an express statement of the intent of our own legislature, we can also look to similar enactments in other states, for our own legislators may have had a similar purpose. The California legislature made specific findings when it enacted a statute that suspended the driving privileges of persons under the age of 21 who committed offenses involving controlled substances.\n\u201c(a) The Legislature finds and declares as follows:\n* *\n\u2018(3) Individuals who abuse drugs or alcohol demonstrate a dangerous disregard for the safe legal operation of motor vehicles. The risk is particularly acute for individuals under the age of 21.\n\u2018(4) The increased potential for teenage death in vehicle collisions and other nondriving accidents, homicides, and suicides, while being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, requires special attention in order to reduce the statewide youth fatality rate and to control unlawful and unsafe driving practices.\n\u2018(b) It is, therefore, the intent of the Legislature to enact this measure in,an attempt to reduce the incidence of young drivers on the highways and roads of this state who, because of their use of alcohol or other illegal drugs, pose a danger to the health and safety of other drivers by all or a combination of the following methods:\n\u2018(1) To prevent use of motor vehicles by drivers under the age of 21 years by suspending their driving privileges for one year from the date of conviction, because a one year suspension of these drivers\u2019 privileges may provide a means of deterring use of alcohol, and other illegal drugs by these young persons.\u201d People v. Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 6, 9-10, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492, 493 (1991), quoting Stats. 1988, ch. 1254, \u00a71, at 4175-76.\nThese legislative findings are entirely consistent with the concerns expressed by the sponsor of the bill that resulted in the enactment of section 6 \u2014 -206(a)(43). I would find that the legitimate legislative purposes of the enactment were to encourage compliance with section 6 \u2014 20 of the Liquor Control Act and to protect the individual young person and the public by suspending the driving privileges of those young persons who, by violating section 6 \u2014 20, have demonstrated that they should not be entrusted with the operation of a motor vehicle.\nIf the means chosen \u2014 suspension of the driver\u2019s license \u2014 bears a reasonable relationship to this purpose, the statute may not be struck down. Johnson, 225 111. 2d at 585. The lead opinion acknowledges that the statute \u201cmust be upheld if there is a conceivable basis for finding it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest\u201d and that the legislature\u2019s judgment is \u201cnot subject to judicial fact finding and \u2018may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.\u2019 \u201d 238 Ill. 2d at 7, quoting Arangold, Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003).\nIt is entirely rational for the legislature to conclude that the possible suspension of one\u2019s driver\u2019s license may serve as an incentive to comply with a law or court order. For example, section 6 \u2014 201(a)(3) of the Vehicle Code provides that the Secretary of State may cancel a license or permit for failure to pay fees or civil penalties owed to the Illinois Commerce Commission. 625 ILCS 5/6\u2014 201(a)(3) (West 2008). Section 6 \u2014 201(a)(9) provides that the Secretary may cancel the license of any person who \u201chas been convicted of a sex offense as defined in the Sex Offender Registration Act,\u201d and that the license shall remain cancelled until the person registers as required and has otherwise complied with the requirements of the Registration Act. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 201(a)(9) (West 2008). Section 6 \u2014 103(14) provides that the Secretary \u201cshall not issue, renew, or allow the retention of any driver\u2019s license nor issue any permit under this Code *** [t]o any person who is 90 days or more delinquent in court ordered child support payments or has been adjudicated in arrears in an amount equal to 90 days\u2019 obligation or more and who has been found in contempt of court for failure to pay the support.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 103(14) (West 2008).\nUnder the reasoning of Lindner, these provisions would be unconstitutional because they do not relate directly to the narrowly defined public interest in ensuring that \u201cdrivers who have demonstrated they are unfit to safely operate vehicles are not allowed to drive.\u201d Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. However, it is clear that the legislature, on occasion, uses the provisions of the Vehicle Code to advance broader public purposes.\nI would find that section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) bears a rational relationship to the legitimate public purposes of encouraging compliance with section 6 \u2014 20 of the Liquor Control Act and of protecting young drivers and the public from the potentially fatal consequences that may follow when a young person whose judgment is impaired by alcohol gets behind the wheel of a car.\nJUSTICE THOMAS joins in this special concurrence.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE CARMAN," }, { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN,\ndissenting:\nI dissent from today\u2019s resolution of this case because, under the principles set forth in People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174 (1989), the circuit court correctly ruled section 6 \u2014 206(a)(43) of the Vehicle Code to be unconstitutional.\nJustice Carman\u2019s assessment of Justice Kilbride\u2019s opinion is well-taken, and I agree with her that his analysis renders Lindner meaningless. 238 Ill. 2d at 22-24 (Garman, J., specially concurring, joined by Thomas, J.). Justice Garman also accurately identifies our options in this case: either we overrule Lindner\u2019s view of the purpose of section 6 \u2014 205 or we apply the case and affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling. 238 111. 2d at 22 (Garman, J., specially concurring, joined by Thomas, J.).\nRather than ask that Lindner be overruled, the State believes it can be distinguished from this case. Lindner cannot be distinguished in any meaningful way, Justice Kilbride\u2019s suggestion notwithstanding, as Justice Gar-man correctly recognizes. I might also note that in the 21 years since Lindner was announced, there has been no indication from this court that Lindner was either wrongly decided or too narrowly defined the purpose of section 6 \u2014 205.\nStare decisis means, of course, that prior decisions, Lindner included, should be overturned only on a showing of good cause. People v. Colon, 225 111. 2d 125, 146 (2007). Because no one is asking for Lindner to be overruled, the court does not have the benefit of any developed argument as to good cause. I therefore express no opinion on whether Lindner should be overruled.\nJUSTICE BURKE joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Henry F. Bergmann, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carlyle (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Jane Elinor Notz, Deputy Solicitor General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.", "Brian K. Trentman, of Nashville, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(Nos. 108289, 108290 cons.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ZACHARY BOECKMANN, Appellee. \u2014 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CHELSEY MASCHHOFF, Appellee.\nOpinion filed June 24, 2010.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Henry F. Bergmann, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carlyle (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Jane Elinor Notz, Deputy Solicitor General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.\nBrian K. Trentman, of Nashville, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 13, "last_page_order": 44 }